5 - Dokken - 2001 - Is Environmental Security A Useful Concept

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Environment, security
and regionalism in
the Asia-Pacific: is
environmental security
a useful concept?
Karin Dokken
Published online: 26 Nov 2010.
To cite this article: Karin Dokken (2001) Environment, security

and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: is environmental security
a useful concept?, The Pacific Review, 14:4, 509-530, DOI:
10.1080/09512740110087311
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The Pacic Review, Vol. 14 No. 4 2001: 509–530
1
2 Environment, security and regionalism
3
4 in the Asia-Pacic: is environmental
5
6
security a useful concept?
7
8
9
10 Karin Dokken
11
12
13
14
15 Abstract From the very beginning the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has been occupied with the task of nding common solu-
16 tions to common security problems. To a large degree, one may say that
17 security questions have been a driving force for continued regional inte-
18 gration in Southeast Asia. In the future questions of environmental security
19 may be playing the same role. The states around the South China Sea are
1120 to a large degree interdependent when it comes to questions of the human
environment. They are interdependent to the degree that if they fail to nd
21 common solutions to environmental problems they may end up in violent
22 conict against each other. In general, environmental interdependence is
23 both a source of conict and a potential for international integration. The
24 direction of the development, i.e. whether it leads to conict or not, is to a
25 large degree a question of how the decision-makers perceive the situation.
This paper addresses the usefulness of the concept ‘environmental security’
26 in relation to political perception of environmental interdependence in
27 Southeast Asia. If the political actors address serious environmental prob-
28 lems as security matters they are more likely to put them at the top of the
29 agenda and deal with them in satisfactory manners, i.e. to cooperate and
1130 nd solutions that are acceptable to all parties involved.
31 Keywords Environmental security; integration; ASEAN; interdependence;
32 epistemic communities.
33
34
35
36
37
38 Karin Dokken is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University
of Oslo. Her major publications include Environment, Security and Regional Integration in
39 West Africa (Oslo: Unipub, 1997).
40
41 Address: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1097 Blindern, 0317
42 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: Karin.dokken@stv.uio.no
43 The Pacic Review
44 ISSN 0951–2748 print/ISSN 1470–1332 online © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
1145 DOI: 10.1080/0951274011008731 1
510 The Pacic Review
1 Introduction
2
With Cambodia’s admission on 30 April 1999, the Association of Southeast
3
Asian Nations (ASEAN) achieved the incorporation of all Southeast
4
Asian states. Cambodia’s accession nalized a programme of ambitious
5
enlargement from 1995, which also saw the entry of Vietnam, Laos and
6
Myanmar. During the twenty-seven years since ASEAN came into exis-
7
tence in August 1967 only one state had been added to the founding ve,
8
Brunei in 1984. Cambodia’s accession also capped a long process of
9
creating one Southeast Asian (political) unit, notwithstanding the member
10
states’ former political record. The recent years’ enlargement of ASEAN
11
makes it better prepared to meet future challenges that cannot be solved

12
without the participation of all the states of the region. One such chal-
13
lenge is the natural environment. At the same time, the inclusion of all
14
the states of the region takes away one of the most important driving
15
forces of the early years of the organization, i.e. that of a common external
16
enemy.
17
The subject of this paper is to see whether common issues related to
18
international resource management (environmental problems) could be a
19
driving force for a continued integration process within ASEAN. I hold
20
that to have such a function (grave) environmental problems need to be
21
dened as security matters.
22
To a large degree one may say that security questions have been the
23
driving force in regional integration in Southeast Asia. In the future envir-
24
onmental security questions may be playing the same role. The states
25
around the South China Sea are to a large degree interdependent when
26
it comes to questions of the human environment. They are interdepen-
27
dent to the degree that if they fail to nd common solutions to environ-
28
mental problems they may end up in violent conicts with each other. To
29
many in ASEAN, one of the most signicant security issues after the
30
Cambodian conict is the conicts in the South China Sea (Lee Lai To
31
1995: 532). Environmental issues may also interact with other sources of
32
conict to prolong or complicate existing disputes. In general, environ-
33
mental interdependence is both a source of conict and a potential for
34
international cooperation. The direction of the development, i.e. whether
35
it leads to conict or cooperation, is to a large degree a question of how
36
the actors perceive the situation.
37
In the following I will show that ASEAN, from its inception in 1967,
38
has had security matters as its principal driving force. Thereafter, I will
39
present some major points from the scientic debate concerning the rela-
40
tionship between security and the human environment. I will then show
41
that some of the most important conicts around the South China Sea
42
can be dened as environmental security matters. The paper concludes
43
with a discussion of these matters as driving forces for further integration
44
within ASEAN.
45
K. Dokken: Environment, security and regionalism 511
1 ASEAN’s record in relation to security questions

2
ASEAN can be said to be a product of the Cold War. To a large degree
3
the organization was designed to reduce tensions between Southeast Asia’s
4
non-communist states. The association’s founding document, the Bangkok
5
Declaration, claimed for the countries of Southeast Asia ‘a primary respon-
6
sibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region
7
and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development’.
8
ASEAN’s ofcial aims and purposes called for cooperation in economic,
9
social, cultural, technical, scientic and administrative elds. The only
10
reference to security questions of the Bangkok Declaration is the general
11
agreement that foreign military bases in the region are temporary.

12
Nevertheless, during its rst phase ASEAN played an important con-
13
dence-building role. Several agreements were reached referring to the
14
general security political situation of the region. One such agreement was
15
the one on ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) in 1971.
16
ZOPFAN committed ASEAN’s states ‘to exert initially necessary efforts
17
to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone
18
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of inter-
19
ference by outside Powers’. The member states had different views on the
1120
actual contents of the neutralization agreement. No specic programme
21
of implementation for ZOPFAN was developed. However, agreement was
22
reached concerning the rights of the neutralized states. This includes the
23
right to membership of the UN, the right to undertake all kinds of trade
24
as long as this is not inconsistent with the neutrality of the states, the right
25
to receive development aid (including military equipment) as long as this
26
is of a defensive character and as long as there is no political return benet
27
attached to it. All the neutralized states also have an indisputable right
28
to military self-defence. The states also agree that neutralization means
29
refraining from military alliances with the superpowers (Kerr 1994).
1130
The neutralization agreement was the rst example of a policy which
31
is often referred to as ASEAN’s externalization policy. ‘Externalization’
32
is a concept referring to the process where the members of a regional
33
organization develop a common position in their relations with non-
34
members (Jørgensen-Dahl 1982: 37). As a phenomenon externalization is
35
related to actions or perceived intentions of governments and organiza-
36
tions outside the region. The perception of a common external threat is
37
important in relation to this.
38
In the years following the neutralization agreement the ASEAN states
39
developed common positions in several foreign policy questions. Among
40
the most important questions were the states’ relationships to China, to
41
Vietnam and to Cambodia. Concerning China it was clear that every
42
ASEAN state had long-range fears of a powerful China (Tilman 1984:
43
48). The fact that ASEAN was established at the time when the cultural
44
revolution in China was very intense does not reduce this impression.
1145
1 From the very rst day China was of central importance to the ASEAN
2 cooperation. Of equal importance was the common position towards
3 Vietnam. In fact, it was only in 1975, following the communist victory in
4 Indochina, that ASEAN began to grow rapidly in status as a regional
5 grouping (Chon Li Choy 1981: 58). In the same way as China, Vietnam’s
6 attitude towards ASEAN had been quite hostile. The Communist victory
7 in Vietnam in 1975 made the ASEAN members perceive an increasing
8 necessity to coordinate their relations to the new state, the Socialist
9 Republic of Vietnam (SRV). ‘[N ]o single external matter after 1975–76
10 has served as strongly as the SRV issue to produce a sense of solidarity
11 and cohesion among the ASEAN ve’ (Jørgensen-Dahl 1982: 123). In the
12 years to follow, several incidents served to intensify this solidarity and

13 cohesion. Most important was the Vietnamese membership in Comecon
14 and the Treaty of Amity between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The
15 growing conict between Vietnam and Cambodia and the Vietnamese
16 invasion were also very important. The last incident in this row was the
17 war between China and Vietnam in February–March 1979. More clearly
18 than ever the states expressed a common position in foreign policy ques-
19 tions.
20 The development of a common policy vis-à-vis Vietnam and China is
21 inspired by the view that the hostility of these states implies a genuine
22 danger for the national sovereignty of the ASEAN countries. The prin-
23 ciple of national sovereignty was also central for the agreement reached
24 in 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). ASEAN was never
25 thought to be a mechanism for resolving disputes between countries. From
26 its formation, it operated on the principle of non-interference in the
27 internal affairs of the various member countries. It was this position that
28 was formalized in TAC. There were, particularly, three reasons why the
29 non-interference principle became a guiding tenet of ASEAN:
30
31 rst, its members feared external support for their domestic
32 communist insurgencies,
33 second, ASEAN’s ethnic, religious, political and economic diver-
34 sity risked irreconcilable differences between its members unless
35 these aspects of national life were excluded from discussions and,
36 third, the Association’s governments were unwilling to cede their
37 new-found sovereignty, either to a supranational body, or by
38 allowing members to comment on each other’s internal affairs.
39 (Henderson 1999: 16–17)1
40
41 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation has been the guiding principle
42 for the way ASEAN has organized its cooperation and contact with
43 its neighbouring countries. From its inception in 1976 the treaty has
44 been ‘open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia’ (Henderson
45 1999: 18).2
1 The end of the Cold War

2
The end of the Cold War changed the security environment of ASEAN
3
4 radically.3 The major powers that had dominated the region earlier grad-
5 ually began to pull out. This created a certain fear among the ASEAN
6 countries that a regional power would try to strengthen its position in
7 Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War was therefore an important
8 reason why ASEAN speeded up its efforts to enlarge the organization.
9 In January 1990 the former Soviet Union announced that it would pull
10 out its entire base from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. This withdrawal meant
11 that the balancing effect of Soviet presence in the region would disap-
12 pear. This meant that China could now dominate the maritime environ-
13 ment of the region.4 Shortly afterwards it became clear that the American
14 Clark air base and the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines would be
15 closed down. According to the ‘East Asia Security Initiative’ (EASI) the
16 Americans should reduce their military presence in the region by 12 per
17 cent by the year 1992. There is still some uncertainty concerning the role
18 of the USA in the region. The conicts in the South China Sea have led
19 several ASEAN members to wish for a stronger American presence to
1120 balance Chinese power. After all China’s proximity, its size, ethnic out-
21 reach and advancement in modernizing itself is still perceived to be a
22 long-term threat by several ASEAN members (Lee Lai To 1995: 534).
23 The single most important security political development of the 1990s
24 was the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It had become
25 clear to ASEAN that the presence of outsiders/great powers would not
26 be sufcient to provide for Southeast Asia’s long-term security (Simon
27 1998: 17). Some kind of cooperative security arrangement which would
28 link the region to its major partners in Northeast Asia (and to some extent
29 North America) was needed to ll the gap. Fortunately for ASEAN no
1130 subregional counterpart to ASEAN had been created. Therefore ASEAN
31 was able to ll the vacuum by offering to create a new region-wide entity
32 modelled on the association’s process of consultation and dialogue. The
33 July 1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC)5 took important
34 steps in bringing security issues explicitly into the agenda for the partic-
35 ipating countries. They agreed that the PMC would be an appropriate
36 base for discussing regional security issues. They emphasized that their
37 denition of security was not conned to military issues, but that they
38 advocated a comprehensive approach to security issues. When the ASEAN
39 heads of state met half a year later in Singapore, they decided to bring
40 their initiative several steps forward as they decided to ‘intensify its
41 external dialogues in political and security matters using the ASEAN
42 PMC’ (Alvestad 1998: 33). These declarations eventually led up to the
43 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on 23–24 July 1993 where it
44 was decided to create a separate security component of the PMC dialogue
1145 named the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The objective of the ARF
1 was to develop ‘a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in

2 the Asia-Pacic’ (Simon 1998: 19).
3 For the purpose of this paper it is interesting to note that the political
4 actors advocated a comprehensive security approach to security matters.
5 This means that issues such as environmental problems might be included
6 in the overall security political philosophy of the actors. A concept like
7 ‘environmental security’ is important in this respect.
8
9
Common environmental challenges in Southeast Asia
10
11 The South China Sea is an integral ecosystem, and as such it needs to be
12 treated in a comprehensive manner by all the states surrounding it. It is

13 also an arena for competing security interests. Over the years it has become
14 increasingly clear that the South China Sea is affected by serious envir-
15 onmental problems that need to be solved by the surrounding states in
16 cooperation. While the idea of joint development has been constantly
17 raised as a condence-building measure to ease the tensions among the
18 parties to the conict, there has been minimal concern about the imper-
19 atives for maintaining the environmental integrity of the territories in
20 question (Magno 1997: 98). In the following I will point to some of the
21 most outstanding examples of the environmental problems, to illustrate
22 the necessity of a regional approach. I will also try to show that solving
23 these problems in a comprehensive and cooperative manner will cater for
24 the security interests of the various states in a better way than if the states
25 do not cooperate.
26 With the exception of Singapore, populations in all the countries around
27 the South China Sea are substantially increasing. The region has some of
28 the world’s largest cities, and increasing urbanization will be a primary
29 cause of environmental degradation as cities strain to cope with the infra-
30 structural and social demands of rapid inuxes of people. Generally, the
31 rapid growth in global population is beginning to reduce the availability
32 and quality of natural resources and living space. This is also the case in
33 the South China Sea region. Population pressure and environmental
34 degradation are responsible for large-scale movements of people, both
35 within states and across borders. These ows are becoming a signicant
36 potential source of conict in many parts of the world. In Southeast Asia
37 this kind of problem is most visible in Indonesia where large amounts of
38 people either voluntarily or compulsorily move from one island to another
39 (Dupont 1998: 22–3). Population growth is in itself ‘conict neutral’ but
40 combined with other factors such as resource scarcity and ethnic tensions
41 it could very well be the decisive factor to violent conict.
42 Energy scarcity is a variable, which combined with population growth
43 is one of the most uncertain issues in the South China Sea region.
44 Economic expansion and population growth in recent years have created
45 excessive demands on the resource base of the various states. For example,
1 from 1980 to 1993, the average annual growth of energy consumption was
2 9.8 per cent in Malaysia, 5.1 per cent in China, 3.5 per cent in the
3 Philippines and 2.6 per cent in Vietnam (Magno 1997: 103). Many govern-
4 ments are beginning to appreciate that certain kinds of energy use will
5 incur political, social and environmental costs, which may have implica-
6 tions for national security. In Southeast Asia, resource scarcity is aggra-
7 vating tensions over unresolved maritime-boundary quarrels. Every state
8 in the region, except Laos, is involved in at least one dispute with a neigh-
9 bour. Disputes in the South China Sea region have led to military
10 confrontation, or have been the subject of ofcial protests. What is new
11 and troublesome about these disputes is that they are taking place against
12 a background of rising energy demand, high economic growth and dimin-

13 ishing self-sufciency energy on an unprecedented scale (Dupont 1998:
14 26). Most people agree that the South China Sea region lacks the energy
15 resources to meet its growing needs. Uncertainty over future energy
16 supplies will remain a signicant factor in prompting maritime conicts in
17 the region. Among the most important issues is the dispute over the Spratly
18 Islands, to which several countries claim sovereignty and the possible
19 impact of these islands on the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones
1120 and continental shelves. Although little is known about the geology of the
21 Spratly area, it has been common to assume that the islands sit astride
22 large deposits of oil and natural gas (Dupont 1998: 31).
23 Among the states claiming sovereignty to the Spratlys, China and
24 Vietnam in particular are using foreign oil companies to ‘stake out’ posi-
25 tions. Given its present annual growth rate of 10 per cent, China would
26 have to nd new oil reserves at a rate of 451 million barrels a year. If
27 new reserves are not discovered, an 8 per cent yearly growth rate is
28 expected to exhaust China’s proven reserves in 15–20 years (Magno 1997:
29 109). The potential for conict is already apparent. In general, China’s
1130 aggressive oil-exploration activities in the South China Sea have height-
31 ened tensions with ASEAN.
32 Another energy-related problematic issue is the question concerning
33 nuclear waste and security. The environmental security implications of
34 nuclear energy are becoming increasingly important. Domestic political
35 sensitivity to the risks of accidental discharges of radioactivity from nuclear
36 power reactors has increased markedly during the last few years.
37 Moreover, waste disposal will become a more pressing political and
38 security issue as the region’s consumption of nuclear power energy
39 increases. This is of course related to the general energy situation as well
40 as the growing population of the region. Environmental considerations
41 could signicantly limit the future energy options of governments
42 throughout the region.
43 Dupont (1998: 39) writes that concerns about energy security in the
44 region are driven by a complex mix of traditional and emerging factors.
1145 These factors include unprecedented population growth, climbing rates of
1 energy dependence, rapid depletion of existing oil reserves and growing

2 awareness of the environmental costs of increased energy consumption.
3 Environmental constraints threaten to curtail or at least complicate the
4 energy choices of governments. Attempts to deepen regional cooperation
5 and an emerging multilateral security dialogue are among the few ways
6 the states might have to manage the growing tensions over energy
7 resources. No doubt, energy-related environmental security issues have
8 the potential to aggravate conict, especially when bilateral relations are
9 already under pressure from other conict issues.
10 Concerning another theme related to the general environmental security
11 of the region, namely food security, the situation is no less alarming. As
12 with other resources, food is linked to security when it becomes scarce.

13 The South China Sea is the main source of protein for the 500 million
14 people who live in the coastal zone of the sea (Townsend-Gault 1999: 13).
15 The sea’s signicance as the main source of protein for the inhabitants of
16 the coastal region is expected to increase with the depletion of the arable
17 land in the littoral states. This depletion is again caused by population
18 increase and general environmental exhaustion. Proper management of
19 the living resources, either unilaterally or multilaterally, is virtually non-
20 existent. As a result of this, the environmental quality of the South China
21 Sea is severely reduced. The heavy shipping activities of the region only
22 add to this problem.
23 Depletion of sh stocks is probably the most important issue here. For
24 an estimated 1 billion Asians, sh is the main source of protein and shing
25 supports more people than in any other region of the world. For most
26 states in the region, therefore, the relationship between food security,
27 ecological damage and conict is most evident at sea. All across East and
28 Southeast Asia, traditional shing grounds are now severely depleted
29 as a result of overshing (Magno 1997). As traditional shing-grounds
30 are exhausted, competition for the remaining stocks has intensied.
31 Competition for sh in Southeast Asia has traditionally been most intense
32 in the Gulf of Thailand. Illegal Thai shing has been an aggravating source
33 of friction between Thailand and its neighbours. Also concerning one of
34 the most central conict areas in the South China Sea, the Spratlys, sh
35 is indeed a central issue.
36 From studies on food security we know that food is most likely to
37 become a security issue when it is combined with other variables such as
38 unexpected uctuations in supply and demand or political and economic
39 failure. 6 Hence, food shortages are most likely to threaten the security of
40 states and individuals when they coincide with other threats to security.
41 Nevertheless, the real food shortage situation of the region is likely to be
42 of such a serious character in the long run that preserving land and sea
43 areas in a sustainable way becomes intrinsic to conict prevention. This
44 will be solved most satisfactorily if it is dealt with by the affected nations
45 together; the resources of the region do not respect international borders.
1 Closely related to the question of food security and a central theme in

2 the international environmental security debate, is the question of fresh
3 water. 7 Today, there is a widening gap between demand for fresh water
4 and its availability. Water consumption increased dramatically in the
5 second half of the twentieth century. At the same time existing supplies
6 of fresh water have been degraded and reduced by unsustainable envir-
7 onmental practices, especially in developing states. And again, this is
8 accompanied by a rapidly growing population. Also in Pacic-Asia the
9 states are beginning to encounter the quantitative and qualitative water
10 limitations that other (drier) parts of the world have experienced for many
11 years already. In Asia as a whole, per capita water availability has declined
12 by between 40 per cent and 65 per cent since 1950 (Dupont 1998: 61),
13 and according to the World Bank most states in the region will be facing
14 serious water shortages by the year 2025, unless strong action is taken.
15 Water shortages are likely to impinge on the security of states and indi-
16 viduals in a number of ways. The perhaps most important link is the fact
17 that it takes a large amount of water to produce just one kilogram of rice.
18 Hence, there is a direct relationship between water shortage and food
19 insecurity. Another problem related to the water policy of the states is
1120 the construction of dams. This often means large-scale population displace-
21 ment, a phenomenon which may prompt political instability and violence
22 within states.
23 In the same way as with other environmental matters, fresh water
24 scarcity is likely to assume broader and more serious security ramica-
25 tions when it becomes entangled with other sources of tension. Also, the
26 quality and the strength of the political relationship between states, and
27 between groups within a state, sharing water resources is crucial in deter-
28 mining whether disputes escalate. Water scarcity will have the potential
29 to affect the region’s security environment both domestically and inter-
1130 nationally. Domestically, water shortages can intensify or aggravate social
31 and political tensions and complicate the everyday political and social life
32 of a country. Internationally, the security problem related to water scarcity
33 is a question of growing interdependence between states. As interdepen-
34 dence grows, the water problems of one state will become the concern of
35 all. In this way, the importance of water as one of the factors prompting
36 international conict will increase.
37
38
The emergence of a new concept: environmental security
39
40 These (very brief) examples of a possible relationship between environ-
41 mental deterioration and security in the South China Sea region are
42 presented to illustrate the necessity to apply a comprehensive security
43 concept if the problems of the region are to be solved. A comprehensive
44 security concept consists of something more than political and military
1145 security. Issue areas that should also be included in a comprehensive
1 concept include economic security, social security and environmental

2 security.8
3 The demand for international cooperation related to a variety of border-
4 transcending issues such as ecological degradation, migration, trade fric-
5 tions etc. necessitates an expanded understanding of security. During the
6 last fteen years numerous scholars have argued that narrow views of
7 security have become increasingly inappropriate. According to Barry
8 Buzan, ‘the linkage between the structure of political fragmentation on
9 the one hand, and the rising tide of mutually consequential activities
10 in several sectors on the other, creates common fates and security inter-
11 dependencies across a wide range of issues’ (1991: 368). Up until the mid-
12 1980s ‘security’ was primarily referred to as the security of states, with

13 the close reference to state sovereignty that this implies (Walker 1990:
14 3–4). Moreover, ‘security’ was traditionally considered to be synonymous
15 with ‘military security’ because most challenges to a state’s normal way
16 of life seemed to come from external violence (Rowlands 1991: 99). In
17 fact, however, the world has changed, not least as to the realities of human
18 security. Particularly due to the rapid changes that the world has experi-
19 enced after the end of the Cold War, the realists’ restrictive interpreta-
20 tions of security have become outdated. Recent years have seen an
21 increasing focus on (1) threats against the international community as a
22 whole: i.e. threats to ‘world peace’, the threat of a global nuclear war,
23 threats against the global ecological balance, etc.; (2) threats against the
24 individual: i.e. against its physical survival, basic welfare rights, human
25 rights etc.; and (3) the extension of security thinking to the regional level
26 (Dokken 1997). In Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan et al.
27 (1998) have suggested ve general components of security: military, envir-
28 onmental, economic, societal and political security. For the purpose of this
29 article it is primarily environmental security which is interesting.
30 As of today there is no general agreement about a clear causal rela-
31 tionship between environmental deterioration or resource scarcity on the
32 one hand and violent conict on the other. What is more generally
33 accepted is that environmental factors interact with other, more tradi-
34 tional security issues as factors prompting intra- or international conict.
35 The impact or weight of environmental issues on security will vary and,
36 in some cases, they may play no role at all. The kind of link is therefore
37 uncertain. But that there is a link is quite obvious. It is primarily this
38 insight that has led researchers to introduce the concept ‘environmental
39 security’. We have become aware of the fact that security depends on
40 substantially more than military security (Westing 1983).
41 We may speak of three main currents in the study of security and the
42 human environment: (1) The ‘military apparatus’ approach, (2) The ‘rede-
43 ning security’ approach, and (3) The ‘environmental conict’ approach.
44 (1) The rst approach emphasizes the relationship between the military
45 apparatus and the human environment. Authors within this approach study
1 inter alia the effects of the military apparatus on the human environment
2 – in peacetime as well as during war. A major work within this area is
3 Arthur Westing’s Environmental Hazards of War (1990a) discussing the
4 consequences of a conventional war on a rapidly industrializing world.
5 High levels of development and industrialization make widespread devas-
6 tation increasingly likely as the result of war damage to civilian facilities
7 such as nuclear power plants, chemical plants and dams. The devastation
8 is not from the weapons alone but from the release of radioactive or toxic
9 chemicals or impounded waters.
10 (2) The second approach can be subordinated under the ‘redening
11 security’ tradition, which started long before the current debate on security
12 and the environment. Concerning the environmental component of this

13 approach there are two mainstreams of scholars: those who aim at
14 redening national security, and those with a more holistic approach or a
15 common security approach. For our purpose, it is primarily the second
16 mainstream that is interesting. Scholars who belong to this mainstream
17 hold that threats are of a different kind today than several hundred years
18 ago (Mathews 1989). Patricia Mische writes that ‘[t]he Earth does not recog-
19 nize security as we now know it’. She looks upon the Earth as an indivisible
1120 ecosystem: ‘The sovereignty of the Earth is indivisible’ (1989: 394–6).
21 A major threat to human security today comes from man’s capacity to
22 alter Earth’s life-sustaining ability. Over-utilization lies at the core of the
23 problem. Renewable resources like global forests and sheries are, on a
24 world-wide basis, now being used up faster by human species than their
25 rate of natural replenishment (Westing 1990b). The emergence of a funda-
26 mentally and pervasively threatening set of environmental problems has
27 pushed environmental issues on to the central stage internationally.
28 Increasingly we have come to realize that not only health but also security
29 is at stake (Dokken 1997: 70). Unlike threats in the social sphere, envi-
1130 ronmental threats cannot be dened in ideological terms. Nor can they
31 be resolved through conventional competition for power. A more powerful
32 state will be no added advantage: domination will not bring salvation.
33 Moreover, environmental threats do not respect national borders,
34 which in turn means that traditional state sovereignty is beginning to be
35 challenged.
36 (3) The third approach concentrates on the conict side of the link
37 between environment and security. The basic assumption of this approach
38 is that conicts over access to natural resources and conicts in the direct
39 aftermath of environmental degradation are becoming more and more
40 likely in our world. Arthur Westing’s Global Resources and International
41 Conict represents a classic work within this group (Westing 1986). Thomas
42 Homer-Dixon’s ‘On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of
43 acute conict’ is an outstanding work along the same line (Homer-Dixon
44 1991). In his work Homer-Dixon suggests a preliminary analytical frame-
1145 work that lays out the research agenda for exploring the issue. In short
1 his framework is the following. He posits that seven major environmental

2 problems may contribute to conict among developing countries: green-
3 house warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid precipitation, deforest-
4 ation, degradation of agricultural land, over-use and pollution of water
5 supplies, and depletion of sh stocks. He then divides the ‘how’ question
6 – how environmental change will lead to conict – into two independent
7 questions: What are the important social effects of environmental change?
8 What types of conict, if any, are the most likely to result from these
9 social effects? To the rst question it is hypothesized four principal social
10 effects of environmental degradation: decreased agricultural production,
11 economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of legitimized
12 and authoritative institutions and social relations. These four are often
13 causally interlinked. In Ecoviolence (Blitt and Homer-Dixon 1998) a fth
14 intermediate variable is introduced, namely social segmentation. The
15 model thereby now operates with ve social effects of environmental
16 degradation.
17 As to the second question, we may draw on more traditional theories
18 of conict to hypothesize that severe environmental degradation may
19 produce three different types of conict. First, there are simple scarcity
20 conicts, arising over struggle for three types of resources in particular:
21 fresh water, sh and agriculturally productive land. Second, there are
22 group identity conicts, arising from large-scale movements of populations
23 brought about by environmental change. Third, relative deprivation
24 conicts, arising from economic decline caused by environmental prob-
25 lems. All these categories could be both domestic and international in
26 scope. Related to the main subject of this paper the question would be:
27 How can regional integration be expected to break the anticipated causal
28 link between environmental change and conict? In particular, how can
29 fear of environmentally induced conicts – security considerations – func-
30 tion as driving forces for regional cooperation. Related to Homer-Dixon’s
31 model, international cooperation could either break the link between envi-
32 ronmental change and social effects, or the link between social effects of
33 environmental change and conict. Figure 1 illustrates this anticipated
34 relationship.
35
36
The necessity of driving forces in international integration
37
processes
38
39 Most researchers studying the environmental situation in the South China
40 Sea region point to the necessity of regional cooperation to come to grips
41 with a growing problem. So far, however, regionalism has not come too far
42 in dealing with the international environmental problems. The most obvious
43 institution to do so is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN
44 has already cooperated on environmental issues for many years. However,
45 the impression is that the association does not put the environmental issues
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 Figure 1 Environmental conict or international cooperation?
9
10 at the top of its agenda. To do so it would probably have to regard them as
11 even more serious than it does today. If serious environmental problems
12 were dened by the political actors as security matters, then they would most
13 certainly be put higher up on the agenda.
14 Let us also look at this from the opposite angle: in the scientic liter-
15 ature on international integration outside Europe, the lack of political will
16 to go forward with the integration process is very often cited as one of
17 the most important reasons for lack of success. This general lack of politi-
18 cal will is probably related to the lack of driving forces in the integration
19 process. Such driving forces, when present, have traditionally been related
1120 to high politics. High politics is politics that concern vital national inter-
21 ests, politics that the actors regard as sensitive to the state and that is to
22 be dealt with by the highest authorities of the state (Dokken 1997: 84).9
23 There is a general tendency for the perception of a common threat to
24 create a strong driving force for inter-state cooperation. In the case of
25 ASEAN we saw that the fear of communism was an important driving
26 force for integration during the rst phases of the process. With the end
27 of the Cold War and through the inclusion of all Southeast Asian states
28 in the association ASEAN has lost its probably most important driving
29 force. The most interesting question to ask in relation to the subject of
1130 this paper is whether environmental security considerations could serve
31 as an equally important driving force for continued integration in
32 Southeast Asia. Before answering this question I would like to refer briey
33 to some theoretical points related to international integration. One of the
34 most important theorists within the eld of international integration is
35 Ernst B. Haas. In his classical works on neo-functionalism (Haas 1958,
36 1964) pragmatic interest policy is put forward as the basic process vari-
37 able. Other kinds of independent variables are de-emphasized at all levels
38 of the integration. Later on, however, Haas admitted that pragmatic inter-
39 ests would not be sufcient to bring a process forward. In fact, this admit-
40 tance was one of the main reasons why Haas nally left his original theory.
41 Another important theorist within this eld, Amitai Etzioni, developed a
42 framework for the preconditions to an integration process. Considerable
43 attention was given to the ‘common external threat’. However, Etzioni
44 sidesteps the question of what will happen to the union if or when the
1145 threat is dissolved (like in the case of ASEAN and the end of the Cold
1 War); likewise the issue of how relevant the threat is to stages other than
2 the ‘pre-unication state’ (Etzioni 1965).
3 A considerable degree of political will seems to be a necessary factor
4 in all processes of integration. This political will is usually related to high
5 politics considerations. In classical integration theory there has been a lack
6 of attention to the role of high politics as driving forces for the integra-
7 tion process.
8 One very important aspect related to this is that driving forces cannot
9 function as such without being perceived by the political actors as high
10 politics. Hence the concept must be related to the general perceptions of
11 the politicians. The actors must recognize and perceive the link between
12 their high politics concern and international integration. To a large degree

13 this is a matter of learning. At this stage the existence of so-called ‘epis-
14 temic communities’ becomes important. We may dene ‘epistemic commu-
15 nities’ as ‘networks of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative
16 claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise’ (Haas
17 1994). Epistemic communities may have the ability to change the percep-
18 tions of political actors. Before moving on to the possible role of epis-
19 temic communities in relation to integration in Southeast Asia let us
20 see whether environmental security issues have the potential of being
21 driving forces in integration between the countries around the South China
22 Sea.
23
24
Environmental security issues as driving forces
25
26 How can environmental security considerations function as driving forces
27 in processes of integration between regional countries? To answer this
28 question let us start by asking its negation: how can environmental
29 deterioration be expected to lead to conict in and between countries?
30 This was briey elaborated above by reference to Homer-Dixon’s
31 suggested agenda for research on environmental changes as causes of acute
32 conict. There are probably many factors that could break the anticipated
33 causal links between environmental change – via the main social effects
34 – and conict. For our purpose we may inquire: how can regional inte-
35 gration be expected to break the causal links between the ve main social
36 effects of environmental change and the three types of conict? We have
37 already indicated how the perception of a common threat is likely to
38 create a strong motivation for integration between states. This is particu-
39 larly evident among developing countries where economic links are far
40 weaker than in the industrialized world.
41 My general anticipation about the relationship between environmental
42 security and international integration is the following:
43
44 It is issues of politico-military security that are likely to generate
45 calls for closer international cooperation. Increasingly, problems of
1 environmental security will do the same. Regional environmental

2 problems may be considered in terms of shared hazards and shared
3 resources: both categories are now poised to acquire signicant inte-
4 grative potential. The problems are growing, and so are the poten-
5 tial gains of cooperation.
6
7 However, unless the politicians recognize environmental deterioration
8 (shared hazards or shared resources) as a threat and as a matter of inter-
9 dependence, these problems will not achieve such a signicant integrative
10 potential. Again, this is to a large degree a matter of learning. And this
11 is where the epistemic communities play their very important role.
12 It is therefore necessary to ask whether there are signs of epistemic

13 communities playing such a role in relation to international cooperation
14 in the South China Sea region. Studies on the role of experts in relation
15 to environment, security and international cooperation in the region are
16 as yet limited. Around the Mediterranean and Baltic authoritative regional
17 communities of scientists have emerged and these communities were inu-
18 ential in establishing ocean governance systems for those seas (Haas 1990,
19 1992; Hjorth 1994; Naess 1999: 10). Generally, authoritative expertise and
1120 data are a vital basis for any community or group of policy-makers dealing
21 with the environment. Scientists who have the ability to think ecologically
22 and in broad terms can play an important role in the development of
23 ocean governance systems. The impact of scientic advice is more likely
24 in situations where decision-makers are uncertain about environmental
25 problems (Haas 1992). This is the case with the South China Sea. There
26 is a general lack of qualied information on the sea and its resources.
27 There are, however, several factors impeding a possible scientic impact
28 on environmental policies in the South China Sea. At the outset, heavy
29 emphasis on vital state interests and national sovereignty does not leave
1130 much room for independent scientic advice on how to formulate envi-
31 ronmental policies in the region. For the time being, the climate is domi-
32 nated by high politics. This obviously hampers the inuence of expert
33 advice, the way it works today.
34 The dependency on the sea for its resources, as means of transporta-
35 tion and foreign exchange earnings, from shing and tourism etc., and the
36 fact that the states around the South China Sea are heavily interdepen-
37 dent in relation to the use of the resources, should imply that international
38 cooperation is the only sensible policy alternative in the future. However,
39 knowing that today there is a perceived contradiction between environ-
40 mental considerations and international cooperation on the one hand and
41 the emphasis on vital state interests and national sovereignty on the other,
42 what does it take to make the political actors feel forced to cooperate?
43 The concept of ‘environmental security’ may be part of the answer.
44 According to this concept there is no contradiction between inter-
1145 national environmental regimes and vital national interests. Rather,
1 international cooperation on environmental resources is the only way to

2 secure vital national resources for the future. Dealing with environmental
3 problems will normally require some pooling of state sovereignty on behalf
4 of common ecological security. The linkage between political/military
5 security and environmental security arises from the fact that we are living
6 in an interdependent world. In our days the destinies of nations are
7 becoming intertwined in ever more complex ways. Sensitivity and vulner-
8 ability are two key concepts related to the phenomenon of interdepen-
9 dence. In general, the sensitivity and vulnerability of states in an
10 interdependent world create a need for policy coordination to reduce the
11 effects of vulnerability and regain control. So far, this has been of impor-
12 tance primarily in relation to political/military security. However, the

13 conceptualization is equally valuable where environmental security is
14 concerned. A trans-border ecosystem out of control creates the need to
15 cooperate between states so as to reduce further vulnerability and regain
16 control.
17 On environmental security matters, states never have been – nor will
18 they ever become – fully sovereign. This is particularly evident when it
19 comes to international policy on pollution. Trans-boundary pollution of
20 waterways raises the question of whether polluting activities within the
21 boundaries of one state should remain the exclusive jurisdiction of its
22 government. Alternatively, is the sovereignty of a state compromised when
23 its environment is degraded by pollutants emanating from neighbouring
24 countries? (See Dokken 1997: 89; Soroos 1986.) These are among the
25 points that need to be emphasized by the scientic experts when asked
26 for advice by the policy-makers in the South China Sea region. It all points
27 in the direction of the need for further international cooperation.
28
29
Environmental security as driving forces in ASEAN
30
integration
31
32 Let us then return to the main question of this paper, i.e. whether common
33 environmental problems could be a driving force for further integration
34 within ASEAN and between ASEAN, China and Taiwan. The recogni-
35 tion of strong environmental interdependence is one of the strongest
36 driving forces for regional cooperation and integration outside Europe
37 today.
38 Above I showed that with the end of the Cold War and through the
39 inclusion of all the Southeast Asian states in the association, ASEAN lost
40 its probably most important driving force. We know that in organizations
41 like ASEAN, pragmatic interests are not sufcient for the integration
42 process to move forward. A driving force is needed. It is possible that, if
43 dened as security matters, grave international environmental problems
44 could be the necessary driving force for ASEAN in the future. For the
45 political leaders of the Southeast Asia region to perceive environmental
1 problems as security matters, they must learn that they are. Teaching the
2 political actors about the relationship between environment and security
3 in the South China Sea region may therefore be an important task for
4 the epistemic communities of concerned scientists in the region. There is
5 particularly one process that deserves to be mentioned here. In 1990,
6 Indonesia initiated a series of annual workshops on the South China Sea
7 problem. Funded by the Canadian International Development Agency
8 (CIDA), they aimed at bolstering cooperation and promoted condence-
9 building processes among the countries involved in the territorial disputes.
10 These workshops are still in function. The participants are foreign ministry
11 ofcials and academics from ASEAN, China and Taiwan. However, the
12 workshops are informal and have no independent policy-making functions.

13 Their best possible effect would be as a community where the policy-
14 makers could learn to see the close relationship between environmental
15 issues and security in the region.
16 ASEAN has been criticized by several scholars for being too soft in its
17 way of handling the conicts in the South China Sea. Nevertheless,
18 ASEAN’s so-called constructive engagement policy, its practice of informal
19 consultation processes (musyawarah) and its continuous strive for unani-
1120 mous decisions (mufakat) has denitely safeguarded that international
21 conicts so far have been solved by peaceful means. Resolving such
22 disputes is undoubtedly one of ASEAN’s highest priorities. At the same
23 time, we know that the organization’s enlargement in the 1990s is another
24 important way of relating to perceived threats by ASEAN’s politicians.
25 Ramses Amer (1999: 1038) holds that recent years’ enlargement of the
26 organization can be seen as an exercise in conict management:
27
28 The gradual process of expanding relations between ASEAN and
29 Indochina and between ASEAN and Burma, the accession to the
1130 Bali Treaty of all the countries of Southeast Asia and the gradual
31 expansion of ASEAN membership within the region has brought
32 the whole region into line, with one framework for conict manage-
33 ment and a code of conduct for inter-state relations. The evolution
34 is a major achievement and provides for a situation, which is
35 conducive to the peaceful management of existing and potential
36 future inter-state disputes throughout the region. Bringing the coun-
37 tries which were earlier perceived as potential or real threats and
38 even as outright enemies, into the framework of regional coopera-
39 tion, as developed by the ASEAN members, can be seen as an exer-
40 cise in conict management.
41
42 A central element of these threat perceptions is the recognition of strong
43 environmental interdependence in the region. International resource/
44 environmental questions are perhaps not yet regarded as security ques-
1145 tions. But they are most certainly regarded as high politics. An outstanding
1 example here is the triangle China, Vietnam and ASEAN. Since the
2 creation of ASEAN China has been perceived (although not ofcially) as
3 a common external enemy to the members of the organization. The poten-
4 tial threat of a strong China has become ever more visible as the South
5 China Sea dispute has been brought to the central stage of the inter-
6 national policy debate in the region. Driven by perceptions of the mili-
7 tary ambitions of China in relation to the country’s claims to South China
8 Sea territories, the ASEAN countries have embarked on efforts to beef
9 up their own naval capabilities. It is undeniable that the territorial disputes
10 in the South China Sea, involving ve of the member countries of ASEAN,
11 have been major factors propelling the arms build-up in the region (Magno
12 1997: 102). Another way of handling this problem within ASEAN has
13 been to bring Vietnam – one of the most important parties to the disputes
14 – into the organization. ASEAN countries have realized that they cannot
15 compete with China individually. They have to deal with her collectively.
16 However, China is not willing to deal with the disputes in a multilateral
17 forum. This is an obvious dilemma for the possible solution to the problem.
18 By bringing in Vietnam, ASEAN has not only made itself stronger in
19 absolute numbers. The admission of Vietnam into ASEAN has also
20 strengthened the organization’s interest in and, not least, its right to
21 conduct discussions on the South China Sea. The admission of Vietnam
22 will most certainly affect the future approach of ASEAN to the South
23 China Sea disputes. It is likely that the organization will come up with
24 a joint declaration during the next few years. The approach favoured
25 by most ASEAN states is a regional approach to a regional problem.
26 Several key politicians have stated this openly.10 As of today, there is
27 primarily one such declaration that deserves our attention here, namely
28 the ASEAN/AMM Declaration on the South China Sea (1992). This
29 declaration marked ASEAN’s rst formal step in tackling the issue
30 and is a milestone in the development of an ASEAN approach to the
31 disputes. ‘Just as in the Cambodian conict, ASEAN did not inch from
32 addressing another delicate and sensitive issue, namely the South China
33 Sea conicts’ (Lee Lai To 1995: 539). By coming up with the declaration,
34 and adopting a common stand in spite of their differences, ASEAN created
35 a new role for itself in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It
36 remains to be seen to what extent Vietnam would affect ASEAN’s
37 solidarity and its position towards China on these questions in the future.
38 Undoubtedly, a future declaration on the South China Sea will differ
39 signicantly from the one that ASEAN worked out before Vietnam’s
40 admission.
41
42
Conclusions
43
44 China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea has had several impli-
45 cations for the ASEAN states. First, it already has caused some concern
1 in the region, and should China persist with its forward policy it will rein-
2 force its neighbours’ mistrust and misgivings towards China. Second, it is
3 likely to force the ASEAN claimant states to establish a political defence
4 coalition against China because they cannot compete with China individ-
5 ually. Third, it may trigger a revision by some states of the two-China
6 policy, with the effect of embarrassing China by recognizing Taiwan.
7 Fourth, it may introduce new factors into the geopolitics of the region,
8 such as providing a pretext for Japan to re-arm itself in order to protect
9 its vital interests in the South China Sea. Fifth, it may introduce host coun-
10 tries of overseas Chinese to adopt once again a hostile policy towards the
11 overseas Chinese communities (Gao 1994: 353).
12 There is a smouldering conict going on between China on the one

13 hand and the ASEAN states on the other. Whether one is committed to
14 the concept of environmental security or not, one has to admit that envi-
15 ronmental interdependence lies to the centre of the conict. The whole
16 issue is about the future management of environmental resources that are
17 of the utmost importance to all parties concerned. The way the countries
18 deal with these matters during the rst coming years will decide whether
19 the future will bring a more serious (armed) conict or if the inter-
1120 dependence is taken advantage of to the benet of all parties concerned.
21 A solution to the benet of all parties is most likely to come about through
22 the work of a multilateral organization, ASEAN.
23 Amid the frenzy of resource activities and military build-up in the South
24 China Sea, the urgency of adopting condence-building measures to
25 promote environmental security and cooperation comes to the fore. The
26 concept most often suggested in relation to condence-building activity
27 in the region is ‘joint development’. As of today, however, very little
28 progress has been made in this respect. While the reasons for it are many,
29 the lack of sincerity and genuine interest in joint development on the part
1130 of most of the claimants is probably a major cause why we have seen so
31 little of it. What does it take, then, to move from words to deeds? The
32 perception among the members of the organization that these questions
33 are matters of high politics is an absolute prerequisite. Otherwise the lack
34 of political will is likely to prevent any real progress in a future solution
35 to the conicts. It is therefore an important task for the epistemic commu-
36 nities, like the Indonesian initiated workshops, to point out the future
37 security implications of today’s smouldering conicts.
38 One suggestion is to promote an environmental security protocol to
39 govern the behaviour of the various states of the region. The protocol
40 would be similar to the 1992 ASEAN Declaration of the South China
41 Sea, except that it would be more encompassing, including non-ASEAN
42 members China and Taiwan as parties to the agreement, and have an
43 additional accent on environmental protection (Magno 1997: 107). The
44 ARF would provide a suitable framework for discussing this matter.11 In
1145 any case, there should be a regional solution to a regional problem.
1 And from the ASEAN point of view, a stronger commitment to envir-

2 onmental security matters would be a driving force for further integra-
3 tion – as security matters have always been for the organization.
4
5 Notes
6
1 See also Ramses Amer (1999: 1033).
7
2 Michael Leifer has a somewhat more pessimistic view on TAC. See Leifer
8 (1999).
9 3 See for instance Renato Cruz de Castro (1998).
10 4 Ibid.
11 5 PMCs are meetings arranged between ASEAN member countries and their
dialogue partners in the aftermath of each ASEAN annual ministers’ meeting.

12
6 For studies on food security, see for instance: John W. Maxwell and Rafael
13 Reuveny (1996) ‘Renewable resource scarcity and political conict: a formal
14 model and policy analysis’, School of Public and Environmental Affairs Work-
15 ing Paper, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Sandra Postel (1996)
16 ‘Dividing the waters: food security, ecosystem health, and the new politics of
scarcity’, Worldwatch Paper 132.
17
7 For studies on the relationship between water and international security, see
18 for instance Peter Gleick (1993) ‘Water and conict: fresh water resources and
19 international security’, International Security 18: 79–112.
20 8 Among the most important contributions to this subject is Barry Buzan, Ole
21 Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis,
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
22
9 For a thorough discussion of the necessity of driving forces in international
23 integration processes outside Europe, see Dokken (1997: 177–88).
24 10 At the time of the US military pullout, the president of the Philippines, Fidel
25 Ramos, actually called on ASEAN to play a more active role in regional security
26 and to adopt a collective posture on every common issue, including the Spratlys.
11 Robyn Lim writes that North Asia is the locus of regional tensions, yet ASEAN
27
clings to its centrality in the ARF. However, in the South China Sea conict,
28 ASEAN is undoubtedly at the central stage, particularly after the admission
29 of Vietnam. See Lim (1998: 115).
30
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5 - Dokken - 2001 - Is Environmental Security A Useful Concept

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This article was downloaded by: [McMaster University]

On: 28 October 2014, At: 09:22

The Pacific Review

To cite this article: Karin Dokken (2001) Environment, security

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512740110087311

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makes it better prepared to meet future challenges that cannot be solved

1 ASEAN’s record in relation to security questions

agreement that foreign military bases in the region are temporary.

12 years to follow, several incidents served to intensify this solidarity and

1 The end of the Cold War

1 was to develop ‘a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in

12 treated in a comprehensive manner by all the states surrounding it. It is

12 a background of rising energy demand, high economic growth and dimin-

1 energy dependence, rapid depletion of existing oil reserves and growing

12 with other resources, food is linked to security when it becomes scarce.

1 Closely related to the question of food security and a central theme in

1 concept include economic security, social security and environmental

12 1980s ‘security’ was primarily referred to as the security of states, with

12 and the environment. Concerning the environmental component of this

1 his framework is the following. He posits that seven major environmental

12 their high politics concern and international integration. To a large degree

1 environmental security will do the same. Regional environmental

12 It is therefore necessary to ask whether there are signs of epistemic

1 international cooperation on environmental resources is the only way to

12 tance primarily in relation to political/military security. However, the

12 workshops are informal and have no independent policy-making functions.

12 There is a smouldering conict going on between China on the one

1 And from the ASEAN point of view, a stronger commitment to envir-

dialogue partners in the aftermath of each ASEAN annual ministers’ meeting.

1 Walker, R. B. J. (1990b) ‘Security, sovereignty and the challenge of world poli-

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12 There is a smouldering conict going on between China on the one