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Husserl's Theory of

the Intentionality of Consciousness

Aron Gurwitsch

Husserls theory of intentionality may be understood as motivated by two historical problems. The first, which may be traced back to Descartes, concerns the objective and, we may say, objectively cognitive significance of mental states; their reference to extramental facts, events, and items of any kind. Perhaps of still .greater importance is the second problem, one which arises most clearly in connection with Hume's theory of Ideas-namely, the pro blem-G-f-the-e0nsei0usness-~j_ecLgi-y_gll-a,s._j.cLen:!:i9lly th~thr-0ugh-3.-1nllltjplicity of mental~s, experiences, acts. Because of its fundamental importance, we shall start by considering the problem of the consciousness of identity, which-we submit-has found a solution in Husserl's theory of intentionality. After that theory has been expounded, at least in its basic outlines,

. the problem mentioned in the first place will no longer present any considerable difficulties.

The notion of intentionality plays a major role in all Husserl's writings, with the exception of Philosophie der Arithmetik. Here we can obviously not enter into a study of the development which that notion has undergone along with that of Husserl's thought in

general." In view of Professor Chisholm's contribution we abstain also from presenting Brentano's conception of intentionality and



setting forth its difference from that of ~u~serl..2 Since .we approach the theory of intentionality from a specific pomt of vIew-namely, the problem of the consciousness of identity, we shall have to overemphasize certain aspects of that theory. or, more co~rectly, to emphasize them more than Husser~ ?id hImself., In domg so, however, we remain faithful to the spmt of Husserl s theory and its leading intentions. Finally, we shall exclude from our presentation a few doctrines, especially the notion of sense-data and the egological conception of consciousness, which play. a certain role in Husserl's theory of intentionality. Not endorsmg those doctrines," we may abstain from dwelling upon them, because the~ do not seem to us to be of crucial importance for what we consider most essential to the concept of intentionality. The justification of our departure from Husserl would lead us too far afield to be

attempted here.

a. The Notion of the Object as Meant or Intended (the Noema)

The consciousness of identity cannot be accounted for in terms of Hume's theory of Ideas, that is to say, on the grounds of th: traditional conception of the mind. Hence a totally new and radically different conception is required in which the consciousness of identity no longer appears as an explicandum but, on the c~ntrary , is made the defining property of the mind, that. es.sentlal property without which the mind could not be ;-vhat It ": For1 that reason it is insufficient, though true and valid as a first approximation, to define intenti~nality as dir~ctedness, sayi~g that in experiencing an act of conSCIOusness we fmd our~elves direct ed to something-for example, in perceiving we are dIrected to the thing perceived, in remembering w: are directed to the event recalled, in loving or hating we are directed to the person loved or hated, and the like. Directedness merely denotes a phenomenal feature of the act inherent and immanent, a feature that appears and disappears along with the act to which it pertains. If intentionality is thus defined, the question remains unanswered as to how we can become aware of the identity of the "somethmg" to which the multiple acts are directed, considering that each one ~f those acts possesses directedness as a phenomenal feature of Its own. Therefore the theory of intentionality must be based upon the notion of the "something" that we take as identical and wh.ose identity we may disclose and make explicit by the appropnate


As a convenient point of departure we choose a special phe-

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nomenon-namely, the understanding of meaningful verbal expressions-a phenomenon whose analysis forms the subject matter of the first investigation of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. 4 To lay bare what is involved in the understanding of meaningful expressions, let us contrast our experience in hearing a phrase like "th~ictor of Austerlitz" or "New York is the biggest city in the U.S.A." with the experience we have when we hear a noise in the street, a sound like "abracadabra" or an utterance in a foreign language with which we are not familiar. In the latter cases we have merely an auditory experience. In the former cases we also have an auditory experience, but one that supports a specific act of interpretation or apperception by means of which the auditory experience becomes a vehicle of meaning or a symbol. The same holds in the case of reading, except for the immaterial difference that the visual experience of marks on paper takes the place of the auditory experience. The specific acts that bestow the character of a symbol upon perceptual experiences may be called acts of meaning apprehension. Like all other acts, they, too, are psychological events occurring at certain moments in time. By means of the following line of reasoning, we may establish the distinction between the act of meaning apprehension and the meaning apprehended. We remember that on numerous occasions we uttered or heard the phrases mentioned. Recalling those occasions, we recall them as different from one another because of their different temporal 10- cations. At the same time we become aware of the fact that what we meant and had in view on those occasions and what we mean now is the same: on all these occasions there presents itself to, and stands before, our mind "the one who won the battle of Austerlitz," or Napoleon as the victor of Austerlitz, or New York under the aspect of its number of inhabitants in comparison with other American cities. Furthermore, we take it for granted that all who listen to our utterance, provided they are familiar with the sym-

"bolic system used-in this case the English language-apprehend the same meaning. Each ~son experienceL£tk_9~~-

. i~ which e cannot share with anybody' else. Yet

VZthroughalltl:lesernuIti~eaamongany nl'i'illber of . . persons, and for each person, varying from one occasion to the ot?er in the course of his life, _the .same :nean~n~EE.e~nded. If this were not so, no communication, either in the mode orassent or dissent, would be possible. For a proposition to be accepted or rejected it must first be understood.

'The identical entity that we call "meaning" may be defined as a

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certain person, object, event state of affairs which_presents itself, taKen exact y as it presents it~ as i~_i~~l2_t~Jl-..?ed. Consider the tWo-pili-aSe~'''meviC~Austerlitz'' and "the initiator of the French legal code." Though both meanings refer to the same person, Napoleon, they differ from one another insofar as in the first

¥ case Napoleon is intended u~der the aspec~ of hi.s victory at Austerlitz and in the second with regard to hIS role m the establishment of the French legal code. The difference in question has been expressed by Husserl as that between the "Q.h.ject which is intended" and the "obk.0 as it is intended.J'f It is the latter notT~~l~eiden'tiiY with-thaf01rn-ea'ning. For a further illustration we mention another of Husserl's examples. 6 In hearing the name "Greenland," each one of us has a certain thought or representation of that island; that is to say, the island presents itself and

--- is intended in a certain fashion. The same holds for the arctic ex-

plorer. Both he and anyone of us intend the same object. How-

I ever, GLeenland as intended and meant by some of us with our sketchy:lugIi1y vague, and indeterminate rep~esentation obvious\ ly differs from Greenland as meant by the arctic explorer, who has "\ been to the island and knows it thoroughly.

-, ~ltiplici.ties, each re~JiJg._an.i.d.en.tibaLmti,ty, must be

distinguished from one another. On the one hand we have the

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( N) preliended; on the other hand there IS tl:1..~,JUU.1tlplH~!t-Y....9f m~n-

'-../ i~s,--oT'''objects as intended," all-referring to one and the same "ob~:-"--~

For the sake of simplicity we have confined ourselves to such meanings as refer to real objects, persons, or events. This simpli-

_. fication makes it easy to see that meanings cannot be identified

~ with physical objects and occurrences any more than with psychological events. From the fact that a plurality of meanings can l£i£__!9-~QY:'_.EE2..s..9.-bj~ct, it follows ~~ifG~s coin;ici.9-.~~igLt.!:~_._9.?j~Ct. Real ~ve~ts like th~ ~attle of Auster~Itz taKe Place at a certam moment in time. But It IS absurd to aSSIgn a temporal place to the meaning of the phrase "the battle of Austerlitz" and to ask whether it precedes, succeeds upon, or is simultaneous with another meaning, though anyone 'of the acts through which the meaning is apprehended occupies a definite place in time. There are no spatial relations between meanings

~ any more than there are causal effects exerted by meanings either upon one another or upon anything else. ~th entities of a special kind-aspatial, atemporal, acausal, hence un cal

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or ~d,eal-wh~ch have a specific nature of eir own. Between these entrties obtam relations of a particular sort, the like of which is nowhere. else enco_unt~red. ~s a simple example we may mention

)(the re~atlOns, studied m logic, that obtain between propositions as a special class of meanings.

Ol_lr ,results can easily be generalized. For the sake of brevity

Xw~ limit ourselves to perceptual experience. When we perceive a thI~g-for e~ample, a house-we do so from the point of observatron at we happen to be placed, so that the house appears

under a certam aspect: f~om one of its sides, the front or the back, 'as near or far, ~nd the like. I~ appears, as Husserl expresses it, by wa_y of ~~~~ntation. 7 Maintaining our point 0 obser,:,atIOn, we may alternately open and close our eyes.

We then expenence a sequence of acts of perception, all differing from each other by the very fact of their succeeding upon one

X another. Through all of these perceptions not only does the same . house appear: but. it also appears under the same aspect, in the same onentatIOn-m a word, in the same manner of adumbrational present~tio~. Agair:- we encounter an identical entity-namely, Xthat ,;Vh~ch IS, perceived exactly as it is perceived, the "perceived as

su~h (aas Wahrgenommene als solehes). It stands in the same reX lation to the acts o~ perception as does the meaning apprehended to the acts of-meanmg apprehension. One may generalize the term X",meaning" so as to use it beyond the domain of symbolic express;ons ~nd speak of perceptual meanings. Husserl also denotes the "p erceived a~ such" ~s "p,erceptual sense" (Wahrnehmungssinn), because b!, vlT~ure of It a grven perception is not only a perception of a c~rtam thmg but als_o a determinate perception of that thing :-tha~ IS to say ,a perceptIOn through which the thing presents itself

'In this ~ather than another manner of adumbrational appearance. 8 Husse~l s most general term here is that 0fE~a, 9 a concept that """compnses meanmgs in ,the conventional sense as a special class. bNoema denotes the object as meant and intended in any mode . whats~ever" h~nce includes the mode of perceptual experience.

'r.!:1 H~vmg distinguished the perceptual noen:a ,fron:- the act of per'CIceptlOn-th~ "l'lOeSIS-we have further to distinguish it from the . t~mg ~erCcived.The latter may be seen from different points of VIeW-It may appear under a variety of aspects: from the front the back, one of the late~al sides, ,and. the like-while the perce~tual noema denot~s the thmg perceived as presenting itself under one of those possible aspects. Again we have to apply the distinction between the "object which is intended" -the thing perceived-and



the object as it is intended" -the perceptual noema, or the thing perceived as it is perceived. A multiplicity of perceptual noemata are related to the same thing, just as in the previous example a multiplicity of meanings were seen to refer t~ the sam~ object.

Let us consider from a different point of VIew the difference between the perceptual noema and the thing perceived. The house may be torn down, but none of the pertinent noemata is affected thereby. 10 Even aft;r its destruction the house may still be remembered, and it may be remembered as presenting itself under one ~r the other of the aspects under which it had previously appeared m perceptual experience. To be sure, the noema is no longer a perceptual one; it is rather a noema of memory. The point is that two or even more noemata, their differences notwithstanding, may have a certain stratum in common, a stratum that Husserl denotes as "noematic nucleus." 11 Within the structure of every noema, the

. distinction must be made between the noematic nucleus and "no. ematic characters," which, incidentally, belong to several dimensions.J? By means of this distinction it is possible to account for the verification of a nonperceptual experience by a perceptual one. When in actual perceptual experience a thing proves to be such as it had been assumed, thought, believed, etc., to be, it is that the nucleus of the nonperceptual noema is seen to coincide and even to be identical with that of the perceptual noema, while the noematic characters indicating the mode of givenness or presentation remain different on either side. 13 Both the identity of the noematic nucleus and the difference concerning the characters are required for and essential to the phenomenon of verification.

b. Consciousness Defined as No etico-Noematic Correlation

In the center of the new conception stands the notion of the noema, of the object meant and intended, taken exactly and only as it is meant and intended. Every act of consciousness is so essentially related to its noema that it is only with reference t? t~e ~atter that the act is qualified and characterized as that which It ISfor example, that particular perceiving of the house as seen from the front, that determinate intending of Napoleon as the victor of Austerlitz and not as the defeated of Waterloo. Traditionally, consciousness has been interpreted as a one-dimensional temporal order, a conception whose most consistent elaboration lies in Hume's theory. To be sure, acts of consciousness are psychological events that take place and endure in time and stand under the laws of temporality, to which Husserl has devoted detailed analyses. 14

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Though temporality undoubtedly denotes a fundamental aspect of consciousness, that aspect is not the only one. The temporal events called "acts of consciousness" have the peculiarity of being actualizations or apprehensions of meanings, the terms "apprehension" and "meaning" being understood in a very general sense beyond the special case of symbolic expressions. It pertains to the essential nature of acts of consciousness to be related and to correspond to noemata. Rather than being conceived of as a one-dimensional sequence of events, consciousness must be defined as a noetic onoematic correlation, that is to say, a correlation between items pertaining to two heterogeneous planes: on the one hand the plane of temporal psychological events, and on the other hand that of atemporal, unreal, that is to say, ideal entities that are the noemata, or meanings understood in the broader sense. Furthermore, it is a many-to-one correlation insofar as an indefinite multiplicity of acts can correspond to the same noema. Correlated terms demand and require each other. To establish the identity of the noema we had to contrast it with, hence refer it to, a multiplicity of acts. Conversely, it can be shown (though this is not the place to do it) that no account of the temporality and especially the duration of an act of consciousness is possible without reference to the noema involved. 15 Thus the conception of consciousness as noetico-noematic correlation brings to light the indissoluble connection between consciousness and meaning (Sinn). It shows consciousness to be essentially characterized by an intrinsic dual£ty, which is to take the place of the Cartesian dualism.

To evaluate the historical significance of the innovation, let us consider in which respect it constitutes a break with the tradition. In. th: first place the theory of Ideas is relinquished, especially the principle that the mind is confined to its own mental states which alone are directly and immediately given to it. Undoubtedly the

- mind lives exclusively in its mental states, its acts. Each act, however, is correlated to a noema which-as we have stressed-is itself not a mental state, an act of consciousness, a psychological event. Relatedness to essentially nonmental entities is the very nature of :n~n~al states. ,~~rthermore, t.he r:oema is. defined as. the. "object as It IS mtended, i.e., as the object m question appeanng in a certain manner of presentation (under a certain aspect, from a certain point of view, etc.), an object capable, however-we must now add-of appearing in different manners of presentation. The definition of intentionality as directedness can now be given its legitimate meaning. Experiencing an act of consciousness, we are directed to

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an object insofar as in the structure of the noema corresponding ~o the act there are inscribed references to further noemata, to different manners of presentation of that object. Objective reference of mental states is no longer an insoluble problem as with Descartes; nor is it to be explained and accounted for subsequently. On the contrary, it proves to be essential to the acts of consciousness-not as an additional phenomenal feature of the arts, of course, but rather in the sense of the conception of consciousness as a noetico-noematic correlation.

As a consequence, consciousness can no longer be interpreted as a self-sufficient and self-contained domain of interiority. This interpretation follows from the Cartesian dualism, the severance of res cagitans from res extensa to which Descartes was led in endeavoring to lay the foundations of the incipient new sci~nc~. It must be stressed that nature in the sense of modem phYSICS IS not the same as the world of common, everyday experience. In the latter world things not only present spatial forms, stand in spatial relations to one another, and change those relations in the course of time, but also exhibit specific qualities, the so-called secondary qualities, and are endowed with characters which, like those of instrumentality, utility, and cultural value, refer to human purpos~s and activities. 16 Quite generally, in the world of common expenence the corporeal in the spatiotemporal sense is intertwined and interwoven with the mental and the psychological in allits forms. Nature in the modem scientific sense is the result and product of an' artful method applied to the world of common experience. That method consists, among other things, 17 of abstracting spatiotemporal extendedness to the disregard of whatever is, me?tal or psychological, relegating the latter to the purely subJectIVe, domain. In this way one arrives at a single coherent and self-contained context encompassing all spatiotemporal things and events. The success of this abstractive procedure suggests its application in the opposite direction-namely, a counterabstraction of what is "subjective" to the disregard of what pertains to the spatiotemporal, hence "objective," domain. However, the attempt at such a counterabstraction fails to yield a self-sufficient and self-contained domain of interiority. Turning to and concentrating upon the life of consciousness, one does not discover occurrences that take place in a closed domain and merely succeed upon one another, as Hume's theory of the mind would have it. Rather one encounters ~prebensiQns of meanings, perceptions of h?uses, trees, fellow human beings; memories afpast and expectancies of future events;



and the like. Generally, speaking, one encounters dealings in several ~anners and. m?des with mundane things and events of the most diverse descrip tinn as well as with nonmundane entities like numbers and geometrical systems, which are not mental states or psy-

~ chological o~currences any more than they are mundane existents.

The very failure of the counterabstraction discloses the essential reference of acts of conscious~ess to ?bjective entities of any kind, hence also to mundane-that IS, spatIOtemporal-objects. This failure marks the breakdown of the Cartesian dualism

. Since pheno~eno,l~gy is, based on the theory o'f intentionality, It ~us~ n?t be ,IdentIfIed with or even too closely assimilated to intUlt17sll1stlC phIlo,sophy or introspectionism as advocated by Berg-

. son. F~r. conscIOus~ess to be grasped and studied in its authentic and. ~bo~lgmal state, It must first, according to Bergson, undergo a punfIcatI~n from whatever contamination or admixture has accru.ed ~o It b~ way of ~ontact with the objective external world, which IS not only a spatial but also a social world. Obviously such a methodological principle presupposes the Cartesian du~lism. What ~ergson, consider , a denaturalization of consciousness :p~e~r_sm ~he light of the, theory of intentionality as an expression :,f ,It:; genume nature. Insistence _upon that difference, profound as It IS, m~st not, however, preclude the recognition that many of B~rgson s analyses have phenomenological significance or, to speak with greater prudence, may by a proper reinterpretation be given phenomenological significance.

Becaus~ of the intentionality of consciousness, we are in direct contact with the world. Living our conscious life we are "at" the world, "at" the things encountered in that world: This should be seen as. a cons~quence ?~ the theory of intentionality rather than b,emg credited as original with subsequent existentialist philosophies, A glance at the phenomenological theory of perception makes th~t clear. ~e recall th,e definition of the perceptual noema as. the thmg_perceIved appeanng from a certain side, under a certam aspect, m a certain orientation-briefly, in a one-sided manner of adumbrationxj presentation. The decisive point is that notwithstandmg the ~ne-sIdeness of its appearance, it is the thing itself ~hat presents Itself, stands before our mind, and with which we are m. ~ontact. ~o~tically speaking, per~eptual consciousness is an original (albeit mcomplete because one-sided) experience of the thing perceived appearing in "bodily presence'; (in Leibhaftigkeit). Perceptual, conSCIOusness must not be interpreted in terms of profoundlYdIfferent modes of consciousness-as, for example, by



means of images, signs, symbols, and the like. 19 A:cordingly, ~he perceptual noema must not be mistaken for an Idea m ~he Cartesian sense=that is to say, the substitute for, or representatlv~ of, a reality only mediately accessible. With the phenomenologlc~l the?ry of perception, we submit, the traditional theory of Ideas IS definitively overcome.

c. On the Notion of Objectivity

There remains the task of defining the relationship between the perceptual rioema and the thing percei:ed. While actu~lly appear~ng in a determinate manner of adumbrational presentation, the thmg is capable of appearing in other manners. It actually so appears in the course of the perceptual process when, for example, :v.e walk around the thing and in general, perceive it under conditions of different sorts. In the course of that process, the thing is perceived as identically the same, presenting itself from differer:t sides: under varying aspects, in a variety of orientations. The thmg cann~t be perceived except in one or t?e othe.r man~~r of adumbrat~or:al presentation. It is nothing besides, or in addltI.on t?, the mu1t:pl~city of those presentations through all of which It appears m ItS identity.?" Consequently, the thing perceived pr~ves to b.e the group, more precisely put, the systemati:ally orgamzed totaht~ of adumbrational presentations. Both the difference and the relationship between the thing perceived and a par~icular perceptual noema can now be defined in terms of a noematic system as a whole and one member of that system. This is in agreement with the previous formulation that every particular perception, its incompleteness and one-sideriess notwithstanding, is an original experience of the thing perceived appearing in bodily presence. In fact, it is the perceptual apprehension of a noematic system as a whole from the

vantage point of one of its members. . .

Two questions arise. One concerns the o~gamz.atIO~al form of the noematic system, the other the manner m which Its membership in the noematic system is. inscribed in the of every particular noerna. Both questions can o~ly be mentioned h~re, not discussed.F' At present we must confme ourselves to stressmg that the thing perceived also proves to have noematic .status. As a noematic system it is a noema itself, but a noema of higher order,

so to speak. .

Just as the theory of intentionality i~volve.s a ne:" concept~on of consciousness or subjectivity, so, too, It entails a remterpretation of the notion of objectivity. Traditionally, the objective has been



opposed to the subjective as entirely alien to it, so that for an object to be reached in its genuine and authentic condition, all mental-that is, subjective-activities and their contributions must be disregarded, if not eliminated altogether. In the light of the theory of intentionality, this conception of objectivity, which derives f~om the Cartesian dualism, can no longer be upheld. The objective reference that is essential to acts of consciouness corresponds to a no less essential relationship of objects to acts of, especially to their noemata. The disclosure of the thing perceived as a noematic system-that is to say, an intentional correlate 22_is in perfect conformity with the here propounded general conception of consiousness as a correlation. Furthermore, several levels of objectivity must be distinguished from one another, in consequence of which the notions of subjectivity and objectivity prove to be affected by a certain relativity.

Every particular meaning or noema as an identical entity can be considered as objective in contrast to the multiple subjective acts that are correlated with it, especially if it is remembered that those acts may be distributed among a plurality of persons. A particular perceptual noema, defined as the thing appearing under a certain aspect, is in turn to be characterized as subjective with respect to the perceived thing itself, of which the former is a one-sided perceptual adumbration, with respect to the noematic system of which the particular noema is a member. The things perceived and perceivable form, in their totality, the perceptual world, the world of pure experience, or as Husserl calls it, the life-world (Lebenswelt). It is the world such as it is understood conceived ~nd interpreted to be by a certain social group which ~nquestion~ mgly accepts It as reality. The life-world is an essentially social phenomenon.23 Accordingly, it differs from' one social group to the other and also for a given social group in the course of its historical development. At every phase of this development and f?r every social group, the respective life-world COunts as object~ve rea!Ity. Over against this multiplicity of life-worlds, the question anses of a world common to all social groups. This is an objective :-"orld in a second, more profound sense. More precisely, the question concerns a set or system of invariant structures universal insofar as they are by necessity exhibited by every sociohistorical life-world.24 Of this common world, which perhaps should not be called life-world but rather the world of pure perceptual ex~er.ience, the diverse life-worlds in the proper sense appear as vaneties to be relegated to the status of merely subjective



worlds. Finally there is objectivity in the specific sense of modern science: the objectivity of the scientific or scientifically true and valid universe as constructed on the basis of perceptual experience by means of mental operations and procedures into whose analysis we cannot enter here. From the point of view of the universe of science, the world of perceptual experience appears in turn as subjective.

Sketchy and incomplete though these remarks are, they may suffice to illustrate, if not substantiate, the thesis that what is meant by objective must not be conceived as severed from the life of consciousness. Moreover, the ascent to higher levels of objectivity, far from requiring the progressive elimination or, at least, disregard of mental activities and operations, on the contrary involves them in increasing complexity; it involves syntheses of consciousness of ever-widening 'scope. As an intentional correlate, the object of every kind and level proves to be an accomplishment (Geleistetes) whose clarification, especially the clarification concerning its objectivity and existence, requires that it be referred to the accomplishing ileistendes mental operations. Accounting in this manner for an object of whatever sort is tantamount to disclosing its "equivalent of consciousness."


Husserl's program of constitutive phenomenology, a generalization and radicalization of the Cartesian program, attempts to account for objects of all possible kinds in terms of subjective, conscious life. A superficial survey of some levels of objectivity may give an idea of the extent of that tremendous task. For the sake of completeness we recall in passing the sense of objectivity which pertains to the ideal orders of being and existence in the Platonic sense or, in Husserl's parlance, to the eidetic realms. In the theory of intentionality we found the theoretical instrument both necessary and sufficient for the realization of that task. Herein appears the historical significance of that theory.

We could as well have started from the theory of intentionality, conceived as a theory of the mind in a merely psychological setting, regardless of philosophical interests. The radical innovation which that theory entails for the conception of the mind and thus for psychological thinking defines its historical significance in a further respect. Consistently developing the theory of intentionality conceived in a psychological orientation, and pursing it to its ultimate consequences, would have led us to the idea of constitutive







~heno~enology in a way Husserl has followed himself in the

oms;~r am lectures a~d th: article in the Encyclopaedia Brz"tan~zca·f The theory of tntentiorialirv thus serves both as a motivatI~ orce, ~s fa~. as the conception of the idea of constitutive p enorep? ogy IS concerned, and as the theoretical instrument for ItS rea IzatlOn. In other words, provided proper allowance is made for t~e tran~cendental reduction, which could here be mentioned

only m passmg, the full elaboration of the theory of int to Iit

Prove tensive wi en rona 1 y oS c~ex ensive WIth and even identical with the philosophy of

constitutive phenomenology.