Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016 with former C.J.

Sereno’s Dissenting Opinion

AUGUST 20, 2018

FACTS:

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent
Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga
Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding
General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their capacities as human
rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368
(Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of the Bar and
human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member of the House
of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-
registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial
law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen
of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on Human
Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime
of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and
taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as concerned Filipino
citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional Human
Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims
of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable
controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution,
domestic and international laws.
RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.cralawred As they
are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure,
political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such
proper party has no standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens,
human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such
petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the
President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal
disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express
or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the
presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush
aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is
not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction
when proven necessary.

Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence.

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just
rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses
committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-
dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27
and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the
Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law
period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

Note:

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, C.J.:

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this Court must
zealously protect.

Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos’ enduring
values. The protection of those values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That this is the legal standard by
which to measure whether it has properly comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various
fashions by the Court itself.

See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women, children, labor, the indigenous
people, and consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived of their human rights.

Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection of human rights,
and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs of kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.

Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect the cherished values of
the Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be passive relative to the “active” nature
of the political departments is a given. But when called upon to discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986
Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its
hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism.

CASE DIGEST: OCAMPO, et al. v. ENRIQUEZ, etc. (THE MARCOS BURIAL CASE)
CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, & 226294

FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).
He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial.

ISSUES: [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB?
[2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the law?

HELD: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents.

It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a
law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the
LNMB.

The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence,
anyone buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is
an inspiration to the youth.

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations
yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust
for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No 160261, November 10, 2003

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress adopted its Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings. The new rules superseded impeachment Rules of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16 and 17 of these Rules state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient
in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the
members of the House.

A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).”

In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7
Associate Justices of SC for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.” The
complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution.

On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first impeachment complaint “sufficient in form.”
However, it also voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Ten days later, on
October 23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide, founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the JDF. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar, members of the House of Representatives, as well as
private individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of public funds for
the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the
1987 Constitution bars the filing of the second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states that “(n)o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to
hear the case as it would mean an encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-equal branch of government.
ISSUES/HELD:

1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution—YES

2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings approved by the HoR are
unconstitutional – YES

3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked – YES

RATIO:

1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar under the Constitution.

2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:

1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning (verbal egis);

2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the framers; and

3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation means simply to begin. The records of the debates by
the framers affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae
briefs of its two members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the Constitution
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the complaint.

By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on
Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the
House Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR
Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.

In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment are unconstitutional because the rules
clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a different meaning from filing and
referral.

Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the constitutional one-year ban.

3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.

The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial review, only carried out its duty as stated in Section 1,
Article VIII, which mandates the judicial department to look into cases where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the different branches of government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of the Rules
of Impeachment against the one-year ban explicitly stated in the Constitution. Consequently, the contention that
judicial review over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.

The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter, effectively checks on the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law. It must declare executive and legislative acts void if they violate the
Constitution. The violation of Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution is thus within the competence of the Court to
decide.

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261

NOV. 10, 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but
voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since
the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in
all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of
the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme
Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was
given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when
they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to
leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits,
or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (Constitutional Law)

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary

GR No. 83896 February 22, 1991

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.cralaw

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

Fernan, J:

FACTS:

(1) Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position,
hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they ( sic) must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled corporations, at least
one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.

This Executive Order, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions which is against Article VII, Section 13 of the
Constitution. They also contend that the said provision is absolute and self-executing.

In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission
that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.

(2) The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception.
Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of
Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being
allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet.

Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in
Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned.

ISSUE:

Whether or notSection 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants
are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general underSection 7, par. (2), Article I-
XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

HELD:

Petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

RATIO:

(1) Practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in
government was strongly denounced on the floor of the BatasangPambansa.
(2) One of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was the
assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the
government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued.

(3) It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.

(4) The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in
the said position. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in
the form of per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism.

(4) Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention,
specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and
expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental
offices or employment.

Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from making deductions of withholding taxes from their
salaries.

According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers is a violation of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that:

“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall
be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”.

In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries are being decreased, citing
Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis.

In particular, since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers was to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution”
of salaries.

The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response to representations that the Court direct its
Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. While the question has
been resolved, the Court decided to settle the legal issues through a judicial pronouncement.

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES

RATIO:

Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax

This payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during
their continuance in office. Further, the deletion of the grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of
the Judiciary was a way of ensuring the equality of the three branches of government.

Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of the framers was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all income earners.

The course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII further clarified
the issue:

Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the word “nor
subjected to income tax” be deleted, was accepted.

Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by putting a period after “decreased”, it is with the understanding that
the salaries of justices are subject to tax. He cited that this is based on the understanding that there will be a provision
in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which states
that no salary of any public officer shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Dencia vs David were not applicable
anymore.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may
revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for
their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial
law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
“militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.

IBP VS ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

What are the requisites before the Court can exercise the power of judicial review?

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan])

POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC Case Digest (G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700)

G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700

THE PETITION:

The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the following:

1. DECEMBER 1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECOND

DIVISION (Cancelled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy);

2. DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and

3. DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten 10 years and 11 months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
2016)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

September 3, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares

1968 (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar. Custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar and his wife.

September 6, Emiliano Militar reported and registered

1968 petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).
1973 When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court

(MTC) of San Juan City.

May 13, 1974 The Poe spouses’ petition for adoption was
granted by the trial court and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe."

December 13, Having reached the age of 18, petitioner

1986 registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City.

April 4, 1988 Petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine

Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs

1988-1991 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a

degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines but opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the U.S. in 1988.

Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston

College in Chestnuts Hill

July 27, 1991 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.

Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in
San Juan City.

July 29, 1991 Desirous of being with her husband who was
then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to
the U.S.

April16, 1992 Petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian

Daniel
April 5, 1993 Renewed her Philippines passport.

May 19, 1998 Renewed her Philippines passport.

July 10, 1998 Petitioner gave birth to daughter Hanna

MacKenzie.

October 18, 2001 Petitioner became a naturalized American citizen

April 8, 2004 – Petitioner came back to the Philippines together

July 8, 2004 with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was
during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika.

December 13, Petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon

2004 – February learning of her father's deteriorating medical
3, 2005 condition who died shortly.

2005 Petitioner and husband began preparing for their

resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring
to Philippine schools

May 24, 2005 Petitioner came home to the Philippines and

without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

March 2006 The petitioner's husband officially informed the

U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.
petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square
meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home.

July 7, 2006 Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
July 18, 2006 The Bureau of Immigration acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is
deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.

August 31, 2006 Again, petitioner registered as a voter

ofBarangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She also
secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
bearing the No. XX4731999.

October 6, 2010 President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed

petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).

October 20, 2010 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an

"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City.

October 21, 2010 Petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the

Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of
office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then
on, petitioner stopped using her American
passport.

July 12, 2011 The petitioner executed before the Vice Consul
of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States" and stated that
she in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to
29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.

December 9, The U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a

2011 "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.

October 2, 2012 The petitioner filed with the COMELEC her

Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for
the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
years and 6 months" to the question "Period of
 residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."

October 15, 2015 Petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for
the May 2016 Elections.

In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a

natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

ISSUES:

1. With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the petitioner a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines? YES TO BOTH.

2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as president? YES.

Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy? NO.

RATIONALE:

1. Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

ON BEING A FOUNDLING:

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than
sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are
Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975,
the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant
in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the

right to change his nationality.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical
chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% -
that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class
of human beings.

While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either.

ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in
the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:

…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-bom
Filipino.
Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson vs. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."

2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as president?

ON RESIDENCE

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years residence in the Philippines before the day of the
elections.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated
to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May
2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005
to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000
pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the
Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for
succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot
issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005
from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to
the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted
to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant
until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and tosell
the family home).

The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay taken together, lead to no other conclusion that when she came here
on May 24 2005, her intention was to permanently abandon the United States. Petitioner also actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005.

ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in
her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013"
in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the
2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period
of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012.

Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about
residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is strengthened by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced
in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner.

CONCLUSION:

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May
2016 National Elections. MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.

G.R. NOS. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ, Respondents.

FACTS : Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody
over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. When petitioner
was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. Having
reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San
Juan City. On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport. On 27 July 1991, petitioner
married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S.,
the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. On 8 April 2004, the
petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May
2004 elections. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. After a few months, specifically on 13
December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.
Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to
take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. The couple began
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester. coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to
be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. In
late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S.
Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB). On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.". On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul
issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. On 15 October
2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. Petitioner's filing of her COC for
President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject
of these consolidated cases.Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections.

ISSUE : 1) WON GRACE POE IS A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES

2) WON GRACE POE SATISFY THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AS MANDATED BY THE

CONSTITUTION

HELD :

(THE 4 REASON WHY THE SC RULED IN FAVOR OF GPOE ON CITIZENSHIP)

1-A) At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is
more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. The Solicitor
General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was
10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was
99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as
an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

1-B) As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present
charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

1-C)Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act
of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children
and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-
SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.

1-D) Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation

D.1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

D.2) The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)

D.3) n 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished
by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139,
both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of
international law." Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada,
where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. In sum, all
of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to
address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be
restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations

2) (RESIDENCY) The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is
the Philippines. Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even
listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases. the Court had no
choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads
to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the
children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was
for good.It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo
warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established
fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy. In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism,
virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and
animus non revertedi to the United States of America. In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy
its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that
mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the
Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with
grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her
marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American
citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally
went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship
to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical
parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want
of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that
only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical
of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the
1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are
being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements
of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI(intent of not
returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the
Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her
candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

Ynot vs. IAC (G.R. No. 74457)

Facts:

In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for replevin,
challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to
rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the
IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

Held:

SC ruled that while there is a lawful subject, there was no lawful method. The EO imposes on the absolute ban not on
the slaughter of carabaos but on their movement, providing that no carabao and carabeef should be transported from
one province to another the purpose of which is to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals
by their slaughter. SC said that the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing. They cannot see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed anywhere.

The EO is also unconstitutional as there was outright confiscation of carabaos without according the owner the right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the EO
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him
under the Constitution. The EO is penal in nature, the violation should have been pronounced not by the police only but
by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial
and conviction of the accused.

Wherefore, the EO is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 74457 – 148 SCRA 659 – Political Law – Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from one province to another but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred that EO 626-A was unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling
that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from
one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should
be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done
only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.

Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla

v. Salvador Mison in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and
Guillermo Carague in his capacity as SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987

Padilla, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both
Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not
valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On
Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments
made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the
confirmation from COA is valid.

HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list
of officers that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It
enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:

 Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister

or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval
Captain, and Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in
this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment
made by the President that requires approval from the COA and the following
instances are those which does not require approval from COA:
 All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.