DENR et al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos
issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as
tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-
82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc.
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG
maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right
to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land
Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay
Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004,
the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again,
the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the
trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a
right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass
of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified
lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto
considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects
titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification
modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands
may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such
presumption is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have
identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did
in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is
misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time
when the President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and
agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public
Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands
of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value
for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge
that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or
the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
“agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks,” do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded
land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in a
dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a classification of
lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes.
One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the
other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At
any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status
of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach
resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments,
it has not been automatically converted from public forest
to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they
may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from
the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
loss of their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack
of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good
faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they
may look into other modes of applying for original
registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent,
subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle
private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to
exempt them from certain requirements under the present
land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House
of Representatives.
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner
versus
Celestina Naguiat, respondent
G.R. No. 134209. January 24, 2006
Facts:
Celestina Naguiat, an Filipino citizen, resident of
Angeles City Pampanga, applied for registration before the
Regional Trial Court of Zambales, four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan Zambales.
with subsisting matters that rest in the powers of the
Executive Branch of government.
Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation
or possession unless until determined by the proper
government agency or proclamation reclassifying the land
agricultural thus alienable and disposable. The Court
properly REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decisions of the
lower court and appellate court and the application of the
respondent DENIED.

She alleges to be the owner of the said parcels of land

having acquired them by purchase from an entity who have
been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years
that had not suffered from any mortgage or encumbrance
of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the

application assailing the ownership of the respondent on
the grounds of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question by the
predecessors-in-interest that is an ownership in fee simple
on the basis of Spanish title or grant that is no longer
applicable; the subject properties are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.

The trial court adjudicated the land to the respondent and

affirmed by the appellate court, hence the petition for
review.

Issue:

Whether the areas in question still part of public domain?

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the areas are still part of the
public domain. The respondent failed to present the
required certification from the proper government agency
or proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,

under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belongs to the State. Accordingly public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.

Anent thereto, under the Section 6 of the Public

Land Act, the prerogative of classifying and reclassifying
lands of the public domain belongs to the Executive Branch
and not with the court. The lower court and the
appellate court erred in deciding in favor of the respondent
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983 public domain,
public forest land, Revised Administrative Code
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning
the decision of the CA which declared the disputed
property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of
private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an
application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz.
The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot
No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an
area of 645,703 square meters.
Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz,
also filed an opposition to the application for registration of
title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which
was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his
opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing
117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner
Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may
have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed
an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated
117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of
the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated
in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6
share to Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of
Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been
in the possession of private persons for over 30 years and
therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of
title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act
No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. Another
petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre
and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre
complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs
of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis
of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the
public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of
the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision
after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain
classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not
capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the
Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does
not divest such land of its being classified as forest land,
much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court
found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest
as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias
Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The
opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by
the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber
within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a
previous warning from the District Forester that the same
could not be done because it was classified as “public
forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is
part of the public domain, classified as public forest land.
Petitions were DISMISSED.
Republic of the Philippines v CA and Morato
G.R. No. 100709
November 14, 1997
FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a
parcel of land, which was approved and issued an original
certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically
mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor
encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of
the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports
that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding
that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide
and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the title
and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain.
RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent
condition prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-
year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?
HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired
under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of
approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The
contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato
constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18
of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the
use of the property.
2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as
it is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea
moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the
invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the
realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the
Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became
foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that said court
had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private
person or entity. The subject land in this case, being
foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public
domain.
Chavez vs PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002
Facts: Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a wholly
government-owned and –controlled corporation which is
the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of
the public domain. By virtue of a Special Patent issued by
President Corazon Aquino, the Register of Deeds of the
Paranaque, in April 1988, issued certificates of title, in the
name of PEA, covering three reclaimed islands known as
the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paranaque City. The Freedom
Islands have a total land area of 157.841 hectares.
In April 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of
an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding
these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-
Manila Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project. The JVA
was later amended giving AMARI an option to reclaim an
additional 350 hectares of submerged area. Part of the
consideration for AMARI’s work is the conveyance of 70%
of the total net usable reclaimed area – equivalent to 367.5
hectares, title of which will be in AMARI’s name.
Issue: Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can
acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay
Held: No. AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire
the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable lands of
the public domain, except by lease, as provided under
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The still
submerged areas (i.e., the more or less additional 250 and
350 hectares of submerged areas) in Manila Bay are
inalienable lands of the public domain; as such, they are
beyond the commerce of man, as provided under Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
The reclaimed Freedom Islands: The assignment to PEA of
the ownership and administration of the reclaimed areas in
Manila Bay, coupled with President Aquino’s actual
issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. They also constitute a declaration that the
Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service.
The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.
The submerged areas: The mere reclamation of foreshore
and submerged areas by PEA does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law
or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
PEA’s authority to sell: In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering
PEA to sell these lands, in view of the requirement under
CA No. 141. Without such legislative authority, PEA could
not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. PEA’s
Charter grants it such express legislative authority to sell its
lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to
PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only
benefit private individuals.
Registration of alienable lands of the public domain:
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does
not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the
land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but
is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by
any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not give the registrant a better right than
what the registrant had prior to the registration. The
registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private
lands. Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the
patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable
land of the public domain automatically becomes private
land cannot apply to government units and entities like
PEA.
Lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public
domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be
registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now
PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands.
For instance,
- Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
private property purchased by the National Government for
expansion of an airport may be titled in the name of the
government agency tasked to administer the airport.
Private property donated to a municipality for use as a
town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the
name of the municipality. All these properties become
properties of the public domain, and if already registered
under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land.
There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for
the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
- Private lands taken by the Government for public
use under its power of eminent domain become
unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless,
Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds
to issue in the name of the National Government new
certificates of title covering such expropriated lands.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting
authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by
the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands
within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement
with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among
others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of
Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question
is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a
broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in
the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC,
and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes
the submerged area.
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed
area is within the commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to
uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
“foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat,
the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water
marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or
stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line
usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the
upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a
beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA
1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the
term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City
Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and
the Agreement under attack, have been found to be
outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
Republic vs. Enciso
G.R. No. 160145
November 11, 2005
Facts:
Pedro Enciso alleging to be the owner in fee and simple a
parcel of residential land located in Brgy. South Poblacion,
Masinloc, Zamblaes, filed a petition for land registration
before the RTC of Iba, Zambales.
He averred, inter alai that he acquired title to the said lot by
virtue of extrajudicial settlement of estate and quitclaim;
the said property is not tenanted or occupied by any person
other than his family who are in actual physical possession
of the same; and his predecessor-in-interest have been in
OCENCO for not less than 30 years immediately preceding
the filing of the application.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through OSG
opposed the application on the grounds that;
a. Neither respondent nor his PII have been OCENCO
of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
b. Failed to adduce any muniment of title and /or the
tax declaration with the application;
c. The tax declaration does not appear to be genuine
d. Barred by prescription for failing to register the
land within the period of 6 months from February 6, 1976
for Spanish title;
e. The subject land is apportion of public domain
belonging to the Republic which is not subject to private
appropriation;
The respondent presented tax receipt to show that the
property was declared for taxation purposes in his name.
he also testified that he acquired the property by
inheritance from his deceased father Vicente, who died in
1991. After which, he took possession of the property and
constructed a house. Consequently, he and his siblings
executed an extra judicial settlement of the estate and the
land was adjudicated in his favor.
He further narrated that the property was originally owned
by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales.
On October 5, 1968, the Municipality passed Resolution no.
71 undertaking to construct a road along the shoreline of
Poblacion, but requiring land owners adjoining the road to
share in the expenses for an inner wall adjacent to their
lots.
Moreover, a supplementary Resolution No. 102, was also
passed which stated that in consideration of the financial
assistance extended by the property owners, and because
the government no longer needed the additional areas for
public use, the municipality authorizing the Mayor to enter
into and sign deeds of purchase between the municipality
and the land owners concerned.
Consequently, they approved Resolution No. 102-A on
march 15, 1969, authorizing its mayor to execute a deed of
sale in favor of Honorato Edao, covering a portion of the
reclaimed lots no longer needed for public use.
Enciso admitted that Honorato Edao was his uncle, being
his father’s half- brother. He further narrated that the
spouses Edao sold the lot to his father via a deed of
absolute sale.
Vicente Enciso together with Natividad Edao
Asuncion and Thelma Edao entered into a Deed of partition
involving the same parcel of land.
Vincent – ½ of the total area of the property (1,398 sq.
mtrs.)
Natividad – ¼ (697.5 sq. mtrs)
Thelma - ¼ (697.5 sq. mtrs)
The TC granted the application for registration and the CA
affirmed the decision of the TC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred on a question of law granting the
respondents petition for registration sans any showing that
the subject property was previously declared alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 provides the qualification and
requirement for persons in application for the registration
of title to land, it explicitly provide that “those who by
themselves or though their PII, OCENCO of A and D lands of
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1845 or earlier.”
Applicants for registration of titles must therefore prove
the following:
a. The lands forms part of the A and D of the public
domain;
b. OCENCO since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945 or earlier
It is not disputed that the aforesaid land was originally part
of the reclamation project undertaken by the municipality
of Masinloc. The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable
lands of the public domain may only be leased and not sold
to private parties, except if the legislative passed a law
authorizing the said sale.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas of
public use or public service. The ownership of lands
reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine which declares that all lands and waters of the
public domain belong to the State.
Further, CA 141, also known as Public Land Act provides
that as a state policy, no government reclaimed foreshore
and marshy alienable lands of public domain may be sold to
private individuals.
Evidently, there is nothing to support the claims of Enciso
that the property was reclassified as residential already
segregated from the public domain and assumed character
of private ownership. It is not clear as to when proper
authorities classified the subject lands as A and D. it must
be stressed that evidence must be presented to establish
that the land subject of application is A and D.
Moreover, he failed to prove that he and his PII have been
in OCENCO since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
The municipality cannot be considered as the PII of the
applicant whom the period of possession and occupation
required by law may be reckoned with.
Hence the petition is GRANTED.