You are on page 1of 37

Case No.

23 reasonable doubt, it behoves us to exert the most painstaking effort to

People v. Ritter examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only
March 5, 1991 | Gutierresz, Jr., J.| Duty to Render Judgement to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed a
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines criminal act
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie
and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the
vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and
Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside
her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object
has already been removed from her vagina.

(After 7 Months) On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with

bloody skirt, foul smelling and unconscious. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to
remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it
was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having
peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the
object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with
homicide. FACTS: (additional facts)
● While Rosario was in the bathroom, Ritter started masturbating
RTC: Ritter is guilty of rape with homicide, citing the provision of Art. 4 the young boy and also guided the boy’s hand for him to be
of the RPC “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil masturbated. When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was
cause.” told to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself between
SC: Reversed the decision. Ritter is acquitted on grounds of
the two children and accused started fingering Rosario.
reasonable doubt. Deportation is directed.
● Ramirez saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of
DOCTRINE: While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support Rosario. After what he saw, Ramirez fell asleep.
conviction, it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should ● In the morning, the accused paid Ramirez P200.00 and Rosario
concur: (a) there is a more than one circumstances, (b) the facts from P300.00.Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore.
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond ● The following day, Ramirez claimed that he saw Rosario and she
reasonable doubt. was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked
her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.
“Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgement
of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
● May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara saw Rosario’s skirt was SC: She was more than 12 years old.
bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling. He brought
her to Olongapo City General Hospital.. SC ruled that all the evidence presented by the prosecution showing
● May 17, 1987, it was found out that there was a foreign object in that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the
her vaginal canal. alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of Birth,
● Barcinal, an OB-GYNE tried to extract the foreign object by much less offset at documentary record showing a different date.
means of a forceps, but the said object was covered by tissues –
it cannot be removed easily. SC: nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document
● The first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted as to Rosario’s birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she
allegedly because the consent of the hospital director was not was born on December 26, 1973.
obtained. Prosecution evidence: Statements from Rosario’s Father and
● Dr. Rosete testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that Grandmother. Defense presented Rosario’s baptismal certificate.
condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded.
2. Rape Committed
● May 19 - Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen. There were
The evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual
infections cause by the object. The foreign object which is a
advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to
portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina. the action as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her
● This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00.
considered the operation successful and the patient was alive The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies
when he left her under Dr. Cruz. and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that
● The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute in spite of her
who pronounced her dead in the afternoon of May 20, 1987. tender age.
● Sis Palence and others were able to trace Rosario’s
3. Is Ritter Responsible for the Vibrator left in her body?
grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her about
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something
inside Rosario’s vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute
● Turla filed a case against Ritter. Ritter pleaded not guilty.
the death of Rosario to the appellant’s alleged act.
● Legaspi, the lawyer of Ritter, asked for a settlement of Php
If the device inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is highly
20,000 to Mrs. Turla. She agreed but Ritter only gave Php
inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort
15,000. He also asked to change the age of Rosario in papers.
until May 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence
However, the balance of Php 5,000 was not paid.
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide. observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
RULING: It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a
1. Rosario’s Age foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and
Trial Court: Rosario was below 12 years old.
serious infection only after seven months inside a young girl’s vaginal Rosario’s vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the
canal. death of Rosario to that act.

4. Richter was a pedophile It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a
With the positive identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and
that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the serious infection only after seven months inside a young girl’s
children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was
vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier.
shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each
other, such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a pedophile. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the confinement testified that she told him, ”Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya
appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but ang naglagay nito,” Ritter is not a black.
also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The
state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to 4. Although he was acquitted for the crime of rape with homicide, the
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, Court ruled that he is not innocent or blameless. While it is true that
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their the court cannot convict on possibilities or probabilities, CIVIL
LIABILITY does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The court held that the Appellant should be expelled from the
country NOTES:

RATIO: The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
1. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in a proof that the cause of the victim’s death must convince a rational
charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect. mind beyond reasonable doubt
2. Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of
If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or,
age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to
indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The rule that reasonable
prove that the usual elements of rape were present; ie: that there
doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused.
was for or intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or
The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral
otherwise. However, there was no proof of such fact. On the
certainty of guilt
contrary, evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to sexual
advances. (she was paid
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that before conviction can
be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved
3. The SC found the witness’ (Jessie Ramirez) testimony to be should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
inconsistent. He was not all certain about the sexual vibrator reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of
because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant. all others, as the author of the crime.
Even if it was established that Ritter did insert something inside
Case No. 24 5. In 1977, or more than ten years after the sale, Tecla Padua,
Alonzo vs. Padua one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area sold to
G.R. No. 72873 | May 28, 1987 | CRUZ.J. | the spouses Alonzo.
Duty to Render Judgment, NCC 9, 10 6. The trial court dismissed this complaint on the ground that
PETITIONERS: Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Tecla days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. It also held
Padua that actual notice of the sales was sufficient. Although there
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
SUMMARY: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal shares a the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
parcel of land registered in the mane of their deceased parents. In 7. The IAC in reversing the lower court, declared that the notice
1963, one brother, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided required by Article 1088 of the Civil Code was written notice
share to the Carlos Alonzo (petitioner) for P550 by way of absolute and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.
sale. One year later, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own Article 1088 states:
share to the same vendees. By virtue of such agreements, the
petitioners occupied, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said Art. 1088. “Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
lot which they enclosed with a fence. With their consent, their son stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
of the enclosed area. In 1977, or more than ten years after the sale, price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
Tecla Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
sold to the spouses Alonzo. vendor."

DOCTRINE: When the facts warrants, we [The Court] interpret the ISSUE/S:
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed 1. Whether or not Tecla can invoke her right to redemption
with justice. . - NO
2. Whether or not actual notice can substitute written
FACTS: notice in this case. - YES
1. Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso
shares a parcel of land registered in the mane of their RATIO:
deceased parents. 1. No, Tecla’s right to redeem had already lapsed not having
2. In 1963, one brother, Celestino Padua, transferred his been exercised within 30 days from the notice of sales in
undivided share to Carlos Alonzo (petitioner) for P550 by 1963 and 1964. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code provides: “The
way of absolute sale. right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
3. One year later, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
share to the same vendees. By virtue of such agreements, writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the
the petitioners occupied, an area corresponding to two-fifths case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
of the said lot which they enclosed with a fence. Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
4. With their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
possible redemptioners….The right of redemption of co- do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.” justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

2. Yes, although there was no written notice as required by the

law, actual notice was accepted and sufficient because of
the following circumstances:
● the whole lot was only 604 meters, including the
portion sold to the petitioners;
● Eustaquia was staying in the same house with
Tecla, they were all close friends and their children
went to school together.
Given these, it was impossible for Tecla to be unaware of the sales.
Even with the erection of the permanent semi-concrete by the
petitioner’s son was done without objection on her part. By requiring
written proof of such notice, the Court would be closing its eyes to
the obvious truth in favor of their false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.

The petition also appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum

that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot
argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by
the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article
1088 can lead to only one conclusion to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run,
much less expired in 1977. But as has also been aptly observed, we
test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It
is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, this Court shall interpret and apply the law not independently
of, but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we
Case No. 25 RATIO:
Barcellano vs. Banas
G.R. No. 165287| Date: September 11, 2014 |Perez, J.| Duty to RULING: The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate
render judgment court decision granting the Banās heirs the right to redeem the
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Barcellano subject property. The decision was based on the provisions of article

We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art.
1623 of the New Civil Code, which provides that:
A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties showed that exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
redemption may be exercised does not exist. Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
FACTS: (additional facts)
A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing
Respondent Dolores Banās, an heir of Bartolome Banās owned a lot in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties showed that
in Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written
Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal
owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to redemption may be exercised does not exist. In this case, the law
Armando Barcellano. The heirs of Banās contested the sale, and was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.
conveyed their intention to redeem the property. However, according
to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was also
mention that the Banās heirs failed to give the amount required by
Medina for them to redeem the lot. Action to redeem the property
was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the ground that
the Banās heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the
period provided in article 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was

ISSUE: W/N the RTC decision to deny the Banās heirs of their right
of legal redemption is valid?
Case No. 26 driver was thrown out from the wagon and was unable to
Martinez vs.Van Buskirk stop the horses resulting to a collision with the carromata.
G.R. No. L-5691| December 27, 1910 | Moreland, .J. | 4. The court found him guilty of negligence and gave judgment
Presumption & Applicability of Customs (NCC 11-12) against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: S.D. MARTINEZ & CARMEN ONG DE per cent per annum from the 17th day October, 1908, and
MARTINEZ for the costs of the action.
SUMMARY: Whether or not William Van Buskirk is liable for the negligence of his
*same as facts* cochero?

Article 11, NCC: “Customs which are contrary to law, public order No, Van Buskirk is not liable for the negligence of his cochero.
or public policy shall not be countenanced.”
Under Article 11 & 12 of the New Civil Code, acts of which that the
Article 12, NCC: “A custom must be proved as a fact, according to performance has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
the rules of evidence.” therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they
have ripened into custom, can not be held to be of themselves
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: infers negligence from the very nature unreasonable or imprudent. In fact, the very reason why they have
of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how been permitted by society is that they are beneficial rather than
any defendant behaved prejudicial.
FACTS: (additional facts) It is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which
1. On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was they were left at the time of the accident. Those conditions showing
riding in a carromata on Calle Real, Ermita, when a delivery of themselves that the defendant’s cochero was not negligent in the
wagon belonging to William Van Buskirk, came along the management of the horse.
street in the opposite direction at a great speed, and run
over to carromata severely wounding Carmen Ong De This is the custom in all cities in which it has not been productive of
Martinez with a serious cut upon her head. accidents or injuries.
2. Van Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the
cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the RULING:
accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs.
a safe and reliable cochero;
3. That upon the delivery of some forage, the defendant’s
cochero tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of
the delivery wagon and then went back inside the wagon to
unload the forage. While unloading the forage, another
vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noise, which frightened the horses
attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away. The
Case No. 27 the computation of the period. (n)
Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property
162155 | August 28, 2007 | Corona, J. | Legal Periods Revised Administration Code, Chapter 8, Sec. 31
PETITIONER: Commissioner on Internal Revenue; Arturo Parcero Sec. 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
(District Revenue Officer) calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a
RESPONDENT: Primetown Property Group specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day,"
SUMMARY: to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decisions sunrise.chanrobles virtual law library
of the Court of Appeals on the tax refund petition of Primetown
Property Group. They were denied the petition on the grounds of
being late in filing the petition within the 2-year period.

Legal Period
New Civil Code Art. 13
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-
five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours;
and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by
the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last FACTS:
day included. (7a) 1. Gilbert Yap, the vice chairman of Primetown Property Groupfiled
for a tax refund in 1997. In a letter he wrote to the District
Rules of Court, Rule 22 Revenue Officer, he mentioned that the increase in the cost of
Computation of Time labor and cost of materials led them to suffer a loss of Php
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period 71,879,228.00 but they still complied with their quarterly income
of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the tax and real estate tax amounting to Php 26,318,398.32. Gilbert
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from Yap stated that because of the company’s loss, they are not
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded liable to comply with income taxes.
and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, 2. In May 3, 1999, the BIR Officer asked Primetown property to
as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday submit additional documents to support their claim. Primetown
in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next Property duly complied, but their request was never acted upon.
working day. (a) 3. Primetown Property filed a case in Court of Tax Appeals in April
Section 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done 2000. Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the case since the 2-year
which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period to claim for tax refund and tax credit had already lapsed.
period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after According to Sec. 229 of National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. a. “no suit or proceedings shall be filed after the
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of
the tax regardless of any supervening cause that
may arise after payment.”
4. Primetown Property paid their last income tax return on April 14,
1998. The CTA used Art. 13 of the Civil Code which states that a
year is made up of 365 days, and the CTA ruled that the filing of
petition fell on the 731st day, which was beyond the prescriptive
period stated in the Sec. 229 of the NIRC.

1. Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April
13, 2000 or April 14, 2000, considering that the last payment of
tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year.
YES - the filing of tax refund was till within the prescriptive

2. Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by

EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of the Administrative Code of
1987. YES - impliedly repealed by Sec. 31 RAC


The filing for the tax refund of Primetown Property was still within the
prescriptive period, since Art. 13 of the Civil Code was impliedly
repealed by Sec. 31 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Sec. 31 RAC states that a year will be composed of 12 months,
regardless of the number of days within the month. The two-year
prescriptive period after the payment of the last income tax on April
1998 by Primetown Period would have ended in April 2000, when
Primetown Property Group filed for a petition for tax refund. The
Supreme Court denied the Internal Revenue’s petition, and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with the order to hear the
case of CTA Case No. 6113 Primetown Property Group Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
Case No. 28 that Rellon is a useless captain and thus threatened him more by
Montajes vs. People bringing out a bolo (or lagaraw) to strike him with it.
G.R. No. 183449 | March 12, 2012 | Peralta, .J. |
Legal Periods (NCC 13) ISSUE:
PETITIONER: ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES Whether or not Alfredo Montajes filed his petition for review out of

The original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was No, Alfredo Montajes files his petition within the time period and thus
on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. On May 21, 2007, a Monday (the should be granted by the Court of Appeals.
next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on
a Saturday), petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file a The petition for review was filed out of time based in A.M. No. 00-2-
petition for review wherein he prayed that he be granted 15 days 14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked
from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his to the original period and commences immediately after the
petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. expiration of such period. Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration
of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June
DOCTRINE: 5, 2007 was already two days late. However, we find the
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court: “How to compute time. – circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day
of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins Under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, if the last day of the
to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, then the time
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a shall not run until the next working holiday. Given that the last day
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time was May 19, 2007 and it was a Saturday, the supposed deadline
shall not run until the next working day.” should be May 22, 2007.

Article 13, NCC: “When the laws speak of years, months, days or There was no showing that respondent suffered any material injury
nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each; or his cause was prejudiced by reason of such delay. Moreover, the
months of 30 days; days of 24 hourss; and nights from sunset to RTC decision which was sought to be reversed in the petition for
sunrise. review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by petitioner of direct assault, hence, the petition involved no less than
the number of days which they respectively have. petitioners liberty. There is nothing on record that shows petitioner's
In computing a period, the 1stday shall be excluded and the last day deliberate intent to delay the final disposition of the case as he had
included.” filed the petition for review within the extended period sought,
although erroneously computed.
FACTS: (additional facts) We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition
Alfredo Montajes assaulted Jose B. Rellon, Brgy. Captain of Aliban, for review does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. And
Buenavista, Agusan Del Norte at around 1am in a benefit dance even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late,
sponsored by the Sangguniang Kabataan at Purok 4. Montajes said where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the
petition, we may relax the stringent application of technical rules in
the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not

really impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the higher
objective of procedural rule is to insure that the substantive rights of
the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant
must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of

The petition is granted.
Case No. 29 common friend Pacita Noel. The couple became estranged and lived
Tenchaves vs. Escaño separately after that.
G.R. No L-19671| July 26, 1966 | Reyes,.J. | Binding Effect 4. Vicenta initiated a suit for annulment against pastor in the Misamis
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Pastor B. Tenchavez Court but this was eventually dismissed for failure to prosecute.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Vicenta F. Escano 5. After some time, Vicenta left for the United States. In 1950, she
applied for and was granted a divorce decree by the court of Nevada
SUMMARY: against Pastor Tenchavez on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
*see facts mental in character".
6. In 1951, the parents of Vicenta filed a petition with the Archbishop
DOCTRINE: (1) A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage.
decreed after the effectivity of the New Civil Code (RA 386), is not entitled to 7. On September 1954, Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction' and neither is the marriage contracted American, and eventually had children by him. On August 1958, she
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree was granted US citizenship.
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country; (2) the remarriage of divorced 8. In 1955, Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation against
wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle Vicenta and damages against her parents on the g
the later to a decree of legal separation conformably to the Philippine law; (3)
the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and
the other to recover damages'; (4) An action for alienation of affections binding upon courts of the Philippines.
against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part
RULING: Marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano
remained subsisting and undisolved under Philippines law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife

1. On February 24, 1948, without the knowledge of her parents,
Vicenta Escaño, a 27 year old “collegiala” from a socially prominent -When it was issued, Escano and Tenchavez were still both Filipino
family, missed her college class to exchange marriage vows with citizens. Thus, Escano was then subject to Philippine law, and Art.
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an ex-army officer and engineer, 15 NCC of the Philipines, already in force at the time.
before a Catholic army chaplain (Lt. Moises Lavares) in Cebu City.
The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. -Art. 15 states that “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
2. Vicenta’s parents, upon learning of the marriage, sought the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
advice of Father Reynes who suggested a re-celebration to validate citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of
the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the -Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce
parish priest for the army chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
3. Vicenta did not agree to the re-celebration after subsequently - Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of
learning of Pastor’s supposed amorous relationship with their absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a
violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination
in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. Vicenta Escano argues that when she contracted the marriage she
The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In have been in conspiracy with Tenchavez. Even assuming that
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such
A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable,
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil
to validity in the Philippines. court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the CFI of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
-Given that Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid in the Philippine jurisdiction, her previous union
to Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in
law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).

-Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is

technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine law, and entitles the husband Tenchavez to
a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery.
Such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies
an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of
the first marriage.

NOTES: (other issues discussed)

Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were validly married to each

other, from the standpoint of civil law. Both parties were then above
the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; both consented to the
marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain
Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere
shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to
solemnize marriages.

Case No. 30 Josefina was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered
ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin petitioners to pay her salary for the three months unexpired
G.R No. 178551, October 11, 2010 | CARPIO MORALES, J. | portion of her contract.
Binding Effect, NCC 15 5. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
6. ATCI appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the
PETITIONERS: ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal, Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune
and Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them.
RESPONDENT: Ma. Josefa Echin Further, Echin was validly dismissed for her failure to meet
the performance rating within the one-year period as
SUMMARY: required under Kuwait's Civil Service Laws.
See facts 7. The CA affirmed both the NLRC and LA’s decision. The
CA noted that under the law, a private employment agency
DOCTRINE: The party invoking the application of a foreign law has shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the
the burden of proving the law. The foreign law is treated as a contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
presumed to know only domestic law. Under the doctrine of employment. As to Ikdal's liability, the CA held that under
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption, where a Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the Overseas Filipinos' Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
FACTS: money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
1. Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas 8. ATCI contends that they should not be held liable because
Corporation on behalf of its principal, the Ministry of Public the employment contract specifically stipulates that the
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum Regulations of Kuwait. They also conclude that it was patent
of Agreement (MOA). Under the MOA, all newly-hired error for the labor tribunals and the CA to apply the Labor
employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year Code provisions governing probationary employment in
and are covered by Kuwait's Civil Service Board deciding the present case. Moreover, given that the foreign
Employment Contract. principal is a government agency which is immune from suit,
2. Josefina was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was ATCI, being a mere agent, cannot likewise be held liable.
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, for not
having allegedly passed the probationary period. She ISSUE: Whether or not ATCI is liable. – YES
returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering
her own air fare.
3. Josefina filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal
against ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented RATIO:
by Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
4. The Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed 1. Yes, ATCI is liable.
that there was just cause for Josefina's dismissal nor that
she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that
As a private recruitment agency, it cannot evade responsibility for the
money claims of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
principal's liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
held jointly and solidarily liable. RA 8042 precisely affords the OFWs attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
payment of what is due them. To allow petitioners to simply invoke seal of such court.”
the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principal's liability before petitioner can To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: the
be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability pointless. MOA, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
period of one (1) year and that the host country's Civil Service Laws
The contention that Philippine labor laws are not applicable since it and Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the
was expressly provided in respondent's employment contract, which termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the
she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and translated copy of the certificate of termination, both of which
Regulations, has not been substantiated. The party invoking the documents were certified by the Head of the DFA-Office of Consular
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law. Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent's
The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of
notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic law. "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
Under the doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual schedule.
presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
ours.To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
Revised Rules of Court which reads: authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as
required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
“SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the was validly terminated.
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in Case No. 31
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country Tuna Processing vs. Philippine Kingford
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his G.R. No. 185582| Date: February 29. 2012 | Perez, J.| Binding Effect
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do
DOCTRINE: business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities
in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
I. Binding Effect Article 15 New Civil Code
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon RATIO: Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. arbitrations in instances where the place of arbitration is in the
Philippines, it is specifically required that a petition to determine any
question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such
arbitration agreement available to the parties before the
FACTS: (additional facts)
commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for judicial relief from
the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding
Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a US Patent, Philippine Letters or declining its jurisdiction after arbitration has already commenced
Patent, and an Indonesian Respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. should state [t]he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner
(KINGFORD). The MOA provides for the enforcing of the or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued.
abovementioned patents, granting licenses under the same, and
collecting royalties, and for the establishment of herein Petitioner
When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration
Tuna Processors, Inc. (TPI). Due to a series of events not mentioned
clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it
in the Petition, the tuna processors, including Respondent
becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result
KINGFORD, withdrew from Petitioner TPI and correspondingly
of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to
reneged on their obligations. Petitioner TPI submitted the dispute for enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in implementation of the result.
the State of California, United States and won the case against
Respondent KINGFORD. To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI filed a
Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. Respondent
RULING: Yes. The court reiterate that the foreign corporation’s
KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC denied for lack
capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the
of merit. Respondent KINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
RTC judge, Judge Alameda, and moved for the reconsideration of
Following the generalia specialibus non derogant principle, the
the order denying the Motion. Judge Alameda inhibited himself
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as
notwithstanding “[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated
the Act, as its title – An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an
assertions in the motion.” Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-
Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to
raffled, in turn, granted Respondent KINGFORDS’s Motion for
Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other
Reconsideration and dismissed the Petition on the ground that
Purposes – would suggest, is a law especially enacted to actively
Petitioner TPI lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom
Petitioner TPI is a corporation established in the State of California
of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their
and not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Hence, the
disputes. It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides

that the opposing party in an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that
were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, and
not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of
the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign
arbitral award. The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule
13.5. Capacity to sue is not included.
Case No. 32 Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of
Amos Bellis vs. Bellis the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
G.R. No. L-23678| June 6, 1967| Bengzon, .J. | NCC 16 $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate
OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS: MARIA CHRISTINA BELLIS & children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the
MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and
DOCTRINE: 2nd marriages.
Article 16, NCC: “Real property as well as personal property is Among the 3 illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma
subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. filed their respective oppositions to the project partition on the ground
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary ISSUE:
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person Whether the Texan Law or Philippine Law must apply in this case.
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said RATIO:
property may be found.” It is not disputed that the Amos Bellis was both a national of Texas
and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even
Doctrine of Renvoi: the court adopts the rules of a foreign assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same
jurisdiction with respect to any conflict of law that arises would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, it
would still refer to Texas Law.
FACTS: (additional facts) Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the USA. He had 5
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
legitimate children (Edward, George, Henry, Alexander and Anna)
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence of proof as to
with his 1stwife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate
children (Edwin, Walter and Dorothy) with his 2nd wife, Violet the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children (Maria Christina, Miriam
renvoi. Under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
Palma, Amos Jr).
legitimates. Accordingly, (in Article 16 of the Civil Code) since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines (to
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
be executed by The People’s Bank and Trust Company) in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of
Amos Bellis.
and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
The order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
against appellants.
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd
wives, in equal shares.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and

filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and
Case No. 33 Relations Commission (NLRC). Rouzie filed a suit in the NLRC
Raytheon vs. Rouzie for the nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and
G.R. No. 162894 | February 26, 2008 | Tinga,.J. | Binding Effect breach of employment contract. On September 1995, NLRC
PETITIONER: Raytheon International Inc. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to
RESPONDENT: Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr. pay Rouzie, and upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed its
decision and dismissed Rouzie’s lawsuit on the grounds of lack
DOCTRINE: of jurisdiction. Rouzie elevated the case to the Supreme Court
Forum non conveniens - in conflicts-of-laws cases, a court may and was dismissed on November 26, 1997.
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded 4. On January 8, 1999, Rouzie who was a resident of La Union filed
from seeking remedies elsewhere. an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court against
Raytheon International Inc., BMSI and RUST, reiterating
Article 17, New Civil Code Rouzie’s points of complaints in his previous case. CMSI verbally
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and contracted Rouzie to negotiate the sale of services in
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the government projects and Rouzie was not paid the commission in
country in which they are executed. the Pinatubo dredging project, which he secured on behalf of
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign as Raytheon International had combined and functioned as one
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be company.
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and 5. Raytheon alleged that it was a foreign corporation licensed to do
those which have for their object public order, public policy and business in the Philippines and dnied entering into any
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or agreement with Rouzie and merging with BMSI and RUST.
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions Raytheon International also referred to the NLRC decision that
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a) the written agreement between Rouzie and BMSI and RUST as
“Special Sales Representative Agreement” is governed by the
FACTS: (additional facts) laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought for dismissal
1. In 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation of the complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Raytheon International Inc filed for an Omnibus Motion for
Connecticut, USA, and American citizen, Stockton W. Rouzie Jr., Hearing on the grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to
entered into a contract wherein BMSI hired Rouzie as its state a cause of action.
respondent to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed commission
of 10% from the gross receipts. On March 11, 1922, Rouzie ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint can be dismissed on the
secured a contract with the Philippine government on behalf of grounds of forum non conveniens.
BSMI for the dredging of rivers by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and
3. On July 16, 1944, respondent filed a suit against BMSI, Rust 1. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
International (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert, and Walter G. where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the
Browning in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, can proceed to
try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is
an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where
the case is filed. The Philippine courts had acquired
jurisdiction once the complaint was filed in the NLRC by
Rouzie. The provision in the contract that it should be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine courts or any tribunal are banned
from hearing the civil action.

2. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.

Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant
to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The
choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

3. The petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court and

Raytheon’s defense about foreign elements is not sufficient
to dismiss the case.
2. After Sen. Tamano’s death, on November 23, 1994, Zorayda
Case No. 34 and Adib (his son) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Tamano vs. Ortiz Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was
G.R. No. 126603| June 29, 1998 | Bellosillo .J. | Binding Effect bigamous. Zorayda contended that Sen. Tamano and Estrellita
PETITIONER: Estrellita J. Tamano misrepresented themselves as single and divorced, making
RESPONDENT: Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz (presiding judge of RTC the marriage contract fraudulent.
Quezon City), Haja Zorayda A. Tamano, Adib. A. Tamano, and 3. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
Hon. Court of Appeals Regional Trial Court of Quezon City did not have any
DOCTRINE: jurisdiction over the subject of action, since only a party to
Article 18, New Civil Code Art. 18. In matters which are governed marriage may file for an action for annulment of marriage
by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall against the other spouse, hence, it was only Sen. Tamano who
be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a) can file for a complaint. She also contended that since
Article 13, Muslim Laws or PD 1083 Art. 13. Application. — (1) Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in
The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear the case was vested in the
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Personal Laws. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. and ruled that the case at bar was within the jurisdiction of the
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, RTC of Quezon City since they were married in accordance
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the with the Civil Code, and not exclusively in accordance with PD
Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. No. 1803 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the 4. Estrelita referred the case to the Supreme Court but the SC
essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, ruled that it should be referred to the Court of Appeals first.
paternity and 􏰀liation, guardianship and custody of minors, support The Court of Appeals ruled that the case at bar falls under the
and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts only when filed in places
breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of where there are shari’a courts. Since Quezon City did not have
marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and any shari’a courts, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City still
wife, parental authority, and the property relations between had jurisdiction over the case.
husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has
Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction RULING: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving
of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi- the contract of marriage and marital relations. In this case, the
judicial functions . . . marriage commenced within civil rites and in accordance with the
Civil Code. And whether or not they were likewise married in a
Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original
FACTS: (additional facts) jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
1. On May 31, 1958, Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were married in Case No. 35
civil rights, and their marriage supposedly remained in effect Llave vs. Republic
until his death. Before his death, on June 2, 1993, Sen. March 30, 2011 | Del Castillo, J.| Binding Effect
Tamano married petitioner Estrellita in civil rights.
PETITIONER: Estrellita Juliano-Llave -In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated
as 'divorced.'
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines, Haja Putri Zorayda A.
-On November 23,1994, private respondents Zorayda and her son
Tamano and Adib Ahmad A. Tamano Adib, filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
SUMMARY: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, -Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994.
She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, and again, another 15
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing days or until February 18, 1995 both of which the court granted.
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, -Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion
his widow. to Dismiss on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter's disbarment
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their complaint against Sen. Tamano.
own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate -The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and asserted its jurisdiction
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for over the case for declaration of nullity.
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. -Thus, Estrellita filed a certiorari petition with this Court questioning
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. -The CA resolved the petition
married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this adverse to Estrellita in its Decision
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993 -Estrellita then elevated the appellate court's judgment to this Court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari
DOCTRINE: A new law ought to affect the future not what is past. -The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage law, no vested rights shall were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano's subsequent marriage
to Estrellita as void ah initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of
be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil
married couple Code of... the Philippines.
-The CA adjudged that Estrellita's marriage to Sen. Tamano is void
Art 18, NCC – In matter which are governed by the code of commerce
ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda
and special law, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of
and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not
this code.
provide for an absolute... divorce.
-CA denied Estrellita's appeal as she was given ample opportunity to
FACTS: (additional facts) be heard but simply ignored it by asking numerous postponements.
-Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita Hence, this petition.
twice -initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993
in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. Tamano was bigamous.
RULING : Yes. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and Art. 186.(1). Effect of code on past acts. — Acts
Sen. Tamano. Their marriage can’t be invalidated by PD 1083. executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
Hence, Sen. Tamano’s marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution,
and nothing herein except as otherwise speci􏰀cally
provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
The Marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under Civil and Muslim rites. The 186 (2) which states:
only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslim
and non-Muslim alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not law shall be considered as one contracted under
Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394
desire to this effect.
which was not availed during its effectivity.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law,
Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we
applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status
since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is
the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim


Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977,

and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Case No. 36 4. The union turned sour and and, in 1998, the two were
Zamoranos vs. People separated. After a bitter custody battle, Zamoranos and
G.R No. 193902, 193908, 194075 (consolidated) | June 1, 2011 | Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested
NACHURA, J. | Binding Effect, NCC 18 primary custody of the minor children in Zamoranos, with the
Pacasum retaining visitorial rights.
In first two petitions: 5. Dissatisfied, Pacasum filed several cases against
PETITIONER: Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos Zamoranos, particularly: (1) Declaration of a Void Marriage,
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines, Samson R. Pacasum, alleging that at the time she married Pacasum, Zamoranos
SR. was already previously married to De Guzman; (2) Criminal
In GR 194075: complaint for Bigamy and (3) Separate administrative cases
PETITIONER: Samson R. Pacasum, SR. for Zamoranos' dismissal from service and disbarment. (the
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos administrative cases were dismissed in due course)
Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine
Dignos on July 18, 2004.
SUMMARY: 6. With respect to the criminal charge of Bigamy against
Zamoranos, the prosecutor initially found probable cause
DOCTRINE: and an Information for Bigamy was filed. However, upon
If there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the RPC Zamoranos' motion for reconsideration, the charge of
which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on Bigamy was dismissed. This prompted Pacasum to file a
subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of
long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" Justice. The DOJ reversed the resolution dismissing the
the Muslim Code, the provision of the RPC on bigamy will not apply. charges. Thus, Zamoranos filed an urgent motion to hold in
abeyance the filing of the criminal case and the issuance of
warrant of arrest. The motions were denied.
7. With respect to the civil case (Declaration of a Void
Marriage), the RTC (Branch 2) of Iligan City dismissed the
FACTS: petition for lack of jurisdiction.
1. Atty. Marietta Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim 8. The RTC found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are
convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage.
Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of
on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites Zamoranos and her first husband [de Guzman] shall be
before Judge Laguio of RTC, Quezon City. governed by Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim
2. A year after, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce Personal Laws of the Philippines) and divorce proceedings
by talaq.* The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Shari'a Circuit District Court which issued a Divorce. the Shari'a Circuit Court. Moreover, the divorce by Talaq
3. Thereafter, Zamoranos married Samson Pacasum, Sr. on dissolved the marriage between Zamoranos and her first
December 20, 1989 under Islamic rites. They subsequently husband [de Guzman] being governed by PD 1083.
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before 9. The CA and the SC both affirmed the dismissal of the civil
Judge Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. The union was case and the decision became final and executory. In the
blessed with three children. meantime, the RTC of Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum,
issued an Order reinstating the criminal case for Bigamy enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
against Zamoranos. Thus, Zamoranos filed a Motion to recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC in the civil case
categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims and the Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
inapplicability of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provision on (i) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of
Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. The RTC denied the general application, the former shall prevail.
Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos filed a petition (ii) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and
for certiorari with the CA but the same was denied. Hence, special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally
this petition. construed in order to carry out the former.
(iii) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims
and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a
ISSUE: Whether or not Zamoranos can be convicted of Bigamy.
– NO Under the first provision, for example, there is conflict between the
provision on bigamy under the RPC which is a law of general
RATIO: application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the
latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent
Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" the Muslim Code, the
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and provision of the RPC on bigamy will not apply.
incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083. The
Shari'a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses In combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the
penalized under the Revised validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial. If both
Penal Code (RPC). Nonetheless, even in criminal cases, the trial parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or
court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the
marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of
In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites
Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are
of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both the Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will
RTC and the CA. arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is,
when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim
The subject matter of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or
second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to Muslim law. A third situation occurs when the Civil Code of the
be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC should have suspended the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the
proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had accordance with the Civil Code.
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce
by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman. Trying A muslim divorce (Talaq) entitles one to remarry. According to the
Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts experts on Muslim Law, one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as
have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial
bond, entitling one to remarry. Therefore, Zamoranos' divorce from FACTS: (additional facts)
De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge of the Shari'a Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her
Circuit Court was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in husband before their marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita
1989. Consequently, the RTC, is without jurisdiction to try Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the
pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by
Geluz. In less than two years, she again became pregnant and had
her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos.
Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware
and did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the
award of damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated
the award of damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral

Case No. 37 ISSUE:

Geluz vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No| Date | Last name of Judge, .J. | (1) Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on
Topic from the syllabus
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Geluz behalf of the unborn child.

SUMMARY: see facts (2) Whether or not the unborn child acquires civil personality.


Unborn fetus without personality. Award for death of a person does RATIO: Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
not cover unborn fetus. An unborn fetus is not endowed with person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed
personality and is incapable of having rights and obligations with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from on that lacked juridical personality.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.


The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at

P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial
court and Court of Appeals predicated.Both trial court and CA
wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous
abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an
administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his
wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for
damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be
the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large
money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and
P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim, which
under the circumstances was
Case No. 38
Quimiguing vs. Icao
G.R. No. L-26795| July 31, 1970 | Last name of Judge, .J. | ISSUE:
Topic from the syllabus Whether or not a conceived (unborn) child should be treated the
SUMMARY: Yes, an unborn child is given the same benefits as that of a born
*same as facts* child.
Under Article 40 and 41 of the Civil Code, a conceived child is given
DOCTRINE: by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
Article 40: “Birth determines personality; but the conceived child to it. Thus, it has a right to support from its parents; particularly of
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, Icao. Though unborn, it may still receive donations as prescribed by
provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the Article 742 of the Civil Code, even if the said child is only ‘en ventre
following article.” de sa mere’.

Article 41: “For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is

alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. RULING:
However, if the fetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven Costs against Felix Icao.
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after
its complete delivery from the maternal womb”

‘En ventre de sa mere’ - child in the mother’s womb (unborn child)

FACTS: (additional facts)

> Carmen Quimiguing is neighbors with Felix Icao. Even though he is
married, he has had numerous unconsented sexual encounters with
Carmen by force and intimidation which resulted to pregnancy. With
this, Carmen had to stop studying and hence, claimed for support at
120 pesos per month, damages and attorney’s fees.

1. Icao moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of
action(because the child had not been born yet), Trial
Judge ruled in favor of Icao.
2. Quimiguing moved to amend the complaint because
she gave birth to a baby girl. But the Court ruled that
there was no amendment allowed because the original
complaint was dismissed due to no cause of action.
Case No. 39 wrote a letter to a father confirming that the child is his and he
De Jesus vs. Syguia wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of
G.R. No. 39110| November 28, 1933 | Street .J. | Natural persons the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia. Cesar asked
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Antonia L. De Jesus et al. his friend Dr. Talavera to attend to Antonia’s birth and hospital
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Cesar Syquia arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
2. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a
DOCTRINE: House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together
Civil Code Article 40-41 for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of a second
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, with another woman at this time. During the christening of the
provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the child, Cesar who was in charge of the event, caused the name
following article. (29a) Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive was first planned.
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb.
However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven ISSUE:
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after 1. Whether or not the note of Cesar to the priest can be evidence of
its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a) acknowledgment of paternity by Cesar.
2. Whether or not Ismael Loanco had uninterrupted possession of a
Article 2 Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution natural child status.
SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous RULING:
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and 1. Yes, the letter of Cesar to the priest is a proof of
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right acknowledgment of Syquia’s patternity of Ismael Loanco. The
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of a. “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the
the Government. continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and
the period in this case was long enough to reveal the
Article 5, PD 603 Child and Youth Welfare Code father's resolution to admit the status”.
Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality 2. It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and
of the child shall commence from the time of his conception, for all authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia
purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco
of the Civil Code. as his natural son because there exists not an indubitable
writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity
FACTS: (additional facts) of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the
1. Antonia Loanco was an unmarried 20-year old woman who uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the
worked as a cashier in the barber shop of Cesar Syquia’s brother. said defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of
Syquia frequented the barber shop and it did not take long for his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
Cesar and Antonia to develop a romantic relationship. As a Case No. 40
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on Continental Steel vs. Montano
June 17, 1931. In the early months of the pregnancy, Cesar was G.R. No. 182836 | October 13, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. |
consistent in his visits to Antonia. In February 1931, he even
Natural Persons - birth dependent under the company and labor union’s CBA because
PETITIONER: Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation Hortillanos’s unborn child could not have reached 38 weeks of its
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator without depending upon the support of the wife for sustenance.
Allan S. Montaño Continental Steel misplaced in positing civil personality of the unborn
child since it is not relevant in the case. In addition, since Hortillano
DOCTRINE: filed the complete requisites for his denied claims in accordance with
the CBA, he is entitled for the bereavement and death and accident
***Related to the topic of the syllabus insurance claims as provided for in the CBA. The petition of
Continental Steel is herein denied and Hortillano must be awarded
with claims against the cost of Continental Steel.

FACTS: Hortillano’s case also qualified the elements for bereavement leave
under Article 10 Sec 2 of the Contract Bargaining Agreement:
1. Hortillano is an employee of Continental Steel and a member of (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent,
the NMCS-SUPER (Labor Union), filed a paternity leave, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3)
bereavement leave, and death and accident insurance for legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The
dependent in accordance with their Contract Bargaining requisites for death and accident insurance under Article
Agreement (CBA). The claims were based on Hortillano’s XVIII, Section 4 (3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death
unborn child through miscarriage. The paternity leave was must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or
granted to Hortillano but the bereavement benefits were not. child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
leave and other death benefits in accordance to their CBA with document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
Continental Steel. Atty. Allan Montaño, the chosen arbitrator to
resolve the issue, argued that Hortillano is entitled to the claim.

2. Continental Steel posited its denial stating that the provision of

the CBA did not include the coverage of the death of an unborn
child without legal personality, that the fetus delivered dead
could not be considered a dependent of support nor acquired
any right to be supported, hence not a legitimate dependent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the unborn child a legitimate dependent,

thereby entitling Hortillano the bereavement and death and accident
insurance claims.

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that since the marriage of Hortillano
and his wife is unquestionable, the child born during their marriage is
legitimate. Moreover, the unborn child can also be considered a
Case No. 41 2. The certificate was issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Limjoco vs. Interstate Estate of Pio Fragante Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special
April 27, 1948 | Hilado, J.| Commencement and Termination of or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
Personality jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant.
PETITIONER: Angel T. Limjoco
RESPONDENT: Intestate Estate of Pedro O. Fragrante, deceased 3. Petitioner Limjoco opposed saying the Commisioner’s decision is
not in accordance with the law. It was error on the part of the
SUMMARY: commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the
estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the
Pedro O. Fragante, A Filipino citizen, applied for certificate of public case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently
convenience to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily granting to said estate the certificate applied for.
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality
of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant.
4. Commissioner argued that the estate was financially able to
However, he died prior to the approval of his application. Since his maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O.
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one
service, the commission, ordered certificate of public convenience be which by its nature did not lapse through his death. The certificate of
issued to the Intestate Estate of the authorizing said Intestate Estate public convenience once granted "as a rule should descend to his
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the
with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in
the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City.

The petitioner, Limjoco, argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante ISSUE: Whether or not Fragrante’s rights for the Certificate of public
cannot be substituted as the applicant for the deceased and is a convenience were extinguished by his death.
contravention of the law.
Yes, Chief Justice cited:

FACTS: (additional facts) “…unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting
the property or rights(emphasis supplied) of a deceased person
1. Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may
likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator,
Ibañez, rendered its decision granting the application of Pedro O.
unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,
Fragante, a Filipino citizen, for a certificate of public convenience to or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death
install,maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. extinguishes the right.”
This provision cited proves that the decedent's rights which by their NOTES:
nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the Art 42. CIVIL PERSONALITY IS EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
control and management of the executoror administrator, can not be
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of
the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and
decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable
prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a and movable things rights which are not material.
certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that
Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be article 336 of the Civil Code has been de􏰀ciently drafted in that it is
not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also
empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right
property for juridical purposes.
effective in that proceeding
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the
The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the
word "person", is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as certifcate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
natural persons. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a "However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also
been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or complete,
corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the
and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or
capacity of having rights and duties. The estate of a deceased executed."
person is also considered as having legal personality independent of
their heirs.

Hence, the court held that that within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of
the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of
those rights and the fulfilment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death. One of those rights was the one
involved in his pending application before the Public Service
Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution
of said application to its final conclusion.

Case No. 42
Dumlao vs. Quality Plastics the subject of legal relations is lost through death; hence, no valid
G.R. No. L-27596, April 30, 1976 | AQUINO, J. | NCC 42, Death service of summons can be effected upon him which will vest
jurisdiction upon the court over his person.|
and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late

To satisfy the judgment debt in favor of appellees, the
trial court ordered the foreclosure of the bond and auction sale
of the real properties given as security. It turned out that Pedro
Oria, one of the bondsmen whose land was sold had already
died long before the filing of the case, and that summons and
copy of the complaint were not served on him but on the
principal in the bond who acknowledged the service for himself
and his co-defendants.
Oria's heirs, appellants herein, sued appellee to annul
the judgment against Oria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. FACTS:
Appellee claimed that appellants were estopped from 1. On April 23, 1959, Pedro Oria died. On June 30, 1960,
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant Quality Products, Inc. filed a case against Vicente
deceased because they were aware of the action against the Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino
principal in the bond and his sureties. The trial court ruled that it Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarily Quality Plastic
had acquired jurisdiction over the deceased. Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of
interest from November, 1958 until its decision became final
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that summons or else Quality Plastics will be authorized to foreclose the
cannot be served upon a deceased litigant since a person's bond.
juridical capacity, which is his fitness to be the subject of legal 2. Defendants failed to pay the amount. Oria's land, which was
relations is lost through death; that since no valid service of given as security under the bond, was levied upon and sold
summons can be effected, jurisdiction over him cannot be by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The
acquired; and that the principle of estoppel has no application summons and copies of complaint was personally served on
to this case. June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter
|| acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-
DOCTRINE: The Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person defendants.
of a party-litigant who is already dead because he no longer has a 3. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed
civil personality. A man's juridical capacity which is the fitness to be Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated
will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for
the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land. Dionisio also sued in his capacity
as administrator of Oria’s testate estate. The petitioners
contend that respondent does not have jurisdiction over the
estate of Oria because Oria died on April 23, 1959, long
before June 13, 1960 when the case against them was filed,
therefore Oria did not have juridical capacity on the day the
summons was served.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his

land can be annulled on the ground of lack of juridical capacity. -

Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons just learned that Oria
was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos’ agreed
in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s
death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment

against him is a patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria
in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria
was concerned. A court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person
of a party-litigant who is already dead because he no longer has a
civil personality. A man’s juridical capacity which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations was lost through death; Hence, no valid
service of summons can be effected upon him which will vest
jurisdiction upon the Court over his person.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the
judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim
attorney’s fees against the corporation.
Case No. 43 RATIO: The Vargases contend that invoking art 305 and 308 of the
Eugenio vs. Velez civil code, as the next of kin, they are the legal custodians of the
G.R. No| Date | Last name of Judge, .J. | dead body of their sister vitaliana.
Topic from the syllabus
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Eugenio According to the court, applying order of preference to give
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Velez support under art 294, since there was no surviving spouse, the
brothers and sisters were preferred over the petitioner who was
SUMMARY: see facts merely a common law spouse.

DOCTRINE: Section 1103 of the revised administrative code also provides for a
justification as to who has the duty to bury a dead person.
Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death
upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined
by law, by contract and by will.
RULING: The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages.
FACTS: (additional facts) And even if it was recognized, the co-ownership requires that the
man and the woman must not in any way be incapacitated to
On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a petition contract marriage. In this case, Eugenio was legally married to
for habeas corpus against Eugenio for forcibly taking Vitaliana another woman, which bars him from being legally capacitated to
(respondents’ sister)from her residence in 1987 and confined by the contract marriages. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines
former in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. The respondent- “spouse” as a lawfully wedded spouse not including common law
brothers, however, were not knowledgeable of Vitaliana’s death on spouses. Hence, the custody of Vitaliana’s body is given to her
August 28, 1988 due to heart failure, prior to their filing of the writ of brothers and sisters.
habeas corpus. Hence, Eugenio did not release the body of Vitaliana
claiming that the writ of habeas corpus is invalid because it was filed
after the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers claimed that NOTES:
there was no existing marital relationship between Eugenio and
Vitaliana and therefore they have the custody over the body of the - BP Bld. 129 Section 19(5): “RTCs shall exercise
latter. The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse or
exclusive original jurisdiction [over]: …(5) in all actions
children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common law
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.”
spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody. Also, it was held
that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.
Article 294: “The claim for support, when proper and two or more
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following
order: Among descendants and ascendants the order in which
ISSUE: Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given they are called to the intestate succession of the person who has
to her full blood brothers and sisters or her common law spouse? a right to claim
Case No. 44 Under Article 42 of the Civil code, the effect of death upon the rights
Marcos vs. Manglapus and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract,
G.R. No. 88211| October 27, 1989 | PER CURIAM. | NCC 42 and by will. Thus, given that the remains of former President Marcos
PETITIONERS: FERDINAND MARCOS no longer has civil liability, it can be restricted entry to the country.
SUMMARY: The Court resolved to deny the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
Based on a decision dated September 15, 1989, the court merit.
dismissed the petition after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return
of former President Ferdinand Marcos and his family due to threats
to national interest and welfare. Since former president Marcos died
in September 28, 1989, the President did not allow the remains to
be brought back to our country until the administration decides.
Thus, a Motion for Reconsideration.

Article 42, NCC: “Civil personality is extinguished by death. The
effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
determined by law, by contract and by will.”

FACTS: (additional facts)

1. On a decision dated September 15, 1989, the court
dismissed the petition on the return of former president
Ferdinand Marcos and his family to the Philippines.
2. According to the Solicitor General, the formal rights being
invoked by the Marcoses under the label, ‘a right to return’,
including the label, ‘return of Marcos’ remains, is in reality a
substance to destabilize the country. Thus, he prays that the
Motion for Reconsideration be denied due to lack of merit.
Whether or not there is basis in barring the return of the remains of
former President Marcos in the Philippines.

No, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Case No. 45 Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother
Marcos vs. Manglapus did. This presumption was based on speculations, not evidence.
G.R. No. 88211| October 27, 1989 | PER CURIAM. | NCC 42 Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on which civil
PETITIONERS: Ramon Joaquin cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of
RESPONDENTS: Antonio C. Navarro survivorship may be direct, indirect, circumstantial or inferential.

During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the
following sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club
building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter
Pilar (32-33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad
Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The building was set on fire
and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided
to leave the building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his
son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they
came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the
ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many
people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and
Francisco sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3
days. On February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy,
they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The
trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled
that son outlived his mother.

Article 42, NCC: “Civil personality is extinguished by death. The
effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
determined by law, by contract and by will.”

FACTS: (additional facts)

Same as summary.

Whether or not the son had died before his mother.
[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession.
If mother died first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first
marriage, would inherit]