You are on page 1of 4
Cover Story Part Prevent Product Release with Pressure Protection Systems Closing off pressure upstream can minimize the need for pressure-relief systems to open, avoiding, product waste and possible environmental damage Erik Mathiason and ‘Afton Coleman Emerson Automation Soisions IN BRIEF RELIEVING PRESSURE AT THE SOURCE LOOKING AT THE INOMOUAL PARTS IMPLEMENTING ‘AN IMPROVED OVERPRESSURE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM PUTTING TALL TOCETHER ny system within a chemical pro: cess industries (CPI) manufactur ing plant that is pressurized, or (could experience pressure dur- ing an upset or maifunction, must have a pressure-relief mechanism, This helps al- leviate a situation where pressure capable of bursting vessals or piping develops. The first approach for protection is a mechani cal device designed to open at a specific pressure to release the contents, Typical examples are pressure-relief valves (PRVS) Or rupture disks. These open and allow the Contents to escape to the atmosphere, & flare manifold or a collection system. The problem with this approach is the amount of product lost, along with the po- tential for an environmental incident if the contents are not fully captured and treated appropriately. For example, a plant's flare system must have the capacity to handle large releases, which could require a more robust system than is needed on a routine Sey eer -GURE 1, The OPS sta ona mai ina sping a ‘ores unt Ie eed pressure passes cal Desh, "Shuts of the fed par othe PAY opening basis. n other words, an overpressure inc- dent involving product release through ame- chanical pressure-relief system is expensive riot onl in lost product and potential envi- ronmental incidents, lout also in the equip- ent necessary to handle the release. This can be made all the worse by a large pro- cess supply, such as that found ina pipeline. Without being shut off, the flow out of an ‘opened PAV tram a pipeline could be vitu- ally inexhaustible, In some situations, it may be more practi- cal to change the approach from releasing the pressure to cutting it off upstream at the source as quickly as possible to mini- mize or prevent product release through a PRV. Although this seems like an obvious solution, it happens less than one would expect; product is stil lost with all the as- sociated costs and inconveniences. It is Cover Story important to consider alternate solutions to address safety and production challenges. Relieving at the source As a typical example, an over- pressure protection systom (OFS) Figue 1) can be used to 0 tect a reactor by shutting off tho pressure source where it reaches the citical vessel. One approach shuts down the system when It reaches 1163 of the rated pres- ‘ro, and before tho PRV is Set 0 ‘open. Thi is abasic safety instru- menied function (SIF and should be part ofthe larger satetyinstu- mented system (SIS) protecting ‘the process unit or lager pant IW designed end applied prop- ey, the OPS may be able to mitigate the need for an ad- ditional pressure-teet system “This is particulary crtical when the pressures imolved make a PRV impractical, or the systems designed to handle a product release might be inadequate for the potential volume. Such situ- ations can emerge when @ plant is changed to increase produc- tion or a process unt is modified The capital expenditure costs of enlarging a fara system can be much higher than adding an OPS. “Thote aro situations where an OPS cannot be used to replace a conventional pressure- ralst system, such as compressed air or steam. In such situations, i becomes neces- sary to have the lwo systems work together, with the PAV serving as a backup. ‘The dasign and implementation of an OPS must be approached just ike ary cthor SF following the procedures outined under the International Electrotechnical Commis- sion’s (EC) 61511 standard (SSA-84). I this standard is not familar, there are many re- sutces availble covering the topic in far ‘greater depth. IEC 61511 provides a com- Diete safety iifecycle approach, covering ‘everything ftom conceptual process design with hazard analysis and risk assessment, all th way to operation, evaluation and management of change. Any OPS should be evaluated and designed by experts with competency in safety standards and pro- cess design within tis fremework. For pur- 1050s of his discussion, wo will concentrate (on the middle steps of the process covering detailed design and installation, but all the thor elements need to be included. Looking at the individual parts Returning to the earlier example, let's focus (on the OPS function itself It is @ basic SIF designed to shut down flow in the event of fan excessive pressure incident, Since it is a SIF, it has throe basic parts: @ sensor, a logic Solver and a final element, These can bbe simple or highly sophisticated, but any components used must be certified to op- erate in a SIS context, with any uncertified ‘components justified as proven-in-use. ‘A SIF must be able to perform its function independently without depending on any larger automation system, or even plant uti ties, Should there be larger falures in the unt, it must be able to shut off the flow at least ‘once and remain closed. A bare-bones sy- om could use 2 pressure switch connected to a simple logic solver and a shutoff vale designed to fal closed in the event of a loss Of electric power or compressed ait. This can probably do the job, but willbe afcul to test, FHGURE2 Stay cree ‘mar pressure vases have neal capa > perorm ents op ig hosts ost protien sch {3 clogged mouse ad Cover Story FOURE . Tis 2. vae istypeal of hut-dom sre for OPS service Wis a ‘union mutts wave acon wi a seoth yoko Dera sping eu alr ad itl vale feat FIGURE 4. mis typical 0° Imire fat areata orate part of process uit forigh pressure wil not provide any clagnostic information, {and won't have any capabity to minimize false trips. One shutdown caused by a fase tip or pressure switch falurewilkely cost more than instaling a more sophisticated system, Implementing an improved OPS ‘The same sophisticated technologies that make instrumentation smart and control systoms more effective can also apply to SIFs. Let's look at hovr they might be ap- plied in this situation, ‘The sensor can be a pressure transmitter (Figure 2), which is safety-ceriied and able to provide diagnostic information in addition to a basic pressure measurement. A pres- sure transmitter with advanced capabilties can evaluate the complete measurement system, extending diagnostics to capture over-pressure scenarios and improve reac- tion time. Speed is critical because the OPS must respond immediately to initiate the Pressure protection system and protect the owinstream equipment. ‘Advanced transmitter capabilties can ine ‘clude functions such as plugged imputse-lino lection, which can be communicated to the logic solver via a wired or wireless digital ‘communications protocol. This valuable infor ‘mation can be passed on to the larger pro: ccess-control and maintenance systems with- ‘out interfering with the basic safety function, While one transmitter may be sufficent to provide the safety function, hight ortcal systems where shutdowns are exceptionally costly may cal for three pressure transmitters arranged in a two-oul-of hres (2008) voting ‘scheme to reduce the potential for a false alarm caused by a transmitter malfunction. Using this approach, at least two transmitters must report an overpressure incident to trig the system and cause a valve closure. This ‘also provides a backup if one or even two transmitters are damaged or malfunction. ‘We'll corne back t0 the logic solver in a moment, but let's frst look at the final ele- ‘ment. The uitimate purpose of an OPS is to close a valve to cut off the source of pres- sure. It may be a single valve, but as the dla {gram shows, it may also be two valves in 6e- rigs so that ether one can close and isolate the process, Having two valves eliminates a valve maltunction as a single point of fare ‘Valves in this service should be safety-cer- tied, and must fail closed (Figure 9). I tere 's a loss of any or all plant utites, such as compressed air to a valve, or if communi- cation is cut off to the logic solver, the valve. ‘must close itsef and stay shut. To handle these and other similar situations, fal-ciosed vale are typicaly spring loaded and have to bbe held open by the instrument supply me- ium, such as compressed air. But as me- chanical devices, a potential faire mode is becoming stuck in one position, leaving them ‘unable to do ther job when called upon. ‘This is particulary important for SiFs, since: these valves don't normally change’ posi- tion very often, Fortunately, the actuators that move these valves can include a smart digital valve controler (OVC). It can perform self-diagnostics and determina if corrosion (or some other condition is causing a valve to require mote forve to move and can detect when there is @ change in the compressed ‘ir supply, power quality or whatever other motive force they may depend upon. The DVC periorms operations that can assist

You might also like