You are on page 1of 113

File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

POLITICAL LAW
suRVEY oF RECENT STcNIFTCANT CASES (2010-2018)
As of October 19, 2018
by

Draru Srornrv M. CaruoruRra


ATENEO LAW SCHOOL

Article 1 (National Territory)

Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 787757, August 15, 2017

Facts:
a R. A. No . 9522
(New Baselines Law ) was passed which shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the archipelago
and classified adjacent territories (Kaiayaan lslancj Group and Scarborough
Shoal) as "Regime of lslands" under Article I2L of UNCLOS lll.
a R.A. No. 9522 amended R.A. No. 3046, as amended by R.A. No.
5446.
a Petitioners questioned R.A. No. 9522 because (1) R.A. No. 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory as embodied in the Treaty of Paris
and other treaties; and, (2 ) R . A . No . 9522 opens the country's waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts.

lssue :

a Constitutionality of R. A. No . 9522

Ruling:
. R. A. No . 9522 is valid
Reasoning:
. UNCLOS has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. lt
regulates sea-use rights.
o Baselines laws are statutory mechanisms to delimit the extent of a state's
maritime zones and continental shelves.
o R . A. No. 9522 merely followed the basepoints engaged by R . A. No .
3046, save for at least nine points that R. A. No. 9522 skipped to
optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline
(to comply with UNCLOS lll's limitation on the maximum length of
baselines ) . This would have the effect of increasing the Philippines' total
maritime space by 745,215 sq. nautical miles.
o The Philippines may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent ahd sea lane paSsa$es. EVen
without legislation, right of innocent passage is customary international
law. Article 53(72) of UNCLOS lll allows innocent passage by ships and
aircrafts through archipelagic waters.

L
File wlth Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

Article 2. Section 1 (Government)

Funa v.
MECO, G.R. 793452, Februory 4, 2014 MECO is not o
GOCC but sui generis.

Update of PCA judgment

Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea (SCS) Dispute Between


Philippines and People's Republic of China, Acbber 29, 2075 ond luly 72,
2075.

PCA ARBITRATION

29 October 2Ol5 - Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility


Philippine position : The Phili ppines' claims ( 15 in total) are entirely within its
(Tribunal) jurisdiction and are fully admissible .

Chinese position : The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case for
the following reasons:

the essence of the subject-matter is the territorial sovereignty over several


maritime features in the SCS, which is beyond the scope of the Convention
and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention;
China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS, to settle their relevant
disputes through negotiations;
assuming, arguendo, that the subject matter of the arbitration were
concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that
subject matter would constitute an integral part of maritime cielimitation
falling within the scope of the declaration filed by China in 200 6 which
excludes disputes concerning maritime delimitation from compulsory
arbitration .

The Tribunal's Award:

1. China's non-participation does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction.


2. There is a dispute between the Parties but the matters submitted to
arbitration by the Philippines do not concern sovereignty.
3. The claims presented by the Philippines do not concern sea boundary
delimitation, and, therefore, not subject to the exception to the dispute
settlement provisions of the Convention.

2
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

4 The Tribunal also ruled that none of the existing instruments to which
Philippines and China are parties to, which provide for other means of
dispute settlement, prevent the Philippines from bringing the present claims
to arbitration .

72 July 20L6 - Award on the Merits

lssues raised and the Tribunal's Rulin gs

1 . China's historic right claim (nine-dash line ) :

Ruling: There is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or sovereign
rights and jurisdiction beyond those provided in the Convention in
the waters of the SCS encompassed by the "nine-dash line";
maritime entitlements are to be claimed only from baselines along
the coast of continental land, island or rock above water at high
tide; all historic rights in EEZ, ' ECS and high seas were extinguished
upon effectivity of UNCLOS; no evidence existed that China
historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the SCS or
their resources; China aligned its declared maritime rights in
accordance with UNCLOS; China only mentioned historical rights in
relation to maritime claims in 1998 through a law on EEZ and CS.

2 . On Geologic Features in the Spratlys:


Rulins: None of the geologic figures (rocks and islands ) in the Spratlys is
capable of human habitation or economic life of its own so as to
be entitled to a 20A NM EEZ; therefore, there could be no overlap
of EEZ with Palawan, so, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on
the maritime dispute; Spratlys cannot be taken as a single unit to
determine capability to sustain human habitation or economic life;
Itu Aba is only entitled to L2 NM territorial sea;
3. On China-Occupied Geologic Features in Spratlys:

Ruling:

HTE Reefs Fiery cross Reef, Johnson south Reel Gaven Reef, charteron
Reef, McKennan Reef (entitled to lZ NM territorial sea )

territorial sea); Mischief is within


Philippine EEZ and part of CS; only Philippines can erect structu res

3
Fale with Elythe usb_rev 20l8Od 19

or islands on Mischief; China's structures are


artificial illegal;
although not stated, Subi is within Philippines ECS.

NOTE:

Reed Bank (totally submerged) is part of Philippine EEZ

Ayungin Shoal (occupied by the Philippines) is an LTE within Philippine EEZ.

(A rock above water at high tide is land territory that generates a 72 NM


territorial sea and territorial airspace above the land and its territorial sea.
Reclamation may be done with due regard to its coastal neighbors and the
marine environment. )

(ln the EEZ and CS, a coastal state has excluslve right to construct artificial
islands cr structures on LTEs. )

4 . On Scarborough Shoal:
Ruling : Scarborough Shoal is a HTE entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea

only; it is a traditional fishing ground of various fishermen from the


region and China cannot prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing.

5. On Harm to the Environment:


Ruling: China violated its obligations under UNCLOS for having dredged and
built islands on reefs and for failing to prevent its fishermen from
harvesting endangered species like sea turtles, corals and giant clams
in the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal causing "permanent and
irreparable harm to the coral reef system . "

Enforcement of the Award


By coastal state conduct of naval and aerial patrols in EEZ; exploitation of
resou rces

By other states - freedom of navigation and overflight in high seas and EEZs

4
File with Blythe usb rev 20i80ct 19

Article 2, Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 3,


Section 1 and Article L4, Section 5 (21 (Academic Freedom)

First Closs Cadet Aldrin Jeff P .


Cudio of the Philippine Militory Acodemy v. the
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), G.R. No. 271352,
Februory 24,2015

Facts
a First Class Cudia was penalized by the PMA for having lied about
Cadet
the cause of his tardiness during a lesson examination. He was dismissed
after having been found guilty by the PMA, pursuant to the Honor Code.

lssue :

a Was the dismissal valid?


h..l:-- -
r\ullttH,:
o PMA complied with due process

Reasoning:
. The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in
their academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules; governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival . " ln this
regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose
disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on
students who violate disciplinary rules
. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly
has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its
internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor
System in particular.
o Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice . The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes
that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet's honor
violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding .
There is aversion to undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in
the military academy

5
tile with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

lmbong v. Hon. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April B, 2074


Facts
a Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 20L2 (RH Law)

lssues:
r Right to life of the unborn even if there is a declared policy against
abortion, implementation cf RH Law would authorize purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives.
n Right to health and right to protection against hazardous products
contraceptives are hazardous.
. Right to religious freedom RH Law authorizes use of public funds for
purposes contrary to their beliefs and threatens conscientious objectors as
it compels medical practitioners ( 1 ) to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and (2) to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service
against their religious beliefs . Section 5 .23 of the {i' - RH Law excludes
skilled health professionals who are public officers as conscientious
objectors and mandatory sex education as an affront to religious beliefs.
. Right against involuntary servitude PhilHealth accreditation of medical
practitioners requires them to provide 4B hours of probono services for
indigent women.
o Equal protection - RH discriminates against the poor.
I Void-for-vagueness - imposition of penalty f or "any violation" is vague;
section 7 removes from people the right to manage their own affairs and
to decide what kind of health facility and services they shall offer.
. Right to free speech while religious groups are free from the
compulsion to explain the full range of family planning methods, they are
not exempt from the requirement to refer their patients to another health
care facility.
c Right to privacy by giving absolute authority to the person undergoing
reproductive health care, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between
spouses and parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.
o Undue delegation the delegation to the FDA the power to determine
what is a non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drug
List .

6
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

a One subject/one bill rule.


Natural law.
a Autonomy of LGU and ARMM.

Ruling:

a Petitions partially granted. R.A. No. 10354 not unconstitutional except


as to the following:

D Section 7 (in relation to RH-lRR)

(a ) requiring health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and


hospitals owned by religious groups to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, to another facility.

(b)allowing minor-parents minors who have suffered a miscarriage


or
access to modern methods of family planning without written consent
from their parents/guardians .

FSection 23(a) (1) (in relation to RH-IRR) - in so far as they punish


any healthcare service provider who fails and / or refuses to disseminate
information programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
religious belief

F Section 23 (a) (2) (i) (in relation to RH-IRR) - in so far as they


allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
to undergo reproductive health procedures without consent of the
spouse

F section 23 (a) (2) (ii) (in relation to RH-|RR) - in so far as they


limit the requirement of parental consent only to surgical procedures

F Section 2 3 (a ) (3 ) (in relation to RH-IRR ) - in so far as they punish


any healthcare service provider who fails and / or refuses to refer a
patient not in any emergency or life-threatening case, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of religious belief

P Section 23 (b) (in relation to RH-|RR and Section 5 .24)


- in so far
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs regardless of religious beliefs

F section 17 (in relation to RH-lRR ) - rendering probono services in so


far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing philHealth
accreditation

7
file with Blythe usb-rev 2018oct 19

} Section 3 . 01 (a ) and Section 3 - 01 (j) of RH-IRR - added "primarily"


in defining abortifacients and contraceptives as ultra vires in violation of
Article 2, Section 72

F On natural law unless a natural right has been transformed into


written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. Natural
law is to be used sparingly only in most peculiar circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.

Article 2, Section L4 (Equality Between Women and Men) in


relation to Article 3, Section 1- (Equal Protection) and Article 8,
Section 1 (Judicial Power)

Garcio v. Hon. Judge Drilon, G.R. No 779267, lune 25, 2073

Facts :

a R. A. No - 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their


Children (VAWC) is being assailed by a husband for being violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
3 The immediate case : Rosalie Jaype-Garcia sued her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia, under R.A- No. 9262 claiming to be a victim of physical abuse,
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of infidelity on
the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support . The victim sought reliefs, such ds, the
Barangay Protection Order (BPO) .

lssues :

' ls R.A. No. 9262 discriminatory against men?


' Does it violate the principle of undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials through the issuance of Bpo by the latter?

Ruling:
o Family courts have jurisdiction to entertain constitutionality of R. A. No.
9262.
a There is a valid classification. The unequal power relationship that women
are more likely to be victims of violence; and, the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women, make for real differences .
a The BPo is issued against a perpetrator to compel him to desist from
(a ) causing harm to the woman or her child; and (b
) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm. This function is purely
executive in nature pursuant to the LGC "to enforce all laws and
ordinances" and "la maintain public order in the brarangay.

8
Filewith Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

Article 2, Section 16 ( Rieht to a Balanced and Healthful Ecoloev)


in relation to Article 8, Section s (21 (a) (Standine); Article 10,
Section 2 (Local Autonomv), and Section 59 of the !ndieenous
Peoples' RiFhts Act

Poje v. Cosifio, et ol., G.R. No. 207257, February 3,2015


Facts :

a Subic Bay Metropolitan authority (SBMA ) entered into a MOU with


Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) for the construction of a power
plant. Another MOU was entered into whereby TCC undertook to build
and operate a coal-fired power plant.
a An Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) by the SBMA Ecology
Center was issued in favor of TCIC, a subsidiary of TCC. Later, TCC
assigned Redondo Peninsula Energy, lnc . (RP Energy) . RP
all its rights to
Energy contracted GHD to prepare an Environmental lmpact Statement
(ElS ) for the coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying
for an ECC with DENR.
a The sangguniang Panglungsod of olongapo city issued a Resolution
objecting to the coal-fired power plant. Meanwhile, DENR issued an Ecc.
RP Energy amended its ECC twice to include new components which DENR
approved accordingly. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales and the
Liga ng mga Baranga,T of Olongapo City issued separate resolutions
objecting to a coal-fired thermal plant and a coal-fired power plant,
respectively.
a Various petitioners led by Congressman Teodoro A. Casifro filed before the
Supreme Court a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan . The Writ was issued and
the Court of Appeals (CA) was ordered to hear and receive evidence and
render judgment. Meanwhile, a fourth amendment to the ECC was applied
for.
a At the cA, petitioners contended: that the power plant project would
cause grave environmental damage and adversely affect the health of the
residents of three Zambales municipalities and olongapo city; that the ECC
was issued without approval of the concerned Sanggunians under Sections
26 and 21 of the Local Government code; that the lease development
agreement (LDA ) was entered into without prior certification of the
National Commission on lndigenous peoples (NClp) under section 59
of
the lndigenous peoples' Rights Act ( tpRA ) ; and that the DENR had no
authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued
ECCs
in the absence of a new EIS
a Meanwhile, a certificate of Non-overlap (cNo
granted the third amendment to the ECC.
) was issued . DENR also
t The cA denied the privilege of the writ for failure of petitioners
to prove
that their constitutionar right to a baranced and hearthfur ecorogy was
violated or threatened. However, the cA invalidated the ECC.

9
File with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

lssues:
a DENR ) a new EIS is not necessary since the first EIS was within
(a
the validity period; and (b) no permits, etc. . . from other agencies are
required in processing ECC .
a SBMA ) since there was not writ issued, CA should not have
(a
invalidated the LDA; and, (b) SBMA has exclusive jurisdiction over projects
with the freeport zone and no prior consultations with the sanggunians
and (CNO) are necessary, besides the subsequent issuance of a CNO
cured any legal defect.
a RP Energy - CA has no power to grant reliefs prayed for in the absence
of a Writ of Kolikoson and that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.

Ruling:
. The petitioners failed to substantiate its claims .

. The CA erred in invalidating the ECC.


. The CA erred in invalidating the 1st and 2nd amendments to the ECC.
. The CA erred in invalidating the ECC for failure to comply with Section
59 of IPRA.
. The CA erred in ruling that compliance with Sections 26 and 21 are
necessary prior to issuance of an ECC; but validity of the third
amendment to the ECC cannot be resolved as it was not raised during
the preliminary conference .

Reasoning:
r Requisites under Section 1of Rule l of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases : ( 1 ) there is an actual or threatened violation of a
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or
threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
ln two or more cities or provinces. The gravity of environmental damage
is to be decided on a case-_to-ease basis
' The DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an Environmental
Performance Report and Management plan ( EpRtvlp ) and a project
Description Report (pDR) for the first and second amendments.
' The ECC is not a license or permit contemplated under Section 5 9 of
IPRA which required a CNo; but in the case of the LDA, it is necessary
to secure a CNO because it is necessary to rule out the possibility that
the proposed lease site encroaches on an ancestral domain in light of the
history of Subic area as traditionally accessed by the Aetas. However, the
LDA cannot be invalidated for reasons of equity as it is the first
time this
rule of action has been laid down in relation to Section 59 of lpRA.
' Prior approval by the sanggunians of the ECC is not necessary and does
not violate the principle of local autonomy because R. A. No . 122-l
(Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) grants
broad powers of

10
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

of SBMA over the economic zone The LGC and R. A. No


administration .

1221 should be harmonized . Section 12 (a (i) of R.A. No. 1221


)

states that "Except as herein provided the local government units


comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic
autonomy and identity. xxx"

West Tower Condominium Corporation v. FPIC, et ol ., G.R. No. 194239, lune


75, 2075

Facts :

a FPIC operates two pipelines stretching from Batangas to Metro Manila . A


leakage was detected from one of the pipelines into the West Tower
condominium basement compelling residents to abandon their units. FPIC
initially disowned the leak thus the residents shouldered the expenses of
hauling the waste water requiring the setting up of a treatment plant to
separate the fuel from the waste water. FPIC later admitted that the
source of the leak is one of the pipelines but placed the blame on the
construction activities on the roads. West Tower Corporation filed a
petition for issuance of a Writ of Kolikosan. lt was joined by civil society
and public interest groups
a The petition prayed, among others, (a ) to check the structural integrity of
the pipelines; and (b ) to open a trust funcl to answer for contingencies
in the future . The Court issued a temporary protection order.
lssues :

. May the precautionary principle be invoked on the matter of the pipeline's


structural integrity?
. May a trust fund be created in a petition for a writ of Kolikasan?

Ruling:
. The precautionary principle does not apply.
c A trust fund is the proper subject of a separate proceeding.
Reasoning:
o Detecting the issue of a leak in the pipeline is different from determining
whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will
cause environmental damage.
r A trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring
the environment . section 15 (e ) of the Rures of procedure or f
Environmental Cases prohibits grant of damages.

1.1
tile with Blythe usb-rev 2018oct 19

LNL v. Agham Porty List, G - R. No. 209755, April 72, 2075


Facts:
a LNL operates a mining claim in Zambales. lt embarked on a project to
build a private, non-commercial port for shipping out ores from the
mines. The ECC and other national permits were secured . The
communities and the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta . Cruz Consented to the
project. LNL encountered problems with the Mayor himself who refused
to issue business and mayor's permits arguing that there was leveling of
the mountain on the Port site -

lssue :

a Did LNL violate environmental laws, rules or regulation?

Ruline
a The petition is denied. There was no violation of any environmental
laws, rules or regulations and neither was there a leveling of any
mountain

Reasoni ns
a LNL was given a tree cutting permit. The mining law was not applicable
to the port site project.
a There were neither expert evidence nor scientific studies to corroborate
the allegation of levelling a mountain. The elevated landform is neither a
mountain or hill, but an elongated landmass or mound.

lnternational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v . Green


Peace Southeast Asio, et al ., G.R. No. 209277, December B, 2075 and July
26, 2076 (MR reversing previous judgment)
Facts:
c A petition f or Writ of Kalikason and continuing Mandamus was filed by
respondents alleging that the field trials of the pest-resistant crop
described as "bioengineered eggplant" ( Bt talong ) violate the right to
health and a balanced ecology.
a Respondent argued that an ECC is required and that Bt talong is
presumed harmful to human health and the environment.
a The court issued the writs of Kalikoson and Continuing Mandamus.

lssue :

a Whether the precautionary principle applies

12
File with Elythe usb rev 2018oct 19

Ruling:
o ln itsDecember B 2015 judgment (1't Decision ) , the Court held that
the precautionary principle applies in this case and there exists a
possibility of serious and irreversible harm. lt also held that field testing
should have been subjected to Environmental lmpact Assessment,
considering that it involved new technologies with uncertain results.
o ln its July 25, 2015 judgment ( MR ) , the Court granted the motions for
reconsideration on the ground that the field trials have been completed
and, therefore, the case has become moot .

Reasoning:
a ln resolving the motions for the Court reasoned out that
reconsideration,
there is no perceivable benefit to the public which may be gained from
resolving respondents' petition for Writ of Kolikoson. The exception to the
mootness does not apply in this case .
a The completion of the field tests does not mean that petitioners may
inevitably proceed to commercially propagate. But this is subject to
permits and additional requirements.
a Resolving the petition for Writ of Kolikosqn would unnecessarily arrest the
results of further research and testing on Bt talong, and even GMOs in
general, and hence, tend to hinder scientific advancement on the subject
matter.
a Besides, there is a new regulatory framework (JDC 07-2076) applied to
GMO field testing which corrects the inadequacies of DAO 0B-2002. JDC
07-2076 provides for a more comprehensive avenue for public
participation and additional expertise in the pool of scientists that
evaluates the risk assessment for field trial.

Article 2 Section 16 (Rieht to A Balanced and Healthful Ecoloev) in


relation to Article 7 Section 2t (Treaties L Article L6, Section ?
(State I munitv) and A e 18, Section 2 5 (VFA)
Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, G.R. 206510, September 7G, 2014

Facts :
e The uss Guardian requested diplomatic clearance to enter and exit
territorial waters of the Philippines. lt ran aground at the Tubbataha Reefs
about B0 miles east of Palawan. The Tubbataha Reefs have been declared
as a Natural Park . The u . s . Ambassador expressed his regrets over the
incident and assured the secretary of Foreign Affairs that appropriate
compensation will be made. salvaging was undertaken by the u. s. Naval
team.

13
File with Blythe usb_.ev 2018oct 19

a Petitioners sought a directive from the Supreme Court through the issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan and the institution of civil, administrative and
criminal suits for acts in violation of environmental laws and regulations.
a Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage
of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, lloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology.
lssues:
a May the writ issue?
a May the respondents, representing U. S. Naval forces, be sued?
Ruling:
o The writ may not be issued.
. Respondents are immune from suit.

Reasoning:
a ln the landmark case of Oposa v . Foctoron, Jr . , we recognized the
"public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law . " We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications . Such right carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
a lf the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done
by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, su ing the state
itself . The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the state, in whose service he is, under the maxim - por in
porem, non hobet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad
terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against
him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although
it has not been formally impleaded.
ln this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in
the unfortunate grounding of the uss Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs

1-4
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

Natural Park (TRNP ) was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by
this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
a Under Article 31, [t]he flag State shall bear international responsibility for
any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of
this Convention or other rules of international law.
a ln the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on
the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic
channels . Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with
another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA.
It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government
is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the
political"--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision - "
a The VFA governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating
Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it
is, the waiver of State Immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions, such ds, the present petition
for issuance of a writ of Kolikasan. ln fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately: SEC . 11 . lnstitution of separate octions. -The filing of a
petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikosan shall not preclude the
filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions

Article 2, Sections 2 5 (Local Autonomv) and 26 (P olitical Dvnastv) ,


Article 6 Sections 1 Undue Dele ion 25 4 S ose
Fund) , 25 (61 Discretionary Fund for Public Purpose ) , 27 (2) (ltem
Veto) , 29 (71 ( Payment Pursuant to an ) Article 10,
Sections 2 and 3 (Local Autonomv) and Article ll, Section 1
(Public Office and Public Trust)

Belgiea v. Hon. Ochoo, et ol ., G.R. No. 2085G6, November 19,2013


Facts :

a "Pork Barrel" or Priority Development Assistance Fund .

15
File with Elythe urb_rev 2018Od l9

a i "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized


Definition
projects and secured safely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district . "
a Philippines: "lump-sum discretionary funds of Members of the Legislative
and the Executive Branches. "

lssues :

o Constitutionality of the PDAF and the "Presidential Pork" (Malampaya Fund


and President Social Fund ) .

Ruling:
r Relationship of Executive and the Legislature in re PDAF

Executive Legislative
o Proposes a budget o Passes the GAA
o Enforces the budget o Exercises the oversight
. lmplements the budget function over the
implementation of law only
through scrutiny or
investigation

a Violation under PDAF by Legislative Representatives -

H No post-enactment measure or a uthority may be exercised by


legislators .

a Violation under "Presidential Pork"


(1) Section B of P.D. No. 910 (Malampaya Fund) provides:

"... and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President"

(2) Section 72 of P.D. No. 1869 (President Social Fund), as


amended by P. D. No . 1993 provides:

tofinance the priority infrastructure development projects as


may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President. "

H :
Fails the test of non-delegability of legislative power. However, the
phrase "to finance the restoration of damaged facilities due to calamities"
in Section i2 of P . D . 18 5 9 remained valid .

16
tile with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

Article 2, lection 28 (Full Public Disclosure)

En Banc Resolution, Februory 14, 2 07 2, ln Re :


Production of Court Records ond
Documents ond the Attendonce of Court Officiols ond Employees os Witnesses
Under the Subpoeno of February 10,2012 and the Various Letters for the
lmpeochment Prosecution Panel doted )onuary 79 ond 25, 2012

Facts :

a Letters of lmpeachment Prosecution Panel requesting for: (a ) examination


of rollo of FASAP v. PAL Cose, G.R. No. 778083; (b) certified true
copies of the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of the Court in
FASAP Case ; (c) examination of rollo of Novarro v. Ermito, G.R. No.
180050, April 12, 2071 ; (d) examination of rollo of Gutierrez v. HR
Committee on lustice, G.R - No. 793459; and, (e) examination of rollo
of Leogue of Cities v. COMELEC, G . R. /Vos. 17 6957, 777 499 ond
778056.
a Clerk of Court of Supreme Court directed by lmpeachment Court to
produce documents subject of the letters-request, such os, recordbooks of
Raffle Committee, letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza in connection with
FASAP Case; PGMA TRO Petition, Mike Arroyo TRO Petition, CJ Corona's
travel order in November 2011, etc.

lssue:
rl May the requested documents be furnished the lmpeachment Prosecution
Panel?

Ruling:
. Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be
compelled to testify on matters that are part of internal deliberations and
actions of the court while testimony on matters external to adjudicatory
functions may be subject of compulsory processes (e .g . bribery charge ) .
. Rollo - No.
. Decisions, Orders, Resolutions - Yes.

Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure) and Article 3 Section


1 (Privacy)

Philippine Sovings Bank and Poscual M . Gqrcia lll v. Senate lmpeachment Court,
6.R. No. 200238, Februory 9, 2072
Facts :

a Certiorari and Prohibition with TRO enjoining public respondents from


implementing the Subpoeno Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum against pSB
t7
File with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

Branch Manager in regard to certain foreign currency deposits of Chief


Justice Corona was filed.

lssue :
a May Prohibition lie?

Ruling:
r Yes.

Reasoning:
a A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency
deposits is provided under Section B of R. A. No - 6426 (Foreign
Currency Deposit Act) .

FCDA establishes absolute confidentiality. The deposit may only be


examined upon written permission of the depositor.
a While impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits
under R.A. No. 1405 (law prohibiting disclosure of an inquiry into
deposits with any banking institution ) , it is not so in FCDA.
o Section B of FCDA states that "in no instance shall foreign currency be
examined or inquired into or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative,
xxx"
! R.A. No. 1405 aiso includes deposit subject of bribery or litigation.

(NOTE: Some cases on R. A. No. 6425 have been the subject of discussions
in the concurring and dissenting opinions, namely: (a) Solvocion v, Centrol Bank
(343 Phil 539 [7991]), wherein the Court held that "The rule that exempts
dollar deposits (of a transient ) from attachment, garnishment, or, any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, cannot serve as an instrument of justice and deprive a
Philippine national who is the victim of a heinous crime of the damages awarded
to her by the court."; (b) China Banking Corporation v. CA, G.R. No.
L406B7, December 7B,2006, wherein a waiver by the rightful owner was
made. ; (c) Ejercito v. Sondigonbayan, G.R. Nos.757294-95, November 20,
2a05, which did not involve foreign currency deposits; and (d) Republic v.
Eugenio, G.R. No. 774629, Februory 74, 2008, where it was established that
the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy and that bank
accounts are not covered by Article lll, Section 7 or Article ll, Section 28 . )

18
File with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

A4!q[e 3, leeliqn 1 (&ight to Life, Liberty and Security; Writ ol


Amparo; Writ of Habeas Dotal

Burgos v. PGMA, et al., G.R. Nos. 1-83717-13, July 5, 2017

Facts:
a Abduction of Jonas Burgos on April 28, 2001 at Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Ave. , Quezon City by alleged AFP personnel .
a CHR found one Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr . of the 5 6th lnfantry Battalion,
7th lnfantry Division, PA as one of the abductors .
a Consolidated Hobeas Corpus, Writ of Amporo and Contempt actions were
filed.

lssue:
a May the President be impleaded (then as incumbent ) ?

Ruling:
. PGMA d ropped as party-respondent

Rodriguez v - PGMA, et al ., G.R. No. 797805, November 75, 2071


Facts :

a Abduction and torture of Rodriguez by the military burt was later released
through CHR.
a Petition for Writ of Amporo which included PGIVIA was filed.

lssue :

a Legal characterization of command responsibility under Philippine law

Ruling:
c Command responsibility in omporo cases applies.

Reasoning:
" The principle of command responsibility as customary international law
applies through the doctrine of incorporation .
o lts application is only for the purpose of determining who is accountable
for the disappearance to enable the court to devise remedial measures to
protect petitioner's rights.
o Elements of command responsibility : (a ) superior-subordinate relationship;
(b) knowledge of the superior or reason for the superior to know that a
crime was about to be committed or had been committed; and, (c)
failure of the superior to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators.

19
File with Blythe usb_rev 20180ct 19

Boac v. Cadapon, G.R. No. 185050, December 73, 2017

Facts :

o Disappearance of Cadapan
o Writ of Amparo filed.

lssue :

a Relation of command responsibility to writ of omporo.


Rulins:
o Command responsibility cannot be applied as prelude to criminal
prosecution or disciplinary administrative proceedings .

Mison v. Hon . Gollegos, G .R. A/o. 270759, June 23, 2075

Facts :

a lnterpol of Seoul requested Bureau of lmmigration Chairperson Mison to


locate and deport Ja Hoon Ku. A Summary Deportation Order was issued
after charging Ku for being a risk to public interest under Section 69 of
Act No . 21 lL. Ku was arrested and confined at the Bl detention
center. Ku filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo .
Respondent judge granted the petition.
lssue :

c Was the issuance of writ of omporo valid?

Ruling:
o The writ may not be issued.

Beageniryj
a The case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance. Ku was validly arrested and there was no refusal to give
information on his whereabouts. He was afforded visitorial rights and had
access to counsel.

Hon. Zorate, et ol. v. H.E. Aquino lll, G.R. 220028. November 10, 2015

Facts:

a Members of the Manobo Tribe sought ref uge at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) compound in Davao City due to persisting

70
File with Blythe usb_.ev 2018Od 19

militarization of their communities and alleged forcible recruitment to the


paramilitary group. Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that
they were deceived into going to Davao City and were deprived of their
freedom of locomotion and were held against their will. Their repeated
pleas fell on deaf ear until a fellow tribe member was found dead.
Complaints for kidnapping and anti-trafficking were " filed. To determine
who would be charged, the complainants were shown "lists" identifying the
petitioners in this case . Petitioners contend that they have been under
surveillance and were being linked to the communist rebels. They sought
the issuance of the writs of omporo and habeas data.
lssue :

a May the writs issue?

Ruling:
rNo
Reasoning:
a Mere membership of petitioners in organizations, such 0s, Bayan Muna
Party-List and the Gabriela Women's Party and their implication in certain
cases do not suffice as an "actual threat" that entitles one to a writ of
amporo.
a Their right to not been violated given that the information
privacy lras
contained in the "lists" are only their names, positions in their respective
organizations and photographs . All these data are of public knowledge
since petitioners are known personalities.

Article 3, Section 1 (Substantive Due Process)

Valentino L. Legospi v City of Cebu, et al . /Bienvenido P . Jaban, Sr., et al .


.

v. Court Of Appeals, et ol., G.R. /Vo. 159110/G.R. No . 159692,


December 10, 2013
Facts :
a The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted Ordinance No. 7664
authorizing traffic enforcers to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the
parking restrictions defined in Ordinance no . B 01 (Traffic Code of Cebu
City) .
a The vehicle will only be released upon payment of the penalties.

2L
file with Elythe usb_rev 20l8oci 19

lssue :

a Whether or not the ordinance authorizing the clamping of vehicles is


constitutional?

Ruling:
e lt is constitutional.
Reasoning
a The tests to determine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are
divided into the formal (i . e . , whether the ordinance was enacted within
the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law ) , and the substantive
(i . e . , involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy) .

a As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive


tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements
of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering
that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in
the population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of
Ordinance No. L664 was to serve the public interest and advance the
general welfare in the City of Cebu. lts adoption was, therefore, in order
to fulfill the compelling government purpose.
a With regard to procedural process, the clamping of the petitioners' vehicles
was within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing . As already
said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires
was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of
apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous.

Article Section L Su 3 ntive Due Process ual Protection


Police Power) in relation to Article 6, Section 26 (Riders in Bills)

Remmon Enterprises, lnc . v . Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service,


G.R. No. 797676, February 4, 2014
Facts :

a R. A. 9646 entitled, "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines," was


signed into law which aimed to professionalize real estate services by
requiring persons and / or entities to be duly licensed and certified before
entering into the practice of real estate service . The law exempted any
person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself
the acts mentioned in the law with reference to his/her or its own
22
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

property, except real estate developers. The latter argued that they are
also property owners and should also be exempt from the requirements.

lssue:
a ls the law violative of equal protection clause?

Ruling:
. No, the law is valid.

Reasoning:
a There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and
enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of Republic Act
No. 9646 . lt petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new
requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate
professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. No right is
absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or
trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise
of the police power of the State . The legislature recognized the
importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners by
increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property
transactions are susceptible to manipulation and corruption.

Villanuevo v. Judicial and Bor Council, G.R . No . 277833, April 7, 2075


Facts :
a lv,lCTCJudge Villanueva assailed the policy of the JBC requiring five years
of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts as violative of the equal protection clause,
due process and equal opportunity of employment.

lssue :
o ls the policy unconstitutional?

Ruling:
rNo
Reasoning
a The function of the JBC to select nominees is discretionary. Petitioner has
no legal right to be included in the list.
a Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the iBC is merely
applying one of the stringent constitutional standards of proven
competence . A five year stint can also provide evidence of integrity,
probity and independence of judges seeking promotion. This classification
satisfies the "rational basis test . "

23
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

a There is no violation process. The JBC policy is not an


of due
administrative rule or regulation exempted from the publication
requirement. Therefore, it should comply with the publication requirement
of the assailed policy and other special guidelines . However, JBC's failure
to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced petitioner's private
interest .

Ferrer, Jr. v. Moyor Bautista, et al., G. R. No. 210557, June 30, 2075

Facts:
a Two ordinances were imposed by the Quezon City government as follows:
(a ) Socialized Housing Tax - a special assessment equivalent to O . 5% on
the assessed value of land in excess of P100,000 which shall accrue to
the Socialized Housing Programs of the City Government; and, (b) Garbage
Fee rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and
whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment.

lssue :

a Whether the SHT and the garbage fees violate the equal protection
clause .

Ruling:
r The SHT is constitutional .
r The garbage fee is unconstitutional .

Reasoni ns
a The SHT is a tax but with a regulatory purpose in pursuit of the Urban
Development and Housing Act (UDHA) and intended to rehabilitate and
develop blighted and slum areas. lt does not favor informal settlers over
real property owners. The disparity between them as two distinct classes
is too obvious.
c The garbage fee violated the equal protection clause as it failed to take
into account that there is no substantial distinction between an occupant
of a lot and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
projects or apartment . Most likely, the garbage output produced by these
types of occupant is uniform and does not vary to a large degree. The
rates being charged are unjust : a resident of 200 sq . m . unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount
than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m . and less have to pay a
fixed rate of P100; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed
regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a
socialized housing project.

24
File with EJythe usb*rev 2018Oct 19

1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205020, April 14, 2A15

Facts :

a COMELEC Resolution No. 9675 prohibited forms of election propaganda,


such 0s, displaying in public utility vehicles and within public transport
terminals. Petitioner sought clarification as regards the application of the
resolution to "privately-owned public utility vehicles" and private transport
terminals.

lssue
o ls the resolution violative of right to free speech and the equal protection
clause?
Ruling:
o Yes, it is violative of Sections 1 and 4 of Article 3 of the Constitution .

Reasoning:
. ln Adiong v. COMELEC (C.R. No. 103956,lVlorch 31, 1992) the Court
struck down the COMELEC's prohibition against the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile places", such as, private vehicles.
. COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate but not
the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals under Section 4,
Article lX-C of the Constitution.
. The owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law, such ds,
franchises . However, a franchise is a limitation only on certain aspects of
the ownership of a vehicle, but not on the totality of the rights of the
owner over the vehicle.
" On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial
advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities
from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the
franchise.

25
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

Article 3, Section L ( Rieht to Propertv; Procedural Due Process;


Equal Protection in relation to Article 3, Section 2 ( rch and
seizure), Article 3, section 3 (privacv) : Articte 3. section 4
( ), Article 3 Section 2t (Do uble Jeopardv) a nd Article
3. section 22 (Bill of Attainder). and Article G. section 1 (Undue
Delegation)

Disini vs. Secretory of Justice, G.R. No. 20333s..., Februory 78, 2074
Facts:
. Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2OI2 (R.A. No. 10175)
lssue and Ruling:

Provision SC Decision on Constitutional issues

a. Section 4(a) (1) on tllegal Access


issue involved
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a )
Offenses against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of computer
data and systems:

(1 lllegal Access . - The access to


)
the whole or any part of a computer
system without right.

b. Section 4(a) (3) on Data


lnterference prove

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The


following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a ) Offenses against the confidentiality,


integrity and availability of computer
data and systems :

26
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

xxxx

(3) Data lnterference. - The


intentional or reckless alteration,
damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right,
including the introduction or
transmission of viruses .
c. Section 4(a) (6) on Cyber-squatting
Equal Protection Clause; it is the
evil purpose punishable
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a )
Offenses against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of computer
data and systems:

xxxx

(6) Cyber-squatting. - The acquisition


of domain name over the internet in
bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from
registering the same, if such a domain
name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly


similar to an existing trademark
registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the
domain name registration;

(ii) ldentical or in any way similar


with the name of a person other than
the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and

27
File with Blythe usb_rev 20180ct 19

(iii)
Acquired without right or with
intellectual property interests in it.

d. Section 4(b) (3) on ldentity Theft


if user made information public,
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The
then, no theft unless used for
illegitimate purpose
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx
b ) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

( 3 )
Computer-related ldentity Theft.
The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,
transfer, possession, alteration, or
deletion of identifying information
belonging to another, whether natural
or juridical, without right: Provided:
that if no damage has yet been
caused, the penalty imposable shall be
one (1) degree lower.

e. Section 4 (c) (1) on Cybersex


consenting adults not covered;
"business"
Sec. 4-
Cybercrime affenses.- The
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

XXXX

(c ) Content-related Offenses

(1) Cybersex.- The willful


engagement, maintenance, control, or

28
File with Blythe usb-rev 20l8oct 19

operation, directly or indirectly, of any


lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity, with the aid of a
computer system, for favor or
consideration .

f . Section 4 (c) (2) on Child


Pornography violation

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The


following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx
(2)Child Pornography. The unlawful
-
or prohibited acts defined and
punishable by Republic Act No.
91'75 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009,
committed through a computer
system: Provided, That the penalty
to be imposed shall be (1) one
degree higher than that provided
for in ublic Act No. 9115.
g. Section 4(c) (3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications akin to unsolicited ads by mail

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The delete anyway


following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

NOTE: Dispositive portion of SC


xxxx decision declared this
unconstitutional.
(c) Content-related Offenses :

xxxx

29
File with Blythe usb rev 20180ct 19

(3 )
Unsolicited Commerciol
Communicotions. - The transmission of
commercial electronic communication
with the use of computer system
which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer
for sale products and services are
prohibited unless:

(i)There is prior affirmative consent


from the recipient; or

(ii )
The primary intent of the
communication is for service and/or
administrative announcements from the
sender to its existing users, subscribers
or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are


present :

(aa) The commercial electronic


communication contains a simple, valid,
and reliable way for the recipient to
reject receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from
the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic


communication does not purposely
disguise the source of the electronic
message; and

(cc ) The commercial electronic


communication does not purposely
include misleading information in any
part of the message in order to induce
the recipients to read the message .
h. Section 4 (c) (4) on Libel
30
File with Blythe usb_rev 20180ct 19

merely incorporates RPC libel


Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. when committed thru computer
- The
system; "similar means" applied
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

XXXX

) Content-related Offenses :
(c

xxxx
(4) Libel. - The unlawful or
prohibited acts of libel as defined in
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, committed through a
computer system or any other similar
means which may be devised in the
future .

l_ Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting


and Attempt in the Commission of commenting; sharing
Cybercrimes
\- l-{. rrnrnnctifrrtinnrl :c in fha I lS.

Reno case; but should be


Sec. 5.
Other Affenses. - The
applied to other than libel; like
following acts shall also constitute an
Sec 4(a) (1) - 4(a) (6) and
offense :
computer forgery, fraud, identity
theft or cybersex..
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the
Commission of Cybercrime. - Any
person who willfully abets or aids in
the commission of any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held
liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of


Cybercrime. - Any person who
willfully attempts to commit any of
the offenses enumerated in this Act
shall be held liable.

j . Section 6 on the Penalty of One


Degree Higher circumstance; valid

31
File with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

Sec. 6 . All crimes


defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code
as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the
use of information and communications
technologies shall be covered by the
relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, as the case may be.

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under


both the Revised Penal Code online chil{ polnqglaBhy, no
(RPC) and R.A. No. 10175 double jeopardy

Sec. 7 .
Liability under Other Laws .
: A prosecution under this Act shall
be without prejudice to any liability
for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, or
special laws.

t. Section B on Penalties
proportionate to severity of
Sec. B. Penalties. - Any person deleterious cybercrimes
found guilty of any of the punishable
acts enumerated in Sections 4 (a ) and
4 (b) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or
a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up
to a maximum amount commensurate
to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the


punishable act under Section 4 (a ) ( 5 )
shall be punished with imprisonment of
prision moyor or a fine of not more

32
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

than Five hundred thousand pesos


(PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4 (a) are


committed against critical infrastructure,
the penalty of reclusion temporol or a
fine of at least Five hundred thousand
pesos ( PhP500,000 . 00 ) up to
maximum amount commensurate to the
damage incurred or both, shall be
imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the


punishable acts enumerated in Section
4 (c) (1) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision moyor or
a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000 . 00 ) but
not exceeding One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000. 00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the


punishable acts enumerated in Section
4 (c) (2) of this Act shall be punished
with the penalties as enumerated in
Republic Act No. 9l'7 5 or the "Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009:"
Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9115, if committed
through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the


punishable acts enumerated in Section
4 (c) (3) shall be punished with
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a
fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding

33
File with Blythe u5b_rev 2018oct 19

Two hundred fifty thousand pesos


(PhP250,000. 00) or both
m. Section L2 on Real-Time Collection
of Traffic Data
Sec. 12 . Real-Time Collection of
Traffic Data. - Law enforcement
authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by
means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the


communication's origin, destination,
route, time, date, size, duration, or
type of underlying service, but not
content, nor identities.

Ail other data to be collected or


seized or disclosed will require a court
warrant.

Service providers are required to


cooperate and assist law enforcement
authorities in the collection or
recording of the above-stated
information.

The court warrant required under this


section shall only be issued or granted
upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation
of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and the showing: ( 1 )
that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes
enumerated hereinabove has been

34
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018oct 19

committed, or is being committed, or


is about to be committed; (2) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe
that evidence that will be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any
person for, or to the solution of , or
to the prevention of, any such crimes;
and (3) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining
such evidence.

upon orders
of law enforcement officers and
not accessible

35
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

preserve computer data shall keep


confidential the order and its
compliance.

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of valid when


Computer Data done with judicial intervention;
executive has power
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer
Dato . Law enforcement authorities,
upon securing a court warrant, shall
issue an order requiring any person or
service provider to disclose or submit
subscriber's information, traffic data or
relevant data in his/ its possession or
control within seventy-two (12) hours
from receipt of the order in relation
to a valid complaint officially docketed
and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for
the purpose of investigation .
p . Section 15 on Search, Seizure and
Examination of Computer Data law enforcement officers

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and


Exominotion of Computer Dato. -
Where a search and seizure warrant is
properly issued, the law enforcement
authorities shall likewise have the
following powers and duties.

Withrn the time period specified in the


warrant, to conduct interception, as
defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or


a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of


those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the

36
file with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

relevant stored computer data;

(d ) To conduct forensic analysis or


examination of the computer data
storage medium; and,

(e ) To render inaccessible or remove


those computer data in the accessed
computer or computer and
communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement


authorities may order any person who
has knowledge about the functioning of
the computer system and the measures
to protect and preserve the computer
data therein to provide, as is
reasonable,the necessary information,
to enable the undcrtal<ing of the
search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may


request for an extension of time to
complete the examination of the
computer data storage medium and to
make a return thereon but in no case
for a period longer than thirty ( 3 0 )
days from date of approval by the
court.

q . Section Ll on Destruction of
Computer Data user could preserve information
by himself
Sec . l'/ . Destruction of Computer
Doto . Upon expiration of the
periods as provided in Sections 13 and
15, service providers and law
enforcement authorities, as the case
may be, shall immediately and
completely destroy the computer data

37
File with Blyrhe usb,rev 2018oct 19

subject of a preservation and


examination.

r . Section 19 on Restricting or
Blocking Access to Computer Data

jud,icial Wiitraht
Section 19 empowers the Department
of Justice to restrict or block access to
computer data:

Sec. 79 . Restricting or Blocking Access


to Computer Dato. - When a computer
data is prima facie found to be in
violation of the provisions of this Act,
the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict
or block access to such computer
data .

s . Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice


merely incorporates the elements

Sec. 20 . Noncomplionce - Failure to


of D. No. 7829; judicial
P.

comply with the provisions of Chapter


determination of guilt still
necessary
lV hereof specifically the orders from
law enforcement authorities shall be
punished as a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment
ot ii:tliiiil,ifi:A.;$;U,A,i&at in its maximum
period or a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or
both, for each and every
noncompliance with an order issued by
law enforcement authorities .
t - Section 24 on Cybercrime tests
of
lnvestigation and Coordinating Center completeness and sufficiency; no
(CICC); and
undue delegation

Sec- 24. Cybercrime lnvestigotion and

38
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

Coordinoting Center.- There is hereby


created, within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity of this Act, an inter-
agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime lnvestigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC), under the
administrative supervision of the Office
of the President, for policy coordination
among concerned agencies and for the
formulation and enforcement of the
national cybersecurity plan.

u. Section 26 (a) on CICC's Powers


and Functions.

Sec. 26 . Powers ond Functions. - The


CICC shall have the following powers
and functions:

(a) To formulate a national


cybersecurity plan and extend
immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses
through a
computer emergency
response team (CERT); x x x.

Article 3. Section 1 (Procedural Due Process; Trial bv Publicitv) in


relation to 3, Section 4 (Freedom of the Press) and Article
3, Section 14 (Riehts of t he Accused; Public Trial)
RE: Petition for Rodio ond Television Coveroge of the Multiple Murder Coses
Agoinst Moguindonoo Governor Zoldy Ampotuon, et ol ., A.M. Nos. j0-Jl-5-
SC and 70-77-5-SC, June 74, 2077

Facts:
a Death of57 people ( including 32 journalists and media practitioners ) in
Maguindanao

39
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

a 5'7 counts of murder and rebellion against 791 accused (People v . Datu
Andol Ampotuan, Jr., et ol.) .
a Journalists and broadcast media sought live television and radio coverages.

lssues:
a Revisit 799L ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of
President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case and 2007 ruling in Re : Request
Radio-W Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases
Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada .
a Standards/guidelines,/tests which may be applied.

Ruling:
o Partially granted pro hac vice the request, subject to guidelines .

Reasoning:
. The 7965 case of Esfes v. Texos relied upon in Aquino and Estroda was
borne out of a jury system as distinguished from a judge . Members of
the jury are not normally schooled in the law unlike the judge.
. Later jurisprudence in Chondler v. Florido, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) and
trends in 50 states of the U.S.A. allow varying degrees of openness.
. The "totality of circumstances" test in People v . Teehonkee, Jr. and
Estrada v . Desierto must apply. There must be allegation and proof of
the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
. The Ampatuan Coverage Guidelines: (a ) audio-visual recording for
documentary purposes and transmittal to live radio and television
broadcasting; (b ) letter of application by media entities; (c ) installation
of a single fixed compact camera operated by Supreme CourU (d )
transmittal of the audio-visual recording with the least physical disturbance
of the proceedings; (e ) continuous broadcasting of entirety of proceedings;
(f) no commercial break; (g) no voice-overs in general; (h) no repeat
airing until after finality of judgment; (i) original audio recording deposited
in the National Museum; (j ) recording under control of the court; (k)
special committee; (l) apply all other present directives .

Article3, Section 2 (Search and Seizure) in relation to Article 3


Section 3 (Right to Privacy) Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public
Disclosure)

Pollo v. Choirperson Constontino-Dovid (Civil Service Commission), G. R. No.


7B1BB7, October 78, 2077

Facts:
a Memo issued by CSC Chairperson to back up all the files in the
computers found in CSC's two divisions headed by Pollo, triggered by an

40
File with Blythe utb-rev 2018oct 19

government employee with


allegation that Pollo is lawyering for an accused
a pending case in CSC.
40-42 documents found in computer files containing draft
pleadings/letters
a

in connection with administrative cases in CSC '


lssue:
a Legality of the search conducted in Pollo's computer in a government
agency.

Ruling:
. Valid search Employee- Pollo had no reasonable expectation of privacy

Reasoning:
c Cited O'Connor test stating that public employers, unlike criminal law
enforcers, have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work
of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. A
probable cause requirement in this case would impose intolerable burdens
on public employers.
. Special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the
probable cause requirement impracticable, for legitimate, work-related
misconduct.
. Cited US v . Simons where a warrantless entry into Simon's office was
reasonable ground for suspecting that the hard drive would yield evidence
of misconduct, such os, downloading pornographic images. (Here, the CIA
later secured warrants to search Simon's office and copied contents of
computer, etc... )
o As applied to the Pollo case, the following tests will be employed :

a. Employee's relationship to the item seized; (b) Whether the item was
in the immediate control of the employee; and, (c ) Whether the
employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item.
r Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not
share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy . (uS v . Ziegter)
' Pollo failed to allege he had a separate closed office or password. There
was also an express office M EMo policy on use of the computer. The
policy stated that the use of password does not imply privacy.
. Pollo's case is distinguished from a court employee who used his personal
computer during working hours to prepare pleadings for personal cases.
The Court did not allow evidence obtained from the personal computer.

41.
Fjle with Blythe usb,rev 20180ct 19

Article 3 Section 2 (Search and Seizure Standards ap pl ied to


Buses)

Solory v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2078 - dinstinguished "reasonoble


seorch" ond "worrontless search"; os applied to buses )

Article 3 Section 3 (Rieht to Privacv)

SpousesBill and Victoria Hing v . Alexonder Choachuy, Sr. and Allon Choochuy,
G.R. No. 179736, lune 25, 2A73
Facts:
a Petitioner spouses Hing are registered owners of a parcel of land used for
business beside Aldo Development and Resources, lnc . owned by
respondents.
a The respondents set-up and installed on the building of Aldo two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners, property.

lssue:
a May the cameras be allowed?

Ruling:
. The cameras should not be allowed

Reasoning:
o An individual,s right to privacy under Article 26 (7) of
should not be confined
the Civil Code
to his house or residence as it may extend to
places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access .
* The phrase "prying into the privacy of another's residence,,, therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which
an individual considers as
private, including a business office. ln this
day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere f
or the protection and safety
of everyone.
" The installation
of these cameras, however, shourd not
there is reasonabre expectation of privacy, unress cover places where
individual, whose right
the consent of the
to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
. Simply put, a person has a " reasonable expectation
property, whether he uses it as a business of privacy,, in his
office or as a residence and
that the installation of video surveillance cameras
property or covering a significant portion directly facing his
thereof, without his consent, is a
clear violation of their right to privacy

42
File with BlYthe usb rev 2018oct 19

Article 3, Section 3 (Rieht to Friva cv: Writ of Amparo: Writ of


Habeas Doto)

Rhondo Ave S. Vivores v. St. Theresa's College, G.R. No. 202556, September
29, 2074
Facts:
a Two students from St. Theresa's College Cebu City took pictures of
themselves while changing their swimsuits for a beach party. They were
clad only in their undergarments.
a The pictures were uploaded by one Angela on her facebook profile . A
computer teacher reported the matter.
a The students were all barred from joining the commencement exercises on
account of their actions.
a Petitioner-parents sought issuance of a writ of Habeos Doto arguing that
their children have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

lssue :
a May the writ issue?

Ruling:
o The petition is denied .

Reasoni ng:
a The writ of habeos doto is a remedy avairabre to any person
whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
unlawful act or omission of a pubric officiar or emproyee, by an
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, coilecting
or of a private
or information regarding the person, famiry, home or storing of data
and
the aggrieved party. rt is an independent and summarycorrespondence of
remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
information of an individuar, and to provide freedom of
right to the truth and to informationar privacy.
a forum to enforce one,s
person's right to control information rt seeks to protect a
regarding oneserf, particularly in
instances in which such information
is being ioilected through unrawfur
means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
a Before one can have an ion of
Network activity,
in his or her Online Social
ch ildren of petitioners,
in this case the
through the empl oyment of measures prevent access thereto
its visibil And this intent ion can materiatize in cyberspace or to limit
ffi1.ffifiHH.E#ffi
privacy tools
. ln other words, utilization ,f ifi"r"
is the manifestation, in cyber world,
of the user,s invocation
of his or her right to informational privacy. Considering that
the default

43
File with BlYthe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

settingforFacebookpostsis"Public"'itcanbesurmisedthatthe
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook' absent
any proof that petitioners' children positively limited the disclosure
of the
photograph. lf such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection
attached to the right to informational
a
ln this regard, the cyber community is agree
that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the
confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following: 1) Facebook
(

"allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the
tools to interact and share in any conceivable wAY"; (2) A gOod number
of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangerS; (3) The
sheer number of "Friends" one user has is usually by the hundreds; and
( 4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag"

others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being
visible only to his or her own Facebook friends- lt is well to emphasize
at this point that setting a post's or profile detail's privacy to "Friends" is
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content.
a Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within
the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that
they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question .

Dr. Joy Margate Lee v. P/Supt. Neri A. tlogon, G. R. No. 203254, October
B, 2 014

Facts:
a Petitioner P/supt . llagan and Dr. Lee were common-law partners . He
visited Lee at the latter's condominium and rested for a while and
thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, petitioner noticed that
his digital camera was missing.
a He confronted Lee regarding a purported sex video she discovered from
the camera involving petitioner and another woman. ilagan srammed Lee,s
head against a wall and walked away.
a Lee used the video as evidence against petitioner for violation of
Anti-
VAWC law.
a
that Lee's acts of reproducing the video and threatening
Petitioner claimed
to upload it in the internet violated his right to
privacy, thus he sought
issuance of the Writ of Habeos Data .

lssue:
. May the writ issue?

44
19
File with BlYthe usb,rev 20180ct

Ruling:
o The Petition is denied.

&Tffi to sufficiently allege


cour, finds that petitioner tlagan was not
able
thathisrighttoprivacyinlife'libertyorsecuritywasorwouldbe
violatedthroughthesupposedreproductionandthreateneddissemination
privacy interest in the
of the subject sex video . while llagan purports a
suppressionofthisvideowhichhefearswouldsomehowfinditsway
toQuiqpoorbeuploadedintheinternetforpublicconsumption_he and any violation
failed to explain the connection between such interest
of his right to life, liberty or security '
lndeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions
of possible
a
matter
transgressions.Astherulesandexistingjurisprudenceonthe
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one's
privacy

right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas
dota cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly ren ders
a hobeos dato petition dismissible, as in this case '

Article 3, Section 4 (Expression)

GMA Network, tnc. v . Commission On Elections, et ol G.R. No. 205357,


September 2,2074

Facts:
c COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the
previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political
advertisements. The resolution
involving all the media of broadcast communications
where it was done on . This effected a drastic
reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and politicai
parties would be able to campaign through the air.

lssue :

o whether the Resolution is within the power of the coMELEC to do or


not

Ruling:
r lt is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so
Reasoning:
. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based,, airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people . Here, the

45
2018Oct 19
tile with Blythe usb-rev

for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits


adverted reason
levelingtheplayingfield_does.notconstituteacompellingstateinterest
whichwouldjustifysuchasubstantialrestrictiononthefreedomof
candidatesandpoliticalpartiestocommunicatetheirideas,philosophies,
platformsandprogramsofgovernment.And,thisisspeciallysointhe
a prohibitive
absence basis for the imposition of such
of a clelr-cut
measure
came uP with does not measure up to
that level of
What the COMELEC
elevates administrative rules to the
a

requirement and accountability wh


governed bY administrative
level of respectability and accepta bi ity Those
regulations are entitled to a reason ble and
rational basis for anY changes
in those rules by which theY are upposed to live by, especially
if there
is a radical deParture from the P us ones.
o The law, on its face, does not j stify a conclusion that the maximum
allowable airtime should be based the totality (aggregate ) of possible
broad ca st in all television or radio stations . Senator Cayetano
has called
our attention to the legislative in relative to the airtime allowed
that it should be on a "Per stati basis

Diocese of Bocolod et ol. v. Comelec, G . No. 205728, lanuorY 21, 2075 ,l


I
J
Facts:
,t
a Petitioners posted two tarpaulins ithin a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod Each tarpaulin, approximately six feet I
by ten feet in size, was posted on the front walls of the cathedral within ,11
'l
public view.
I
a The first tarpaulin contains the "IBASURA RH Law" while the
t
second contained the heading tt
cience Vote" and lists candidates as I
,l
either " (Anti-RH ) Team Buhay" w a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team
,

Patay" with an "X" mark. It


a The tarpaulins were neither sponsore nor paid for by any candidate . I

o COMELEC ordered the tarpaulins for being oversized. I


tt
lssue t\
a Would the removal of the tarpaulin violate the constitutional r,ight of the tl
petitioners?

Ruling:
Yes, this violated the freedom of sp ch of petitioners.
Reasoning:
r COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expression made by private
citizens; The tarpauiins were not campaign materials belonging to
candidates. Existing election law provisions on the subject refer to matters

46
19
File with Blvthe usb-rev 2018Oct

donebyoronbehalfofandinconsiderationwithcandidatesandpolitical
BB1 defines..n-"1".,,.on-campaign as
an "act
a !:I:: 1s of B.p.
designedtopromotetheelectionordefeatofaparticularcandidateor
provides that
,,Public expressions or
candidates to a public office .,, lt also
opinionsordiscussionsofprobableissues'..shallnotbeconstruedaspart
of any election campaign, or partisan political activity"'"
a ThetarpaulininquestioncontainsspeechaSamatterofpublicconcern
of expression ' Every
within the realm of petitioners' right to freedom a high degree of
with political .Jnr.quun.", enjoys
citizen,s expression
protection .

a coMELEC contends that removal of the tarpaulin


is a content-neutral
regulation. But petitioners found it as content-based as
it applies to
political speech . Assumin g arguendo that the size restriction is a mere
time, size and manner regulation, it is still unconstitutional f or lack
of a
clear and reasonable nexus with constitutionally 5$.1;i,:$tidffi objective. There
is no compelling state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin .

a Finally, the tarpaulin remained the private property of petitioners even if


readily seen by the public. Their right to property is likewise protected by
the Constitution.
a The tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech . lt did not convey \ I
any religious doctrines of the Catholic Church.

\l
l
SWS ond Pulse Asio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April 7,2075 {'
Facts: i!
a COMELEC Resolution No - 96'7 4
pursuant to the Fair Elections Act required i
,l
SWS and Pulse Asia as well as "other survey firms of similar circumstance"
to submit to COMELEC \i
I

# published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including


those of their "sL.lbscribers" .

lssue:
a whether the resolution violates petitioners' freedom of speech (political
speech ) and the non-impairment clause in relation to section 26 of
Article ll, section 4 of Article lX-C and section z6 of Article Xlll which
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service.

Ruling:
r There is no constitutional violation .

47
2018oct 19
file with BlYthe usb-rev

-i*ffiioners, free speech rights must be weighed in reration to the Fair


and, therefore' the
of ensuring political equality
Elections Act,s purpose
speechofotherswhowanttoparticipateunencumberedinourpolitical
propaganda, when pubrished,
. ilil:t erection surveys are not per se erection
however,thetendencytoshapevoterpreferenceComesintoplay.lnthis
respect, these surveys partake of the
nature of election propaganda' hence'
subject to regulation under Section 5 '2
of the Fair Elections Act'
the
. The resolution does not suppress expression but merely regulates
mannerofpublicationbydisclosingthosewhocommissionedand/orpaid
for, including those subscribed to, published election Surveys.
r Existing contracts of petitioners with third parties must be understood to
have been made in reference to possible exercise of the coMELEC's

regulatorY Powers -

Dovoo City woter District v. Araniuez, et ol. G .R. No. 194792, June 76,
2075

Facts :
a Private respondents are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo
sa Davao City Water District ( NAMADACWAD ) who were charged with
several administrative cases due to acts committed during the fun run
anniversary celebration of DCWD, such ds, wearing of t-shirts with
inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the designated places . The
inscriptions and postings bore employees' grievances .
e The private respondents were found administratively liable.

lssue :

a Were the constitutional rights to assemble and petition for redress of


grievances violated?

Ruling r

r Yes, there was a violation of Section 4 of Article 3


Reasoning:
a The prohibition on concerted mass action done within the regular
government office hours pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of CSC Resolution
No . 02L376 [s anchored on two operative phases, namely: (a ) ,,any
collective activity"; and, (b) "work stoppage or service disruption . "

48
19
File with Blvthe usb-rev 20i8Oct

service disruption, the concerted


Without intent at work Stoppage or
activity is not prohibited, even if done
within government hours '
a Thewearingoft_shirtswithinscriptionsduringthefunrunfallwithinthe
descriptionof"anYsportsattire"thattheofficememoallowedtobe
worn.

Article 3 ction 5 (F reedom of Relisi on)

Perfecto v. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, luly 22, 2075

Facts: : r l-lt:
a Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera mar ried Richard Tang TePace on rya.v
in a civil ceremony. There was no' VaIia, titense ttO.;,ri,aifV.
a .ludge Desales-Esidera married Renato Esidera under
a Catholic wedding rite (Matrimonio de conciencia) but th" 6:Ei1t*1fi{ii$fiiffi
under civil la w.
I
a Judge Desales-Esidera t
I

.On Judge Desales-Esidera's


ly

a Desales-Esidera entered into a


I
!I
but this I
a On July 15, 2OlO, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative
rl
Desales- Esidera
\,
and that their
daughter was a legitimate child. t
I
o Judge Desales argued that everything she did was legal and in accordance t
with her religious beliefs. The office of Court Administrator found her I
guilty of disgraceful, immoral and dishonest conduct . \
't

lssue :

G May the judge be found guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of


Professional Responsibility?
Ruling:
r Judge Desales-Esidera's liability was distinguished by the Court as follows:
(a) She disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second
husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, l99o; (b
) her
omission to correct her child's birth certificate is not sufficient to render
her administratively liable because the error was attributed to the husband
who signed as informant; and (c ) her alleged affair and failure to

49
19
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct

to the Cathotic faith is not within the Court's


compost according
jurisdiction to decide

nl judges, "immoral
r For purposes of determining liabilitY of lawyers and moralitY is not
conduct" shou ld relate to their conduct
in Court ' Religious
administrat ive liabilitY of lawYers
binding whenever the Court decides the
and judges. The Court, in resolving cases
that touch on issues of moralitY,
of its judgment on
is bound to remain ne utral and should limit the bases
"secular moral standards" '
liable for
. while Judge Desales-Esidera was not found administratively
directs lawyers to obey
immorality, the code of Professional Responsibility judge may have
the laws and promote respect for the law. Respondent
disobeyed the law, particularly Article 3 50 of the Revised
Penal Code'
which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of
laws. She knew that the solemnizing officer in the 1990 marriage had
no

civil authority to solemnize, but, unless the iudge's act of participating in a


marriage ceremony according to her religious beliefs violates other
peoples'
rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the society, the court will
not rule that she is administratively liable . The test of benevolent
neutrality must be aPPlied.
o However, Judge Desales-Esidera knowingly entered into a civil marriage with ,t
her first husband knowing the effects under existing laws. She had sexual I,

relations with her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting. \
This act is obviously not in the exercise of her religious expression. Her
i

conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice.


\
t
Re :
Letter of Tony a. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituols ot the I
Holl of Justice Building in Quezon City, A . M . No. 10-4-7 9-SC, l\
Morch 7, 2077. I

Article 3. Section 5 (Liberty of Abode and Freedom to Travel) in


relation to Article 3 Section l- ( Due Process) , Article 3, Section 4
(Sneech and Assemblv) . Article 3. 5 (Relieion)
and Article 2. Section Lz ( Primarv of Parents to
Rear their Children)

SPARK, et al. v. Quezon City, G. R. No. 225442, August B, 2A17

Facts:

a Three curfew ordinances for minors (Quezon City, Manila and Navotas)
were challenged as violative of the following constitutional provisions :

50
2018oct 19
file with Blythe usb-rev

Article Z, Section L2 (primary right


of parents in the rearing of their
(due process); Article 3' Section 4 ree
(f
children); Article 3, seciion 1
speech, expression and assembly ) ;
Article 5 ' Section 5 (religion ) ; Article

3, Section 6 (liberty of abode and right to travel) ; a nd, Article 3,


Section B (association) ' R'A' 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
was also alleged to have been violated '

Hours for minors from


The Quezon City ordinance provided Disciplinary
1O:O0pmto5:00ambutSection4providedforexemptions:(a)
those on their way to
those accompanied by parents or guardians; )
(b
and / or other
and from a party, graduation ceremony' religious mass' wherein
extra-curricular activities of their school or organization
their

attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when


such minors
are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their
control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; (c ) in case
of
an emergency situation; (d ) if minor is in authorized employment or
going to or returning home from the same place of employment without
any detour or stop; (e ) if inside a motor vehicle or on travel
accompanied by an adulU (f ) in case of official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school or other private civic/religious group (recognized
by the community); and (g) when the minor can present papers
certifying that helshe is a student and was dismissed from his/her
classes in the eveni or that he /she is a workin student

a The Manila City Ordinance declared the hours from 10:00 p.m. to
4 : 00 a. m. as Barangay Curfew Hours for minors. There are four (4)
exemptions, namely : (a ) minors accompanied by their
parents, farnily members of legal age or guardian; (b ) those running
lawful errands; (c ) night school students and those who, by virtue of
their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence
after 10:00 m . ; and, (d ) those working at n t. t

a The Navotas ordinance contained the following exemptions : (a ) minors


with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a
school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d ) those travelling towards home during curfew hours; (e
) those
running errands under supervision of their parents, guardians or persons of
legal age having authority over them; (f ) those involved in accidents and
calamities; and (g ) specific occasions, such ds, christmas eve, Christmas
day, New Year's eve, New year's day, the night before a barangay fiesta,
fiesta day, All Saints' and All Souls' H Thu G Fri Black
Saturday and Easter Sunday.

51

L._
19
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018oct

lssue:
a Are the curfew ordinances unconstitutional?

Ruling:
o Quezon CitY Ordinance is valid '
. The Manila and Navotas Ordinances are void '

Reasoning:
units to set
. Article 13 9 of PD 60 3 explicitly authorizes local government
curfew hours for children . This is the statutory basis to restrict
the

minors' exercise of the right to travel'


. The void for vagueness doctrine does not apply. Petitions only point to
the ordinances' Iack of enforcement guidelines but failed to assert any
confusion as to what conduct the ordinances prohibit or not prohibit.
o ln implementing the ordinances, law enforcement agents are bound by the
parameters of R. A. g344 in the determination of the age of the chitd
through a birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. ln the absence of these documents, any other information
,i!
I
from the child or other persons or through physical appearance would )
suffice . 'ii

o The primary right of the parents in rearing their children is qualified by l


the state's legitimate interest to promote public welfare or the well-being 1l
,T
of the child.
e The curfew ordinances apply only when minors are not, whether actually 1
or constructively, accompanied by their parents. This only amounts to a i:
minimal or reasonable infr:ingement upon a parent's right to bring up !
his/her child . .!
c The contention on the violation of the right to travel of minors is partlv lr

meritorious . Public safety may be basis to restrict the minors' right to


\

travel. Under the strict scrutiny test government must prove that the lI
classification ( 1 ) is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; and, \
(2) is the least restrictive means. The local government units showed i

com state interest, but


and run the risk
of ove restricti the minors' fundamental freedoms.
sufficiently protect the minors' right to association, freb exercise of religion,
assemble and of free ressron.
a

. What the law prohibits is the


imposition of on mtnors is a valid form of
Community service
intervention program Admonition is a mere warning. These are net

52
File with BlYthe usb-rev 2018oct 19

Ities. On the otherhand,

Article 3, Section 6( Rieht to Travel and HDO

Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No- 197930, April 77, 2018

Article3, Section 7 (Rieht to lnformation in relation to Article 2


Section 28 ( Public Disclosure)

Sereno v. Committee, G. R. No. 77527A, Feb. 7, 2076


Facts :

a Sereno, as executive director of the Association of Petrochemical


Manufacturers of the Philippines (A.PMP1 filed a petition for mcndamus ta
compel the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM ) -NEDA to
provide him a copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2oo5 meeting as well
as all official records, documents, papers and government research data as
basis for the issuance of E . O . 48 6 which lifted the suspension of tariff
reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the
ASEAN Free Trade Area Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme
(AFTA-CEPT) . The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition.

lssue:
a Will mondomus lie?

Ruling:
o No.

Reasoning:
r Section 3, Rule IV of the IRR of R . A. 6i L3 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for public Officials and Employees states :
)

"Sec - 3 . Every department, office or agency shall provide


information, records and documents to any requesting public ii*tE$t it
xxxx

53
19
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct

document sought falls within


the
(c) the information, rgcord or
recognized exceptions as
or may be
concepts of esta6,t' e-ot,.,, olriv.ileE4
provided by law oi-I"itt"a policy or
jurisprudence;

of
(d) such information, record or document comprlses dr:afts

memoranda, etc '


decisions, orders, rulings, Policies,
com of various dePartment
a The which may fall
heads or secretaries and is
under the category of privileged information '
a The burden of showing the exemption from access to the information rests

upon the government agencY '

DFA V BCA tnternotionol, G.R. No.270B58, lune 29,2076

Article 3 n9 Emi nt Domain

Nationa! Power Corporotion v. Monalostas, G.R. No. 795740, lan- 27, 2015
ti,
Facts :

a NPC constructed a transmission line sometime in 1911 to 191 B on


Manalastas'property without the knowledge or consent of Manalastas and
without initiating expropriation proceedings and without any compensation.
a Manalastas filed a complaint with the RTC of Naga City demanding
removal of the power lines and payment of damages or in the alternative,
payment of the fair market value of the affected areas at 800.00 per
square meter.
The RTC ordered NPC to pay 92,827,351 .00 by way of compensation -
on appeal to the cA, NPc argued that the devaluation of the peso should
not have been factored in the computation of the fair market value of
the land. The CA ruled that NPC could no longer assail the valuation
recommended by NPC itself . NPC is estopped.

lssues :
o May estoppel lie against NpC?
c should inflation be factored in the computation of just compensation?
c May the Court review the formulation of just compensation?
Ruling:
. Estoppel does not lie against the State even if the persons representing
the government were negligent

54
File with BlYthe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

a The just comPensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective


forbearance on the Part of the State

in order to eradicate the issue of the


constant variabil of the value of the currency over time -
a Therefore, the for purposes of determini ng just
compensa because
this is recomprised through payment of interest on the market
value of the land.
It is the Court, not NPC's counsel which decides on the proper
interpretation or application o f the law, such os, the determination of
rightful compensation.

Article 3. Section 10 ( Non-lmpairment Clause)

Goldenway v. Equitoble Bank, G-R. No. 795540, March 73, 20lj


Facts:
o Goldenway executed a 1e:al;,estate mortgage in 1 9 B 5 in favor of Equitable
Bank to secure a loan. Goldenway failed to settle the loan obtigation and
the properties mortgaged were sold .
o Goldenway's counsel offered to redeem the properties but was informed
that it is no longer possible because R. A. Bl9l applied and, therefore,
barred the redemption.
' Goldenway argued that Act No . 313 5 should instead
apply
a one-year period of redemption and not the shorter termwhich allowed
under R . A.
B'7 9r, otherwise it wourd impair its
obrigation of contract.
lssue:
c was the right of Gordenway viorated when the amendatory
8191, was in effect when the mortgage was forecrosed? raw, R. A.

Ruling:
o There is no impairment of the obligation of contract.
Reasoning:
o section 41 of R ' A. 81 gl did not divest juridical
persons of the right to
redeem foreclosed properties but onty ,,ojirieu
of such right by reducing the one-year period the time for the exercise
originally provided in Act
No. 3135.
' There is, likewise, no retroactive application
of the new redemption period
because section 4'7 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed
prior to its effectivity and whose owners
retain redemption rights under
Act No. 3135.

55
19
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oci

Article 3 Secti on 1-3 ( to Ba )

August 1B' 2075' 767 SCRA 282


Enrile v. Sondigonboyon, G'R' No' 213847'

Facts :

a SenatorJuanPonceEnrileWaschargedwithplunder.Whenthe
voluntarily surrendered and was
Sandiganbayan ordered him arrested, Enrile
lateronconfinedatthePNPGeneralHospital.HefiledaMotiontoFix
yet established that the
Bail He argued (a ) that the prosecution has not
.
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b ) that
the penalty as to him would
risk' and his age
only be reclusion temporal; and, (c ) he was not a flight
at 90 and physical condition must further be seriously consider:ed ' The
SandiganbaYan denied bail.

lssue:
a Should Enrile be granted bail?

Ruling:
o Yes, he may be granted bail
!,,i
Reasoning:
\
a Enrile's social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered I
to the authorities Indicate that the risk of flight or escape is highly t
unlikely. I
a The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another compelling rl
justification for his admission to bail. This is borne out by the findings of il
Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of Philippine General Hospital .
a Bail f or the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime il
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life . I
I
\
I
Article 4, Sections2 and3 (Citi zenship) I
1
coson Macode tvlaquiling v . 1)MELEC, Rommel Arnodo y. cogoco, Linog G
Balua, G.R. No. 795549, April 15, 2013 and luly 2, 20t3 (MR) .
\
Facts :
a Respondent Arnado, a natural born Filipino citizen, acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. He later on reacquired Filipino citizenship by
taking an oath of Allegiance to the philippines and Renounced his
American citizenship . Later, Arnado used his u . s . passport at least four
times.

56
2018Oct 19
tile with EiYthe usb- rev

that Arnado should be deemed to have been


a Petitioner contends
disqualifiedtorunforpublicofficeevenashehasalreadyfinishedhis
Local Government Code '
term of office in May 2OIO under the

lssue :

or not resPondent Arnado is disqualified to run for a local


a Whether
elective office?

Ruling:
. Respondent is disqualified '

Such reversion was not retroactive; it too


place the instant he represented himse lf as a foreign citizen bY using his
foreign passport.
Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of rl
a

Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally I


renounce foreign Citi2enship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office - tf by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of I
candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and foreign citizenship, he was qualified to vote, but by the f
express disqualification under Section 4 0 (d ) of the Local Government
Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being I
I
barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus I
I
rendered void from the
t
a

ti
!
.\
li
\j

Artiele4, Sections 2 and3 (C itizenship) in relation to Article 12, t\

Seetios 7 and 8 (Acquisitions of Private Land Distineuish ed from \r\[


Fublic Land ) l

David v. Editho A Agboy ond People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 7gg7t,
March 18,2075

Facts :

a ln 19'74, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became Canadian citizen


by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned

57
2018Oct 19
tile with Blythe usb-rev

they purchased a 600-square


to the philippines. sometime in 2000,
meterlotalongthebeachinrambong,Gloria,orientalMindorowhere
theyconstructedaresidentialhouse.However,intheyear2O04,they
they built their house is public
came to know that the portion where
land and part of the salvage zone ' , ^^-^ ^^^rir:r'
a onAprilL2,20o.],petitionerfiledaMiscellaneousLeaseapplication
(MLA)overthesubjectlandwherewiththeDepartmentofEnvironment
Environment and Natural
and Natural Resources (DENR ) at the Community
Resources Office (CENRO ) in Socorro '
ln the said application' petitioner
complaint was filed against
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. A
petitioner for falsification of public documents'
under R . A ' 9225 as
a Meanwhile, petitioner re_acquired Filipino citizenship
issued by the
evidenced by ldentification certificate No. 266-10-07
consulate-General of the Philippines in Toronto, canada on
october 11'
2001 .

a Private respondent, Editha A - Agbay opposed the application on the


ground that petitioner, a canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land '

lssue :.
a ls the petitioner disqualified to own land in the Philippines and, therefore,
subject to prosecution for falsification of public documents? t!

Ruling:
r Petitioner may be proceeded against for violation of the Revised Penal
Code based on a misrepresentation that he is a Filipino citizen qualified to
acquire land -

Reasoning:
a When petitioner re-acquired Filipino citizenship under R . A . 9225, the
falsification was already a consummated act and the law did not have a
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned .
a Besides, while Section 2 of R . A. 9225 states the general policy that
Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed
"not to have lost their Filipino citizenship," srrch is qualified by the phrase
"under the conditions of this Act. "
a

a The first paragraph of Section 3 refers to re-acquisition while the second


ragra covers retention of citizenshi
a

Besides, even assuming that the


principle applies, it will not work for petitioner's cause because he had
not alleged that he applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before
he made the declaration in the public land application that he is a
Filipino.

58
2018Oct 19
tile with BlYthe usb-rev

of petitioner applies to a
a The rule that favorable interpretation in favor
a
penal statute and not to R ' A ' 9225 which
is not a criminal statute .

Article 4 Sections 1 2and3 Citizenshi )

Poe-Llomonzores v. COMELEC, G 'R ' No ' 221697' March B' 2076

Facts:

several coMELEC cases were filed against Mary Grace Natividad '
s Poe-
a

Llamanzares on account of the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy


(COC )

for the Presidency for the May 2076 Elections - The oppositors questioned
her declaration as a natural-born citizen and her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2076 as would be ten ( 10 )
years and eleven ( 11 ) months counted from 24 May 2005. She also
attached her "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U . S . A. Citizenship . "
a It appears that Poe-Llamanzares was an abandoned newborn when she
was found in the Parish church of Jaro, lloilo by Edgardo Militar on 3
September 7968. Custody over Poe-Llamanzares was passed to Emiliano
Mititar and his wife, who registered po+i:.fafi:ati.aiss,.'.:,.aiir:iii;ii:6.fififfieffitfi
She was given the name, Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar
a Poe-Llamanzares was later on adopted', bV Ronald :Al'lah , Ke.[lev' iPoe
ltdlkif;ei!,,:if:$u#n
i 'l.dr,l:j
.
nn., l'. r '.n
Municipal Trial Court of San juan City.
.:

Rqq€j") through a judgment of the


a When Poe-Llamanzares reached eighteen (18) years of age, ihii:;tr$i6i:6iit
She was issued a Philippine
passport on o4 April 1988. she renewed her passport in 1993 and
1998 . She initially studied in U . P. but decided later on to continue her
studies in the US in 1 9 B B .

(Philippines and U .s.A. ) The couple flew back to the U. S. two da


after the weddi in San Juan City.
and, subsequently, obtained a U. S
passport . she went back in 200 4 to support her father,s presidential
candidacy. she returned to the u.s. on B July 2004. she had to
immediately come back to the Philippines to take care of her father until
3 February 2 0 0 5 . when her father died, she and the family decided to
move and reside permanently in the philippines in the first quarter of
2005. ln nearly 2006, the couple acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon where th built a family home.

59
2018oct 19
tile with Blvthe usb-rev

On 6 October
of MTRCB but before
20L0, she was aPPointed as ChairPerson
she executed an
-" Thereafter, she

t2 JulY 2O1I she executed before


stopped using her U. S ' Passpo rt. On
an "Oath of Afflrmation
the Vice-Consul of the U. S. E mbassy in Manila She was issued bY
of Renunciation of NationalitY of the United Nationa
States '
lity" on 9 December
the Vice-Consul a "Certificate of Loss of
?-OLL, effective 21 October 20lo '
a On 2 October 20L2, P oe-Llamanzares filed her to the
wherein she answered
question
The
a she filed her
First Division granted the oppositors' contentions and ruled that
:
COMELEC
(a ) is not a natural-born citizen; (b) she failed to
Poe-Llamanzares
complete the ten ( 1O ) year residency; and, (c ) she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC.

lssue :

a ls - Lla ma nzares qualified


Poe to run for the Presidency for being a

natural-born Filipino citizen ?

Ruling:
o She is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Reasoning:
a The Solicitor-General offered official statistics that from 7965-7915, the
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15, 986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the country was 10, 558, 2i B . The
i!,6rtii:fiBa.ffiip.6a]btifuV *,at any child born in the phitippines that decade is
natural*born Filipino was 99 . B3%. Poe-Llamanzares showed that in lloilo
province in 7960, there was 962, 532 Filipinos and 4,'t34 foreigners.
This translates to 99 . 62% Filipino population . ln 7gl o, the figures
showed 7,762,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99 .55%. ln terms
of child-producing ages (15-49), in lg60, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against l3o female foreigners or 99 . GB% . ln the same year,
there were 210, 349 Filipino males and BBG male aliens, or 99.58%. ln
l9'/0, there were 21o, 299 Filipino females versus l, 190 female aliens,
or 99 - 56%. That same vear, there were 245,'t 40 Filipino males as
inst on ly 7, 155 male aliens or 99.53 %

a As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While


the 193 5 constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would exclude foundlings either. The Rafols

60
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

amendment intended to include "children of unknown parentage" in the


1 93 5 Constitution as natural-born citizens was not carried simply because
their number was not significant enough to merit specific mention.
a Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
. An adoptee must be a
a

a Foundlings are citizens under lnternational law. Under the Universal


Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), "everyone has a right to nationality"
(Article 15 ) . Similarly, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC), a child has "a right to acquire a nationality" (Article 1 ,
par. 1 ) . ln the lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR )
"every child has the right to acquire a nationality" (Article 24, par. 3 ) .
Two other international law instruments, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, form part of the generally accepted principles of international
law, namely: (a) Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality laws under which a
foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of birth;" and, (b ) Article
2 of the I96l UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which
states that " a foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have
been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that
State

a Poe-Llamanzares' domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005 .


She permanently settled back with her family on this date.

Rizalito Y. Dovid v. Senote Electoral Tribunol ond Poe-Llomonzores, G.R. No


221538, September 20, 2076

Facts :

. David sought to unseat Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for


allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The SET
found Poe-Llamanzares to be a natural-born citizen. David argued that
SET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

lssue:
a Did SET commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction?

bI
File with Blythe usb rev 2018Oct 19

Ruling:
r No.

Reasoning:
e The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born citizens unless
there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
o David's reliance on Article 4, Section 7 (2) and the need to establish
bloodline is misplaced. Between Article 4, Section 1(2) and Section 2, it
is Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether Poe-Llamanzares is a
natural-born citizen, one must look into whether she had to do anything
to perfect her citizenship. ln view of Bengson lll ruling, she did not have
to go through the naturalization process to become a Filipino. The
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefit children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted . lt is a glaring mistake to liken them to an
adult filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to
become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he
or she must himself or herself adduce.
o R. A. 9225 is premised an immutability of natural-born status and
proceeds from an entirely different premise from the restrictive process of
naturalization.
. Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of
citizenship, nor identity.
o The burden of evidence does not shift to Poe-Llamanzares by the mere
showing that she is a foundli
a

It is true that in Paa v. Chan (LZB Phil . B 15 ) it was


ruled that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases. This is
no longer true in light of Tecson. Besides, the factual backdrop of Paa is
markedly different. ln Paa, evidence showed that respondent Quintin Chan
was registered as an alien . His father was likewise registered as an alien.
Go v . Ramos ( 6L4 Phil 4 51 ) cited Paa but revising it to make it
appear that the same pronouncement was generally applicable . Go was
decided by a Division unlike Tecson, which was decided by the court
sittlng En Bonc - Go involved deportation not an election controversy. ln
Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showed Chinese citizenship of
Go.
a Article 4, Section L(2) must be read with Article 2, Sections 11 and 13;
Article 15, Section 3; Article 3, Section 1; and, Article 13, Section 1 .
a The equal protection clause prohibits differentiation of foundlings from
children with known Filipino parents.

62
File with Elythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

Article 5, Section L (Suffrage)

Kobotaon Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227378, December 18, 2015

Facts :

a Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R. A. 70361 entitled, "An Act


Providing f or the Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration," and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9121, 9863 and 10013 related thereto. The law
provides that only voters who fail to submit for validation on or before
the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the
May 2 015 elections shall be deactivated .
a Petitioners contended that biometrics validation rises to the level of
"additional, substantial qualification" and applying the strict scrutiny test,
there is no compelling reason for state regulation and, hence, an
unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage.

lssue:
a ls R.A. 10367 (including related COMELEC resolutions) unconstitutional?

Ruling:
o Petition has no merit. The law is valid .

Reasoning:
a The State may impose statutory disqualifications, with the restriction that
the same do not amount to a "literacy, property or other substantive
requirement. "
a The concept of "qualification" should be distinguished from the concept of
"registration," insofar as suffrage is concerned. The act of registering is
only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that
makes the citizen a qualified voter. Registration is a form of regulation
not a qualification. Registration is a mere procedural requirement as
pronounced in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC (401 Phil 618).
o R-A. B1B9 governs the registration process. R.A. 10361 built on the
policy considerations behind R . A . B 1B 9 to systematize the present
method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent
and updated list of voters.
Biometrics is a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification
of an individual. Validation is the process of taking the biometrics of
registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured .
a The regulation passes the strict serutiny test. There is a compelling state
interest involved, i . € . , to cleanse the national voter registry so as to
eliminate electoral fraud .
a The regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve this end. There
was sufficient information and time afforded the public to abide by the
law.

63
Filewith Btytheusb rev 2018oct 19

ati,l"rq

207 6

@ 1 (Unelue lqlegqlion of Legislative Power) in


re[ation Jo Artic[llectlon 17 (Enrqle Farlhful Elequtiql of Laws)
and Article 3, Section 1 (Equal Protection)

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. Nos. 192935, 193036, December


'/,2070

Facts:
a E. O. No. 1 of July 30, 2OL0 created the Philippine Truth Commission,
founded on P-Noy's anti-corruption drive, with the "powers of an
investigative body under Section 3J, Chapter 9, Book 1 of the
Administrative Code of 198J" and tasked to conduct a fact-finding
investigation of the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
"previous administration . "

lssue:
a Constitutionality of E. O. No . 1 : (a ) separation of powers; (b ) quasi-
judicial powers; and, (c ) equal protection.

Ruling:
r E . O. No . 1 is unconstitutional in so far as it is violative of the equal
protection clause.

Reasoning:
o PTC cannot determine if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information; neither could it impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.

64
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

. PTC is different from truth commissions in other states emerging from


periods of internal unrest to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
The main goals range from retribution to reconciliation .
r The PTC could not be borne out of the power of the President to
"reorganize" under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code because
this contemplates situations where a body or an office is already existent.
Neither is it justified by the power of control.
. The PTC, however, is justified by Article 7, Section L] on the duty of the
President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed . Ad hoc
investigating committees have been resorted to by the Chief Executive in
the past, (PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, Feliciano Commission, Melo Commission
and Zenarosa ) . No quasi-judicial powers vested in these committees.
o There is no "appropriation" for PTC but mere allocation of existing funds.
. By singling out the previous administration, the PTC embarks on "an
adventure in partisan hostility" . Neither will E . O . No. 7, Section L1 be
able to save the infirmity of singling out PGMA by stating that "lf and
when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section t hereof to include the
investigation of cases during the prior administrations, such mandate may
be so extended accordingly by way of a Supplemental Executive Order. "
There is no guarantee that other administrations would be covered.
o ln the case of PCGG, Viroto v. Sondigonboyon declared the PCGG Charter
as valid and does not violate the equal protection clause (without any
explanation though ) .

Article 6, Section 1 (Undue Delegation) in relation to Article 7,


Section 2L (Treaties) and Article 8, Section 14 (Standards in
Decision)

Deutsche Bank v. ClR, G.R. No. 788550, August 19, 2A73

Facts:
c Deutsche Bank alleged that it made an overpayment of P22, 562,857.77
representing its branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) and thereby sought a
refund . lt also requested from . the lnternational Tax Division ( ITAD ) of
the BIR confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of l0%
under the RP-Gerrnany Tax Treaty.
a BIR denied the claim for refund on the ground that the application for a
tax treaty relief was not filed with the ITAD prior to the payment by

65
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

Deutsche Bank of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to
DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the preferential rate of l0%
pursuant to the treaty under the 15-day period mandated by Revenue
Memorandum Order (RMO ) No . 1-200 following the Supreme Court
Resolutions in Mirant dated 12 November 2001 and 1B February 20AB
in G.R. No. 168531.
lssues:
o Was there a violation of the principle on undue delegation of legislative
power in relation to our treaty obligation?
. Does Article B, Section 74 apply to SC Resolutions?

Ruling:
o BIR should not impose new requirements to burden or negate resort to
tax reliefs under the treaty.
r The purpose of a tax treaty is to eliminate precisely international juridical
double taxations and to encourage the free flow of goods and services,
capital, technology and persons.
. The MIRANT ruling in a Minute Resolution is not a binding precedent.
Besides, MIRANT does not apply to Deutsche Bank's case because the
latter's case is a refund case which does not require compliance with the
15-day perioci enunciated in MIRANT.

(NOTE: ln
CBK Power Co. v. ClR,746 SCRA 93, the Supreme Court
reiterated this ruling. )

Article 6 Section 5 (1) (3 4 lative Districts

Aquino v. Comelec, G . R. No. 789793, April 7, 2070


Facts :

o R. A. . 9176 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the


No
First ( 1't ) and Second (Znd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from Such
Reapportionment. "
. CamSur Population L,693,821 with four (4) legislative districts.
-
c The new district, which will now be the 2nd legislative district, was carved
out of the 1't district (5 towns ) and the former 2nd district (2 towns ) .

66
Fi e with Blythe usb_rev 20180ct 19

a The result is that the new 1st district had a population of only 116,383
while the new 2nd district has 250;000. The rest of the 3 districts have
more than 250,000 population

lssue :

a Whether or not R . A. No. 91 76 violates the requirements under Article


5, Section 5(1), (3), (4) of the Constitution.
Rulins:
a R. A. No . 9116 is valid .
Reasoning:
o The 2 5 0,0 0 0
population requirement does not apply to
creation of
legislative districts in provinces. This only applies to creation of a
legislative district in a city.
. There is no fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of
districts in provinces
.

. Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors
in the composition of additional district.
NOTE: Read this with Mqrisno v. Comelec, 372 Phil. 259 (1995), which
dealt with conversion of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City with the effect
of creating an additional legislative district. The Supreme Court sustained the
additional district even if the 1990 census of Makati stood at 450,000
because the application of the 250,000 minimum population for cities is
limited to its initial legislative district . lt does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. The
same rule should apply then to additional districts in provinces, considering
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation
and regardless of the population . The earlier case of Tobios v . Abalos, 2 3 9
SCRA 705 (1994), had raised the issue of the lack of showing that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
2 5 0,0 0 0 inhabitants to justify separation into two legislative districts . But the
Court merely applied the presumption of validity in favour of the passage of
the law converting the municipality of tViandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City. ln another related case of Somson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (7999),
the Supreme Court inquired into the allegation of oppositors to the creation
of Novaliches City out of 15 barangays of Quezon City that there were no
certifications as to income, population and land area presented to the
Congress during the dellber.ations on R . A. No . 8 535 . Only an oral
manifestation was made by the NSO representative that the population in the
proposed city of Novaliches would comprise 347,310. Congress presumed
that the requirements were met in the passage of R.A. No. 8535. But in
Aldaba v. Comelec, G.R. No. 7BB07B, Januory 25, 2070, R.A. No.
9597, creating a separate legislative district for Malolos City and amending
the City Char.ter of Malolos, was questioned. The Court laid down the rule

67
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018Od 19

that the requirement of 250,000 minimum population for a city to have a


legislative district cannot be based on an assumption. Thus, R.A. No. 9591
was declared unconstitutional. Malolos failed to meet the requirement even
on a growth rate projection by 2072 elections. lt will be noted that Malolos
City was part of the First Legislative District of Bulacan together with 5
municipalities. The certification issued by the Regional NSO Director projecting
254,030 population by 2010 is without legal effect because he has no
authority to do So, unless declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board. Finally, in Sema v . Comelec, G. R. No. 7'/159'1, July
16,2008, the Supreme Court emphasized that the power to create a
legislative district is legislative in character and, therefore, the AR[\llM Regional
Assembly cannot create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the B
municipalities in the 1st District of Maguindanao .

Article 6, Section 5 el (Partv-List)

Atong Pagloum v. Comelec, G.R. No. 203756, April 2, 2013


Facti:
c COMELEC disqualified more than 52 party-list groups and organizations
', from participating in the 13 lVlay 2Ot3 party-list elections either by
. denying petitions for registration or cancellation of registration and
. accreditation as party-list organizations .

lssuF :

o Was there GADLEJ on the part of COMELEC?


. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in
Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT v. COMELEC should be applied by the
COMELEC in the May 2013 party-list elections?

Ruline:
o No GADLEJ but remand cases applying new parameters.
o New parameters laid down by the Court:
1 Three different groups may participate in the party-list system : ( 1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations;
and ( 3 ) sectoral parties or organizations .
2 . National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political pal.ties caR participate in party-list elections provided therT


register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,

68
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct l9

that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in


party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition .

4 . Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and


underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies. " lt
is enough that their political advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented : include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women and the youth .

5 A majorlty of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that


represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations .

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be


disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Article 6, Section 5 (2) (Partv-List)

Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 20, 2015


Facts:

o in the Party-list Representation for the May 10,


Ating-Koop participated
2070 elections. lt had lsidro Lico as first nominee, while Roberto
Mascariffas was second nominee.
a Ating-Koop won a seat and Lico took his oath of office on 9 December
2 01 0 . lt appears that several months prior to its proclamation as a

69
File with Elythe usb rev 20180ct 19

winner, Ating-Koop had resolved a term-sharing agreement among the


nsminees. Lico would serve for the first year.
a On5 December 2077, or almost one year

Lico sought a reconsideration of the


party's decision. Meanwhile, intramurals within the party led to assumption
of a new leadership headed by the Rimas group.
a The Rimas group filed a petition before COMELEC and prayed for Lico to
vacate the office of Ating-Koop in the House of Representatives and allow
the second nominee to sit.
a COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of Lico from Ating-Koop
and declared Mascariffa as the duly-qualified nominee of Ating- Koop. lt
characterized the expulsion of Lico as an intra-party leadership dispute
which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register political
rties
a the latter ruled : (a )

it,.:rh6.ti:inO
and, (c)

lssue :

a Were the resolutions of COMELEC valid?

Ruling:
o COMELEC's En Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2073 and COMELEC
Second Division Resolution dated 1B July 2012 are annulled and set aside
insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of Lico from Ating-Koop and it
upholds the Rimas group as the Legitimate Party-list group.
" The legitimate Central Committee or set of officer are those prior to the
split of Ating-Koop.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) acquires jurisdiction


over a distinguished case upon proclamation of the winning party-list, oath
of the nominee and assumption of office.
a COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of Lico from Ating-
Koop touched upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be
a bonafide member of the party-list group sought to be represented.
a COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Rimas
troup as the legitimate set of Ating-Koop officers for the simple reason
tn'at the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws were not registered
with COMELEC. lts jurisdiction to settle intra-party leadership dispute is
well-settled.

70
File with B{ythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

Article 6, Section 5 (Qualifications; Domicile)

Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. l/o. 195540, Morch 19, 2013 - one-year residency.

Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. 207264, June 25, 2013 one-yeor residency in


relotion to AG, Sec. 7 7 on jurisdiction of HRET over election contests .

Article 6, Section 16 (Officers; Minoritv)

Baguilat v. Speoker Alvarez, G.R. l/o. 227757, luly 25, 2077 minority
leader who voted for mojority.

Article 6, Section 2L (Legislative lnquiries)


Balog v. Senate, G.R. I/o. 234508, July j, 2018 - iimitatian on detention of
witness.

Article 6 n23 2 State of Eme n in relation to


7 Section L7 Executive Power of C rol and 1_

Section L6 (Presidential Supervision over Autonomous Regions)

Ampotuon v. Secretory Puno, G.R. No. 790259, June 7, 2011


Facts :
a PGMA issued Proclamation 7946 placing the provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a "state of emergency"
and directing the AFP and PNP to undertake measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence .
a Three days later, Administrative Order 213 "transferring" supervision of
ARIVIM from the O. P - to the DILG but this was amended by
Administrative Order 213-A "delegating" supervision of ARMM to DILG.

7L
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

lssue:
a Constitutionality of Proclamation 794 5 and Administrative Order 213 to
21 3-4.
Ruling:
o Valid and constitutional.

Reason ins:
a DILG Secretary did not exercise control. Vice-Governor Adiong assumed
the vacated post of Ampatuan based on succession provision in R. A. No.
9054 (ARMM Law)
a PGMA only exercised calling out power which did not require congressional
authority.
The Supreme Court may inquire into the factual basis of the
Proclamation.

Article Seetion 23 (2t (State of Emergency)


6, in relation to
Article 7, Section 18 (Comman{q:r-in-Chief Povqers}

Logmon v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. l/o 237558, luly 4,2077 snd
MR February 6, 2078 - Martiol Low in Mindonao.

6, Section 29 (1)
Nozareth v. Villor, 589 SCRA 385 [2013] - augmentation.

72
File with Elythe usb rev 2018oct 19

Aroullo v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July l, 2014 ond February 3,
207s (MR)

Facts:
a Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP) sourced funds from:

(1 ) unreleased appropriations under personnel services (void )


(2) unprogrammed funds (void )
(3 ) carry-over appropriations unreleased from previous years
(4) budgets from slow-moving items or projects that had been realized
to support faster-disbursing projects

lssue :

. Did this violate standards under Article 6, Section 25 (5)?


o DAP is unconstitutional.

o DAP is not a fund or appropriation but a program of prioritizing spending


in pursuit of Executive Power to faithfully execute the laws. There is no
need for a law to validate the program.
o But, unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under
the DAP were not savings and the use of such violated Article 6, Section
25 (5) .
. The GAA ?011 and 2072 gave open-ended power to the President to
use "savings" for even outside the Executive (cross-border) .
. The GAA 2013 corrected the deficit but other requisites were still not
complied with such as the defin ition of savings a nd the need for
augmentation.
. Operative fact - As a rule, it applies only to a law and an executive act,
not a mere administrative practice . There should be a ruling or regulation
by an administrative body not just an administrative practice . DAP is
covered by a circular and not just a mere practice which produced
effects . The good faith rule still applies. The Court extended this to the
proponents and implementors of DAP.

Bqtn8,l

Article 6, Secti on 28 (Exemptions)

CIR v. St. Lukes Medical Center, G.R. L/o. 795960, September 26, 2012

73
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

{rlicle 5, lection 29 (3) (Special Fund)

Philippine Coconut v Republic,563 SCRA 574 [2012] coco levy as public


fund .

Article '7, Section 4 (PET)

Macolintal v. PET, 535 SCRA 783 [2010] - constitutionality of PET.

Article '7, Section 13 (Other Officers)

7 L5 intment 2 Months Before Elections

De Costro v . JBC, 675 SCRA 565 [2010] - provision read with AB, Sec. 4(1)

Article 7, Section 16 (Appointments)

Velicario-Grafel et ol . v. O.P., G.R. l/os. 203372,206290 and 209738,


June 76,207

Facts:
a Prior to the conduct of the May 2070 elections, President Gloria
Macapagal *Arroyo (PGMA) issued more than 800 appointments to
various positions in several government offices. For purposes of 2070
elections, 10 March 2O7O was the cut-off date for valid appointments
and the next day, 11 March 2070 was the start of the ban on midnight
appointments.

14
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

a On 30 June 2070, President Benigno S. Aquino lll (P-Noy) issued EO 2


recalling, withdrawing and revoking appointments issued by PGMA in
violation of the ban on midnight appointments.
a Petitioners were among those affected by EO 2 and whose appointments
were revoked.

lssue :

r Were the appointments in violation of Article 7, Section 15?

Ruling:
. The appointments were void.

Reasoning:
r The following elements must exist in making a valid appointment: (a )
authority to appoint and evidence of exercise of such authority; ( b )

transmittal of appointment paper and evidence of such transmittal; (c)


vacant position at the time of appointment; and, (d ) receipt of the
appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications .
o Petitioners failed to show compliance with all four elements. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before
the appointment ban took effect. They admitted that they took their oath
of office during the ban.

Article 7, Section 17 LConlrol)

Boy Scouts v COA, G-R. 7771-31, G.R. No. 777L, June 7, 2077 - power
to controf over BSP.

t5
file with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

76
File with Blythe usb_rev 201aoct 19

Article 7. Section 1.8r (Calling-Out Power: Habeas Corpus: Martial Law)


in relation to Article 18, Section 24 (Armed Groups)

Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. l/o. 790293, NIarch 20,2072 inquiry


into factuaf basis.

Jamor M. Kulayon, et ol v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan, et al., G.R. No


787298, luly 3,2072

Facts:
Governor Tan of Sulu declared a state of emergency in Sulu citing the
kidnapping of ICRC members, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to
the Human Security Act. He also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code bestowing him the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence.
a The Proclamation further called upon PNP and Civilian Emergency Force to
set up checkpoints, conduct general search and seizures, including arrests,
and other actions to ensure public safety.

lssue:
3 Does the Governor have such powers pursuant to Section 455 in relation
to Section 16 of the Local Government Code?
Ruling:
o The Governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the
President.
A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President, and an exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code . Neither is the provincial governor authorized to
convene a local civilian group or an organization of private citizens as it is

77
file with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

proscribed pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force


and under Sec. 24 of Article XVlll of the Constitution.

Article 7, Section 18 (Commander-in-Chief Powers)

Logman v. Executive Secretary Medioldea, G.R. IVos. 231558, 231777, and


237774, luly 4, 2017

Facts:
a On 4 September 2A7 6
President Rodrigo R . Duterte declared a state of
national emergency Proclamation 5 5 ) on account of lawless violence in
(

Mindanao, triggred by the Maute terrorist group attacks in February 20L6


in Butig, Lanao Del Sur and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August
2076.
a On 23 May 2Ol-/, the Maute group took over a hospital in Marawi City,
Lanao Del Sur, established check points, burned down government facilities
and inflicted casualties on government forces, and started flying the flag of
the lslamic State of lraq and Syria. ln response, the President, while in
Russia, declared a state of martial law (Proclamation 216) in the
Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding 50 days and the
privilege of the writ of hobeas corpus was also suspended. A report was
submitted to Congress establishing the factual basis of Proclamation 276.
a Petitioners questioned the lack of factual basis for Proclamation 216
stating that there is no rebellion or invasion; that acts of terrorism did
not constitute rebellion; and, that the extraordinary powers of the
President should be dispensed sequentially .

lssue :

a Was the declaration of Martial Law in accord with Article 7, Section 1B?
Ruling:
e Proclamation 276 is constitutional.

Reasoning:
c The void-for-vagueness rule does not apply to the Proclamation which
involved conduct and not speech . ln AJ , 51B, on the declaration of
Martial law and / or suspension of the privilege of the writ of hobeas
corpus, standing is relaxed whereby any citizen, even not a taxpayer, ffidy
question the declaration . The process may be triggered by a complaint,
petition or a matter to be resolved by the court.
a The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the exercise of the
extraordinary powers to declare Martial Law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is distinct from AB, Section 1 and Article B,
Section 5 . This is sui qeneris in character.

78
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

The 7gB1 Constitution codified the ruling in Lansang (149 Phil. 54'l ) ,
which held that an inquiry into the factual basis of the declaration of
Martial Law and / or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is not a political question. The 7981 Constitution further extends
judicial review to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis
f or the declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of hobeas

corpus.
a Three (3 ) parameters must be satisfied initially by the Court in inquiring
into Proclamation 276, namely: (a) actual (not mere threat) of
existence of rebellion or invasion; ( b ) public safety requires exercise of
Presidential power; and, (c) probable cause, meaning, common sense that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is no need
to resort to calibration of rules of evidence but only to weigh facts and
circumstances. The precise extent or range of rebellion cannot be
measured by exact metes and bounds. Rebellion may be a predicate
crime under a speciat law on terrorism (Human Security Act) but does
not result to an automatic absorption of rebellion in terrorism .
a The sequence of the three (3 ) Commander-in-Chief powers is not
exclusive but merely refers to scope. A nullification of Proclamation 216
does not affect the prior Proclamation 55 calling out the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
a A comparison of
the three Commander-in-Chief powers shows as follows:
(a ) ln the calling-out power, the Court could examine whether the
President acted within permissible constitutional boundaries and not with
grave abuse of discretion and that ordinary police action may be
undertaken. The actual use of AFP is not within judicial review; while,
(b ) ln Martial Law or suspension of the privilege of writ of habeos
corpus, there must be actual invasion or rebellion; effectivity of the
declaration on suspension is for 60 days; Congressional and judicial review
may be undertaken; and, liberties may be curtailed.
a The power of the Supreme Court to review Proclamation 27 6 may be
exercised simultaneously with the Congressional review mechanism. While
judicial review is passive in nature, the Congressional rnechanism is
automatically exercised. The Court will not require absolute correctness of
the facts or factual basis underlying lVlartial Law or suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas cor"pus but Congress may inquire into the
accuracy of such facts . The President makes a judgment call based on
information prior to the proclamation or suspension. He may withhold
some confidential information so as not to prejudice operations. There is
even no need for the Defense Secretary's recommendation as a condition
precedent before the President acts to issue the proclamation or
suspension . This is one he should act in person .

79
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

Article 7 , Section 19 ( Pardon) in relation to Article 9-C, and


Seqtion 5 (COIILELEe and Beqqxnlaeldalan)

Atty. Alicio Risos-Vidol v. Alfredo Lim, G.R. No. 206556, Januory 27, 2075

Facts :

o Former President Estrada was extended clemency by former President


Arroyo, by way of pardon, as follows : ".... Whereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office... He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights..."
. The pardon was received and accepted by former President Estrada .
o Later, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. He
lost during that elections.
o He would again file a Certificate of Candidacy this time for the position of
Mayor of the City of Manila.
r A petitlon for disqualification is filed against former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which disqualified a candidate unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty in cases where the
candidate have had previously sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude.

lssue :

a ls former President Joseph Estrada qualified to run?

Ruling:
r He is qualified to run as Mayor,
Reasoning:
o Former President Estrada was granted absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, including the right to seek public elective
office.
o The pardoning power of the Fresident cannot be limited by legislative
action as provided in Articles Vll, Section L9 and lX-C, Section 5 of the
Constitution . Articles 3 6 and 47 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
interpreted to mean a diminution of the President's power.
r lt is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3 ) cases involving violationi of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by
way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.

80
File with Elythe usb rev 2018Oct 19

a The disqualification of the former President under Section 40 in relation to


Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon.
a The preambular provision is not an essential part of an act and neither
did it make the pardon conditional .

San Diego v. People, G.R. l/o. 775114, April B, 2015, 755 SCRA 260
Facts :

a Grace San Diego was charged with qualified theft before the RTC of
Bulacan. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and sentenced her "to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuo f or forty years without pardon before the lapse of forty years
and with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised
Penal Code..."

lssue:
a May the Judge impose the penalty without possibility of clemency?

Rulins:
o The portion "without pardon" in the decision is unconstitutional .

Reasoning:
. This had the effect oflimiting the power of the Chief Executive.
The exercise of pardoning power is discretionary on the part of the President.

Londbank of the Philippines v. Atlonta lndustries, G.R. No. L93796, luly 2,


2014

Facts
a Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the lnternational Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) entered into a loan agreement
4833-H which required the participation of two (2) local governments by
way of a subsidiary loan agreement (SLA) with LBP . LBP subsequently
81
File with Blythe usb_rev 2O18Oct 19

signed a SLA with lligan City which provides that the goods, works and
services to be financed out of the proceeds of the loan were to be
procured in accordance with the IBRD procurement guidelines.
a Atlanta lndustries participated in the bidding but was disqualified. During
the re-bidding, Atlanta called the attention of the Bids and Awards
Committee ( BAC ) for not having applied the bidding process prescribed
the Government Procurement Policy Board. The BAC declared that the
bidding was not covered by R.A. 9784.
a Atlanta filed a suit to enjoin the bidding before the RTC which ruled that
lligan City cannot claim exemption from R . A . 978 4 because it was LBP
which entered into the agreement with IBRD . The RTC ruled that R . A.
9lB4 applies.

lssue:
a ls the loan agreement between the LBP and lligan City an
(SLA )
executive agreement similar to the loan agreement between LBP and IBRD
(4833-H) and deemed exempt from the application of R.A. 9LB4?
Ruling:
o The RTC decision, GR Non is reversed . The petition for prohibition is
dismissed.

Realqnlngi
a R. A.9784, Section 4 recognizes the country's commitment to abide by
its obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement.
The terms and conditions of loan agreement between LBP and IBRD
(4833-H) were incorporated and made part of the SLA. The latter
agreement cannot be treated as an isolated contract but as a conjunct of
4833-H. lt is a mere a:iteE.$S:i llcO*.iialat whose nature and consideration
are thus the same as the princlpal contract.

Hontiveros - Boraquel v. TRB, G.R. Na. 181293, February 23, 2015

DPWH v. CMG, GR 779732, September 73, 3017

Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 272426 and 272444 lonuary
72,2075

Facts:
a The Philippines and the United States entered into the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement ( EDCA ) in 207 4 . The Senate through Resolution

82
File with Blythe usb,rev 2018Oct 19

105 expressed strong sentiment for EDCA to become valid and effective, it
must fir:st be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.
a Based on the terms of EDCA there will be an identification of Agreed
Locations where the following activities may be undertaken by the
American Military and civilian personnel and American contractors: training,
refueling of aircraft, bunkering vessels, temporary accommodation,
preposition of equipment, deploying of forces and materiel, etc...
a Petitioners argued that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty and that it
infringes on the sovereignty of the Philippines.

lssue :

o What is the legal characterization of EDCA?

Ruling:
o lt is an executive agreement.

Reasoning:
. There are two types of executive agreernents, namely: (a ) purely
independent of legislative action (e . g . exchange of notes ) ; and, (b )

subject to congressional authorization (e .g . comrhercial agreements ) but


without need of Senate concurrence.
. The Department of Foreign Affairs determines whether an agreement is an
executive agreement or a treaty but the Court has a task or determining
whether the agreement is consistent with applicable limitations as provided
by the Constitution, statutes or treaties.
r The President has the prerogative to choose to enter into executive
agreement, unless required by law or the Constitution to do otherwise.
. The term gi,6.EB$ :t{"H under Article i, Section 2L of the
Constitution is not the same as executive agreement but the latter,
nevertheless, has the effect of an international agreement under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
c Unllke a treaty proper, an executive agreement cannot create new
international obligations not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the
law it purports to implement. A treaty is superior over executive
agreements just like a statute. lf a later law or treaty is passed or
adopted inconsistent with an executive agreement, the latter is deemed
revoked/ineffective.
c As applied to EDCA, Article 18, Section 25 does not cover activities done
after entrv of troops or establishment of bases or facilities. EDCA is a
mere adjustment in detail in the irnplernentation of the Mutual Defense
Treaty and Visiting Forces Agreement, both of which have undergone
concurrence by the Senate. The 2002 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
was intended to facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistics support,
supplies and services between military forces of two countries inclusive of
billeting, operations support, construction and use of temporary structures

83
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018Od 19

and storage services during an approved activity under the existing military
arrangements.
a EECA. therefore, is a mer,e contraCt of use a.Fd a:ccess. Operational control
is less than effective command and control . Operational control inside the
Agreed Locations is limited to construction activities .
a The Philippines never ceded sovereign power over the Agreed Locations .
Under the VFA, the Philippines allowed construction during "temporary
visit" of U . S . personnel (authorized presence ) ; while under EDCA, it
allowed the building of "permanent facilities" to be owned later by the
Philippines (authorized activities ) .
a To determine "basing" under Article 18, Section 25, the following may be
applied : (a ) independence from foreign control; ( b ) exercise of Philippine
sovereignty and applicable law; and, (c ) respect for national security and
territorial integrity.
a For purposes of application of lnternational Humanitarian Law, the principle
of distinction on military targets should exclude the Agreed Locations under
EDCA as legitimate targets by U . S. enemy state .
a ln sum, the test upon entry of foreign troops or establishment of military
bases or facilities is Article 18, Section 25, while activities thereafter will
no longer require

Aflicle 7, Sectiop 2L ( Peace Treaties; lnternational Agreements;


Foreign Relations Power)

Bayon Muno v " Executive Secretary Romulo, G. R. Nos. 759578, February 7,


2 017

Facts :

o ln 2 0 0 0, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute .

c ln 2A03, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, a Non-Surrender


Agreement ( NSA ) between U . S . and the Philippines sought to protect
"persons" of R. P. and U. S. from frivolous and harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals . The agreement
prohibits surrender or transfer to any international tribunal, or any other
entity or third state for the purpose of surrender or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless the tribunal has been established by the
U. N. Security Council.
. The Philippines considered the exchange of diplomatic notes as mere
executive agreement while the U. S. treated it as legally binding under
international law which did not require the advice and consent of Senate.
File wjth Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

lssue :

a whether or not the NsA contravenes our obligation under the Rome
statute and universally recognized principles of international law.
a Whether or not the NSA requires concurrence by the Senate .

Ruling:
o NSA is valid and constitutional

Reasoning:
o Characterization of international agreements is not cast in stone . Choice of
the form is based on intent of parties.
o The principle of complementarity underpins the creation of lCC. Besides
under Article 9B of the Rome Statute, the ICC "may not proceed
with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to
act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender
a person of that State to the Court, unless the court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender. "
o The Philippines is a mere signatory State not ratifying State and, therefore,
merely obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty.
o But even under Article 90 (4 ) of the Rome Statute, "if the requesting
State is a State not Party to this Statute, the requested State, if it is not
under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting
State, shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court."
o NSA does not amend R.A. No. 9851 on lnternational Humanitarian Law,
specifically Section 71 (Jurisdiction ) which provides options for the
Philippine authorities, in the event another court or international tribunal is
already conducting investigation or undertaking prosecution of crimes
covered by R . A. No . 9B 51 . The Philippine authorities have the option
to surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines
to an international court or to another State pursuant to extradition laws
and treaties. R.A. 9851 is a subsequent law to the NSA.

China Notional Machinery a Equipment Corp . v . Santomorio, 665 SCRA 78 g,


February 7,2072

Facts:
o Documents signed:
(1) rylqu between CNMEG and NORTH RA|L feasibility study on
Railwall line lVlanila * San Fernando, La Union.
(2) MOU between EXIMBANK of China and DOFIGRP China to give
Preferential Buyer's Credit to GRP to finance Northrail Project.

85
File with Blvthe usb_rev 2018oct 19

(3) NOTEr*China designated EXIMBANK as lender


TcRp named DoF as borrower
( P aOO,OOO,OOO ; ZO yrs. to pay ; 3% / yr
interest )
CNMEG as Prime Contractor
(4) Northrail and CNMEG Contract to Construct - US$ 42I,050,000
(5) GRP and EXIMBANK Counterpart Financial Agreement or Buyer Credit
Loan reement EXIMBANK to extend Preferential Buyers Credit (US$
4 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0 ) to finance construction of Northrail .

a Complaint to annul (1) Contract to Construct and (2) Loan Agreement

lssues:
. Nature of : (a) CNMEG - as agent of Chinese government -
(b) Northrail Project as product of executive agreement
(c) Transaction as iure imperii

Held: (a) CNMEG is not immune from suit


(a) Contract agreement is not an executive agreement

Reasoning:
. Two types of sovereign immunity : (a ) absolute ; and, (b ) restrictive .
r Prevailing practice is "restrictive immunitv" in matters of purely commcrcial
activities of states.
o CNMEG is engaged in proprietary activitv - construct railway.
. Read the Contract Agreement between CNMEG and Northrail in relation to
other documents (MOUs ) showing that it is CNMEG's initiative not the
Chinese Government's intent to carry out transaction .
o CNMEG is a 'llqlg--gqrcglelgn" within PRC, but, the use of the term is
only descriptive of its nature as a GOCC and its assignment as Primary
Contractor did not imply it was acting on behalf of China in the
performance of the latter's sovereign functions . lt is akin to a GOCC
without an original charter and, therefore, may be sued and could sue
under Section 35 of the Corporation Code.
. The:.,LOa-n':,,Agr.ee-meht,iS ,ldbtr.,ran;:eie'butiliid.,iagi.bement. the choice of laws
of PRC as governing law . There is a waiver of immunity. The Loan
Agreement must be viewed in relation to the Contract Agreement, i. €.,
purely commercial in nature.
. The certification executed by the Economic and Commercial Office of PRC's
Embassy stating that the Northrail project is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity is not the kind of certification that can establish CNMEG's
entitlement to immunity from suit. Neither would the OSG's and OGCC's
indorsements be sufficient.
c An agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, similar to the U . S.
Foreign Sovereign immunities Act of L916 is an implicit waiver of

85
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

immunity from suit. The place of arbitration shall be in Hong Kong


lnternational Arbitration Center.
a beca use the
contract shall be construed in accordance with Philippine laws. lt is but
an ordinary commercial contract.

Vinuyo, et al . Romulo, G.R. No. 762230, April 28, 2070 ond August 72,
2074 (MR)

Facts :

a A group called MALAYA-LOLAS, alleged victims of Japanese military sexual


slavery and abuses during the 2ndWorld War, sought to compel the
Executive Department (DOJ, DFA, and OSG ) to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
lnternational Court of Justice and other international tribunals.

lssues :

. May the Executive be compelled, through an injunctive relief, by the


Court?

Rulins:
rNo The Court can only urge and exhort the Executive Department.

!qason!4gq
. Espousal of claims on behalf of nationals is a discretionary act lodged in
the Executive Branch .
o lt is not the individual's rights that are being asserted, but the state's
own rights.
. There is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international
obligation for states to exercise diplomatic protection of their own
nationals abroad .

. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 7956 have dealt with all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals referring to Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace on payment of
reparations for damage and suffering caused by Japan and a waiver of all
reparation claims arising out of any actions taken by Japan.
. lnternational settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims
thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law.
. Tokyo courts have dismissed suits by former comfort women.
. The US tribunals have also dismissed similar suits.
. The Asian Women's Fund was established in 1995 by Japan representing
the government's concrete attempt to address its moral responsibility. A
MOU was signed in 1991 by the Philippines and Japan for medical and
welfare support programs for comfort women.

87
File with Slythe usb_rev 2018Od 19

a There is no showing that crimes committed as of the Treaty of Peace


constituted 7us cogens. Neither is the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes an ergo omnes obligation or part of jus cogens.

Government of
Hongkong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR ) v . Munoz,
G.R. No. 207342, August 75, 2075
Facts:
a Juan Antonio Muffoz, a public servant, is the former head of the Treasury
Department of the Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP ) . He was
instructed to raise 700 million U.S. dollars to fund the buyback of
Philippine debts and the purchase of zero coupon U . S . Treasury bonds.
a Mufioz recommended that the amount obtained through gold loans/swaps,
for which, seven (1) contracts of 100 million U.S. dollars each were to
be awarded to accredited parties. Two (2) contracts were awarded to
Mocatta, London.
Muffoz allegedly entered into transactions with one Ho Chi (CHl) , an
executive of Standard Chartered Bank - The Mocatta Group ( Hongkong )
(MHK) . Some funds were disbursed to the benefits of CHI and Mufroz
personally without knowledge of CBP.
a Muffoz was charged with criminal cases - three ( 3 ) counts of accepting
an advantage as an agent, contrary to Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 207 and seven (1) counts of
conspiracy to defraud, contrary to Common Law of HKSAR.
HKSAR sent Note No . SBCR 7t / L / 29L6 / B0 dated July 9, 791'7 to the
Philippine Consulate General in Hong Kong for the purpose of extradition
of Mufroz pursuant to the HKSAR-RP extradition agreement of 1 9 95 .
Mufioz was arrested but, subsequently, allowed bail .
a The RTC ruled that the "crimes of conspiracy to defraud and accepting an
advantage as an agent" were extradible offenses.
a The CA, however, concluded on appeal by Muffoz, that the crime of
"accepting an advantage as an agent" should be excluded due to non-
compliance with the double criminality rule.

lssues :

r ls the crime of "accepting an advantage as an agent" compliant with the


double criminality rule"?

Ruling:
o No . The crime must be dropped from the request for extradition .

Reasoninp:
. The crime of conspiracy to defraudincluded in the agreement is analogous
to Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code on "estafa through false

88
tile with Elythe usb rev 20l8oct 19

pretense." But it is disputed that the crime of "accepting an advantage as


an agent" is also punished as a crime in the Philippines.
a Mufroz argued that the crime of "accepting an advantage as an agent"
under Section 9 ( 1 ) (a ) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance
(POBO ) , Cap . 20L applied to private individuals not one belonging to
the public sector. The RTC, on the otherhand, concluded that this act was
analogous to the crime of corrupt practices of public officers, under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
a Experts in Hong Kong shared the opinion that the POBO provision was
derived from Section 1 of the U . K. Prevention of Corruption Act of
1 9 0 6 which pertained to private sector bribery .

Article 8, Section L in relation to AL:l (JUstrclability; Constitutional


Amendments)

v. GPH, G.R lvfos. 278405, 278751, 204355, 278407


Philconso ond
204354, November 29, 2015

Facts:
a The government negotiating panel and the Moro lslamic Libcration Front
(MILF ) negotiating panel signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB ) and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(FAB) on 2'7 March 2074 and 12 October 2012, respectively.
a The CAB and FAB essentially called f or an autonomous political entity
named Bangsamoro, replacing ARMM. Several Annexes and an Addendum
were later signed and formed part of the CAB and FAB. These additional
instruments referred to transitional arrangements, revenue generation and
wealth sharing, power sharing, normalization and Bangsamoro waters and
Zones of Joint Cooperation. The relationship between the Central
Government and the Bangsamoro is asymmetrical in character.
a Petitioners questioned the CAB, FAB and its Annexes as unconstitutional for
being a mere reincarnation of the earlier lVlemorandum of Agreement on
Ancestral Domain with MILF but was declared unconstitutional.
a An implementing law, i. e., Bangsamoro Basic Law, has yet to be passed.

lssue :
a Whether the CAB, FAB and its annexes are unconstitutional?

Ruling:
. The petition is dismissed. Any question on the constitutionality, without
the implementing legislation (i-e. of Bangsamoro Basic Law), is
prernature.

89
tile with Bllthe usb-,rev 2018Oct 19

Reasoning:
r The CAB and the FAB mandate the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law in order for these peace agreements to be implemented. ln the
MOA-AD, there was nothing in the agreement which required the passage
of any statute to implement the provisions of the MOA-AD.
. Under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumed the mandatory
obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. ln the
present case, there is no such guarantee.
o The Bangsamoro Transition Commission is tasked to draft proposals for
Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Article 8, Section 5 (21 (a) (Operative Fact)

Film Development Council v. Colon Heritoge Reolty Corporotion,


G.R. l/o. 203754, June 16,2075

Facts:
a Cebu City passed an ordinance pursuant to Section L40 of the Local
Government Code, requiring proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxin stadia and other laces of
amusement, to

a A decade later, on June '1, 2002, R.A. 9161, amending Section 740 of
the LCG, created the Film Development Council of the Philippines and
provided ror an ffistcl-riEthit.:fte*iiXtffiidilisr6.tirqiiiF for films which obtained
il
A't or ttB"
. All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded
grading
film which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities
in the Philippines iildilii;'b16,1iid' fid$t f iii i.d by the proprietors,
operators, or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted to the Council
which shall rewa rd the c nd amusement tax to the producers of
the graded film. with the law.
a The Council demanded payment but Cebu City refused and, instead, filed
for declaratory relief before the RTC which declared Sections 1 3 and 7 4
of R. A. 9761 as unconstitutional .

lssue:
a Did the RTC err in declaring Sections 13 and l4 of R.A. 9161
u nconstitutiona l?

Ruling:
a No . However, all remittances of amusement taxes pursuant to Sections 13
and L4 of R.A. 9LB1 prior to the date of finality of this Decision shall
remain valid.

90
File with Elythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

Reasoning:
o R.A. 9L81 infringed on the principle of local autonomy. What Congress
did in this instance was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement
taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not
altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the
taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing
authority. This is a clear contravention of the constitutional command that
taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to the LGUs and is repugnant
to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their
priorities.
o On the otherhand, to order the Council and the producers of graded films
which may have already received the amusement tax incentive reward
pursuant to R. A. 9761 , to return the amounts received to the respective
taxing authorities would impose a heavy financial burden upon them, who
merely relied on good faith in R . A. 9161 . The application of the
operative facts doctrine is proper

A1trcle 8, Section 5 (5) (Rule-Making Authority of the Supreme


Court)

Estipono Jr. v. Hon. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 225679, August 15, 2077

Facts:
a Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. was accused of violating R.A. 9165, particularly
Section ll, Article ll (possession of dangerous drugs) . He filed a motion
to be allowed to enter into a plea bargaining agreement. Section 23 of
R . A. 9765, however, prohibited plea bargaining . Accused Estipona, Jr .
argued that this violates the Rule 1B of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

lssue:
a Does Section 23 of R. A 9165 violate the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court?

Rulins:
o Yes.

Reasoning:
o The 7981 Constitution altered the provisions of the 1 93 5 and 7913
Constitutions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the
rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule - making powers.

91
File with Elythe urb_rev 2018oct 19

a Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure found in Section 2 of Rule 11 5


and Rule 118 of the 2000 Rules. lt is allowed during arraignment, pre-
trial, or even up to the point when prosecution already rested its case.

ArtjQIe t, lection S end 9 JBC; Nominations; Clustering)

Hon Aguinoldo v. H.E. President Aquino lll, G.R. No. 224302, November
aa 2075 and August B, 2017 (MR)

Facts :

a The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC ) published in the Philippine dailies and
posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or
recommendations for the six newly created position of Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan . Later, the JBC submitted to the President six ( 6 )
Shortlists in six ( 6 ) separate letters.
a The President appointed six ( 5 ) new SB Associate Justices : Musngi and
Ecorrg (irr cluster 6) ; R. Cruz (in cluster 4 ) ; Mendoza-Arcega (in cluster
2) ; Miranda (in cluster 5 ) ; and Trespeses (in cluster 3 ) .
a Petitioners, all nominees in the shortlist for the 15th SB Associate Justice,
argued that the President could only choose one nominee from each of
the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy,
and no other. They cited that the appointments of Musngi and Econg,
who belonged to the same shortlist for the position of 21sr Associate
Justice in cluster 5 were in violation of Article B, Section 9 of the
Constitution .

lssue :

0 Did the President violate Article B, Section 9 of the Constitution?

Ruling:
o No . The clustering of nominees by the JBC is unconstitutional . The
appointments of Musngi and Econg are valid.

Reasoning:
. The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six ( 5 ) clusters, one for
every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its
constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the
President. Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment,
as well as restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified
nominees.
o The Court noted that clustering is a new practice of the JBC. Previously,
the JBC submitted only one shortlist for two or more vacancies in a
collegiate court.
92
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

a To meet the minimum requirement under Article B, section g, on the


three (3 ) nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 3 nominees
from the JBC for the six ( 5 ) vacancies .

Article L0 Section 6 (Just Share in National Taxes)

Villofuerte v. Robredo, G.R. l/o. 195390 December 70, 2014.

Mondonos v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G .R. No. J99802, Juty 3, 2018


computation of just share

Article 10, Section 6 (Just Share in National Taxes) and Article 10,
Section 1O (Creation of Cities) in relation to Article 3 (Equal
Protection )

Leogue of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, et ol., G-R. Nos. 776951,


177499,778055, November 78,2008; Morch 37,2009; December 27,2009;
August 24,20L0; Februory 75,2077; April J2,2011; lune 2B,2AJ7

Facts :

o Constitutionality of
Cityhood Laws
. 1 1th Congress 3 3 municipalities converted to cities but 24 other
municipalities not acted upon.
. l2th Congress R.A. No. 900 9 (30 June 2OOL) amended LGC,
Section 4 5 0 increasing annual income requirement
or conversion of a municipality into a city from p2O
f

million to P100 million.


Joint Resolution No. 29 sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement the 24 municipalities
but the l2th Congress ended without Senate approving
JR No. 29.
. rtn Congress House of Representatives re-adopted JR No . 29 as JR
l No . 1 but Senate failed to approve .
l6 of the 24 municipalities filed cityhood bills, with a
common provision exempting them from P100 million
93
File with glythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

income requirement, which were approved by both


Houses (except Naga, Cebu which was passed later) ;
cityhood bills lapsed into law .

lssue :

a Alleged violation of Article 3 (equal protection ) and Article 10, Sections 5


and 10.

Ruling:
o November 18, 2008 (Carpio) - Cityhood Laws unconstitutional (6-5)
r March 31, 2009 (MR) - Denied MR (6-5)
. April 28, 2oo9 - Denied 2nd MR (6-6)
. December 27, 2009 (Velasco ) - Constitutional (6-a1
. August 4, 2010 (Carpio) - Unconstitutional (1-6)
. February 5, 20tl (Bersamin ) - Constitutional (1-6)
. April 12, 2071 (Bersamin) - Ad Coutelom MR denied (5-5)
r June 28, 20LI (Bersamin ) - MR denied and Entry of Judgment granted
(7_s)

Reasoning:
a Article 10, Section 10, which sets the standard for the creation of LGUs
by mentioning the "critcria established in the local government code and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected," has been interpreted to mean that:
"Congress can, via either a set of laws or a
consolidated
much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be
embodied in the Local Government Code, albeit this Code is
the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the
element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a
codification, enact an amendatory law, adding it to the
existing layers of indicators earlier codified ln this case,
the amendatory R. A. No . 9009 upped the already codified
income requirement from PhP20 million to PhP100 million.
At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is
no different from the enactment of laws, i. e . , the cityhood
laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision
from the criteria earlier mentioned . Congress, in enacting
the exempting lawls, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators . "
a No substantial reduction in "just share" of LCP after Cityhood Laws.
Shares, in fact, increased.

94
File with Elythe usb-rev 2018oct 19

a The deliberations in the Senate (between Drilon and Pimentel) indicated


the non-retroactivity of R. A. No. 9009 to pending cityhood bills.
a There is substantial distinction because the 76 respondent LGUs had
pending cityhood bills before R. A. No. 9009. They complied with all
the requisites under the old Section 4 5 0 of the LGC . The extraneous
circumstances which left the bills unacted upon by Congress were not
attributable to respondent LGUs.

Article 1!-SeEtions 8 (Term of Local Officials)

Abunda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207776, January B, 2073 - three-term limit

Navol v. COMELEC, G.R. l/o. 207851, July B, 2074

Article 10 Sections L0 Creation of Province

v. Ermito, G.R.
Novorro No 780050, luly 20,2072 (7st Decision) ond April
12,2011 (MR)
Facts :

o R.A. No. 9355 created the Province of Dinagat lslands out of Surigao
del Norte.
o Petitioners opposed the law because Dinagat had 802 .12 sq . kms. only
and a population of only 105,951 contrary to the requirement of Article
10, Section 1 0 of the Constitution and Section 4 6l of the Local
Government Code.
o The LGC provides for 2,000 sq. kms. and 250,000 population for
creation of a province.

lssue :

c Constitutionality of R, A. No . 9355

Ruling:
. 1st decision - unconstitutional .
. 2nd decision - constitutional .

95
File with 8\dhe u5b_rev 2018oct 19

Reasoning:
a Under Article 9 (2) of the IRR of the LGC: "The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1 or more
islands . "
a ln Section 4 42 and 4 5 0 of the LGC if the LGU to be created is a
municipality or a component city, consisting of 1 or more islands, then,
these are exempt from the land area requirement . This is absent in
section 467 of the LGC (referring to a province) but is in Article 9 (2)
of the IRR of LGC.
a There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply
to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces . There was an
inadvertent omission in Section 461 of the LGC. The IRR intended to
correct the Congressional oversight.

Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. l/o. 209185, October 25, 2013 - plebiscite.

Umali v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014 - plebiscite in
Cobonotuon .

Aftlcle 10, Sections L4 (Reeional Develo Coun cils )

Pimentel v. Executive Secretory Ochoa, 576 SCRA 557 [2A12]

Article l-0, Sections L5-22 (ARMM), in relation to Article 6,


Section 1 (Leeislative Power), Article 6, Section 16 (2) (Maiority
Vote), Article 6, Section 26 (21 (Urgent Bills), Article 7, Section
16 (Appointment), and Article 18 , Sections 1, 2 and 5 (Transitory
Provisions)

Abas Kida v.
Senote, G.R. Nos. 796277, 796305, 797227, 797280, 197282,
797392, 1 97454, October 18, 2071

Facts :

a R.A. No. 10153 of 201I was passed providing for the synchronization
of the elections in ARMM with national and local elections and it also

96
Eile with Slythe usb rev 2018oct 19

granted the President the power to appoint olCs for the Regional
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly.
a Since the passage of the Organic Act for ARMM (R.A. No. 9054 ) ,
several amendments also allowed re-setting of ARMM regional elections.

lssues:
o Validity of synchronization of elections .
. Validity of passage of R . A. No . 10153 in relation to Article 6, Section
26 (2),
o Validity of a supermajority vote and plebiscite (2/3 of both Houses voting
separately) in amending or revising ARMM Law (R.A. No. 9054) in
relation to Article 6, Section 1 and L6 (2) .
o ls ARMM autonomy violated?
. Validity of grant of power to the President to appoint OlCs.
. Validity ofspecial elections .

Ruling:
oft A. No. 10153 is constitutional.
Reasoning:
. The Transitory Provisions contemplating synchronization of national and local
elections include regional elections 1"local" )
o Presidential certification of R.A. No. 10153 as urgent is allowed with a
waiver of the "3-separate days readings" requirement pursuant to Article
5, Section 26 (2) , as interpreted in Tolentino v . Secretary of Finonce.
. R.A. No. 10153 and R.A. No. 9333, which re-set ARMM elections,
did not amend the ARMM Law (R.A. No. 9054) because the latter did
not fix the date of the regular elections in ARMM but merely fixed the
first ARMM elections.
. The supermaiority voting in R . A . No . 905 4 is unconstitutional because
even Article 6, Section 76 (2) only requires a simple majority to
constitute a quorum to do business . To allow a supermajority vote
would give R.A. No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law.
. Even the plebiscite requirement under R. A. No. 9054 for amending the
date of ARIMM elections is inconsistent with Article 10, Section 1B of the
Constitution because only amendments to the Organic Act in the following
instances require notification through a plebiscite :
(a ) Basic structure of regionol government; (b ) region's judiciol system;
ond, (c ) grant ond extent of legislotive powers constitutionolly conceded
to the regional government under Article 7 0, Section 2 O of the
Constitution .

a The appointment of olcs as interim measure has been done in the


creation of Quezon det Sur and Dinagat lslands . Holdover violates the
express mandate under Article 10, Section 8 of the Constitution .

97
File with Blythe u5b_rev 2018Oct 19

Holdover, by exception, has been allowed only in regard to barangay or


Sanggunian Kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution . Comelec has no power to order special
elections except as provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders
of a body to whom Congress may have delegated a power to ascertain or
fill-in details. B.P. No. BB1 only allows Comelec to postpone elections
due to unforeseen circumstances.
a The power to appoint OlCs is justified by Article J, Section 75 on the
third group of officers, i .€ . , "those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint." R.A. No. 10153 is the source of such
power in this instance .
a Autonomy is not violated . Besides autonomy cannot defeat national
policies and concerns.

Article Ll, Section 3 (5) (Simullgneo$ lqfelEl el ee!1plarnl!)


Gutierrez v. House of Representotives, G.R. No. 793459, Februory 15, 2077

Facts
a On July 22, 2010, Rissa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et ol. filed an impeachment
complaint against Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez upon endorsement
of Party List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello .
a On July 2J, 2010, the complaint was transmitted to House Speaker
Belmonte
a On August 3, 2070, Renato Reyes, et al. filed another impeachment
complaint against the Ombudsman with a resolution of endorsement by
another group of Party List Representatives . On even date, the House of
Representatives provisionally adopted the Rule of Procedure in lmpeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress.
o On August LA, 2AlO, the two complaints were included in the Order of
Business for the following day, August 11, 2070.
c On August \L, 2 0 1 0, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred
both complaints to the Committee of Justice .
On September l, 2010, the Committee on Justice found both complaints
sufficient in form and considered these as having been referred to it at
exactly the same time.
e Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in lmpeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress was published on September 2, 2OtO.
On September '1, 2010, Ombudsman Gutierrez applied for injunctive reliefs
with the Supreme Court . A status quo ante order . (SQAO ) was issued
by the Court en banc,

98
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

lssue:
a Validity of simultaneous referral of impeachment complaints.

RulinR:
. Valid referrals.

Reasonine
a ln exercising its power of judicial review, the Court noted that " (t ) he
unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent (Committee on
Justice ) two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke
judicial power. "
a The Court was asked by the Ombudsman to look into the narration of
facts constitutive of the offenses in relation to her submission disclaiming
the allegations in the complaints. To this the Court reiterated the
Francisco ruling that such determination is a "purely political question. "
a On the matter of provisional adoption of the Rules of lmpeachment of the
14th Congress, to meet the exigency of early filing, the Court found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the House of Representatives .
Neither would the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation amount to a violation of due process in
light of the "discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate
its lmpeachment Rules. "
a Finally, the Court found nothing objectionable to the simultaneous referral
of multiple complaints filed. Applying the Francisco ruling, the Court said
that "referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the
impeachment proceeding. "

NOTE: The Supreme Court rulings on impeachment cases have so far


indicated that the Court will readily review questions of law arising from
impeachment proceedings. However, there is no indication concretely of a
matter which has been raised from the impeachment trial itself that has been
ruled upon by the Court except for the fact of declaring that the
impeachment trial has been rendered functus officio in the Estrada case,
including the possibility of prosecution of the respondent thereafter - The all-
embracing provision of Article B, Section 1 of the Constitution on the power
of the Supreme Court to declare an act of the lmpeachment Court as in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction remains
to be tested . The following cases are also instructive :
(a) Romulo v. Yfiiguez

On August 13, 1985, more than one-fifth (1/ 5) of all


members of the Batasan signed Resolution No. 644 calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint for
impeachment. The Committee on iustice, Human Rights and Good
Government found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance
and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint. Attempts by
the petitioners, mostly opposition members in the Batasan, to recall

99
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

from the archives Resolution No. 64 4 and the verified complaint were
disapproved by the Batasan.

On August 71 , 1985, in G.R. No. L-71688, IBP members


Arturo M . De Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, filed a petition to
annul the Resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government but the Supreme Court held in a Resolution dated
September 3, 1985 that the action of the Committee involves a
political question . The Court further noted that the petition failed to
allege that the Batasan had violated any provision of the Constitution.
It emphasized:
"x x x The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed the petition
on the same day it was filed after deliberating on it for several hours
as reported in the newspapers, radio and television (which must have
been the bases of petitioners' claim that the Committee had acted with
undue haste in unceremoniously dismissing the complaint f or
impeachment) does not provide basis for concluding that there had
been a violation of any provision of the Constitution which would justify
the Court's intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional
norms and conduct."

Finally, the Court maintained that " (t ) he interpretation and


application of (impeachment ) rules are beyond the powers of the Court
to review. " lt declined to issue a writ of mandamus against the
Batasan in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.

The present petitioners, Romulo, et al . , alleged that Sections 4, 5, 6


and B of the Rules ol Procedure in lmpeachment Proceedings are
unconstitutional principally because these rules "empowered a smaller
body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by
the requisitive I / 5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and
that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at
various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc, the power to
impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to
Batasan Pambansa as a collective body. "

The Supreme Court noted that petitioners are seeking relief "in order
that the impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan
as a body. " Answering in the negative, the Court found no
inconsistency in the Rules in relation to the Constitution . "

(b) ln Re Raul M. Gonzoles

A letter-complaint against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan dated


December L4, 198'7 was filed by Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court before the Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzales. The
latter endorsed the letter to the Supreme Court on March 16, 1988.

The letter contained, among others, charges for disbarment of


Justice . On February l1 , 198 8, the Court resolved to dismiss
Fernan
the charges for utter lack of merit and required complainant to show
cause why he should not be administratively dealt with f or making
unfounded serious accusations against Justice Fernan.

ln dismissing the charges against a sitting magistrate, the


Supreme Court reasoned out in the following manner:
100
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018Oct 19

"lt is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here


involved. The principle may be succinctly formulated in the following
terms: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a
Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by
him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot
be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public
officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any court with any
offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
penalty service of which would amount to removal from office."

The Court emphasized the underlying rule behind the strict


constitutional route under Sections 2 and 3 of Article Xl of the 1987
Constitution:

"The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial


independence and separation of powers x x x. Without the protection
of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all
manner of charges which might be brought against him by unsuccessful
lit;gants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of
reasons, might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the
Court. "

(c) Estrddo v. Desierto

On October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. accused


President Estrada of receiving P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000 and that the
President took from Governor Singson P'7 0 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for llocos Sur. A joint investigation was conducted
by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice.
On the part of the House of Representatives, a similar investigation was
conducted by the Committee on Public Order and Security. Other
representatives moved to impeach the President.

On November 13,2000, House Speaker Villar, presiding over a


tumultuous session, transmitted the Articles of lmpeachment signed by
115 representatives to the Senate . Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. presided over the trial .

The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo revealed that she was one


foot away from the President when he affixed the signature "Jose
Velarde" on documents involving a P5 0 0 million investment agreement
with Ocampo's bank on February 4, 2000. Further revelations by
other witnesses led to an intensified trial .

On January 16, 2A07, on an 11-10 vote, the senator-judges


ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing the President held P3 . 3 billion in a secret
bank account under the name "Jose Velarde. " This triggered a walkout
by the public and private prosecutors and spontaneous outburst of anger
by the public.

101
File with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

On January L1 , 20OI the public prosecutors tendered collective


resignation and withdrew their appearance with the impeachment court.
Senator Raul Roco moved for the indefinite postponement of the
impeachment proceedings until resolution of the issue of resignation of
the public prosecutors.

the Estrada Administration led to


Meanwhile, mass action against
the change in power in favor of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo.

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. B3 declaring


that the lmpeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated.

Former President Estrada later faced criminal charges before the


Office of the Ombudsman . He instituted the present suits principally to
enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving the criminal cases.

The Supreme Court addressed, among others, the issue of


"Whether conviction in the impeochment proceedings ls o condition
precedent for the criminol prosecution of petitioner Estrodo."

The Court ruled that "since the lmpeachment Court is now


functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should
first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution."

(d) Froncisco v. The House of Representatives, et ol

On July 22,2OO2, the House of Representatives adopted a


Resolution (H. R. No. 260), sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) . This would later on trigger on June 2, 2003
the filing of an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices.

On October 13, 2003, the House Committee on Justice ruled


that the impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to
dismiss it on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The Committee Report was not sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with Section 3 (2 ) of Article Xl of the Constitution .

Later, a second impeachment complaint was filed four months


and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint on June 2, 2003
by Representative Gilberto C. Teodoro and Felix William B . Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by the Resolution No. 60 . This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of
Endorsement/ lmpeachment signed by at least one-thir"d (L / -'1) of all
the Members of The House of Representatives.

1.02
tile with Bl!{he usb_rev 2018oct 19

The Supreme Court's exercise of its power of judicial review was


pleaded by petitioners in determining the validity of the filing of a
second impeachment allegedly in violation of the "one impeachment in
one year" rule under Section 3 ( 5 ) of Article Xl of the Constitution .

Of special interest is the argument raised by the legislators on


the need for judicial restraint in addressing issues confronting the
lmpeachment Court. The Supreme Court categorically declared that "the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. "

Speaker de
Venecia raised the fear that judiclal review of
impeachment might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between Congress
and the Judiciary. But according to the Supreme Court "a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases."

The Court proceeded to inquire into the validity of Sections 16


and L'7 of Rule V of the House lmpeachment Rules in 'relation to
Section 3 ( 5 ) of Article Xl of the Constitution on the meaning of the
term "initiate. "

Citing the Constitutional Commission proceedings, the Court found


that "the word 'initiate' in Article Xl ( 3 ) and ( 5 ) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it." Amicus
curiae Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. explained:

"x x x that when Section 3 (5 ) says, 'No impeachment proceeding


shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year,' it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. "

Thus, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House lmpeachment


Rules, providing a different meaning to the term "initiate," ran afoul the
constitutional standard. lnitiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed on June 2,
2OO3 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint on October 23,2003 violates
the Constitution.

103
File with Blythe usb_rev 20i8Oct 19

Article 1 1. Section 5 a nd L2 ( lndependence of the Ombudsma n:


Power to lnvestigate)

2074; ,14 S'CRA 6.t7

Facts:
a Manila Police District Senior lnspector Rolando Mendoza and four others
were charged with robbery, grave threat, robbery exhortation and physical
injury. An administrative charge for grave misconduct was subsequently
filed with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) .
a Emilio A. Gonzales lll, Deputy Ombudsman for military and other law
enforcement officers, directed NAPOLCOM to turn over the record of
Mendoza's case to his office. On February L6, 2009, after preparing a
draft decision on Mendoza's case, Gonzales forwarded the entire records to
the office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review. The
latter approved Gonzales' recommendation finding Mendoza guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal. Mendoza filed a motion
for reconsideration .

a On August 23,2070, pending final action by the Ombudsman, Mendoza


hijacked a tourist bus and held the foreign tourist as hostages. The
hostage-taking ended tragically, resulting in deaths of Mendoza and some
tourists. ln the aftermath, President Aquino directed DOJ and DILG to
investigate the incident. The irrvestigation report found the Ombudsman
and Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct
in handling the case against Mendoza. " Gonzales was formally charged
before the office of the President and found guilty for Gross Neglect of
Duty. He was dismissed from the service .
lssue :

c Does the Office of the President have administrative disciplinary jurisdiction


over a Deputy Ombudsman?

Ruling:
eNo
Reasoning:
o Under Section 27 of R. A. 6'77 0, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman .
o Section B (2) of R.A. 6'71O is unconstitutional with respect to the Office
of the Ombudsman. The exercise of the President of the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the office of
the Ombudsman.
. Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Ombudsman
would result in an absurd situation wherein the office of the Ombudsman

L04
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competences of the


very persons who can remove or suspend its members.

Article 11, Section 13 (Powers of the Ombudsman; lniunctions


asainst lnvestieation conducted bv Ombudsman) in relation to
"Condonation Doctrine"
Carpio-[Vloroles v CA, G.R. Nos. 277126-27, November 70, 2015
Facts :

a The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB ) issued an Order preventively


suspending Mayor Binay, lr. and other public officials of the City of
Makati in relation to various cases accusing them of plunder and
corruption. The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) against implementation of the OMB's order.
a The OMB argued that the CA had no jurisdiction to issue a TRO citing
Section 74 of R. A. 6110 which states that no injunctive writ could be
issued to delay the OMB's investigation unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter is outside the latter's jurisdiction .
a Mayor Binas, Jr. argues, on the otherhand, that the OMB committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
posits that it is incumbent upon the OM B to have been apprised of the
condonation doctrine in determining the imposition of the preventive
suspension.

lssues:

o ls Section l4 of R. A. il1A constitutional?


o ls the condonation doctrine applicable?

Ruling:

. The second paragraph of Section l4 of R. A. 611A is unconstitutional


. The condonation doctrine is abandoned.

105
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

ReasoninR:

a Section 74 of R. A. 6110 which provides that "no appeal or application


for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the OMB,
with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure question of law" is
vague. Congress cannot alter procedural matter in the Rules of Court. ln
fact, the questioned provision increased the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction without its consent under Article 6, Section 3 0 of the
Constitution.
a The CA, therefore, has subject matter jurisdiction over Mayor Binay, Jr. 's
petition.
a The Court finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine
which originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon - Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija under the 1935 Constitution .
a Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, however,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President under Section 19, Article 7 of the Constitution as interpreted in
Llamas v - Orbos.
a This abandonment of the doctrine should be prospective in application.

Article L2. Section (Service Contract)

,t;6,e:;izn ApriT 21, 2075

Facts
a A Service Contract between the Philippine Government thru DOE Secretary
Vicente S. Reyes, Jr. and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX) was
entered into which allowed the exploration, development and exploitation
of petroleum resources within Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water
situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu .
c Petitioners are toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the water in the Tanon Strait. These are joined by
legal guardians and friends known as "stewards" .

lssues:
o Do the mammals have standing?
o ls the Service Contract valid?

Ruling:
c The mammals do not have standing.
. The Service Contract is void. lt was not signed by the President
106
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

Reasoning:
o Our own Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural
or juridical . ln this case, the stewards are the real parties in interest.
o ln La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of words "Service Contract"
in the 7gB1 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.
. Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements ( FTAA ) under the present
Constitution are in fact service contracts but entered into with foreign
corporations acting as contractors. The safeguards today include the
President as signatory to FTAAs with a notice requirements to Congress
within 30 days of the executed agreement.

Article A2, Section l-0 (in relation to ALA, Sectlon 15 (Historic


Sites: Arts and Culture) and A3, Section 9 (Expropriation)
Knights of Rizol v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 2L3948, April 25, 2017
Facts:
a DMCI planned to construct the Torre de Manila 4 9-storey condominium
located near Taft Avenue, Ermita beside the former Jai-Alai Building behind
the Rizal Park. The City Council of Manila temporarily suspended the
Building Permit on the ground that the condominium will rise up high
above the back of the national monument to clearly dwarf the statue of
Jose Rizal. Later, on 23 December 20L3, the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustments recommended approval of DMCI's project which was eventually
adopted by the City Council.
a The Knights of Rizal ( KOR ) argued that the Rizal Monument, as a
National Treasure, is entitled to full protection of the law. KOR cited the
National Historical Commission of the Philippines ( NHCP ) Guidelines on
Monuments Honoring National Heroes, lllustrious Filipinos and other
Personages, and the lnternational Charter for the Conservation and
Restoration of Monuments and Sites (Venice Charter) to bolster its claim.
o Article 14, Section 15 has also been cited as a source of constitutional
duty of the State to conserve, promote, and popularize the nation's
historical and cultural heritage. *

lssue:
a Was there a violation of the Constitution when DIVICI was allowed to
construct a condominium at the back of Rizal's monument?

Ruling:
a No

147
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018Oct 19

Reasoning:
o No law prohibits the construction . City Ordinance B 1 1 9 on historic sites is
a mere "guide" but does not prohibit construction of a building outside a
historic site or facility.
o R . A. 100 6 6 protects the physical integrity of heritage property if there is
a danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state.
. Stoppage of DMCI's construction would constitute a taking without
compensation.
o The Venice Charter is a mere codification of guiding principles and not a
treaty instrument.
. DMCI's condominium is not a nuisance per se.
r The SC is not a trier of facts, RTC is the proper venue.
. Article 14, Section 15 is not a self-executing provision .

Article L2, Section 11 (Foreign Ownership in Public Utilitv)


Gomboo v. Secretary Teves, et ol ., G . R. No. 176579, lune 28, 2011 (7"
Decision) and October 9, 2072 (MR)

Facts :

a PLDT is a telecom franchise holder licensed in 1928 .


a ln L969, GTE, an American company and a major stockholder of PLDT
sold 26% of outstanding common shares to Philippine Telecom lnvestment
Corporation (PTIC) .
a ln I9'71, Prime Holdings (PHl) became owners of 71_L,4l5 shares of
stock of PTIC but these shares ( 46 . L25 of outstanding capital stock of
PTIC) were sequestered by PCGG and declared as owned by the Republic.
ln 7999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based firm,
acquired 54% of outstanding capital stock of PTIC.
a ln December 2006, Parallax Venture Fund bid f or the 46 .725% of
outstanding capital stock of PTIC.
a First Pacific announced its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder and
interest to buy the 46 .725% shares, but failed to do so.
a ln February 2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into
a conditional sale of the 46.125%o shares.
a PTIC being a stockholder of PLDT, the sale of 4 6 . 125% of PTIC shares is
an indirect sale of 12 million shares or 6 .3o/o of outstanding common
shares of PLDT.
a With the sale, First Pacific's common shareholding in PLDT increased from
30.1% lo 37%, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners
in PLDT to 87 .4-lo/o

108
File with Blythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

lssues:
o Does the transaction violate Article I2, Section 11 which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%?
o What does "capital" mean in Article 12, Section 11?

Ruling:

1't Decision
o The term "capital" refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus only to common shares, and not to the
total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares) .

2nd Decision- Motions for Reconsideration denied.


r The Court emphasized that the term "capital" refers to shares with full
beneficial ownership . This is precisely because the right to vote tn the
election of directors, coupled with full beneficlal ownership of stocks,
translates to effective control of a corporation.

Reasoning:
a The interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. The deliberations of the Con-Conr reveal
tlrat "capital" refers to voting stock or controlling interest.
a By way of illustration, there will be a glaring circumvention of the
Constitution if a broad definition of capital were to be applied as follows:
"Let us assume a corporation has 10 0 common shares owned by
foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos,
with both classes of share having a par value of one peso (P1.00) per
share. Under the broad definition of the term capital, such corporation
would be considered compliant with the 40% constitutional limit on foreign
equity of public utilities - - . This is obviously absurd . ln the example
given, only the foreigners holding common shares have voting rights in the
election of directors, even if they hold only 10 0 shares . "
a PLDT does not dispute that, in fact, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common
shares while Filipinos hold only 66,'750,622 (64.21% - 35.13% ratio) .
This is effective control by foreigners .

Roy lll v - Chairperson Herboso, G . R - No. 207246, November 22, 2016


Facts :
a The Securities and Exchange Commission issued Memo Cir. No. B, Series
of 2073 pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gamboa v.
Finance Secretary Teves (G . R . No . 71 6519, june 28, 2077 anci October

109
File with Blythe usb rev 2018oct 19

9, 2012) where it interpreted Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution


as follows:

" ...the term 'capital' in Section 11, Article Xll of the l9B1
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors, and thus in the present case
only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting shares ) . Respondent
Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is
DIRECTED to
apply this definition of the term 'capital' in
deternrining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in
respondent Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there
is a violation of Section 1t, Article Xll of the Constitution,
to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law. "
a Pursuant to the Gamboa directive, Section 2 of SEC- MC No . B provides :

"Section 2 . All categories shall, at all times, observe the


constitutional or statutory ownership requirement. For
purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required
percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH
(a ) the total number of outstanding shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors; and, (b ) the
total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote . "

lssue :

a ls SEC-MC No. B constitutional?

Ruling:
c Yes

Reasoninp:
. SEC-tr/lC No. B is
consistent with the Gamboa decision and resolution and
is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction .

Article 13, Section 4 (Rights of


Farmers and Farmworkers) in
relation to Article 3, Section 1 (Due Process) and Article 3, Section
10 (Contract Clause)

110
File with Slythe usb_rev 2018oct 19

Hociendo Luisito lnc. v. Presidentiol Agrarion Reform Council, et ol ., G.R. No


777707, luly 5,2011

Facts :

r Hacienda Luisita (HL) was bought by TADECO (owned by Jose Cojuangco)


from Compania Tabacalera in 1950s.
o On May J , 1 9B 0 the Martial Law Administration filed a suit before RTC-
Manila against TADECO, et al. to surrender HL to the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. The RTC
ordered TADECO to surrender HL.
o On March 7J , 198 B the OSG moved to withdraw the government's case
against TADECO which the Court of Appeals granted but subject to the
obtention by TADECO of PARC's approval of a stock distribution plan
(SDP ) . R . A. No . 6651 , Section 31 allows either land or stock transfer
as options for farmer beneficiaries .
o TADECO later organized a spin-off corporation, HLl, as. vehicle to facilitate
stock acquisition. TADECO assigned and conveyed to HLI 4,915 .15
hectares in exchange for HLI shares of stock.
o On May 9, 1989,93% of farmworker-beneficiaries complement of HL
voted for SDP and a MOA was entered into by TADECO, HLI and
farmworkers.
. On October 74, 1989. 5,7L'/ farmworkers, in a follow-up referendum
by DAR, opted to receive shares while 1 3 2 chose actual land distribution .
r On August 1 5, L995, HLI applled for conversion of 5 0 0 hectares to
industrial use . Another B 0 . 51 hectares were detached from coverage as
part of SCTEX, only 4,335 .7 5 hectares remained of the 4,915 hectares
TADECO ceded to HLl.
. ln 2003, a Supervisory Group of HLI sought revocation of the SDOA.
o DAR Secretary Pangandaman recommended revocation and the acquisition
of HL through compulsory acquisition scheme. The PARC endorsed DAR's
actions. A Mediation Panel failed to settle various disputes arising from
the emergence of a new faction from the farmer-beneficiaries.
lssues:
" Validity of PARC's revocation of the SDOA in relation to vested property
rights of an innocent purchaser for value over portions of converted
property covered by notice of coverage.
" Constitutionality of R . A. No . 6651 , Section 31 (stock distribution ) .

Ruling:
o PARC has authority to revoke the SDOA by necessary implication from
R.A. No. 6651 which gives it authority in the first place to approve the
SDOA.
o There is no impingement of the impairment clause. A law authorizing
interference in contractual relations is deemed read into the contract. The
SDOA is a special contract imbued with public interest. The rights,

111
File with Blythe usb-rev 2018oct 19

obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA are governed by


R. A. No. 6651 , a special law. The present impasse between HLI and
private respondents is not an intra-corporate dispute .
e R . A. No . 565'7 , Section 31 is constitutional and does not violate Article
13, Section 4 . Besides, R . A. No . 6651 , Section 31 vis -a -vis stock
distribution has now been amended by R . A . No . 91 A0, Section 5 which
provides: "That after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be
limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition - "
. Article 13, Section 4 has not been violated insofar as it provides farmers
who are landless to own directlv or collectivelv the lands they till.
o lnnocent purchasers for value of converted portions of HL are protected.
. 6,296 qualified farmer-beneficiaries have the right to choose whether to
remain as HLI stockholders or not, pursuant to the 2070 Compromise
Agreement.
. The reckoning date for "taking" is November 27, L9B9 when PARC
approved HLI's SDP.

Qn llotion for Reconsideration (November 22, 2017) :

a Motion f or Reconsideration partially granted with respect to the option


granted to the original farmworker-beneficiaries of HL to remain with HLI
which is recalled and set aside.

Article ]-4, Section 4 (3) in relation to A6, Section 28 (3) (Tax


Exemptins Educational lnstitutions)

Commissioner of lnternol Revenue v DLSU, G.R. Nos. 195596, 798847, ond


798947, Nov g, 2015

Facts
a The Bureau of lnternal Revenue (BlR ) assessed DLSU deficiency taxes :
(1) income tax on rental earnings from restaurants,/canteens and
bookstores operating within the campus; (2) value-added tax (VAT) on
the business income; and, ( 3 ) documentary stamp tax ( DST ) on loans
and lease contracts . DLSU protested citing Article lV, Section 4 ( 3 )
exempting all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
from taxes and duties .

lssue:
ls DLSU exempt from a portion of its rental income?

Ruling:

1,12
File with Blythe usb,rev 2018Oct 19

a DLSU is exempt from a portion of its rental income .


Reasoning
a The taxpayer institution must show proof that revenues and assets of its
institution must have been used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes before it can claim exemption .
a DLSU is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution .
a DLSU is granted a broader tax privilege, while those institutions subject of
Article 6, Section 28 (3) are exempt merely from property tax. lt only
exempts the assets, while DLSU's revenues and assets used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from taxes
and duties .

L13