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January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the
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"earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No.
526 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
2

Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.
On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the
Court. Written oppositions were admitted, and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.
3 4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for
the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer
population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material
upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

 (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for
this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.
An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State.
Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization
of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make
reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent
and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
 (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services
throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to
elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects
of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages
44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be
no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the Integrated Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom
to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power
of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose
an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
 the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even
the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been
dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers
and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay
annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they
have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time —
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of
the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar;
(4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public.
No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine
Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying
will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission
on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the
integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association
and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662
(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. All these clearly indicate an
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overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on
January 16, 1973.

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B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any
of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of
the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral
and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the
annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

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B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966;
that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August
28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines
and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his
petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin
M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No.
9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to
seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006,
Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before
the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the
bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
1

becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains
to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
2

with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
1âwphi1

both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in

lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as
well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume
his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's
resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he
shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the
privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

#4

B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues
to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary
to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption
from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention
to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the
creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they
are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be
oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where
the inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by
the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers. 7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus:
 For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to
levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar
program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad
before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
#5

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10)
days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and
verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an
answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before
the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the
resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The
hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second,
for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova
never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.

In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband had
already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to
file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors
submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were
born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as
well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own
husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the
name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the
public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent
promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her
(complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one
Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress
hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.

Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and
continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.

Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and
respondent had been reconciled with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent
reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away
the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in
the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras, this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession ... of a
1

good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " It is2

important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral
character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage." In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-
3

year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct
in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter
cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his
4

immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant
who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with
another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a
married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family
which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up
again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them.
Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations
before his own daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until farther
orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

#6

A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006

QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent.
 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his monetary obligations and
for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of Professional Responsibility 2 and Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22.3

Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven postdated checks.
However, when complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by
the drawee bank, to wit:

Check No. Due Date Amount Reason for

Dishonor

MOB 1011326 May 16, 2001 P13,500.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011311 June 11, 2001 P30,000.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011328 June 17, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011313 August 12, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011329 August 16, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011314 August 19, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011330 September 18, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter4 sent on September 25, 2002;5 however,
respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason. Consequently, complainant instituted a
case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan.6 In addition, he filed the instant case for respondent’s disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions for extension
of time to file a responsive pleading7 and a motion to dismiss complaint.8

Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping. He
argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 against
respondent pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 9 Respondent argued that the filing of
the administrative case despite the pendency of the criminal cases is a form of harassment which should not be
allowed.
On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied10 the motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading
under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration 11 was likewise denied on
June 16, 2004.12

Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer. 13 His last motion for extension
was however denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline declared him in default. 14

Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of prescription 15 and
omnibus motion to recall the default order.16

On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective verified
position papers after which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution. 17

Only the complainant submitted his position paper.18

In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent
failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in disregard of the orders of the
IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against respondent does not pose a prejudicial
question to the resolution of the issues in the present administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Investigating
Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one year to two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so
doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. 19 Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in
their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.20 Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of
the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to
the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. 21

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no justifiable
reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but
respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to
the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to
recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross
misconduct.22 Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial
obligations.23

The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this administrative
complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another 24 or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.25 Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment
proceedings.26 Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the
respondent’s act of making or drawing and issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case
seeks to discipline respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.lavvph!1.net

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a
criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance of evidence is
required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.27

Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a
lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the rules on admission to
and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. 28

Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several opportunities
given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 200329 the Order30 of the IBP requiring him
to file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating Commissioner submitted the Report and
Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion
for reconsideration, manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default
order. Until the end, respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on
insisting, on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondent’s failure to comply with
the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. 31 Respondent should
be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein. 32

In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as recommended
by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective
immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

#7

[G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and
the RTC's Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.
The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the
Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002,
resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior
courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial
Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated
June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration
and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction
of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,
WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT
[GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI;
IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO
HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS
BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC'S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed,
may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of
a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25,
2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as
used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused
by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not
have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the
simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the
crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of
the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant
for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore,
petitioner's appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an
enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is
DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor
under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

#8

[G.R. NO. 154464, September 11, 2008]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, Petitioner, v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY, METRO MANILA, PUBLIC, Respondents.

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, Private Respondents..
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated
May 10, 20021 and July 31, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the
appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public
respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf,
before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance.
Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court3 that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera,
counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz
vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares
then remarked, "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending
Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the
trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge,
in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not
be served.5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous
allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it
was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.8 In the same Order, the trial court held that for the
failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but
Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances,
but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER'S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO.
01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS
PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE'S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner
as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed.11
A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons,
or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it.13

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his
practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with
dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it
necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to
comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on
December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz
to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school's clinical legal education program and is under
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the
petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation.14
Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law,15 Petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the
snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct
the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject
to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's
claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts,
while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The
Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it
was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to
the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and
counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived.17 The rationale for this
ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the
Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party
litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer's assistance, effectively undertake the successful
pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and
impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident
to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts.
Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling
that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial
when she said: "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his
motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioner's and his co-plaintiff's loss of faith and confidence in the respondent's impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case19 against the respondent
for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now
adopt the Court's findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence
to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself
must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.21
Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

#9

BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.

IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING
TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).

The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice
Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired
Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A.
Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.

The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an
intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo
questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly
accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr.
Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA
and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of
the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.

Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied
by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the
matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left
to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under
Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.

Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer
during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3

1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or

inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;

2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect
itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law
students; and

3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice
a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as
required by law.

The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be
left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be
under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law
schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only
to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5

Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past,
our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of
the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal
courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a
lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in
regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.

The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the
law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of
Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his
appearance.

#10

A.C. No. 7056 February 11, 2009

PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, finding respondent guilty of
gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:

On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of herein
complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de
Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez
and Maria Esguerra, who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that
respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was
elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land.
Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and
misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several
motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves
out as his partners/associates in the law firm.

The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two
years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on
the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance. 1

Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, appealing to the Court to take a
second look at his case and praying that the penalty of suspension of two years be reduced to mere reprimand or
admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients he was defending. 2

Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he took were not meant
to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious
study, research and experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his
clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory
designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. 3 He stresses that he was not the original
lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to them
and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told
him in the course of his interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and notorious
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title
was resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he
merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the law, considering
that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary eviction by the
complainant.4 He posits that he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be
protective of his own family,5 and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono. 6 1avvphi1

Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, he humbly submits that
there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same or did he fail to dispute this, contrary to the findings of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the
cooperative Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his office in this cooperative, together
with Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late Alfredo Caloico and Marciano Villavert. He signed the retainer
agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyer-client relationship, and the complainants were fully aware
of such arrangement.7

Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action he took in behalf of his
clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind consideration, pardon and forgiveness. He reiterates that
he does not deserve the penalty of two years’ suspension, considering that the complaint fails to show him wanting
in character, honesty, and probity; in fact, he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as
former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City handling detention
prisoners and pro bono cases, and is also a member of the Couples for Christ, and has had strict training in the law
school he graduated from and the law offices he worked with.8 He is the sole breadwinner in the family with a wife
who is jobless, four (4) children who are in school, a mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support. The
family’s only source of income is respondent’s private practice of law, a work he has been engaged in for more than
twenty-five (25) years up to the present.9

On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from respondent, requesting that he be
issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial commission. Respondent stated therein that he was aware of the
pendency of the administrative cases10 against him, but pointed out that said cases had not yet been resolved with
finality. Respondent sought consideration and compassion for the issuance of the clearance -- considering present
economic/financial difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that he was the sole breadwinner in the family.

It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 11 A lawyer’s
devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for
the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to
succeed.12 In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the
respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the
interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in
defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but
respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. We stress what we have
stated in our decision that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and
justice.13 This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. 14 Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court
processes.15

Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must have realized with the sanction
he received from this Court. However, the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain
from imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s length of
service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and
equitable considerations, and respondent’s advanced age, among other things, which have varying significance in
the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. Thus, after a careful consideration of herein respondent’s motion
for reconsideration and humble acknowledgment of his misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of
leniency towards him.16 We find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law sufficient in this case

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED. Respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolution within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on
the Court Administrator, who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

#11

A.C. No. 7056 September 13, 2006

PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must uphold truth and justice above
everything else, even above their own and their client's interests. They must be willing and able to stand for their
convictions against all odds; to carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to be beacons for the
weak, the oppressed and the marginalized. For failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent must be
sanctioned.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Plus Builders Inc. and Edgardo
C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.
with committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:

"On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR,
DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of
Bienvenido De Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin
Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called [tenants/farmers] x x x.

"On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in
favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.

"[Tenants/farmers] filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of DARAB cases above-mentioned
alleging under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject
properties, acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that time, even before the ownership and
title were transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. x x x.

"On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J.
Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not
give due course to the same x x x.

"On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who
represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is
representing TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona fide' members of the [Kalayaan
Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that
they received the Decision on March 14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and
jurisprudence x x x.

"On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way
of Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow
Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment' (referring to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated
November 15, 1999 x x x) with a prayer 'x x x to include the name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION representing the following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the] pleading.'
 Also, a Contract of Retainership dated April 4, 2001 was attached to the Motion x x x to make x x x KDC
represented by Respondent, [the] retained x x x 'counsel on record' x x x.

"After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a
Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash
Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x
before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed
by another lawyer (Atty. Willy Roxas). x x x.

"On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City,
was issued on July 25, 2001 and an extension of or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued dated
August 24, 2001, as a result of the active participation of Respondent x x x.

"Emboldened by the two (2) TRO's coming from DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed an Indirect
Contempt case dated August 28, 2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of Directors, Edgardo
Garcia and [its] counsel Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office. x x x.

"Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further, that the DARAB Central
Office refused to hear arguments from Petitioners on the two (2) questionable TRO's, Petitioners decided to
elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals on [December] 20, 2001 stating that:

'WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, this Court sees
no impediment for the IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial
adjudicator.

'SO ORDERED.'

"This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a Petition, but said
Petition was dismissed with finality x x x.

"Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified "Action to Quiet Title" before the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and
maliciously stop the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to implement the PARAD Decision
dated November 15, 1999. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law as [KDC]
LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation of
the Rules on the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact, under the Retainership Contract
submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite, it was specifically mentioned that legal fees were to
be collected as counsel on record for the cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was
effectively used [for] unlawful solicitation of clients in the practice of law with non-lawyers, being the
cooperative (KDC) to become "counsel on record [sic] x x x.

"On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO and dismissed
the case on the ground of 'res judicata' because the Court of Appeals ruled that, 'x x x the Decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become final x x x' and that,
prescription does not run against registered land. x x x." 2

In his Answer3 dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against him. He averred that by filing the
action to quiet title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his clients.
According to him, they sincerely and honestly believed that their possession of the litigated land had already ripened
into ownership. He explained thus:
 "Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with [the] previous owner in the decisions
of PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION CASES,
(DARAB CASE NO. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-
99; R-402-031-99) the said farmers, are not precluded, by any law or jurisprudence, from entertaining in
good faith an opinion or belief that they could legally be considered as owners of the subject-property
precisely because of the undisputed fact that they have been in possession thereof in an open, continuous,
public, uninterrupted possession for more than fifty (50) years. x x x.

"It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest belief and opinion o[f] acquiring ownership of the land through
prescription that the said farmers had decided to pursue and file the Action to Quiet Title in Civil Case No.
2763-03, before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA[D], Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
DARAB CASE No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-
99; R-402-031-99, [i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance compensations. They did not in any
way, involve [the] question of ownership of the subject property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No.
2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title), filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.

xxx xxx xxx

"As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete discretion [of] what legal strategy or
cause of action to undertake on their behalf and the complainant and their counsel have no business or right
to interfere with or dictate [upon] the respondent on how to protect the rights and interests of said farmers
under the applicable law and jurisprudence.

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or
immoral acts towards the complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet
Title, RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and
Complaint before the Ombudsman), as a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden
duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his right, no matter how guilty or evil he appears
to be, especially if they are poor and uneducated like the said farmers." 4

In a Reply5 dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of the possession of the subject land by
respondent's clients had already been settled in the case for disturbance compensation. Complainants maintained
that the PARAD Decision, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, clearly stated that
these clients were mere tenants of the land. Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by respondent in good
faith, especially when he had previously acknowledged the rights of complainants as landowners.

On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina, commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). During the hearing, the parties were
directed to submit their respective Memoranda.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In his April 30, 2005 Report,6 Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.7 Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of
his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," 8 in order to secure a temporary restraining
order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision dated November 15, 1999.

Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful practice
of law was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of respondent to do so led
to the presumption that the allegation was true.
Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended by the investigating commissioner. In
Resolution No. XVII-2005-172,9 the board of governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Espina.

The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, 10 pursuant to
Rule 139-B Section 12(b).

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our
legal system,11 protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. 12 They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing
or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. 13 Moreover, they are
obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. 14

Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession. 15 Thus, while lawyers
owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case
that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a
party or to misuse judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath. 16

In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records show, however,
that his course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution of the
provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999.

It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a
different forum to pursue his clients' lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients as
tenants and acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title,
however, he conveniently repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse
possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary restraining order
preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision.

Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of ownership of the land,
he cannot feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients and
complainants, as correctly observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.

The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his declaration that his clients were pauper
litigants. His prayer for an exemption to pay court fees, on the ground that they did not have sufficient income, 17 was
granted by the trial court. Earlier, however, he admitted that they had engaged the services of his legal office for a
fee of P20,000, in addition to P2,500 per appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he even alleged that
they were willing to post a bond to answer for damages, in the event that the court ruled in favor of the defendants.
These facts contravene his claim that his clients could not afford to pay the appropriate court fees.

In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law. This obligation, however, must never be at the expense of truth and justice, 18 as explained
in Choa v. Chiongson:19

"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of his client's case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself
of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he 'will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
 groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same'; and that he 'will conduct [himself] as
a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients.' Needless to state, the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense.
A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party." 20

Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to
challenge the allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed
an admission of the truth of the accusation. We note that complainants successfully substantiated their claim that
respondent, who held himself out as a law partner of the "KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was
rendering legal services together with persons not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation is deemed
an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it. 21

Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:

"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

'Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.'"

The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,22 which we quote:

"The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded
on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual
and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on
his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law." 23

Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. In line with
jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law. 24

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two
years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on
the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

#12

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.
There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now,
from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically
pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque
language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," been verbally
1

jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas
"where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence
to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings.
Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements
against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions with three
(3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with his
contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment.
These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co.
(SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages
over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and
when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were quite
inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks
refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said
banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He
sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as
the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or
spawned in different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil,
criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts
with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.

I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS

ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2,
1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria
(his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the
amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V.
Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special
Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in
consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September
7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties at their
auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this
disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as
aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.

CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance and
damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought
to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with stipulated
interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned.
Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants'
appeal to the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by decision
dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and
can no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated
August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that the
respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the
contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable
law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration
was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989.
The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt
execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the
Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the
Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be
overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . . ."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;

CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action in the same
Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the
action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990, on the ground of res judicata, the
3

only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been
ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and,
on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints
were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC,
this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City
Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario
Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged
Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just
mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the
foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On
defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res
judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB),
and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th
Division on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;

CA-G.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action for the
same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law
office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of
Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants'
motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 14 ) on the ground of litis pendentia.
5

The RTC ruled that —

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the Honorable
Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are
impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank,
Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more defendants were
impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants
Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil
Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with the
questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and
the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation
of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on
November 11, 1991 — the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
6

November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on March
31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
7

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event
the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz, Honorato
Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452,
and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again
involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious,
deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On
defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . .,
8

plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will
ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and its
officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No.
CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its
officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the
Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the
Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable
to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —
 . . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and pertinent
laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or
laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against
deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently
illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE
DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27,
32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held
liable under said laws.

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and
recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This
action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court,
by Order dated November 7, 1989, dismissed the case.
9

7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions instituted
by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario
Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, on the ground of res judicata — the subject
10

matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter
11

being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 22356. 12

8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against
Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
13

CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial.
His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor
set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as
may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion was again
found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action
of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had been
unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31,
1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and
19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional,
Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . .
(failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere
clerk."15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience drew his
attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June
16

22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions
simply advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter,
additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court
start with the opening clause —

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated.
_________,

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that on
July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with
the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. The same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him from
17

Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division)
Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court,
18

notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil,
but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal
20

prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.

1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto
Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed
as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed,
among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them:
that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed)
properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale
thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received
P588,030.00 more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints observing that
21

actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to
the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the
foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation;
and moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to
two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and directed
against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of
which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:

a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for
"Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." — This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on
nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a
portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new
owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty.
Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the
period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of
complainant; and
 b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False
Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was dismissed by Resolution dated
January 31, 1990.

2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court, an affidavit was
22

executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over property
registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister)
and foreclosed by said bank. In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June
23

1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which property is located
at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty.
Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the foreclosed lots
was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and
invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and
the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28,
1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in
24

its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file,
and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment of
the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of
a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His
complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" — was dismissed
for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
25

It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules of
Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Office to make
a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The
records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the Ombudsman
may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it
believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;"
and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary
authority over members of the Judiciary.

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
26

Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was
constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot
was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its
repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and
consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained from the
Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's
delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of
which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation
prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings foreclose the
mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB and
the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal
Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.

No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-
square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao
was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's
application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying
consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de
retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00,
representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in
connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file
brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals
dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page Resolution dated
September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a
motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was
unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the
Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any
concurrence of at least three of the members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply
noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over
the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo
MARASIGAN, respectively).

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to
vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the
adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for
recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst.
Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them
with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and
unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These processes
were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No.
82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in
the future be filed in his court." Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent by
27

the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court.
In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly
alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately
appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4
(3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions
which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the
deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that
the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the
law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is patently without
merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord
with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition
is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao
Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all
the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on
all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . . .

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions
raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some
other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for
reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court
through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by
quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform
the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk
of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of
the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case —
G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July
6, 1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court,
which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any
of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this
Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and
legal conclusions.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require
members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by
 the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the
formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this
procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet
the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)

6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or
SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against
administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a certain
Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance with
P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it
was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario
Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28, 1988.
His first and second motions for reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a verified
statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second
Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once more
remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of fact
or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that
"the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was
denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
17, had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the
result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the
exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed
by the Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra (or
the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of
the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions, and that the
intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's action
to the parties concerned.

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series, was
to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk
of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No.
84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas
presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to
G.R. No. 91030 — in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to
demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and
unspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the
defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants
demanding an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored;
defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and
without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently abusive acts"
had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and
consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Supreme Court
conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court
of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it
for appropriate action.28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices" committed
against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record
(Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.

CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a
complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB
Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a
time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was
represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R.
Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for
moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of
P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That
Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his
appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in
form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31,
1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First
Division) said:

The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself
and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having been filed without "express
leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the
averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected as without
merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner
desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court.
Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and important reason
therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed summarily on the ground
that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the question raised is too
unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised
in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence of
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to
a resolution as to which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of June 26, 1989
denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed state the legal
reasons therefor. The plain and patent signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution
of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review and consequently bringing about a review of the decision of the Court
 of Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had
indeed been committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in that
judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and restating the
conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's First
Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-
SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from the
people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and
characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-
LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo
attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated
August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated
August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because containing "false, impertinent and
scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7,
1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.

SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999

In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosure
effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was
Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with
Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint
on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but
his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that Court's
Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December 26,
1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . .
order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated
October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents
therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L.
Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by
Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again
complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this
time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella
G. Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First
Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the case was raffled — caused
issuance of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said
defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 —
this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a time represented Borromeo in G.R. No.
84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between him
and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge
and advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB
8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23,
1989, apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No.
CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the
Court in its Resolution dated November 29, 1989.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.

CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another
action that ultimately landed in this Court. The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the
29

"San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu
Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court
(Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale
thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097,
affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of
the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well
as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the
findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution
dated June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through various
motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him
by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y.
Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:

Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual resolution with the
signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R. No.
56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the Supreme Court declared that
"(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in
the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court,
this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by
quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation,
Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
 1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 21880, Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a
30

complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III,
and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining
31

that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts including
the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we
find it unreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree
rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."

2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990,
against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a
violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in
that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273
which did not bear the justices' signatures. In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman
32

dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the
respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really
were the ones rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial
resolutions."33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY

BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-

G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank &
Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.
(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the
case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations.
Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares,
presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law
firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.

Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to pay to
SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00);
and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an
immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the
highest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was denied on
March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals
for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo
appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this
Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment
was made on December 26, 1990.

However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitrance and
bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal
concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo.

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu
RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He
denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused
defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry,
social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as
litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to
present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."

2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;

CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same parties
— SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, who had rendered the
34

latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one
"for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they
decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton,
malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due
process," on account of which he had been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights,
and embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge
German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from liability
in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.

Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.

In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The
motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. Said the
35

Court:

Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact, proffer
nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res judicata under
the circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant for argumentum
ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the acceptable limits of
argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the
 irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and needlessly
derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a licensed law
practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise contumacious behavior is presently
accorded the patience and leniency it probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he
has, by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the future
shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.

IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,

CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is Case No.
CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San
Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of
36

P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations;
Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which
a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged
to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of
P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court
alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him by
the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February
7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution
denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the
resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of this
Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18),
which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated
against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action
was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August
31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's
complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no jurisdiction
to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or
omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the
highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond
the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality.
To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court would
appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a
careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof
are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the Third
Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made directly against defendant Marcelo B.
Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of
the final order or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff
himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's decision as
 reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules of Court, due
process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy
should not have been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review
the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon
common sense. Lower courts are without supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the
judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal
basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers

of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for his
adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned,
these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo
Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment.
Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed
of sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders,
all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged
that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pure
harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo
in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by
Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director),
Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The
lawyers made the following observations:

It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with deferential awe
and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer
who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter
disregard to the authority and name of the courts.

And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer who uses the
instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more especially if their
actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with
supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:

The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other members of the
Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend to bring
dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the
scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in
the country's judicial system and administration of justice.

. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal profession. So
many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this Honorable Court and other
courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who
afforded the court with all the respect and esteem due them.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the
notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in
seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15,
1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning
to Borromeo to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints
against lawyers." 37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars,"
flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against him
and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court employees
involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent
lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently
undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to
refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have
authored . . . (which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and
reputation of the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the
Constitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported conferment
on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding
the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently
violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute
Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after
INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF
RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the
irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible
injustices inflicted on me by this Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled.
Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of
the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last
resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply
with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated
June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa,"
repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft
and landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in your
house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most
unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions what he
regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders
Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne
marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw!
Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court
minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme
Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38

One other "circular" reads:

SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!!

— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the judiciary. Adding
"The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the supreme Court." These are
lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which
speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR,
SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs.
4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank
TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown
IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned
UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land grabbing — What are these if not
TYRANNY? (GR 84999).

Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the motion for
reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the SC to order a case
dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit"
— despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of
law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves! NARVASA &
ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!

IMPEACH NARVASA

• ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL "MINUTE

RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution

• VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING CASE

AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S
FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT

• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING, THAT

CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING
LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS
LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION

• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL COURT

ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION

• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND PREDICTABLY

EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES
 • DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE
FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO
ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO

M
a
b
o
l
o
,

C
e
b
u

C
i
t
y

T
e
.

7
-
5
6
-
4
9
.

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS

OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter

IBP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated
June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City
Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks
against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and
members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on the
letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of Court,
Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306
(Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to
by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by
Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No.
84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by
different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal
principles applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases instituted by
Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and
No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of
other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already passed upon by
the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related facts on record, the
Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE:

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt against Joaquin
T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's
letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution and a
copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo
at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and the IBP
Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the letter and its annexes as
well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.

1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution just
mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice
relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other communications and resolutions sent
to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y.
Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 ) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
39

Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,

1989, and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July
40

31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), and that dated June 11,
41 42

1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in which he
alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution which requires
"signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy duly
signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"
 2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be
the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and
independent body;"

3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter)
Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty.
Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the "libelous
circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of
expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of public officials;" the circular
merely states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged; . . . Atty.
Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies;

5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with pertinent facts,
evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of the High Court to
either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they are duty bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side, and be
reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which
was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated
August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are
both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT
Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to
engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such further
arguments in addition to or in amplification of those set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if
he be so minded.

SO ORDERED.

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment

of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and allegations in his
Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:

1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged 'libelous'
remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .
(failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the
precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;

2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH and
the LAW", namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are patent
violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appelate Court's
ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption price, since no less than this
 Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in
right of redemption;

c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance of
court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP
and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and admission of the thruth in said circular,"
theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's
baseless and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of
and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. He has stubbornly litigated issues
44

already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in
many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting
on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite
erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the
attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the
judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings
and motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who have
had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his
attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions"
of this Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings,
45

causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial
and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption
of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument
long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a
charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the
preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the
prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting
officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform
their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not
necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that
the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be
heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46

His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board;
. . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the circular are
allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a
complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial
philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be
contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of
public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same
causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes
and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing

the Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles governing
finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down definite
postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like
Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.

1. Reason for courts; Judicial

Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more or less
established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments
and final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues through briefs or
memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.

2. Paramount Need to end

Litigation at Some Point

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures
and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the
losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no
moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public
policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon
accorded absolute finality. As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, a
47 48

party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right."

3. Judgments of Supreme Court

Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the
highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of Government.
Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to
or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings
of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. This, on
49

the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.

In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by
a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having
knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of
Article 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-
heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . —
the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50

. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby
adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo
vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts
determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law,
or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court
which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion
of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end
to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective
rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-
317)

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or
inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons,
34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1)
The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . .
is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-
importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is
fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis
mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for
the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they
see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary
has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of
its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that
could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of
powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government.
(Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

4. Final and Executory Judgments of

Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party who is
adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an
appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law,
or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of
courts. Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or in excess
51

of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals —
become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a
higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action

against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the resort to
administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to
coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,
administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages
commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the
Supreme Court.

1. Common Basis of Complaints

Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered
manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord
53

with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion — thereby causing
injustice, and actionable and compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of
complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial
Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or
erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.

2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for

Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses
for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously
seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have
only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final
and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous
function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after
more fully explored.

Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established
hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
"rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on
the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to
review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should
likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as
this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of
the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official
duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and
subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge
would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with
deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their
high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand
would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and
resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow
such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers
mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal
issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court
and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory. Such
judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or
authority.

3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed

Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust — or was (or was not)
rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and
powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law
and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other
entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch; nor any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and executory or not —
and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
 4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or
interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution
of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and
lead to absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by
a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is
appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought
up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the
original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it
would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the
decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of
supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public
prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question — despite its
having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4)
courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an
indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.

Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial
Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question, already
passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal
action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the offense,
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is a
civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly
rendering an unjust decision or order.

5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative

Criminal Prosecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment
or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that
there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character
of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily
contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in the civil or
criminal action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to
which — the same being unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press
that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc.
Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly
unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the
prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge
precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action against
the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from

Influence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized
independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in
good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make
55

his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious,
56

or incurred with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an
57

imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction
are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions
when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, the doctrine is still good
58 59

law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or
assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment
rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for
an essential element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to
the caveat already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a
final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no less than
sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present administrative measure. The imposition on the
time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and
require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the
repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his
understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been
declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the
Court's forbearance had no effect on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and impotence.
Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado
or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman
included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must
come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent
and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it
will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive
sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed
over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and
grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of
imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or
other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

#13

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for
review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees
for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961,
ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision
became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed
a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis
also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the
same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty.
Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants
were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion
was overruled on 20 January 1965. He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained
1

averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for
all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. The case was considered submitted for decision
2

without respondent's brief. 3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees,
4

whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of
Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to
be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even
if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule
138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one,
he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he
cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of
parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the
rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of
courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or
admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority
is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been
duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney with
7

authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not
8

assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed
9

to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also
leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary
measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers)
cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent"
and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to
refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be
excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the
aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible
from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for
an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for
extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being
contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible
from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the
industrial court, on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral,
12

social and economic well-being"; hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute
13

an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court
may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective
action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as
attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
respondent Muning.

#14

A. M. No. 08-8-7-SC February 1, 2016

THE REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

RESOLUTION

Section 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as "The Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases."

Section 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTCs) for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

Section 3. Objectives. -
 (a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to a speedy disposition of their cases;

(b) To provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the disposition of small claims cases; and,

(c) To introduce innovations and best practices for the benefit of the underprivileged.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Plaintiff refers to the party who initiated a small claims action. The term includes a defendant who has
filed a counterclaim against plaintiff;

(b) Defendant is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a small claims action. The term includes a
plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a claim, or a person who replies to the claim;

(c) Person is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability partnership, association, or other juridical
entity endowed with personality by law;

(d) Individual is a natural person;

(e) Motion means a party's request, written or oral, to the court for an order or other action. It shall include
an informal written request to the court, such as a letter;

(f) Good cause means circumstances sufficient to justify the requested order or other action, as determined
by the judge; and,

(g) Affidavit means a written statement or declaration of facts that are sworn or affirmed to be true.

Section 5. Applicability. - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions that are purely civil in nature where the claim or relief
prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money.

The claim or demand may be:

(a) For money owed under any of the following:

1. Contract of Lease;

2. Contract of Loan;

3. Contract of Services;

4. Contract of Sale; or

5. Contract of Mortgage;

(b) For liquidated damages arising from contracts;

(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim
covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code of 1991.

Section 6. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims action is commenced by filing with the court an
accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification Against
Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action, and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A SCC), and two (2) duly
certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and
other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or
submitted together with the Statement of Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence.

The plaintiff must state in the Statement of Claims if he/she/it is engaged in the business of lending, banking and
similar activities, and the number of small claims cases filed within the calendar year regardless of judicial station.

No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim/s described in this Rule, is necessary to initiate a small
claims action.

Section 7. Venue. - The regular rules on venue shall apply.

However, if the plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, banking and similar activities, and has a branch within
the municipality or city where the defendant resides, the Statement of Claim/s shall be filed where that branch is
located.

Section 8. Joinder of Claims. - Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or more separate small claims
against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

Section 9. Affidavits. - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of
the affiants or based on authentic records, which are admissible in evidence.

A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted the party in the preparation of
the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action. The inadmissible affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof shall be
expunged from the record.

The non-submission of the required affidavits will cause the immediate dismissal of the claim or counterclaim.

Section 10. Payment of Filing Fees. - The plaintiff shall pay the docket and other legal fees prescribed under Rule
141 of the Revised Rules of Court, unless allowed to litigate as an indigent. Exemption from the payment of filing
fees shall be granted only by the Supreme Court.

However, if more than five (5) small claims are filed by one party within the calendar year, regardless of the judicial
station, an additional filing fee of P500.00 shall be paid for every claim filed after the fifth (5th) claim, and an
additional P100.00 or a total of P600.00 for every claim filed after the tenth (10th) claim, and another P100.00 or a
total of P700 for every claim filed after the fifteenth (15th) claim, progressively and cumulatively.

If the plaintiff is engaged in the business of banking, lending and similar activities, the amount of filing and other
legal fees shall be the same as those applicable to cases filed under the regular rules.

A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be referred to the Executive Judge for immediate
action in case of multi-sala courts. If the motion is granted by the Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or
assigned to the court designated to hear small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall be given five
(5) days within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice. In no case
shall a party, even if declared an indigent, be exempt from the payment of the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons
and processes.

Section 11. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that the case falls under these Rules, it may, from
an examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim/s and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss
the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of the case. The order of dismissal shall state if it is with or
without prejudice.

If, during the hearing, the court is able to determine that there exists a ground for dismissal of the Statement of
Claim/s, the court may, by itself, dismiss the case even if such ground is not pleaded in the defendant's Response.
If plaintiff misrepresents that he/she/it is not engaged in the business of banking, lending or similar activities when in
fact he/she/it is so engaged, the Statement of Claim/s shall be dismissed with prejudice and plaintiff shall be meted
the appropriate sanctions, such as direct contempt.

However, if the case does not fall under this Rule, but falls under summary or regular procedure, the case shall not
be dismissed. Instead, the case shall be re-docketed under the appropriate procedure, and returned to the court
where it was assigned, subject to payment of any deficiency in the applicable regular rate of filing fees. If a case is
filed under the regular or summary procedure, but actually falls under this Rule, the case shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for appropriate assignment.

Section 12. Summons and Notice of Hearing. - If no ground for dismissal is found, the court shall forthwith issue
Summons (Form 2-SCC) on the day of receipt of the Statement of Claim/s, directing the defendant to submit a
verified Response.

The court shall also issue a Notice of Hearing (Form 4-SCC) to both parties, directing them to appear before it on a
specific date and time for hearing, with a warning that no unjustified postponement shall be allowed, as provided in
Section 21 of this Rule.

The Summons to be served on the defendant shall be accompanied by a copy of the Statement of Claim/s and
documents submitted by plaintiff, and a blank Response Form (Form 3-SCC) to be accomplished by the defendant.

A Notice of Hearing shall accompany the Summons and shall contain: (a) the date of the hearing, which shall not be
more than thirty (30) days from the filing of the Statement of Claim/s; and (b) the express prohibition against the
filing of a motion to dismiss or any other motion under Section 16 of this Rule.

If Summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the court shall order the plaintiff to
cause the service of summons and shall inform the court within thirty (30) days from notice if said summons was
served or not; otherwise, the Statement of Claim/s shall be dismissed without prejudice as to those who were not
served with summons.

Section 13. Response. - The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the plaintiff a duly accomplished and
verified Response within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of summons. The Response shall be
accompanied by certified photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support
thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the
Response, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence.

Section 14. Effect of Failure to File Response. - Should the defendant fail to file his/her/its Response within the
required period, and likewise fail to appear on the date set for hearing, the court shall render judgment on the same
day, as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim/s.

Should the defendant fail to file his/her/its Response within the required period but appears on the date set for
hearing, the court shall ascertain what defense he/she/it has to offer which shall constitute his/her/its Response, and
proceed to hear or adjudicate the case on the same day as if a Response has been filed.

Section 15. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule. - If at the time the action is commenced, the defendant
possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b)
arises out of the same transaction or event that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim; (c) does not require for
its adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the subject of another pending action, the claim shall be
filed as a counterclaim in the Response; otherwise, the defendant shall be barred from suing on the counterclaim.

The defendant may also elect to file a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence, provided that the amount and nature thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and the
prescribed docket and other legal fees are paid.

Section 16. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed
in the cases covered by this Rule:
 (a) Motion to dismiss the Statement of Claim/s;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

(d) Petition for relief from judgment;

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;

(f) Memoranda;

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;

(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j) Reply and rejoinder;

(k) Third-party complaints; and

(l) Interventions.

Section 17. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel. - The Clerk of Court or other court personnel shall
provide such assistance as may be requested by a plaintiff or a defendant regarding the availability of forms and
other information about the coverage, requirements as well as procedure for small claims cases.

Section 18. Appearance. - The parties shall personally appear on the designated date of hearing.

Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of an individual-party must not
be a lawyer and must be related to or next-of-kin of the individual-party. Juridical entities shall not be represented by
a lawyer in any capacity.

The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 7-SCC) to enter into an amicable
settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.

Section 19. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the
hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.

If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense and needs assistance, the court
may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist that party upon the latter's consent.

Section 20. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be cause for the dismissal of the
Statement of Claim/s without prejudice. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on a permissive counterclaim.

Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as failure to file a Response under Section 14 of this
Rule. This shall not apply where one of two or more defendants who are sued under a common cause of action and
1âwphi1

have pleaded a common defense appears at the hearing.

Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of both the Statement of Claim/s and the
counterclaim.
Section 21. Postponement When Allowed. - A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon
proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may
avail of only one (1) postponement.

Section 22. Duty of the Court. - At the beginning of the court session, the judge shall read aloud a short statement
explaining the nature, purpose and the rule of procedure of small claims cases.

Section 23. Hearing. - At the hearing, the judge shall first exert efforts to bring the parties to an amicable settlement
of their dispute. If efforts at settlement fail, the hearing shall immediately proceed in an informal and expeditious
manner and be terminated within the same day.

Any settlement (Form 8-SCC) or resolution of the dispute shall be reduced into writing, signed by the parties and
submitted to the court for approval (Form 9-SCC and Form 10-SCC).

Section 24. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its decision based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 11-SCC), within twenty-four (24) hours from termination of the hearing. The decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served
on the parties.

The decision shall be final, executory and unappealable.

Section 25. Execution. - When the decision is rendered, execution shall issue upon motion (Form 12-SCC) of the
winning party.

Section 26. Certification of Documents. - All documents attached to the Statement of Claim/s or Response that are
required to be certified, except public or official documents, shall be certified by the signature of the plaintiff or
defendant concerned.

Section 27. Applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure. - The Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply suppletorily
insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Rule.

Section 28. Non-applicability. - The rules on mediation/judicial dispute resolution shall not apply, inasmuch as the
parties may enter into compromise at any stage of the proceedings.

Section 29. Effectivity. - These Revised Rules shall take effect on February 1, 2016 following their publication in two
newspapers of general circulation. They shall govern all cases filed after their effectivity, and also all pending
proceedings, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would
work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.

The following forms shall be used. Substantial compliance therewith shall be sufficient.
(See attached forms)

INDEX OF SMALL CLAIMS STANDARD FORMS

FORM 1-SCC Statement of Claim/s

FORM 1-A-SCC Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action and
Multiplicity of Suits
FORM 2-SCC Summons
FORM 3-SCC Response
 FORM 4-SCC Notice of Hearing
FORM 5-SCC Plaintiff’s Return/Manifestation
FORM 5-A-SCC Plaintiff’s Return/Manifestation (with substituted
service)
FORM 6-SCC Motion to Plead as Indigent
FORM 7-SCC Special Power of Attorney
FORM 8-SCC Joint Motion (for Dismissal)
FORM 9-SCC Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreement
FORM 10-SCC Decision based on Compromise Agreement
FORM 11-SCC Decision
FORM 12-SCC Motion for Execution

#15
This web page features the full text of

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93

TO: ALL REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT

CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW [SECTIONS 399-422, CHAPTER VII, TITLE I, BOOK
III, R. A. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991].

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
effective on January 1, 1992 and which repealed P. D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not only in the authority
granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be observed in the settlement of disputes within the
authority of the Lupon.cralaw

In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate,
improper and/or premature issuance of certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries,
attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are hereby issued for the information of
trial court judges in cases brought before them coming from the Barangays:chanrobles virtual law library

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D.
1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a
complaint in court or any government offices, except in the following disputes:chanrobles virtual law library
[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to
Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules];

[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate Lupon;

[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued,
specifically the following:chanrobles virtual law library

[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law];

[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally
deprived of or on acting in his behalf;

[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property
and support during the pendency of the action; and cralaw

[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice;
[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];

[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442;
Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of
disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment];

[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA
459].cralaw

II. Under the provisions of R. A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation, as implemented by the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in
court or any government office shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon compliance with the following
requirements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[1] Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman (Punong Barangay), certifying that a confrontation
of the parties has taken place and that a conciliation settlement has been reached, but the same has been subsequently
repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);

[2] Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman certifying that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[a] a confrontation of the parties took place but no conciliation/settlement has been reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); or

[b] that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat through no fault of the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III,
Katarungang pambarangay Rules).

[3] Issued by the Punong Barangay as requested by the proper party on the ground of failure of settlement where the
dispute involves members of the same indigenous cultural community, which shall be settled in accordance with the
customs and traditions of that particular cultural community, or where one or more of the parties to the aforesaid
dispute belong to the minority and the parties mutually agreed to submit their dispute to the indigenous system of
amicable settlement, and there has been no settlement as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to the Punong
Barangay of place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); and

[4] If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there having been no agreement
to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b], Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8,
a, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance at this stage of a
certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.cralaw

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court shall be carefully
read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as a pre-condition to judicial action,
particularly whether the certification to file action attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements
hereinabove enumerated in Par. II;

IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal
adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s,
not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA
470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court may suspend proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule
21 of the Rules of Court; and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec.
408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are filed may, at any
time before trial, motu proprio refer case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

Strict observance of these guidelines is enjoined. This Administrative Circular shall be effective immediately.

Manila, Philippines; July 15, 1993.

#16

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9406 March 23, 2007

AN ACT REORGANIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (PAO), AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987", AS AMENDED, GRANTING SPECIAL ALLOWANCE TO PAO OFFICIALS
AND LAWYERS, AND PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Organizational Structure - The Department shall consist of the following constituent units:

(1) Department Proper;

(2) Office of the Government Corporate Counsel;

(3) National Bureau of Investigation;

(4) Public Attorney's Office (as an attached agency);

(5) Board of Pardons and Parole;

(6) Parole and Probation Administration;

(7) Bureau of Corrections;

(8) Land Registration Authority;

(9) Bureau of Immigration; and

 (10) Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems."

SEC. 2. Section 14, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

"SEC. 14. Public Attorney's Office (PAO). - The Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) is renamed Public
Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall exercise the powers and functions as are now provided by law for the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office or may hereafter be provided by law.

"The PAO shall be an independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice in
accordance with Sec. 38(3), Chapter 7 of Book IV of this Code for the purposes of policy and program
coordination.

"The PA0 shall be the principal law office of the government in extending free legal assistance to indigent
persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases."

SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:

"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to render, free of
charge, legal representation, assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the service, the PAO may be called upon by
proper government authorities to render such service to other persons, subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations."

SEC. 4. Section 15, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 15. Organizational Structure. - The PA0 shall consist of the following constituent units:

(1) Office of the Chief Public Attorney and two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys to serve as a
'Deputy Chief Public Attorney for Administration' and placed in charge of three divisions, namely;
Administrative; Financial Planning and Management; and Executive Division, while the other to
serve as 'Deputy Chief Public Attorney for Operations' and shall be responsible for special and
appealed cases; legal research; and field services and statistics upon the designation by the Chief
Public Attorney. One of the deputies shall be designated as Deputy Chief Public Attorney for Luzon
and the other Deputy Chief Public Attorney for Visayas and Mindanao.

(2) SIX (6) line divisions in the Central Office, namely: Administrative, Financial Planning and
Management, Special and Appealed Cases, Legal Research and Statistics, Field Services and
Statistics, and Executive Division.

(3) Regional, Provincial, City, and Municipal District Offices."

SEC. 5. Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 16. The Chief Public Attorney and Other PA0 Officials. - The PA0 shall be headed by a Chief Public
Attorney and shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys. Each PA0 Regional Office
established in each of the administrative regions of the country shall be headed by a Regional Public
Attorney who shall be assisted by an Assistant Regional Public Attorney. The authority and responsibility for
the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in
the Chief Public Attorney.

"The Office of the Chief Public Attorney shall include his/her immediate staff, the six (6) line divisions in the
Central Office, the Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and the Regional, Provincial, City, and Municipal District
Offices.
 "The Chief Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances,
and retirement privileges as those of the Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service. The
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances,
and retirement privileges as those of the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution
Service.

"The services herein created shall each be headed by a staff director who shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances and privileges as those of staff director of the National
Prosecution Service.

"Each of the PAO Regional Offices shall be headed by a Regional Public Attorney who shall be assisted by
an Assistant Regional Public Attorney. The regional offices shall have such provincial, city and municipal
district offices as may be necessary.

"The Regional Public Attorney and the Assistant Regional Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those of a Regional State
Prosecutor and the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service respectively.

"The Provincial Public Attorney, City Public Attorney and the Municipal District Public Attorney shall have the
same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances and retirement privileges as those of a
Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutor as the case may be, of the National Prosecution Service,
respectively.

"The other administrative personnel in the PAO shall have the rank and salaries equivalent to their
counterpart in the National Prosecution Service."

SEC. 6. New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, to read as
follows:

"SEC. 16-A. Appointment. - The Chief Public Attorney and the Deputy Chief Public Attorneys shall be
appointed by the President. The Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys shall be
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Chief Public Attorney. The Chief Public
Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys shall not be removed or suspended,
except for cause provided by law; Provided, That the Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, the Regional Public
Attorneys and The Assistant Regional Public Attorneys, the Provincial Public Attorneys, the City Public
Attorneys and Municipal District Public Attorney shall preferably have served as Public Attorneys for at least
five (5) years immediately prior to their appointment as such. The administrative and support personnel and
other lawyers in the Public Attorney’s Office shall be appointed by the Chief Public Attorney, in accordance
with civil service laws, rules, and regulations."

"SEC. 16-B. Vacancy. - In case of death, permanent incapacity, removal or registration of the incumbent
Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys or Regional Public Attorneys or vacancy thereof, the
President shall appoint a new Chief, Deputy Chief or Regional Public Attorney or shall designate one, as the
case may be, in an acting capacity until a new one shall have been appointed.

"In case of temporary absence of the Chief Public Attorney, the latter may designate an Officer-in-Charge to
be a caretaker of the Office."

"SEC. 16-C. Incumbent Officials and Personnel. - The incumbent officials and personnel of the Public
Attorney's Office shall continue holding his/her position without the needs of new appointment."

"SEC. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. - The clients of the PAO shall exempt from
payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies,
as an original proceeding or on appeal.
 "The costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients
after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed
for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO."

"SEC. 16-E. Local Government Support. - Local government units, subject to their capabilities, are
authorized to extend financial and other support in the form of honoraria, free office space, equipment,
furniture, stationery, and manpower to the PAO."

"SEC. 16-F. Franking Privilege. - The PAO may transmit through ordinary mail and/or registered mail with
return card, free of charge, all official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of its
duties, function and/or its exercise of administrative supervision over its personnel.

"The envelope or wrapper of the privileged mail matter shall bear on the left upper corner 'Public Attorney's
Office' together with its address and on the right upper corner, the word 'Private or unauthorized use to avoid
payment of postage is penalized by fine or imprisonment or both.'"

SEC. 7. Ratio of Public Attorney"s Position to an Organized Sala. - There shall be a corresponding number of
public attorney's positions at the ratio of one public attorney to an organized sala and the corresponding
administrative and support staff thereto.

SEC. 8. Sections 41 and 42, Chapter 10, Book I of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

"SEC. 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oaths. - The following officers have general authority to
administer oaths: President; Vice-President, Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
Members of the Judiciary; Secretaries of Departments; provincial governors and lieutenant-governors; city
mayors; municipal mayors; bureau directors; regional directors; clerk of courts; registrars of deeds; other
civilian officers in the public service of the government of the Philippines whose appointments are vested in
the President and are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; all other constitutional
officers; PAO lawyers in connection with the performance of duty; and notaries public.

"SEC. 42. Duty to Administer Oaths. - Officers authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries
public, municipal judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute certificates save
in matters of official business or in relation to their functions as such; and with the exception of notaries
public, the officer performing the service in those matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized
by law."

SEC. 9. Grant of Special Allowances. - The Chief Public Attorney, the Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, the Regional
Public Attorneys, the Provincial, City and Municipal District Public Attorneys, other PAO lawyers and officials who
have direct supervision over PAO lawyers shall be granted special allowances in the amounts to be determined by
the Secretary of the Department of Budyet and Management (DBM) and the Chief Public Attorney.

The grant of said special allowances shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the basic salary of the PAO
officials and lawyers as provided in the immediately preceding paragraph.

SEC. 10. Effects of Subsequent Salary Increases. - Upon the implementation of any subsequent increases in the
salary rates provided under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended, all special allowances granted under Section 9
hereof shall be considered as an implementation of the said salary increases as may be provided by law. The
special allowance equivalent to the increase in the basic salary as may be provided by law shall be converted as
part of the basic salary.

SEC. 11. Appropriations. - The amount necessary for the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against
the current fiscal year's appropriations under the budget of the PAO. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for
the continued implementation of this act shall be included in the Annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 12. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act, the DBM
and PAO shall adopt and issue the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act.
SEC. 13. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, presidential proclamations, letters of
implementation, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 14. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the provisions not
affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

SEC. 15. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

#17

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1275

REORGANIZING THE PROSECUTION STAFF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE

OFFICES OF THE PROVINCIAL AND CITY FISCALS, REGIONALIZING THE PROSECUTION
SERVICE, AND CREATING THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE

WHEREAS, to improve the quality of prosecution services, it becomes imperative, in the public
interest, to reorganize and restructure the entire prosecution system, in line with the general
reorganization of the executive branch of the government which is a priority measure of the
Administration;

WHEREAS, there is a need to regionalize the prosecution service in line with the government policy
of decentralization, to rationalize the allocation of prosecution positions and functions in accordance
with the requirements of the service, and to upgrade the salaries of all prosecutors, and of provincial
and city fiscals;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the
supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the
Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and
Provincial and City Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible
for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice includes the authority to act
directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Prosecution Staff, the Regional State Prosecution
Office or the Office of the Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or revoke any decision or
action of the Chief of said staff or office.

Section 2. The prosecution Staff: Functions. There shall be a Prosecution Staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, which shall perform the following functions under the control of the Secretary of
Justice:

(a) Investigate administrative charges against fiscals and other prosecution officers;

(b) Conduct the investigation and prosecution of all crimes;

(c) Prepare legal opinions on queries involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and special
penal laws; and

(d) Review appeals from the resolutions of fiscals and other prosecuting officers in connection with
criminal cases handled by them.

Section 3. Prosecution Staff; Organization, Qualifications, Appointment. The Prosecution Staff shall
be composed of prosecuting officers in such number as hereinbelow determined. It shall be headed
by a Chief State Prosecutor who shall be assisted by three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors.

The Chief State Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors; and the members of the
Prosecution Staff shall be selected from among qualified and professionally trained members of the
legal profession who are of proven integrity and competence and have been in the actual practice of
the legal profession for at least five (5) years prior to their appointment or have held during like
period, any position requiring the qualifications of a lawyer.

They shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.

Section 4. Prosecution Staff: Composition and Salaries. The composition of the Prosecution Staff
shall be as follows:

One Chief State Prosecutor;

Three Assistant Chief State Prosecutors;

Six Senior State Prosecutors;

Six Senior State Prosecutors;

Six State Prosecutors;

Six State Prosecutors;

Six State Prosecutors;

Ten State Prosecutors;

Ten State Prosecutors;

Six State Prosecutors;

Six State Prosecutors;

Six State Prosecutors;

In addition, there shall be in the Office of the Secretary of Justice, six Prosecution Attorneys, who
shall be members of the bar, to be appointed by the Secretary of Justice, and who shall assist the
Prosecution Staff in the performance of its functions as hereinabove provided.
Section 5. Compensation. The compensation of the Prosecution Staff and Prosecution Attorneys
shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of the Budget and
pursuant to P.D. No. 985.

Section 6. TheRegionalState Prosecution Office: Regions. There shall be an office, to be known as

the Regional Prosecution Office in each of the following regions:

Region I Center – San Fernando, LaUnion

Area – Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province,
Pangasinan and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag and San
Carlos.
Region II Center – Tuguegarao, Cagayan
Area – Batanes, Cagayan Ifugao, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Viscaya
and Quirino.
Region III Center – San Fernando, Pampanga
Area – Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales and the
cities of Angeles, Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose
Region IV-A Center – Pasig, Metro Manila
Area – Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental, Mindoro
Occidental, Palawan, Quezon, Rizal, Romblon, Aurora Sub-Province
and the cities of Batangas, Cavite, Lipa, Lucena, Puerto Princesa, San
Pablo, Tagaytay and Trece Martires
Region V Center – Legaspi City
Area – Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate,
Sorsogon and the cities of Legaspi, Naga and Iriga
Region VI Center – Iloilo City
Area – Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental and the cities of
Bacolod, Bago, Cadiz, Iloilo, La Carlota, Roxas, San Carlos and Silay
Region VII Center – Cebu City
Area – Bohol, Cebu, Negros Oriental, Siquijor and the cities of Bais, Canlaon,
Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Lapu-Lapu, andaue, Tagbilaran and Toledo
Region VIII Center – Tacloban City
Area – Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar; Southern Leyte, Western
Samar; Biliran Sub-Province and the cities of Calbayog, Ormoc and
Tacloban
Region IX-A Center – Jolo
Area – Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi
Region IX-B Center – Zamboanga City
Area – Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur and the cities of
Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian and Zamboanga
Region X Center – Cagayan de Oro City
Area Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin Misamis
Occidental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and the cities of
Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Guingoog, Ozamis, Oroquieta, Surigao and
Tangub
Region XI Center – Davao City
Area – Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato,
Surigao del Sur and the cities of Davao and General Santos
Region XII Center – Cotabato City
 Area – Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato,
Sultan, Kudarat and the cities of Cotabato, Iligan and Marawi

For purposes of this regionalization, Region IV comprising the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and
Caloocan, as well as all the municipalities comprised within the Metropolitan Manila Area under P.D.
No. 824, shall be placed directly under the administrative supervision of the Chief State Prosecutor.

Section 7. TheRegionalState prosecution Office: Staffing, Appointment, Qualification and Salaries.

Each State Prosecution Office shall be headed by a Regional State Prosecutor, who shall be assisted
by an Assistant Regional State Prosecutor, and three State Prosecutors, all of whom shall be
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The Regional State Prosecutors and the Assistant Regional State Prosecutors shall have the same
qualifications as those provided in section 3 hereof for members of the Prosecution Staff.

They shall receive the same salaries provided for the Assistant Chief Prosecutors and the higher
ranking Senior State Prosecutors, respectively, in section 5 hereof.

The three State Prosecutors shall have the same qualifications and shall receive the same salaries
provided for the highest ranking State Prosecutors in sections 3 and 5 hereof.

The salaries herein fixed for the Regional State Prosecutors, the Assistant Regional State
Prosecutors, and the three State Prosecutors as well as those of the subordinate personnel of the
Regional State Prosecution Office shall be paid entirely out of national funds and included in the
annual appropriations of the Department of Justice.

Section 8. TheRegionalState prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. The

Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following
functions:

(a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of
the Department of Justice relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.

(b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other
prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his region.

(c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.

(d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals within his region,
he shall:

1. Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve
transfers of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office.

2. Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting officers within his region
and submit his recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof,
submit the appropriate recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided, that where the
Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing of charges, he may render a decision of
dismissal thereof.
3. Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the region and submit his
recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision
thereon.

4. Approve requests for sick, vacation and maternity leaves of absence with or without pay, for a
period not exceeding one year; for overtime services; for permission to exercise their profession or to
engage in business outside of office hours; for official travel within the region for periods not
exceeding thirty days; and for benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code.

5. Prepare the budget for the region for approval of the Secretary of Justice and administer the same.

6. Negotiate and conclude for services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment for amount
not exceeding P50,000.00 for each quarter.

(e) Coordinate with regional offices of other departments, with bureaus/agencies under the
Department of Justice, and with local governments and police units in the region.

Section 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Staffing. There shall be in each province and
each sub-province; one provincial fiscal and such number of assistant provincial fiscals as may
hereinafter be provided for.

There shall be in each city one city fiscal and such number of assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter
be provided.

Section 10. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals and their Assistants: Qualifications and Appointment.
No person shall be eligible for appointment to the position of provincial fiscal city fiscal, assistant
provincial fiscal or assistant city fiscal unless he possesses the same qualifications as members of
the Prosecution Staff as provided in Section 3 hereof.

Provincial and city fiscals and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

Section 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and Functions. The provincial fiscal or the city
fiscal shall:

(a) Be the law officer of the province or city, as the case may be. He shall have charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of
such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal
prosecutions.

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information
or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he
or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by
subpoena for the purpose.

(c) Investigate commissions of criminal acts and take an active part in the gathering of relevant
evidence. For this purpose, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine Constabulary and
other offices and agencies of the government shall extend to him the necessary assistance.
(d) Any provision of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, and
Republic Act No. 5185, also known as The Decentralization Act, to the contrary notwithstanding, the
provincial or city fiscal may, concurrently with the Municipal Attorney or with the Provincial
Attorney/City Legal Officer, whose positions are provided for in the above-mentioned Act, act as legal
adviser the various municipalities, and municipal districts of the province, or the provincial or city
government and its officers or of the city. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in
writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties
thereof.

(e) Assist the Solicitor General, when so deputized in the public interest, in the performance of any
function or in the discharge of any duty incumbent upon the latter, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the former, in which cases, he shall be under the control and supervision of the Solicitor General with
regard to the conduct of the proceedings assigned to him and render reports thereon.

Section 12. Offices of the Provincial Fiscal: Their Number in Each Province/Sub-Province. There
shall be in each of the following provinces and sub-provinces the corresponding number of provincial
fiscals and their assistants:

(a) Rizal:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Ten Second Assistants
Ten Third Assistants
Fourteen Fourth Assistants
Fourteen Assistants

(b) Cebu:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Four Second Assistants
Four Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
Eight Assistants

(c) Pangasinan:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Three Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
Seven Assistants

(d) Quezon:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Two Third Assistants
Four Fourth Assistants
Five Assistants

(e) Leyte;Negros Occidental:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Four Third Assistants
Five Fourth Assistants

(f) Bulacan; Nueva Ecija:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Four Third Assistants
Four Fourth Assistants

(g) Iloilo:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Four Second Assistants
Five Third Assistants

(h) Pampanga; Batangas; Ilocos Norte; Ilocos Sur; Laguna; Albay; Davao del Sur; Camarines Sur:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Four Third Assistants

(i) Cagayan; Isabela; Negros Oriental; La Union; Misamis Oriental; Cavite; Zamboanga del Sur:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Three Third Assistants

(j) Benguet; Tarlac; Northern Samar; Bohol; Capiz; Zamboanga del Norte; Palawan:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Two Third Assistants

(k) Western Samar; Zambales; Sorsogon; Masbate; Surigao del Norte; Surigao del Sur; Misamis
Occidental; Camarines Norte; Aklan; Davao del Norte; Davao Oriental; Eastern Samar; Bukidnon;
Lanao del Norte; Nueva Vizcaya:
One Provincial Fiscal
One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants

(l) South Cotabato; Bataan; Antique; Agusan del Norte; Abra North Cotabato; Mindoro Oriental;
Mindoro Occidental; Catanduanes; Kalinga Apayao; Lanao del Sur; Southern Leyte; Maguindanao;
Sulu:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant
One Second Assistant

(m) Agusan del Sur; Romblon; Marinduque; Camiguin; Quirino; Mountain Province; Ifugao; Siquijor;
Batanes; Sultan-Kudarat; Tawi-Tawi; Basilan:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant

(n) Sub-Provinces ofAurora; Biliran; Guimaras:

One Provincial Fiscal

One First Assistant

Section 13. Offices of the City Fiscal: Their Number in Each City. There shall be in each of the
following cities the corresponding number of city fiscals and their assistants:

(a) Manila:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Twenty-Four Second Assistants
Thirty Third Assistants
Thirty Fourth Assistants
Forty Assistants

(b) Quezon City:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Twenty Two Second Assistants
Twenty Two Third Assistants
Twenty Two Forth Assistants
Twenty Two Assistants

(c) Pasay City:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Six Second Assistants
Six third Assistants
Eight Fourth Assistants
Eight Assistants

(d) Caloocan City:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Five Second Assistants
Six Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
Six Assistants

(e) Dagupan:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Four Second Assistants
Five Third Assistants
Five Fourth Assistants
Five Assistants

(f) City of Cebu:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Four Second Assistants
Six Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants

(g) City of Davao:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Six Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants

(h) City ofIloilo:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Five Third Assistants
Five Fourth Assistants

(i) Olongapo:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants
Three Third Assistants
Six Fourth Assistants
(j) Bacolod; Baguio:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Two Third Assistants
Four Fourth Assistants

(k) Lucena:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Four Third Assistants

(l) San Pablo; Cabanatuan; Angeles; Legaspi; Cagayan de Oro:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Three Third Assistants

(m) Naga; Dumaguete; Tacloban; Tagbilaran:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants
Two Third Assistants

(n) Laoag; Cavite City; Batangas City; Roxas City; Dipolog; Zamboanga City; Pagadian:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Three Second Assistants

(o) Butuan; Surigao City; General Santos; Oroquieta; Ozamis:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
Two Second Assistants

(p) San Jose; Puerto Princesa; Lipa; Iriga; San Carlos; (Neg. Occ.); Ormoc; Mandaue; Iligan; Marawi;
Cotabato City:

One City Fiscal

One First Assistant
One Second Assistant

(q) San Carlos (Pangasinan); Tagaytay; Trece Martires; Cadiz; Silay; Calbayog; Danao; Lapu-Lapu;
Toledo; Palayan; Bago; La Carlota; Bais; Canlaon; Gingoog; Tangub; Dapitan:
One City Fiscal
One First Assistant

Section 14. Offices of Provincial and City Fiscals: Salaries. The annual salaries of Provincial and City
Fiscals and their Assistants shall be as approved by the President upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of the Budget and pursuant to P.D. No. 985.

The salaries of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants shall be paid entirely out of national
funds and included in the annual appropriations of the Department of Justice. This is without
prejudice to the grant of allowances to the above-mentioned fiscals by their respective local
governments, in amounts not exceeding twenty-five percent (25%) of their basic salaries.

The salaries of clerks, stenographers and other subordinate employees in the offices of the provincial
and city fiscals shall be paid by the province or city where they are assigned.

Section 15. Special Counsels. Whenever the exigencies of the service require the creation of
positions of additional counsel to assist provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties,
positions of Special Counsels may be created by any province or city, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city funds. The Secretary of
Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal and
regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent or temporary basis.

Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed not more than the
salary rate provided in this Decree for the lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or
city where assigned.

Section 16. Office, Space, Maintenance and Other Incidental Expenses. Pending the construction of
regional government centers in each of the administrative regions as provided in the Integrated
Reorganization plan, the Budget Commission and other departments or agencies concerned are
hereby directed to provide the Department of Justice such technical assistance and establish suitable
building sites and office spaces for the Regional State Prosecution Offices created herein. Rental
costs and all other expenses incidental to the maintenance of the Regional State Prosecution Offices
shall be paid out of national funds.

The provincial and city governments shall be responsible for providing adequate office spaces for the
offices of their respective provincial or city fiscals and all expenses incidental to the maintenance of
said offices, including rental payments, shall be paid by the province or city concerned.

Section 17. Transitory Provisions: Abolition of Existing Prosecution and Fiscals Offices and Positions.
After the approval of this Decree, the President shall issue the necessary letter/s of implementation
specifying the details of the reorganization provided herein.

All existing prosecution offices and positions in the Department of Justice and the Offices of the
Provincial and City Fiscals throughout the country as well as all positions of district state prosecutors
and special counsels shall cease to exist from the date specified in the letter of implementation issued
by the President pursuant to the preceding paragraph. Their pertinent functions, applicable
appropriations, records, equipment, property and such clerical and subordinate personnel as may be
necessary shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices created above.

Section 18. Transitory Provisions: Incumbents; Vacation of Offices. The provision of the second
paragraph of the preceding section notwithstanding, all officials in the prosecution service whose
appointments are by this Decree vested in the President shall continue in office until, and shall vacate
the same only upon, the appointment and qualification of the officials to whom their powers, functions,
and responsibilities substantially pertain: Provided, however, That with respect to the incumbent
district state prosecutors, each of them shall continue in office until the appointment and qualification
of the Regional State Prosecutor of the region to which his district pertains.

An incumbent who is appointed by the President to a similar or equivalent position created in this
Decree shall be allowed to receive either the salary rate authorized for the position or his present
salary whichever is higher.

Section 19. Transitory Provisions: Payment of Gratuity. All officers and employees who may be
separated or removed from the service by reason of the reorganization authorized herein shall be
granted a gratuity at a rate equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of continuous satisfactory
service rendered, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of the
highest salary received: Provided, That any such officer or employee already entitled to gratuity or
pension under existing law shall have the option to select between said gratuity or pension and the
gratuity provided for in this Decree.

The officers and employees referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not lose their civil service
eligibilities and their names shall be entered in a preferential re-employment list so as to facilitate their
reappointment to appropriate positions created pursuant to this Decree.

Section 20. Appropriation. There is hereby appropriated initially the sum of THIRTY-ONE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (31,500.00) from the funds of the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated for the organization and operational expenses of the National Prosecution
Service for a period of one year from the issuance of this Decree. Henceforth the said amount shall
be added to the annual budget of the Department of Justice.

Section 21. Repeal. All acts, laws, decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions and regulations
or any part thereof which are consistent with any of the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed
and/or modified accordingly.

Section 22. Separability Clause. If for any reason, any section or provision of this Decree is declared
to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions of this Decree which are not affected
thereby shall continue in full force and effect.

Section 23. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of April, in the Year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight.

#17

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10071

AN ACT STRENGTHENING AND RATIONALIZED THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010."
Section 2. Scope. - The constituent offices herein covered shall include the Prosecution Staff and the Regional,
Provincial and City Prosecution Offices under the Secretary of Justice, that compose the National Prosecution
Service as created and established in the succeeding sections.

Section 3. Creation of the National Prosecution Service. - There is hereby created and established a National
Prosecution Service to be composed of the prosecution staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such
number of regional prosecution offices, offices of the provincial prosecutor and offices of the prosecutor as are
hereinafter Provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the preliminary investigation and prosecution of all
cases involving violations of penal laws under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice, subject to the provisions of
Sections 4, 5 and 7 hereof.

Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in the Secretary of Justice includes authority to act
directly on any matter involving national security or a probable miscarriage of Justice within the jurisdiction of the
prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review,
reverse, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) may provide, final judgements and orders of the prosecutor general, regional prosecutors, provincial
prosecutors, and city prosecutors.

For purposes of determining the cases which may be acted on, directly by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase
"national security" shall refer to crimes against national security as Provided under the Penal Code, Book II, Title 1,
and other cases involving acts of terrorism as defined under the Human Security Act under Republic Act No. 9372.

Section 5. The Prosecution Staff and its Functions. - There shall be in the Office of the Secretary of Justice a
prosecution staff that shall be composed of prosecuting officers in such number as herein below determined. It shall
be headed by a Prosecutor General who shall be assisted by the following:

(a) Five (5) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;

(b) Five (5) Deputy State Prosecutors;

(c) Thirty five (35) Senior Assistant State prosecutors;

(d) Eighty (80) Assistant State Prosecutors; and

(e) Twenty (20) Prosecution Attorneys.

The Prosecution Staff, which shall be under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice, shall have the
following functions:

(1) Assist the secretary of Justice in the exercise of his/her appelate jurisdiction;

(2) Conduct the preliminary investigation and prosecution of criminal cases involving national security, those
for which task forces have been created and criminal cases whose venues are transferred to avoid
miscarriage of justice, all when so directed by the Secretary of Justice as public interest may require;

(3) Act as counsel for the People of the Philippines in any case involving or arising from a criminal complaint
investigated by any of its prosecutors and pending before any trial court;

(4) Investigate administrative charges against prosecutors, other prosecution officers and members of their
support staff;

(5) Prepare legal opinions on queries involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and special penal laws;
and
 (6) Monitor all criminal cases filed with the Office of the Prosecutor General; maintain an updated record of
the status of each case, and adopt such systems and procedures as will expedite the monitoring and
disposition of cases.

The Prosecutor General and Senior Deputy State Prosecutors shall act as a Selection and Promotion Board to
screen for appointment or promotion to any prosecutorial position in the Office of the Prosecutor General. The
regional prosecutor, provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor shall sit as a member of the Board whenever it
considers applicants for positions in his/her office. The Prosecutor General shall be the chairperson of the Board.

Section 6. Regional Prosecution Office. - There shall be at each administrative region, except the National Capital
Region (NCR), a Regional Prosecution Office to be headed by a Regional Prosecutor who shall be assisted by one
(1) Deputy Regional Prosecutor, one (1) Senior Assistant Regional Prosecutor, three (3) Assistant Regional
Prosecutors, and one (1) Prosecution Attorney.

For purposes of this regionalization, the NCR shall be placed under the administrative supervision of the Prosecutor
General.

Section 7. Powers and Functions of the Regional Prosecutor. - The Regional Prosecutor shall, under the control
and supervision of the Secretary of Justice, have the following powers and functions:

(a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of the DOJ
relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his/her region;

(b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city prosecutors and other
prosecuting officers for provinces and cities comprised within his/her region;

(c) Prosecute any case arising within the region;

(d) When so delegated by the Secretary of Justice, resolve with finality appeals from or petitions for review
of judgements and orders of provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants within the region in cases
where the offenses charged are cognizable by the municipal trial court. This notwithstanding, the Secretary
of Justice is not precluded from exercising his power or review over such resolutions of the regional
Prosecutor in instances where lies grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Prosecutor, and
from determining the extent of the coverage of the power of review of the Regional Prosecutors;

(e) Designate a prosecutor from any office of the provincial or city prosecutor within the region as Acting
Provincial or City Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute a case in instances where parties question the
partiality or bias of a particular city or provincial prosecutor or where the city or provincial prosecutor
voluntarily inhibits himself/herself by reason of relationship to any of the parties within the sixth (6th) civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity;

(f) With respect to his/her regional office and the offices of the provincial and city prosecutors within his
region, he/she shall:

(1) Appoint such number of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve
transfer of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office and exercise
disciplinary actions over them in accordance with the Civil Service law, other existing laws and
regulations;

(2) Approve requests for sick, vacation and maternity and other kinds of leaves, with or without pay,
for a period not exceeding one (1) year, for overtime services; for permission to exercise their
profession or to engage in business outside of office hours; for official travel within the region for
periods not exceeding thirty (30) days; and for claims and benefits under existing laws;

(3) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants and all other prosecuting officers of the provinces and cities within his/her region;
 (4) Investigate administrative complaints against prosecutors and other prosecuting officers within
the region and submit his/her recommendation to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review
thereof and where warranted, submit the appropriate recommendation to the office of the president
for the latter's consideration;

(5) Approve attendance of personnel in conferences, seminars and other training programs within
the region;

(6) Prepare the budget for the region for approval of the Secretary of Justice and administer the
same;

(7) Approve requisition for supplies, materials and equipment, as well as books, periodicals and the
like and other items for the region in accordance with the approved supply procurement program;

(8) Negotiate and conclude contracts for services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment
and the likes within the budgetary limits set for the region;

(9) Within his/her region, monitor the submission of all reports as may be required by the Secretary
of Justice;

(10) Coordinate with the regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies of the
government and with local governments units in the region; and

(11) perform such other duties and functions as may be Provided by law or as may further be
delegated by the Secretary of Justice.

Section 8. The Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - There still be for each province or city a Provincial
Prosecutor or city Prosecutor, as the case may be, who shall be assisted by at least one (1) Deputy Provincial
Prosecutor or Deputy City Prosecutor and such number of assistant and associate prosecutors as provided for
hereinafter. Provided, however, That whenever a new province or city is created, it shall have a provincial prosecutor
or city prosecutor, a deputy provincial prosecutor or deputy city prosecutor and such number of assistant and
associate prosecutors as there are court branches therein at the ratio of two (2) prosecutors for each branch of
regional trial court, one (1) prosecutor for each branch of metropolitan trial court or municipal trial court in cities, and
one (1) prosecutor for every two (2) municipal trial courts in municipalities or branches thereof municipal circuit trial
courts.

Upon the establishment of the new province or city, position items of Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for the mother province in excess of the new equivalent pursuant to the ratio established above for the
courts or branches thereof that remained to be served by the office shall be transferred automatically to the Office of
the provincial Prosecutor or Office of the City Prosecutor for the new province or city, as the case may be: Provided,
further, That when all or almost all of the regional trial court branches are seated at the city, the number of
prosecutors for the city shall be proportional to the territorial jurisdiction covered by such branches of the courts.

In case a province is reverted to the mother province or a city is reconverted into a municipality for whatever reason,
all the prosecution position items of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or Office of the City Prosecutor shall go
to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the mother province: Provided, however, That the position title
provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor for the former province or city shall be changed to Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor or Associate Prosecutor, as the case may be, and shall have the corresponding rank provided in Section
15.

When the exigencies of the service so require, a province or city may create positions for special counsels whose
salaries and other emoluments shall come exclusively from local funds.

Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor shall:

(a) Be the law officer of the province or city, as the case may be:
 (b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal
laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or any of
his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this
purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him/her, and the
attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial court;

(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution
of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.

Section 10. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor Number of Prosecutors in Each Province. - There shall be for each
of the following provinces the corresponding number of provincial prosecutor and his/her deputies, assistants and
associates:

(a) Bulacan: (47)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Eighteen (18) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty-six (26) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(b) Pangasinan: (36)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Ten (10) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty-three (23) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(c) Cebu: (33)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Ten (10) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty (20) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(d) Leyte: (32)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty (20) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(e) Quezon; Camarines sur: (31)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Nineteen (19) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(f) Cagayan: (28)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Eight (8) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Seventeen (17) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(g) Nueva Ecija; Batangas; Laguna; Rizal: (26)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Eight (8) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Fifteen (15) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(h) Iloilo: (24)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Fifteen (15) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(i) Cavite; Bohol: (23)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Fourteen (14) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(j) Isabela; Pampanga; Aklan: (22)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

 Seven (7) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(k) Samar; Zamboanga Del Sur: (20)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(l) Northern Samar; Eastern Samar; (19)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Eleven (11) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(m) La Union; Lanao Del Sur: (18)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Eleven (11) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(n) Ilocos Sur: (17)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Ten (10) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(o) Benguet; Camarines Norte; Negros Oriental: (16)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(p) Nueva Vizcaya; Misamis Oriental: (15)

 One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(q) Ilocos Norte; Antique; Negros Occidental; Cotabato: (14)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Eight (8) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(r) Albay; Zamboanga Del Norte; Lanao Del Norte: (13)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(s) Abra; Surigao del Sur; Davao Oriental; Sulu: (12)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(t) Zambales; Oriental Mindoro; Masbate; Sorsogon; Southern Leyte; Capiz; Tawi-tawi: (11)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Six (6) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(u) Tarlac; Occidental Mindoro; Palawan; Surigao del Norte; Agusan Del Norte; Maguindanao: (10)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

 Five (5) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(v) Davao Del Sur; Sultan Kudarat: (9)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(w) Ifugao; Quirino; Bataan; Romblon; Misamis Occidental; Bukidnon: (8)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Three (3) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(x) Mt. Province; Marinduque; Catanduanes; Zamboanga Sibugay; Agusan del Sur; South Cotabato: (7)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Three (3) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(y) Aurora; Biliran; Compostela Valley: (6)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Two (2) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(z) Batanes; Kalinga; Apayao; Camiguin; Basilan; Davao del Norte; Sarangani; (4)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

One (1) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(aa) Guimaras; Siquijor; Dinagat Islands: (3)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

 One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Associate Provincial Prosecutor

After the approval of this Act, there shall be for each province one (1) deputy provincial prosecutor for every twenty-
five (25) prosecutors of a fraction thereof. When an office of the provincial prosecutor has more than one (1) deputy
provincial prosecutor, the incumbent deputy provincial prosecutor first appointed shall be called senior deputy
provincial prosecutor.

Section 11. Office of the City Prosecutor. Number of Prosecutor for Each City. - There shall be for each of the
following cities the corresponding number of City Prosecutor and his/her deputies, assistants and associates.

(a) Manila: (178)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Deputy City Prosecutors

Seventy-four (74) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Ninety-six (96) Assistant City Prosecutors

(b) Quezon City: (109)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Five (5) Deputy City Prosecutors

Forty-eight (48) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fifty-five (55) Assistant City Prosecutors

(c) Makati: (107)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Five (5) Deputy City Prosecutors

Fifty (50) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fifty-one (51) Assistant City Prosecutors

(d) Cebu: (42)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Seventeen (17) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twenty-two (22) Assistant City Prosecutors

(e) Pasig: (37)

One (1) City Prosecutor

 Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Sixteen (16) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Eighteen (18) Assistant City Prosecutors

(f) Iloilo: (36)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twenty (20) Assistant City Prosecutors

(g) Caloocan: (35)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Nineteen (19) Assistant City Prosecutors

(h) Pasay: (31)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fifteen (15) Assistant City Prosecutors

(i) Bacolod; Davao; Cagayan de Oro: (30)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fourteen (14) Assistant City Prosecutors

(j) Naga (Camarines Sur): (27)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Assistant City Prosecutors

(k) Paranaque: (23)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Assistant City Prosecutors

(l) Marikina: (22)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Assistant City Prosecutors

(m) Las Pinas: (21)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

(n) Mandaluyong: (16)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Senior Assistant City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

(o) Valenzuela; Muntinlupa; Taguig: (15)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Senior Assistant city Prosecutors

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

(p) Malabon and Navotas: (13)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

 Five (5) Senior Assistant city Prosecutors

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

(q) San Juan: (10)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Four (4) Senior Assistant city Prosecutors

Four (4) Assistant City Prosecutors

(r) Baguio; San Fernando (Pampanga); Antipolo; Dumaguete: (20)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Assistant City Prosecutors

Eight (10) Associate City Prosecutors

(s) Cabanatuan; Legaspi: (19)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Assistant City Prosecutors

Nine (9) Associate City Prosecutors

(t) Batangas: (18)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Assistant City Prosecutors

Eight (8) Associate City Prosecutors

(u) Angeles: (17)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

Eight (8) Associate City Prosecutors

(v) Tacloban; Zamboanga: (16)

 One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate City Prosecutors

(w) Iligan: (15)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate City Prosecutors

(x) Laoag: San Fernando (La Union); Tuguegarao; Lucena; Iriga; Roxas: (14)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

Six (6) Associate City Prosecutors

(y) Dagupan; Olongapo; Calamba; General Santos: (13)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant City Prosecutors

Six (6) Associate City Prosecutors

(z) Tagbilaran; Butuan (12)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant City Prosecutors

Five (5) Associate City Prosecutors

(aa) Urdaneta; Puerto Prinscesa: (11)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant City Prosecutors

 Four (4) Associate City Prosecutors

(bb) Dipolog: Pagadian: (10)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant City Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate City Prosecutors

(cc) San Jose Del Monte: San Pablo: Masbate: Mandaue: (9)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant City Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate City Prosecutors

(dd) Santiago; Malolos; Meycauayan; Tarlac; Sorsogon; Oroquieta: (8)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant City Prosecutors

Three (3) Associate City Prosecutors

(ee) Gapan; Balanga; Lipa; Ligao;Tabaco;Lapu-Lapu;Tagum: (7)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant City Prosecutors

Two (2) Associate City Prosecutors

(ff) San Jose; Cavite; Talisay (Cebu) : (6)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant City Prosecutors

Two (2) Associate City Prosecutors

(gg) Candon; Vigan; Alaminos;Cauayan; San Carlos (Pangasinan); Tanauan; Calapan; San Carlos (Negros
Occidental); Clabayog; Ormoc; Ozamis; Malaybalay; Cotabato; Gingoog; Digos; Koronadal; Kidapawan;
Marawi: (5)
 One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant City Prosecutors

One (1) Associate City Prosecutor

(hh) Surigao: (4)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

One (1) Assistant City Prosecutor

One (1) Associate City Prosecutor

(ii) Palayan; Science City of Munoz; Sta. Rosa; Tagaytay; Trece Martirez; Passi; Bago; Cadiz; Himamaylan;
Kabankalan; La Carlota; Silay; Sagay; Danao; Toledo; Bais; Bayawan; Canlaon; Tanjay; Maasin; Dapitan;
Isabela; Tangub; Panabo; Island Garden City of Samal; Bislig; Tacurong: (3)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

One (1) Associate City Prosecutor

(jj) Escalante; Sipalay; Talisay (Negros Occidental); Victorias; Valencia: (2)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

After the approval of this Act, there shall be for each city one (1 deputy city prosecutor for every twenty-five (25)
prosecutors or a fraction thereof. When an Office of the City Prosecutor has more than one (1) deputy city
prosecutor, the incumbent deputy city prosecutor first appointed shall be called senior deputy city prosecutor first
appointed shall be called senior deputy city prosecutor.

Section 12. Realignment of the Position Items. - Upon the approval of this Act, the Prosecutor General shall transfer
vacant excess position items of prosecutors to the cities within the province or to the province of which the cities
used to be municipalities or to other cities within the province: Provided, however, That if the position items are
occupied , they shall be transferred as soon as they become vacant or when the incumbent prosecutors consent to
their transfer.

When new cities or provinces are created and court branch seats are realigned or redistributed, the Secretary of
Justice shall correspondingly realign position items of prosecutors to the new cities or provinces from the provinces
where cities are located or the provinces used to be part of, without prejudice to the provision of Section 8 hereof.

After the approval of this Act, branches of the Regional Trial Court that are seated t the city and hitherto try and hear
criminal cases filed by either the office of the provincial prosecutor or office of the city prosecutor shall proportionally
divide themselves into branches where criminal and other cases filed , and those to be prosecuted and or defended
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor shall be exclusively raffled to, tried and heard, and branches where
criminal and other cases filed, and those to be prosecuted or defended by the Office of the City Prosecutor shall be
exclusively raffled to, tried and heard. Upon such division, the Secretary of Justice shall also realign position items
of prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Office of the City Prosecutor affected.
Section 13. Automatic Creation of Positions of Prosecutor. - Whenever new courts or branches thereof are created,
there shall be automatically created for the province or city where such courts or branches are seated positions of
assistant and associate prosecutors in such number determined pursuant to the ratio established in Section 8
hereof: Provided, however, That if the branches of a regional trial court shall be seated at a city outside the
metropolitan area established by law, the number of positions shall be distributed between the city and the province
where the city is located according to the territorial jurisdiction covered by such branch: Provided, further, That in
case the branches created are of regional trial court, not less than one-half of the corresponding prosecutors shall
have the rank of Prosecutor III If the province or city has at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors, including the
additional, or the city is in a metropolitan area established by law, and the rest, Prosecutor II; otherwise, they may
have the ranks of Prosecutor II and Prosecutor I.

Section 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General shall have
the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
emoluments, and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the
same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed
by the President.

Section 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. - The Prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service shall have the following
ranks:

RANK POSITION/TITLE
Prosecutor V (1) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors
of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five
(25) prosecutors, and City Prosecutors of cities
within a metropolitan area established by law.
Prosecutor IV (1) Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors;
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors
of provinces or cities with less than twenty-five
(25) prosecutors; and
(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy
City Prosecutors of provinces or cities within a
metropolitan area established by law.
Prosecutor III (1) Senior Assistant State Prosecutors and
Senior Assistant Regional Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Provincial or Deputy City
Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than
twenty- five (25) prosecutors; and
(3) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors or
Senior Assistant City Prosecutors.
Prosecutor II (1) Assistant State Prosecutors;
(2) Assistant Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors or
Assistant City
Prosecutor I (1) Associate Provincial Prosecutors or
Associate City Prosecutors.

Whenever a province or city shall have had at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors or a city shall have been made a
part of a metropolitan area established by law, each level of the prosecution position items of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor or Office of the City Prosecutor thereof shall be automatically upgraded one rank higher and
shall have the corresponding position titles provided in this section.
Section 16. Qualifications, Ranks, and Appointments of Prosecutors, and other Prosecution Officers. - Prosecutor
with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualification for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary
grade, and salaries, allowances, and emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a n associate justice of the
Court of Appeals.

Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the
Regional Trial Court.

Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor II shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in cities.

Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in municipalities.

Any increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or retirement benefits or any upgrading of the
grades or levels thereof of any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to herein to whom said emoluments are
assimilated shall apply to the corresponding prosecutors.

All the above prosecutors shall be selected from among qualified and professionally trained members of the legal
profession who are of proven integrity and competence. They shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and shall serve until they reach the age of sixty five (65) years
old: Provided, however, That the ages of "seventy (70) years" and "sixty-five (65) years" and the years of service
"twenty (20) years" provided in Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and other retirement laws for judges shall be
understood as "sixty-five (65) years" and "sixty (60) years," and fifteen (15) years," respectively, when applied to
prosecutors.

A prosecution attorney or special counsel shall be a member of the bar in good standing and shall have a salary
under Salary Grade 25. Such prosecution officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice: Provided,
however, That with respect to a special counsel, his/her appointment shall be upon the recommendation of the
provincial governor or city mayor and with the endorsement of the provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor, as the
case may be.

Subject to Section 20 hereof, the salaries and allowances of regional, provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants, and the members of the prosecution staff, including the prosecution attorneys, shall be paid entirely out
of national funds and included in the annual appropriations of the DOJ: Provided, however, That this provision is
without prejudice to the grant of allowances to the above-mentioned prosecutors by their respective local
governments in amounts not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of their basic salaries; Provided, further, That the whole
of the allowances or portion thereof, whether granted by the national or local government shall be exempt from the
income tax.

The salaries, allowances and other emoluments herein fixed shall not apply to officers other than those of
prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service, notwithstanding any provision of law assimilating the salaries of
other officers to those herein mentioned.
Section 17. Continuation in Office of Prosecutors. - Upon approval of this Act, the prosecuting officers, including the
prosecution attorneys, in the present prosecution staff shall continue in office to discharge the functions under this
Act, and the position titles Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor are respectively renamed
Prosecutor General and Senior Deputy State Prosecutor. All prosecutors who have the ranks of Prosecutor III and
Prosecutor II in the existing prosecution staff shall be called Senior Assistant State Prosecutors and Assistant State
Prosecutors, respectively, under this Act.

The Regional, Provincial or City Prosecution Office established as teach of the regions, provinces or cities pursuant
to law is retained and renamed Regional Prosecution Office, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or Office if the City
Prosecutor, as the case may be.

All regional, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall continue in office to discharge their functions
under this Act.

All Assistant Prosecutor who have the ranks Prosecutor Iv, Prosecutor II, Prosecutor II and Prosecutor I in each of
the existing regional, provincial and city prosecution offices shall be known by the position titles provided in Section
15 hereof: Provided, however, That in provinces or cities with at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors and in cities
within a metropolitan area established by law all assistant prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor I before the
enactment of this Act shall be upgraded to Prosecutor II upon the approval of this Act and shall bear the title
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor or Assistant City Prosecutor, as the case may be.

Section 18. No Demotion or Diminution of Salary. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to demote a prosecutor or
to diminish his salary. In the event that all the incumbent prosecutors are not accommodated by the number of
position items allocated, the excess incumbents shall continue in the service until they are accommodated,
transferred or separated.

Section 19. No Undermining of Security of Tenure. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to allow the transfer,
except as Provided herein or in case of temporary assignment, as public interest may require, of any prosecutor to
any place or station or to undermine the security of tenure of incumbent prosecutors as provided in the laws. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed three (3) months without his or her written consent. No Provincial
Prosecutor or City Prosecutor shall be detailed or assigned to another office or station, except in a concurrent
capacity and with his or her written consent. lawphil

Section 20. Special Allowances. - The special allowances granted to the members of the National Prosecution
Service under Republic Act No. 9279 shall continue to be given to them subject to the provisions hereof: Provided,
however, that the amount not supported by the funding source specified in Section3 thereof to complete the
equivalent of hundred percent (100%) of the basic salary shall be paid through appropriations included in the budget
of the DOJ: Provided, further, That when the amount being supported by the said funding source shall have been
also included in the General Appropriations, the fees authorized under said Section 3 shall no longer be collected.

Section 21. Retirement Benefits. - When a prosecutor, who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service either
in the National Prosecution Service or in any branch of government, or in both, retires for having attained the age of
sixty-five (65) years or resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office, he/she shall, during
the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter Provided, receive a retirement pension based on the
highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances,
which he/she was receiving at the time of his/her retirement or resignation.

When a prosecutor has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in
government, the last five (5) years of which must have been continuously rendered in the prosecution service,
he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his/her natural life the same
benefits Provided for in this section: Provided, however, that those with less than fifteen (15) years of service in the
government shall be entitled to a pro-rata pension computed as follows:

No. of years Basic Pay Plus the Highest

In Monthly Aggregate of
Government Transportation, Living and
Representation Allowances
 15 years

Section 22. Conditions. - To maintain entitlement to the pension herein Provided, no prosecutor, during the time
he/she is receiving said pension, shall appear as counsel before any judicial or quasi-judicial or quasi-judicial
agency in any civil case wherein the Government or any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof is an
adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his/her office, or collect any fee for his/her appearance in any administrative proceedings to
maintain an interest adverse to the government , whether national, provincial, or municipal or to any of its legally
constituted officers. When a prosecutor covered under this Act shall assume an elective public office, he/she shall
not, upon assumption of office and during his/her term, retrieve the monthly pension or any of the allowance due to
him/her.

Section 23. Automatic Increase. - All pension benefits of retired prosecutors of the National Prosecution Service
shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase n the salary and allowance of the same position
from which he retired.

Section 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted to all those who
retired prior to the effectivity of this Act.

Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and all other
benefits that may be extended by the way of amendment thereto shall likewise be given to the prosecutors covered
by this Act.

Section 26. Appropriation. - There is hereby appropriated initially the sum of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
from the funds of the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the organization and operational expenses of
the Office of the Prosecutor General for a period of one (1) year form the effectivity of this Act. The said amount shall
be added to the annual budget of the DOJ.

Section 27. Repealing Clause. - All acts, laws, decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions and regulations or
any part thereof which are inconsistent with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed and/or modified
accordingly.

Section 28. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any selection or provision of his Act is declared to be
unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions of this Act which are not affected shall continue in full
force and effect.

Section 29. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.

#18

FELIPE E. ABELLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

Felipe E. Abella (complainant) filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 67131 (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees against Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra (respondent). In his affidavit-complaint2 dated 8 May 2002, complainant
charged respondent with engaging in private practice while employed in the government service.
Complainant alleged that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar on 30 May 1986 and was appointed as Deputy
Register of Deeds of General Santos City on 11 August 1987.3 Complainant asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds,
respondent filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 29 February 1988 without
obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ).4 Complainant claimed that respondent
has notarized some 3,000 documents.5 Complainant pointed out that respondent only stopped notarizing documents
when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the Investigation Division of the Land Registration Authority.6

Complainant contended that respondent could not justify her act by pretending to be in good faith because even non-
lawyers are not excused from ignorance of the law. Complainant branded as incredible respondent's claim that she was
merely motivated by public service in notarizing 3,000 documents. Complainant pointed out that respondent spent
money to buy the Notarial Register Books and spent hours going over the documents subscribed before her, thereby
prejudicing her efficiency and performance as Deputy Register of Deeds. Complainant believed that even if respondent
had obtained authority from the DOJ, respondent would still be guilty of violating Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because her
practice as a notary public conflicts with her official functions.7

In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was a notary public from 29 February 1988 to 31 December 1989.8
Respondent stated that she was authorized by her superior, the Register of Deeds, to act as a notary public. Respondent
pointed out that the Register of Deeds, Atty. Pelagio T. Tolosa, also subscribed petitions and documents that were
required to be registered.9 Respondent explained that the Register of Deeds imposed the following conditions for her
application as a notary public:

xxx

4. That the application for commission was on the condition that respondent cannot charge fees for documents required
by the Office to be presented and under oath.10

Respondent contended that when she filed her petition for commission as a notary public, the requirement of approval
from the DOJ Secretary was still the subject of a pending query by one of the Registrars and this fact was not known to
respondent.11 Respondent maintained that she had no intention to violate any rule of law. Respondent, as a new lawyer
relying on the competence of her superior, admitted that an honest mistake may have been committed but such mistake
was committed without willfulness, malice or corruption.12

Respondent argued that she was not engaged in illegal practice as a notary public because she was duly commissioned
by the court.13 Respondent denied that she violated Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because she was authorized by her
superior to act as a notary public. Respondent reasoned that her being a notary public complemented her functions as
Deputy Register of Deeds because respondent could immediately have documents notarized instead of the registrants
going out of the office to look for a notary public. Respondent added that she did not charge fees for the documents
required by the office to be presented under oath.14 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Respondent insisted that contrary to complainant's claims, she only notarized 135 documents as certified by the Clerk of
Court of the 11th Judicial Region, General Santos City.15

In her Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 25 January 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for lack of merit. The
Report reads in part:

However, the fact that she applied for commission as Notary Public without securing the approval of the proper
authority although she was allowed to do so by her superior officer, was not her own undoing for having relied on the
ample authority of her superior officer, respondent being a neophyte in the law profession for having newly passed the
bar a year after at that time.

Records further showed that after having been reprimanded by Atty. Flestado for said mistake which was done in good
faith respondent ceased and desisted to perform notarial work since then up to the present as could be gleaned from
the Certification issued by Clerk of Court VI Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa of the 11th Judicial Region General Santos City;
dated December 23, 2004 that 135 documents have been notarized by the respondent from February 29, 1988 to
December 31 1989 and there was no record of any notarized documents from January 19, 1990 to December 21,
1991.16

In a Resolution dated 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, in adopting and approving the Report, dismissed the
case for lack of merit.

Complainant claims that in dismissing the complaint for "lack of merit" despite respondent's admission that she acted as
a notary public for two years, the IBP Board of Governors committed a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
authority.17

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:

xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

xxx

Memorandum Circular No. 1718 of the Executive Department allows government employees to engage directly in the
private practice of their profession provided there is a written permission from the Department head. It provides:

The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in
accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:

"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any
way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer or member of the board of directors",

Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the interest
of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied)

It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a written
permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization
because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent
failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in
1986.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer Sr.,19 we suspended a lawyer employed in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for failing to
obtain a written authority and approval with a duly approved leave of absence from the CHR. We explained:

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a matter of right. Although
the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly
approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written
request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of
absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.

As to respondent's act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied for commission as notary public on 14
November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC
Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000. However, the CHR authorized respondent to act as notary
public only on 29 October 2001. Considering the acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term "practice of law,"
for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required, the crucial period to be
considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.20

In Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho,21 we suspended a lawyer for having filed petitions for commission as a notary public while
employed as a court attorney. We held:

Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government lawyer, he was prohibited from engaging in notarial practice, or in
any form of private legal practice for that matter. Atty. Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or good faith, as he did not
seek to exculpate himself by providing an explanation for his error. Atty. Gatcho's filing of the petition for commission,
while not an actual engagement in the practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade the prohibition.22

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of profession,
when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by reprimand.23

Wherefore, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the written authority from the
Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.

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