Honasan vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Dept. of Justice, et. al.

G.R. 159747, April 13, 2004.

Facts: Senator Honasan was charged with the crime of coup d’état by the Department of Justice.On
August 27, 2003, Honasan filed a motion for clarification concerning the jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) over the case while arguing that the Ombudsman, in accordance wit
Art. XI of the Constitution, has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations (moto proprio); that
charges filed in court must be by the Sandiganbayan, and not regular courts, considering that he
belonged to the Salary Grade 31 group of public officials.
Senator Honasan argues that the 1987 Administrative Code and R.A. 6770 cannot be superior
to the Constitution. Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari as per Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court against the DOJ Panel et al. noting that a grave abuse of discretion was committed on the part
of the DOJ Panel and its members in the issuance of the order (September, 10, 2003) directing
Honasan to file his counter-affidavits and controverting presented evidence based on the DOJ’s non-
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations.
The DOJ counter-argues that they have jurisdiction in pursuance to the Revised
Administrative Code and that crime of coup d’état is not immediately related to his public office as
Senator. Therefore, making the jurisdiction of the DOJ a statutory grant.
The Ombudsman concurs with DOJ and argues that the OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 need
not be published (Art. 2 of the Civil Code) as it is an internal arrangement between the two offices
and neither regulates or penalizes the conduct of persons.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d’état against petitioner.
2. Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770
or Ombudsman Act of 1989.
3. Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in
deferring the resolution of the petitioner’s motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim of
the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

1. The jurisdiction of DOJ is based on Chapter 1, Title 3, Book 4 of the Administrative Code
governing the DOJ. The DOJ is not excluded from investigating and prosecuting public
officials; thus, the concurrent jurisdiction of DOJ with Sandiganbayan.
2. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the two, outlining
the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors in the conduct of prelim investigation; it
does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public in general; there is no merit to
petitioner's submission that the Circular has to be published (Tanada vs. Tuvera ’86 Art. 2
CC). The power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any
public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city
prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors (Paragraph 1, Sec. 13, Art. XI of Constitution).
3. The Ombudsman is given authority by the Constitution and RA 6770 to lay down its own rules
and procedures. Power to investigate offenses is not exclusive, but concurrent with other
similarly authorized government agencies (i.e. DOJ).
 Gatbonton vs, NLRC, et. al.
G.R. 146779, January 23, 2006

FACTS:

On November 1998, A civil engineering student of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology filed a letter
complaint against petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton, an associate professor of MIT for unfair/unjust grading
system, sexual harassment, and conduct of unbecoming of an academician which placed petitioner under
a 30 day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint
for illegal suspension, damages, and attorney fees. The Labor Arbiter rendered his 30 day suspension to
be illegal and directed the respondents to pay his wages. The rest of his claims were dismiss. Both filed
for an appeal with the petitioner questioning the dismissal of his other claims. NLRC set aside the LA
decision, which led to the petitioner filing for a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeal
but, the court affirmed the NLRC decision. Thus petitioner filed for the review of certiorari of the decision
of the CA for not considering the publication of RA 7877 that were not promulgated at the time of his
suspension and the lack of award of the damages. Supreme court partially granted the petition wherein
it did not find any legal basis for the suspension thus granting his payment of wages for the duration of
the 30 days preventive suspension, while setting aside his claim for damages for lack of basis.

ISSUE:

Is the 30 Day preventive suspension inflicted on Gatbonton enforceable

RULING:

No. The 30 day preventive suspension is not enforceable.

Petitioner’s preventive suspension was based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the
MIT Rules and Regulations whereas:

“Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases.—Any member of the

educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong
and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or poses a risk or danger
to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.”

But it must be noted, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February 23, 1999 and
considering that at the time of his preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules have not been
promulgated yet but enforced on him. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation Whereas; The Mapua
Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.
FERRER v. DIAZ , ET. AL.
G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

FACTS:
 Petitioner, Atty. Ferrer claimed that, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from
him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second mortgage
over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999.
Comandante also issued post-dated checks to secure payment of said loan to petitioner, Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer claimed that prior to the said loan, Comandante executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary
share over her parents‘ property. The execution of said waiver was to secure Comandante‘s loan with petitioner,
Atty. Ferrer, which at that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests. On the basis of said waiver,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at the back of the TCT.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon
presentment. Atty. Ferrer filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage
Contract against the Diazes and Comandante as despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and
refused to settle the loan.
The respondents answer to Ferrer’s petition was that Comandante’s initial loan amounted to P500,000.00 but
were secured by taxi units in addition to several postdated checks issued to petitioner. As respondent could not
practically comply with her obligation, she was presented with the aforementioned Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interest Over a Real property, which she signed due to fear of losing the taxi units as it is her main source of income.

ISSUE:
 Is Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights valid?
 Is petitioner’s adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective?

RULING:
It was initially ruled by the Regional Trial Court wherein a Summary Judgement was rendered in which it favored
plaintiff (Ferrer) where the defendants (Diaz, Comandante, Pangan) were to pay P1,118,228.00 plus P10,000.00
for the costs of suit, and the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City was ordered to annotate the back of the
TCT with the rights and interests of the plaintiff.
The Pangan’s filed a petition to the CA as they bought a parcel of land from the Diaz’s in good faith and they
had no civil liability for that matter as the property was free from the mortgage encumbrance mentioned. With that
the Court of Appeals merely adjusted the original ruling in which they removed the Pangan’s from the list of
defendants-appellants.
A petition for review on certoriari was filed insisting the Pangan’s should together with Diaz and Comandante
be held liable.
The honorable court ruled the petition lacked merit as the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
property was null and void as not only did it violate Article 1347 of the Civil Code, the parcel of land was already
sold in good faith to the Pangan’s.
Therefore, the petition of Ferrer is denied to have the Pangan’s pay, the inscription of the adverse claim on TCT
cancelled and the case remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224.

G.R. No. 170236. August 31, 2006

People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Quiachon y Bayona, appellant
Facts:

On May 21, 2001 appellant, Roberto Quiachon, by means of force and intimidation, had sexual
intercourse with his 8 year-old deaf-mute daughter, Rowena Quiachon. Rowel, the 11 year-old sibling of
Rowena, testified against appellant Roberto as he claims that he has witnessed appellant forcing himself
unto her sister while they were sleeping on the same bed. Rowel could not do anything at that time because
of the fear he had felt from appellant. The following day, Rowel immediately told his aunt about what
appellant did to her sister. Subsequently, Rowel and Carmelita went to the police station to file a report.

Appellant was charged with qualified rape by the Regional Trial Court due to the means he used to
rape his own daughter pursuant to Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, imposing upon
him the punishment of death. It should be duly noted that R.A. 9346 or the law that abolished the death
penalty at the time of the trial period.

Issue:

Is Roberto Quiachon covered by Republic Act 9346?

Ruling:

YES. Roberto Quiachon is covered by R.A. 9346

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(1) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(2) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

For committing qualified rape, Roberto should be penalized by death penalty. However, in
accordance with Republic Act 9346, Section 2. Appellant should be serving a sentence of reclusion
perpetua. The criminal law principle “penal laws which are favorable to the accused shall have retroactive
effect”, is applicable in this case even though the crime was committed long after the complete legislation
of R.A. 9346.

On appellant’s eligibility for parole; appellant Quiachon may not be eligible for parole since
Section 3 of R.A. 9346 states that “any person serving a sentence of reclusion perpetua or those which have
been reduced to reclusion perpetua should have no right or eligibility for parole.
 Jarillo vs People.
G.R. 164435. June 29, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regards to the court’s decision to convict
him of bigamy. Petitioner claims that his marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the
Family Code, and that the applicable law would be Section 9 of the Marriage law instead of
Article 40 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Is Jarillo correct in saying that Section 9 of Marriage law is applicable and not Article 40 of
the Family Code?

Ruling:
No, The court made a declaration in Atienza v. Brillantes that Article 40, is a rule of procedure
and should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself says that “Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights”,
the court further explained that “the retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any rights of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected”

ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, petitioner, vs. GEORGINA R. ENCANTO, ERNESTO G. TABUJARA,

GEMINO H. ABAD and UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 171303. January 20, 2016.]

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant, Elizabeth L. Diaz, has been in the service of the University of the Philippines
(U.P.) since 1963. She was an associate professor in the College of Mass Communication (CMC) and was
teaching as a full time member of the faculty. On May 3, 1988, she filed for a sabbatical leave with pay for
one year. It was initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto to be granted, but afterwards referred it to
the Secretary of U.P., Chancellor Tabujara, recommending its denial. Tabuara instead recommended that
Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to enable CMC to hire a substitute.

Diaz dropped her courses and expressed her refusal to teach in a letter, but later came back and
requested to teach. She was not able to receive her full salary and was told that she needed to “accomplish
the Report for Duty Form to entitle her to salaries and make official her return to the service of the
University.”

Diaz brought the issue to court where there was a finding that the grant or denial of such leave is
not a matter of right as it is a subject to the exigencies of the service, like the acute shortage of teaching
staff in CMC. Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found that the grant of leave is
 not a matter of right and that there was no bad faith on the part of the officials of UP in denying Diaz of her
sabbatical. Before the Supreme Court, Diaz insisted that the UP officials acted in bad faith, but the Supreme
Court sustained the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the Ombudsman.

Issue:

Is the denial of the sabbatical leave done in bad faith?

Ruling:
No the denial of the sabbatical leave was not done in bad faith.

The RTC ordered the defendants, except Abueva and Encanto, to pay jointly the total unpaid salaries of Diaz
(P133,665.50) as well as moral damages (P300,000.00), exemplary damages (60,000.00) and attorney’s fees
(P50,000.00).

It was in the Court of Appeals where the issue was trimmed down on whether or not the university officials were
negligent or acted in bad faith in denying Diaz’s application for sabbatical leave and withholding her salaries. In the
Court of Appeals’ decision the University of the Philippines, through its appropriate officials is directed to pay Diaz
the sum of P21, 879.64 as unpaid salaries and allowances, but the sums awarded as moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees were deleted.

The Court of Appeals found neither negligence nor bad faith on the part of the respondents in their denial of the
petitioner Diaz’s sabbatical leave application and in withholding her salaries. The CA emphasized that a sabbatical
leave is not a right which could be demanded at will.

This Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held:
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a
dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. and MICHELLE S. YBANEZ, petitioners, vs. SHIRLEY G.

QUINONES, respondent
G.R. No. 175822. October 23, 2013

Facts:

Respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu
City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique and decided to purchase a black jeans worth P2,098.00.
Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store however
while she was on her way to the Mercury Drug Store, a Guess employee approached and
informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She insisted that she paid and showed the
receipt issued in her favour then insisted that they settle the matter in the Cebu Pacific Office.
While they were in the office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation and
 repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans. The respondent thus filed the Complaint for
Damages before the RTC against the petitioners.

Petitioners stated that they approached the respondent to clarify whether or not payment was
made in a gentle and polite manner. They sought payment for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses as counterclaim.

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim stating that it was
in good faith that the respondent failed to make payment. Petitioners also did not act in bad faith
since it was the respondent herself who invited the employees to settle the issue. As to the letter
sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees, because
they merely asked for assistance for the collection of the payment.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that the
letter addressed to Cebu Pacific's director was not merely to ask for assistance for the collection
of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she
would be pressured to pay, thus acting in bad faith.

Issue:

1. Did the petitioners act in bad faith which resulted to the award of moral damages and attorney’s
fees to respondent?

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioners acted in bad faith. Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of
the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be
liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.The elements of abuse of
rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. It is evident from the circumstances of the case
that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were
demanding. First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no payment made when
respondent already presented the black jeans with the original receipt. Second, they accused the
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and
quickly left the shop. Third, the letters sent to the respondent’s employer was not only intended
to ask for assistance in the collection of the payment but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.

JOYCE V. ARDIENTE , petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JAVIER and MA. THERESA

PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT and GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 161921. July 17, 2013

FACTS:
1. Joyce Ardiente owns a housing unit at Emily Homes. On June 2, 1994, Ardiente and Pastorfide
signed a Memorandum of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying all rights and interest
in the housing unit to the latter.
2. On March 12, 1999, Pastorfide’s water connection was cut off without notice.
 a. Mrs. Pastorfide’s use of the water connection was never questioned nor pertubated for
the last four years.
3. Proceeding to the COWD to complain, the personnel told Pastorfide of her three-month
delinquency, to which she argued of the scheduled deadline in 6 days. She was also told that
Ardiente had the water line cut off, confirmed by the general manager days after.
4. Pastorfide’s water connection was restored after 9 months when the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE:
Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:
Yes, Ardiente, COWD, and Engr. Gonzalez are liable for damages.

Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, it states that “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith”.
A right, while it is recognized to be legal by law, can also be a source of illegality when it does not conform
with the norm of Article 19 and causes damage to another. This, therefore, makes the respondents liable
for the damages caused to Pastorfide.

Ardiente is liable for not issuing notice prior to or immediately after the disconnection. COWD and Engr.
Gonzalez are likewise liable for the damages of disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and
their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply even after Pastorfide paid the delinquent
account.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES,
a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
G.R. 154259, February 28, 2005

SUMMARY:
RTC Branch 104 dismissed the complaint giving credence to Ms. Lim that she was being discreet in asking Mr. Reyes
to leave. Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave since he had no business at the party as he was uninvited.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC. The Court recognized Ms. Lim’s measures of informing Mr.
Reyes to leave while within the hearing distance of other guests is contrary to morals and good customs. Moreover,
involving several people to inquire about the presence of Mr. Reyes was uncalled for. Ms. Lim and Dr. Filart should
have approached Mr. Reyes privately to tell him that the celebrant only want close friends around. The Court of
Appeals imposed P 200,000 for exemplary damages, P 200,000 for moral damages and P 10,000 for attorney’s fees.

FACTS:
 1. At 6:00 pm of Oct. 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes was having coffee at Nikko Hotel’s lobby when his friend, Dr.
Violeta Filart saw him and invited him to join her at the birthday party of Mr. Tsuruoka, the Hotel’s former
general manager at the penthouse.
2. Mr. Reyes assisted Dr. Filart in carrying the basket of fruits as her present to the celebrant.
3. At the buffet dinner, Ms. Ruby Lim, Nikko Hotel’s Executive Secretary, stopped Mr. Reyes and told him to
leave the party with a loud voice in the presence of other guests.
a. Ms. Lim admitted to having asked Mr. Reyes leave, as the event is only limited to 60 guests. The celebrant wanted to
keep the celebration intimate. Ms. Lim asked 2 guests (Ms. Zenaida Fruto and Captain Batung) who were near Mr. Reyes
in two different occasions to ask him to leave but he still stayed.
b. Dr. Filart said that she never invited Mr. Reyes. It was him who volunteered to carry the basket of
fruits since he will also take the elevator to Altitude 49. She thought that Mr. Reyes already left but
she later saw him talking to Col. Batung. When the commotion started, she ignored Mr. Reyes
because she did not want Mr. Tsuruoka to think that she was the one who invited him.
ISSUE:
1. Did Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party where he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code?

RULING:
1. No, Ms. Lim did not act in an abusive manner in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

The party is very private, thrown for the hotel’s former manager, a Japanese national. Mr. Reyes clearly came
uninvited. Ms. Lim, being mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would want to fix
the glitch in the most silent manner in order to not call attention to an otherwise seamless affair. Moreover,
Mr. Reyes was unable to prove that Ms. Lim talked loudly and rudely ordered her to leave.
2. Article 19 (commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights) is not a solution for all grievances.
a. The common theme among Articles 19 and 21 is that the act must be intentional.
b. Ms. Lim and Mr. Reyes has not known each other until the evening of October 13, 1994 leaving no
explanation for alleged abusive conduct.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER

CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY
G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013.
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo

FACTS
Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Barangay
Basak, Mandaue City, Cebu. They claimed that Alexander Coachuy, Sr. and Allan Coachuy are the owners of Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc., located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C. These lots are adjacent to the property of the Hings.
The Coachuys constructed an auto-repair shop building, Aldo Goodyear Servitec, in Lot 1900-C. 1.
On June 13, 2005, the Coachuys illegally set up and installed on Aldo’s building two video surveillance
cameras. These cameras faced the Hings’ property. Furthermore, the Coachuys, through their employees and without
the Hings’ consent, took pictures of the Hings’ on-going construction. Because of this, the Hings prayed that the
Coachuys be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and be enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.
The Hings claimed that the Coachuys’ act violated their right to privacy.
On the other hand, the Coachuys claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, nor did they
order their employees to take pictures of the Hings’ construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of the
Aldo. They are mere stockholders.
 ISSUE: Was there a violation of the right to privacy of the spouses Hing?

RULING: YES, THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF THE SPOUSES HING UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

The right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded
therefrom, and only certain individuals are allowed to enter. Said Article 26(1) protects an individual’s right to privacy
and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. Article 26(1)
recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It
includes any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of
the latter.
However, the phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence” contained in the provision does not mean
that only the residence is entitled to privacy. The law covers also “similar acts,” as well as places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. Thus, a business office is entitled to the same privacy. As long as
the individual’s right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, it was ruled that the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends
on a two-part test: 1) Whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and 2) His
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since
it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. In the case at bar, the operation by the Coachuys of a
revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right to privacy of the Hings, who are the owners
of the adjacent lot. If the purpose of the Coachuys in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and
factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. The camera cannot be
made to extend the view to the Hings’ lot. To allow the Coachuys to do so would violate the right of the Hings as
property owners. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. Therefore, the Hings have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence.

TOMLIN II v. ATTY MOYA II

A.C. No. 6971, FEBRUARY 23, 2006

FACTS:
On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint against Atty. Moya IIfor reneging his monetary
obligations and for bouncing checks. Tomlin II claimed that Atty. Moya II borrowed a total amount of Php 600,000
partially covered by seven (7) postdated checks. When the complainant tried to encash the checks on their respective
due dates, all checks were dishonored by the bank.
Tomlin II made several demands including the last formal letter that was sent on September 25, 2002 addressed
to Atty. Moya II. However, the respondent refused to pay his debts without justifiable reason. As such, Tomlin II
instituted a case for seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and filed an instant disbarment against Atty Moya
II.
Atty Moya II filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading and a motion to dismiss
complaint. He argues that the filing of administrative case despite the pendency of criminal cases is a violation of
the rule of non-forum shopping and therefore a form of harassment.
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline consistently denied his motions and consequently declared him in
default. On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required both parties to submit their respective
verified position papers, but only Tomlin II has submitted. The recommendation of Investigating Commissioner is
to suspend Atty Moya II from the practice of law for one (1) year. However, the IBP Board of Governors modified
the penalty of suspension from one (1) year to two (2) years.

ISSUE:
1. Is Atty. Salvador Moya II guilty for violating the Code of Responsibility and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22?
2. Was there a violation of the rule of non-forum shopping with the filing of an administrative case for
the disbarment of Atty. Moya II?

RULING

1. Yes. Atty. Salvador Moya II is guilty for the violations.

The Code of Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and of legal processes”. This means that a lawyer must not engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral conduct. In the case, the refusal of Atty Moya II to pay his obligations is an unlawful and
immoral conduct.
Further, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or The Anti-Bouncing Check Law which penalizes the making or drawing
and issuance of a check with insufficient funds or credit has also been violated by Atty Moya II. As a matter of fact,
he issued 7 postdated checks to Tomlin II.
Thus, high standard of discipline is highly essential in the practice of law and continuance of the privilege.
Doing so the opposite would be a ground for the imposition of penalty of suspension or disbarment.

2. No. Forum shopping is applicable only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. The
administrative case that was filed against Atty. Moya II was due to his failure to meet his obligations in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Whereas, the criminal case filed against him refers to his issuance of
bouncing checks to Tomlin II.

Geluz vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. L - 16439. July 20, 1961.

Facts:
In 1950, Lazo impregnated Nita before they were legally married. In hopes to conceal Nita’s pregnancy from her
parents, she had herself aborted by Geluz. When the couple got married, Nita again got pregnant, but had herself
aborted again by Geluz, because her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient. Less than two years later, Nita incurred
her third and last abortion, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of a sum of Php 50.00; in which her husbad,
Lazo, did not know of nor gave consent. It was based on this third and last abortion, that Lazo sued Geluz for damages.
The trial court rendered judgment and favored Lazo, ordering Geluz to pay the former Php 3000.00 as damages, Php
700.00 attorney fees, and the costs of the suit. The award of damages were predicated under the provisions of the
initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Can Lazo recover damages from the death of his unborn child?
Held:
No. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is clear that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone
can take place from on that lacked juridical personality. The court ruled that it is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child under Article 40. Of the Civil Code, because it also limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child be subsequently born alive. In the case at bar, it is clear that the child was
dead when separated from its mother’s womb. However, this is not to say that Lazo is not entitled to any damages at
all. But, such damages must those be inflicted directly upon him, not the injury or violation of the rights of his unborn
child, his right to life and physical integrity.
G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp., petitioner vs Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, respondents

Facts:

Rolando P. Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing (petitioner) and a member

of Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines
for Empowerment and Reforms (NMCSC-SUPER; respondent) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave, and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. The CBA reads that the
company grants bereavement leave with pay, death and accident insurance, and in cases of death of
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children), employees will be awarded P11,550, and the death
certificate will need to be presented. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child as his
wife, Marife V. Hortillano suffered a premature delivery on the 38th week of pregnancy. A Certificate of
Fetal Death was given and cited that the fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave, but denied
bereavement leave and death benefits (death and accident insurance). Hortillano seeked the reversal of the
denial of Continental Steel for bereavement and death benefits. Despite a series on conferences held to
settle matters, the dispute could not be settled and so the Union filed a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE. The Union argued that Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA because a) the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have been born first or have acquired juridical personality for
their death to be covered for benefits; b) Union cited jurisprudence (Dugan, employee of Mayer Steel,
signed the same CBA that Continental did) who had a similar case and was still able to receive death
benefits; c) Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that all doubts in labor legislations
& contracts shall be construed in favor of the laborer. However, Continental Steel posited that a) there are
two elements for the entitlement of benefit: death and status as legitimate dependent, which they argued
was missing with Hortillano’s case; b) relied on Articles 40, 41, and 42 & contented that the fetus didn’t
have civil personality yet, therefore could not die (unborn child never died since it didn’t have juridical
personality); c) the dead fetus was never a person, and could not be declared a dependent nor could not
acquire the right to be supported; d) Mayer Steel were separate and distinct companies, thus called irrelevant
evidence. But, Atty. Montano (Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator) ruled that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave with pay and death benefits. Continental Steel did not accept the ruling and filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but they only affirmed Atty. Montano’s
resolution. The petition was denied for lack of merit.

Issue:
 Is Hortillano entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article 10, Section
2, and Article 18 Section 4.3 of the CBA?

Ruling:
Yes. Continental Steel is ordered to pay Hortillano P4,939 (bereavement leave pay) and P11,550
(death benefits) for a total amount of P16,489. The court ruled that the dead fetus is still loss of human life,
especially for expectant parents.
Three indispensable elements must be present for the benefit of bereavement to be awarded: 1)
there is death; 2) the death must be of the employee’s dependent; 3) dependent must be legitimate. Atty.
Montano ruled that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred: 1) The fetus has to rely on
her mother for support, making it dependent; 2) Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, thus their
dependent unborn child, legitimate.

Pimentel vs Pimentel and People of the Philippines

G.R. 172060

FACTS:
On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against
her husband Joselito Pimentel.
Joselito filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On February 7, 2005, Chrysantine received summons to appear before RTC for pre-trial and trial
for the civil case filed. Chrysantine filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before RTC
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. She asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the annulment
case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against Joselito before the RTC.RTC denied
the motion to suspend the annulment case for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
TRO before Court of Appeals assailing the decision of RTC. Court of Appeals ruled that even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to
the criminal case because prior to declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide already committed. The court further rule that all that is required for the charge
of frustrated parricide is that at the time of commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

ISSUE:
Is the resolution of the civil case (nullity of marriage) is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case?

HELD:
No, The Supreme Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal actions.
In this case, the criminal case was raffled on October 25, 2004. Chrysantine served the summons
for the annulment of the case was on November 4, 2004 and was filed on November 5, 2004. The
civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. The
Resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.
 The issue in the annulment of annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
issue of the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

[G.R. No. 183788. April 5, 2010.]

KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSELITO C.

VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City,
and FANNIE TORRES-TY, respondents.

FACTS:
In August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary) and petitioner, Krizia Ty-de Zuzuarregui filed 􏰀a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Rosemary’s mother, Bella Torres (Bella), in
court (RTC of Pasig) in which it states that they are the only heirs of Bella. Subsequently, Peter Torres Ty, Catherine
Torres Ty - Chavez, and Fannie Torres Ty (Fannie) all claimed to be biological children of Bella.
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that they held several discussions about the settlement of Bella's estate.
Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care of the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided
among them in the manner provided by law. However, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a
disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No progress was made towards the settlement
of Bella's estate.
Fannie filed a charge (RTC of Pasig) against petitioner and Rosemary of falsification and forgery for having to
allege that they were the only heirs of Bella and for the annulment of the compromise agreement.
On December 20, 2005, three (3) information against petitioner and Rosemary were thus 􏰀led with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61.
The petitioner 􏰀led a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer proceedings
17 before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Petitioner and Rosemary 􏰀led with the
MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The petitioner's appeal was
dismissed by the DOJ, while her motions before the MeTC were denied.

The petitioner 􏰀led a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 66, the RTC
denied the petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial question. The petitioner 􏰀led a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC's orders. The appellate court dismissed the petition
on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioner's counsel and not by
petitioner herself.

ISSUE:

 Is the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be
cured by subsequent compliance.
 Is there a prejudicial question involved?

RULING:
Yes, however, under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions
for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
A certification of the plaintiff's counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel,
who is in the best position to know whether he led or caused the 􏰀ling of a petition. A certification against forum
shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement
and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.

In this case, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were signed by petitioner's counsel. Upon
receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for non-compliance with the rules, petitioner
submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, verification and certification signed by her in compliance
with the said rule. The court deems this to be sufficient compliance especially given the merits of the case, which
may be considered as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard
consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum shopping.

Yes, there is a prejudicial question involved. . It was clear that in the petition to annul the compromise
agreement in which their names were not included, having to adjudge the civil case would know if they are
really heirs of Bella. If not, then the criminal case against petitioners has no basis to proceed its course.

(Note: There are two elements to determine that there exists a pre-judicial question. First, the civil action that is
previously instituted has similar or closely related issue/s involved in the criminal action. Second, the decision or
resolution of the issue/s will determine whether the subsequently filed criminal action may or may not proceed. The
rationale behind this prejudicial question is the avoidance of two conflicting decisions. In other words, the civil
action must be resolved first before the criminal action proceeds in a trial in order not to create a conflict with the
court decisions in both civil and criminal actions. The civil action may not constitute a prejudicial question when
there is no need to determine first the resolution of the civil case before taking up the criminal case. If the
determination of the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal case does not vary on the resolution of
the issue in the civil case, then there shall be no prejudicial question to deal with.)

IMELDA R. MARCOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062. January 18, 2011.

Facts:

Imelda R. Marcos filed an administrative complaint against Judge Fernando Vil Pamituan of Branch 3 of Baguio Regional
Trial Court for Gross Ignorance of the Law after reversing motu prorprio the final executory order of then Acting Judge
Jose Antonio Reyes dated May 30, 1996 in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled "Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive
administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al." regarding
the formal and final release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner/s. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties.

In a final and executory order regarding the case, Judge Pamintuan reversed the decision made by Judge Reyes ten years
prior. Marcos then averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted Gross
Ignorance of the Law. She further argued that final and executory orders made by lower courts are not reviewable even by
the Supreme Court. Morever, Marcos argued that Judge Pamintuan failed to indicate where and how he obtained the
information that the Golden Buddha sitting on the sala was a fake one.
Judge Pamituan, counter-argued however, that Imelda Marcos could have just led a pleading manifesting lack of interest or
moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. With her appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. She should have led a motion for reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an
administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted
with the filing of this case.

However, in her Reply-Affidavit, Marcos stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence, she could not file
a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion
for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal.

In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be
dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from
re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of
the Law and for "violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct."

Issue/s:
1. Is Judge Pamintuan guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law?
2. Should Judge Pamintuan be dismissed of his judicial duties?

Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court declared that in his assailed August 15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations
that were not embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order. It is a known fact that when a
judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either
by the court which rendered it or even by the Supreme Court.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom
of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”

Moreover, he failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which provides in Rule 1.01 that “a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.”.
Moreover, according to Rule 3.01, “a judge shall . . . maintain professional competence.”

Failure to commit to the said rules of conduct as stated above meant incompetence in the part of Judge Pamintuan. Moreover,
the Supreme Court acknowledges that this is not the first administrative case filed against Judge Pamintuan. He has also
paid a fine and served suspensions for being guilty of some administrative cases in the past.

Based on these reasons, the Supreme Court finds Judge Pamintuan GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law. The court also
ruled that Judge Pamintuan be DISMISSED from service. He must also CEASE and DESIST from performing official act
or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him for this decision.