PEOPLE v. DIONISIO A.

MANEJA
[ GR No. 47684, Jun 10, 1941 ]

The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription for the offense of false
testimony which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code),
should commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in
criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends.

We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
(Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties
provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore
constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662,
663; People vs. Marcos et al., G. R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable
offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.

If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is given, it would
be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend,
on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is
charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer
is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is
twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the
perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five
years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be prosecuted before final judgment in the basic case, it
would be impossible to determine the period of prescription whether twenty years or five years as either of
these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main case.

The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the same, whether
the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of
pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180. of the Revised Penal Code and the instant case
falls on one of them uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a
prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false testimony.

Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings,
without costs.

FACTS: Dionisio Maneja was charged of false testimony. He did such act on 1933. The case he testifed to
became final in 1938. Maneja contends that his offense has prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether the crime has prescribed.

RULING: The SC ruled that the period of prescription shall start from the day the crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agents. With false testimony, it is not an actionable offense until
the case is decided. For one to be judged of falsely testifying there should a decision on the case he testified
to. In short, there is no prescription present yet. The SC reversed the dismissal and remanded it to the court
of origin.