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1. Mangaldan vs Manaoag GR No.

11627 Aug 10 1918

THE MUNICIPALITY OF MANGALDAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE


MUNICIPALITY OF MANAOAG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

TORRES, J.:
On May 23, 1914, counsel for the municipality of Mangaldan filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against the municipality of Manaoag, alleging that
from time immemorial it has been enjoying and using one-half of the water of the
Tagumising River, that is, all the volume of water carried by the so-called Tolon River, a
continuation of the former, which passes through the municipality of Manaoag; that,
under an easement that for more than 30 years had existed in favor of the plaintiff,
certain residents of Mangaldan have been enjoying the use of the water from the said
Tagumising and Tolon Rivers for the purpose of irrigating their lands, but that, two
years prior to the date above-mentioned, they were deprived of the use and enjoyment
of the water of said rivers, by reason of the defendant's having obstructed the channel by
means of a strong dam built at the confluence of the two rivers at a place between the
localities of Tagumising and Tolon, thus obstructing the flow of the water; wherefore,
the plaintiff municipality prayed the court to hold that it was entitled to use and enjoy
the water carried by the so-called Tolon River, and further, that the court oblige the
defendant to tear down the dam that it had constructed at the confluence of the
Tagumising and the so-called Tolon Rivers, and to pay the costs.
proper bill of exceptions, which was transmitted to the clerk of this court.
ISSUE:
WON the Tagumising River, as well as the water that flows through it and then passes
through the Tolon River, which is a continuation of the Tagumising River, are of the
public domain?
Rulling:
This is confirmed by article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, in force in these
Islands. Therefore, the inhabitants of both Manaoag and Mangaldan have the same right
to enjoy the use of this water, and the defendant municipality may not, to the prejudice
of the inhabitants of Mangaldan, alter, modify, or reduce the water bed of the said river
in the part thereof where it passes through the town of Manaoag; neither may the
inhabitants of Manaoag impede the flow of the water of the Tagumising section of the
river, so as to prevent its coming into the Tolon section of the stream, thus absolutely
depriving the people of Mangaldan of said water.
People of Manaoag and those of Mangaldan only have the right to use and enjoy the
water of the said river, which, as well as the river itself, is of the public domain, as
already stated. Neither of these two municipalities has a right to monopolize the water
of said river, especially that of Manaoag which is on a higher elevation, so that the water
runs from the boundary of the municipality of Manaoag, eastward, toward the town of
Mangaldan situated, westward, at a lower altitude.
If the water of the rivers called by the names of Tagumising and Tolon belong to the
public domain, it is unquestionable that, while it passes through the section of the
stream which crosses the town of Mangaldan, it may be used publicly by the inhabitants
of this municipality, and the latter is by law entitled to defend the community
comprising its inhabitants by compelling the recognition and respect of their rights,
through the institution of such actions as may correspond to it as a legitimate
representative of said community.
In the Ruling Case Law (vol. 19, sec. 345) the following doctrine is laid down: "A
municipal corporation is the proper representative of the equitable rights of its
inhabitants to the use of a public square, and is authorized to file a bill in equity to
prevent the erection of a nuisance therein."
Although the record does not satisfactorily show that the municipality of Manaoag filled
in the bed of the Tagumising River in the vicinity of the dam constructed in said river,
and although it is probable that the accumulation of earth in the river and in the dam
was due to the force of the current of the water of the river itself, yet this would not
relieve the defendant from its obligation to remove all the obstacles that obstruct the
flow of the water, thus restoring the dam to its original state so that it may allow the
water of the river to pass through its fissures and small openings, to the end that the
people of Mangaldan may enjoy the use of this water, to which they have a right by
reason of the fact that the Tagumising section of the river and the water which flows
over its bed belong to the public domain, and no one has a right to monopolize them for
his exclusive benefit and to the prejudice of others who have the same right. The
existence of the dam or dams in the Tagumising River which benefit the inhabitants of
the town of Manaoag by their enjoyment of the water of public use, implies the
obligation to maintain and preserve the said dam or dams in proper condition so that
any alteration or change may not cause injury to the residents of other towns.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
2. Mercado vs Reyes GR No. 45768 Dec 23 1937

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 45768. December 23, 1937.]

EUFEMIA MERCADO, Petitioner, v. HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of First


Instance of Pampanga, THE MUNICIPAL PRESIDENT OF MACABEBE,
PAMPANGA, and THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

Carmelino G. Alvendia for Petitioner.

Roman de Jesus and Solicitor-General Tuason for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

WATERS AND WATER COURSES; OBSTRUCTION OF CREEKS BY MEANS


OF DIKES; AN UNLAWFUL ACT CANNOT BE RATIFIED EITHER EXPRESSLY
OR IMPLIEDLY. — The fact that the municipality of Macabebe, with the
approval of the corresponding authorities, has leased the creek in
question to Francisco de Leon., and that said creek is actually under the
administration and care of said lease, is no reason to exempt the
petitioner from complying with the obligation which, by judgment, she
had been ordered to perform, that is, to remove the dikes at the ends of
the creeks passing through her hacienda. The municipality of Macabebe
could not have exempted the petitioner from complying with said
obligation by the mere fact of having leased the creek to F. de L.,
because an unlawful act cannot be either expressly or impliedly, and it is
undoubtedly unlawful to have blocked up with dikes a navigable creek, as
the one in question (secs. 64, Act No. 4003).

Facts:

l Romulo Mercado, the petitioner’s predecessor in interest, caused the


construction of dikes at both ends of the creek to close it to water
traffic and convert the same into a fishpond, as he had done with
some portions thereof. While the aforesaid case was being tried in the
courts, the fishponds in the hacienda, together with the creek whose
two ends had been closed by Romulo Mercado, were in the possession
of Francisco de Leon, as lessee thereof, and the latter’s contract to
said effect with the Mercados, that is, Romulo Mercado and the
petitioner, did not expire until November 15, 1937.

ISSUE: WON the creek named Batasan-Limasan or Pinac-Buñgalun,


which crosses a part of the hacienda described in certificate of title No.
329 of the registry of deeds of Pampanga and registered therein in the
name of the petitioner, belonged to said petitioner or to the public
domain.
RULING:
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga and this court decided the
question by holding that the creek in question is property of the public
domain.

After the judgment holding the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac-Buñgalun


creek to be property of the public domain had become final, the lessee
Francisco de Leon, in order not to lose the creek in question which, as
stated above, had already been converted into a fishpond, and to be
able to continue enjoying it as such lessee, filed an application to lease
said creek from the municipality of Macabebe, within whose
jurisdiction it was located. His application was granted with the
approval of the Secretaries of the Departments of Public Works and
Agriculture, and the contract so entered between him and the
municipality will not expire until the 31st of the current month and
year.

The fact that the municipality of Macabebe, with the approval of the
corresponding authorities, has leased the creek in question to
Francisco de Leon, and that said creek is actually under the
administration and care of said lessee, is no reason to exempt the
petitioner from complying with the obligation which, by judgment, she
had been ordered to perform, that is, to remove the dikes at the ends
of the creek passing through her hacienda. The municipality of
Macabebe could not have exempted the petitioner from complying with
said obligation by the mere fact of having leased the creek to
Francisco de Leon, because an unlawful act cannot be ratified either
expressly or impliedly, and it is undoubtedly unlawful to have blocked
up with dikes a navigable creek, as the one under consideration (sec.
64, Act No. 4003).
3 De los Santos vs Roman Catholic Church GR No. L-6088 Feb 25 1954

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:


On December 9, 1938, a homestead patent covering a tract of land situated in the
municipality of Midsayap, Province of Cotabato, was granted to Julio Sarabillo and on
March 17,1939, Original Certificate of Title No. RP-269 (1674) was issued in his favor.
On December 31, 1940, Julio Sarabillo sold two hectares of said land to the Roman
Catholic Church of Midsayap for the sum of P800 to be dedicated to educational and
charitable purposes. It was expressly agreed upon that the sale was subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In December, 1947, a request for said approval was submitted in behalf of the Roman
Catholic Church by Rev. Fr. Gerard Mongeau stating therein that the land would be used
solely for educational and charitable purposes. The sale was approved on March 26,
1949, and on March 29, 1950, the deed of sale was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cotabato. No new title was issued in favor of the
Roman Catholic Church although the deed was annotated on the back of the title issued
to the homesteader.
In the meantime, Julio Sarabillo died and intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of his estate and Catalina de los Santos was appointed administratrix of the
estate. And having found in the course of her administration that the sale of the land to
the Roman Catholic Church was made in violation of section 118 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, the administratrix instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato praying that the sale be declared null and void and of no legal effect.
ISSUE: WON immediate effect would be not the return of the land to appellee but
rather its reversion to the State wherein the Government is the interested party. (Section
124 of the Public Land Act). Appellants further claim that the present action cannot be
maintained by the appellee under the principle of pari delicto.
Ruling:
Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law.
Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-
interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality (8
Manresa 4th ed., pp. 717-718), but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of
public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring
it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the
policy on which our homestead law is predicated (Pascua vs. Talens, supra). This right
cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what
public policy by law seeks to preserve" (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Pantaleon de las
Ama, et al., 74 Phil., 3). We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can
maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our
homestead law.
As regards the contention that because the immediate effect of the nullification of the
sale is the reversion of the property to the State appellee is not the proper party to
institute it but the State itself, that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose,
to decide. That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the homestead, or his
heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to
the possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to
the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the
purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no
more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants.
Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and,
therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during
and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State. (See Castro vs.
Orpiano,[*] G. R. No. L-4094, November 29, 1951.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.

4 Mesina vs Sonza GR No. L-14722 May 25 1960

G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960

IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant, vs EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.,


defendants.EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land located in San Antonio,
Nueva, Ecija. He has been in possession of the subject land openly, publicly and
peacefully since 1914. The said lot was subject of registration proceedings. Surprisingly,
the defendant Pineda without knowledge of the Plaintiff was able to procure a
homestead patent in the same court were the registration of property was pending of
the same land by the plaintiff, despite of the fact that defendant had not complied with
the requirements of CA 141. That the said title was procured by defendants through
frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belong to the
plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff sought to annulled and cancelled the patent issued to
defendant and prayed that this registration case pending in the same court be given
due course.

ISSUE: WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be declared null and
void

RULING: In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his open, continuous,
exclusive possession of the disputed land for more than thirty years or since 1914 and
that lot is at present subject of registration proceeding. Plaintiff is deemed to have
acquired the lot by grant of the state, it follows that the same had ceased to part of the
public and had become private property and therefore beyond the control of the
Director of Land. The homestead patent issued to defendant therefore is null and void
and for having it issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. The case was
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
5 RP vs Sioson GR No. L-13687 Nov 29 1963

EN BANC

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SEGUNDO


SIOSON and PASCUALA BAUTISTA, Respondents-Appellees.

Solicitor General for Petitioner-Appellant.

De los Santos & De los Santos for Respondents-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE OF


REGISTRATION; ALLEGATION OF ACTUAL AND EXTRINSIC FRAUD; HEARING
OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY BEFORE PETITION MAY BE DENIED. — The action
of the lower court in denying the petition for review of a decree of
registration, filed within a year from entry of the decree, without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which
the petition is predicated. is held to be error, because the lower court should
have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.

2. ID.; ID.; BED OF NAVIGABLE RIVERS CANNOT BE REGISTERED UNDER


THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT. — If the lot sought to be registered is or
forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river, the decree or
title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any right or
title to it Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the
Land Registration Act.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court, because in


its opinion "the only purpose of the instant appeal is to question the
propriety of the lower court’s order denying the petition to review on the
grounds alleged therein," which is purely a question of law, the review of
which falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of this Court.

It appears that on 6 November 1951, in the Court of First Instance of


Bulacan the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an
application for registration of four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio San
Roque, municipality of Paombong, province of Bulacan, delimited in plan
Psu-12152, attached to their application, of which they claimed to be the
owners in fee simple.

On 20 March 1951, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the


parcels of land the registration of which was applied for stating (a) that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient title to
the said parcel of land, the same not having been acquired either by
composicion title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; (b) that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors in interest have possessed the land openly,
continuously, publicly, adversely and under bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894; and, (c) that the said parcel of land sought to be
registered is a part of the public domain and as such belong to the Republic
of the Philippines.

After hearing, on 30 January 1954, judgment was rendered by the court, the
dispositive portion of which is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court confirming its order of general


default issued herein, hereby adjudicates and orders the registration of Lots
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 shown in plan Psu-127152, Exhibit A, and described in
technical description Exhibits B, B-1, and B-2, respectively, in favor of the
spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista, of legal age, Filipinos, with
residence and postal address at Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal.

No adjudication is hereby made with respect to Lot 4 of plan, Psu-127152,


Exhibit A. No pronouncement as to costs.

The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far as it did not decree the
registration of Lot No. 4 in their names.

On 20 January 1955, the Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands,


instead of filing a brief to answer that of the appellants, filed in the Court of
Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. 4 be
decreed in the name of the appellants.

On 31 January 1955, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that


of the lower court and decreeing the registration of Lot No. 4 in the name of
the appellants.

On 25 April 1955, in accordance with the judgment rendered by the Court of


Appeals just mentioned the lower court entered an order for the issuance of
the decree on Lot No. 4.

On 25 April 1956, the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the


Philippines, filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of
registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land (Pesqueria) in the
name of the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The parcel of
land referred to in the petition is Lot No. 4, the registration of which was
decreed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in Land Registration Case No.
317, G.L.R.O. 4928, CA-GR No. L-12688-R. The petition alleges actual and
extrinsic fraud practiced by the herein respondents, then applicants, by
intentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and
between the herein respondents and the land inspector.

On 2 May 1956, the respondents Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed
an opposition to the "Petition for Review of Decree of Registration and
Cancellation of Title" filed by the Solicitor General. In their opposition,
respondents alleged, among other things, that they had not practiced any
actual fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in fact an
accretion to a titled parcel of land: that the present petition for review under
the principle of res judicata is undeniably improper, unwarranted and illegal;
that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to review or nullify a final and
irrevocable judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals; that the issue raised
in their appeal to and passed upon by the Court of Appeals is the same as
the one raised by the Solicitor General in its petition for review; that
petitioner’s petition for review does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action; that during the pendency in the Court of Appeals of the
appeal of Lot No. 4, the Solicitor General as counsel for the Director of Lands
filed a pleading entitled "Comments" recommending that the registration of
the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled lands of the
then applicants-appellants be decreed in their names; and that the Solicitor
General is deemed to be in estoppel to make allegations in the present
petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the aforesaid
"Comments."

On 18 September, 1956 without hearing and presentation of evidence the


lower court entered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the
Philippines has appealed.

In its brief, petitioner-appellant assigns two (2) errors claimed to have been
committed by the lower court, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO EXTRINSIC OR


COLLATERAL FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS-
APPELLEES IN COLLUSION WITH OTHERS, AGAINST THE PETITIONER-
APPELLANT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN EFFECTING THE
REGISTRATION OF A PORTION OF THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
INSTANT CASE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT THEREFORE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AT


BAR WITHOUT AFFORDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO THE PETITIONER-
APPELLANT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE SAME.

The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud committed
by the respondents, then applicant, and was filed within a year from the
entry of the decree. Without hearing the evidence in support of the
allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by
the respondents the Court below denied the petition. This is an error. There
being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have
afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. Moreover, if it is true that
the lot is or forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river the
decree and title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them
any right or title of it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and
registered under the Land Registration Act.

The order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accord with law, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Regala, JJ., took no part.

6 De los Angeles vs Santos GR No. L-19615 Dec 24 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND. LEONOR DE


LOS ANGELES, FEDERICO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL., applicants-appellants, vs.
ISIDORO O. SANTOS, ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, oppositors-appellees

G.R. No. L-19615 December 24, 1964; Bengzon, JP, J.

FACTS:

On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title on 12 parcels of land in


Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor De
Los Angeles and 7 co-applicants. They alleged that they are “owners pro - indiviso and
in fee simple of the aforesaid land.”

The Director of Lands opposed, stating that the land is “a portion of the public domain.”
The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition, asserting “the required 3.00 meters
strips of public easement” on lots along Ampid River and the creek.

At the initial hearing, an order of general default was issued except against the Director
of Lands, the Director of Lands, the Province of Rizal and 11 private oppositors who
appeared therein.

The private oppositors, Julio HIidalgo one among them, filed their written opposition
claiming that they “are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question, having
acquired homestead patents over said lots”.

The Land Registration Commissioner in its report stated that (1) Lot 11 was under
patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and (2) That the land registration case
filed by herein applicants-appellants was set for hearing but no decision has as yet been
received.

The court then ordered the dismissal of the case as regards Lot 11 without prejudice on
the part of the applicants to pursue the corresponding remedy in any ordinary action.
Motion for reconsideration having been denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

WON a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of
land for registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a
subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Director of Lands of a
homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.

HELD:

NEGATIVE. It is well-settled that the Director of Lands’ jurisdiction, administrative


supervision and executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not
to lands already or private ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by him
over land NOT of the PUBLIC DOMAIN is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the
owner.

As contended by the applicants, as of Nov. 21, 1957–date of application for


registration, they are already “owners pro-indiviso” and in “fee simple”. If this is the
case, then Julio Hidalgo’s homestead patent over Lot 11 makes said lot no longer
public.

Since proceedings for land registration in rem (enforcement is upon the property not
against the person), as against a homestead patent which is NOT, the latter does not
therefore finally dispose of the public or private character of the land. Hence, applicants
should be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11.

7 Miguel vs CA GR No. L-20274 Oct 30 1969

140 Phil. 304

CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and the two resolutions of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 10, July 23, and September 5, all in the year 1962, in G.R.-
16497-R, entitled "Eloy MIguel and Demetrio Miguel, plaintiffs-appellees vs. Ana-
cleta M. vda. de Reyes, defendant-appellant."
During the Spanish regime and prior to July 26, 1894, Eloy Miguel, then single and
resident of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, went to Isabela and for some appreciable period of time
stayed with his kinsman Juan Felipe in barrio Ingud Norte, municipality
of Angadanan. There he spotted an uncultivated parcel of land, one hectare of which he
forthwith occupied, and then cleared and planted to corn. After the
PhilippineRevolution, he returned to Laoag, Ilocos Norte and took a wife. In the early
years of the ensuing American regime, Eloy Miguel returned to Ingud Norte with his
family, resettled on the same land, cultivated and planted it to rice, declared it for tax-
ation purposes, and paid the annual realty taxes thereon.
During the year 1932, Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary public and husband of the
private respondent Anacleta M. Reyes, used to visit barrio Ingud Norte, looking for
documents to notarize. He and Eloy Miguel became
acquaintances. Later, Leonor Reyes asked Miguel if he wanted to secure expeditiously a
title to his landholding. Having received an affirmative answer and after Eloy Miguel
had handed to him the tax declaration and tax receipts covering the land, Leonor Reyes
prepared and filed a homestead application in the name of EloyMiguel and,
furthermore; promised to work for the early approval of the said application. Reyes
handed to Miguel the receipt for the filing fee (exh. A) corresponding to the homestead
application, advising the latter to keep it, but he (Reyes) withheld other papers including
the tax declaration and tax receipts, assuring Miguel that he would return them as soon
as the homestead patent was issued in Miguel's name. Reyes likewise advised Miguel to
cease paying the land taxes until the patent shall have been issued by the Bureau of
Lands.
After a long wait and becoming impatient about the issuance of the promised
title, Eloy Miguel inquired from Leonor Reyes about the status of his application. Reyes
promised to send a letter-tracer to the Bureau of Lands, and, in fact, asked Eloy Miguel
to affix his thumbmark to a blank paper upon which was supposed to be written a letter-
tracer. However, World War II broke out in the Pacific, and Miguel did not hear of and
about his homestead application; after the war he had no way of ascertaining the
outcome of his application because Leonor Reyes had died meanwhile during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines.
For the services rendered and still to be rendered by Leonor Reyes in preparing the
homestead application and in securing the issuance of the correspondent patent, Miguel
gave the former 1/5 of his yearly harvest from the land. After the death of Leonor Reyes,
Miguel continued to deliver an equal number of cavanes of palay to
the former's widow, Anacleta M. Vda. de Reyes, who likewise promised to help him
secure the necessary homestead patent.
Meanwhile, Demetrio Miguel helped his father, Eloy Miguel, clear and cultivate the
land. Sometime in 1932, on the occasion of the marriage of Demetrio, Eloy Miguel
ceded to Demetrio 14 hectares of the southern portion of the land as a
gift proper nuptias. Demetrioforthwith declared the said portion for taxation purposes
in his name, as evidenced by tax declaration 7408 (exh. G).
However, unknown to Eloy and Demetrio Miguel, Leonor Reyes on June 25, 1935 filed
sales application 20240 in the name of his wife, Anacleta M. Vda. de Reyes (hereinafter
referred to as the private respondent), covering the same parcel of land occupied and
cultivated by the Miguels and the subject of Eloy Miguel's
homestead of application. The sales application was duly acknowledged by the
Bureau ofLands on June 29, 1935, and a sale at public auction took place on August 3,
1939 whereat the private respondent was the sole bidder. The Director of Lands
awarded the land to her on March 7, 1940, the value of which was to be paid on
installments.
Sometime in 1950, the private respondent had the land surveyed by Maximo Lorenzo
who, in the course of the survey, assured Eloy Miguel that the land was being surveyed
in the latter's name. The private respondent, who was present during the survey, made
the same assurance to Eloy Miguel. However, because his suspicions were aroused by
the act of the private respondent of having the land surveyed, Eloy Miguel directed his
son, Demetrio, to inquire from the office of the district land officer of Ilagan, Isabela,
about the status of his (Eloy's) homestead application. Demetrio discovered that their
land was covered by the sales application of the private respondent. EloyMiguel
forthwith filed on February 16, 1950 a protest with the Bureau of Lands against sales
application 20240 of the private respondent. Consequently, on February 21, 1950, the
Director of Lands ordered an investigation. Hearing of the protest was scheduled for
May 26, 1950 by deputy public lands inspector Alejandro Ramos of Land District 4,
Bureau of Lands, Ilagan, Isabela, but was postponed at the instance of the private
respondent. The hearing was then reset for February 10, 1951, by assistant public lands
inspector Hilarion Briones. However, the Miguels had in the interim discovered that
notwithstanding their protest and the investigation ostensibly being conducted by the
administrative branch of the Government, sales patent V-522 and original certificate of
title P-1433, covering the parcel of land in question, were granted and issued to the
private respondent on January 10, 1951 and January 22, 1951, respectively.
Consequently, on February 17, 1951 Eloy and Demetrio Miguel lodged a complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the private respondent, Anacleta M. Vda.
de Reyes, the Director of Lands, and the Register of Deeds of Isabela, for the annulment
of sales patent V-522 and the cancellation of original certificate of title P-1433. That
case, docketed as civil case 315 of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, was dismissed
by that court on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have personality to institute the
action, and that it was prematurely filed - the Miguels not having exhausted all
administrative remedies, more specifically not appealing to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources from the grant by the Director of Lands of the patent to the
private respondent. On appeal to this Court, the dismissal was affirmed on the second
ground (G.R. L-4851, promulgated July 31, 1953).
On September 7, 1953, Eloy and Demetrio Miguel commenced the present action (civil
case 616) in the Court of First Instance of Isabelaagainst the private respondent to
compel her to reconvey to them the land covered by the abovementioned patent and
title. After due hearing, the trial court found that Eloy Miguel "has always been, and up
to this time, in physical possession of the whole tract of land in question under claim of
ownership thru occupancy, he having occupied and cultivated the land since the Spanish
regime;" that he was a homestead applicant way back in 1932 for the land possessed by
him; that there exists a trust relationship between the Miguels and the private
respondent and her deceased husband, Leonor Reyes, a notary public, with respect to
the same property, without which relationship Eloy Miguel would himself have
personally attended to his own application; and that, through fraud and
misrepresentations, Leonor Reyes caused the filing and approval of an application and
the issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a sales patent covering the property in the name
of his wife, the private respondent, without the consent and knowledge of
the Miguels. The lower court, however, held that reconveyance is not proper because
the land in question is not the private property of the Miguels since time immemorial
but remains a part of the public domain, and instead declared that Eloy Miguel "should
be given priority to acquire the land under the homestead provisions of the Public Land
Law." Upon the foregoing premises, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering (1) the
Director of Lands to cancel patent V-522 issued in the name of Anacleta M. Vda. de
Reyes, (2) the Registrar of Deeds of Isabela to cancel original certificate of title P-1433 in
the name of Anacleta M. Vda. de Reyes and to return Patent V-522 to the Bureau of
Lands, and (3) the Director of Lands to give due course to the homestead application
of Eloy Miguel over the land.
The private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (hereafter referred to as the
respondent Court) which dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the judgment
appealed from could not and did not bind the Director of Lands and the Registrar of
Deeds of Isabelawho were not parties thereto. Eloy and Demetrio Miguel (hereafter
referred to as the petitioners) filed a motion for reconsideration, wherein they argued
that while the trial court might have incurred error in the legal conclusions drawn from
its own findings of fact, the respondent Court was not legally precluded by the Rules of
Court and applicable jurisprudence to modify the judgment of the trial court, so as to
make it conform to the evidence, and to grant the relief of reconveyance sought in the
action, in which action the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Isabela are not
proper or necessary parties. The motion for reconsideration was denied in an extended
resolution of the respondent Court promulgated on July 23, 1962, which ruled that the
petitioners should have appealed from the decision of the trial court. A second motion
for reconsideration was denied in a minute resolution dated September 5, 1962.
The petitioners are now before us on appeal by certiorari, assigning as errors (1) the
Court of Appeals' holding that they should have appealed from the decision of the trial
court, and (2) its finding that, assuming that reconveyance in favor of the petitioners as
mere appellees is still proper, the cases cited in the latter's first motion for
reconsideration are not in point.
It has been postulated - and, we think, correctly - that the Supreme Court is vested with
ample authority to review matters not assigned as errors in an appeal, if it finds that
their consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just
decision in a given case.[1] Thus, before passing upon the foregoing assigned errors, we
shall first resolve in seriatim the matters raised in both the appealed decision and
resolutions of the respondent Court because to do so is imperative in arriving at a fair
and equitable adjudication of this case.
1. The respondent Court points up the failure of the petitioners to present a petition for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, if they indeed had been in possession of the land
since July 26, 1894, in accordance with the Public Land Act. Eloy Miguel should not,
however, be expected to file such a petition because all along he was relying on the
solemn assurances of Leonor Reyes and later his wife, the private respondent, that they
were in the process of securing a homestead patent for him.
2. The respondent Court observed in its decision that the evidence on the allegation
that Leonor Reyes acted fraudulently in applying for the purchase of the land and later
transferring his right to his wife, is sharply conflicting, and that even granting that there
was fraud in the obtention of the issuance of the patent, any objection based on that
ground should have been interposed within one year from the date of its issuance.
We cannot give our approval to this view. As found by the court below the petitioners,
have proven by preponderance of evidence the fraud perpetrated by the private
respondent and her husband on Eloy Miguel. The weight of evidence leans
heavily in favor of the fact of occupation and cultivation by Eloy Miguel of the land from
prior to July 26, 1894. This was the finding of the lower court - which belies the private
respondent's allegation that Eloy Miguel entered as her tenant only in 1935. There is
also the receipt, exh. A, evidencing the payment of a filing fee for a homestead applica-
tion, which receipt, in the possession of Eloy Miguel, raises at least the presumption that
he had filed a homestead application. That the records of the Bureau of Lands or of any
of its units, particularly the district land office at Ilagan, Isabela, do not show that such
application was ever filed, supports the petitioners' thesis, concurred in by the trial
court, that the blank paper which Eloy Miguel thumbmarked at the behest
of Leonor Reyes was used by the latter to withdraw the former's application instead of to
trace the application. Finally, there is the private respondent's and her husband's act of
misleading the Bureau of Lands by falsely stating in their application for a sales patent
that there was no improvement on the land, when, as found by the lower court, the land
had already been cultivated and improved by Eloy Miguel since 1932, by the
latest. (This misleading statement, noted by the court aquo on exh. 15 dated March 28,
1939 of the private respondent, significantly, is not impugned by the latter.) In fact, the
lower court observed that the private respondent herself affirmed on the witness stand
that Eloy Miguel was in 1935 already working on the land, although supposedly as her
tenant. Therefore, at the time the private respondent's sales patent application was filed
in 1935, Leonor Reyes and she led the Bureau of Lands to believe that the land was
uncultivated and unoccupied by other claimants. The very relevant question
arises: Why did the Reyes spouses conceal from the Bureau of Lands the fact that the
land was occupied and being cultivated by the Miguels, when there existed no
prohibition against having the land cultivated for them by tenants? There are only two
logical reasons for the mysterious conduct of the Reyes spouses. First, had they stated
in their sales application that the whole parcel of land was under cultivation by the
petitioners, the Director of Lands would have in all probability discovered that the land
applied for was covered by the prior homestead application of Eloy Miguel and most
likely would have disapproved the sales application of the private respondent. Second,
had a survey of the land been conducted earlier, this would have aroused the suspicions
of Eloy Miguel earlier and enabled him to discover much sooner the fraud perpetrated
by Leonor Reyes before the sales application of the private respondent was given due
course. Indeed, the private respondent waited until she had just about paid all the
installments on the land before ordering a final survey thereof. It was this survey which
aroused Eloy Miguel's suspicions and enabled him and his son to discover the fraud
perpetrated upon them.
The respondent Court's holding that any objection based on fraud should have been
interposed within one year from the issuance of the sales patent, has no relevance to the
case at bar. This is an action for the enforcement of a constructive trust - the ultimate
object of which is the reconveyance of property lost through breach of fiduciary relations
and/or fraud.[2] Therefore, it can be filed within four years from the discovery of the
fraud 23. And since the petitioners discovered the fraud committed against them by the
Reyes spouses in 1950, they had until 1954 within which to bring this action. This action
was seasonably instituted because the complaint was filed on September 7, 1953.
3. The respondent Court also held that the only remedy available at the time the action
below was instituted, was for the Government (through the Solicitor General) to file an
action for the reversion of the land to the public domain based on the illegality of the
grant - a suit which a private person is not authorized to file. The foregoing rule is
correct but inapplicable in this case, which, as earlier mentioned, is an action
for reconveyance of a piece of land through enforcement of a constructive trust. For this
same reason, the provision of Land Administrative Order 6 of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, cited in the respondent court's decision, is likewise
inapt.
4. The respondent Court attributes error to the lower court's finding that Eloy Miguel
filed a homestead application for the land in question, stating that no other evidence
was presented to show that such application was filed except the testimony
of Eloy Miguel and the receipt for the filing fee of a homestead application; and that if
such application was really filed, some trace or tell-tale evidence of it would be extant,
and the application could have been easily reconstituted after the liberation in 1945
when the Government adopted a policy to enable all public land applicants to
reconstitute their applications. It is too well-settled to require any citation of authority
that the lower court's findings of fact are entitled to considerable weight, especially with
respect to the appreciation of the testimony of witnesses on the stand, since it was in the
best position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. The testimony of Eloy Miguel
regarding his filing of a homestead application over the parcel of land - as found by the
lower court - should not therefore lightly be brushed aside. The receipt, exh. A, for the
filing of the homestead application raises a presumption in favor of Eloy Miguel's having
filed such an application. As earlier explained, if no trace of the said application could
be found among the records of the Bureau of Lands or of any of its units, particularly the
district land office at Ilagan, Isabela, it is because through fraud i.e., by
asking Eloy Miguel to thumbmark a blank piece of paper - Leonor Reyes succeeded in
withdrawing the application of Miguel. And he did this to pave the way for his wife, the
private respondent herein, herself to apply for the land under a sales application. Of
course, having relied on the assurances of the Reyes spouses that they would help him
secure a homestead patent, Eloy Miguel found no need to reconstitute his homestead
application. It is not even farfetched to suppose that Miguel, being illiterate, never even
came to learn of the Government's policy of enabling public land applicants to recons-
titute their applications.
5. Coming now to the assigned errors, the respondent Court's view is not correct that it
cannot grant the relief of reconveyance because the petitioners did not appeal from the
decision of the lower court. There exist sufficient bases, hereinafter to be discussed, for
the respondent Court to award said relief in the exercise of its broad appellate powers to
affirm, reverse or modify the judgment or order appealed from.
To start with, the petitioners cannot entirely be blamed if they thought it the better part
of prudence not to appeal. For although it did not incorporate a decree of reconveyance,
still the decision of the court below was favorable to them because it vindicated their ac-
tual possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since the Spanish
regime, and adjudged them as having a better right to the land and the priority to own it
under the Public Land Act. Besides, it was their legitimate desire to avoid incurring
additional expenses incident to the bringing of an appeal.
However, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, the petitioners pointedly called the
attention of the respondent Court in their brief to several questions decided against
them in the court below. Thus, working on the theory that it was plain error for the trial
court to order the Director of Lands and the Registrar of Deeds of Isabela to implement
its decision, the petitioners called the attention of the respondent Court to the precise
nature of the action below in which the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds
of Isabela need not be impleaded.
". . . The action in this case is reconveyance, the purpose of which is to compel
the defendant to return to the plaintiffs-appellees the land in question which she has
acquired through fraudulend means. Such being the case, it would have been utterly
improper for the plaintiffs to have impleaded the Director of Lands or the Register of
Deeds of Isabela inasmuch as the action is personal in nature directed against the
person of the defendant."
The petitioners likewise called the attention of the respondent Court to the trust
relationship existing between them, on one hand, and the Reyes spouses, on the other,
which was breached by the latter. Thus, to justify the reconveyance to them of the pro-
perty, they stated that:
"Moreover, a situation of trust has been created in the instant case between the plaintiff
and the defendant-appellant's deceased husband upon whom the plaintiff Eloy Miguel
relied through his (Reyes') representations that the corresponding title to said land
would be secured in favor of the plaintiff Eloy Miguel. The evidence likewise shows that
the defendant Vda. de Reyes promised the plaintiff to continue the work began by her
late husband with the ultimate result of securing the said homestead patent and title in
favor of the plaintiff Eloy Miguel. Inasmuch as the said promise was violated by the
defendant who secretly worked toward the acquisition of the said land for her own self,
fraudulently and stealthily, no prescription can run as against plaintiffs' right to claim
ownership of the said property."
We held in one case that appellants need not make specific assignment of errors
provided they discuss at length and assail in their brief the correctness of the trial
court's findings regarding the matter. Said discussion warrants the appellate court to
rule upon the point because it substantially complies with sec. 7, Rule 51, of the Revised
Rules of Court, intended merely to compel the appellant to specify the questions which
he wants to raise and be disposed of in his appeal. A clear discussion regarding an error
allegedly committed by the trial court accomplishes the purpose of a particular
assignment of error.[3]
Reasoning a fortiori from the abovecited authority, an appellee who occupies a purely
defensive position and is not required to make assignments of errors, need only discuss
or call the attention of the appellate court in his brief to the issues erroneously decided
against him by the trial court.[4] Here the petitioners (appellees in the Court of Appeals)
stated quite explicitly in their brief that since the action was for reconveyance, it was
utterly improper to implead the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds - in effect,
calling the attention of the respondent Court to a plain error committed by the trial
court in ordering the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds to nullify the sales
patent and original certificate of title issued to the private respondent. And, in
discussing the trust relationship between the Miguels and the Reyes spouses which was
breached by the latter, the petitioners (as appellees) also clearly brought to the attention
of the respondent Court a valid ground disregarded by the lower court as a basis for
granting the relief of reconveyance.
Moreover, the Rules of Courts[5] and jurisprudence authorize a tribunal to consider
errors, although unassigned, if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors[6] not specified, and (3) clerical
errors. Certainly, the mandate contained in the dispositive portion of the lower court's
decision and addressed to the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds, who were
not parties to the case, is a plain error which the respondent Court properly
corrected. As afore-narrated, the petitioners (as appellees) brought this error to the
attention of the respondent Court. Another plain error which the respondent Court
should have considered was the court a quo's conclusion that the land in litigation was
still part of the public domain, in the face of the parties' mutual allegations to the
contrary and despite the admitted fact that a sales patent and an original certificate of
title over the land had already been issued, thus segregating the land from the public
domain and making it private land.
It is noteworthy that the complaint for reconveyance was not dismissed by the trial
court. What it denied was merely the relief or remedy of reconveyance. However, in its
decision, the trial court made certain findings of fact which justified the relief of re-
conveyance - e.g., that Eloy Miguel "has always been, and up to this time, in physical
possession of the whole tract of land in question under claim of ownership thru
occupancy, he having occupied and cultivated the land since the Spanish regime;" that
there was a trust relationship between Eloy Miguel and the Reyes spouses; and that the
Reyes spouses have fraudulently and in bad faith breached that trust. Hence, in
reiterating their positions before the respondent Court on the private nature of the land,
on the impropriety of impleading the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds
of Isabela, and on the existence of a trust relationship between the petitioners and the
Reyes spouses, the petitioners were in point of fact inviting the respondent Court's
attention to questions erroneously decided against them by the trial court, in the hope
that the respondent Court would render judgment in accordance with the facts adjudged
by the trial court as proven.
"If the complaint states a claim upon which any relief can be given, it is immaterial what
the plaintiff has asked for in his prayer or whether he has asked for the proper relief; the
court will grant him the relief to which he is entitled under the facts proven" (Kansas
City St. L. and C.R. Co. v. Alton R. Co., 5 Fed. Rules Service, p. 638; U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Dec. 18, 1941).
On appeal to the respondent Court by the private respondent, the suit was, as it has
always been in the court of origin, one for reconveyance. And of course, the petitioners
did not ask the respondent Court for an affirmative relief different from what was
logically justified by the facts found by and proven in the court a quo.
6. The respondent Court opined that the cases cited by the petitioners in their motion
for reconsideration (i. e., Republic of the Philippines v. Carle Heirs, L-12485, July 21,
1959, and Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, L -11651, Dec. 27, 1958) are not applicable because they
involved properties which admittedly belonged to the parties entitled to reconveyance,
unlike the herein petitioners who are mere public land applicants and have not acquired
title under the Public Land Act. Assuming the respondent Court to be correct, a legion
of cases there are which can be cited in favor of the petitioners position. Since the law of
trust has been more frequently applied in England and in the United States than it has
been in Spain, we may draw freely upon American precedents in determining the effects
of trusts, especially so because the trusts known to American and English equity
jurisprudence are derived from the fidei commissa of the Roman Law and are based
entirely upon civil law principles.[7] Furthermore, because the case presents problems
not directly covered by statutory provisions or by Spanish or local precedents, resort for
their solution must be had to the underlying principles of the law on the
subject. Besides, our Civil Code itself directs the adoption of the principles of the
general law of trusts, insofar as they are not in conflict with said Code, the Code of Com-
merce, the Rules of Court and special laws.[8]
In holding that the cases cited by the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration (i.
e., Republic of the Philippines v. Carle Heirs, supra, and Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, supra)
are inapplicable, the respondent Court advances the theory that an action for recon-
veyance based on constructive trust will prosper only if the properties involved belong to
the parties suing for and entitled to reconveyance. This is not entirely accurate. In Fox
v. Simons[9] the plaintiff employed the defendant to assist him in obtaining oil leases in
a certain locality in Illinois, the former paying the latter a salary and his expenses. The
defendant acquired some leases for the plaintiff and others for himself. Whereupon, the
plaintiff brought suit to compel the defendant to assign the leases which he had acquired
for himself. The court found for the plaintiff, holding that it was a breach of the
defendant's fiduciary duty to purchase for himself the kind of property which he was
employed to purchase for the plaintiff.[10]
It is to be observed that in Fox v. Simons, supra, the plaintiff was not the original owner
of the oil leases. He merely employed the defendant to obtain them for him, but the
latter obtained some for the plaintiff and some for himself. Yet, despite the absence of
this former-ownership circumstance, the court there did not hesitate to order the
defendant to assign or convey the leases he obtained for himself to the plaintiff because
of the breach of fiduciary duty committed by said defendant. Indeed, there need only be
a fiduciary relation and a breach of fiduciary duty before reconveyance may be
adjudged. In fact, a fiduciary may even be chargeable as a constructive trustee of
property which he purchases for himself, even though he has not undertaken to
purchase it for the beneficiary, if in purchasing it he was improperly competing with the
beneficiary.[11]
Parenthetically, a fiduciary relation arises where one man assumes to act as agent for
another and the other reposes confidence in him, although there is no written contract
or no contract at all. If the agent violates his duty as fiduciary, a constructive trust ari-
ses. It is immaterial that there was no antecedent fiduciary relation and that it arose
contemporaneously with the particular transaction."[12]
In the case at bar, Leonor Reyes, the private respondent's husband, suggested
that Eloy Miguel file a homestead application over the land and offered his services in
assisting the latter to secure a homestead patent. Eloy Miguel accepted Leonor Reyes'
offer of services, thereby relying on his word and reposing confidence in him. And in
payment for the services rendered by Leonor Reyes in preparing and filing the
homestead application and those still to be rendered by him in securing the homestead
patent, Eloy Miguel delivered to Reyes 1/5 of his yearly harvest from the said
land. When Leonor Reyes died, the petitioners continued to deliver the same
percentage of their annual harvest to the private respondent who undertook to continue
assisting the former to secure a homestead patent over said land. However, in breach of
their fiduciary duty and through fraud, Leonor Reyes and the private respondent filed a
sales application and obtained a sales patent and ultimately an original certificate of title
over the same parcel of land. Therefore, following the ruling in Fox v. Simons, supra,
the private respondent can be compelled to reconvey or assign to the petitioners the
parcel of land in the proportion of nine hectares in favor of Eloy Miguel and 14 hectares
in favor of Demetrio Miguel, respectively.
The private respondent argues that there is no violation of trust relationship because the
petitioners could have participated in the public bidding. She avers that the alleged
fraud supposedly committed upon the petitioners, and on which the claim for recon-
veyance is founded, is clearly of no moment because the sales patent in question was not
the necessary consequence thereof, but rather, it was granted in consideration of her
being the highest bidder and the purchaser of the land. In refutation of the foregoing
argument, it must be observed, firstly, that the petitioners - because of the
fraud practised on them by the Reyes spouses - never came to know about the public
bidding in which the land was offered for sale and therefore could not have participated
therein. Had not the Reyes spouses misrepresented in their sales application that the
land was uncultivated and unoccupied, the Director of Lands would in all probability
have found out about the occupancy and cultivation of the said land by the petitioners
and about Eloy Miguel's homestead application over the same, and consequently would
have denied the sales application of the Reyes spouses. Secondly, it may justifiably be
postulated that equity will convert one who, for any reason recognized by courts of
equity as a ground for interference, has received legal title from the Government to
lands, which in equity and by the laws of Congress ought to have gone to another, into a
trustee for such other and compel him to convey the legal title
accordingly.[13] Thirdly, Eloy Miguel could have very easily obtained title to the said
parcel of land in either of two ways, had he not been inveigled by Leonor Reyes to file a
homestead application. Thus, since he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, who is not an
owner of more than twenty-four hectares of land, and who since prior to July 4, 1926
(under R.A. 782, approved June 21, 1952, occupation and cultivation since July 4, 1945,
or prior thereto, is deemed sufficient) has continuously occupied and cultivated a parcel
of land not more than twenty-four hectares in area, he was entitled to apply for a free
patent, for, or gratuitous grant, of said land. This is known as confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles by administrative legalization.[14] Or, since Eloy Miguel has
possessed the land prior to July 26, 1894 and said possession has been continuous,
uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a
presumption juris et de jure that all necessary conditions for a grant by the State have
been complied with, and he would have been by force of law entitled - pursuant to the
provisions of sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act - to the registration of his title to the
land.[15]
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 10, 1962 and its
resolutions of July 23 and September 5, 1962, are set aside. Another judgment is hereby
entered, ordering the private respondent Anacleta M. Vda. de Reyes to convey the land
subject-matter of the complaint, in fee simple, to the petitioners, in the proportion of
nine (9) hectares in favor of Eloy Miguel and fourteen (14) hectares in favor
of Demetrio Miguel. In the event of failure of the said private respondent, for any
reason whatsoever, to convey within thirty (30) days from the date this judgment
becomes final, it is hereby decreed that at the end of that period she will be
automatically divested of her title to the property in dispute, and this decision shall be
authority for the Register of Deeds to forthwith cancel the original of the original
certificate of title P-1433 in his office and the owner's copy thereof in the name
of Anacleta M. Vda. de Reyes, and to issue in favor of EloyMiguel and Demetrio Miguel
new Torrens titles over the land in the proportion above indicated. Costs against the
private respondent Reyes.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

8 Lahora vs Dayanghirang GR No. L-28565 Jan 30 1971

G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971 IN RE: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
OF TITLE. SPOUSES FRANCISCO LAHORA and TORIBIA MORALIZON,
petitioners-appellants, vs.
EMILIO DAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
oppositors-appellees.

FACTS:
Appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davao for registration of nine
(9) parcels of land located in barrio Zaragosa, municipality of Manay, province of
Davao, one-half of which having been acquired by appellant Toribia Moralizon
allegedly by inheritance, and the other half by purchase and by continuous,
open, public and adverse possession in the concept of owner. One of the said
parcels of land is identified as lot No. 2228, plan SWO-36856, Manay Cadastre.
The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr., who alleged that lands
belonging to him and his wife were included in the application for registration,
mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which was said to be already covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-6055 in the name of oppositor's wife. The
Director of Lands also filed an opposition to the petition, contending that the
applicants or their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the
parcels of land sought to be registered, nor have they been in open, continuous,
and notorious possession thereof for at least 30 years.

Counsel for the private oppositor filed a motion for correction of the number of
the certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously referred to as OCT No.
P-6055, when it should properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is likewise prayed in the
same motion that the petition be dismissed insofar as it includes Lot No. 2228,
for the reason that said lot was already registered and titled in the name of
oppositor's wife as of 21 June 1956. In its order the court granted the oppositor's
motion and directed the dismissal of the petition as regards Lot No. 2228, on the
ground that it having been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land
can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of title issued by virtue of public land
patent is irrevocable.

HELD: NEGATIVE. The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents
and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof,
is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to
the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of
the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all
the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon
expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.
9 Pajomayo vs Manipon GR No. L-33676 June 30 1971
Cancellation involving Double Title

MARIANO PAJOMAYO, PATRICIO PAJOMAYO, EUSEBIO PAJOMAYO, SOLEDAD PAJOMAYO assisted by


her husband FLORIANO CHITONGCO, DEMFTRIO PAJOMAYO, CRISTITA PAJOMAYO assisted by her
husband MANUEL RAMIREZ, PATROCINIO PAJOMAYO and CRISPO PAJOMAYO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
RODRIGO MANIPON and PERFECTA ZULUETA, defendants-appellants.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX) in its
Civil Case No. U-655. The decision was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals on
November 3, 1964. In the resolution of the second special division of the Court of
Appeals, promulgate on April 27, 1971, this case was certified to this Court as one that
is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court — only errors on
question of law being involved in the appeal.1

On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch
IX, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are owners pro-indiviso of
the parcel of land described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan; that they had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late
father Diego Pajomayo; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for a
period of more than 70 years until the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants
dispossessed them of said property, resulting in their having suffered annual damages
amounting to around P1,100.00 representing the value of the crops of rice; mongo, corn
and vegetables that they failed to harvest; and that because they have to file the
present suit they must spend P800.00 for incidental expenses of litigation and attorney's
fees. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the lawful owners pro-indiviso of the
land in question, and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay them
the damages they have suffered.

In their answer the defendants, after denying some of the allegations of the complaint,
alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral
proceedings of the Malasique cadastre and that apparently the plaintiffs are claiming the
same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned in
their answer by inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the reclusion of plaintiffs; and that as
possessors in good faith they have introduced on the land improvements worth
P1,000.00. As affirmative defenses, the defendants allege that plaintiffs' action is barred
by res-judicata and/or prescription and that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. The defendants set up a counterclaim for damages in the sum of
P500.00 representing attorney's fees that they paid their counsel. The defendants
prayed that they be declared the owners of the parcel of land mentioned in their answer;
that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay them damages in the sum of P500.00; and, in the
alternative should judgment be rendered against them, that the plaintiffs ordered jointly
and severally to pay them the sum of P1,000.00 representing the value of the
improvements they have introduced on the land.

When the case, was called for trial on July 6, 1964, the counsels for the parties
submitted to the court a stipulation of facts, as follows:

1. That plaintiffs are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Diego
Pajomayo;
2. That parties agree that the land in question is covered by two
Certificates of Title, one in the name of Diego Pajomayo under Original
Cert. of Title No. 1089 issued under Free Patent, owner's copy attached
hereto as Annex A; and Original Cert. of Title No. 14034, in the name of
the Defendant Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral Case No. 91 of
Malasique Cadastre, certified true copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B;

3. That parties agree to submit this case on the above stipulations without
further presentation of evidence.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed this Honorable Court that decision


be rendered upon the foregoing stipulation after the parties have
submitted simultaneous memoranda within a period of twenty (20) days
from today.

Urdaneta, Pangasinan this 6th day of July, 1964.

On the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IX) made a finding that Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 held
by the plaintiffs was issued earlier than Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 held by
the defendants, and on September 10, 1964 it rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and


against the defendants, hereby orders the latter to vacate the land in
question and deliver possession thereof to the former who are entitled
thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo who is hereby declared the legal
and lawful owner of the said property.

The Register of Deeds for Pangasinan is hereby ordered to cancel de


oficio Original Certificate of Title No. 14034.

With costs of this suit against the defendant.

From the above-mentioned decision of the lower court, the defendants brought up the
present appeal. In their appeal the defendants made the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 14034
of herein appellants null and void notwithstanding the fact that this is not
one of the reliefs prayed for by the appellees.

2. The lower erred in ordering the herein appellants to vacate the land in
question and to deliver the possession thereof to the herein appellees
although the latter failed to prove their cause of action against the herein
appellants.

3. The lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of res judicata in favor
of herein appellants.

The appeal has no merit. There is no question regarding the identity of the land
involved. The only question to be resolved in the present appeal is: which of the two
original certificates of title should prevail — the No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-appellees
which was issued in virtue of the homestead patent, or the No. 14034 held by the
defendants-appellants which was issued in connection with the cadastral proceedings?
Necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should
be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to
be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said party is
entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of
registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the
title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the land
Registration Law (Act 496).

The lower court, therefore, had correctly ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Title
No 14034 held by the defendants when it declared that Original Certificate of Title No.
1089 held by the plaintiffs should prevail. Likewise, the lower court had correctly
ordered the defendants to vacate the land in question and deliver possession thereof to
plaintiffs after declaring plaintiffs entitled thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo, the
lawful owner of the land.

Contrary to the claim of defendants, the doctrine of res judicata can not be applied in
their favor in the present case.

The undisputed fact is that the plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question
on Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on
November 27, 1931 in virtue of a free patent that was granted to him. The law requires
that the homestead patent must be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of
the province where the land covered by the patent lies. Section 122 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496) provides as follows:

SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging (to
the Government of the United States or) to the Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the
duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or
conveyance in behalf of the Government to came suck instrument before
its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds
and conveyance, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to the
grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the
Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind
the land, but shall operate only as contract between the Government and
the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds
to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and effect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration
shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where
the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After
due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such
land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act. (Emphasis
supplied).

Thus, it has been ruled by this Court that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496
(Land Registration Act), the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force
and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. In the cage of Aquino vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, this Court held:

The procedure under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions
of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against
the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both
the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. (Act No. 496,
secs. 35, 38, and 45, as amended; Act 926. secs. 59 and 63, as amended;
Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482; Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17
Phil. 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31
Phil. 591) ...2

In the case of Manalo vs. Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973, 979, this Court said:

The record shows that the land covered by said judgment had already
been granted by the government to Monico Corpus Manuel as
homesteader under the provisions of Act 926, the corresponding
certificate of title having been registered and issued to said grantee. By
virtue of said registration and issuance of the certificate of title, that land is
considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act, No.
496 (sec. 122 of said Act).

So that when the trial was held in the cadastral proceeding which covered
said land, and when the judgment of June 29, 1922 concerning said land
was rendered in said proceeding, the title to that land could no longer be
the subject of any inquiry, determination or judgment, for it had already
been adjudicated to Monico Corpus Manuel more than ten years before,
with all the legal formalities and with all the force of a title under Act 496.

The doctrine laid down in the two cases above-cited has been affirmed and applied by
this Court in a long line of decisions.3 The ruling regarding the validity and force of a
certificate of title issued in virtue of the registration of a homestead patent is applicable
to certificates of title issued in virtue of the registration of other land patents under the
Public land Law. In the case of Lahora, et al. vs. Dayanghirang, et al., G.R. No. L-
28565, January 30, 1971, 4 thus Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held:

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the
character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is
that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within
the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee
becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act.
In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where,
more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second
certificate.5

In the case now before Us, it appearing that Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 upon
which the defendant appellants base their claim of ownership over the land in question
was issued on April 1, 1957, while Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 upon which
plaintiffs-appellees base a similar claim was issued on November 27, 1931, under the
law and the authorities. We have herein cited, the latter certificate of title should prevail,
and the former should be cancelled.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with
costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
10 Lee Hong Hok vs David GR No. L-30389 Dec 27 1972

o Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM


o Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
government grant.

FACTS:

This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto,
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the
Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said
lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of
title to David.

During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD:

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void
certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said
officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent
and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered
owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings after claiming it as their private property.

The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government
may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant
cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee
and the government.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately


embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium;
its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character.
In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.

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