How a Bill Becomes a Law 3. Recorded: Representatives record their vote using the electronic voting system.
3. Recorded: Representatives record their vote using the electronic voting system. Representatives can
Creating laws is the U.S. House of Representatives’ most important job. All laws in the United States begin
as bills. Before a bill can become a law, it must be approved by the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S.
Senate, and the President. Let’s follow a bill’s journey to become law.
The Bill Begins
Laws begin as ideas. These ideas may come from a Representative—or from a citizen like you. Citizens who
have ideas for laws can contact their Representatives to discuss their ideas. If the Representatives agree,
they research the ideas and write them into bills.
The Bill Is Proposed
When a Representative has written a bill, the bill needs a sponsor. The Representative talks with other
Representatives about the bill in hopes of getting their support for it. Once a bill has a sponsor and the
support of some of the Representatives, it is ready to be introduced.
The Bill Is Introduced
The Hopper
In the U.S. House of Representatives, a bill is introduced when it is placed in the hopper—a special box on
the side of the clerk’s desk. Only Representatives can introduce bills in the U.S. House of Representatives.
When a bill is introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, a bill clerk assigns it a number that begins
with H.R. A reading clerk then reads the bill to all the Representatives, and the Speaker of the House sends
the bill to one of the House standing committees.
The Bill Goes to Committee
When the bill reaches committee, the committee members—groups of Representatives who are experts
on topics such as agriculture, education, or international relations—review, research, and revise the bill
before voting on whether or not to send the bill back to the House floor.
If the committee members would like more information before deciding if the bill should be sent to the
House floor, the bill is sent to a subcommittee. While in subcommittee, the bill is closely examined and
expert opinions are gathered before it is sent back to the committee for approval.
The Bill Is Reported
When the committee has approved a bill, it is sent—or reported—to the House floor. Once reported, a bill
is ready to be debated by the U.S. House of Representatives.
The Bill Is Debated
When a bill is debated, Representatives discuss the bill and explain why they agree or disagree with it.
Then, a reading clerk reads the bill section by section and the Representatives recommend changes. When
all changes have been made, the bill is ready to be voted on.
The Bill Is Voted On
Electronic Voting Machine
There are three methods for voting on a bill in the U.S. House of Representatives:
1. Viva Voce (voice vote): The Speaker of the House asks the Representatives who support the bill to
say “aye” and those that oppose it say “no.”
2. Division: The Speaker of the House asks those Representatives who support the bill to stand up and
be counted, and then those who oppose the bill to stand up and be counted.
vote yes, no, or present (if they don’t want to vote on the bill).
If a majority of the Representatives say or select yes, the bill passes in the U.S. House of Representatives.
The bill is then certified by the Clerk of the House and delivered to the U.S. Senate.
The Bill Is Referred to the Senate
When a bill reaches the U.S. Senate, it goes through many of the same steps it went through in the U.S.
House of Representatives. The bill is discussed in a Senate committee and then reported to the Senate
floor to be voted on.
Senators vote by voice. Those who support the bill say “yea,” and those who oppose it say “nay.” If a
majority of the Senators say “yea,” the bill passes in the U.S. Senate and is ready to go to the President.
The Bill Is Sent to the President
When a bill reaches the President, he has three choices. He can:
1. Sign and pass the bill—the bill becomes a law.
2. Refuse to sign, or veto, the bill—the bill is sent back to the U.S. House of Representatives, along with
the President’s reasons for the veto. If the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate still
believe the bill should become a law, they can hold another vote on the bill. If two-thirds of the
Representatives and Senators support the bill, the President’s veto is overridden and the bill
becomes a law.
3. Do nothing (pocket veto)—if Congress is in session, the bill automatically becomes law after 10 days.
If Congress is not in session, the bill does not become a law.
The Bill Is a Law
If a bill has passed in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate and has been approved
by the President, or if a presidential veto has been overridden, the bill becomes a law and is enforced by
the government.
Article VI
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
CIVIL CODE ART. 2
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against
those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations
and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations
and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in
Title One of Book Two of this Code.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
CIVIL CODE Art. 3,4&7
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, BK 1, CHAPTER 5 AND 6
Chapter 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it
is otherwise provided.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly
provided.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or
administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless
otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be
consulted.chanrobles virtual law library
 Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.chanrobles virtual law library
Chapter 6
OFFICIAL GAZETTE
Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions
of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application; decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and such documents or classes of documents
as the President shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he may
authorize so to be published.chanrobles virtual law library
The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 25. Editing and Publications. - The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of the President
and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed by the
National Printing Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of
postage.chanrobles virtual law library
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
FACTS:
 Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) was organized to provide domestic water
services in Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad, Benguet. Respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a
government owned and controlled corporation, a local water utility created under PD No. 198, authorized
to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purpose within municipality of La Trinidad,
Benguet.
 October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water Resources Board an application for Certificate
of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang LTWD claimed
that under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
 August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. XII.
 October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the latter cancelled TMPC’s CPC and held
that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid; that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is for the State, through its
authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain ultimate control and supervision
over the operation of public utilities. What is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise exclusive
in character so as to preclude the State itself from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than
the present grantee when public interest so requires.
 November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by TMPC.
ISSUE:
 Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid
HELD:
 Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo,
prohibetur et per obliquum – Those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Under Sec. 2
and 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, The President, Congress, and Court cannot create indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Sec. 47 of
PD no. 198 is in conflict with the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. And the rule is that in
case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the former prevails, because the constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled
“An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will
affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right
to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held
that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The
common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be
described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the
police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to
its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that
they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also
recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons –
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary
for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of
the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as
their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
Chapter 11
PROMOTIONS
Sec. 39. Merit Promotion System. - The Board of the Foreign Service shall establish a merit
promotion system for all officers and employees of the Department.chanrobles virtual law library
Chapter 6
ATTACHED AGENCIES
Sec. 19. Attached Agencies. - The Law of the Sea Secretariat, the Inter-Agency Technical Committee
on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries (SOCCOM), the Inter-Agency
Technical Committee on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (IATC-TC), the Permanent
Inter-Agency Technical Committee on ESCAP Matters (PITCEM), and other agencies attached to the
Department shall continue to operate and function in accordance with their respective charters or laws
creating them, except as otherwise provided in this Code.chanrobles virtual law library
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, GR No. 179579, 2012-02-01
Facts:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country
of origin; and (3) port of discharge.[5] The... regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for
feed... grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff... differential.[6]
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief[7] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation
of the regulation on its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.[8] Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued
without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice,
and publication or registration with the University of... the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing... them to pay 133% more than was
proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when
the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Issues:
discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Ruling:
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.[15] We find that the Petition filed by
respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs.
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily
imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO
27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has
actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic.
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable[19]
for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour
millers classified as food grade wheat... importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a
protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the
case.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond... merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard, and thereafter to be... duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus,
the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there... is a reasonable classification. For a
classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally
to all members... of the same class.
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat
is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus
prevent their misclassification."
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the
customs officer's duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the
article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In... effect, petitioner Commissioner
of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat
importation when it no longer required the customs officer's prior examination and assessment of the
proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It... is required that the regulation be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.
In summary, petitioners violated respondent's right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when
they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise
violated respondent's right to equal protection of laws when they provided... for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to Issues:
examine and assess imported articles.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
BOOK III
Ruling:
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
Title I his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Chapter 1
POWER OF CONTROL Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
Sec. 1. Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive use of his true and official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
executed.chanrobles virtual law library
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was not
Chapter 2 within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
ORDINANCE POWER concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.chanrobles virtual law library reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
Article 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the law The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to
attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Art. 25 of this Code.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and judicial decrees
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned Art..
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or a fine mentioned by... any law, expressly or impliedly.
not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 174689, 2007-10-19 physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
Facts:
not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the... correction or change of the entries in his birth
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. certificate.

Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He underwent Principles:
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.[11]
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.[13]
Bangkok, Thailand.
In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
sex from "male" to "female."
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
provides:
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No
Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
sex... alteration.
typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications... for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3)
The change will avoid confusion.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground... of sex reassignment.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term... status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis
supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for
the registration of a birth in the... civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
A Digest of David Reyes vs. Jose Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against
respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a
parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of
January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995,
he would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was
also alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000
monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved
their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location
for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its
merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim
requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10
million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the
Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim
learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with
Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due
to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an
action for specific performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial court.
The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the
cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim
prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes
to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court
be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?
Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in the law and
in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the
expense of Lim. Here the court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial justice
may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can
return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million
down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals.was affirmed.