ELPIDIO S.
UY, doing business under the name and  The PEA-PMO evaluated the EDC’s claim
style EDISON DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
 Respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA)
was designated as project manager by the
Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA), primarily tasked to develop its 105-
hectare demilitarized lot in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City into a first-class memorial park to
be known as Heritage Park.
 PEA then engaged the services of Makati
Development Corporation (MDC) to
undertake the horizontal works on the project;
and Uy, doing business under the name and
style Edison Development and Construction
(EDC), to do the landscaping.
 For a contract price of ₱355,080,141.15, PEA
and EDC signed the Landscaping and
Construction Agreement
 EDC undertook to complete the landscaping
works in four hundred fifty (450) days
commencing on the date of receipt of the
notice to proceed.
 EDC received the notice to proceed on
December 3, 1996; and three (3) days after,
or on December 6, 1996, it commenced the
mobilization of the equipment and manpower
needed for the project.
 PEA, however, could not deliver any work
area to EDC because the horizontal works of
MDC were still ongoing. EDC commenced the
landscaping works only on January 7, 1997
when PEA finally made an initial delivery of a
work area.
 PEA continuously incurred delay in the
turnover of work areas. Resultantly, the
contract period of 450 days was extended to
693 days.
 In view of the delay in the delivery of work
area, EDC claimed additional cost from the
PEA-PMO amounting to ₱181,338,056.30.
 Specifically, Uy alleged that he incurred
additional rental costs for the equipment,
which were kept on standby, and labor costs
for the idle manpower. He added that the
delay by PEA caused the topsoil at the
original supplier to be depleted; thus, he was
compelled to obtain the topsoil from a farther
source, thereby incurring extra costs. He also
claims that he had to mobilize water trucks for
the plants and trees which had already been
delivered to the site. Furthermore, it became
necessary to construct a nursery shade to
protect and preserve the young plants and
trees prior to actual transplanting to the
landscaped area.
and arrived at a lesser amount of
₱146,484,910.
 The Performance Audit Committee (PAC)
reviewed the progress report and noted that
the EDC’s landscaping works were behind
schedule by twenty percent (20%). The PAC
considered this delay unreasonable and
intolerable, and immediately recommended to
BCDA the termination of the landscaping
contract.
 The BCDA adopted PAC’s recommendation
and demanded from PEA the termination of
the contract with EDC. In compliance, PEA
terminated the agreement.
 PEA fully paid all the progress billings but it
did not heed EDC’s additional claims.
Consequently, Uy filed a Complaint with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC).
 the CIAC rendered a Decision in favor of the
Contractor ELPIDIO S. UY and Award is
hereby made on its monetary claims as
follows:
--- for the cost of idle
₱19,604,132.06
time of equipment.
--- for the cost of idled
2,275,721.00
manpower.
--- for the construction of
6,050,165.05 the nursery shade net
area.
--- for attorney’s fees
605,016.50
 Uy received the CIAC decision on June 7,
2000. On June 16, 2000, Uy filed a motion for
correction of computation.
 The CIAC, however, failed to resolve Uy’s
motion within the 30-day period as provided in
its rules, and Uy considered it as denial of the
motion.
 Hence, on July 24, 2000, Uy filed a petition for
review with the CA. Uy’s petition was
consolidated with the earlier petition filed by
PEA, assailing the same CIAC decision.
 But on August 1, 2000, the CIAC issued an
Order denying Uy’s motion for correction of
computation.
 the CA rendered decision dismissing both
petitions on both technical and substantive
grounds. PEA’s petition was dismissed
because the verification thereof was
defective. Uy’s petition, on the other hand,
was dismissed upon a finding that it was
belatedly filed..
 PEA and Uy filed motions for reconsideration.
Subsequently, PEA filed with the CA an
 Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, seeking to enjoin the CIAC from
proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001,
which Uy had subsequently filed. PEA alleged
that the case involved claims arising from the
same Landscaping and Construction
Agreement, subject of the cases pending with
the CA.
 the CA denied both MRs but issued an
injunction permanently enjoining the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
from proceeding with CIAC CASE NO. 03-
2001,
 PEA and Uy then came to us with their
respective petitions for review assailing the
CA ruling. PEA’s petition was docketed as
G.R. Nos. 147933-34, while that of Uy was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 147925-26.
 PEAs petition was denied. Thus, what
remains to be resolved is Uy’s petition.
ISSUES:
1) W/N THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING
PETITIONER UY’S PETITION ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD IN FILING AN APPEAL.
YES.
Appeals from judgment of the CIAC shall be taken
to the CA by filing a petition for review within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of the notice of award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date
of its last publication if publication is required by
law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or
agency a quo.
Admittedly, Uy received the CIAC decision on June 7,
2000; that instead of filing a verified petition for review
with the CA, Uy filed a motion for correction of
computation on June 16, 2000, pursuant to Section 9,
Article XV of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Construction Arbitration.
With the filing of the motion for correction, the
running of the period to appeal was effectively
interrupted as provided in Sec 9.
CIAC was supposed to resolve the motion for
correction of computation within 30 days from the time
the comment or opposition thereto was submitted. In
Uy’s case, no resolution was issued despite the lapse
of the 30-day period, and Uy considered it as a denial
of his motion. Accordingly, he elevated his case to the
CA on July 24, 2000. But not long thereafter, or on
August 1, 2000, the CIAC issued an Order denying the
motion for correction of computation.
Obviously, when Uy filed his petition for review
with the CA, the period to appeal had not yet
lapsed; it was interrupted by the pendency of his
motion for computation. There is no basis,
therefore, to conclude that the petition was
belatedly filed.
2) W/N THE CA ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ENJOINED THE
PROCEEDINGS IN CIAC CASE NO. 03-2001
NO.
Indeed, the assailed resolution shows no patent or
gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic exercise
of power arising from passion or hostility.
At this point, it should be stated that the Court is not
convinced by Uy’s argument that the claims under
CIAC Case No. 03-2001 are different from his claims in
CIAC Case No. 02-2000. There is only one cause of
action running through Uy’s litigious undertakings – his
alleged right under the Landscaping and Construction
Agreement. Therefore, the landscaping agreement is
indispensable in prosecuting his claims in both CIAC
Cases Nos. 02-2000 and 03-2001.
2) W/N THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARDS OF CIAC
Uy cries foul on the award granted by CIAC, and
affirmed by the CA. He posits that PEA already
admitted its liability, pegged at ₱146,484,910.10, in its
memorandum. Thus, he faults the CA for awarding a
lesser amount.
We meticulously reviewed the records before us and
failed to discern any admission of liability on the part of
PEA.
By no stretch of the imagination can we consider the
memorandum an admission of liability on the part of
PEA. First, nowhere in the memorandum does it say
that PEA is admitting its liability. The evaluation
contained in the memorandum is merely a verification
of the accuracy of EDC’s claims. As a matter of fact,
the evaluation is still subject for review by the project
manager, whose decision on the matter requires the
approval of the Heritage Park ExCom. Second,
Messrs. Ignacio and Urcia had no legal authority to
make admissions on behalf of PEA. Thus, even
assuming that the evaluation contained in the
memorandum was in the nature of an admission, the
same cannot bind PEA. Third, Uy filed his complaint
with the CIAC because PEA did not act on EDC’s
various claims.
This supports our conclusion that PEA never
admitted, but on the contrary denied, whatever
additional liabilities were claimed by Uy under the
landscaping contract.
Neither do we find any admission of liability on the part
of PEA during the proceedings before the CIAC. What
was admitted by PEA was that PMO evaluated the
claim at the lesser amount of ₱146,484,910. The
admission of the evaluation made by PEA cannot
translate to an admission of liability. There is simply no
basis for Uy to claim that PEA had admitted its liability.
As to the monetary award:
Uy claims ₱95,740,834.30 as the standby equipment
cost. CIAC, however, did not agree and granted only
₱19,604,132.06 as the cost of standby equipment
using its so-called equitable method.
Upon review of the records before us, we find a need
to modify, by increasing, the award for standby
equipment cost.
CIAC found that PEA incurred delays in the turnover of
work areas. The several periods of delayed turn-over
of work areas total one year and six months or 546
days.Surely, on the days that EDC was waiting for the
turn over of additional work areas, it was paying rentals
for the equipment on standby. Yet, CIAC completely
ignored these delays in determining the cost of
equipment on standby,
20% as statedin the agreement to 10% of the total
amount due.
But the agreement is about the stipulated attorney’s
fees applicable only in complaints filed by PEA against
the contractor. The provision is silent on the amount of
attorney’s fees that can be recovered from PEA.
Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code empower the
courts to reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable. The determination of whether the
penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court
The Court finds Uy’s claim for attorney's fees
equivalent to 20% of whatever amount is due and
payable to be exorbitant. The CIAC and the CA,
therefore, correctly awarded 10% of the total amount
due and payable as reasonable attorney’s fees.
Respondent Public Estates Authority is ordered to pay
Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style
Edison Development and Construction,
₱55,680,492.38 for equipment rentals on standby;
₱2,275,721.00 for the cost of idle manpower; and
₱6,050,165.05 for the construction of the nursery
shade net area; plus interest at 6% per annum to be
computed from the date of the filing of the complaint
until finality of this Decision and 12% per annum
thereafter until full payment. Respondent PEA is further
ordered to pay petitioner Uy 10% of the total award
as attorney’s fees.

Uy is entitled to the cost of idle time for equipment

by reason of the delay incurred in the delivery of
work areas.

As to Uy’s claims for costs for additional hauling

distance of topsoil and for mobilization of water truck:

Indisputably, Uy mobilized water trucks for the

landscaping projects and, certainly, incurred additional
costs. But like his claim for additional cost of topsoil,
such additional expenses were incurred without
prior written approval of PEA’s general manager.
Thus, he cannot claim payment for such cost from
PEA.

Uy cannot, therefore, claim from PEA the costs of

the additional hauling distance of topsoil, and of
the mobilization of water trucks.

As to attorneys’s fee,he ascribes error to the CIAC and

the CA for reducing the stipulated attorney’s fees from