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US vs.

McMann
G.R. No. 2229, July 1, 1905

Facts:

McMann and McKay were packers at Camp Vicars in Mindanao. While McMann was away, McKay with a
revolver in his hand, tried to enter the house of Amay Pindoloan to get a match to light his cigar but the
owner of the house refused to let him in. McMann then with a revolver and hammer on his hands,
attempted to enter the house but the owner again refused. McMann snatched a bolo from a moro
named Master who cut his finger, went to the authority to report the incident. While McKay and
Pindoloan was seated side by side and 3 to 6 meters away from the defendant, the latter raised his
pistol and fired at McKay. The bullet struck McKay in the back of his hand which killed him instantly.
McMann also shot Pindoloan while he was running away. Both McMann and McKay were drunk at this
time. McMann admitted in his testimony that he fired at McKay and three other witnesses testified
against him.

Issue:

Whether McMann was guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

Yes. McMann’s argument that he had no intention of killing McKay cannot stand because in the face of a
positive testimony of the witnesses, there is no ground for saying that the shooting was accidental and
the fact that the Moro and McKay were sitting side by side, their testimony makes it plain that in no
event was the discharge of the revolver accidental.

In this case, whatever the cause it may have been, it is absolutely unnecessary for the court to find a
motive thereof. Because the question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as whether
the defendant is or not the person who committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond
all doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of McKay, it is not so important to
know the exact reason for the deed.

The court also held that his drunkenness cannot be used to lessen his sentence, because it is held that
his drunkenness was habitual based on the testimony of a witness.
US vs. Carlos
G.R. No. L-5476, January 15, 1910

Facts:

Daniel Carlos was identified by Isabel Beltran, Calixto Maris, Joaquin Beltran, Alpio Baluyot and
Alejandro Carreon as one of the members of the band of ten to twenty men who disguised as
constabulary soldiers which made them prisoners on the night of December 30, 1980. These witnesses
testified that Carlos was clothed in a constabulary uniform and carried a bolo and a revolver and Isabel
Beltran positively identified him as one of the members of the band who entered the Barrio of Carmen
and that Carlos was present when Felix Maris was murdered. It was not clear however, whether he or
some other member of the band inflicted the final blow.

Issue:

Whether Daniel Carlos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The court, in view of the facts concluded to give the appellant the benefit of the provisions of Article 11
of the Penal Code. In doing so, the court are largely influenced by the fact that the record fails to
disclose the motive for the commission of the crime, and by the further fact that it was committed six
years ago, at a period when any thousands of misguided persons were induced to become members of
roving bands, organized ostensibly for political purposes, but in many cases, in truth and in fact, for
robbery and pillage and where thus drawn to a guilty participation in the commission of grave and
heinous offenses. It is clear that in the absence of proof that the accused was the leader of the band, or
that he directly and actively participated in the assassination of the prisoner of the band he would have
not sentenced to the death penalty under the Brigandage Act, under all those circumstances, under the
provisions of Article 11 of the Penal Code as extenuating circumstance, the penalty imposed upon the
appellant should be reduced to life imprisonment. The court then reminded the importance of definitely
ascertaining and proving when possible the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
judicial review. It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive
for taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the
commission of a crime is clearly proven conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its
commission is unknown (151 U. S., 396); but in many criminal cases one of the most important aids in
completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge the criminal act; and in nearly every case
wherein the law places the penalty to be imposed in the discretion of the courts within certain limits, it
will be found that a knowledge of the motive which actuated the guilty person is of the greatest service
in the exercise of this discretion.
People vs. Puno
G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993

Facts:

On January 13, 1998, Maria Socorro Sarmiento was fetched by the driver of his husband Isabelo Puno.
She got into the car with Isabelo on the wheels. After it turned right in Araneta Ave. the car stopped and
a young man, accused Enrique Amurao boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside, Amurao sat
beside Mrs. Sarmiento and poked a gun at her asking her for money. Mrs. Sarmiento then gave them
P7000.00. The two then told her they wanted P100,000.00 more.

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a
check for P100,000.00. After issuing checks worth two P30,000.00 and one P40,000.00, Mrs. Sarmiento
allegedly jumped out of the car, and was able to flag down a fish vendors van. After reaching Balintawak,
she reported the matter to CAPCOM.

Both accused were arrested. Enrique was arrested while trying to encash the check worth P40,000.00 at
PCI Bank.

Issue:

Whether Puno and Amurao committed felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of RPC or a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) or the
offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or
at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants,
without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated,
candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we
were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that
your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and
I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me
any bale (sic).

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim,
we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission
of another offense primarily intended by the offenders, it has been held that the detention and/or
forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such
other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty
does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under
the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of
kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a
robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the
crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the
trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential
Decree No. 532.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293
and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in
conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft shall
be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against
appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation
having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as
decreed by Article 295 of the Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former
offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged.
For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of
personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been,
proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information
where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender
of the things subject of the robbery.

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