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Ontological Difference and the Jewish Subersion of the Subject; Infinity

and the Antinomies of Pure Reason

This effective sacredness - in the Hegelian sense of "effectiveness", which we will submit to examination
in its place - it's obviously what we will call the event; and, only later, the modes according to which we
advise the means of prolonging it's memory in constructible repetition: in the "sacred" ritual. Not only
what humanity sanctified in the proper sense, it is never the void as such (the Being-God), but the sign
of its event-driven appropriation (being-Christ).

The sacred is the trace of the punctual reappropriation of the void by Man, therefore of the event.

In play here is the status of Badiou's and Agamben's immoderate love for the figure of the apostle, Saint
Paul notably, and the curious neglect, especially in the case of Agamben, whose thought is explicitly
intended as (and we will see how) "messianic", of the figure of the Messiah himself, that is to say, the
quilting point of the dialectic of the event, which is the event itself, incarnated.

What that the event is:

a. ontologically, the impossible. But what does the"ontologicly" impossible mean? Ontology is the law.
This law is an ontological law only to support a universally ontic application: it is impossible for a being
to belong to itself (impossible which is therefore the very definition of the event);

b. ontically, the event is, of course, the sudden transition from non-existence to maximum existence,
but, from the point at issue here, it is above all: the greatest possible identity to oneself. The ontic law
(logic) tells us that there are (in the appearance) only "differential degrees" of identity and difference:
neither absolute identity nor absolute difference. The event is therefore: what is maximally identical to
oneself;

c. ontico-ontologically, pure self-identity is the impossible. But this law is the law of all beings, it is an
ontic law and not an ontological one (we can only speak by metaphor of "perfect identity to oneself"
about a being, which only means: an identity to itself, an extremely strong intensity of existence). Only
Being is the perfect identity to itself; there is no absolute identity in appearance . Two perfectly identical
letters, a and a, in their Being, are nevertheless different as soon as written, in appearance. The Being
itself, on the contrary, and it only, is the perfect identity and equality to itself, and this is what makes
Hegel designate it as the "pure sacred": what no being can dispute it, the perfect identity to itself, the
fact of remaining eternally always while leaving itself indefinitely, of being everywhere and nowhere
(what has long been called, for excellent reasons in short: God). Except: the event. And this is why it is
impossible for ontology to admit that there is an event, that there is a Being of the event: it is that the
event concerns "only" the "ontic" - the event is the being that "is" most relative to other beings, that is
to say maximally identical to itself. Being, on the other hand, is an impassible identity to itself, without
variation in intensity, without the principle of minimality or maximality;

d. there is nowhere, by definition, "pure Being" transmissible, with the exception of what happens to
capture it in historical mathematics. This is Badiou's historic passage, which does a lot more for the exit
from nihilism than Heidegger. This passage says: there is pure Being, because mathematics proves it
absolutely; since there is pure Being, there is Being tout court and nihilism is therefore historically
doomed to defeat; a defeat that promises to be hard to obtain, but finally an assured defeat ;

e. everywhere else than in mathematics, Being is always Being of a being, and this is the weak link that
attacks all nihilism, denying that Being is something other than being "flat", dry appearance.

Therefore:

f. the event is the being that captures, while remaining absolutely existing and appearing, the maximum
of Being. The event is the being that is "the most", and that is why it is ontologically impossible: the
event is the being that is the Being, among the beings. It therefore does not exist, even if it does exist; it
is not the Being, and yet it is, of all beings, the one who "is" the " most " " the " the Being itself ", the
Being itself large ;

g. of the time when the being was God, the Messiah, the prophet, were those who embodied the event
in the sense we have just said.

In the Agambenian optic, the Messiah is precisely the one who reabsorbs the division between the
profane and the sacred. But how does he do it? Is he a desecrator? How, for whom?

Since the beginning, monotheism has been "exited" from ancient paganism by a subversion of what was
sacred by the State, which throws a new light on the figure of Roman law, Homo sacer, precisely
deprived of any state status.

Tacit reminds us that what scandalized the Romans when they entered the synagogue was to see that
for the Jews, everything sacred in the Roman city became profane, and everything profane became
sacred2.

The event is this suppression, because the sacred is the excess of the territorialized being in worship,
images, state repetition; the event breaks idols, because it is this being precarious and intense that
makes "the most of Being" happen. And since the being has no image, its "incarnation" suppresses them
all.

The pagan gods of the Greeks and Romans were the imaginary projections of the ruling classes of the
Greek-Roman Empire, of the City; to the elective and elitist, Nietzschean beings, of the Greek and
Roman gods, the Jews already substitute the egalitarian empty God, the God of the masses. In the
synagogue, all the signs of social election, of the fetishized Greco-Roman sacredness, were overthrown;
and it was the egalitarian void that was elevated to the rank of the sacred.
This point is fundamental for many reasons, which concern the very meaning of our enterprise. The first
is that it shatters the heideggerian montage of onto-theology as the scene of the original murder (of
Being) from which the historical detective novel of nihilism follows. Small milestones:

a. Parmenides3 is the first philosopher, to be the first thinker of Being. But how does he "discover" the
primordial vocation of philosophy? By tying the Being to the One. That the Being is always related to the
being, as it will always be until Heidegger, is the first time that Being is thought of as such, and most of
the determinations fixed by Parmenides to the question of the Being still direct, and will always direct,
the philosophical investigation (just as in mathematics Bourbaki or Grothendiek do not refute Euclid, but
redispose its relevance);

b. Plato was indeed the actual pioneer of the philosophical singularity, and not the pre-Socratics, who
still stuck to being. He is therefore the only Greek thinker to be as such "open without withdrawal",
which L'Affect4 supported the argument. Here again, Plato does not think of the ontological difference
by name, of course; and yet the Idea, pure form of being, is what comes closest, in Antiquity, to the
contemporary ontological difference. As such only, but as a whole, Plato is more ontological than
Heidegger (we will explain how);

c. the God of Jewish monotheism was not One in any way, but unique. The Old Testament literally
ignores the One, which will be the conceptual creation of the Greeks consecrated by Plato, then cement
of Christianity, with Augustine terminally.

Put in its context, Jewish monotheistic subversion has not been, as the heideggerian scenario argues, an
"original error" parallel to Plato's (missing the full blossoming of the being in the false enlightenment of
the Idea), that of the "onto-theology" consisting in putting, in place of questioning the being as such, the
Idea of God as "supremely being". It is, as we will see, the true heideggerian "anti-Semitism", present as
a letter on the table in its historical montage. The "degeneration" of God into "supremely being" will be
a very late operation of monotheism, in reality absolutely consecrated by Saint Augustine. Heidegger
and his disciples act as if it had always been so; they fail to examine the extremely complex historical
becoming of the notion of "God".

For Jewish subversion was immediately both theological-political and philosophical-ontological. The
literal profanation operation reported by Tacitus consists of a pre-philosophical operation of
substitution of being by Being.