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~ Pergamon AcraA6tronautwaVol 48, No 5-12. pp.

431-438, 2001
© 2001 International Astronauttcal Federation Published by Elsevier Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain PII: S0094-5765(01)00061-3 0094-5765/01 $ - see front matter



Ryuichi Sekita*, Atsutaro Watanabel

Kunio Hirata~, Takayukt Imoto*
NASDA. 2-4-1 Hamamatsu-cho, Minato-ku. Tokyo, 105-8060 Japan

NOMENCLATURE of the H-II rocket. After the successful maiden flight

of the H-II rocket in 1994, the next five H-II rockets
BFT =battle ship firing test launched eight payloads into GEO, LEO and SSO.
CFT =captive firing test However, the last two H-II rockets failed to deliver
DRF =axis displacement toward radius payloads to orbit. The last failure (H-II rocket No.
FTA =failure tree analysis 8) was due to the early cutoff of the first stage main
FTP =fuel turbopump engine, the LE-7. The H-II rocket No.8 was called
GEO =geostationary earth orbit the improved version of the H-II rocket or the
GTO =geostationary transfer orbit transition vehicle from the H-II to H-IIA because it
GTV =grand test vehicle utilized the newly developed second stage for the H-
HATS =high altitude simulation test stand IIA and the conventional first stage of the H-II.
LEO =low earth orbit
LH2 =liquid hydrogen Subsequent to the failure, extensive investigations
LN2 =liquid nitrogen were undertaken, including search and recovery of
LOX =liquid oxygen the failed LE-7 engine from the seabed about 3000m
LRB =liquid rocket booster deep. Also, non-destructive and destructive tests of
MHI --mitsubishi heavy industries co.hd the engine were performed as well as other
MR --mixture ratio investigative tests. Since space transportation is the
MTSAT =multi-functional transport satellite most essential element of NASDA's space activities,
OTP =oxygen turbopump NASDA decided to abandon the last H-II rocket
PM =prototype model No.7 development and to give the highest priority to
QM =qualification model the development of the H-IIA. This paper traces the
SRB =solid rocket booster design of the H-II and H-IIA rockets. Also, this
SSB =small size solid booster paper shows the lessons learned from the H-II No.8
SSO =sun synchronous orbit failure by discussing the technically interesting
TNSC ---tanegashima space center issues obtained from the failure investigation.
Finally, enhancements that will be introduced to the
H-IIA project that will secure upcoming space
missions in the new century are presented, and the
ABSTRACT status of the development tests is summarized in this
paper. © 2001 International Astronautical
Twenty three (23) years have passed since the Federation. Published b.~ Elsevier Science Ltd.
research and development of Japan's first LOX/LH2
propulsion system began for the H-I rocket, and 14
years have passed since the successful maiden flight
of the H-I rocket. The outcome of LOX/LH2
The H-IIA rocket development has two objectives.
propulsion technology from the H-I rocket provided
The first is better launch capability than the H-II
the basis for both the first stage and the second stage
rocket. The other is achieving significant reduction
of launch cost from the H-II rocket to meet the
various launch demands in the 2 Ist century.
*Associate Senior Engineer of H-IIA Launch
Vehicle Project Team The fundamental development policy of the H-IIA
1"Project Manager of H-llA Launch Vehicle Project rocket is the redesigning and refining the all vehicle
Team subsystem and ground equipments of the H-II rocket
#Senior Engineer of H-IIA Launch Vehicle Project using the lessons and expertise from the H-If rocket
Team development and operations.

432 51st 14F Congress

[ Fairing ]
[ Faznng ]
e . ~ S~mphf,ea Des,gn i_
S~mpl,f,ed Manutactar,nq I
[ Awonics ]
[ Aviontcs I
I) Box nlegrll ,or~ HIC Paris ApDl,Cahon
2) Szmphhed Interlace !Data BuS!
COSt Reduction basea on lhe H-iI Deszgn 3) AutomaTic Check-out Support V'dnct,on
[ Second Stage ]
[ Second Stage ]
[ I r~ew Second Stage I
t.~ Sel~arate Tank System
I '
I 2~ Srmolifleo Propulsion Svslerr,J
31 LE.SB Enqme __1
First Stage ]

:1 J
11 Siml:)t,f,eo Manufactbrlng
S,mphhed Tank Dome Design
2t h:ew Core Stage Support Concept
[ First Stage ] 31 S,mptffied Prcpuls,on SySlern
4j S,rnpllfl~d Ground Interlace
COSl Red~CtlOrl based on 1~e H-II Design
51LE.7A Engine
S=rrlDIrt,ed Slruclure & System

Cas.'lng Paris ~.ppl,cahon
[ SRB ] It' _ 1I Monolylh, c MoIor
2) CFRP Motor Case
.~! Cos, Reduc,,on based on ,he H-,I Des,gn t_~l ~ 31 Eleclro.mecr, an,cal Tv'C
i 41 On sde Manufaclunnq ,=lanl

Fig.l The Improvement from H-I! to H-IIA

Major Change of Rocket System The First Stage Propulsion System

The major changes from H-II rocket to H-ilA rocket The first stage propulsion system ts the key
standard vehicle are shown in Fig. I. The upgrade development item of the upgrade from H-II to H-IIA
program from H-Ii to H-IIA is taking three steps. second step, and consequently, is the primary focus
The first step is the improvement of H-ll rocket. In of this paper. Fig.2 shows the major change of the
the improvement of H-II rocket, the fairing system first stage propulsion system and SRB-A.
and the second stage propulsion system are upgraded
and applied to the H-ll rocket No.8. In the second The H-IIA first stage replaces the spherical tank
step, the remainders of the H-IIA standard vehicle bulkheads called orange-peal-welded domes of H-II
are upgraded including the avionics system, the first rocket with the elliptical monolithic tank bulkheads
stage structure, the first stage propulsion system, the and extends the tank cylinders. By these
SRB-A, and the launch facility. The H-IIA standard improvements, the first stage can store 100 tons of
vehicle, named H-llA202, has the same launch LOX/LH., (14 tons more than that of the H-II first
capability as the H-il rocket, but at significant launch stage). Although the tanks are stretched, the
cost reduction. In the last step, the LRB augments elliptical monolithic tank bulkheads minimize the
the H-IIA standard vehicle and doubles the launch total length of the first stage.
capability. After all, the family of H-IIA rockets will
cover a broad range of missions ranging froml0 tons The LE-7 engine development was the most critical
to 17 tons in LEO or from
4.1 tons to 7.5 tons in
H-II Fimt Stage H-IIA Firm Stage
In the H-ilA development, sine,loreDeanChan~u
Wslaed SptemcaJShape Dome | ElliloticalDome formed plale
the design of the standard 8RBs I~ogort file Core Stage I Core Slmge~ SRB-Ae
vehicle and the augmented CFRP Imr-Stage Section. etc
i sy=m sw~eo~or~
vehicle are proceeding I Simpl~ledGround / Voh,cJe Inlerface
I 8knpi~lied~ n Cornponents
concurrently, because the O~xt rank ixeuunzed by hei~m I Ox~Tlmk i:¢lmat~zed by QOX
Turl]ne Dr~en H~mJc SyMem | PresmJ~eBlow.downHydraulic SyMemn
two configurations consist
of the same subsystems.
On the other hand, large-
scale system tests such as 44egrnemoO Me4alMotor Mo~oliS~: Compoue MatermlC m
BFT and GTV campaigns HyOfamc 'rVC System (Blow-do.n) TVC Syslern
-- Sml#;fiorl Launch O~)mbons
for the standard vehicle ~ L ~ ; h o n PreSsure (55 k0t/cf'n~ H~her Cornbul Pre~.~l (120 k0f~nrIpJ
-- Sn-~ile.N o ~ ariaR~aled Fans
and augmented vehicle are On-611ePropehnt Loading Planl
conducted separately. Easy ;r anscx~bon

Fig.2 The 1st Stage Propulsion System of H-II & H-IIA

51st IAF Congress 433

component and hardest development effort in the H- engine also burned normally from ignition to 238.5
I1 rocket project. The problems that emerged on the seconds after lift off; but suddenl2r engine cut off
LE-7 caused the postponement of the H-II rocket occurred 107 seconds earher than planned. Attitude
initial test flight for two years. On the other hand, control was disabled, and the H-II No.8 flew in an
the experiences brought various ideas about what a abnormal attitude.
booster engine should be. The improvements of the
booster engine should not focus on performance as The Hill No.8 continued inertia flight, follo,~.ed by
much as reliability, simplicity and lower cost. fairing separation at 288 seconds after lift off. After
reaching altitude of 130 kin, the H-II No.8 started to
The LE-7 engine has a number of welding lines and descend. The second stage engine LE-5B ignited,
delicate parts that required considerable surely under severe condition, at 328 seconds after
manufacturing and inspection processes. lift off and achieved full thrust. However, the H-II
Improvement of engine's robustness and the cost No.8 continued to descend in an abnormal attitude.
reduction are necessary for the LE-7A engine, The telemetry data acquisition was finally disabled at
because the H-IIA family uses multiple engines. 439 seconds aRer lift off. The H-II No.8 was
Since the design philosophy of the LE-7A engine is calculated to have dropped into the Pacific Ocean at
low cost, high reliability and the additional throttling about 380 km northwest ofthe Bonin Islands.
capability, an engine structure and component
arrangement more suitable for easier manufacturing, Failure Analysis
inspections, and better vibration characteristics was To clarify the cause of the LE-7 engine early cut off,
pursued. The welded structure redesign, the simple the flight telemetry data was analyzed carefully.
and compact component arrangement, and the Then the order of abnormal occurrence in the LE-7
reduction of the engine parts are considered in the engine was arranged. Fig.4 shows the engine
improvements from the LE-7 to the LE-7A as shown pressure data, and Fig.5 shows the turbopump inlet
in Fig.3. data. It was understood that the FTP inlet pressure
and temperature were increased at first.
• OxlCllZer T u r i n > P u m p
However, the FTA could not narrow the cause of the
abnormal phenomena in FTP to one point. It was so
great, that the LE-7 engine of H-II No.8 was
recovered from the 3000m deep sea floor using an

• • L~I'B Pro4- OmlSlD ~ i l I

LE-7 Engine
"J~/'IJ~IIrlVI~CUU~'I 1 0 ~ O K N Thr, J s t l n y a l ~ 10~CIKN
Specl1~: I m p u i ~ s 4 4 6 $6C SpeCifiC Im(Ou'~e 441 ¢Jec

Fig.3 The LE-TEngine and The LE-7A Engine

The LE-7A engine operates at both 100% and 70%
thrust levels. Therefore, using the throttling
capability, the H-IIA rocket can reduce the 2:~ 1~.O~lllllll, ZSO.e. ~31
T~IL' .,~ - - emlmO,
aerodynamic loads on the vehicle. The H-IIA also
can provide a good acceleration environment to the Fie.4 The H-II No.8 LE-7 Engine Pressure
payload at the first engine cut off with this
capability. t2a z4

I I .,,r...,, ,_
~ "-'-"-~


r-- -]
/---, -i

Launch Results
, j ,
The H-II rocket No.8 was launched at 16:29
November 15, 1999 from NASDA's Tanegashima
Space Center with the purpose of delivering MTSAT 02~j 1.L5 ~J
to GTO. The SRB burned normally and separated at r~ tram ~ (e)

96 seconds after lift off as planned. The LE-7 Fig.5 The H-II No.8 LE-7 Engine FTP Inlet Data
434 51st IAF Congresr

Fuel Turbopurnp

Fig.6 The H-II No.8 LE-7 Engine in Seabed Fig.7 Recovered FTP Inducer

occurred with abrupt increase of pump speed in

American sab,.age technique. The picture of the L.E-7 upstream opening tests, the pump stall was not
engine in the Seabed was shown in Fig.6. The generated in a downstream opening simulation test.
failure analysis was enhanced by the direct It was concluded that the first abnormal phenomena
inspection of the LE-7 engine of H-I[ No.8. The occurred in the FTP inlet.
inspection made clear that the FTP was severely
damaged, but the OTP and the other engine pipes The LE-7 engine firing tests were conducted to
were scarcely damaged. The detailed investigation simulate the lowering of FTP inlet pressure to the
found the FTP outlet part and the FTP inlet part were actual flight level. There was no incoherent
heavily damaged. Only one blade of FTP inducer vibration data, but the data of axis displacement
was fractured by fatigue and striations were obse~'ed toward the radius indicated the symptom of rotating
on the broken surface. The reco,~ered inducer of cavitation. Also the pressure just downstream of the
FTP is shown in Fig.7. inducer indicated that the peak pressure oscillation
Three different kinds of tests of the FTP were was generated at a frequency of approximately 3.2
conducted to make clear the cause of the inducer kHz. which was close to the natural frequency of the
blade fatigue. The water flow tests were conducted inducer blade.
to measure strains of the inducer blades and pressure
oscillation around the inducer. The test results Estimated Cause of Failure
showed that the stress on a blade was too low The final FTA for the FTP inducer breakage could
compared with an estimated stress at breakage, even not specify a single factor and therefore, two factors
if rotating cavitation was generated. It was revealed tbr the failure remain. The first factor was the
by the visible water flow tests that the back flow vibration forced by the rotating cavitation. The
accompanied by strong swirling, reaches to quite a second factor v,as the resonance generated by the
high point of upstream, in the case of severe rotating pressure oscillation around the natural frequency of
cavitation. The rotating cavitation in visible water 3.2 kHz of the inducer blade.
flow test is shown in Fig.8.
The detailed contributors of the rotating cavitation
The FTP technical tests using IN., and LH, were were the strong back flow interference between the
conducted to simulate sudden opening cases at FTP inducer and the inlet vanes, the difference of FTP
upstream or downstream. Although the pump stall inlet condition during flight, and the geometrical
errors such as the step of inlet flange attachment.
Moreover, if some damage at the inlet vanes were
caused by the back flo~,, the oscillation stress would
ha~.e been increased. Any one of these factors alone,
could not be the cause of breakage, but the
combination of factors peculiar to the H-II rocket
No.8 was specified to have caused the failure.

The scenario of H-II rocket No.8 malfunction

phenomenon was estimated as follows.
(I) Rotating ca~,itaion was generated during
depressurizing control, and it caused pressure
Fig.8 The H-II FTP Iducer Rotating Cavitation oscillation, which contained low frequency
51stlAFCongress 435

element, and generated over stress on the limits for main components such as turbopumps and
inducer blade. combustion chamber. Moreover, the sampling
(2) Pressure oscillations generated inducer blade quahfication level test for flight engine should be
resonance. continued after the development is finished. These
(3) Pressure oscillation was large under the peculiar were the important lessons for H-IIA rocket
condition of the H-II rocket No.8. development.
(4) The above stresses were concentrated on a
processed tool mark, which initiated a crack on
the inducer blade. ENHANCEMENT OF H-ilA
(5) The fatigue deepened the crack and unstable
.breakage happened when the crack reached 4.6
mm deep and 32.5 mm wide.
(6) Due to an unbalanced axis, the inducer blade
When the H-II rocket No.8 failure happened, the H-
contacted against FTP inlet body, which led to
IIA rocket development was near the final
gasify LH2.
development phase. The first test flight of standard
(7) The engine suddenly stopped due to FTP stall.
H-IIA rocket was planned for the winter of 2000.
(8) The FTP inlet body was broken by complex
After that, the first test flight postponed by one
load, and leaked excessive amounts of LH2.
year to keep sufficient development period and to
conduct careful verification tests. Also, one more
Lessons Learned
test flight vehicle of the H-IIA was added to apply
The H-II rocket No.8 failure is the most painful
strict flight verification methods, and the final H-II
experience in the launch vehicle development at
rocket of No.7 launch was cancelled to concentrate
NASDA. However, the experience certainly provides
NASDA's resources on H-IIA development.
important lessons that will enhance the H-IIA rocket
development program.
As for the forced vibration of the FTP inducer blade,
the H-IIA rocket first stage main engine named LE-
Although, the rotating cavitation of the LE-7 FTP
7A engine had adopted a design change to prevent
inducer was recognized in the development tests, the
the rotating cavitation as much as possible. The
FTP design was fixed before the qualification test
rotating cavitation had not been observed in LE-7A
review with no additional measures. At the engine
tests. However, sufficient data of vibration and
design phase, shaft vibration, pump suction
pressure oscillation around the inducer have not been
performance, pump discharge performance and
acquired yet. As for the water flow tests, the FTP
endurance of the FTP were approved as good
performance tests and low interface pressure to
enough, even though the rotating cavitation
simulate firing tests related to the inducer were
occurred. However, the rotating cavitation that
added to get sufficient test data. As for the resonant
occurred in the H-II rocket No.8 FTP was the most
vibration, the H-IIA first stage propulsion had no
severe cavitation the LE-7 FTP ever experienced.
vane in LH2 inlet line, therefore, the interference or
Also, the case of resonance easued by the severe
resonance is unexpected in the LE-7A inlet of LHz.
interference of the FTP inducer and pressure
The additional pressure oscillation data from the
oscillations had not been considered during engine
firing tests were needed to have confidence that the
design phase. So, it could be concluded that the
oscillating pressure did not promote resonance of the
verification tests were not sufficient for the H-II
inducer blade.
rocket development. This was the fundamental
lesson for the development policy.
The 2nd stage propulsion system, including the LE-
5B engine development, was finished and was
In NASDA's rocket development, the number of
actually used for the H-ll rocket No.8 launch. After
engines for the qualification tests was limited to five
the LE-5B engine development, and before the H-II
at most due to budget restrictions. A good approach
rocket No.8 failure, two more engines were added
was needed to evaluate these few engines under
for additional firing tests to enhance verification data
every possible sever condition. The qualification
and to confirm robustness. The additional firing
test limits for the engine development, such as MR
tests are planned for the end of 2000. On the other
versus thrust was established from the flight
hand, the acceptance firing tests for the test flight
operating condition limits with some margin (per the
No.I engine were done successfully in September
conventional method). The H-I! rocket No.8 failure
2000. The picture of the LE-5B engine in HATS
indicated that it was possible to encounter more
was shown in Fig.9.
severe loads than that of qualification tests for any
component in actual flight. The new qualification
limits for the engine should include more severe load
436 51st LhF C, m e r e ~

Fig.9 The LE-SB Engine in HATS Fig.10 The SRB-A Firing Test at TNSC

As for the SRB-A, three firing tests, the engineering

model test, prototype model test, and qualification
model test ~ere completed in No,,ember 1999. As
the measure against the lessons learned from the H-II
rocket No.8, the nozzle erosion characteristics was
impro~,ed to enhance reliability, and two more
qualification model firing tests were added to
confirm the good erosion characteristics. One QM
firing test was done successfully in June and another
QM firing test ~.ill be done in October. The picture
o f a SRB-A firing test was shown in Fig. 10.

LE-7A Engine Development Status Fig.I I The LE-7A Engine Firing Test at Tashiro
The LE-7A engine development had been coming
along fairly well, until the H-II rocket No.8 failure.
At that time, two PM engines tests were completely .o

done. Also the first series of QM engines tests were

successfully accomplished. As a de~,elopment
enhancement for the LE-7A engine, QM No.3 and
QM No.4 engines were added to prove the quality, of
critical processes and to confirm operational margins
for the standard H-IIA rocket. i,0

After the H-II rocket No.8 failure, three test series of

engines were conducted at the Tanegashima Space '°i
Center and MHI Tashiro Test Site. The summary of
lag ~
these three tests is shown in Tablel. The. picture of
the LE-7A firing test at Tashiro is shown in Fig. I I.
Fig.12 The LE-7A Engine Firing Test Data
Tablel Summary of the LE-7A firing tests of Vibration and Interface Pressure
QM Test Time Duration Test Ste
simulation data, the FI"P bearing mount bolts were
Engine Time (sec) broken by the severe vibration toward radius of the
No I 3 490 TNSC inlet part. The severe xibration occurred at the low
No.2 II 485 Tashiro interface pressure. The test data of ~,ibration and
No.3 12 2029 TNSC interface pressure were shown in Fig. 12.

QM No. 1 engine tests were successfully done getting The reason ~hy the severe ,,ibration occurred at low
long duration performance data in April 2000. QM interlace pressure has not been determined at this
No.2 engine tests were also successfully done, time. Although the suction performance of LE-7A
confirming the wide MR-thrust operating range in FTP inducer is better than the LE-7 FTP inducer, the
August 2000. Although QM No.3 engine tests were severe cavitation at FTP inducer is a candidate cause
done m September 2000 getting the long duration for this vibration cause. On the other hand, the
performance data and the flight interface pressure design of inducer leaves some room tbr
515t IAF Congres~ 437

impro~,ement. After careful consideration, the latest Tests No.2 to No.4 were done successfull~ during
decision for the LE-7A engine development is that the later term of the GTV-I. The functions and
the inducer design should be changed fur characteristics of the tank pressurized system,
improvement. This is the latest problem to be sol~ed propellant feed system, the ambient helium purge
in the LE-7A engine development. The detailed plan system, the hydraulic gmlbal system, the LE-7A
for this problem has been being discussed. engine and so on, v,ere confirmed to be good enough
from the ignition to the cut offofthe L.E-7A engine.
GTV-I and 1st Stage Propulsion System CFT results The example of CFT data and the picture of CFT
The ground test vehicle/range system tests for the were shown in Fig, 13 and Fig. 14.
standard H-IIA rocket (named GTV-I) was
conducted in two terms. The first term was April to
June 1999 that was before the H-II rocket No.8
failure. The second term was May to September ,dlm~'laL.L Jd~i.m~..,llt,~ IL~,lK.,.,,t.~.,,~k~.-IJL.,
2000. The launch operations procedures and the
o; nr,,- -it ~ l v ,,-Jmn,,I- . . . . ~ ~ • ~ ' 1

automatic countdown sequence up to 6 second

before the LE-7Aengine ignition were established
through the GTV-I tests. Also, the H-IIA launch J
facilities were modified from H-II facilities and the
interface components between facilities and vehicle
i o' J
were confirmed to be without significant problems.
On the other hand, the new launch pad was almost
ready to go for the augmented H-IIA rocket.
nr, .m ~ 4o "-~ *o ,o ~o qo ,or, nnl, 120 L~o Lao n',~
tlua~ r . ~ ,iI

Four tests, totaling 275.6 seconds of hot firing, were

done as the first stage propulsion system CFT. The Fig.13 The H-IIA Ist Stage CFT Engine Data
summary of CFT results is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. S u m m a r ' ofThe H-IIA Ist sta e CFT Launch Plan of Test Flight
Test Test Test Test LE-7A The H-IIA rocket project had only one test flight
No.I No.2 No.3 No.4 Design vehicle for the standard vehicle in original
Duration Time 15.6 10 100 150 400 development plan. One more test flight vehicle was
(sec) added to verify the performance of the vehicle
Chamber I 1.9 12.0 12.2 12.1 I 1.9 components and the repeatability with enhanced
Combustion telemetry data. The flight verification with two
Pressure(Mpa) vehicles will allow demonstration results of the first
LOX Interface 0.64 0.64 0 . 6 1 0 . 6 1 0.74 test flight to be implemented for the second test
Pressure(,Mpa) flight if necessary.
LH2 Interface 0.35 0.38 0.32 0.32 0.34
Pressure(Mpa) The H-IIA test flight No.1 with the fixed LE-7A FTP
is scheduled to be launched in February 2001 with a
Test No.I was planned for 30 seconds, but dummy payload. The H-IIA test flight No.2, with
augmentation of four SSBs, will be launched after
terminated by the incorrect set up of a health
monitoring system. Atter the test, a damaged the improvement of the FTP inducer. The launch
date of the H-IIA test flight No.2 will be February
bracket, which connected the hydraulic gimbal
actuator and launch vehicle, was found. The failure 2002.
analysis clearly identified the reason for damage was
After the two successful test flight launches of
unexpected side loads forced by the jet separation on
standard vehicle, the augmented H-IIA development
the engine nozzle extension during start transient
time. To assure marginal side force, the LE-7A will be continued to aim at established LRB
technology including engine cluster techniques and
engine was changed to remove a tip section of the
nozzle extension equixalent to a 530ram high, film so on. The augmented H-IIA test flight vehicle will
be launched two years after of the standard H-IIA
cooling section. After the development of new
electromechanical gimbal actuator, the tip section of test flight No.2.
nozzle extension would be fitted to the LE-7A
engine for both standard and augmented H-IIA
Fig.14 The H-IIA Rocket 1st Stage CFT on the Launch Pad

CONCLUSION "'Development Status of LE-7A and LE-5B

Engines for H-HA Family", IAF-97-S. 1.02K
The cause of the HAl rocket No.8 failure and the 2. A.Watanabe, K.Hirata,
lessons learned have been clarified and the "'H2-H2A Redesign for More Efficient and
corrective actions to the LE-7A engine are set. Active Space Development-Enhanced Capability
These results are presented in this paper. Also, to and Reduced Launch Cost-", IAA-98-IAA. I. 1.0 I
ensure certainty of the H-IIA development and 3. A.Watanabe, H.Katsuta,
launch, additional tests have been started. Currently, "H-IIA's Cryogenic Upper Stage Technology",
the engineering problems related to the LE-7A IAF-99-V. 1.08
engine have been corrected and the development of 4. H.Nanri, K.Hirata, T.Watanabe,
standard H-IIA rocket is proceeding towards "'Development Status of H-IIA Launch Vehicle",
successful launch of the first test flight early next ISTS-2000-g-03
year. 5. R.Sekita, M.Yasui, S.Warashina,
"'The LE-5 Series Development, Approach to
Higher Thrust, Higher Reliability and Greater
Flexibility", AIAA2000-3453
6. "'The Failure Analysis on H-II Flight No.8 and
REFERENCE Corrective Action", Report to Space Activities
CommissionfFechnology Assessment Board,
I. Y.Fukushima, H.Nakatsuji, R.Nagao, May 2000
K.Kishimoto, K.Hasegawa, T.Koganezawa, 7. "'H-HABrief Description", NASDA KAD-
S.Warashina, 9g007A(E)