The Struggle Over The Dissolution of The Croatian Military Border, 1850 - 1871 PDF

The Struggle over the Dissolution of the Croatian Military Border, 1850- 1871
Author(s): Gunther E. Rothenberg

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1964), pp. 63-78
Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
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THE
STRUGGLE OVER THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE CROATIAN
MILITARY BORDER, 1850-1871
BY GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG
Historians have differed in their evaluation of the nationality problem

in the Habsburg Empire, but they have generally agreed that the Mili-
tary Border maintained along the southern boundaries of Hungary and
Croatia constituted a traditional element of dynastic strength. "There
arose," Oscar Jaiszi wrote, "a proverbial Habsburg patriotism, perhaps
the only real one which the Habsburgs were capable of fomenting in
their realm."'1 The dissolution of the Military Border in Croatia-Slavo-
nia, which took place soon after the celebrated Ausgleich of 1867, has
been considered a serious blow to the military posture and the stability
of the monarchy.2 Yet such appraisals need a critical reassessment.
After the middle of the nineteenth century, South Slav national tend-
encies profoundly altered; and the Border became a blunted and much
less "reliable" instrument of imperial policy.
The Croatian-Slavonian Vojna Krajirta or Militdrgrenze was, of
course, but part of the extensive frontier system which stretched from
the Adriatic to the Carpathians. But, comprising about two-fifths of
the total complex, it was the oldest and the strongest segment, dating
back to beginnings made by Ferdinand I in the first half of the six-
teenth century and repeatedly expanded and reorganized by successive
Austrian rulers. In this region appointed Habsburg officials superseded
the authority of the Hungarian-Croatian crown, and the entire male
population, the Grenzer or Granicari, formed an ever-ready military
force. The largest element of this force was recruited among Serb and
Croat refugees from the Ottoman Empire, who were granted land allot-
ments and freedom from the usual manorial obligations in return for
permanent military service.3 Whatever the original intent, in time this
M R. R 0 T H E N B E R G is associate professor of history at the University of Nezv Mexico.
The preparation of this article was made possible by grants from the American Philo-
sophical Society and the American Council of Learned Societies.
1 Oscar JAszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 57.
2 Most recently by Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten (Graz and Cologne, 1956), p. 66, and
by Kurt XVessely,Die osterreichische Militdirgrenze (Kitzingen, 1953), p. 21.
3 For the development of this institution see Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Austrian
Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747 (Urbana, 1960). A discussion of the special privileges
in Branko P. Sucevic, "Razvitak 'Vlaskih prava' u VaraMdinskom generalatu," Historijski
Zbornik, VI (1953), 33-70.
64 Slavic Review
arrangement created a gulf between the "military" and "civil" Croatia,

and gave the Grenzer a special sense of attachment and loyalty to the
crown. In the words of an Austrian general, the Border functioned
"not only as a rampart against the Turks, but also as a restraint upon
the rebellious tendencies of the Hungarian-Croatian nobility."4
The military establishment was based on an exclusively agricultural
economy. Only soldier families were permitted to hold land, which
was regarded as a military fief, and with the exception of a few indis-
pensable trades, no nonagricultural occupations were permitted. The
purpose of the numerous reforms-and in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries hardly a decade passed without such a scheme-
was not the improvement of the material and spiritual conditions of
the Border but the intensification of its military efforts.5 Territorial
units maintained themselves at little or no expense to the state in
times of peace, and "regiment," in the language of the Border, denoted
not a tactical formation but an administrative district.6 The tendency
of such a system to degenerate into mere militia was counteracted by
placing all inhabitants, whether actually serving under arms or not,
under a Draconic military code. An important reservoir of trained
manpower, the Military Border became an instrument of imperial
policy and not merely a frontier defense organization. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the military authorities in Vienna repeatedly
rebuffed Hungarian-Croatian demands for the disbandment of this
institution.7
The military system of the Croatian-Slavonian Border and its way of
life survived the upheavals of the revolutionary period, remaining vir-
tually intact under the brief French occupation (1809-13). But the new
political and social ideas of the nineteenth century slowly penetrated
through civil Croatia into the Border. Dissatisfaction with the eco-
nomic restrictions and complaints about the hardships of the service
and abuses of power by the regimental officers became common after
1815.8 But as long as serfdom continued to exist in the Habsburg
4 Duke Joseph Friedrich zu Sachsen-Hildburghausen in his 1737 report on the Border,
Kriegsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter cited as KA), Kanzlei-Archiv, VII-349.
5 Carl B. Hietzinger, Statistik der Militdrgrenze des osterreichischen Kaiserthumns (3
vols.; Vienna, 1817-23), II, 52, tabulated more than thirty major reorganizations between
1703 and 1807. A French military observer commented: "Le gouvernment, loin de cher-
cher a augmenter le bien-etre et la richesse des habitant des fronti&res, craint plutot que
trop d'aisance n'enlve quelque chose de leur qualites militaires; il veut des soldats avant
tout." M. de Terrason, "Essai sur l'organisation des Frontieres Militaires et Regiments
Fronti&es de l'Autriche," Archives Historiques de la Guerre, Paris, Reconaissances, carton
1599.
6 Carl Frhr. v. Pidoll zu Quintenbach, Einige Worte iuber die russischen Militair-
Kolonien im Tfergleiche mit der k.k. osterreichischen Militair-Granze (Vienna, 1847), p. 27.
7 Rothenberg, op. cit., passim.
8 Reports on the unsatisfactory conditions of the Border include orders issuied by the
Hofkriegsrat to stop the mistreatment of the Grenzer, KA, HKR 1820, B-1/55, and the
reports KA, Mem. 22-84, of Oct., 1830, and KA, Mem. 23-74 of Nov., 1832. Cf. Emmerich
I. v. Tkalac, Jugenderinnerungen aus Kroatien (Leipzig, 1894), pp. 315-16, 324-29; Ognie-
The Dissolution of the Croatian Military Border 65
lands, military status was preferable, and the Grenzer opposed the de-
mands of the still largely feudal Croatian estates for the introduction
of civil administration.9 The imperial authorities, of course, encour-
aged these differences and took the greatest care to keep the Grenzer
communities "uncontaminated" by the rising spirit of nationalism.
During the Serbian revolt, Vienna took extraordinary precautions to
prevent any involvement of the Military Border,'0 and in the 1840's
Gaj's Illyrian movement aroused the most serious misgivings."-l How-
ever, the war council felt assured that "the Grenzer, because of their
special status and because of their gratitude for their special privileges,
were immune to the blandishments of parties."12 Indeed, they were
regarded as a reliable instrument against the militant Magyar nation-
alists, and Count Hartig declared that "should it ever be necessary to
use force in Hungary, the enthusiasm of the Border regiments would
insure victory for the government."13 On the eve of the revolution of
1848 the Croatian-SlavonianBorder was comprised of eleven regiments,
a total population of 572,000, about evenly divided between Orthodox
and Catholics and able to raise well over 50,000 trained soldiers.'4
As the military had predicted, the Croatian-Slavonian Grenzer
wholeheartedly supported the dynasty in 1848. Some regiments served
under Radetzky in Italy; others followed Banus Jelacic on the Hun-
garian plains and against revolutionary Vienna. At the same time,
however, "military" and "civil" Croatia drew closer together. Serfdom
was abolished in Croatia, and when for the first time in history Grenzer
delegates participated in the sessions of the national diet, the Sabor,
slav M. Utiesenovic, Die Militdrgrenze und die Verfassung (Vienna, 1861), pp. 48-49, and
Pidoll zu Quintenbach, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
9 As a report to Count Josef Sedlnitzky, the police minister, put it: "Denn der Grenzer
als Lehnsmann Sr. Maj. des Kaisers, achtet sich hbher als ein Untertan im Provinzial."
Zagreb, Apr. 17, 1847, in Gyula Miskolczy, ed., A horvdt kdrdds t&5rtdnetees iromdnyai a
rendi dllam koradban(2 vols.; Budapest, 1927-28), II, 542.
10 Documents in Aleks Ivic, ed., Spisi belkih arhiva o prvomn srpskomn ustanku, Vols.
VII, IX, X, XI and XIV, 2nd ser. of Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i knjizevnost srpskog naroda
(Belgrade and Subotica, 1935-39), passim.
11 Correspondence between the Court War Council and the authorities in Croatia con-
cerning Gaj, the Illyrian movement, and the attitudes of the Grenzer, Miskolczy, op. cit.,
I, 590-193,603-10; II, 21-43, 283-40, and 540-42.
12 Report of Ignaz Count Hardegg, President of the Court War Council to the Staats-
konferenz, Vienna, Feb. 13, 1843, ibid., II, 39-40.
13 Memorandum by Franz Count Hartig, Vienna, Nov. 17, 1843, ibid., pp. 72-74, and the
report concerning the attitude of the Grenzer, KA Hofkriegsrat Prasidial 1846, 626.
14 Normally each regiment comprised two active infantry battalions, about 2,750 men,
and a third reserve battalion. In addition there was the armed Landsturmn or populace,
which could be formed into field units and double the strength of the Border. By 1847
the regiments were grouped under two headquarters, the Banal-Warasdiner-Karlstadter
Generalkommando in Zagreb with eight regiments, and the Slawonisches-Syrmisches
Generalkommando in Peterwardein with three regiments. Alexius v. F6nyes, Statistik cles
Kdnigreiches Ungarn (2 vols.; Pest, 1843-44), II, 205-12. Matthias Stopfer, Erlduterungen
iiber die Militlir-Grdnz Verwaltung des osterreichischen Kaiserthumns (Vienna, 1838), has
complete tables of organization following p. 273.
66 Slavic Review
they voted for resolutions ending the military regime and incorporating
the Border into the Croatian kingdom.'5 As it turned out, however,
these resolutions were not carried into effect. Under the influence of
Bantis Jelacic, a former commander of a Border regiment and closely
connected with centralist circles in Vienna, the Sabor agreed to suspend
all changes until the conclusion of hostilities with Hungary.'6 The
greater was the disappointment when Croatian national aspirations as
well as the wishes of the Grenzer were disregarded in the imperial con-
stitution handed down in March, 1849, which simnply proclaimed the
"Military Border and all its inhabitants an integral part of the imperial
army.''17 Even Jelacic was moved to protest but was satisfied by an
imperial assurance that the Border would participate "in all the
benefits granted our other peoples."'8
The extent of the benefits was revealed in 1850, when a new funda-
mental ordinance (Grundgesetz) was issued. Essentially a compromise,
the law made concessions in the economic sphere but preserved the
military character of the Border and its direct relation with the central
wvarministry in Vienna. Landholdings became actual and inheritable
property of the Grenzer, and limitations on civil occupations were
lifted. On the other hand, however, all able-bodied men remained
permanently enrolled as soldiers; military jurisdiction was maintained,
and the regiments continued as the civil and military framework.'9
However, there was no longer much military justification for main-
taining the traditional establishment. The patent decline of the Otto-
man Empire had removed any danger from that direction, and the
composition, training, and equipment of the Grenzer units made them
unsuitable for use against troops of the major Western powers.20 Bor-
15 Resolutions in KA, HKR 1848, B-99/25, and in Joannes Kukuljevic, ed., Jura r-egni
Croatiae, Dalmatiae, et Slavoniae (3 vols. in 2; Zagreb, 1861-62), II, 335-44. Discussion of
events in J. Horvat, Politic'ka povijest Hrvatske (Zagreb, 1936), pp. 183-92; Robert W.
Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy (London, 1911),
pp. 350-56, and Anton Springer, Geschichte Osterreichs seit denz Wiener Frieden 1809
(2 vols.; Leipzig, 1869), II, 442-56. See also the important Marxist account in Vaso Bog-
danov, Drustvene i politic'ke borbe u Hrvatskoj, 1848-49 (Zagreb, 1949), pp. 101-243.
16 Order to suppress all agitation for the incorporation of the Border, Zagreb, July 9,
1848, in Arhiv Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti, Zagreb (hereafter cited as
Arhiv JAZU), Ostavstina Bana Jelacia, C-VI-13; also Rudolf Kiszling, Die Revolution im
Kaisertumn &sterreich 1848-1849 (2 vols.; Vienna, 1948), I, 165, and Springer, op. cit., II,
455-56.
17 Printed in Utiesenovic, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
18 Emperor Franz Joseph to Jelacic, Mar. 31, 1849, in ibid., pp. 151-52, and the corre-
spondence between Jelacic and Baron Kulmer in Kresimir Nemeth, "Nekoliko neobja-
vljenih pisama iz korespondencije Kulmer-Jelacic 19.III-5.V. 1849," Arhivski vijesni-ik,II
(1958), 333-65.
19 The complete ordinance and a discussion of its regulations appears in the official
handbook by Leopold Krainz, Die k.k. Militargrenze und dereni Grundgesetz (Vienna,
1866), pp. 66-205.
20 Opinion of Bartels v. Bartberg, colonel in the Austrian General Staff, cited in Emil
Daniels, Geschichte der Kriegskunist inm Rahmnen der politischenl Geschichte, Vol. V of
Hans Delbrtick et al., Geschichte der Kriegskunst . . . (7 vols.; Berlin, 1900-37), pp. 352-53
der regiments fought bravely but without much success in the Italian
campaign of 1859, and in 1861 were converted from light to line in-
fantry. Even so, they could no longer be considered first-class troops.
"The establishment," observed General Mollinary, "was continued pri-
marily for political considerations.'"21 But these, especially the assump-
tion that the Grenzer were absolutely "reliable," were becoming less
valid. Croatia had supported the Habsburg cause in 1848 because it
had considered the dynasty the guarantee of its national development
in the face of Magyar pressure, but during the Austrian experiment in
centralized absolutism conducted in the decade 1850 to 1860 "it re-
ceived as recompense what the Hungarians received as punishment."22
During these years the administration was completely centralized, and
all local rights of self-government were suppressed. Disillusioned
Croatian nationalists turned away from Vienna, although Hungarian
appeals, especially during the crisis of 1859, for a common front were
unsuccessful. Nationalist agitation branched out into the Border,
where dissatisfaction with the ordinance of 1850 brought the Grenzer
to identify themselves with Croatian national aspirations.23 The pro-
found shift in attitude was strikingly revealed in 1861 when the Feb-
ruary Patent once more permitted a session of the Sabor.
Under the provisions of the Patent the various diets acted only as
electoral colleges for the extended imperial council to be set up in
Vienna, but the session provided an opportunity for Croatian protests
against the central authorities. When the house assembled in April,
1861, the delegates were divided into three major groupings. The
strongest faction was the National Liberals (narodna liberalna stranka),
who regarded Vienna and Budapest with almost equal distrust. They
were opposed by the Unionists or Magyarones, who desired a closer
union with Hungary. Uncomfortably situated between the two op-
posing groups were the Independents, who tended to look towards
Vienna. Finally, there were the ultra-Croat followers of the fiery Ante
Starcevic and the deputies from the Military Border.24
The imperial government had been most reluctant to concede repre-
sentation of the Border, and then only with the provision that its
deputies were to limit themselves to participation in the election of
delegates to the imperial council. Any discussion of the military status
of the Border was specifically prohibited.25 Attempts to do just that
21 Anton Frhr. v. Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre imn 5sterreichisch-Ungarischen Heere
1833-1879 (2 vols.; Zurich, 1905), II, 206.
22Jaszi, op. cit., p. 101, and Josef Redlich, Das 6sterreichische Staats und Reichspro-
blem (2 vols.; Leipzig, 1920-26), II, 2, 4-15.
23 Kiszling, Kroaten, pp. 57-58, and KA, Schriftgut Militargrenze, fasc. 28.
24 Vaso Bogdanov, "Uloga Vojne Krajine i njenih zastupnika u Hrv. Saboru 1861,"
Zbornik Historijskog Inistituta Jugoslavenske Akademije, III (1960), 59-214, is the most
complete account based on the journals of the assembly. Cf. Martin Polic, Parlamnentarna
povjest kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije, i Dalmacile (2 vols.; Zagreb, 1899-1900), I, 93-106.
25 Messages exchanged betwveen Vienna and Zagreb, including code telegrams, in KA,
68 Slavic Review
were overruled by the Banus, General sokcevi, acting on specific in-

structions from Vienna. However, the Grenzer still retained an almost
childlike confidence in the "good emperor, who opposed the just de-
mands of his soldiers because he was misinformed," and they sent a
delegation to Vienna to present their grievances to the monarch in
person. What occurred during the audience is not a matter of record,
but it appears that the delegation was curtly dismissed.26 On their re-
turn, the Grenzer joined the nationalists and on August 5, 1861, fur-
nished the decisive margin of votes against Croatian participation in
the imperial council. Exasperated, the Banus now declared that the
mandates of the Grenzer deputies had expired, and despite protests by
the Sabor ordered them to rejoin their regiments.27 In Vienna the war
ministry was much alarmed by this unprecedented defection of the
Grenzer. Orders were issued to keep the former deputies under close
supervision and to transfer all native officers suspected of nationalist
leanings.28 But the purge misfired when several of the most active
officers resigned and took service in Serbia, from where they continued
and even intensified their agitation.
For years the growing Serb national state had enlisted sympathy and
support among the Grenzer, especially in the Orthodox regiments.
And although the national movement on the Border became divided
by two centers of attraction, one in Zagreb and the other in Belgrade,
the division between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs was as yet
not clear-cut and there existed a common South-Slav feeling which cut
across loyalty to religion. Moreover, an opportunity for national co-
operation lay close at hand in Bosnia, where a Christian Slav popula-
tion simmered with discontent under Turkish misrule. Successful in-
surrection here not only would provoke Serbian intervention but also
would exert almost irresistible pressure on the Grenzer to give active
support. And such a great war of liberation might be the first step in
the creation of a South Slav state comprised of Serbia, Bosnia, and the
South Slav parts of the Habsburg Empire. Rumors of such a scheme
had reached Vienna as early as 1845,29 and after 1862 such plans were
revived by Major Antunje Oreskovic, one of the former Grenzer
officers in the Serbian service, who was organizing a revolutionary net-
work in Bosnia with connections on the Croatian-Slavonian Border.30
Kriegsministerium Prasidial (hereafter cited as KM Pras) 1861, 2248, and KA, Militar-
kanzlei SM des Kaisers und Kbnigs (hereafter cited as MKSM) 1861, 1692 and 1842.
26 On the quiestion of the delegation see Sokevic"s message, Zagreb, July 20, KA, KM
Pras 1861, 3337, and the telegram from Vienna, July 27, ibid., 3401.
27 Sokcevic's report, Zagreb, Aug. 6, 1861, ibid., 3566.
28 KA, KM Pras 1862, 2100 and 1842.
'9 Col. Mayerhoffer's report from Belgrade, Jan. 26, 1845, in Miskolczy, op cit., II, 266-
67. Cf. Fran Zwitter et al., Les problemes nationaux dans la monarchie des Habsbourgs
(Belgrade, 1960), pp. 48-49.
30SokUevic, report of Feb. 11, 1862, KA, KM Pris 1862, 592. See also Hermaiun Wendel,
Bismnarckund Serbien im Jahre 1866 (Berlin, 1927), pp. 19-27, 58, and Johann A. v. Reis-
Some of his collaborators were arrested, but attempts to seize Oreskovic

during his surreptitious visits to Croatia failed. Summing up the situa-
tion in 1863, the brigade commander at Karlovac concluded that al-
though the majority of the Grenzer were still subject to the steadying
influence of their officers, a major upheaval in Bosnia would have the
most serious repercussions on the Border.3'
That same year, however, it seemed that the political constellation in
Croatia once more favored the re-establishment of the traditional rela-
tionship between the Grenzer and Vienna. A temporary alliance of the
Unionists and the National Liberals alienated the fiercely anti-Hun-
garian Grenzer, and during the November, 1865, session of the Sabor,
the Border deputies joined the government-supported Independent
party.32 Even so, the Sabor, despite the wishes of the government, once
again went on record as demanding the abolition of the Military
Border.
In the spring of 1866, war with Prussia and Italy threatened, and the
Border was mobilized for the last time in its long history. Mobilization
was not popular on the Border this time, and to the former Grenzer
officers in Serbia, especially to Oreskovic, the moment seemed oppor-
tune for a huge South Slav insurrection under the pretense of a war of
liberation in Bosnia.33 The conspirators had made Prussian and Italian
contacts, and by early spring of 1866 a variety of schemes for a South
Slav rising were under active consideration in Berlin and Florence as
well as in Belgrade.34 But the orderly, if unenthusiastic, mobilization
of the Border regiments removed the necessary cadres, and Italy and
Serbia hesitated to commit themselves. In Prussia interest disappeared
after the rapid victories in Bohemia eliminated prospects of protracted
Austrian resistance.35
Chances of success for such far-fetched undertakings were, in any
case, doubtful, but the realization that the Slavs, even the Grenzer,
wvere no longer reliable, influenced Austrian negotiations with Hun-
gary which had been under way since 1865. When the negotiations
were brought to a successful conclusion in 1867, the new dualism was
exclusively a compromise betwveen the emperor and the Hungarians.
The Croatians, after attempting to treat with Vienna as well as with
Budapest, were left to make the best terms they could with the new
ivitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 1866-71 (Munich, 1936), pp. 64-65. For Oreskovic see
KA, Konduitenliste 1861, G.I.R. 11, and the article by V. Belic, Narodna enciklopedija
srpsko-hrvatsko-sloveozacka (4 vols.; Zagreb, 1925-29), III, 213.
31 Sokcevic's report of Feb. 15, 1863, KA, KM Prqs 1863, 537, anld Andreas Kienast, Die
Legion7 Klapha (Viennila, 1900), pp. 50-51.
32 The competence of the Border deputies had again been limllitcd by imperial order.
KA, Schriftgut Militargrenze, fasc. 57, no. 13.
33 Kienast, op. cit., pp. 60-61, 85-86; Wendel, op. cit., pp. 36-37, 74-77.
34 Ibid., pp. 44-47; Reiswitz, op. cit., pp. 65-68.
35 Count Usedom, Prussian envoy in Florence to Bismarck, Apr. 28, 1866, ibid., pp. 57,
n. 17, and 215; Wendel, op. cit., pp. 38-40, 92-93.
70 Slavic Review
Hungarian government. Proving obstreperous, the Sabor was dissolved

by imperial decree, and in 1868 a new house, with a manufactured
Unionist majority, concluded a Hungarian-Croatian subcompromise.
In this agreement, the nagoda, Croatia-Slavonia was defined as an in-
tegral part of the Hungariani kingdom; all decisions regarding military
and financial affairs were reserved to the Budapest government. Ac-
cordingly, the agreement stipulated that Hungary would work for the
reincorporation of the Croatian-Slavonian Military Border into the
Croatian state, a point well received by almost all factions in Zagreb.36
The question of the future status of the Military Border already had
come up during the negotiations leading to the Atsglcich. At that
time the imperial war minister, Franz Baron von John, had demanded
that the central war ministry retain its exclusive jurisdiction. Count
Julius Andrassy, then chief Hungarian negotiator and later first prime
minister, had temporized. Hungary, he had declared, could never
accept John's position in principle but for the time being would not
press the issue.37 Andrassy had remained deeply stuspicious of a central-
ized Habsburg state. He especially distrusted the imperial military and
regarded the Border as "an ever present tool for the reactionary circles
in Vienna to demolish, at the first opportunity, the new state of affairs
in Hungary."33 Therefore, once the Hungarian government was actu-
ally established, it moved swiftly to neutralize this potential threat. In
the fall of 1867, Lonyay, the Hungarian minister of finance, contended
that the Grenzer customs patrols were unreliable and that the service
should be taken over by his ministry.39 The military were able to re-
pudiate this first attempt, but their victory was only temporary, and
relations between the military and Budapest worsened in the following
year when radical Hungarian politicians demanded the creation of a
completely separate Hungarian army.40 Though in the end this con-
troversy, too, was solved by a compromise, War Minister John resigned
and, during an inspection tour in Croatia, Archduke Albrecht prayed
at Jelacic's grave. At this point Andrassy decided personally to enter
the fight for the dissolution of the Border.41
Early in 1869, the common war ministry planned to cut and sell some
30,000 yokes of timber in the Slavonian regimental districts and use the
proceeds for public improvements. Andrassy seized this occasion, and
36 Paragraph 65 of the nagoda in Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 372.
37 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter cited as HHStA), KZ 322, Ministerrat
of Feb. 11, 1867.
38 Eduard v. WN;ertheimner, Graf Julitus Andrdssy: Sein Leben uniid seine Zeit (3 vols.;
Stuttgart, 1910-13), I, 393.
39 KA, KM Pris 1867, 21-9/8, and 1868, 21-8/2.
40 Wertheiiner, op. cit., I, 335-40, 366-68, and the account in Edmund v. Glaise-
Horstenau, Franz Josephs T4Weggefeidrte:Das Leben, des Generalstabschefs G cfean Beck
(Vienna, 1930), pp. 146-52.
41 Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 355, and Heinrich v. Srbik, Auts Osterreichs T'erogangenlicit
(Salzhurg, 1949), pp. 111-13.
The Dissoltution of the Croatian Military Border 71
on February 27 he protested against this action in the council of comn-

mon ministers (Ministerrat fur gemeinsame Angelegenheiten), asserting
that such a step could not be taken without the concurrence of the
proper Hungarian authorities. He was promptly opposed by Beust, the
imperial chance'lor, wvhorejoined that the compromise had in no way
diminished the common war minister's exclusive competence in the
Military Border and that the Hungarian concern over the timber sale
merely was an opening wedge to abolish the organization.42 The chan-
cellor was, of course, quite right. Andra'ssy was resolved to press for the
complete dissolution of the Border, and during the imperial visit to
Zagreb in March, he tried to approach the monarch directly. Although
on this occasion Beust managed to prevent any discussion of the issue,
he changed his position soon thereafter. He needed Hungarian sup-
port, or at least acquiescence for his foreign policy, and decided that it
was not his duty to oppose the dissolution of the Border to the bitter
end. On the other hand, he also needed the support of the military,
and so he adopted a neutral position from then on.43
The military and the emperor, for the time being, continued to
oppose the disbandment of the Border. Franz Joseph's devotion to the
Atsgleich could not be questioned, but on any issue affecting the
common army he was quick to assert his prerogatives.44 When, in the
ministerial council of May 26, Andrassy once again raised the question
of the timber sale, the emperor, clearly irritated, declared with some
vehemence that he was not at all sure that the Hungarian government
had any competence to concern itself with administrative affairs of the
Military Border. Forced to counter this challenge, Andrassy acknowl-
edged that the fundamental issue at stake was the future status of the
Militdrgrenze. Appealing to the monarch's devotion to the Hungarian
settlement, Andrassy claimed that he in turn was committed by the
constitution as well as by the nagoda to seek the return of the Border
territory to the administrative control of the crown of St. Stephen.45
Franz Joseph faced a most agonizing internal conflict. Andrassy
pressed him to accept the disbandment of the Military Border as a logi-
cal consequence of the Ausgleich, and the emperor recognized the force
of this argument. But he considered himself primarily a soldier and
was reluctant to renounce the traditional ties between his dynasty and
the Grenzer. Even so, Andrassy felt sure of eventual, and perhaps near,
success. "I hope to return," he wrote to his wife on the eve of the next
council meeting, "with a much greater success than I had originally
42 HHStA, KZ 479, Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, Feb. 27, 1869. For the lengthy
negotiations on this issue see KA, Schriftum Militargrenze, fasc. 98, "Verhandlungen
betreffend Holzverwertung in der MVIilitdrgrenze."
43 Friedrich Graf v. Beust, A us drei Vierteljlhrhuclnderte'n: Erinn)ie)-vuogezzomdAufzeich-
21o1u1ge7z(2 vols.; Stuttgart,
1887), II, 257.
44 Glaise-Horstenau, op. cit., pp. 227-28.
45 HHStA, KZ 479, Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, May 26, 1869.
72 Slavic Review
hoped for."46 The next morning, July 1, Andrassy returned to the

attack. He repeated his arguments about the rights of the Hungarian
crown and the provisions of the nagoda, and capped his presentation by
arguing that while Border regiments no longer had any military value,
they constituted armed support for South Slav machinations.47
Andrassy had scored an important point when he linked the disband-
ment of the Border to the bogey of South Slav nationalism. In Croatia,
nationalist resentment against the imposed Unionist regime, as well as
dissatisfaction with the nagoda, had reversed attitudes toward the Bor-
der. Elements of the National Liberals, and, of course, the followers of
Star'evic who had never accepted the nagoda, charged that the demili-
tarization of the border was a sell-out to Budapest, and that the Banus
and the Sabor were but corrupt Magyar tools.48 When the Unionist
Banus Baron Rauch suppressed the nationalist opposition paper, the
Pozor, it moved first to Vienna and then to Sisak on the Military Bor-
der. At Sisak, under the benevolent eyes of the military administration,
and styled Zatocnik ("Exile"), it continued to engage in violent anti-
Hungarian polemics. Financial interests in Budapest, the paper
alleged, schemed to defraud the Grenzer of their last valuable property,
the communal forests.49 Similar arguments were voiced in a number of
anonymous pamphlets, which attacked the proposed disbandment and
accused the Hungarian government of cruel oppression of the Croats.
One such piece, Die Militdrgrenz-Frage und der osterreichisch-unga-
rische Constitutionalismus, compared the Border to the suffering Christ
about to be sacrificed on the Hungarian cross.50 Despite this extrava-
gant hyperbole, or perhaps because of it, "many of the half-educated
Grenzer regarded this pamphlet as their Bible."51 And since Vienna no
less than Budapest was convinced that South-Slav nationalism was
largely Moscow inspired and designed to disrupt the Dual Monarchy,
Croatian efforts to maintain the distinct character of the Military Bor-
der in opposition to the Unionist regime were taken as evidence of
subversive intentions.52
46 Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 398.
47 HHStA, KZ 1937, Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, July 1, 1869.
48 An exposition of the Croatian nationalist grievances in L. v. Suidland, Die Siidsla-
zvische Frage und der W47eltkrieg (1st ed.; Vienna, 1918), pp. 443-46.
49 Polic, op. cit., II, 7-8, and Gilbert in der Maur, Die Jugoslawen einst und jetzt (2
vols.; Leipzig, 1936), I, 50-51. For the Grenzzerattitudes see Reiswitz, op. cit., p. 167; Wer-
theimer, op. cit., I, 412, and the reports KA, MKSM 1869, 49-5/3, and KA, KM 1869,
1OA-28/4.
50 Published in 1869 in Vienna by 0. Utiesenovic, a dismissed official of the Croatian-
Slavonian Chancellery. See also Grivcic (pseud.), Gegenwart und Zukunft der k.k. Mili-
tdirg)-enze(Vienna, 1869), pp. 1-3.
51 KA, KM Pras 1870, 15-11/2.
52 For a general discussion of Austro-Hunlgarian apprehensions about Pan-Slavism and
Russia see Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1951),
pp. 98-101; Theodor v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik csterreich-Ungarns seit 1866 (2 vols.;
Stuttgart, 1913), I, 77-92; and B. H. Sumner, Russia and thze Balkans (Oxford, 1937), pp.
126-32. On the suspicions regarding Russian influence on the revolt in Southern Dalmatia
The military found themselves in an embarrassing position, and

within a week, on July 6, the war minister, Baron Kuhn, submitted a
memnorandum to the emperor that conceded the necessity for certain
liberal reforms on the Border.53 At the same time, however, the min-
ister maintained that the continued existence of the institution was a
military requirement. But Andrassy had prepared his final move.
When toward the end of July, the Austro-Hungarian delegations met
in Vienna to discuss an increased budget for the common army, the
Hungarian delegates flatly refused to make any appropriations unless
they were informed that positive steps had been taken toward the disso-
lution of the Military Border.54 A demand for such information was
politely rejected by the war minister, and on August 11, Andrassy told
the council of common ministers that the military budget was in
danger. However, declared Andrassy, Hungary, as always, was willing
to compromise in the interest of the Dual Monarchy and would accept
a gradual dissolution of the Border.55
The threat to the army budget, combined with the specter of Pan-
Slavism, forced the emperor's hand. On August 12, Andrassy had a
very chilly audience, and during a reception given for the delegations
that evening Franz Joseph pointedly ignored the Hungarians and con-
versed at length with Archduke Albrecht. However, this was merely a
show of temper. The next morning the emperor called for Andrassy
and informed him that he would approve the gradual dissolution of the
Military Border.56 Under these circumstances, the council meeting in
the afternoon was an anticlimax. Andrassy reviewed his arguments for
the dissolution of the Border, "an unreliable military organization, po-
tentially dangerous to the Monarchy."57 Beust, too, cautiously ex-
pressed himself in favor, while Kuhn argued for delay. In the end, the
emperor overrode the opposition and informed the council of his deci-
sion. Dissolution was to be gradual and in stages; he would issue the
necessary orders directly to the war ministry. Having made up his
mind, Franz Joseph acted with dispatch, and on August 19 he sent in-
structions to Kuhn ordering as a first step the dissolution of the Varaz-
din regiments.58
Reaction to this decision varied. Hungary, of course, was highly
satisfied, while Austrian politicians were displeased that Andrassy had
see Reiswitz, op. cit., pp. 175-77, 236-37. Concerning apprehensions about Russian activi-
ties on the Military Border and Russian influences on the Orthodox Church in Croatia-
Slavonia see the report by Col. Konig, KA, KM Pras 1869, 35-12/7.
53 KA, MKSM 1869, 49-2/9.
54 Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 395-97, and Walter Rogge, Osterreich von Vildigos bis zur
Gege,nwart (2 vols.; Leipzig, 1872), II, 242.
55 HHStA, KZ 2581, Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, Aug. 11, 1869.
56 Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 398-400.
57 HHStA, KZ 2583, Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, Aug. 13, 1869.
58 Letter to Kuhn, Ischl, Aug. 19, 1869, in KA, KMI Pras 1869, 35-17/1. Copies in KA,
MKSM 1869, 49-1/4.
74 Slavic Review
gained his end, not by negotiation through the common parliamentary

institutions, but by dealing directly with the emperor.59 The Vienna
press was highly critical.60 On the Military Border the decision was
received with outright hostility, and when on September 12, 1869, the
dissolution order wvasmade public in the Varazdin reginments, the local
military commander found it necessary to announce that no discussion
of this measure would be tolerated, that all opposition would be met by
force, and that the emperor would not receive any petitions or delega-
tions on this matter.61 But at the same time Colonel Konig, the chief
of the Military Border department in the war ministry, and certain
other senior officers tried to obstruct the execution of the decree. They
maintained that the question of implementation, and especially the
disposition of the forests still owxned in common by the regiments,
should be discussed by a special Grenzer diet.62 It appears that Kuhn
at first favored these moves but withdrew when he learned that such
plans were playing into the hands of Oreskovic and the national ex-
tremists hoping to promote a separatist Grenzer movement. After that
Kuhn, albeit reluctantly, decided that further obstruction was harmful,
and that the dissolution should proceed in an orderly manner, and it
was on his recommendation that in January, 1870, Franz Joseph ap-
pointed General Mollinary to supervise the process of demilitariza-
tion.63
Early that month, the emperor received Mollinary and gave him
explicit oral instructions. The Compromise of 1867, the monarch de-
clared, had once and for all settled the political future of the Border,
and all agitation for a special diet or local autonomy was to be sternly
suppressed. The emperor expressed his desire for the closest coopera-
tion with the Hungarian ministry, and Andrassy's approval was ob-
tained before Mollinary's appointment was gazetted on January 21,
1870. It appears that Mollinary, despite the emperor's mandate, still
expected difficulties on the part of the military in Croatia, and there-
fore secured powers to appoint his owvn chief of staff and summarily to
remove all uncooperative officials from their posts.64 When the general
59 Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 401-3; Rogge, op. cit., II, 243.
60 Especially the editorials in the morning editions of the Neue Freie Presse (Vienna),
Aug. 19, 20, 21 and 24, 1869. A year later Austrian Prime Minister Potocki observed that
"the dissoltution of the Border had not been popular in Cisleithania." HHStA, KZ 2872,
Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, Aug. 4, 1870.
61 KA, KM\l1869, IOA-128/6, and Zukunft (Vienna), Oct. 2, 1869.
32 Glaise-liorstenau, op. cit., p. 144; Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 408-11. Complaints about
these activities by Rajiner, Hungarian minister of the interior to Kuhn, Nov. 5 and 10,
1869, in KA, KM Pras 1869, 35-19/1. Konig's answer of Nov. 24, in ibid. Demands for a
GreenzLaiidtag in K6nig's memorandum of Jan., 1870, filed in KA, MKSM 1871, 49-2/29,
and in General M\ollinary'sreport, Agram, KA, KM Pras 1870, 15-20/6.
63 KA, KM Pras 1870, 35-4/1, and KA, MKSM 1870, 49-1/1. Also Wertheimer, op. cit.,
I, 410-11. On Kubln's change of position- see Srbik, op. cit., pp. 210-11. Personal differences
betwveen Archduke Albrecht, conservative and dyn-astic, and Kuhn, a brash German liberal
centralist, may also have been a factor. Ibid., pp. 173-75.
04 iMollinary, op. cit., II, 203-12.
reached the Border late in February, he found the country in turmoil.

An extended inspection tour revealed widespread opposition to the
prospect of demilitarization, considerable distrust of the Unionist
Sabor, and unconcealed resentment against Hungary.5 Petitions
against demilitarization and for local auLtonomy were circulating.6
Feeling ran especially high in the Orthodox Ogulin regiment, where
leaders voiced outright demands for self-determination. Although
Mollinary was horror-struck by the independent tone adopted toward
an imperial general, he refused to be provoked, and limited himself to
assturing the men "that the emperor only wanted the best for his
Grenzer." 67 In fact, despite the manifestations of disaffection, Molli-
nary rendered a somewhat optimistic report. There still existed, he
wrote, strong elements of the traditional loyalty, and the population
understood the necessity for demilitarization. No armed resistance wvas
to be expected on the Border, but the situation was aggravated by the
inflammatory nationalist agitation in civil Croatia and the impatient
diatribes in the Hungarian press demanding a faster tempo of demili-
tarization.68 Kuhn repeatedly complained to Andrassy about the tone
of the Hungarian press, while Andrassy in turn demanded that the
military authorities should discipline Grenzer officers promoting de-
mands for "self-determination" and suppress the Zatocnik.69
Matters were in this stage when the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian
War interrupted the progress of demilitarization. Though the famous
council of June 18 decided to adopt a policy of neutrality, involvement
was not totally excluded and limited military preparations were under-
taken.70 These caused serious misgivings on the Border, and late in
July the Zatocnik came out with an editorial calling on the Grenzer to
utilize Austro-Hungarian involvement in foreign war for the realiza-
tion of national aspirations.71 The response of the military administra-
tion to this flagrantly subversive act was surprising. On August 4,
Kuhn suggested in the council of ministers that the foreign situation
and the threatening attitude of the Grenzer demanded a temporary
suspension of dissolution. Andrassy was, of course, opposed. Any
delay in carrying out the dissolution of the Border would be regarded
65 Ibid., pp. 215-20, and KA, KM Pras 1870, 15-20/6.
66 Mollinary to Kuhn, Zagreb, Mar. 1, 1870, KA, KM Pras 1870, 35-9/2.
67 KA, KM Pras 1870, 15-20/6, of June 30, 1870.
68 Ibid., and Mollinary, op. cit., II, 223-25.
69 Ibid., and KA, MKSM 1870, 49-1/3; Kuhli's memorandtum of June 11, 1870, KA, KM
Pras 1870, 35-4/1, and Kuhn to Andrissy, Vienna, June 29, 1870, ibid., 35-13/3.
70 Srbik, op. cit., pp. 67-98, sorts out the conflicting accounts of Andrissy, Beust, and
Kuhn. Cf. Friedrich Engel-Janosi, "Austria in the Summer of 1870," Journal of Central
European Affairs, V (1945-46), 335-53.
71 Copy of editorial in KA, KM Pras 1870, 59-1/7. According to Kuhn, Mollinary be-
lieved that the Grenzer would resist mobilization. KA, MKSM 1870, 49-1/6. Mollinary
later expressed the belief that Kuhn had exaggerated the discontent on the Border.
MXollinary,op. cit., II, 233. See also his letter concerning the suippression of the Zatoc,nik,
KA, KM Pras 1870, 59-1/7.
76 Slavic Review
as a sign of weakness, and he insisted that reports about the disaffection

and the anti-Hungarian sentiments of the Border were much exagger-
ated. All that was required was a firm hand and the suppression of
subversive propaganda. This time, however, Franz Joseph, who had
not abandoned all hope of profiting from the foreign situation, sup-
ported the military. The Zatocnik, he agreed, had been treated too
leniently and should be suppressed. On the other hand, the monarch
declared that the danger of war required the maintenance of the full
military potential and the temporary suspension of the demilitarization
of the Border.72
Whatever plans Franz Joseph had entertained for exploiting the
Franco-Prussian War evaporated after Sedan, and in November, 1870,
all military preparations were halted. Once dreams of foreign adven-
ture were abandoned, the emperor attempted to find solutions for the
national problems besetting the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.
Above all he began to seek a settlement of difficulties with the Czechs
of Bohemia, a move that encouraged nationalist elements in Croatia.73
Early in 1870 the ultra-Unionist Banus Rauch was forced to resign
after losing a personal suit for defamation of character brought against
the editors of the Zatocnik, and when his successor, Koloman Bedeko-
vic, called for new elections, the nationalists gained an overwhelming
victory.74 In turn, these developments brought about an unexpected
alliance between the military and the Magyars. The military, and
above all Kuhn, an extreme German nationalist from Bohemia, were
anxious about the concessions made to the Czechs and were willing to
align themselves with the Magyars against the supposed Slav threats.75
With regard to the Military Border in Croatia-Slavonia, this meant
that the military were ready to accelerate demilitarization. It had, in
fact, never been the emperor's intent to extend concessions made to the
Slavs of Austria to those in the Hungarian kingdom. He was firmly
committed to the compromise of 1867, and therefore, while the Hohen-
wart cabinet was seeking an accommodation with the Czechs, he was
quite willing to continue the dissolution of the Military Border. The
subject was reviewed during February to May, 1871, by a top-level
conference in Vienna and Budapest.76 The conferees, reassured by
reports from Mollinary that the situation had eased, worked in un-
precedented harmony, and on June 8, 1871, the emperor signed a
series of decrees that spelled out the steps terminating the Croatian-
Slavonian Military Border.77
72 HHStA, KZ 2782, Ministerrat f. gem. Angelegenheiten, Auig. 4, 1870.
73 May, op. cit., pp. 58-62, and Zwitter et al., op. cit., pp. 103-12.
74 Mollinary's report, Zagreb, Dec. 31, 1870, and Jan. 3, 1871, KA, KNI Pras 1871, 59-2/1
and 59-2/2.
75 On Kuihn's militant German nationalism and his dislike for Slavs see Srbik, op. cit.,
p. 170; Glaise-Horstenau, op. cit., p. 239, n. 1.
76 Mollinary, op. cit., II, 225; conference protocols in KA, MKSM 1871, 49-2/29.
77 KA, MKSM 1871, 49-2/25.
There was yet to be a tragic epilogue. In September, 1871, enraged

by the repeated attempts of the Banus to delay convocation of the new
Sabor with its nationalist majority, and encouraged by developments
in Bohemia, a group of delegates issued a manifesto denouncing the
nagoda.78 This assertion of Croat independence, together with the
demands of the Czech-controlled Prague diet, which would have ele-
vated Bohemia to an equal position with Hungary within the mon-
archy, aroused fierce Austro-German and Magyar opposition.79 And
while the emperor was debating what he ought to do, an uprising
occurred on the Military Border. On October 7, 1871, two Croatian
national fanatics, Eugen Kvaternik and Ludwig Bach, proclaimed the
establishment of an independent Croatian state at Rakovica, a village
in the Ogulin regiment. They called on all Croatians to rally against
the "Swabian dogs" who had sold the country to the Magyars and
hinted that aid from France and other powers could be expected. Only
the local company, however, supported the insurrection, and Mollinary
quelled the revolt without difficulty.80
Unrealistic in its conception and execution, the revolt nonetheless
had important consequences. Andrassy, already apprehensive that the
Dual Monarchy was about to be "handed over to the Slavs," denounced
the rising as part of a monstrous Pan-Slav conspiracy, involving South
Slav agitators, Czech propaganda, "a secret Russian society and the
French International."81 And when the minister, supported by the
military and the Unionists, charged that the policies of the Hohenwart
cabinet had encouraged these Pan-Slav machinations, Franz Joseph
abandoned the idea of conciliating the Czechs and dismissed the
cabinet.82 In Croatia and on the Border, the fiasco of Rakovica, for the
time being, broke the back of the national extremists. There were
allegations that the revolt had been masterminded from Hungary, and
news about the fall of the Hohenwart ministry came as a heavy blow.83
Nonetheless, the dissolution of the military structure, the distribution
of the communal property, and the introduction of civil administration
went on without further incident or hindrance.84 Finally, in 1881, the
last remnants of the separate military organization were discontinuied,
and the Border came to an end.
78 Siidland, op. cit., p. 447.
79 May, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
80 Documents on the revolt in KA, KM Pras 1871, 52-16/1-39. Court-miiartial proceedings
and reports of the investigating commiission in Drzavni Arhiv, Zagreb, Rakovicka bulna,
fasc. 1-9. See also the pamphlet by Ferdo gigk, Kvaternik (Zagreb, 1926), pp. 1-48, which
somewhat exaggerates the importance of the rising.
81 Wertheimer, op. cit., I, 583-84; Mollinary's report on the alleged connections with the
Bohemian political developments, Nov. 6, 1871, KA, KM Pras 1871, 52-16/38, and the
telegram con-cerning the involvement of a "French international conspiracy," Oct. 15, 1871,
ibid., 52-16/15.
82 Beust, op. cit., II, 497-513; Srbik, op. cit., p. 210; In der Maur, op. cit., p. 52.
83 Mollinary's report, Zagreb, Nov. 1, 1871, KA, KM Pras 1871, 52-16/39.
84 Mollinary, op. cit., II, 274. Documents in KA, MKSM, Sep. fasc. 81/42.
78 Slavic Review
The fate of the Military Border was determined by a number of

factors, evident already before 1848, but becoming stronger in the
second half of the century. First, the decline of the Ottoman Empire
and the advent of the modern mass armies had reduced the military
value of the Grenzer. Secondly, in the Habsburg Empire these military
changes coincided with the Hungarian settlement and the rising tide
of nationalism, which together reduced the "reliability" of the Border
as an instrument of imperial policy. And the imperial military, though
more devoted to the interests of the entire Dual Monarchy than the
Hungarians, were also too suspicious of Slav nationalism to permit the
continued existence of a Slavic, and nationally conscious, military in-
stitution.85 The struggle over the dissolution of the Border illustrated
the attitudes of the Magyars and of the imperial military toward the
problem of the Slav nationalities in the Habsburg Empire. It revealed
the deep-rooted conflicts between the South Slavs and the governing
groups and foreshadowed the inability of the monarchy to solve this
vital question.
85 Daniels, op. cit., V, 425.

The Struggle Over The Dissolution of The Croatian Military Border, 1850 - 1871 PDF

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The Struggle over the Dissolution of the Croatian Military Border, 1850- 1871

Author(s): Gunther E. Rothenberg

Historians have differed in their evaluation of the nationality problem

arrangement created a gulf between the "military" and "civil" Croatia,

were overruled by the Banus, General sokcevi, acting on specific in-

Some of his collaborators were arrested, but attempts to seize Oreskovic

Hungarian government. Proving obstreperous, the Sabor was dissolved

on February 27 he protested against this action in the council of comn-

hoped for."46 The next morning, July 1, Andrassy returned to the

The military found themselves in an embarrassing position, and

gained his end, not by negotiation through the common parliamentary

reached the Border late in February, he found the country in turmoil.

as a sign of weakness, and he insisted that reports about the disaffection

There was yet to be a tragic epilogue. In September, 1871, enraged

The fate of the Military Border was determined by a number of

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