Moya v.

Del Fierro

Facts:. Del Fiero was declared as mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines
Norte. However, Moya, his rival, opposed contending that the liberal appreciation of the ballots
was wrong.

Issue: whether or not ballots should be read and appreciated with reasonable liberality.

Ruling: Yes, there should be no technical rules permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if
that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. In one ballot properly
counted for Del Fiero, the elector wrote the respondent’s name on the space for vice mayor, but,
apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to
the word “mayor” (Alcalde) printed on the left side if the ballot. Here, the intention of the elector to
vote for the respondent for mayor was evident, in the absence of proof showing that the ballot
had been tampered with. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative
type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. This is the reason for the rule
that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.

Badalles v. Cabili
Facts: Mariano Badelles together with Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along
with the five protestees were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such
election for councilors in the City of Iligan, who contested the election of Honorable Camilo P.
Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of the said city.
It was then alleged that there are irregularities on the said election and that illegal votes were cast
by those not qualified to do so. Protestees moved to dismiss in different suits the petition on the
following grounds:
1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election
Code;
2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the
Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same;
3. That the complaint states no cause of action.
On march 23, 1968, in a single order, the election protests were dismissed based on the
lack of a cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal issued by COMELEC on March 23, 1968 is valid.
Held: No. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and
orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not
be permitted to taint the electoral process.
Tolentino v. Comelec
Facts: Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate.
Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
"Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.

On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces
but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13
candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve
(12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve
the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed
Vice-President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked
12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.

Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction
because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether
they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5 and, consequently,
(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the
special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of
Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No. 6646").

In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an
amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners
accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their
original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.

COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and
on petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity
of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss
the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is
not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation
of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.

Issues: The following are the issues presented for resolution:

(1) Procedurally --
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
 (b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
validly held on 14 May 2001.

Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio: The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization.

The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of
necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right
of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that
COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held
on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections.

The Nature of the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction

A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in
the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.

Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from
committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts
already done.

In view of petitioners' standing

We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters
since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised
in this petition is likely to arise again.

Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on
14 May 2001
 Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term

Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by
fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than
ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices; to be voted for.

A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections
reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial,
with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions
24 or even in its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a
single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor
did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate
receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.

In view of COMELEC's failure

The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the
election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election
held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with
the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the
election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the
law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than
60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office
to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy.

More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan,
in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right
of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election.

Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No
such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office
or offices to be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the
filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election
returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in
general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes
in a jointly held regular and special elections.

However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to
amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering
the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC
and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience.

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and

important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective
for which it was created — free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its
choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not interfere.

The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of
necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right
of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that
COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held
on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections.

Purisima v. Salanga

FACTS
● 1963 November, Purisima and Gregorio Cordeo were among the candidates running
forProvincial Board Members of Ilocos Sur. Nov 25 the provincial board and canvassers
met and started canvassing the returns for the said office
 ● Purisima noted that during the canvass the returns from 41 precincts showed that the
words and figures for Corderos vote have been “obviously and manifestly erased” and
superimposed with other words and figures. For purposes of comparison it was found that
a discrepancy of 5042 votes in favor of Cordero was thereby found.
● A request for suspension was made by Purisima which was denied by the board of
canvassers on the ground that it was not yet ascertained if the discrepancies would
materially affect the result. Canvass proceeded.
● After the returns has been read the results showed that for the Cordero won the LAST
SLOT for board member with a difference of 1857 votes against Purisima
● After multiple attempts of Purisima again to call to attention the erasure and discrepancies
and asked for the suspension- then denied- he filed a petition in COMELEC to annul the
canvass and proclamation which issued the annulment of the canvass and proclamation
as regards to Purisima and Cordero.
● CFI RULLING:
○ Purisima filed a petition for recount under 163 of the Revised Election Code where
motions to dismiss were filed by both Cordero and the board of Canvassers. After
preliminary hearing, the motion was dismissed- Cordero then filed to COMELEC a
motion for resumption of canvass [Cordero admitted that there were erasures but
denied tampering]
○ He then filed a MOR, in the same case he also filed a petition for preliminary
injunction against the canvassing. He also filed in COMELEC an opposition for
resumption of canvass (bes tatlong kaso isang problema)
● Alleging the COMELEC was about to resume canvassing Purisima went to SC who asked
for opposition to file an answer
ISSUE: Whether a recounting of the ballots was in order
HELD: YES. The SC explained the requisites of judicial recount in Sec 163 of the Revised Election
Code which are:
1. that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a discrepancy exists;
2. that said discrepancy is between the copy submitted to the board and another authentic
copy thereof;
3. that said authentic copy must also be submitted to the board.
The CFI judge erred (respondent) in stating that the requisites were not present since:
1. it is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for recount, even if he does
so alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers
2. Purisima first called attention to the discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party copies
and the Provincial Treasurer’s copies, the board of canvassers admitted the discrepancy
3. In the motion to dismiss filed by the board of canvassers, the existence of the discrepancy
is not disputed, and the board merely raises the defense that the recount is up to the court
and not to said board
OBITER:
● It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent
irregularity in the election returns. A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such
 patent defects, without awaiting proper remedies, is null and void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated,
the Commission on Elections declared the canvass and proclamation, made by
respondent provincial board of canvassers, null and void.
● Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the petition for recount is set aside, respondent Judge isordered
to proceed with the petition for recount, and respondents Commission on Elections and Provincial
Board of Canvassers are enjoined, until after the termination of proceedings in the petition for
recount, from ordering or holding another canvass and proclamation as between petitioner
Purisima and respondent Cordero.

Cauton v. COMELEC
Facts:
● Petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad, along with Godofredo S.
Reyes, were candidates for Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos
Sur in the Nov. 9, 1965 national elections.
● During the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, particularly after the Board
had opened the envelopes containing the copies of the election returns from the election
precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, Sanidad brought to the
attention of the Board that the entries of votes for the candidates for Representative in
those copies of the election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the
provincial treasurer differed from the entries in the copies of the returns that were in the
possession of the Liberal Party.
● Sanidad filed a petition with the Commission on Elections praying for the opening of the
ballot boxes in all the precincts of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, to canvass of the
votes, and that in the meantime the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur be
ordered to refrain from proclaiming the winning candidate for the office of Representative
in said district. Comelec issued the restraining order and set his petition for hearing.
● After hearing, the Commission on Elections found that the copies of the election returns
for the Municipal Treasurer, Comelec and Provincial Treasurer for Santa Cruz have
uniform alterations and showed different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies.
The returns for Candon and Santiago were never verified as the municipal treasurers of
the two municipalities did not comply with the subpoena duces tecum issued by the
Commission on Elections directing them to bring to the Commission the copies of the
election returns of the precincts in their respective municipalities.
● On December 22, 1965, Comelec issued an order directing the opening of the ballot boxes
of the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago to retrieve the corresponding
election returns in all the precincts of said municipalities. The ballot boxes were opened
by the Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of the Commission, Atty. Fernando Gorospe,
and the envelopes containing the election returns were brought to Manila.
● On December 28, 1965, the envelopes that were taken from the ballot boxes were opened
and the election returns were taken out and their contents examined and recorded by a
 committee appointed by the Commission in a formal hearing with notice to the parties
concerned
● On the same day, petitioner Lucas Cauton filed before the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, praying that the Comelec Resolution
ordering the opening of the ballot boxes used in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and
Santiago in the elections be annulled and set aside, and that Comelec be restrained from
opening the envelopes containing the election returns, alleging that Comelec acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the resolution.
● Cauton contends that under Section 157 of the Revised Election Code the Commission
on Elections has authority to order the opening of the ballot boxes only in connection with
an investigation conducted for the purpose of helping in the prosecution of any violation
of the election laws or for purely administrative purpose but not when the sole purpose is
to assist a party in trying to win the election, and that the mere fact that the copies of the
returns of the Liberal Party do not tally with the returns in the possession of the Provincial
Treasurer, the Comelec and the Nacionalista Party does not legally support the validity of
the resolution.
Issue: Whether Comelec had the authority to order the opening of the ballot boxes
Ruling: Yes. In issuing the resolution in question, the Commission on Elections simply performed
a function as authorized by the Constitution to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and exercise all other functions which
may be conferred upon it by law. Comelec has the power to decide all administrative questions
affecting elections, except the question involving the right to vote.
Comelec has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the canvass of election
returns made by the board of canvassers. In Albano v. Arranz, the Court held that:
The suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into irregularities
brought to the attention of the Commission on Elections was well within its administrative
jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority conferred upon it by the Constitution (Art. X) for the
administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections. The Commission certainly had
the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed between the various copies of election
returns for the precincts in question and suspend the canvass in the meantime so the parties
could ask for a recount in case of variance.
Comelec issued the questioned resolution after hearing the arguments of the petitioner and the
opposition thereto, and considering that it has been clearly established that the copies of the
election returns for the Municipal Treasurer, for the Comelec and for the Provincial Treasurer for
the municipality of Sta. Cruz have uniform alteration in the entries of the votes cast for
representative, showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party copies, while
the copies of the election returns for the Commission of Elections and the Provincial Treasurer
for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and showing
different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies.
Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on which petitioner herein relies in support of his stand
in the present case, authorizes the opening of the ballot box whenever it is the subject of an official
investigation. Under this section, the ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election
contest, or even if there is no election contest when their contents have to be used as evidence
in the prosecution of election frauds. Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject
of any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent
authority, which necessarily includes the Commission on Elections which is charged with the
administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
Dispositive: The petition for certiorari and prohibition in the present case is dismissed.
[Additional important info]
This power of Comelec is simply administrative and supervisory – intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. When the
Commission on Elections exercises this power, the purpose is not for the Commission to help a
candidate win the election but to bring about the canvass of the true results of the elections as
certified by the boards of election inspectors in every precinct.
The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare four copies of the election returns in
each precinct: one to be deposited in the ballot box, one to be delivered to the municipal treasurer,
one to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the Commission on Elections. In
the case of the canvass of the election returns for candidates for provincial or national offices, the
election returns received by the provincial treasurer from the boards of inspectors are used. It is
the duty of the provincial treasurer to turn over to the provincial board of canvassers the election
returns received by him from the boards of inspectors. If the Commission on Elections is duly
informed and it so finds, in appropriate proceedings, that the election returns in the hands of the
provincial treasurer are tampered, then the Commission should afford the candidate adversely
affected by the tampering an opportunity to show that there exist authentic copies of the same
election returns which are not tampered. A recourse may be had to the copies received by the
Commission on Elections and to the copies received by the municipal treasurer.
If it is shown, that the copies in the hands of the Commission on Elections and of the municipal
treasurer are similarly tampered as the copies in the hands of the provincial treasurer, then it
becomes evident that all the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot box do not
constitute a reliable basis for a canvass. The only copies left to be checked, whether they are also
tampered or not, are the ones inside the ballot boxes.
Certainly, the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer and enforce the
laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain
whether the copy inside each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot
box, corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on Elections may do this on its own
initiative, or upon petition by the proper party.
Once it is found that the copy of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered, the
Commission on Elections would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a basis
for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2) afforded the party
aggrieved by the alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial
recount of the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.
Thus, the Commission on Elections has thereby made available the proper and reliable basis for
the canvass of the votes that will lead to the proclamation by the board of canvassers of the true
winner in the elections. In so doing the Commission on Elections, as We have said, had performed
its constitutional duty of administering and enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of elections
with a view to promoting clean and honest elections· the very purpose for which the Commission
on Elections was created by constitutional mandate.
Roque v. Comelec
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project
(automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and
Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM
and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award. They
contend the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the
people to the secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in Sec. 2, Art.
V of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is the Poll Automation Law unconstitutional for infringing the constitutional right of the people to
the secrecy of the ballot?

RULING:
No. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a “three feet”
long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such
infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as
demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the
machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to
do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his
vote known.

Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec

NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in
G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a
second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental
petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice
(DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary
Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding
Team), et al.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao
was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike
Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the
election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However,
the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud
in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of
the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of
the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding
probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with
the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot
consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction
to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited
is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as
the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and
the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed.
Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

FALLO: petition is denied

Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec
Facts:

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On
October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s
COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency,
date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and
filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s
COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June
5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to
assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative.
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office
Discussion:

Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election
returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office,
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA,
and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner
complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be
considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency,
the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship,
he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts,
and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality
can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.

Lico v. COMELEC
Facts:
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list
representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization... registered... under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.
it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee
OMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.
Ating Koop earned a seat in the House... of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took
his oath of office... and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations,... Ating
Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees
Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year
of the three-year term
Ating Koop... introduced amendm... ents to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient
changes was the composition of the Central Committee,... The amendments likewise mandated
the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second
National
Convention.
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to
hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.
The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled
him from Ating Koop for disloyalty.
Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner
Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for
his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
Rimas Group... h COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico... prayed that petitioner Lico... be
ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives
COMELEC
RESOLVES... to:
DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of
Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of ATING
KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for lack of... jurisdiction
Issues:
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list
representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
Ruling:
the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House
of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as
member of the House, and therefore it was... the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that
when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members
remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had... expired;... and that the COMELEC
was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of
the expulsion.
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon
the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution... ndows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives,
the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representative
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico
took his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET,
and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity
of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has
jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon... the qualification
requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be
represented.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that
do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by
Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the... jurisdiction of electoral
tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the
cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.
In the pre
The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of... bona fide
membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc
Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18 July
2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it... declares valid
the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list
Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.

Lokin v. Comelec

Estrella v. Comelec
Facts:
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His
opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which
consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor
and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for
inhibition ofCommissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However,
Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself anddesignated another Commissioner to
substitute him. The SecondDivision, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC
decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC EnBanc, in which this time, Commissioner
Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He
said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote
when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself inDivision deliberations may
participate in its En Banc deliberation.
HELD:
The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is
nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibitwith
reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Bancproceedings when he previously inhibited
himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but
legally improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the
issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the
necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The
order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision or order.

Sevilla v. Comelec

Ibrahim v. Comelec

Jaramilla v. Comelec

Cagas v. Comelec
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed
with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same
province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental.
H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of
the Province of Davao Occidental.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this
Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within
sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.

As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for
the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the
COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously
with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend
or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so
thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Was COMELEC's act unconstitutional?

HELD: The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."

The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text
and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections."

The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or
plebiscites.

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5
February 2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13
May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for
the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A.
No. 10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC's burden in the accreditation and
registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of
holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected,
a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg.
881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the
holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013
to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.

To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would have
the COMELEC hold off all of its tasks for the National and Local Elections. If COMELEC
abandoned any of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of these
tasks then it could have put in serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local
Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its manpower and other
resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it
would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.
DENIED.

Atty. Francisco v. Comelec

Macalintal v. Comelec
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has
actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds
are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer
and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the
1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his
claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is
deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?

RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted
the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting
that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically
present in the country.
The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID
for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject
to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission” of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in
full force and effect.

People v. Corral