A.C. No.
9074 August 14, 2012 and instead set the complaint for Mandatory Conference on October 6, 2008. 12 On the said
GRACE M. ANACTA*, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO D. RESURRECCION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of
the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence."1
In a Complaint2 for disbarment filed on August 22, 2007 with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant Grace M. Anacta
(complainant) prays for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion
(respondent) for "gross misconduct, deceit and malpractice." 3
Records show that on November 15, 2004, complainant engaged the services of
respondent to file on her behalf a petition for annulment of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for which she paid respondent ₱ 42,000.00.4
In December 2004, respondent presented to the complainant a supposed copy of a Petition
for Annulment of Marriage5 which bore the stamped receipt dated December 8, 2004 of the
RTC, as well as its docket number, Civil Case No. 04-25141.
From then on, complainant did not hear from respondent or receive any notice from the trial
court relative to the said petition. This prompted her to make inquiries with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City (OCC-RTC). To her surprise and dismay, she
discovered that no petition for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141 was ever
filed before the said court.6 Thus, complainant terminated the services of respondent "for
loss of trust and confidence"7 and requested the OCC-RTC to refuse any belated attempt on
the part of respondent to file a petition for annulment of marriage on her behalf. 8
On July 30, 2007, complainant, through her new counsel, wrote a letter 9 to the respondent
demanding for an explanation as to how respondent intended to indemnify the complainant
for damages she had suffered due to respondent’s deceitful acts. Respondent has not
replied thereto. Hence, complainant filed before the IBP a verified complaint praying that
respondent be disbarred.
In an Order10 dated August 22, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal, required the respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within 15 days
from notice. However, respondent did not heed said directive. Hence, complainant filed
Motions to Declare Respondent in Default and Hear the Case Ex-Parte.11The Investigating
Commissioner, Romualdo A. Din, Jr., held in abeyance the resolution of the above motions
date, however, only the complainant and her counsel appeared. Accordingly, in an
Order13 dated October 6, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner deemed respondent to have
waived the filing of an answer; noted complainant’s motion to declare respondent in default;
and gave the complainant 10 days from notice within which to file her verified position
paper, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Complainant filed her verified Position Paper14 on October 15, 2008.
In his Report and Recommendation15 dated December 8, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner found clear and convincing evidence that respondent is guilty of deceit and
dishonesty when he misrepresented having filed the petition for annulment of marriage after
receipt of P42,000.00 when in fact no such petition was filed. He thus recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years and to
reimburse/return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00.
In a Resolution16 dated August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two years to four years and ordered
respondent to return to the complainant the amount of ₱ 42,000.00, otherwise his
suspension will continue until he returns the sum involved.
Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
In Narag v. Atty. Narag17 this Court held that "[t]he burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."
In this case, complainant submitted the following documents to prove her allegations: (1) the
Service Agreement dated November 15, 2004 to prove the existence of attorney-client
relationship between the parties; (2) the Petition for Annulment of Marriage 18 supposedly
filed by respondent on December 8, 2004 with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as
Civil Case No. 04-25141; (3) the Certification issued by the Assistant Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Quezon City showing that "no Petition for Annulment of Marriage with Civil Case No.
Q-04-25141 was filed on December 8, 2004"; (4) the letter dated March 6, 2005 of the
complainant to the respondent informing the latter that she is terminating his legal services
effective immediately; (5) the letter of complainant to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Quezon City wherein she requested that "any belated attempt by my former lawyer Atty.
Resurreccion to file any Petition for Annulment x x x be refused acceptance"; and, (6) the
letter dated July 30, 2007 of complainant’s new counsel demanding for an explanation as to
how respondent intended to indemnify the complainant for damages she had suffered by
reason of respondent’s fraudulent misrepresentations.19
In the face of such a serious charge, the respondent has chosen to remain silent.
Thus, we find the confluence of the evidence submitted by the complainant to have clearly,
convincingly and satisfactorily shown that indeed the respondent has authored this
reprehensible act. Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting
that he had already filed a petition for annulment on behalf of the complainant and pocketing
the amount of P42,000.00. He even went to the extent of presenting to the complainant a
supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court. After he was found out, he made
himself scarce. He ignored all communications sent to him by the complainant. After the
disbarment complaint was filed, he failed to file his answer despite due notice. He totally
disregarded the proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons. "The act of
respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating
Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings." 20
We thus agree with the observation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner that "such action
of the respondent is patently deceitful and dishonest, considering further that he received an
amount of money from the complainant."21
"The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and
defend himself. It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing
in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as
implied admission of the truth thereof."22
As early as In Re: Sotto,23 this Court held that:
One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession
of good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly
shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern
the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the
courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every
attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the
preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to
deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused.
In addition, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "The Code exacts from
lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship."24
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred
or suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in any of the following circumstances, to
wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the
authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere
suspension. Certainly, the Court is not placed in a straitjacket as regards the penalty to be
imposed. There is no ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding
of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the
extreme penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by law to exercise its discretion either to disbar
or just suspend the erring lawyer based on its appreciation of the facts and circumstances of
the case.
We examined the records of the case and assessed the evidence presented by the
complainant. After such examination and assessment, we are convinced beyond doubt that
respondent should only be meted the penalty of four-year suspension as properly
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. In the exercise of our discretion, we are
unquestionably certain that the four-year suspension suffices and commensurable to the
infractions he committed. As will be pointed out later, there have been cases with more or
less the same factual setting as in the instant case where the Court also imposed the
penalty of suspension and not disbarment.
We have gone over jurisprudential rulings where the respondents were found guilty of grave
misconduct and/or dishonesty and we observe that the Court either disbars or suspends
them based on its collective appreciation of attendant circumstances and in the exercise of
its sound discretion.
In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,25 the Court found respondent therein to have committed
dishonesty and abused the confidence26 of his client for failing to file the ejectment suit
despite asking for and receiving from the complainant the money intended as filing fees. In
his bid for exoneration, therein respondent attempted to mislead the Court by claiming that
he has not yet received the registry return card of the notice to vacate hence his failure to
file the ejectment suit. However, the records indubitably showed that he had already
received the same. Moreover, therein respondent likewise refused to return the monies he
received from the complainant despite repeated demands.27The Court thus concluded that
therein respondent's actions constitute gross misconduct. Nevertheless, based on its
appreciation of the evidence, the Court refrained from imposing the penalty of disbarment.
Instead, it imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
months, ratiocinating thus:
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence
calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent.
Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.28
In Ceniza v. Rubia,29 respondent therein was alleged to have misrepresented having
already filed in court the necessary complaint by showing the copy of the complaint
stamped "received" with a docket number thereon.30However, upon verification with the
appropriate court, it was discovered that none was filed. 31 It was also noted that respondent
therein prompted the complainant to borrow money from a third party just to be able to pay
her attorney's fees. When the case reached this Court, it imposed the penalty of suspension
and not disbarment. In so doing, the Court lent more credence to the explanation of the
respondent that the case was "withdrawn" after it had been stamped "received" by the court.
In Roa v. Moreno,32 the Court found respondent therein guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty. He issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to the complainant 33 and
refused to return the amount paid by the complainant. 34 For said infractions, the Court
meted him with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. 35
In Barcenas v. Alvero,36 respondent failed to deposit in court the amount of ₱ 300,000.00
which he received from his client supposedly as redemption price. He also failed to return
the amount despite repeated demands. He was suspended for two years.
In Small v. Banares37 respondent received P80,000.00 from complainant for his legal
services and as filing fees. He however failed to file the necessary complaint and was never
heard from again. He was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years.
In Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,38 therein respondent failed to promptly report that he
received money on behalf of his client. However, for lack of evidence of misappropriation,
he was only suspended and not disbarred.
In Gonato v. Atty. Adaza,39 Atty. Adaza asked money from his client supposedly as filing
fees when in fact no such filing fees are needed or due. Worse, he issued a falsified "official
receipt" as proof of payment. Finally, when he was discovered, he failed to heed his client's
demand to return the amount. For such infractions, Atty. Adaza was suspended for a period
of six months.
In Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona,40 Atty. Barcelona deliberately misrepresented to his client that
he was able to successfully facilitate the restructuring of his client’s loan with a bank through
his "connection". On the basis of said false pretenses, he collected ₱ 60,000.00 from his
client. His client eventually became aware of such misrepresentations when his property
was foreclosed by the bank. Atty. Barcelona was thus charged with misconduct and for
which he was suspended by the Court for a period of six months.
The foregoing cases illustrate that the Court is not bound to impose the penalty of
disbarment in cases of gross misconduct and/or dishonesty, if in its appreciation of facts
and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the penalty of suspension would be more
commensurate.41 "Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end
desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic
life and honor of the erring person." 42 In this case, we believe that the penalty of suspension
of four years will provide Atty. Resurreccion "with enough time to ponder on and cleanse
himself of his misconduct."43 "While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end." 44 We note that there
is no mention in the records of any previous or similar administrative case filed against
herein respondent.
Anent the issue of whether respondent should be directed to return the amount of ₱
42,000.00 he received from the complainant, we note that the rulings of this Court in this
matter have been diverse. On one hand, there are cases where this Court directed
respondents to return the money they received from the complainants. On the other hand,
there are also cases where this Court refrained from venturing into this matter on the ground
that the same is not within the ambit of its disciplinary authority as the only issue in
administrative cases is the fitness of the lawyer to remain a member of the bar.
Now is the most opportune time to harmonize the Court's ruling on this matter. Thus, it is
imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the
matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the
Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or
criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the
lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that
when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the
respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent
be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s
disciplinary authority.
In this case, respondent received the amount of P42,000.00 supposedly as payment for his
legal services and as filing fees. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x
In this case, it is thus clear that respondent violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct
when he withheld the amount of ₱ 42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary
legal services and after complainant demanded its return. He must therefore be directed to
return the same.

Finally, we emphasize that "the object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish
the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by proceeding
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the
profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office has proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust respect in them as members of the bar."45

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion is ordered SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for four years. He is also DIRECTED to return to the complainant the
amount of P42,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the promulgation of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed
to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013
NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION
FELIPE-DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V.
FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco A.
Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution 2 dated June 19, 1996, we required
respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July 16,
1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension Of
Tme To File Comment.4 He requested for additional period of 30 days within which to file his
comment citing numerous professional commitments. We granted said request in our
October 2, 1996 Resolution.5 The extended deadline passed sans respondent’s comment.
Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To Submit The
Administrative Case For Resolution Without Comment Of Respondent 6 claiming the
respondent is deemed to have waived his right to file comment.
On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 7
The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-
Palma who set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8
The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present. The next hearing was
set on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the complainants' counsel. 11
Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last hearing,
complainants moved to calendar the case.12
The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case on
January 12, 1999.13
During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their
Position Paper.1âwphi1Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16
It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation. 17
In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the
Petition; he then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no
discussion was made regarding the merits of the complaint. However, it was recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month. In Resolution No.
XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In their Petition, complainants
alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch 216
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while respondent is the counsel for the
defendants therein; that respondent committed dishonesty when he stated in the
defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to
each other despite knowing that the defendants are half-brothers and half-sisters of
complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against the defendants in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent
introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906; and that they filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No.
A-95-22906] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No.
95-15656-A. Next, complainants averred that respondent knowingly filed a totally baseless
pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance with the rules of procedure; that the said
filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they filed a Vigorous
Opposition to the said pleading. Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations,
respondent violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to
pay complainants the amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In
fine, complainants charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the
defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to
each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence
in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading
captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
in the same case. At the outset, we note that in order to determine whether respondent is
guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the issue of whether the complainants are
indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 being half-brothers and half-
sisters. We would also be tasked to make an assessment on the authenticity of the
Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed was indeed
baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these
prerequisites cannot be accomplished in this administrative case. The resolution of whether
the parties are related to each other appears to be one of the issues brought up in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906 which is a complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of
Nullity of Documents and Damages. The complainants claimed that they are the legitimate
children of the late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the defendants therein, as
represented by the respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants. Clearly, the
issue of filiation must be settled in those proceedings, and not in this administrative case.
The same is true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the Marriage Certificate which
was submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. infraction committed by the respondent.23

Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been filed
against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case No.
41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful" statement
that they are strangers to each other. They had also filed another Perjury charge against the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A for allegedly submitting in evidence a falsified
Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they already filed a Vigorous Opposition to the Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the
respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a
judicial action. We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion18 that -
ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to
give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED that
commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-
246 dated November 19, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C.
No. 4549 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the
personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary
authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against
lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it
falls within the Court's disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which
carry civil or criminal liablity, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral
fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19

Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:

While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to
remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the
Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed
acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo
Mansion without going through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned
civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as not to preempt the conclusions that will
be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court deems it wise to dismiss the
present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending on the final outcome
of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements, the Petition filed by
complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. However, we cannot end our discussion
here. It has not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our directive, respondent did not
file his comment. Neither did he file his Position Paper as ordered by the IBP. And for this,
he must be sanctioned.

Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only
irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers.
His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court
orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
being themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to
know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers. 22
A.C. No. 9259 August 23, 2012
JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M.
ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE,**
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons." 1
This is a Complaint2 for disbarment filed by Jasper Junno F. Rodica (Rodica) against Atty.
Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro (Atty. Manuel), Atty. Edwin M. Espejo (Atty. Espejo), Atty. Abel
M. Almario, (Atty. Almario), Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro (Atty. Michelle), and Atty. Joseph C.
Tan (Atty. Tan) for gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral
conduct, and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Factual Antecedents
On May 5, 2011, William Strong (Strong), an American, was arrested and detained by the
operatives of the Bureau of Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of Philip 3 G. Apostol
(Apostol), a friend and neighbor, to secure the services of a lawyer. Apostol referred him to
Atty. Manuel, who is a partner at the M.M. Lazaro and Associates Law Office (Lazaro Law
Office).
Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law office only handles cases of its retained
clients and those known to him or any of the associate lawyers. 4 However, he was
eventually prevailed upon by Apostol who would consider it as a special favor if Atty.
Manuel would handle Strong’s case. Hence, Atty. Manuel, together with Atty. Almario and
Atty. Espejo, senior and junior associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office, agreed to
meet Strong at the Taguig Detention Center of the Bureau of Immigration. 5
During the meeting, Atty. Manuel explained to Strong the terms of the Lazaro Law Office’s
engagement as well as the fees. Strong assured him of his capacity to pay and offered to
pay a success fee of US$100,000.00 should the said law office be able to expedite his
release from detention as well as his departure from the Philippines. 6 Finding Strong to be
believable and trustworthy, Atty. Manuel agreed to handle his case.7
During the course of their meeting, Strong casually mentioned that he has a property in
Boracay and that he suspected his neighbors as the persons who caused his arrest.
According to Strong, his live-in partner Rodica filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, for recovery of possession and damages 8(against Hillview
Marketing Corporation9 (Hillview), Stephanie Dornau (Dornau) as President of Hillview, the
Alargo Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. and spouses Robert and Judy Gregoire) in
connection with the 353-square meter property they bought in Boracay. He disclosed that
he and Rodica had been trying to sell the Boracay property to rid themselves of the
problems but could not find buyers because of the said case. They even offered the
property to Apostol but the latter was hesitant because of the said pending case. Atty.
Manuel averred that towards the end of the interview with Strong, Rodica arrived. Strong
described Rodica as his "handyman" who will act as his liaison in the case.
Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that Strong’s arrest was
made pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for Conspiracy
to Commit Fraud, Setting Up a Gang and Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is
being indicted for his alleged involvement in "an international gang involved in shares fraud
which led to the creation of hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal securities." 10 Strong
denied any participation in the alleged crime. Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to
expedite his deportation to any country except Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay
the success fee of US$100,000.00.
In her Complaint, Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro
Law Office, she hinted that Atty. Tan, a senior partner at the Marcos Ochoa Serapio Tan
and Associates (MOST Law) and who is also the lawyer of Hillview and Dornau, was
instrumental in the immigration case of Strong. According to Rodica, Atty. Manuel called up
Atty. Tan. Thereafter, Atty. Manuel allegedly informed Rodica that Atty. Tan admitted having
initiated the immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty. Tan threatened
to do something bad against Rodica and her family; and that Atty. Tan demanded for
Rodica to withdraw the RTC case as part of a settlement package.
On May 25, 2011, the Bureau of Immigration, rendered its Judgment 11 granting the motion
of Strong to voluntarily leave the country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the Philippines.
Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011, Rodica filed with the RTC a motion effectively
withdrawing her complaint.
Rodica alleged that after the deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she
heard nothing from the Lazaro Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her
expectations, there was no "simultaneous over-all settlement of her grievances x x x [with]
the defendants [in the RTC] case.12 Thinking that she was deceived, Rodica filed the instant
administrative case. In sum, she claimed that:
21. RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS (MANUEL, MICHELLE, EDWIN and ABEL) of M.M.
LAZARO & ASSOCIATES, furthermore, committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT & DECEIT to
complainant and the courts when (among other things):
(a.) they mis-represented to complainant that the withdrawal of her case at the
Regional Trial Court at Kalibo (Branch VI-Civil Case No. 8987) was only the first
 step in an over-all settlement package of all her differences with her legal
adversaries (i.e. Hillview Marketing Corporation and the latter’s officials / Stephanie
Dornau / Atty. Joseph Tan etc.), which respondent Manuel M. Lazaro had allegedly
already taken care of ;
(b.) they extorted from her more than ₱ 7 MILLION for alleged professional / legal
fees and PENALTIES involved in William Strong’s immigration case, when what
actually happened was -
(c.) as complainant came to know later, almost all of said amount was allegedly
used as "pay-off" to immigration, police and Malaca[ñ]ang officials as well as Atty.
Joseph Tan, and as ‘graft money’/ ‘kotong’ / ‘lagay’ / "tong-pats", for the
expeditious approval of Mr. William Strong’s voluntary deportation plea with the
Bureau of Immigration ;
(d.) they even shamelessly denied the status of the complainant as their client, just
so that they can evade their responsibility to her ;
(e.) they even submitted concocted stories (re Mr. Apostol’s purchase bid for the
Boracay villa of complainant; Atty. Espejo’s attempt to cover-up for Lolong Lazaro
and accept sole responsibility for signing the questioned manifestation and
withdrawal documents last May 24, 2011, and many others) with the Regional Trial
Court of Kalibo (Branch VI) just so that they can hide the truth, hide their crimes
and go scot free ;
22. RESPONDENT Atty. JOSEPH C. TAN on the other hand performed as a willing partner
of ATTY. MANUEL M. LAZARO by acting as ‘conduit’ to his Malacañang patron ("JOHN
DOE") in causing the arrest of William Strong last May 5, 2011, and in packaging with
Lolong Lazaro of the ‘magic formula’ regarding William Strong’s voluntary deportation bid
and the conditions attached thereto as sufficiently explained ;
xxxx
23. RESPONDENTS also violated THEIR OATH AS x x x ATTORNEYS, especially with the
phrases ". . . I will obey the laws . . . I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court ; . . . I will delay no man for money or malice . . . with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients . . . " ;13
Otherwise stated, Rodica claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law Office and that she
was deceived into causing the withdrawal of the RTC case. Further, she claimed that the
Lazaro Law Office collected exorbitant fees from her.
In their Comment, Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo admitted being present in the May 13,
2011 meeting with Rodica. They denied, however, that Atty. Manuel talked with Atty. Tan
during the said meeting, or conveyed the information that Atty. Tan and the group of Dornau
were the ones behind Strong’s arrest and detention.
Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo disputed Rodica’s assertion that the withdrawal of the RTC
case was a condition sine qua non to Strong’s departure from the country. They pointed out
that the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed only
on June 3, 2011,15 or nine days after the May 25, 2011 Judgment of the Bureau of
Immigration was issued, and three days after Strong left the country on May 31, 2011. They
insisted that Rodica withdrew the RTC case because it was one of the conditions set by
Apostol before buying the Boracay property.
As to the preparation of Rodica’s Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration relative to
the RTC case, Atty. Espejo claimed that the former begged him to prepare the said motion.
Since the two already became close friends, Atty. Espejo accommodated Rodica’s request.
He admitted to acceding to Rodica’s requests to put the name of the Lazaro Law Office, the
names of its partners, as well as his name, in the motion and into signing the same, without
the prior knowledge and consent of the other senior lawyers of the firm. Atty. Espejo
claimed that he did all of these out of his good intention to help and assist Rodica in making
the Boracay property more saleable by freeing it from any pending claims.
In his Comment,16 Atty. Manuel contended that none of the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office
communicated with Atty. Tan relative to the deportation proceedings or the RTC case. He
claimed that it was highly improbable for the Lazaro Law Office to impress upon Rodica that
it will coordinate with Atty. Tan for the withdrawal of the RTC case to expedite the
deportation proceedings as the RTC case was already dismissed as early as March 29,
2011 for failure to state a cause of action. Atty. Manuel averred that the two cases are
incongruous with each other and one cannot be used to compromise the other.
Atty. Joseph Tan’s Arguments
For his part, Atty. Tan asserted that the allegations against him are "double hearsay"
because the same were based on information allegedly relayed to Rodica by Atty. Manuel,
who, in turn, allegedly heard it from Atty. Tan. 17 He denied any participation in the
withdrawal of the RTC case and the arrest and deportation of Strong.
Atty. Tan stressed that Strong was deported on May 31, 2011. Three days thereafter, or on
June 3, 2011, Rodica, with the assistance of her counsel of record, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-
Ibutnande (Atty. Ibutnande), filed the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration. He averred that if it is indeed true, as Rodica alleged, that the filing of the
said motion was a pre-condition to Strong’s voluntary deportation, then the filing of the same
should have preceded Strong’s deportation. However, it was the reverse in this case.
Atty. Tan also pointed out that it would be inconceivable for him to participate in Strong’s
arrest as he had already obtained a favorable ruling "on the merits" for his clients in the
RTC case even before Strong was arrested and incarcerated. Besides, Strong is not a party
and had nothing to do with the RTC case. Atty. Tan likewise denied having any dealings
with the rest of the respondents insofar as the arrest and voluntary deportation of Strong are
concerned. Neither did he receive any phone call or message from his co-respondents nor
did he communicate with them in any manner regarding Strong’s case.
Issue
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the allegations in Rodica’s Complaint merit the
disbarment or suspension of respondents.
Our Ruling
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,18 this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by
preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared
thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the
trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number. (Citations omitted.)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer
continues and the complaint against him must be dismissed.19
In the present case, the totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said
presumption of innocence.
Rodica’s claim of "settlement package" is devoid of merit.
Rodica’s assertions that Atty. Tan orchestrated Strong’s arrest and that Atty. Manuel
proposed the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are mere
allegations without proof and belied by the records of the case. "The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof." 20 Aside from her bare assertions,
Rodica failed to present even an iota of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the
records belie her claims. The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed that
Strong was the subject of the Interpol Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for
crimes allegedly committed in Brazil.21 His warrant of arrest was issued sometime in
February 2008. Significantly, even before Strong was arrested and eventually deported,
Atty. Tan had already obtained a favorable judgment for his clients.
We also agree that it is highly inconceivable for Atty. Tan and the Lazaro Law Office to
concoct the scheme of "pressuring" Rodica to withdraw the RTC case for the purpose of
expediting the deportation proceedings of Strong. The following facts are undisputed: (1)
Rodica’s counsel of record in the RTC is Atty. Ibutnande; (2) the RTC case was already
dismissed in the Order22 of March 29, 2011 for failure to state a cause of action; (3) on April
18, 2011, Rodica through her counsel of record filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (4) on
May 5, 2011, Strong was arrested and detained pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; (5)
Strong hired the Lazaro Law Office to handle his deportation case; (6) on May 19, 2011
Strong filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion to voluntarily leave the country; (7) the
Bureau of Immigration rendered a Judgment23 dated May 25, 2011 granting Strong’s motion
to voluntarily leave the country; (8) Strong left the country on May 31, 2011; (9) Rodica’s
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on June 6,
2011; and, (8) acting on the said Manifestation with Motion, the RTC on June 14, 2011
issued an Order24 granting the same.
Given the chronology of events, there appears no relation between the deportation case
and the withdrawal of the RTC case. Thus, it would be specious if not far-fetched to
conclude that the withdrawal of the RTC case was a pre-condition to Strong’s deportation.
As regards the alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of
Rodica, suffice it to say that Atty. Manuel has in his favor "the presumption that, as an
officer of the court, he regularly performs the duties imposed upon him by his oath as a
lawyer and by the Code of Professional Responsibility." 25 Hence, absent any competent
evidence to the contrary, Atty. Manuel, as Strong’s counsel, is presumed to have worked
out the release and subsequent deportation of his client in accordance with the proper
procedures.
Preponderance of evidence shows that Rodica caused the withdrawal of the RTC case to
facilitate the sale of the Boracay property to Apostol.
We cannot lend credence to Rodica’s allegation that she was deceived by Atty. Manuel,
Atty. Espejo, Atty. Almario and Atty. Michelle, another senior associate at the Lazaro Law
Office, into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was part of a settlement package
to settle her differences with her legal adversaries. We accord more credence to the
explanation of the respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that in the course of rendering
legal services to Strong, he had become close to Rodica so much so that he
accommodated Rodica’s request to cause the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the
sale of the Boracay property to Apostol.
In their Joint Comment,26 respondents Attys. Almario, Espejo and Michelle debunked the
opinion of Rodica’s "well-meaning lawyer friends" that the withdrawal of the RTC case
"absolve[d] all defendants from any wrong-doing" and made "the contents of her original
complaint practically meaningless." Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo opined that since the
dismissal of Rodica’s complaint was based on her failure to state a cause of action and
without prejudice, the same may simply be re-filed by revising her complaint and ensuring
that it states a cause of action.
As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only acted in the best interest of their client
Strong and rendered services in accordance with the latter’s objective of leaving the country
and not being deported to Brazil. The Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal
of the RTC case because it had already been dismissed even before the Lazaro Law Office
was engaged to handle Strong’s immigration case. Besides, Rodica admittedly agreed to
withdraw her RTC case to meet Apostol’s condition and to make the property marketable.
Apostol corroborated Atty. Manuel’s statement in his Affidavit 27 of July 21, 2011. He affirmed
that he told Rodica that he would only consider purchasing the Boracay property if it is
cleared of any pending case so that he can protect himself, as a buyer, from any possible
issues that may crop up involving the said property. According to him, Rodica assured him
that she would work for the termination of the RTC case and consult her lawyers in Boracay
on the matter so she could already sell the property.
It is difficult to imagine that Rodica was deceived by some of the respondent lawyers into
believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only the initial step in the settlement of
her differences with her adversaries.28 We went over the said Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration29 and we note that paragraph 6 thereof specifically
states:
6. However, the Plaintiff respectfully manifests that after much serious thought and
deliberation, and considering the anxieties caused by the pendency of the instant case,
Plaintiff is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves
for the withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2011 of the Order dated
March 29, 2011 dismissing the instant Complaint filed on April 18, 2011. 30
As already noted by the RTC, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in its Order 31 dated April 4, 2011, in
the case for recovery of possession with damages:32
This Manifestation was signed by plaintiff, her Manila lawyers and Atty. Joan Ibutnande,
plaintiff’s counsel on record. From the statements made by plaintiff in her Manifestation to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration that she had made serious thoughts and deliberation
she cannot now say that she was manipulated and forced in signing the same. The Court
perceives plaintiff to be an intelligent woman not to be swayed of her principles and beliefs
and manipulated by others, she may have a fickle mind when it comes to other things but
definitely it can not be applied to the Court.
The Court does not see the connection between the instant case and that of William Strong
as alleged by the plaintiff. Mr. Strong is not a party in this case, even plaintiff’s counsel
thought so too. From the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Joan Ibutnande, it was
stated in paragraph 5: "That the undersigned counsel was baffled as she did not see any
connection [between] the incident surrounding the arrest of Mr. William Strong and the
above-entitled case filed by the [plaintiff], and told the plaintiff about it x x x." As Mr. Strong
is not a party in the instance case, his affairs whatever they are can not dictate the outcome
of this case.33
Moreover, it would appear from her own narration that Rodica is not someone who is naïve
or ignorant. In her complaint, she claimed to be an astute businesswoman who even has
some business in Barcelona, Spain.34 Thus, the more reason we cannot lend credence to
her claim that she was tricked into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only
preliminary to the complete settlement of all her differences with her perceived adversaries.
If such had been the agreement, then a Compromise Agreement enumerating all the terms
and conditions should have been filed instead of the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw
the Motion for Reconsideration. In addition, the withdrawal should not have been limited to
the RTC case as it appears that there are other cases pending with other tribunals and
agencies35 involving the same parties. If Rodica is to be believed, then these cases should
likewise have been dismissed in order to achieve the full and complete settlement of her
concerns with her adversaries.
From the above and by preponderance of evidence, it is clear that Rodica’s purpose in
withdrawing the RTC case is to pave the way for Apostol to purchase the Boracay property.
In fact, Rodica eventually executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Apostol over the
Boracay property.36
Rodica’s claim of paying more than ₱ 7 million to the Lazaro Law Office is not substantiated.
There is likewise no merit in Rodica’s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted from
her more than ₱ 7 million for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to
Strong’s immigration case. To support her claim, Rodica attached four statements of
account issued by the Lazaro Law Office for US$2,650.00 under Statement of Account No.
13837,37 US$2,400.00 under Statement of Account No. 13838,38 US$1,550.00 under
Statement of Account No. 1383939 and US$8,650.00 under Statement of Account No.
13835,40 or for a total amount of US$15,250.00. She likewise presented photocopies of
portions of her dollar savings account passbook to show where the aforesaid funds came
from.
Considering the prevailing exchange rate at that time, the Court notes that the sum total of
the abovementioned figures in its peso equivalent is far less than ₱ 7 million. In fact, the
statements of account even support the contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully
pay the amount of US$100,000.00 as success fee. Anent the alleged withdrawals from
Rodica’s dollar savings account, the same merely established that she made those
withdrawals. They do not constitute as competent proof that the amounts so withdrawn were
indeed paid to Lazaro Law Office.
Rodica was not the client of the Lazaro Law Office.
Rodica also faulted the Lazaro Law Office lawyers for disclaiming that she is their client.
However, Rodica admitted in paragraph 5 of her unnotarized Sworn Affidavit 41 that Atty.
Manuel and his lawyer-assistants were "engaged by William Strong to handle his case with
the Philippine immigration authorities." Thus, this Court is more inclined to believe that the
Lazaro Law Office agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and such
acceptance cannot be construed as to include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of
Lazaro Law Office pertained to the immigration case, and not to the RTC case. To reiterate,
the RTC case has nothing to do with Strong’s deportation case. Records also show that the
RTC case was filed long before Strong was arrested and detained. In fact, it had already
been dismissed by the trial court long before Strong engaged the legal services of the
Lazaro Law Office. More importantly, Strong is not a party to the RTC case. Also, the
counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty. Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law
Office. There is nothing on record that would show that respondent Attys. Manuel, Michelle,
and Almario had any participation therein.

Atty. Espejo’s participation in the RTC case.
However, we cannot say the same as regards Atty. Espejo. He admitted drafting Rodica’s
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration indicating therein the firm
name of the Lazaro Law Office as well as his name and the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty.
Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, and in likewise affixing his
signature thereon.
Atty. Espejo acknowledged committing the abovementioned acts as a way of assisting
Rodica who had already become his close friend. Atty. Espejo’s admissions are as follows:
11. Atty. Espejo further recounts that after being advised to simply withdraw her Motion for
Reconsideration ("MR"), Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to prepare the documents
required to be filed with the RTC x x x to spare her Boracay lawyers from preparing the
same. Atty. Espejo accommodated Jasper and drafted the Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion to Withdraw MR") to be given to Rodica’s
Boracay counsel, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande, who is in a better position to evaluate the
merit of the withdrawal of the MR.
11.1. Upon seeing Atty. Espejo’s initial draft, Rodica requested Atty. Espejo to include x x x
the name of the Lazaro Law Office as signatory allegedly to give more credence and weight
to the pleading and to show the defendants in the RTC case her sincere intention to
terminate the case.
Due to Rodica’s pleas and insistence, Atty. Espejo, who among all lawyers of the Lazaro
Law Office, became the most familiar and "chummy" with Rodica, agreed to include the
Lazaro Law Office and put his name as the signatory for the Office. Still not satisfied,
Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to further revise the Motion to Withdraw MR to include the
names of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle as signatories and represented that she herself
will cause them to sign it. Relying on Rodica’s representations that she would speak to Atty.
Manuel about the matter, Atty. Espejo obliged to include the name of Atty. Michelle and
Atty. Manuel. Rodica repeatedly reminded Atty. Espejo not to bother Atty. Manuel on the
matter and that she herself will take it up with Atty. Manuel at the proper time.
11.2 Atty. Espejo has a soft heart. He signed the pleading only with good intentions of
helping and assisting Rodica, the common law wife of a client, whom he had learned to
fancy because of being constantly together and attending to her. He never thought ill of
Rodica and believed her when she said she would speak to Atty. Lazaro about the matter
as represented. Atty. Espejo only agreed to sign the pleading for purposes of withdrawing
Rodica’s MR to attain Rodica’s purpose or desired result and objective – to convince or
facilitate the sale to Apostol and/or to make the property more marketable to interested
buyers and to attain peace with the defendants in the RTC case. Evidently, Rodica took
advantage of Atty. Espejo’s youth and naivete and manipulated him to do things on her
behalf, and deliberately excluded Atty. Almario the senior lawyer. Rodica preferred to
discuss matters with Atty. Espejo than with Atty. Almario as the latter often contradicts her
views. Atty. Espejo apologized to Atty. Manuel for allowing himself to be manipulated by
Rodica.42
At the outset, Atty. Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel
in the RTC case. As a practicing lawyer, he should know that it is the said counsel, Atty.
Ibutnande, who has the duty to prepare the said motion. In fact, he himself stated that it is
Atty. Ibutnande who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the withdrawal of the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Atty. Espejo’s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to
Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01 and 2.02, Canon 2 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not
accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if only to the
extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be
considered as defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by
counsel in the RTC case. Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would
have been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not
the case.
Moreover, the Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their
law firm’s client and without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica’s
request for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and
Atty. Michelle for the purpose of "giving more weight and credit to the pleading." As a
member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are
acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law
firm or the lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing,
he was actually assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being
represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost
an officer of the court.43Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and
fair dealings and must conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. 44 He must likewise
ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he
is an instrument of truth and justice.45 As shown by his actuations. Atty. Espejo fell short of
what is expected of him. Under the circumstances, Atty. Espejo should have exercised
prudence by first diligently studying the soundness of Rodica’s pleas and the repercussions
of his acts.
We note that on August 5, 2011, or even before the filing of the disbarment complaint, Atty.
Espejo already caused the filing of his Motion to Withdraw Appearance46 before the RTC.
Therein, Atty. Espejo already expressed remorse and sincere apologies to the RTC for
wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office. Considering that Atty. Espejo is
newly admitted to the Bar (2010), we deem it proper to warm him to be more circumspect
and prudent in his actuations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against
respondents Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario,
Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan is DISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo
is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9385 November 11, 2013
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA
LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA, JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT
GAYDOWEN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio Igme, Jose
Numbar, Cecilia Langawan, Pablo Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel Flores and Albert
Gaydowen filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Baguio Benguet Chapter
(IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter) a Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar
Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan) for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that
Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) to operate public utility jeepney filed before the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board – Cordillera Administrative Region (LTFRB-CAR) and
docketed as Case No. 2003-CAR-688 by substituting the name of the applicant from Gary
Adasing (Adasing)2 to that of Joseph Batingwed (Batingwed);3 that Atty. Kilaan submitted
false and/or insufficient documentary requirements in support of Batingwed s application for
CPC; that Atty. Kilaan prepared a Decision based on the Resolution of the LTFRB Central
Office which dismissed the Opposition filed by the complainants; and that the said Decision
granted the application of Batingwed which was adopted by the LTFRB-CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the Complaint to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action. 4 Acting on the
Complaint, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his Answer.5
In his Answer6 dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He disclaimed any pat1icipation in the preparation of
the Decision with respect to the application of Batingwed for CPC. He explained that it is the
Regional Director of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-CAR
who approves the application and who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies its
favorable recommendation. He denied exercising any influence over the DOTC-CAR or the
LTFRB. He claimed that Batingwed had decided to abandon his application hence he no
longer submitted the necessary requirements therefor. He also disavowed any knowledge
that Batingwed s application had been forwarded to the LTFRB Central Office for approval.
Atty. Kilaan claimed that he knew about the favorable Decision only when Batingwed
showed him the same. He narratted that considering the incomplete documents, the LTFRB
mistakenly approved Batingwed s application. Thus, when it discovered its error, the LTFRB
immediately revoked the grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He averred that
once an application has been filed, the application and all accompanying records remain
with the LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved by the applicant or his counsel; as such, it
is highly improbable for him to intercalate the entries therein. Atty. Kilaan further explained
that it was Adasing who paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier
erroneously indicated Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor. Atty. Kilaan lamented that
Adasing who is not in the Philippines could not corroborate his explanation. Finaliy, Atty.
Kilaan noted that complainants filed the instant suit in retaliation for the dismissal of their
Opposition to the application for CPCs which he filed on behalf of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference 7 after which the parties submitted their
respective Position Papers.8 In their Position Paper, complainants further alleged that the
Verification in Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No:
253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's
Notarial Registry submitted to the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the
said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed's
application. Also, complainants belied Atty. Kilaan's allegation that Adasing is 'presently
abroad by presenting the Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left the country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner9 found complainants to
have miserably failed to prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries in the application for
CPC of Batingwed. Their allegation was based on mere suspicion devoid of any credible
proof, viz:
At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was responsible
for any intercalation, particularly the substitution of Joseph Batingwed's application folder in
lieu of Gary Odasing's. Indeed, that is a grave charge, and based on the evidence
presented by complainants, all that they can muster is a suspicion that cannot be confirmed.
Of course, this has to be pointed out - anyone who had access to the case folder could have
possibly been responsible for whatever intercalation that may have occurred. That being
said, this Office is not prepared to make that leap into conjecture and conclude that it was
respondent's doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC CAR dated 18 October 2006 -
which notably was submitted by complainants -stated that the application of Gary Odasing
was continued by Joseph Batingwed. Complainants have not alleged that the same
constitutes a violation of the rules and procedures of LTFRB. Thus, it may be presumed to
have been done in the regular course of business. 10
However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as he found
him liable for violating the Notarial Law considering that the Verification of Batingwed's
application which he notarized and denominated as Doc. No. 253, Page No. 51, Book No.
VIII, Series of 2003 was actually recorded as a Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In
addition, the Investigating Commissioner noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he
alleged that Adasing was abroad as this was squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit. The
Investigating Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document the
Verification-when in truth and in fact, the entry in his Notatial Registry shows a different
document. Thus, it is but proper to suspend respondent s privilege of being commissioned
as a Notary Public.
Not only that. Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized, respondent,
as counsel for the applicant, proceeded to file the defectively verified Petition with the
LTFRB-Baguio City. Clearly, there was falsehood committed by him, as there can be no
other conclusion except that respondent antedated the Verification.
xxxx
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said. Respondent made matters worse by alleging
in his Answer to the instant administrative complaint that Gary Odasing was abroad -which
seemingly was drawn up more out of convenience than for truth. Now, that allegation had
been completely rebuffed and found to be untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by Gary
Odasing himself. x x x It is therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt
to defend himself by pleading allegations, which were seemingly made deliberately, and
which were later found to be untrue. Clearly, respondent tried, albeit vainly, to deceive even
this Office.11
The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent s notarial
commission, if still existing, be REVOKED immediately and that he be further PROHIBITED
from being commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2) YEARS.
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of TWO (2) MONTHS.12
In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with modification that Atty. Kilaan’s Notarial Commission be revoked and that he be
disqualified from being appointed as Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-41 dated January
15, 2012.
After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the following
infractions: 1) violation of the Notarial Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer s Oath; and 3)
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Motion for Reconsideration tiled before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Kilaan
passed on the blame to his secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial
Register. He asserted that being a private practitioner, he is burdened with cases thus he
delegated to his secretary the job of recording the documents which he notarized in his
Notarial Register. He argued that the revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification for two years is too harsh. a penalty considering that he is a first-time
offender; he prayed for leniency considering that his family depended on his income for their
collective needs.
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the
entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent s explanation that
he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial
acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. In tact, this argument has already been
rebuffed by this Court in Lingan v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga, 13 viz:
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register.--Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall
supply a ce1tified copy of such record, or any part thereof: to any person applying for it and
paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him, the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging the instrument, the
witnesses, if any to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and,
when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a connect copy thereof as part of his
records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof
and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each
calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also
state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No
blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds fix revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the
part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notatial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is
personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be
relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to
their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open
condemnation. Respondents. especially Calubaquib. a self-proclaimed "prominent legal
practitioner should have known better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary
act but one invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified
or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting
themselves upon the public the courts and the administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must
therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,14 we have also ruled that –
x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entitles and his failure to enter the documents
that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot
escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his
secretary, should be held accountable for these misdeeds.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which
are the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance
of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial
seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public
instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its
genuineness and due execution.1âwphi1 Thus, notarization should not be treated as an
empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for caretl1lness
and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take pmt or allow themselves to be pmt of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly
commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to
refrain from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the
revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper
entry or entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence
of a principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the
basis of personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a
lawyer s commission as a notary public.
Indeed, Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary
public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act.
His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial
acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission. 15 As mentioned, respondent
failed to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission
may be properly revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted
before the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad hence could not corroborate the
explanation made by Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants submitted
the Affidavit of Adasing insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10,
Rule 10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent failed to observe these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan s suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months and the revocation and disqualification of his notarial commission for a
period of one (1) year appropriate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if still
existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of one (1) year. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar
violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt
of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member
of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
January 10, 2017
A.M. No. P-11-2989 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3249-P)
WYNA MARIE P. GARINGAN-FERRERAS, Complainant,
vs.
EDUARDO T. UMBLAS, Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Ballesteros, Cagayan, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Aggrieved by what she believed was a case of falsification of public documents in the
supposed Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33,
Ballesteros, Cagayan, complainant Wyna Marie G. Ferreras filed this case against
respondent Eduardo T. Umblas, Legal Researcher II of the said RTC.
Factual Antecedents
Complainant narrated in her letter-complaint1 that she received in June 2009 an e-mail with
an attachment purportedly a Certificate of Finality dated March 24, 2006 of Civil Case No.
33-398C-2006 entitled "Reynaldo Z. Ferreras v. Wyna Marie G. Ferreras" for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage issued by RTC, Branch 33, Ballesteros, Cagayan. The Certificate of
Finality which bore the signature of respondent as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Clerk of
Court2 stated that the Decision, declaring void ab initio the marriage contracted by
complainant with Reynaldo z. Ferreras (Reynaldo) on the ground of psychological capacity,
granting complainant custody to their child, and dissolving their conjugal property regime,
had already become final and executory.
Fearing foul play since she had absolutely no knowledge about said case nor received any
summons/notices regarding the same, complainant asked for a Certification from the
National Statistics Office which confirmed an annotation on the records of her marriage:
PURSUANT TO THE DECISION DATED JANUARY 19, 2006 RENDERED BY JUDGE
EUGENIO M TANGONAN OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL
KEG/ON, BRANCH 33. BALLESTEROS, CAGAYAN UNDER CIVIL CASE NO. 33-398C-
2006, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HEREIN PARTIES CELEBRATED ON JULY 16, 1993
IN BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA IS HERE',B Y DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO. 3
Proceeding on her quest for the tn1th of such declaration, she asked for copy of all
documents relative to the annulment case4 from Branch 33, RTC, Ballesteros, Cagayan,
from which the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage supposedly originated. On August 18,
2009, Jacqueline C. Fernandez, Court Interpreter III, issued one, stating in part:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that according to available records, Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006
entitled REYNALDO Z. FERRERAS versus WYNA MARIE P. GARINGAN-FERRERAS for
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIANGE, is NOT ON FILE. 5
On October 21, 2009, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the said
complaint to respondent for comment.6
In his Comment, 7 respondent denied the material allegations of the
complaint, stating, among others, that the Decision and Certification of Finality were
fraudulent and that his purported signatures thereto were spurious and not his own
handwriting and accord. Furthermore, he countered that he was no longer acting as the OIC
Clerk of Court and responsible for such issuances as he had been replaced prior to the date
of issuance.
On September 19, 2011, the Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as an administrative
matter and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Tuguegarao City for
Investigation, Report and Recommendation.8
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Judge
Despite calendaring several settings, no actual confrontation was had between the parties.
Notably, complainant, who hails from Nueva Vizcaya, would travel all the way to
Tuguegarao City to attend all the scheduled hearings, except in one instance when she
moved for its postponement as she had to accompany her son to Manila. On the other
hand, respondent did not honor any of the scheduled hearings with his presence despite
receipt of summons.9So, the case revolved substantially on the documents submitted by the
parties, particularly on the signature of the respondent. According to the Investigating Judge
and per records, complainant submitted the following documents:
x x x (1) A Certificate of Finality dated March 24, 2006 signed by the respondent and duly
authenticated by the National Statistics Office at the dorsal portion; (2) A duly authenticated
copy of the Decision in Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006; (3) A certified true copy of the
Certification issued by Jacqueline Fernandez, Court Interpreter II of RTC Ballesteros; (4) A
certification by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ballesteros stating that their
office had received a copy of the said Certificate of Finality and Decision on October 3,
2007; (5) The authenticated NSO copy of the petitioner's marriage contract bearing the
annotation that the marriage of the petitioner was declared null and void ab initio; and (6)
the Affidavit of Edna Forto. 10
In her Report and Recommendation11 dated February 1, 2013, Investigating Judge Vilma T.
Pauig found respondent guilty of falsification of official document based on the following
ratiocination:
Contrary to the respondent's vehement denial of his participation in the annulment of the
petitioner's marriage, the evidence on record substantially proves that his signature in the
Certificate of Finality bears a striking resemblance to the signature he uses when compared
to his signature in the Comment he submitted dated February 18, 2013. x x x
xxxx
From a mere examination of the signature of respondent Umblas in the Certificate of Finality
and in the Comment he submitted before this investigator, the similarity of stroke creates a
reasonable inference that only one and the same person could have made this signature.
His mere denial that he participated in the fraud because no such case was filed before their
Court is rather flimsy especially that it is precisely that fact that the petitioner contends - how
could her marriage be dissolved when no case for annulment was truly filed?
xxxx
Other than the respondent's claim that he did not participate in the annulment of petitioner's
marriage and that the signature in the Certificate of Finality was a simulation, he did not
present any evidence or witnesses to prove that his signature in the Certificate of Finality
was forged. Since it was the respondent who alleged forgery, it falls upon him to produce
clear, positive and convincing evidence to prove the same. However, he failed to do so. 12
The Investigating Judge thus recommended that respondent be dismissed from service for
committing the grave offense of falsification. 13
On July 1, 2013, the Court resolved to refer this matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
The OCA shared the view of the Investigating Judge that there is more than substantial
evidence to prove that respondent falsified the subject Certificate of Finality and that he be
dismissed from service for committing said infraction, viz.:
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Judge Pauig.
Complainant was able to adduce evidence to support her allegations of fraud against
respondent whose signature appears in the Certificate of Finality dated 24 March 2006 in
Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006, which case was declared as nonexistent by Branch 33, RTC,
Ballesteros, Cagayan, the court where it was supposedly filed.
Complainant was able to submit certified true copies of the Decision dated 19 January 2006
in Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006 and the Certificate of Finality dated 24 March 2006
obtained from the Office of the Civil Registrar-General, NSO. The Office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Ballesteros, Cagayan likewise certified that these were the documents
they received on 3 October 2007. These were made the basis of the NSO for making the
corresponding annotation on the marriage contract of complainant and her husband, the
named petitioner in the contested civil case.
Respondent, on the other hand, failed to controvert the authenticity of his signature on the
Certificate of Finality.1âwphi1 He argued that his signature thereon had been forged yet he
failed to validate his claim by any evidence or witnesses. Not only that, he himself failed to
attend the hearings conducted by Judge Pauig. Of the seven scheduled hearings, not once
did respondent appear. Four of these hearings were postponed at the instance of his
counsel. Considering the gravity of the charge respondent was facing, his indifferent attitude
toward the case is contrary to the natural reaction of an innocent man who would go to great
lengths to defend his honor.
Instead, respondent lamely contended that it must be the petitioner who was responsible for
the falsified documents since it was incumbent upon him, as the successful petitioner, to
have the decree/order registered in the civil registrar. Petitioner, however, could not have
acted alone and must surely have had someone who was privy to the court processes, court
decisions and court personnel. The falsified documents did not utilize fictitious persons but
contained the names of Judge Eugenio M. Tangonan, Jr., then the Presiding Judge of
Branch 33, and of respondent who, being the court Legal Researcher and the designated
Officer-in-Charge of Branch 33 from January 16, 1997 to July 31, 2005, was in a position of
power and authority to confirm the authenticity of the documents should the local civil
registrar or the NSO seek verification. His assertion that he was no longer the Officer-in-
Charge at the time the Certificate of Finality was purportedly issued on 24 March 2006 as
his designation ended on 12 July 2005 could not be given weight as he was not precluded
from issuing the said document. In fact, being privy to, if not the cause of the fraudulent
transaction, he was compelled to sign it himself and not the incumbent branch clerk of court
who would have looked for the records herse1f.
Judge Pauig observed that the signatures of respondent in the Certificate of Finality and in
his Comment submitted before her are similar in stroke from which can be inferred that only
one and the same person executed the same. We share the same view. A careful perusal of
respondent's 201 file kept by the Records Division, Office of Administrative Services, OCA,
containing his performance rating forms and applications for leave executed before, during
and after the date of the questioned document, shows that his signatures therein are also
very similar to, if not the same as, those appearing in the Certificate of Finality.
Having failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to contradict complainant's evidence
on record, respondent should he held accountable for issuing the fraudulent Certificate of
Finality which bears his signature.15
Issue
The central issue around which this case revolves is whether the respondent fraudulently,
maliciously, and willfully caused the preparation of, and signed, a Certificate of Finality of a
non-existent case from Branch 33, RTC Ballesteros, Cagayan that led to the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between Ferreras and complainant and its subsequent annotation in
the marriage certificate on file with the National Statistics Office.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.
Indeed, having affirmatively raised the defense of forgery) the burden rests upon
respondent to prove the same. Plainly, he cannot discharge this burden by simply claiming
that no such Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006 was on file with the RTC, Ballesteros, Cagayan.
As correctly noted by the Investigating Judge, that was precisely the issue raised by
complainant. How could there be a Certificate of Finality which bore the signature of
respondent when there was no pending Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006 in the first place?
Aside from his bare denial, respondent did not even make any attempt to show that the
signature appearing in the Certificate of Finality was not his signature or that it was
dissimilar to his real signature. We therefore lend credence to the conclusions reached by
both the Investigating Judge, (after comparing the subject signature with respondent's
signature in his comment), and the OCA, (after making a comparison of the subject
signature with respondent's signatures in his 201 file), that the signature in the Certificate of
Finality was affixed by respondent himself Section 22, Rule 132, Rules of Court instructs
that genuineness of handwriting may be proved "by a comparison, made by the witness or
the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by a party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the Judge."
x x x The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document
bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect. Mere disclaimer is not
sufficient. x x x At the very least, he should present corroborating evidence to prove his
assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness. As a rule, forgery cannot be
presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery. 16
Respondent's cavalier and lackadaisical attitude regarding this administrative matter further
strengthens our view that he was indeed guilty of the falsification. As pointed out by the
OCA, respondent was never present during any of the seven hearings set by the
Investigating Judge. For four times, he moved for postponement for ambiguous and lame
grounds. During all this time, complainant would travel all the way from Nueva Vizcaya only
to find out that the hearing was again cancelled or postponed. To be sure, respondent was
fully aware of the gravity of the offense of which he was charged. If it was established that
he committed the falsification, he could be dismissed from service or even criminally
prosecuted. Yet, he did not give the complaint the requisite attention it needed thereby
impressing upon this Court that he did not have any viable defense to offer and that he is
guilty as charged.
The OCA correctly held that:
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS),
falsification of an official document is considered a grave offense warranting the penalty of
dismissal from the service. It also amounts to serious dishonesty due to the presence of
attendant circumstances such as respondent's abuse of authority in order to commit the
dishonest act and his employment of fraud or falsification of an of an official document in the
commission of the dishonest act related to his or her employment. Serious dishonesty is
considered a grave offense warranting the penalty of dismissal from the service.17
"Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It
also amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of
1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting
the penalty of dismissal from service"18 even if committed for the first time.
Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an
office dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater
moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court
employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people's
respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice
bear a heavy burden of responsibility .19
Respondent's infraction would have merited the penalty of dismissal from service. However,
we note that in the recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Umblas,20this Court
found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees for similarly
unlawfully producing spurious court documents, particularly the purported June 20, 2005
RTC Decision and the December 18, 2005 Certificate of Finality in Civil Case No. 33-328C-
2005. In said case, respondent was accordingly meted the penalty of dismissal from service
with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Thus, considering his earlier dismissal from service and its
accessory penalties, the penalty applicable in this case, which is also dismissal, is no longer
relevant or feasible. In lieu thereof, we find it proper to impose a fine of ₱40,000.00 to be
deducted from his accrued leave credits.21
WHEREFORE, respondent EDUARDO T. UMBLAS is found GUILTY of falsification of
public document and dishonesty. In lieu of dismissal, he is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine
of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits. In case his leave credits be
found insufficient, respondent is directed to pay the balance within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision.
The Office of the Court Administrator is enjoined to file the appropriate criminal charge
against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the
basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.1
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision3 and the August 8, 2007
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an
Administrative Complaint5 against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of
Authority and Grave Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of
a 601-square meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion,
Maramag, Bukidnon.6 The said property, which they mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15,
1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of
₱2,355,000.00.7Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in
PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for Bukidnon on August
25, 1999.8 The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem
the property.9
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as counsel de
officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the owner of a lot
adjacent to the property.10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted to
reacquire11 the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it. 12 Thus, they were
hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell
him the 331-square meter portion of the property, where one of the buildings is located, for
₱5 million.13
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to inquire
about the status of the property.14 They were informed by the bank that the property could
be purchased at the fair market value of ₱2,938,000.00. 15 The following day, Atty. Garay
went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a down payment of
₱587,600.0016 or 20% of the purchase price.17
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire
property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. 18 The
bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim 19 to formalize
their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB.21
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of
PNB.22
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay 23 since
spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment. 24
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession25 before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as
Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order26 granting the Petition and, on
June27, 2005, he issued a Writ of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garay’s offer to purchase the
property had been approved due to their failure to pay the full down payment. 29
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration30 of the issuance of the
Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, 31 who was the former counsel of Hilly, was
barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5, 32 Article 1491 of the Civil
Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order 33 holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, a portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a mandatory
and ministerial duty under Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the
implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession would work [great] injustice to the
registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel for the
Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty.
Garay in manipulating that the property in question was finally bought by him from the PNB
not to mention the possible violation of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the
court cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty. Garay [the
opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to
appear on August 2, 2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be
accommodated in the morning[,] it will proceed in the afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby held in
abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C. Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of
Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of the property, if already
implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction 35 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for Certiorari for several
procedural defects.37 However, on reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the Petition.39
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution 40 granting the PNB and Atty. Garay’s
application for a TRO. Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a Five
Thousand Peso (₱5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering,
[petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to, or
alters the nature and condition of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have already
received to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region,
Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the disputed
property to the said Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED.41
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision42 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession.43The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14,
2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.44
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration 45 but the CA denied the same in its August 8,
2007 Resolution.46
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING
THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING
THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY
CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.47
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certioraridue to
the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Order.48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed a
Motion to Recall Order with the RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed
with the CA.49
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because
PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply for a Writ of Possession considering that
the subject property had already been sold to Atty. Garay, 50 who they claim is also not
entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject property
pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for
Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the
Writ of Possession without notice to him and PNB.52 He also emphasizes that it is a
ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has
lapsed.53
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to
the Writ of Possession.54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, which he
had earlier issued.55
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty. Garay
and spouses Sombilon.56 In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
Civil Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property
from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon.57
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari,
PNB explains that in this case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed
with as the issue involved is purely one of law, which is an exception under prevailing
jurisprudence.58
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time
considering that Judge Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording PNB the opportunity to be
heard.59
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute another
action simultaneously with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA. 60
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint 61 against Judge
Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he
proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s motion for reconsideration of the Order
granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier issued 62 and for ignoring Sections
4,63 5,64 and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear the motion
despite lack of notice to PNB.66
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did not
annul the Writ of Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent
any injustice.67 He insists there was no violation of due process because he immediately
scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence.68
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse
of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure.70 Although the OCA did not touch
on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending with
the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion
filed by spouses Sombilon.71 It also pointed out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of
their rights to due process as no proper notice was sent to them. 72 Thus, the OCA
recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative
complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of
procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will
be dealt with more severely.73
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R.
No. 179914.74
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr.
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ
of Possession; and (2) whether he should be administratively sanctioned for holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5,
and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of
Deeds within which to redeem his property.75 During the one-year redemption period, the
purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond.76 But after the one-year period, the
purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a
bond.77 And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to
the court.78 Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance
of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.79 The pendency of such action is also not a ground to
stay the issuance of a writ of possession.80
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of
the Writ of Possession.1âwphi1In fact, the title over the subject property had already been
consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the
Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be
deferred,81 we find none of these recognized exceptions present in the instant case.
Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was
done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged
invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of
Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there
was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB, as the
registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the assailed
Order prior to the availment of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the decision is a patent
nullity or where there is violation of due process, 82 such as in the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the
findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the
required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took
cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their
right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the
motion was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to
receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to
substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge
Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure
for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross
ignorance of the law,83which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of
the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal
from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a
fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.84
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Order, and considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge
Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and
is hereby fined the amount of ₱20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in
A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for
disability retirement but withheld the amount of ₱100,000.00 pending the final resolution of
this case. In view thereof, the fine of ₱20,000.00 herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is
to be deducted from the withheld amount of ₱100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007
Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld amount of
₱100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M.
No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
 ALICIA Y. LAUREL, SUBSTITUTED BY HER SOLE HEIR AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, Petitioner, v. FERDINAND M.
VARDELEON, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails: 1) the October 13, 2011 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the appeal in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 01360 and affirming the
October 12, 2005 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th Judicial Region, Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 6 in Civil Case No. 7249; and 2) the CA's June 20, 2012 Resolution 4 denying
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the herein assailed Decision.
Factual Antecedents
On July 23, 2004, petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint5 for recovery of possession
and ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon
concerning a 20,306-square meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 7249 and assigned to Branch 6 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he bought the
island on April 9, 1973 from Avelina Casimero, and that petitioner was guilty of laches in
filing her claim.6redarclaw
In a July 6, 2005 Pre-Trial Order,7 petitioner was scheduled to present her evidence on
three separate dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and November 23, 2005.
Previously, on August 1, 2005, respondent moved to correct the Pre-Trial Order, in order to
reflect therein petitioner's supposed admission made during pre-trial that she knew of
respondent's possession of the subject property since 1975.8 Petitioner opposed the
same.9redarclaw
In an August 19, 2005 Order,10 the trial court denied respondent's motion to correct the Pre-
Trial Order. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 11 but the trial court did not act on
the motion.
On September 2, 2005, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the scheduled September 7,
2005 hearing to October 12, 2005 or any available date. 12 The trial court, in a September 7,
2005 Order,13 granted the motion provided that petitioner defrays the transportation
expenses as well as the appearance fee of respondent's counsel. Petitioner moved to
reconsider,14 but the court failed to act on the same.
During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner was present, together with
substitute counsel Atty. Roy Villa and her first witness. Petitioner moved in open court to
postpone trial on the ground that there are pending motions that have to be resolved, and
that the substitute lawyer had yet to confer with the witness, since her true counsel, Atty. De
la Vega - who originally interviewed the witness - was not present. This time, the trial court,
in an Order15 of even date, denied: 1) petitioner's oral motion to postpone trial; 2) her motion
for reconsideration of the trial court's September 7, 2005 Order directing her to defray
respondent's counsel's transportation expenses and appearance fees; and 3) respondent's
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to
correct the Pre-Trial Order. It likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 7249 on the ground of
failure to prosecute on petitioner's part, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.16 It decreed, thus:
Resolving the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff, the same is hereby DENIED.
The alleged illness of Atty. Maria Theresa Diaz-dela Vega which allegedly prevented [sic]
from appearing at the initial trial is not supported by a medical certificate that is under oath.
(Sec. 4, Rule 30, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
As regards the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the defendant, the same was just a
rehash of the ground mentioned in their [sic] first motion which was amply discussed in the
Order sought to be reconsidered. Said Motion for Reconsideration is also DENIED.
Called for trial, plaintiff is unable to present anew her evidence. She is asking for the
postponement of the trial. It is significant to take note that when this case was set for trial on
September 7, 2005, plaintiff failed to present evidence based on the alleged illness of her
counsel. And today, plaintiff is not again ready to present evidence.
Defendant opposed the motion, and manifested that he is willing that the counterclaim be
dismissed to facilitate the eventual dismissal of this case.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs verbal motion to postpone the trial is hereby DENIED and the case
is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. The counterclaim is also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Open Court, Kalibo, Aklan.
October 12, 2005.
On November 9, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration17 of the trial court's
October 12, 2005 Order, but in a January 31, 2006 Order,18 the trial court denied the same,
stating among others that -
The fact that another trial date was left for her to present evidence cannot be made as a
justification because for two settings, i.e., September 7, 2005 and October 12,2005, she
admittedly failed to present evidence. As a matter of fact, on September 7, 2005, the Court
was already inclined to dismiss the case for failure of the plaintiff to appear, especially that
her motion to postpone the
hearing failed to comply with the 3-day period to file and serve the motion prior to the date
of the hearing. The motion was filed two (2) days before the date of the hearing.
Nonetheless, the Court had to bend the procedural rules by granting the motion and set the
presentation of plaintiffs evidence on October 12,2005 as previously set during the trial. The
reason therefor is just to allow the plaintiff to present her evidence and decide the case on
the merits. Unfortunately, as earlier stated, plaintiff was again unable to present evidence.
Some pending incidents mentioned by the plaintiff is [sic] not a legal justification for her not
to present evidence. The same were already resolved when the Court directed plaintiff to
proceed with the presentation of her evidence. However, plaintiff refused to do so.
Hence, the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute as mentioned at the outset.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
Riding of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 01360. She
claimed that the trial court should not have dismissed her case since she still had one more
scheduled hearing — November 23, 2005 — for the presentation of her evidence. Petitioner
asserted that she could not begin trial since respondent's motion for reconsideration of the
trial court's August 19, 2005 Order remained unresolved and was still awaiting resolution.
Moreover, her own motion for reconsideration of the trial court's September 7, 2005 Order
directing her to defray the transportation expenses and appearance fee of respondent's
counsel was still pending at the time. But in an October 13, 2011 Decision, the CA denied
the appeal, stating thus:
Appellant claims that it was her honest belief that during the hearing on October 12, 2005,
the trial court would first hear and resolve appellee's motion for reconsideration from the
Order denying his earlier motion to correct the pre-trial order. She was caught by surprise
when the trial court outrightly denied appellee's motion for reconsideration and directed her
to present her witness. Moreover, under the Pre-Trial Order, she still had another date to
present her evidence, that is, on November 23, 2005.
We are not impressed with appellant's contentions.
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence-in-chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or
any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to
proceed with the scheduled trial or when postponements in the past were due to the
plaintiffs own making, intended to be dilatory or caused substantial prejudice on the part of
the defendant.
Appellant could not pretend that she did not know that she would be presenting her
evidence on October 12, 2005. Appellant was duly notified of the hearing dates. The Pre-
Trial Order dated July 6, 2005 clearly stated that appellant was set to present her evidence
on the following dates: September 7, 2005, October 12, 2005 and November 23, 2005 at
9:30 in the morning. When appellant's counsel filed a motion to reset the hearing, the trial
court granted the same.
With due notice of the proceedings, appellant and her counsel were both well aware that
they had to present their evidence on October 12, 2005. This was their chosen date, but
instead of coming prepared, appellant moved for another postponement. Appellant's
justification that her counsel was not yet able to talk to the witness is not a meritorious
ground to defer the hearing of the case. In fact, under Sec. 3, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court,
a motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon
affidavit showing the materiality or relevancy of such evidence and that due diligence had
been utilized to procure it. There was no such affidavit in this case, nor was there any
showing that due diligence had been exerted to procure the attendance of the intended
witness.
The fact that the trial court no longer heard appellee's motion for reconsideration is of no
moment. Appellant's complacent attitude and lack of preparedness [in pursuing] her case
warrants its dismissal for failure to prosecute, xxx [A] plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute his
action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch in order to obtain the relief prayed
for and, at the same time, minimize the clogging of court dockets. The expeditious
disposition of cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court's.
The trial court therefore did not err in issuing the assailed Order since it was only performing
its duty in ensuring that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. To allow
appellant to postpone the case until such time that she is ready to present her evidence
would only cause unreasonable delay and violate appellee's right to speedy trial.
Accordingly, We sustain the trial court's dismissal of appellant's complaint for failure to
prosecute.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Order dated October 12, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 7249 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs on plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.20
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its assailed June 20, 2012 Resolution, the CA held its
ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits that -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR SUPPOSED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DESPITE THE
FACT THAT PETITIONER THROUGH HER COUNSEL HAD ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED
IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT A QUO AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE
WAS A PENDING UNRESOLVED MOTION INVOLVING THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
BOTH THE COURT A QUO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE
CLEARLY DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.21
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that Civil Case No. 7249 be
reinstated, petitioner essentially maintains in her Petition and Reply22 that during the
October 12, 2005 scheduled hearing, her counsel and witness were present but they did not
commence trial because they honestly believed that the respondent's pending motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to
correct/amend the July 6, 2005 Pre-Trial Order needed to be resolved first. Petitioner insists
that said motion for reconsideration had a direct bearing on the course of the trial, thus the
necessity of resolving it first. In any case, it was already agreed upon during pre-trial and
allowed by the trial court in its pre-trial order, that she still had one more opportunity to
present her evidence on the scheduled hearing on November 23, 2005. Thus, the RTC -
instead of dismissing the case - should have allowed her to present evidence on said date.
Petitioner posits that agreements reached at the pre-trial conference and embodied in the
pre-trial order control the course of trial and should not be disturbed unless there would be
manifest injustice.23 Since she had one more scheduled hearing available to her, it cannot
be concluded that she has failed to prosecute her case. In addition, petitioner claims that
she has a meritorious case since she purchased the property from a seller who has a valid
tax declaration his name, while respondent himself admitted during pre-trial that his
supposed predecessor-in-interest Avelina Casimero had no document or tax declaration to
support her title to the subject property.24 She points out that the trial court erred in not
giving the parties the opportunity to present their arguments on their pending motions for
reconsideration, and instead denied them outright on October 12, 2005; and that the power
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute should be exercised with care, as it may forever
bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief, and so the circumstances surrounding the case
should be considered to the end that technicality shall not take precedence over substantial
justice.25redarclaw
Respondent's Arguments
In his Comment,26 respondent maintains that the CA is correct in affirming the dismissal. He
labels petitioner's insistence for the RTC to resolve first the pending motions for
reconsideration before trial could commence, and for her to be allowed to commence the
presentation of evidence on November 23, 2005, as specious and flimsy. He argues that
these claims even constitute glaring proof of petitioner's lack of interest in prosecuting her
case; and that if petitioner was keen on pursuing her case, then the substitute counsel (Arty.
Villa) should nonetheless have been prepared on October 12, 2005. He avers that petitioner
has exhibited a complacent attitude toward her case in violation of his right to speedy trial/
disposition of his case. Finally, he contends that petitioner has been accorded due process
and given ample opportunity to present her case.
Our Ruling
The Petition must be granted.
This Court has said that "[t]he fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute."27redarclaw
To constitute failure to prosecute, his non-appearance must be equated with unwillingness
to proceed with the trial as when both plaintiff and counsel made: no appearance at all, or
with the assumption that plaintiff has already lost interest in prosecuting his action, in the
same way that should the ground for dismissal be delay, this delay or failure to proceed
must be for an unreasonable length of time beyond the reasonable allowance which by
judicial leniency
litigant is normally entitled.28
Likewise -
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such
power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence
in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or a scheme
to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, x x x courts should decide to dispense
rather than wield their authority to dismiss.29
Finally, in Padua v. Hon. Ericta,30 the following pronouncement was made:
... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the merits
whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on their own
motion, to enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the
case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true that the
dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores v. Phil. Alien Property
Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 (I960]; Montelibano v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable
v. Bonifacio, 105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, L-17631,
October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion must be exercised soundly with a
view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case(Vernus-Sanciangco v.
Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts obtain that serve as mitigating
circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set
aside (Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 Colo 190, 362 P. 2d
1050 [1961]), especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was
not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd
680). (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. 1, 70 SCRA 590, 595).
(Emphasis supplied)
With the above-cited pronouncements as guides, the Court declares that the trial court erred
in dismissing Civil Case No. 7249, and the appellate court should not have affirmed such
dismissal. Petitioner's actuations indicate that she was not at all unwilling to prosecute her
case; nor can it be said that - as the trial court puts it - she "refused" to present her
evidence. Far from these, she was indeed more than eager to see her case through. When
she instituted Civil Case No. 7249 in 2004, petitioner was already eighty-one (81) years of
age.31 Yet, despite her advanced age, the record indicates that petitioner attended the
scheduled hearing of October 12, 2005, together with her counsel and the first witness -
only that the lawyer who attended was a mere proxy, and not petitioner's true counsel who
previously conferred with the witness. Moreover, in coming to court that day, petitioner and
the substitute counsel were acting in the honest belief that trial cannot proceed on account
of pending incidents which the trial court has failed to resolve, that is: 1) her motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's September 7, 2005 Order directing her to defray
respondent's counsel's transportation expenses and appearance fees; and 2) respondent's
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to
correct the Pre-Trial Order. Given the circumstances petitioner was confronted with at the
time, it is understandable that she should seek another continuance. Given her advanced
age, determination, the surrounding circumstances of the case, and the fact that no
prejudice is caused to respondent by further postponement of trial since petitioner - by prior
agreement during pre-trial - is expected to conclude her case within the agreed three
settings, the trial court should have extended to petitioner the courtesy she deserved by
granting a continuance.
Then; is merit in petitioner's argument that since she was granted three scheduled hearings
within which to present her evidence, then she should have been afforded such opportunity.
Thus, it was error for the trial court to summarily dismiss the case after only the second
hearing. Since petitioner and respondent agreed to the three settings during pre-trial, then
petitioner should have been given three opportunities to present her case, and not merely
two. As far as the parties are concerned, an allocation of time for trial has been made and
agreed upon by and between them. So long as the parties act within schedule, then none of
them should complain. Besides, the delay or failure to prosecute contemplated under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules must be for an "unreasonable length of time." In
petitioner's case, the continuance she sought was not for an unreasonable length of time. It
was within the period expected by and made known to the defendant and the trial court
during pre-trial. In fact, it was only until the next scheduled setting on November 23, 2005,
which was just over one month away. This may not be characterized as delay, as such
scheduled hearing was expected by respondent and could not have come as a surprise to
him. He was expected, as he agreed, to wait until the termination of these three scheduled
hearings. Within such period, he can do nothing but await his turn to present evidence,
unless petitioner terminates it earlier. Moreover, respondent could not have been prejudiced
by the postponement being sought. The trial court even ordered petitioner to reimburse his
counsel's expenses and attorney's fees for the scheduled September 7, 2005 hearing.
Using this as precedent, it could have ordered the same with respect to the October 12,
2005 setting.
In a number of previous cases, we have consistently warned that courts must ensure that
litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. We also held 1hat although the grant
or denial of postponements rests entirely on the sound discretion of the judge, we cautioned
that the exercise of that discretion must be reasonably and wisely
exercised. Postponements should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds, in
light of the attendant circumstances. Deferment of the proceedings may be allowed
or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to
any party. 'The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible,
result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in the plaintiffs
being non-suited or of the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment'
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non-prosequitur, the real test for the
exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. 32 (Emphasis
supplied)
As the Court has ruled in Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin:33redarclaw
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be
made with care. The repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication
upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal
may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of action.
Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances
surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.
For its part, the trial court was remiss in its duty to act on the two pending motions before it.
It appears that it did not even grant the parties the opportunity to comment respectively on
these motions, and instead simply summarily denied them in open court during the October
12,2005 scheduled hearing. The trial court should be reminded that "the unreasonable delay
of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting
magistrate."34redarclaw
On respondent's argument that he is entitled to a speedy disposition of his case by agreeing
to grant petitioner three scheduled hearings for the presentation of her evidence,
respondent is expected to honor such agreement and await his turn. So long as petitioner
acts within the period allowed her for the presentation of her evidence, respondent may not
complain; any grumbling on his part would be flimsy, arbitrary, and unfair. As far as
petitioner is concerned, no right of respondent has been violated by her actions; as
elsewhere declared herein, petitioner is not guilty of delay and/or failure to prosecute her
case for an unreasonable length of time.
The foregoing disquisition is consistent with the trial court's exercise of discretion in deciding
how best to administer justice, taking into consideration the rules of procedure, applicable
jurisprudence, and the circumstances of the case. In not assuming a similar stance, the trial
court and the CA committed evident error, thus resulting in misguided and unjust
dispositions that unnecessarily took the parties all the way to this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed October 13, 2011 Decision and
June 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 01360
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 7249 is REINSTATED, and the Regional
Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6 is ORDERED to forthwith set the
case for the reception of petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel's evidence.
SO ORDERED
A.M. No. P-07-2293 July 15, 2015
(Formerly A.M No. 06-12-411-MTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JOEBERT C. GUIAN, former Clerk of Court, Bulan, Sorsogon, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Clerks of courts are custodians of the court's funds and revenues. Any delay in its
remittance, or any shortages in the amounts, shall make the clerk of court administratively
liable. Respondent Joebert C. Guan (Guan), former Clerk of Court of Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Bulan, Sorsogon, was found remiss in his duties and is accordingly penalized.
Factual Background
A financial audit of the books of accounts of MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon covering the period July
28, 1993 to August 31, 2004 disclosed that: (1) some collections were not properly and
accurately recorded in the cashbooks; (2) there were shortages in the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund in the amounts of
₱48,207.10 and ₱5,l 16.00, respectively; p~ (3) the financial reports on the JDF,
General/Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF) and Fiduciary Fund (FF) were not
regularly submitted to the Accounting Division of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA); (4) the records control is not systematic; (5) no legal fees forms were attached to the
case records; (6) daily transactions in the FF account were not duly recorded in the
cashbooks; and, (7) documents needed to validate withdrawals of cash bonds from the
Municipal Treasurer’s Office (MTO) of Bulan were missing. The audit team thus made the
following recommendation in its Partial Report1 on the financial audit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that:
I. This report be docketed as a complaint against Mr. Joebert C. Guan, former Clerk of
Court of MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon and DIRECT Mr. Guan to:
1. IMMEDIATELY RESTITUTE his incurred shortages [in the] Judiciary
Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund amounting to
Forty Eight Thousand Two Hundred Seven Pesos and 10/100 (48,207.10) and
Five Thousand [One] Hundred Sixteen Pesos and 00/100 (5,116.00) respectively
by depositing the same to [their] respective bank account[s] through Mr. Joseph G.
Guim,2 the incumbent Officer-in-Charge, copy furnished the Fiscal Monitoring
Division, Court Management Office with the machine validated deposit slip/s as
proof of compliance.
2. EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice why he incurred such shortages and
why he should not be administratively dealt with for failure to comply with the court
circulars and issuances regarding proper handling of court collections;
3. SECURE from the Municipal Treasurer’s Office of Bulan[,] Sorsogon an itemized
list of Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund or cashbonds he deposited thereat, certified
correct by the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Treasurer; and
4. TRANSMIT to [the Office of the Court Administrator] through the Fiscal
Monitoring Division, Court Management Office all the documents regarding the
deposits and withdrawals of cashbonds from the Municipal Treasurer’s Office for
the period covering May 1998 to July 31, 2005, i.e., triplicate copies of Official
Receipts issued, Fiduciary Fund official cashbooks, and file copies of monthly
Reports of Collections, Deposits and Withdrawals together with the corresponding
supporting documents like the court order, original copy of surrendered official
receipts, vouchers and acknowledgment receipts as proof that all withdrawn
cashbonds were properly received by the bondsmen or their authorized
representatives.
x x x x3
Then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock approved 4 the recommendation and
submitted the same to the Court.5 On January 29, 2007, the Court issued a
Resolution6 adopting the recommendation of the OCA. In addition, this Court held in
abeyance any claim of Guan for separation benefits pending resolution of the administrative
matter against him.
Subsequently, Guan wrote the Court a letter7 dated March 12, 2007 requesting that the
monetary value of his leave credits be applied as payment for his accountability amounting
to 53,323.10.He explained that he could no longer account for the shortages because some
of the records pertaining thereto, as well as his Judiciary and General Fund reports, could
no longer be found.
In a Resolution8 dated August 13, 2007, the Court deferred action on Guan’s request
pending submission of the documents required of him, specifically (1) an itemized list from
the MTO of the unwithdrawn fiduciary fund or cash bonds, certified correct by the Municipal
Accountant and Municipal Treasurer; and (2) all documents regarding the deposits to and
withdrawals of cash bonds from the MTO for the period covering May 1998 to July 31, 2005.
But since Guan still failed to submit all the required documents, he was directed, through a
Resolution9 dated October 17, 2011, (1) to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt for such failure and (2) to comply by submitting the said documents.
In a letter10 dated August 26, 2011, Guan explained that while he was able to secure from
the MTO a list of cashbond deposits made by him, the Fiscal Monitoring Division (FMD) of
the OCA did not accept the same for being incomplete. He thus exerted all efforts to secure
a complete list but what was issued him was the same incomplete list, which when
submitted was again rejected by the FMD. And while he was also able to present to the
FMD a certification from the MTO that its records were damaged by typhoon "Melenyo" in
July 2007 (which thereby hindered the MTO from providing a complete list), the same still BALANCE
proved futile as the FMD did not accept the certificate. Therefore, Guan requested that an FUND/ PERIOD/S ACCOUNTABILITY
audit be conducted in the MTC of Bulan, Sorsogon. Granting Guan’s request, the Court, via ACCOUNT NAME AUDITED (SHORTAGE/
a Resolution11 dated August 13, 2012, directed Executive Judge Adolfo G. Fajardo of the (OVERAGE)
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65 of Bulan, Sorsogon, to conduct a financial audit on the
itemized list of unwithdrawn fiduciary fund or cashbonds deposited by Guan and to Fiduciary Fund 17 June 1998 to
thereafter submit a report thereon. Unfortunately, Judge Fajardo, in his Compliance 12 dated 23 Sept. 2004 [P]238,000.00
January 24, 2013, informed the Court that he cannot make an intelligible and
comprehensive financial audit as several pertinent records were nowhere to be found. In Judiciary Development
view of this, the Court issued its July 24, 2013 Resolution 13 directing the OCA to constitute a Fund (Unrestituted
financial audit team to conduct the audit. Accordingly, an audit team was again sent to the Shortages from previous 28 July 1993 to
MTC of Bulan, Sorsogon. audit) 31 Aug. 2004 [P]48,207.10
Judiciary Development
Upon the conclusion of the audit, it was revealed that both the former Officer-In-Charge, Fund 1 to 23 Sept. 2004 [P] 1,402.00
Joseph C. Guim (Guim) and the incumbent Clerk of Court, Emerose F. Denso, have no
accountability insofar as their periods of accountability are concerned as their books of Special Allowance for the
account were in order. With respect to Guan, however, the audit team found him Judiciary Fund
accountable for the following: (Unrestituted Shortages
from previous audit) 11 Nov. 2003 to
I. FIDUCIARY FUND (FF) 31 Aug. 2004 [P] 5,116.00
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund
FOR THE PERIOD COVERED: June 17, 1998 to September 23, 2004 1 to 23 Sept. 2004 [P] 708.0015

Guan’s final accountability/shortage is 238,000.00. The audit team noted that
Guan’s FF accountability was not due to undeposited collections but to lacking
documentations, specifically the deficient supporting documents on cashbonds
withdrawal transactions.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF)
FOR THE PERIOD COVERED: September 1 to 23, 2004
Guan’s accountability/shortage is 1,402.00. This comprised the unreported and
undeposited collections for the period covered.
III. SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY FUND (SAJF)
FOR THE PERIOD COVERED: September 1 to 23, 2004
Guan’s SAJF accountability/shortage is 708.00. This comprised the unreported
and undeposited collections for the covered period. 14
In its report16 dated November 7, 2014, the OCA concluded that Guan was remiss in the
performance of his duties and is administratively liable for:
1) failing to properly remit his cash collections in contrast with the requirements set
forth in the Commission on Audit (COA) and Department of Finance (DOF) Joint
Circular 1-81 and in Administrative Circular No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992 as
amended by Administrative Circular(A.C.) No. 3-2000 dated June 15, 2000;17 and,
2) failing to remit FF collections, in complete derogation of Administrative Circular
No. 50-95 dated October 11, 1995.18
Thus, it recommended that:
1. Mr. Joebert C. Guan, former Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Bulan,
Sorsogon, be found GUILTY of Violation of Office Rules and Regulations and
Simple Neglect of Duty and that he be ordered to PAY A FINE of 10,000.00 to be
deducted from the monetary value of his earned leave credits and/or other
retirement benefits;

Thus, including his previous accountabilities for JDF and SAJF as found during the earlier 2. the Office of the Administrative Services, OCA be DIRECTED to provide the
audit in 2006, Guan’s balance of accountabilities are as follows: Financial Management Office (FMO), OCA with the following documents pertaining
to Mr. Joebert C. Guan:
 2.1) Official Service Record;
2.2) Certification of Leave Credits; and
2.3) Notice of Salary Adjustment (NOSA) if any.
3. The FMO, OCA be further DIRECTED to:
3.1) PROCESS the money value of the terminal leave benefits of Mr.
Joebert C. Guan, dispensing with the usual documentary requirements,
and apply the same to the following shortages:
As found by the audit team, Guan’s accountabilities were either due to unreported or
undeposited collections or to deposited collection but with lacking documentation. This only
demonstrates Guan’s disorganized way of managing and documenting his collections
which, as aptly observed by the OCA, is in violation of Administrative Circular No. 5-93 that
provides, viz.: 3. Duty of the Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge or accountable officers. –
The Clerk of Court, Officers-in-Charge ofthe Office of the Clerk of Court, or their
accountable duly authorized representative designated by them in writing, who must be
accountable officers, shall receive the Judiciary Development Fund collections, issue the
proper receipt therefor, maintain a separate cash book properly marked CASH BOOK FOR
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND, deposit such collections in the manner herein
prescribed and render the proper Monthly Report of Collections for said Fund.
However, the Court disagrees with the OCA’s finding that Guan’s transgressions constitute
simple neglect of duty only.

Name of Fund Period Covered Amount

In the Office of the Court Administrator v. Acampado, 20 the Court declared that any
Fiduciary Fund 17 June 1998 to [P]238,000.00 shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance thereof
23 September 2004 constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively
liable. Moreover, in the Office of the Court Administrator v. Melchor, Jr., 21 it was held that
Judiciary Development 28 July 1993 to [P] 49,609.10 delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty because this
Fund 23 September 2004 omission deprives the court of interest that could have been earned if the amounts were
deposited in the authorized depository bank. This was also reiterated in the fairly recent
Special Allowance for the 28 July 1993 to [P] 5,824.00 case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Mrs. Aurora T. Zuniga. 22
Judiciary Fund 23 September 2004
Total [P]293433.10 Here, Guan’s shortages with respect to the JDF in the total amount of 49,609.10 and to the
SAJF totaling to 5,824.00 were both due to unreported and undeposited
collections.1âwphi1 In other words, Guan’s transgressions did not merely consist of delay in
3.2) COORDINATE with the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court the remittance of his collections but to his total failure to deposit the same as well. This is a
Management Office, OCA, before the processing of the checks to be clear case of gross neglect of duty. As held, "[g]ross neglect is such neglect which, from the
issued in favour of the Fiduciary Fund account of the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten the public welfare." 23 In this case, the frequency of the instances
MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon, and for the preparation of the necessary communication alone, i.e., for two separate periods of accountability, Guan was both found to have incurred
with the incumbent Clerk of Court/Officer-in-Charge thereat; shortages with respect to the JDF and SAJF due to unreported and undeposited collections,
makes respondent’s neglect of duty so serious in its character as to threaten the public
4. ORDER Mr. Guan to restitute the remaining shortages in case the monetary welfare.
value of his earned leave credits and/or other benefits would not be sufficient to
cover the aforementioned shortages; and Anent Guan’s accountability of 238,000.00 in FF, the audit team noted that the same was
not due to unreported or undeposited collections but to incomplete documentation to
5. CLEAR MR. JOSEPH G. GUIM AND MS. EMEROSE F. DENSO, former support cash bond withdrawals therefrom. Still, it is well to state that documentation of cash
Officer-in-Charge and incumbent Clerk of Court, respectively, MTC, Bulan, collections is essential to the orderly administration of justice.24 It is for this reason that court
Sorsogon, of any accountability insofar as their corresponding periods of circulars and other relevant rules for proper documentation such as by submission to the
accountability are concerned, after having been audited of their books of accounts court of reports of collections of all funds and proper issuance of receipts, among others,
which were found to be in order.19 were designed. Evidently, respondent failed to comply with the same and this likewise
constitutes gross neglect of duty.25
Our Ruling
"Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if
for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
The Court modifies the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Administrative Cases in the Civil Service."26 While Guan had already been dropped from the
rolls for being absent without official leave (AWOL) in A.M. No. 06-5-171-MTC, he still
remains administratively liable, although the penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed upon Name of Fund Period Covered Amount
him. Nevertheless, "[a] fine can be imposed, instead, and its amount is subject to the sound
discretion of the Court. Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules provides that 17 June 1998 to
fine as a penalty shall be in an amount not exceeding the salary for six months had the Fiduciary Fund ₱238,000.00
23 September 2004
respondent not resigned [or been dropped from the rolls] the rate for which is that obtaining
at the time of his resignation. The fine shall be deducted from any accrued leave credits, Judiciary 28 July 1993 to
₱49,609.10
with the respondent being personally liable for any deficiency that should be directly payable Development Fund 23 September 2004
to this Court. He is [also] further declared disqualified from any future government
Special Allowance for 28 July 1993 to
service."27 ₱5,824.00
the Judiciary Fund 23 September 2004

As a final note, "Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts’ ‘funds and revenues,
records, properties, and premises.’ They are ‘liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment’ of those entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and
the delay in the actual remittance ‘constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of
court shall beheld administratively liable.’"28
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Joebert C. Guan GUILTY of gross neglect of
duty and resolves to:
Total ₱293,433.10
3.2 COORDINATE with the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court
Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator, before the
processing of the checks to be issued in favor of the Fiduciary Fund
account of the MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon, and for the preparation of the
necessary communication with the incumbent Clerk of Court/Officer-in-
Charge thereat;

1. ORDER respondent TO PAY A FINE equivalent to his salary for six months 4. ORDER respondent Guan to pay any remainder of the fine and/or restitute any
computed at the salary rate of his former position at the time he was dropped from remaining shortages incase the monetary value of his earned leave credits and/or
the rolls to be deducted from the monetary value of his earned leave credits and/or other benefits would not be sufficient to cover the same; and,
other retirement benefits, and, DECLARE him DISQUALIFIED from re-employment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; 5. CLEAR MR. JOSEPH G. GUIM AND MS. EMEROSE F. DENSO, former
Officer-in-Charge and incumbent Clerk of Court, respectively, MTC, Bulan,
Sorsogon, of any accountability insofar as their corresponding periods of
2. DIRECT the Office of the Administrative Services of Office of the Court accountability are concerned, after having been audited of their books of accounts
Administrator to provide the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court which were found to be in order.
Administrator, with the following documents pertaining to respondent Joebert C.
Guan:
SO ORDERED.
a. Official Service Record;

b. Certification of Leave Credits; and

c. Notice of Salary Adjustment, if any.

3. FURTHER DIRECT the Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court
Administrator to:

3.1 PROCESS the monetary value of the terminal leave benefits of

respondent Joebert C. Guan, dispensing with the usual documentary
requirements, and whatever remains therefrom after deducting the fine
imposed upon him, APPLY the same to the following shortages:
 A.M. No. CA-12-26-P, August 17, 2015
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ANA MARIE ABARENTOS,
RECORDS OFFICER IV, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative complaint stemmed from an anonymous letter1 dated February 9, 2011
addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona charging respondent Anna Marie Abarintos,
former Records Officer IV at the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
station, of tampering the date of receipt of the Petition for Review filed in CA-G.R. SP No.
05464.2 Respondent allegedly made it appear that said pleading was timely filed on
November 4, 2010 to favor her husband's kumpadre who filed it. In the same letter,
respondent likewise accused of taking the ATM card of her officemate, Records Officer II
Elizabeth Gilos (Gilos), and withdrawing therefrom P10,000.00 without the latter's
knowledge and consent.
In her Comment,3 respondent denied the accusations. She averred that the issue of
tampering had already been clarified and that it did not prejudice the rights and interest of
any of the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 05464. With regard to the alleged unauthorized
withdrawal, respondent explained that the same is a personal issue between two friends
arising from a simple misunderstanding. According to respondent, the anonymous letter
does not deserve the attention of this Court and that the same has caused undue stress and
pain to her father-in-law, Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, who was then the
Chairperson of the Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu station. Thus, on
February 14, 2011 she resigned from the Court of Appeals. 4redarclaw
On December 3, 2012, upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), this case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the
Court of Appeals, Cebu station for investigation, report and recommendation. 5redarclaw
Administrative hearings thereafter ensued.
On March 18, 2013, however, this Court modified its December 3, 2012 Resolution by
referring the case to the Court of Appeals, Manila for investigation, report and
recommendation.6redarclaw
Thus, the new Investigating Justice in Manila set this case for hearing on January 10, 2014
for the reception of respondent's evidence.7 But respondent instead filed a Manifestation
Under Oath8 stating that after consulting her family, she decided not to present any
controverting evidence other than those mentioned in her Comment.
Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
On April 15, 2014, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and
Recommendation,9 finding the charge of tampering unsupported by substantial evidence.
He based his conclusion on the testimony of Atty. Lucila C. Enjambre (Atty. Enjambre),
Assistant Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, Cebu station, explaining that the Petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 05464 was actually filed and received by the Receiving Section of the
Judicial Records Division on November 4, 2010. The date November 5, 2010 appearing
thereon indicates the date the Office of the Division Clerk of Court received said pleading.
With respect to the charge of unauthorized withdrawal from the account of Gibs, however,
the Investigating Justice found sufficient evidence to hold respondent liable therefor. Thus:
Elizabeth Gilos' identification of respondent in the CCTV recording and her testimony that
respondent admitted the withdrawal and even paid her two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as
partial payment for the ten thousand pesos (510,000.00) that was withdrawn from her
account conclusively prove that respondent committed the act of withdrawing money from
her Land Bank deposit [account with the use of] her ATM card without her consent. 10
The Investigating Justice categorized the unauthorized withdrawal as a grave misconduct
and recommended the penalty of disqualification from holding public office for one year.
Thereafter, this case was referred to OCA for evaluation, recommendation and
report.11redarclaw
Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated February 17, 2015, the OCA opined that respondent is guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having received a pleading beyond
office hours and without authority to do so. Anent the unauthorized withdrawal, it agreed
with the Investigating Justice that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct, with the
modification that the same also constitutes dishonesty. Since respondent had already
resigned, the OCA recommended the penalty of P20,000.00 fine with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification from holding public
office. Thus:
Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACS provides that if the respondent is found guilty of two (2)
or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the
most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
However, considering that respondent Abarintos already resigned from the service effective
14 February 2011, the penalty of dismissal can no longer be imposed. The penalty of fine is
therefore deemed proper.
Furthermore, Section 52 of the same rule provides that the penalty of dismissal carries with
it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from
holding public office and [being] bar[red] from taking the civil service examination.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the
Honorable Court that:
1. Anna Marie Abarintos, former Records Officer FV, Court of Appeals (Cebu Station) be
found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and be FFNED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (¥20,000.00) and with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification
from holding office in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; and
2. The Finance Management Office of the Court of Appeals be DIRECTED to DEDUCT the
fine of P20,000.00 imposed against Anna Marie Abarintos from whatever sums are due to
her as accrued leave credits, if sufficient.12
This Court's Ruling
The Court partially adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
The charge of tampering is not supported by sufficient evidence.
In finding respondent liable for tampering the date of receipt of the Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 05464, the OCA essentially relied on the following circumstances: it is not part of
respondent's duty to receive pleadings as there are four (4) court personnel in the Receiving
Section tasked to do the same; and, she received said pleading after office hours or at 5:10
in the afternoon of November 4,2010.
At first blush, the circumstances enumerated by OCA are enough to raise a quizzical
eyebrow. But administrative liability cannot rest on mere suspicion or speculation. 13 There
must be substantial evidence to support a finding that respondent is responsible for the
reprehensible act imputed against her. "Substantial evidence in an administrative case
consists of that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."14redarclaw
In this case, respondent is being charged with tampering the date of actual receipt of the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 05464. Thus:
Sensing that the filing was out of the desired date, ANNA personally tampered the date at
our receiving section to make it appear that the pleading was filed on time as November 4
instead of November 5, extrinsically a dismissible ground by technicality, x x x15
The aforesaid circumstances relied upon by the OCA do not, however, prove that
respondent altered or intercalated the actual date of receipt of the Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 05464 as appearing on the face thereof. There is no showing that said pleading was
actually filed on November 5, 2010, but that through respondent's intervention or
manipulation she changed the date and made it appear that the same was seasonably filed
on November 4, 2010. On the contrary, Atty. Enjambre categorically declared under oath
that said pleading was filed on November 4, 2010, viz.:
Q: Can you assist the Investigator with [regard] to this Petition for Review and show to
me when this Petition for Review was received?
A: On page 16 of the rollo, Your Honor, we have the Petition for Review. On its face
on page 16 there is a mark ["]Received - November 4, 2010["] and this is the
signature of Anna Marie Abarintos. This petition was supposedly received by her
on November 4, 2010 at 5:10, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: So, Atty. Enjambre, you said that it was received on 4 November, right?
A: Appearing on page 1 of the Petition, Your Honor.
Q: Yes. There is a stamp here on the right side portion of the first page of the Petition
for Review as mentioned November 4, but on the left side, Atty. Enjambre, there
also appears a stamp ["JReceived - 19th Division, November 5, 2010["]. What is
the significance of this other stamp Received?
A: From the Receiving Section, Your Honor, the same will be forwarded to the SP
Section and then they will docket the case and then they will assign a docket
number and then forward it to the Raffle Committee for raffle and after the raffle,
the same will be forwarded to the Division Clerk of Court concerned. 16
We also note that the CA's February 21, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 05464
outrightly dismissed the petition for: (i) being patently without merit; (ii) lack of competent
evidence of identity; and, (iii) failure of the notary public before whom the verification and
certification was subscribed to indicate his/her notarial commission number. It did not
include tardiness as one of the grounds for dismissing said petition.
As regards respondent's alleged lack of authority, no office order or memorandum was,
however, cited or presented to establish that only the four court personnel in the Receiving
Section, to the exclusion of all others, are authorized to receive pleadings. Put differently,
there is no proof that respondent, who is the head of the Judicial Records Division, is
prohibited from receiving pleadings. On the other hand, The 2002 Revised Manual for
Clerks of Court outlines the functions and duties of the Chief Judicial Staff Officer of Judicial
Records Division as follows:
5.1. Adjudicative Support Functions:
5.1.1. Takes charge of docketing all cases received by the Court;
5.1.2. Receives and reports to the Divisions concerned all pleadings and communications
relative to the cases already filed;
x x x x17
Since it has not been established that respondent is forbidden to receive pleadings, she
should not be administratively held liable for doing so.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the recommendation of the OCA that respondent's
receipt of subject pleading several minutes after office hours raises a presumption that she
used her office to extend a favor to a litigant. There is simply no such presumption that
exists in the Rules on Evidence or in statute books. On the other hand, it is basic that court
officials and personnel are presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.18 At
this point, it may not be amiss to state that the circulars issued by this Court pertaining to
the observance of prescribed working hours19 are intended to promote punctuality and
prevent tardiness or absenteeism "if only to recompense the government and, ultimately,
the people, who shoulder the cost of maintaining the Judiciary." 20 They are not intended to
deny public service to the same people who come to court to transact business, even if they
arrive a few minutes after the prescribed working hours, when there are still court personnel
present who could serve them. Neither should they be construed as to prohibit dedicated
court personnel to render genuine public service beyond the regular office hours. "Truly,
public servants at times should share a part of their extra time and skills in order to facilitate
swift delivery of service to the public."21redarclaw
 investigation and then would show to me that they really have debited that as a
The acts of respondent in taking the ATM card of Gilos and making an unauthorized system error.
withdrawal constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty. Q: Your first impression was that it was just erroneously debited from your account
and you wanted the bank to rectify the system error they committed?
The Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA that the acts of respondent in taking the A: Yes, that [was] my intention.
ATM card of her officemate and making an unauthorized withdrawal therefrom do not only Q: So, your account is with Land Bank. [In] which branch?
constitute grave misconduct, but amount to dishonesty as well. A: Capitol Branch.
Q: When you went to Land Bank, Ms. Abarintos accompanied you?
Misconduct has been defined "as 'a transgression of some established and definite rule of A: Yes.27
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.' The xxxx
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to Q: Land Bank did not [restitute] the amount that was withdrawn or did not return or
violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial deposit P10,000.00 to your account?
evidence."22 Dishonesty, on the other hand, "has been defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, A: No, because according to them x x x it is not a [system] error.
deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or xxxx
integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and Q: So right now that amount is still unaccounted for[;] it has not been returned to you
straightforwardness in his or her dealings."23redarclaw whether it's system error or unauthorized withdrawal?
A: A portion of that was returned.
In Rojas, Jr. v. Mina,24 the respondent therein was found guilty of gross misconduct and xxxx
dishonesty for stealing and encashing the checks payable to trial court judges without their Q: How much is the amount?
knowledge and consent. A: P2,000.00.
xxxx
In this case, the fact that respondent took the ATM card of Gilos and the manner by which Q: Who [returned the] P2,000.00?
respondent was able to withdraw P10,000.00 from her account on November 12, 2010 have A: Ms. Abarintos.
been duly proven by substantial evidence. Gilos testified that earlier that day she gave her Q: Where did she do that, here in the office?
PIN to respondent to inquire thru phone banking the balance of her account. The CCTV files A: In the office.
of the ATM from which the money was withdrawn show that respondent withdrew said Q: Was there any explanation why she paid you P2,000.00?
amount from Gilos's account.25 Gilos also testified that respondent admitted to her having A: That is the only money she could afford during that time.
withdrawn the amount of P10,000.00, and even paid her P2,000.00 as partial payment. Q: Was that the only x x x [explanation for] the P2,000.00? No other statements were
Thus: made such as the withdrawal or anything to do with your ATM card or other
statements on that regard?
[Justice Yap] A: She made a statement that she did it.
Q: Who would know your PIN x x x other than you, of course? Who else did you share Q: And how were you able to take that from her?
[it] with? A: I did not even [ask] her to pay even after viewing. I did not tell her that I already
[Gilos] viewed it x x x.
A: We have phone banking. So, during that time I shared that ATM PIN x x x [with] Q: This happened after your viewing of the CCTV slides?
the respondent because she was inquiring her bank account while I [was] doing A: Yes, Your Honor.
the encoding in my table where the telephone was and then she also inquired the Q: Could it be before February 14?
balance x x x of my ATM [deposit account]. A: Yes.
Q: When would that be? Is it the same day that you discovered the P10,000.00 was Q: So, [the P2,000.00 was just given to you] and then Ms. Abarintos [admitted
withdrawn? responsibility]?
A: The same day that the money was withdrawn. A: Before she gave that P2,000.00 to me she already called me at home and then
Q: November 12 based on Exhibit "A-7"? she told me that she really did it and x x x apolog[ized] and then after giving the
A: Yes, Your Honor.26 P2,000.00 she told me that she will give me the remaining amount as [soon] as
xxxx she x x x has the money.28
A: That is why I made a manifestation earlier that I did not approach her. She
voluntarily went with me to the bank when she learned that I will be going there to As head of the Judicial Records Division, and involved in the administration of justice,
file my complaint because to my belief it was debited by the bank erroneously or respondent "ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in public
system error. That is really my intention of going to the bank to file a complaint so service."29 Indeed, "[n]o position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
that they will act on it because I am very sure that I did not [make] any withdrawal from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of
for that P10,000.00. So, I wanted them to know so that they could conduct an uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people's respect and faith in the
judiciary."30 "[A]ny conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm
of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in
the judiciary shall not be countenanced."31

The resignation of respondent from the service on February 14, 2011 is of no moment.
Resignation from the service will not extricate court employees from the consequences of
their acts. It is settled that the cessation from office neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against the respondents while they were still in the service nor
does it render the case moot and academic.32 "A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications," 33as nothing "would
prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and
other condemnable acts knowing fully well that they would soon be beyond the pale of the
law and immune to all administrative penalties[.]"34 The only effect of respondent's
resignation is that it rendered moot the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.

Under Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
dishonesty and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses meriting the supreme
penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense, with the accessory penalties of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification
from re-employment in the government service. In view of respondent's resignation,
however, the penalty that can be imposed against her is a fine with the same accessory
penalties of forfeiture and disqualification. Although the OCA recommended a fine of
P20,000.00, circumstances in this case warrant a lesser amount. While We do not condone
the lamentable act of respondent in making an unauthorized withdrawal, it does not escape
Our attention that respondent is a first-time offender. She eventually admitted to Gilos that
she took the money which she returned, albeit partially. After consulting her family,
respondent did not present controverting evidence in this case and effectively submitted her
fate to the judicious resolution of this case. Finally, to save her family from embarrassment
and unnecessary emotional stress, respondent resigned. To Our mind, these circumstances
evince her sincere remorse and wholehearted repentance for committing a regrettable
misstep in her life. In Apiag v. Judge Cantero,35 this Court treated the indiscretion committed
by a repentant respondent as follows:

Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not
look only at his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his
genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.

Thus, and out of compassion and mercy, We deem it just and proper to reduce the
recommended fine to P5,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Anna Marie Abarintos, former Records Officer IV
of the Court of Appeals, Cebu station, guilty of Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct and
orders her to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with forfeiture of whatever benefits still due her from
the government, except accrued leave credits. Respondent is likewise declared disqualified
from employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149 March 9, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2787-RTJ)
LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, Complainant,
vs.
Judge VENANCIO J. AMILA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint1 dated November 29, 2007 filed by complainant Lydia A.
Benancillo (Lydia) charging respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila (Judge Amila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Tagbilaran City with Grave Abuse of Discretion,
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or
Order, Partiality and Impropriety relative to Civil Case No. 7268 entitled "Lydia A. Benancillo
v. Paul John Belot," a Petition for Temporary Protection Order and Permanent Protection
Order under Republic Act No. 9262.
The facts as culled from the Report2 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) are as
follow:
1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT
xxxx
The complainant, the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, avers that Branch 1 of RTC
Tagbilaran City, acting as then Family Court in Tagbilaran City, issued a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner, Paul John Belot (Belot). The TPO
included a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal effects, including properties in their
diving business called the Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. (Underworld). Belot sought the
reconsideration of the issuance of the TPO. Meanwhile, their business partners, Paz
Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion for intervention with respect to the
properties of Underworld. The complainant filed an opposition to the motion for intervention
with prayer for preliminary injunction.
The complainant alleges that when Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran City, presided by the
respondent judge, was designated as the new Family Court in Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil
Case No. 7268 was transferred to the said court. Acting on the pending incidents, the
respondent judge denied both Belot’s motion for reconsideration and the intervenors’ motion
for intervention in an Order dated July 16, 2007. The respondent judge incorporated in the
resolution a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the intervenors from taking possession of the
properties of Underworld.
The complainant further alleges that the respondent judge reiterated his Order of July 16,
2007 in an Order dated August 14, 2007. Subsequently, the respondent judge denied the
intervenors’ motion for reconsideration in an Order dated October 2, 2007.
The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her favor as he
consistently held that the intervenors had no legal personality in the case. However, the
respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.
The complainant claims that on October 8, 2007, the respondent judge called her and her
counsel to a meeting in his chambers on October 9, 2007. They agreed to the meeting but
they did not proceed when they learned that the intervenors were joining them. Subsequent
to the respondent judge’s meeting with the intervenors, he issued an Order dated October
18, 2007 which rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007. Then, in an Order dated October
25, 2007, he denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
According to the complainant, the respondent judge’s conduct smacks of impropriety and
partiality. She further charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion, gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for
issuing the questioned Orders of October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his Order of October
2, 2007, without any motion being filed by any of the parties. Moreover, the Order of
October 18, 2007 was based on an inexistent ground as the respondent judge mentioned in
this Order a petition for certiorari supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet been x x x filed
with the Court of Appeals.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judge’s Order of October 25, 2007 ruling on
the complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Order of October 18, 2007 introduced a
new issue on the jurisdiction of the court over the person of Belot. The respondent judge
also ruled on maintaining the status quo, a position inconsistent with the preliminary
injunction he had previously issued.
2. COMMENT of Judge Venancio J. Amila dated February 8, 2008 wherein he denies the
charges against him.
The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her "insatiable greed
to have exclusive control and possession pending trial of the case [of] all the properties of
the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of respondent Paul John Belot." x x x [H]e added that
the "complainant . . . is only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who
was branded repeatedly by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’."
According to the respondent judge, he rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007 because the
complainant had no right to her alleged shares in the corporation being merely a dummy
owner of Belot’s shares. He was "fearful of the consequence in the event that complainant
would stealthily dispose of or abscond [with] the properties. . . because of the illegitimate
status of their relationship, more so, with their present feud caused by the arrival of Belot’s
son and the alleged coming of the legitimate wife."
The respondent judge averred that the complainant "masterminded all [the] legal
manipulations [and] moved heaven and earth x x x to get possession of all the properties of
Belot to the extent of filing the instant administrative charge and a petition for certiorari lately
with the Court of Appeals, dated December 21, 2007 using the same offensive and
disrespectful language in her arguments.
The respondent asserted he had the authority to motu proprio rectify an error to restore
things to their status quo during the pendency of the case in order to avoid damage or loss.
x x x [T]he complainant refused to attend the meeting he called with the intervenor in
chambers to explain the Order.1avvphi1
Respondent Judge Amila incorporated in his submission his comment to a similar
administrative complaint filed earlier by the complainant. x x x [H]e alleged that he set aside
his Order of October 2, 2007 because the Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot before the
Court of Appeals had placed the jurisdiction of the court under question.
3. REPLY-AFFIDAVIT dated February 29, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant claimed that she suffered psychological and emotional violence as the
respondent judge echoed Belot’s verbal and psychological abuse against her that she was
"only a live-in partner" "in an illegitimate relation" and a "prostitute." The respondent judge’s
remarks revealed his prejudice and lack of gender sensitivity and this was unbecoming of a
family court judge. His remarks also manifested his lack of knowledge and/or utter disregard
of the law on the equal protection to women-victims in intimate relationships under the anti-
VAWC law which he was mandated to uphold as a family court judge.
The complainant averred that the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO under the
Anti-VAWC law because of his prejudiced view that she would abscond with the contested
properties due to the "illegitimate status" of their "relationship." His personal bias against the
complainant reflects his utter lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The complainant denied the respondent judge’s accusation that she and her counsel
"masterminded all these legal manipulations." She added that the accusation implies that
the respondent judge was not in control of the proceedings and that he could be
manipulated by the parties.
The complainant alleged that as the respondent judge still refused to implement the TPO
despite the dismissal of Belot’s petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, she filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court for the annulment of the Orders dated
October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant asserted that while the respondent judge can change his mind, he could
no longer do so when the Order already became final and executory and was not
questioned anymore by the parties. Moreover, there was no reason for the respondent
judge to call for a meeting with the intervenors because he already ruled that intervention
was not allowed in the case.
4. AFFIDAVIT-MANIFESTATION dated May 27, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant manifested that the Court of Appeals of Cebu City already dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot which petition the respondent Judge cited as reason for
rescinding his Order dated [October] 2, 2007, the petition being a prohibited pleading under
Section 22 of RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC).3
In its Report4 dated September 11, 2008, the OCA found that Judge Amila acted
inappropriately in calling the intervenors to a meeting in his chambers. It was also noted that
he used derogatory and irreverent language in presenting complainant in his Comment as
an opportunist, a mistress in an illegitimate relationship and that she was motivated by
insatiable greed. As regards the charge for gross ignorance of the law, the OCA noted that
the same is premature considering that complainant filed before this Court a petition
assailing the October 18 and 25, 2007 Orders of respondent Judge. 5
The OCA thus recommended:
xxxx
1. That the case be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. That the charges of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order relative to the
issuance of the Order[s] dated October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007 be
DISMISSED for being premature;
3. [That r]espondent Judge Venancio J. Amila, Regional Trial Court (Branch 3),
Tagbilaran City, be found guilty of impropriety for the use of intemperate language
and unbecoming conduct and be FINED in the amount of ₱10,000.00 with the
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense x x x shall be dealt with
more severely.6
We adopt the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of
the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
Judge Amila should be reminded of Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.7
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, 10 Rule 140
activities. of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11C 11 thereof by any of the following: (1)
A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
xxxx Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but
even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts
that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as
such. "Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct
than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust." 8
In as much as Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
connection with his Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 14988 and 14989 which was docketed
as A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071 where he was ordered to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00 and warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the penalty of
fine of ₱21,000.00 is deemed appropriate in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Venancio J. Amila GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge, and FINE him ₱21,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the
intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. His explanation that he called the said
meeting to advice the parties that he will rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not
acceptable. Why would a judge give the parties advance notice that he is going to issue an
Order, more so rescind his previous Order? Worse, why would he call on the intervenors
whom he had earlier ruled as not having any legal personality in this case? This act of
respondent judge would logically create an impression to complainant that the meeting of
the judge with the intervenors had turned his views around towards issuing a revocation of
the October 2, 2007 Order.

In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to
complainant. The former in effect maliciously besmirched the character of complainant by
calling her as "only a live-in partner of Belot" and presenting her as an opportunist and
a mistress in an illegitimate relationship. The judge also called her a prostitute. The judge’s
accusations that complainant was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with
the contested property are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of complainant is also
inconsistent with the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) he issued in her favor as a victim of
domestic violence. Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his
language.

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack
of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient
control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases
his persuasiveness.9

Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct

unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.