PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS.
After the appearance of a new counsel, a motion for
ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 189669
February 16, 2015
Where filed: RTC of Naga City
Crime Comitted: Violation of Section 168, in relation to Section
170 of R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines / Section 2 of R.A. No. 623,
otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped
or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar
Containers.
Doctrine:
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the
trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not
raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or
existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant;
or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in
relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections
be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be
deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar
by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
Omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash
search warrants; that “the motion to quash the search warrant
which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing.
Facts:
Petitioners received information that respondent was
selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by and
bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent
Petron. Subsequently, the NBI in behalf of SHELL and Petrol filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two
separate Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section
155.1,6 in relation to Section 1707 of R.A. No. 8293 against
respondent and/or its occupants.
reconsideration of the previously denied motion to quash search
warrant was filed the alleged crime was committed in a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-
Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing of
the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by
Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that respondents were too late in raising such issue of the
application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of the
Omnibus Motion Rule.
SC: Under paragraph (b) of SEC 126 of ROC, the application for
search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons
why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the
RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed and also the place where the search warrant was
enforced. However being raised on a motion for reconsideration
the Omnibus Rules must apply which states that the trial court
could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the
motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the
issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The court held that the issue of whether the application
should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted
case, the power to issue a special criminal process is
inherent in all courts. The Motion to Quash Search warrant
remains denied.
PEOPLE V. ANDRADE
G.R. No. 187000
November 24, 2014
Where filed:
Crime Comitted: Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (RA 9165) Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
Doctrine:
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the
motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be
ordered to file an amended information. Generally, the fact that
the allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or
that the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to
this rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to
amend the information.
Facts:
After a random drug testing in the National Bilibid Prison, 21
inmates were charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) under identical Informations
after a confirmatory test. After arraignment, respondents filed a
Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts
alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section
15, RA 9165 on the ground that they were not apprehended or
arrested during their act of using nor were they given the results
of the screening test which they should have been given the
chance to challenge. Both the RTC and CA granted the Motion to
Dismiss. The petitioners brought the case before the SC due to the
fact that the CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy
under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court having been
already arraigned before availing of the said remedy.
SC: The timeliness of the fling is inconsequential since even if the
motion to quash was filed after arraignment the ground relied
upon by the respondents in their Motion is, that the facts alleged
in the Information do not constitute an offense which is actually
one of the grounds provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3
(a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied
the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its
evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by
respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend
the Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings
until the amendment of the Information without dismissing the
case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
clearly states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to
make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment.
PEOPLE VS. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566
July 17, 2013
Where filed: RTC of Pasig City
Crime Committed: Bigamy
Doctrine:
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde
or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To
be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the
information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be
cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by
the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If
the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except when the information is
quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. (Antone V. Beronilla)
Facts:
Edgardo Odtuhan, contracted a marriage with Eleanor A. Alagon
on 1993 during the subsistence of his marriage with Jasmin Modna
on 1980. On 1999, the first marriage, between Odtuhan and
Modina was declared to be void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. Subsequently, his wife from the second marriage, Alagon,
died. On 2003, Odtuhan was charged before the RTC with Bigamy.
Odtuhan moved for the quashal of the information on the ground
that there was a declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
prior to the filing of the action.
The RTC denied the Odtuhan’s motion to quash holding that the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes
of extinguishing criminal liability. Odtuhan appealed to the CA
assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information. CA
agreed with Odtuhan and ordered the lower court to give due
course on the motion to quash citing the case of Morigo V. People.
The case was appealed to the SC
SC: The court sustained the findings of the CA. It held that the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint
against him is not a valid reason to quash information. Well settled
is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the
time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material
only for determining prescription.
QUIAMBAO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185267
September 17, 2014
Where filed: OCP Pasig City
Crime Committed: Sec 74 of B.P. 68
Doctrine:
Requisites of Double Jeopardy:
(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
A first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consen
(2) The first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) A second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
Facts:
The private respondents, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and Aderito Z.
Yujuico, both directors and officers of STRADEC filed a case of
violation of Section 74 of B.P 68 against petitioners Quiambao and
Pilapil who are the President and the Corporate Secretary,
respectively, of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation
(STRADEC).
The following motions were filed
1. MTC- An Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest Pending
Determination- Denied
2. RTC- Petition for Certiorari- GRANTED
Directed the MTC to dismiss the case
3. SC- Petition for Certiorari field by the Private Respondents after
their reconsideration was denied in the RTC
4. MTC- dismissed the case pending motion of PR in the SC
SC: The petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No.
180416) filed by the private respondents to question the RTC
Branch 154’s Order, remains pending before this Court. Being the
subject of a pending review, the RTC Order – directing the MTC to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 for want of probable cause – was
therefore not yet final and executory.
Nonetheless, despite the pendency of the petition for review
before us, the MTC, by virtue of the RTC’s "non-final" Order,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724. Thus, we find that the MTC
acted without jurisdiction when it issued its Order of Dismissal
dated June 18, 2007.
The private respondents also contended that contrary to the
petitioners’ claim, double jeopardy had not yet attached. Since the
dismissal of the case was made provisionally and upon the express
request of the petitioners, the revival of the criminal information,
according to the respondents, did not give rise to double jeopardy.
There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of
Dismissal and the Order of Revival, there can be no double
jeopardy as provided in Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE V. BALUNSAT
G.R. No. 176743
July 28, 2010
Where filed: RTC OF Tuao, Cagayan
Crime Committed: 2 counts of Statutory Rape/ 1 attempted Rape
Doctrine: It is the rule that a judgment acquitting the accused is
final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that
accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it
happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Nelson Balunsat was charged with 2 counts of statutory rape for
raping AAA and attempted Rape for the act he has done to BBB.
Balunsat allegedly tried to have carnal knowledge with AAA twice
when she was 10 years old. The first occurrence was while her
parents were out in the conrnfields, the second was when she was
laying asleep with BBB wherein the latter was the first one who
was attempted to be raped by Balunsat. The RTC convicted the
accused of the charges.
On Appeal the CA modified the decision by acquitting the accused
of the second count of statutory rape and instaed of convicting
Balunsat of attempted Rape with regards to BBB they downgraded
it to acts of lasciviousness. Balunsat filed a notice of appeal to the
SC
SC: Given that Nelson was already acquitted of the charge of rape
in Criminal Case No. 762-T (1st statutory rape ) on the ground of
reasonable doubt, his instant appeal relates only to his convictions
for rape in Criminal Case No. 763-T (2nd Statutory Rape) and for
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 781-T. We can no
longer pass upon the propriety of Nelsons acquittal in Civil Case
No. 762-T because the appeal before us is Nelsons and not the
Peoples.
With Regards to the charge of attempted Rape which was
downgraded to acts of lasciviousness we can no longer review the
downgrading of the crime by the appellate court without violating
the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from
a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of increasing the
penalty imposed upon the accused. [32] In effect, the Court of
Appeals already acquitted Nelson of the charge of attempted rape,
convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less
severe penalty. Hence, we limit ourselves to determining whether
there is enough evidence to support Nelsons conviction for acts of
lasciviousness. The court upheld CA decision.
GELIG vs. PEOPLE
July 28, 2010
G.R. No. 173150
CRIME CHARGED: Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion
WHERE FILED: RTC of Cebu City Branch 23
DOCTRINE: When an accused appeals from the judgment of his
conviction, he waives his constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We
are then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and
sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.
FACTS:
Lydia Gelig and Gemma Micarsos were public school teachers at
Nailon Elementary School. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of
Gemma at that time. One day, Lydia confronted Gemma after
learning that the latter had been calling Rosseler a sissy. During
the confrontation, Lydia slapped and pushed Gemma. As a result
of the assault, Gemma suffered a contusion. Fourty-two (42) days
after the incident, Gemma suffered an incomplete abortion.
An information charging Lydia with the crime of Direct Assault
with Unintentional Abortion was filed.
For her defense, Lydia claimed that she only approached Gemma
to tell her to refrain from calling her son such names and that it
was Gemma who initiated the attack by holding her hands and
kicking her. Lydia claims that she was only forced to retaliate.
The RTC found Lydia guilty for the crime charged. Upon appeal to
the CA, however, the appellate court ruled that Lydia should only
be found guilty for the crime of slight physical injuries instead.
Lydia appealed before the SC, claiming that the CA erred in
finding her liable for Slight Physical Injuries, especially since the
information charged her for the crime of Direct Assault with
Unintenional Abortion.
HELD:
Lydia is liable for the crime of Direct Assault.
When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he
waives his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and
throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in
the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and sift
through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned.
In this case, the Court found that the elements of Direct Assault
under the second mode -- i.e., without public uprising, the person
shall attack, employ force, seriously intimidate, or seriously resist
any person in authority or his agent while engaged in the
performance of his official duties or on occasion thereof – were
present. Being a public school teacher, Gemma belongs to the
class of persons in authority expressly mentioned by Article 152 of
the RPC.
The SC did not find Lydia liable for only the crime of Direct Assault
and no longer the complex crime of Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion because there was no evidence on record
to prove that the assault of Lydia was the proximate cause of the
abortion, especially considering that the abortion happened 42
days after the incident.
PEOPLE vs. TAN
July 26, 2010
G.R. No. 167526
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Rule 36(a)-1, in relation to
Sections 32(a)-1 and 56 of the Revised Securities Act
WHERE FILED: RTC of Pasig City Branch 153
DOCTRINE:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar,
is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the
same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the
case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused."Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.
FACTS:
Two informations against Tan were filed charging him with
violation of Rule 36(a)-1, in relation to Sections 32(a)-1 and 56 of
the Revised Securities Act for his failure to file with the SEC and
the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of
all his Best World Resources Corporation shares of which he is a
beneficial owner within 10 days after he became such owner. Tan
plead not guilty.
The prosecution made its formal offer of evidence. The RTC
admitted only four exhibits, but denied all others.
In the meantime, Tan filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence and to admit the attached Demurrer to
Evidence. RTC issued an Order allowing the Motion for Leave to
File the Demurrer and ordered the prosecution to file their Reply,
which they did.
The RTC subsequently issued an Order granting the Demurrer to
Evidence of Tan.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
assailing the Order of the RTC, but thte same was dismissed. In
denying the petition, the CA reasoned that the dismissal of a
criminal action by the grant of a Demurer to Evidence is one on
the merits and operates as an acquittal. Therefore, the prosecution
cannot appeal therefrom, as it would place Tan in double jeopardy.
HELD:
The People’s appeal is unmeritorious.
The general rule is that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
operates as an acquittal and is, therefore, final and unappealable.
To allow the appeal to prosper would place the accused in double
jeopardy.
The exception to this real is when the court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as when the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham.
In this case, the SC found that the general rule should be applied.
The RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. It did not
prevent the prosecution from presenting its case. The People were
given ample opportunity to present its case, formally offer its
evidence, and oppose the respondent’s demurrer.
Even assuming that the RTC committed an error, such errors or
irregularities cannot be corrected because of the timely plea of
double jeopardy. he fundamental philosophy behind the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard
him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes.
PEOPLE vs. SALAZAR
October 20, 2010
G.R. No. 181900
CRIME CHARGED: Two counts of Statutory Rape
WHERE FILED:
DOCTRINE: The Affidavit -- even when construed as a pardon in
the erstwhile private crime of rape -- is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already
been instituted. To justify the dismissal of the Complaints, the
pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the
criminal actions.
FACTS:
BBB, the mother of AAA, was the common law wife of Salazar. At
the time of the incident, AAA was only 12 years old.
During the first rape incident, while BBB was out gambling, AAA
was awakened by Salazar who had returned from a drinking
session. As he had carnal knowledge of her, Salazar covered her
mouth so as to stifle the noises she was making. When her mother
arrived, AAA told her mother about the rape, but the latter did not
believe her.
During the second rape incident, BBB was again out gambling
when Salazar had carnal knowledge of AAA. Once again, when her
mother returned, AAA told her of the incident. This time, BBB
confronted Salazar.
AAA also told her aunt, DDD, about the second rape. DDD brought
her to the police station to report the incident.
Two informations were filed charging Salazar with two counts of
statutory rape. The information identified Salazar as AAA’s step-
father.
Salazar gave the defense of alibi. He claims that at the time of the
first rape, he was at his farm and at the night of the second rape,
while he was in their house, AAA was not as she was with her
brother.
On February 22, 2000, AAA purportedly executed an Affidavit of
Desistance wherein she stated that she was not raped by Salazar
and she no longer intends to pursue the case. During the hearing,
she explained that her own mother forced her to execute the
affidavit upon threat of harm.
The RTC convicted Salazar of two counts of statutory rape, while,
on appeal, the CA found him guilty only of two counts of simple
rape.
HELD:
The Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by AAA cannot be
given any weight.
The Affidavit cannot cause the dismissal of the case because it was
executed after the case had already been instituted. As such, the
Court had already acquired jurisdiction over the case and control
over the proceedings.
To reiterate: by itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in
court. In the present case, private complainant lost the right or
absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should
proceed, because the case had already reached and must
therefore continue to be heard by the court a quo.
VASQUEZ vs. HOBILLA-ALINIO
April 8, 1997
G.R. No. 118813-14
CRIME CHARGED: Double murder
WHERE FILED: Ombudsman / RTC of Bago City
DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, it is
clear that failure of the prosecution to furnish copy of the
resolution to private respondents is not one of the grounds to
quash an information. In Torralba, the SC held that the incomplete
preliminary investigation in this case . . . does not warrant the
quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the
proceedings already had. Stated differently, the failure to furnish
the respondent with a copy of an adverse resolution pursuant to
Section 6 . . . does not affect the validity of an information
thereafter filed even if a copy of the resolution upon which the
information is based was not served upon the respondent.
FACTS:
A complaint for murder against the respondents Mayor Mondia, et
al was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman. The
Deputy Ombudsman concluded that there was probable cause to
hold them liable for the crime charged.
However, upon review of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), it found that the two crimes were not committed in relation
to the performance of their duties. Therefore, they recommended
the filing of 2 separate informations before the RTC of Bago City.
The Informations were filed before the RTC and the warrants were
issued. However, on the same day they were issued, Mayor
Mondia, et al, filed a motion to recall the warrants on the ground
that they had not yet received a copy of the complaint nor had
they been furnished a copy of the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman. They claimed that as a result, they were denied the
right to seek reconsideration or reinvestigation. Judge Hobilla-
Alinio granted the motion of Mayor Mondia et al and also granted
the motion to quash the informations.
The Office of the Ombudsman moved for reconsideration, stating
that the failure to furnish a copy of the resolution to Mayor
Mondia et al was not an authorized ground to quash the
Information. The Office of the Ombudsman invoked the SC’s ruling
in Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan to support their argument.
HELD:
The appeal of the Office of the Ombudsman is meritorious.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, it is clear that
failure of the prosecution to furnish copy of the resolution to
private respondents is not one of the grounds to quash an
information. In Torralba, the SC held that the incomplete
preliminary investigation in this case . . . does not warrant the
quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the
proceedings already had. Stated differently, the failure to furnish
the respondent with a copy of an adverse resolution pursuant to
Section 6 . . . does not affect the validity of an information
thereafter filed even if a copy of the resolution upon which the
information is based was not served upon the respondent.
Therefore, in ordering the quashal of the informations
notwithstanding the ruling of the SC in Torralba and Sec. 3, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, Judge Hobilla-Alinio acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Case Title: SY v PEOPLE
Date: August 14, 2010
Where Filed: RTC Las Pinas
Crime Charged: One count of illegal recruitment in Criminal Case
No. 02-0537 and one count of estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-0536
Doctrine: Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed
simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for illegal
recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa.
Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal
intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which,
proof of criminal intent is necessary.
Facts: Corazon went to the house of Corazon’s sister, Felicidad
Navarro (or “Felicidad”), in Talisay, Batangas to convince her
(Felicidad) to work abroad. Appellant assured Felicidad of a good
salary and entitlement to a yearly vacation if she decides to take a
job in Taiwan. On top of these perks, she shall receive
compensation in the amount of Php120,000.00. Appellant
promised Felicidad that she will take care of the processing of the
necessary documents, including her passport and visa. Felicidad
told appellant that she will think about the job offer. Felicidad was
then showed the birth certificate that she would use in applying
for a Taiwanese passport.
In December 1999, appellant sent to Felicidad the birth certificate
of Armida Lim, the Marriage Contract of Armida Lim’s parents,
ACR No. E128390, and ICR No. 317614. These documents were
submitted to and eventually rejected by the Taiwanese authorities,
triggering the filing of illegal recruitment and estafa cases against
appellant.
SC: Guilty as charged. The fact that Felicidad actively participated
in the processing of the illegal travel documents will not exculpate
Sy from liability. Felicidad was a hapless victim of circumstances
and of fraud committed by Sy. She was forced to take part in the
processing of the falsified travel documents because she had
already paid P120,000.00. Sy committed deceit by representing
that she could secure Felicidad with employment in Taiwan, the
primary consideration that induced the latter to part with her
money.
The filing of charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing
of estafa, and vice versa. Sy’s acquittal in the illegal recruitment
case does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa.
Case Title: PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
Date: September 22, 2010
Where Filed: Sandiganbayan
Crime Charged: Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019
Doctrine: An acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception
where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a
finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. x x x x x x
x Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in
its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
Facts: ABELARDO PANLAQUI, the Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan,
Pampanga, RENATO B. VELASCO and ANGELITO PELAYO, the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator and the
Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Sasmuan, Pampanga,
VICTORINO MANINANG, the Barangay Captain of Malusac,
Sasmuan, Pampanga, and hence all public officers, while in the
performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their
position, committing the offense in relation to their office, and
conspiring and confederating with one another and with
WILFREDO CUNANAN, the representative of J.S. Lim
Construction, caused undue injury to the Government and granted
unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction.
That PANLAQUI, without being authorized by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Sasmuan, Pampanga, entered into a Contract of Lease of
Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented by accused
CUNANAN, whereby the municipality leased 7 units of Crane on
Barge with Clamshell and 1 unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an
unstipulated consideration for 30 days, which equipment items
were to be purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the
Palto and Pakulayo Rivers in Sasmuan, Pampanga; thereafter
accused caused it to appear that work on the said project had been
accomplished and 100% completed per the approved Program of
Work and Specifications and turned over to Barangay Malusac; as
a result of the issuance of the Accomplishment Report and
Certificate of Project Completion and Turn-Over, payments of
P511,612.20 and P616,314.60 were made to and received by
accused WILFREDO CUNANAN notwithstanding the fact that no
work had actually been done on the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers
considering that J.S. Lim Construction had no barge or any kind of
vessel registered with the First Coast Guard District and that no
business license/permit had been granted to the said company by
the Municipal Treasurer’s Office of Guagua, Pampanga, which acts
of the accused caused undue injury to the Government and
granted unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the total
amount of P1,127,926.80.
Sandiganbayan acquitted the accuseds.
SC: Petition unmeritorious. An acquittal is immediately final and
cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only
exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there
is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
Case Title: GANDAROSA v FLORES
Date: July 17, 2007
Where Filed: RTC Ilo Ilo
Crime Charged: Libel
Doctrine: Amendment as cure; Under Section 4, Rule 117, which
allows the amendment of complaint or information, the same shall
be done before the accused entered his plea, hence, the
desirability of amendment, since the Court will not entertain any
Motion to Quash, after the arraignment pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 117. This is so because with accused’[s] arraignment, the
issue has been joined.
The writ of certiorari will not lie against the denial of a motion to
quash an information. The remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on
the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in a manner authorized by law. We have, however,
sanctioned a writ of certiorari on the basis of a patent, capricious
and whimsical exercise of discretion by a trial judge or when an
appeal will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious
effects of the disputed orders.
Facts: Daily Informer, a newspaper of daily circulation in Iloilo
City, touted the banner headline, “Gandarosa Wants Flores Out for
Personal Convenience? ‘Backdoor-pay’ anomaly exposed.”5
According to the article, petitioner, in his capacity as the Assistant
Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) -
Regional Office, revealed to members of the media that high-
ranking BIR officials, among them Regional Director Sonia Flores
and Revenue District Officer Willy Narnola, are involved in
anomalous transactions to favor certain taxpayers in the
assessment of their taxes.
Petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings before the RTC, stating therein that he had a pending
Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the City Prosecutor
which sought to reverse its finding of probable cause against him.
However, denied.
In 2002, City Prosecutor filed with the RTC a Motion with Leave of
Court to Amend Information; however, denied.
SC: Petition denied. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it was
revealed that the RTC did not deny the Motion on the lone basis
that it had already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. It
denied because “Nonetheless, the instant Motion is filed after the
said accused has already been arraigned. Under Section 4, Rule
117, which allows the amendment of complaint or information, the
same shall be done before the accused entered his plea, hence, the
desirability of amendment, since the Court will not entertain any
Motion to Quash, after the arraignment pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 117. This is so because with accused’s arraignment the issue
has been joined.” In the case at bar, following petitioner’s
arraignment, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his
petition for review earlier filed with the DOJ Secretary.
Case Title: GONZALES v SALVADOR
Date: December 5, 2006
Where Filed: RTC Makati City
Crime Charged: Libel
Doctrine: Section 5 of Rule 117- where the motion to quash is
sustained on grounds other than those stated in Section 6 of the
same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the filing of
another information within a specified period which is extendible
to such further time as the court may allow for good cause. The
order to file another information, if determined to be warranted by
the circumstances of the case, must be contained in the same
order granting the motion to quash. If the order sustaining the
motion to quash does not order the filing of another information,
and said order becomes final and executory, then the court may no
longer direct the filing of another information.
Facts: The above-named accused, has a regular column named
“BIZZ ‘N’ FIZZ” in Today newspaper, did with malicious intent of
impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the complainant
RAFAEL GONZALES, to injure his good name and exposing him to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, publish or cause to be
published in a column of Today.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, there being no allegation in
the Information that the offended party—herein petitioner actually
resides in Makati or that the allegedly libelous article was printed
or first published in Makati.
SC: In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule 117, where the motion
to quash is sustained on grounds other than those stated in
Section 622 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to
order the filing of another information within a specified period
which is extendible to such further time as the court may allow for
good cause. The order to file another information; if determined to
be warranted by the circumstances of the case, must be contained
in the same order granting the motion to quash. If the order
sustaining the motion to quash does not order the filing of another
information, and said order becomes final and executory, then the
court may no longer direct the filing of another information.
This order to file another information, if the trial court finds that
circumstances warrant its issuance, must be included in the order
granting the motion to quash.
Amendments of the information to vest jurisdiction upon a
court is not permissible; At all events, the prosecution is
not, under the circumstances attendant to the case,
precluded from refiling an information against respondent
as long as prescription has not set in.
DIMAYACYAC VS CA
May 28, 2004
Where Filed: RTC of Quezon City
Crime Charged: Falsification of public document
Doctrine:
Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another
prosecution
Facts:
The Assistant City Prosecutor accused and charged Atty.
Reynaldo Dimayacyac and three others of ourterime of falsification
of a public document in the RTC of Quezon City. Before
petitioner’s arraignment, he moved to quash the information on
two grounds: (1) that the officer who filed the information had no
legal authority to do so, and (2) that more than one offense was
charged in the information. Judge Benigno Dayaw of Branch 80 of
the RTC of QC granted petitioner’s motion to quash upon the
second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed. More
than two years after the quashal, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed
against the same accused two informations for falsification of
public documents. Now, Atty. Dimayacyac argued that he would be
placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the same
offenses and the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in concluding that an ORDER
sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense, as it has no legal basis.
Ruling:
NO. The general rule is that an order sustaining a motion to
quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on grounds specified under Section
3(g) and (i) of Rule 117. The issue in this case boils down as to
whether or not there exists double jeopardy which is one of the
exemptions to the general rule.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In Sta. Rita v. CA, the Court held that “the reinstatement of
criminal cases against the accused did not violate his right against
double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial
court had been effected at his own instance when the accused filed
a motion to dismiss x x x.” In this case, considering that since
the dismissal of the previous criminal case against the
petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the
information, petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly
given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no
double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites
therefore, i.e., that the dismissal be without accused’s
express consent, is not present. Therefore, the general rule
that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution applies in the case at bar.
JUMAQUIO VS VILLAROSA
January 19, 2009
Where Filed: RTC
Crime Charged: Grave threats and Physical Injury in relation to RA
7610
Doctrine:
When a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
petitioner’s remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in his motion
to quash.
Facts:
On August 2, 2003, Resty Jumaquio allegedly threatened
and assaulted two young men, then ages 13 and 17. As narrated by
the minors, Resty, upon seeing the younger child, belted out his
anger and yelled. Later in the evening, while the minors and their
mother were traversing the road fronting another neighbor's
house, petitioner, who was then having a drinking session, cursed
them. Aghast, the mother cursed him back. Resty thence threw a
stone towards the older child, but missed him. When the children's
father went out of their nearby house, Resty picked up another
stone to fling towards the father, but the older child rushed to
Resty to grab it. At that moment, Resty repeatedly punched the 17-
year-old. The family hurried home when Resty bellowed at his son
for the latter to get a gun. Resty then pelted stones at the family's
house again cursing at them.

Two informations were filed against the petitioner, one for
grave threats under RA 7610 and physical injuries under the same
law. After posting bail and before the arraignment, petitioner
moved for the quashal of the informations for being duplicitous.
He argued that, under the informations, he stood charged with
several crimes - grave threats and violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7610, and physical injuries and another violation of the
aforesaid law; that grave threats in relation to R.A. No. 7610 could
not be considered a crime; and that the said separate crimes could
not even be complexed, as neither may be considered to fall within
the ambit of Section 10, R.A. No. 7610. Following Section 3(e),
Rule 117of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
informations should therefore be quashed. The RTC denied the
motion hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the information filed against the petitioner
should be quashed.
Ruling:
NO, immediately apparent is that the instant petition
disregards the hierarchy of courts. While the SC’s original
jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is not exclusive - it is
shared with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the RTC - the choice of
where to file the petition for certiorari is not left entirely to the
party seeking the writ. The principle of hierarchy of courts serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for the said
petition. A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first-level courts should be filed with the RTC; and those
against the latter, with the CA.
As a rule, when a motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, petitioner's remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in his
motion to quash. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered
after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom is the next
appropriate legal step.
On its merits, the petition should likewise be dismissed.
The questioned informations separately charge two distinct
offenses of child abuse--Criminal Case No. SJC-78-04 for child
abuse committed through the use of threatening words, and
Criminal Case No. SJC-79-04 for child abuse through the infliction
of physical injuries. Thus, contrary to his contention, petitioner is
not in jeopardy of being convicted of grave threats and child abuse
in the first case, and slight physical injuries and child abuse in the
second.
Moreover, an information is not duplicitous if it charges
several related acts, all of which constitute a single offense,
although the acts may in themselves be distinct offenses. The
specific acts are only alleged to complete the narration of facts.
Petition Dismissed
PEOPLE VS LACSON
April 1, 2003
Where Filed: Sandiganbayan
Crime Charged: Murder
Doctrine:
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party.
Facts:
The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution by the SC
remanding the instant case to the RTC of Quezon City for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application
of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the dismissal of several criminal cases filed against
the respondent and his co-accused. In the said criminal cases, the
respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder
for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons bandied as
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The Court ruled in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional
dismissal of the said criminal cases were with the express consent
of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional
dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The petitioners
aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not applicable to the said criminal cases because the
essential requirements, respondent’s express consent to the
dismissal and due notice to the private complainants, for its
application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec.8, Rule 117 is applicable to the criminal
cases herein disputed
Ruling:
NO. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount,
or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of
prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is
burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the
order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non
to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the
new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case
is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of
the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the
same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first
and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were
present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the criminal cases.
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the
respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and
the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases,
there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against respondent and to have the prosecution’s witnesses
summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent
did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the
criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly,
to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners’ contention that
no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of
the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, even if
the respondent’s motion for a determination of probable cause and
examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his
motion for a provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, however,
the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the
hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. There is no proof on
record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.
It should also be noted that when the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, the State
only had one year and three months within which to revive the
cases or refile the Informations. The issue which arose from such
event was whether the time-bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 thereof
should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the
State, to which the Court ruled that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as
an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates
to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The
time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a
limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against
the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused.
Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right
to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso facto permanent. The State may revive a criminal
case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there
is a justifiable necessity for the delay.
MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set aside.
LOS BANOS VS PEDRO
April 22, 2009
Where Filed: RTC of Marinduque
Crime Charged: Violation of the Code’s Article XXII, Section 261
(q), in relation to Section 264. (Election gun ban violation)
Doctrine:
A dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional
dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their
features, and legal consequences.
Facts:
Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without
the required written authorization from the Comelec a day before
the May 2001 elections accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) in Boac, Marinduque.
A Complaint was filed against him. After Inquest, the
Information was filed in court. When his motion for Preliminary
Investigation was granted, it did not materialize. Hence he filed
Motion to Quash arguing that the Information “contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification
and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.” He
attached a Comelec Certification that he was “exempted” from the
gun ban. The RTC granted the quashal.
Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños, representing the
checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s Comelec
Certification was a “falsification,” and the prosecution was
“deprived of due process” when the judge quashed the information
without a hearing. The RTC reopened the case, as Pedro did not
object to Los Baños’ motion. Pedro filed an MR for the RTC’s order
primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the
dismissal had become permanent. The RTC denied Pedro’s MR.
The CA initially denied Pedro’s petition. In his MR, Pedro
manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque provincial
prosecutor’s receipt of the quashal order to be “2:35 p.m.,
December 10, 2001,” and argued that based on this date, the
provisional dismissal of the case became “permanent” on
December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed
itself ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar
under this provision.
Issue:
Whether or nor the CA is correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule
117 in this case
Ruling:
NO. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine
quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated
in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled
that the time-bar under the provision is a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making
the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the
right of the State to prosecute the accused.
The modifier “provisional” directly suggests that the
dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are
temporary in character, and not the dismissals that are permanent.
Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals
are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the
previous extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial,
and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the
accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these
dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the
grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked
contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified
under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a
motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself,
with specific and closelydefined characteristics under the Rules of
Court.
Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal
can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the
offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a
dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7
provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double
jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section
8 – i.e., one with the express consent of the accused – is not
intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7,
but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the
special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for
the effects of sustaining a motion to quash – the dismissal is not a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense – unless the basis
for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double
jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i)
and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry
unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions
between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8.
They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has
been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a
motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The
failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8
provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the
framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and
a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8
operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and
merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals
other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3,
Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.
The Court notes also the following differences stressing
that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class
that should not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to
question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against
him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may
be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the
prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as
stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not
apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses
apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may
be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the
information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the
arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional
dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is
already underway provided that the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms,
impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it
becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information
that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion
to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence,
and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-
filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the
action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action
or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be
no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate
consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are
different concepts whose respective rules refer to different
situations that should not be confused with one another. If
the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of
the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the
remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3,
Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the
complaint or information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional
dismissal.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the
Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117].
We find from our examination of the records that the Information
duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the
offense was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no
merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the
averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. This
COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an
appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to
quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face
of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever called to
allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC
certification.

As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the
basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. JUDGE ADIONG (PJ of RTC,
Branch 8, Marawi City)
Date: July 27, 2011
Where Filed:
Crime Charged: Administrative case for gross ignorance of law,
manifest partiality and conduct unbecoming a member of the
Judiciary
Doctrine:
The holding of a pre-trial conference is mandatory and
failure to do so is inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so
elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court
procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross
ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty.
Facts:
Plaintiffs Ibrahim Abdo, et al. sought to hold NPC liable for
damages for operating seven Hydroelectric Power plants allegedly
without due regard to the health and safety of the plaintiffs and
other residents of Marawi City and the province of Lanao del
Sur. The plaintiffs alleged that they and several others suffered
ecological and economic disasters brought about by the operation
of regulatory dams which affected the natural flow
of Lake Lanaoand destroyed their farms, properties, businesses
and sources of livelihood. In addition to damages, the plaintiffs
also sought the refund of millions of pesos from the Purchase
Power Adjustment (PPA) collected by NPC from its electric
consumers through the Lanao Del Sur Electric Cooperative.
Plaintiffs filed an ex-parte Motion for the release of
P640,000,000 worth of PPA and other generation charges. Judge
Adiong granted the motion but later set it aside after NPC filed a
MR on the ground of lack of notice and due process.
Judge Adiong through a Resolution ordered NPC torefund
the amount of P114,000,000. And to refund the amount
of P176,000,000, representing the Fuel and Power Cost
Adjustment and PPA collected from January 1996 to April 2003;
and to pay the amount of P97,537,000 as attorney’s fees.
NPC sought reconsideration of the order alleging that no
pre-trial was conducted and yet respondent judge already passed
upon the merits of the case but was denied by Judge Adiong.
Thus, NPC filed the present administrative complaint,
asserting that the resolution is contrary to and violative of the
Rules of Court because it was issued by respondent judge without
first conducting the requisite pre-trial conference and despite the
fact that no formal offer of exhibits was made by plaintiffs in
support of their allegations. Also, NPC complains of respondent
judges failure to lay down the basis for granting the plaintiffs ex-
parte motion to release the PPA refunds, and in awarding the
exorbitant amount of P97,537,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
NPC further states that while it admits that judges are not
to be administratively charged for acts committed in the exercise
of their judicial functions, respondent judge had acted in violation
of elementary rules that was equivalent to intolerable and
inexcusable gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
This Court referred the present complaint to the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Justice Ayson submitted his report finding
respondent judge administratively liable. Judge Adiong failed to
conduct a pre-trial conference and erred in conducting the series
of hearings in the case without determining the existence of
necessary pre-conditions before the court could take cognizance of
the case.
To show that the Court is serious in implementing the rules
on pre-trial, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension on a
judge who merely failed to issue a pre-trial order within ten (10)
days after the termination of the pre-trial conference as mandated
by Paragraph 8, Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or Guidelines to
be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the
Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures which recognized the importance of pre-trial and the
deposition-discovery measures as vital components of case
management in trial courts.
Here, respondent judge failed to conduct the pre-trial
conference itself. It is elementary and plain that the holding of
such a pre-trial conference is mandatory and failure to do so is
inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as
the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know it or to act as if
one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Such
ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as failing to conduct
pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a
corresponding penalty.
This Court has already dismissed Judge Adiong, the
penalties of suspension from office without salary and dismissal
from the service are no longer possible. Hence, the penalty of fine
of P40,000 is more appropriate.
PEOPLE vs. SAJOLGA
Date: August 21. 2002
Where Filed: RTC City of Malaybalay
Crime Charged: Rape
Facts:
Accused Ramil Sajolga and private complainant Genlei
Abejaron (15 years old) were half-siblings. Genlei lived with her
teacher Mrs. Alceso during weekdays three kilometers aways from
her mother’s house where she stayed home only on weekends.
At about 5pm on Oct. 17, 1998 while she was alone in her
mother’s house playing cards someone knocked on the door, and,
when she opened it, she saw her half-brother, who was drunk.
Without warning, accused-appellant boxed her in the abdomen,
causing her to fall on the floor on her buttocks. Genlei said that
she gasped for breath as she suffered excruciating pain. She tried
to give accused-appellant some blows but accused-appellant
proved to be stronger. Genlei said accused-appellant dragged her
to the bedroom, made her lie on the bed, and took off her shorts
and panties. Before she became unconscious, Genlei remembered
that accused-appellant kissed her lips and neck.
When she recovered, she realized that she was raped by
Sajolga who was lying beside her, asleep. He told her that there
was nothing she could do and pointed out to her that she would
not win any case against him as he had not been sued or jailed
despite molesting her twice when she was eight years old.
She tried to tell her mother twice but she only shouted at
her so she kept it a secret. Mrs. Alceso noticed that something was
bothering Genlei and the latter told her that she was raped but
was afraid that her mother wouldn’t believe her.
Ruling:
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is proper if
the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. In this case, the
totality of circumstances warrants a finding that private
complainant was raped by accused-appellant while the former was
unconscious. The prosecution presented credible and substantial
evidence showing interlocking circumstances that accused-
appellant sexually abused complainant.
Complainants silence upon her mother’s arrival was
sufficiently explained. She knew that her mother would just
dismiss it if she told her that her brother had raped her.
Although complainant was unable to get sympathy from her
mother, she was able to find this from her teachers. This explains
her silence and the delay of about four (4) months in reporting the
crime to the authorities.
Accused-appellant argues that the death penalty may not
be imposed upon him because, although he and complainant were
related, the prosecution failed to show that complainant was below
18 years of age at the time the rape took place as this was merely
alleged in the information.
Although no birth certificate or document was presented to
prove that complainant was 15 years old at the time she was
raped, the parties stipulated that she was born on February 15,
1983. This stipulation is contained in a Pre-Trial Order issued by
the trial court. A stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now
authorized to be made by Rule 118, 1 and 4 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, not only was complainants age alleged
in the information, it was proven, having been made the subject of
stipulation and admission.
Anent accused-appellants contention that he is guilty only
of simple rape and not qualified rape because he is not a full-
blooded brother of the victim sister and there are no half
measures in the Heinous Crime Law, suffice it to say the law does
not distinguish between full blood and half blood relatives. The law
does not in fact speak of full blood and half blood relatives but of
relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree.
In any event, because of the failure of the prosecution to
allege that accused-appellant is a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree of the offended party, accused-appellant can
only be held liable for simple rape even if it was proven and
stipulated that the victim was under eighteen (18) years of age
and that he is a half-brother of complainant.

Decision on RTC is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE vs. LIKIRAN
Date: June 4, 2014
Where Filed: RTC of Malaybalay City
Crime Charged: Murder (convicted for Homicide)
Doctrine:
Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118,
meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused. In this case, while it appears that the
pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and
defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given
that the defense failed to object to its admission.
Facts:
It was the town fiesta at Barangay Bugca-on, Lantapon,
Bukidnon and there was a dance held at the basketball court.
Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado
Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) testified
that they were with the victim, Rolando Sareno, Sr. Jerome
Likiran, accused’s brother, punched Mercado on the mouth.
Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome
was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was
holding a hunting knife, so he backed off.
Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance area,
heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and
shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant
stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident
first-hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was.
Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after
Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already
dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a
stab wound at the left scapular area.
RTC: Accused is guilty of Murder
CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision
SC:
The identity of the accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the
prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon.
Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as
one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight
than alibi and denial.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one
of the matters stipulated upon and admitted by the prosecution
and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr.
Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and
reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is
admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab
wound scapular area."
While it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed
only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to
its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal
health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie
evidence of the cause of death of the victim.
More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable
for the natural and logical consequence resulting from his act of
stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is
nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno
contributed to the latter’s death. The Court, however, cannot
agree with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that the killing of Sareno
was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant
and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which
they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the
prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander
who unfortunately became a target of the accused-appellant and
Jerome’s rampage. Consequently, the accused-appellant should be
liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
PEOPLE vs. AGRAVANTE
Date: December 11, 2001
Where Filed: RTC of Daet, Camarines Sur
Crime Charged: 3 counts of Rape
Doctrine:
Rule 118, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused
unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.” This
requirement is mandatory.
Facts:
Maria, the victim, was Agravante’s daughter. She was a
freshman who stays in a boarding house owned by Adelina Racho,
going home only on Saturday mornings.
One night, she was home with her father, herein accused-
appellant and the latter’s ward, Gary Fraga.
Accused-appellant and Gary Fraga slept in the living room,
while Maria slept in her room. Accused-appellants common-law
wife, Virginia Bangayciso, had gone to a dance party. At around 7
oclock in the evening, Maria woke up to find accused-appellant on
top of her. She tried to push him, but accused-appellant proved too
strong for her. She was slapped and then forced to have sexual
intercourse with accused-appellant. After he was through,
accused-appellant left. Maria lighted a lamp and went to the
kitchen, where she washed off blood and a whitish substance from
her private parts. She then returned to her bedroom and went to
sleep. At around midnight, however, accused-appellant was back
and raped her again. She tried to resist him, but he punched her
on the thighs. The following day, Maria returned to her boarding
house. She saw the owner, Adelina Racho, but did not tell her what
had happened for fear of her father.
On November 19, 1994, Maria came home for the
weekend. Because she did not arrive until noon, she was scolded
and given some lashes by accused-appellant. After lunch, her
father’s common-law wife left to attend a birthday party in a place
about a kilometer away from their house. On the pretext that he
wanted her to pick lice from his hair, accused-appellant assaulted
her when she came to him. Maria pleaded with him, reminding
him, “I am your daughter, why are you doing this to me?” but her
pleas fell on deaf ears. Accused-appellant just the same raped
her. After he was through, accused-appellant left and went to fetch
his common-law wife, leaving his daughter sobbing. He returned
with his common-law wife at 4 o’clock in the afternoon.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence based on an affidavit
executed by his niece, Criselda Agravante. In this case, the
evidence supporting accused-appellants motion cannot be
considered newly discovered. It had been in existence even before
the trial, only that the witness, Criselda Agravante, who knew
about the matter was not presented during the trial. In effect, it
amounts to no more than forgotten proof which would not justify
an order to conduct new trial. The Court does not think that her
testimony is of such weight that it would probably cause the
acquittal of herein accused-appellant because the affidavit is
merely of corroborative value and does not really concern facts
constituting the crimes subject of these cases. It does not
incontrovertibly show that accused-appellant did not commit the
crimes with which he was charged.
Ruling:
What accused-appellant perceives to be a cavalier reaction
(going back to sleep as if nothing happened to her) appears more
to be a desperate attempt on her part to deny what had
happened. This reaction is consistent with her other actions after
the first rape, i.e., the washing of her private parts and changing
her underwear. Indeed, there is no standard reaction of a victim to
the crime of rape. Rape is both a physical and emotional assault
causing tremendous stress on the victim.
While the Informations allege that complainant was a minor
fourteen years of age at the time of the commission of the rapes
and that accused-appellant is the father of the offended party, only
the relationship of accused-appellant to the complainant has been
sufficiently established. To be sure, the minority of complainant
(14 years of age at the time of the commission of the rapes) was
the subject of the parties’ stipulation of facts. However, the
stipulation of facts was not signed by accused-appellant as
required by Rule 118, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that No agreement or admission made
or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed
by him and his counsel. This requirement is mandatory.
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of
the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts
inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused,
in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not
cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and
his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution
should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign
the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit
evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying
solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation
of Facts.
The stipulation of facts, therefore, cannot be used as evidence
of complainant’s age at the time of the rapes in question. Nor is
there sufficient evidence of complainant’s age. The testimonies of
complainant concerning her age and that of her father, herein
accused-appellant, concerning this matter are insufficient.
Garayblas vs Ong
August 3, 2011
Crime charged: Petitioners were held liable by the Sandiganbayan to pay
for Php 10K penalty and to partially pay for the expenses incurred by the
court in the cancelled pre trial conference in Davao City.
Where filed: Sandiganbayan
Doctrine:
Pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its
early stage; during pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their
positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not
be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the
opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their
failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial.
Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Emelita H. Garayblas (Garayblas) is the principal
legal counsel, with petitioner Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz (De la Cruz) as
collaborating counsel, for Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal who is facing charges for
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 before several divisions (2 nd and 4th divisions) of the
Sandiganbayan (SB). Ramiscal was arraigned and the SB set the pre-trial
to April 6, 2006; however, the a subsequent notice from the 4 th division
was sent resetting the pre trial to April 27, 2006. Atty. Garayblas,
opposing to the resetting to April 27, 2006, filed a Motion to Reset. The
SB 4th division denied the motion to reset, stating that “Garayblas and
associates must adjust their schedule to suit all the other accused and
their counsels, who are available for the pretrial hearing in Davao City on
April 27, 2006.” Petitioners failed to appear for pretrial on April 27, 2006
in Davao City which resulted to the cancellation thereof; hence, public
respondents ordered petitioners to explain why they should not be held in
contempt. Atty. Garayblas filed a Compliance/Manifestation explaining
that at the time, she was suffering from hyperglycemia and hypertension
and that she opted to stay at home as per advice of her doctor until her
sugar count and blood pressure normalize. Atty. De la Cruz also filed his
Explanation stating that he had to appear before the Second Division of
the SB in Criminal Case No. 25741 involving the same accused, attaching
a certificate of appearance from the Second Division as proof of his
explanation.
The SB 4th division issued an Order stating that it found their
explanations to be unsatisfactory and considering that they belong to the
same law office, they should have made the necessary arrangements to let
one of their associates or colleagues appear at the pre-trial conference.
The Court held Atty. Dela Cruz and Atty. Garayblas liable for their absence
or nonappearance which caused the cancellation of the scheduled pretrial
conference and thus wasted the time of the Court. They were ordered to
pay the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) each as sanction or
penalty and to partially answer the traveling and other expenses of the
Court in holding the subject pretrial conference in Davao City. They
moved for a reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Petitioners
filed the present petition for certiorari, alleging that the SB 4th Division
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not finding their explanation satisfactory and ordering them
to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each and to partially
answer the traveling and other expenses of the Court in holding the
subject pretrial conference in Davao City.
SC:
The Court found some merit in the petition. Pursuant to Sec 3 of
Rule 118, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if
the following concur: (1) counsel does not appear at the pretrial
conference AND (2) counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse.
As to Atty. Garaylas:
The Court noted the importance of having counsel who is most
well-versed with the facts of the case attend a pre-trial conference, stating
that a “pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case
at its early stage; during pretrial, attorneys must make a full
disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial
would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or
inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their
careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant
issues at the outset of a trial.” Thus, it would be imprudent to send in a
new lawyer who has not had ample time to familiarize himself with the
facts and issues involved in the case.
 Considering that the symptoms for hypertension and
hyperglycemia include confusion, fatigue and headache, difficulty in
concentrating and blurred vision, it would not be reasonable to expect
Atty. Garayblas to have been able to make the necessary arrangements for
another lawyer to attend in her stead. However, she should have sent a
word to the SB 4th division when she began feeling the symptoms.
As to Atty. Dela Cruz:
The Court found his nonappearance at the pretrial conference
excusable. The Court noted that Atty. Garayblas and Atty. Dela Cruz
agreed to attend to different hearings for their client as there were
hearings in 2 separate divisions of the SB on the very same date in
different locations. It seemed that Atty. Dela Cruz was not apprised of
Atty. Garayblas’ condition such that it was too late to make adjustments
on Atty. Dele Cruz’s part to be able to attend the hearing in Davao. It was
understandable why Atty. De la Cruz could not have abandoned the
hearing
before the Second Division.
The Court deems imposing a fine on petitioners and ordering them
to answer part of the court personnels’ travel expenses to be too harsh.
The records showed that the cancellation of the hearing was not mainly
due to petitioners’ non-attendance, but also because of all the other
accused’s failure to submit their respective pretrial briefs. Petitioner Atty.
De la Cruz has presented a valid and acceptable excuse, for which he
should not be found liable under Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, petitioner Atty. Garayblas
showed some lapse in judgment, not to mention discourteous behavior, in
not informing the SB 4th Division at the earliest possible time of her
illness and inability to attend said pretrial conference.
People vs. Villanueva
September 1, 2010
Crime charged: 3 counts of qualified rape
Where filed: RTC (Tayug, Pangasinan)
Doctrine/s:
To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by
him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized
agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into
without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-
trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused of
the facts agreed upon. In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial
Order was not signed by both appellant and his counsel.
Facts:
Three (3) Informations were filed against Villanueva (appellant)
for the crime of rape. “accused, who is the father of complainant, armed
with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one “AAA,” a minor 12 years of age, against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of said “AAA.”
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.
During pretrial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of
“AAA.” It was likewise agreed that “AAA” was below 12 years of age when
the rape incidents happened. “AAA’s” birth and medical certificates were
likewise marked as Exhibits.
RTC:
It found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for 3 counts
of rape. The court lent credence to AAA’s testimony; however, it noted that
although it was agreed upon during the pretrial that “AAA” was a minor
below 12 years of age, the fact remains that “AAA” was 12 years, six
months and 19 days when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9,
2002.
CA:
In the CA, appellant argued, among others, that the prosecution
failed to formally offer in evidence the medical certificate and to present
the doctor who conducted the medical examination to testify on his
findings. “AAA’s” birth certificate was not formally offered; neither did the
Municipal Civil Registrar who allegedly prepared the same take the
witness stand. Thus appellant claimed that assuming he was indeed guilty
of the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape and
not qualified rape because the minority of the victim was not duly
established.
On the other hand, appellee insisted that the crimes committed
were three counts of qualified, and not simple, rape considering that
“AAA” was a minor and the offender was her father, and that the parties
had already stipulated during pretrial as regards the age of the victim.
CA found accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of qualified rape. It said that even without the medical certificate,
appellant could still be held liable for three counts of rape. His conviction
could rest exclusively on the testimony of “AAA” and the medical
certificate would only be corroborative evidence. Anent the birth
certificate, the CA recalled that during pretrial, the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the appellant had already been stipulated upon.
Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the
Informations and proven during trial. Case was appealed to the SC.
SC:
The appeal was partly meritorious. The Court upheld the
credibility of AAA’s testimony. It agreed with the appellate court that
appellant could be convicted of rape even without the medical certificate
because in rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of his
victim’s testimony.
However, it ruled that both the medical certificate and “AAA’s”
birth certificate, although marked as exhibits during the pretrial,
should not have been considered by the trial court and the CA
because they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: “The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.” The
Court noted that after the marking of the exhibits during pretrial, the
prosecution did not formally offer the said medical certificate or birth
certificate in evidence; the prosecution rested its case after presenting
the testimony of “AAA” without formally offering any documentary exhibit
at all. The SC said that the trial court is bound to consider only the
testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered.
Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during
pretrial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in
any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof
be assigned any evidentiary weight and value.
Appellant’s admission during the pretrial that “AAA” was a minor
below 12 years of age would not help the prosecution’s case. First, the
trial court found this admission inaccurate as in fact, “AAA” was already
above 12 years of age when the rape incident transpired on June 9, 2002.
Second and more important, appellant’s admission during pretrial is
not admissible as it violates Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court which explicitly provides that: “All agreements or admissions
made or entered during the pretrial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and his counsel, otherwise they
cannot be used against the accused. The Court emphasized that to
bind the accused the pretrial order must be signed not only by him
but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to
further safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or
unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may
have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived
his presence at the pretrial conference; eliminate any doubt on the
conformity of the accused of the facts agreed upon.” In this case,
records would show that the Pretrial Order was not signed by both
appellant and his counsel.
In view of the foregoing, appellant was found guilty only of three
counts of simple rape.
NB
Distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal
offer:
The former is done in the course of the pretrial, and trial is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter
is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that
any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.
People vs. Bocbosila
January 26, 2007
Crime charged: Murder
Where filed: RTC (Quezon City)
Doctrine/s:
The trial court may properly deny defense counsel’s motion for
substitution of witnesses since Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure mandates that the matters agreed upon in the
pretrial conference and as stated in the pretrial order shall bind the
parties.
Facts:
Appellant (Bocbosila) was charged in an Information with Murder.
The information reads:
“abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating with two other
persons, whose true names/identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person
of one MICHAEL ANGELO BALBER Y CASTILLON, a minor, 17 years of
age, by then and there stabbing him on the trunk with the use of a bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wound which was
the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Michael Angelo Balber y Castillon.”
During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, all of whom identified appellant
as the one who stabbed the victim. The defense proffered a different
version of the incident stating that appellant was not in the crime scene at
the time the stabbing incident happened.
RTC:
RTC convicted appellant of murder. It sustained the “clear, direct
and positive” testimony of the prosecution witnesses who all declared that
they saw appellant stab Michael. It also ruled that there was treachery in
the killing of Michael since the latter was unarmed, unsuspecting and
very young at the time of the attack.
CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision. Modification pertained only to the penalty
imposed.
SC:
Before the SC, appellant avers, among others, that his
constitutional rights to produce evidence on his behalf and to due process
were violated when the trial court denied the motion of his counsel
to present substitute witnesses. It should be noted that in the PreTrial
Order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000, the defense named only four
witnesses. In the same order, the RTC stated that “All parties are
informed that witnesses and documents which were not mentioned in this
pretrial order shall not be entertained during the trial on the merits.”
During the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able to testify. When the
two other witnesses in the pretrial order failed to appear and testify in
court several times, the defense counsel moved to substitute them
explaining that they were hesitant to testify, and, that one of them went
home to his province.
The Court ruled that the RTC was correct in denying the
defense counsel’s motion for substitution of witnesses since Section
4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that
the matters agreed upon in the pretrial Conference and as stated in
the pretrial order shall bind the parties. Thus, pursuant to the
aforestated provision and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the
disposition of criminal cases and ensuring fair trial, the denial of the
defense counsel’s motion for substitution of witnesses was justified.
However, the provision is not absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater
interest of justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of
appellant in this case as the RTC had observed that his motion for
substitution of witnesses appears to be a “fishing expedition” of evidence
which is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution. If the two other
witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant to testify, he should
have moved the RTC to subpoena the said witnesses to testify in court
pursuant to his constitutional right to compulsory process to secure the
attendance of his witnesses. Unfortunately, appellant did not avail himself
of this remedy.
`Appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.
Olbes vs. Buemio
December 4, 2009
Crime charged: Grave Coercion
Where filed: MeTC (Manila)
Doctrine/s:
The exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle
that “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of
flexibility.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus
preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the
situation.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors
must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Facts:
Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by an information which
was raffled to Branch 22 thereof. Denying petitioner’s motion to defer or
suspend his arraignment in light of his pending petition for review before
the Department of Justice from the City Fiscal’s Resolution finding
probable cause to hale him into court, the Judge proceeded with
petitioner’s arraignment in which he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Pretrial was thereupon set to May 28, 2003 which was declared a
nonworking day due to the occurrence of typhoon “Chedeng.” The
pretrial was thus reset to October 23, 2003. At the scheduled pretrial,
petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to issue a warrant for
his arrest, which warrant was later recalled on discovery that neither
petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pretrial was again
reset to January 21, 2004.
Before the scheduled pretrial on January 21, 2004 petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground of violation of
his right to a speedy trial under RA No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 and Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No. 3898. He argued that
“considering that [he] was not— without any fault on his part—brought to
trial within 80 days from the date he was arraigned, this case should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 in relation to Rule 119, Section
6 of the Rules. The Motion was denied by the trial court. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. The judge held that the term
“speedy trial” as applied in criminal cases is a relative term such that the
trial and disposition of cases depended on several factors including the
availability of counsel, witnesses and prosecutor, and weather conditions.
RTC:
Said orders were challenged by petitioner before the RTC. He
alleged that not only was he (petitioner) not brought to trial within 80
days from the date of his arraignment as required under Section 6, Rule
119, but the prosecution had failed to establish the existence of any
of the “time exclusions” provided under Section 3 of the same Rule
to excuse its failure to bring him to trial within the 80-dayperiod.
 RTC denied the petition, holding that Section 9 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case just
because trial has not commenced within 80 days from arraignment; and
that the concept of a speedy trial is not a mere question of numbers that
could be computed in terms of years, months or days but is understood
according to the peculiar circumstances of each case.
SC:
Petitioner argues that his right to speedy trial is a substantive
right and that, Section 9 of Rule 119 is mandatory in character; that the
last paragraph of said Section 9 clearly indicates that it is the right of an
accused to move for dismissal of the Information should the prosecution
fail to prove the existence of the time exclusions under Section 3 of Rule
119; and that the enumeration of the allowable time exclusions under
Section 3 is exclusive, hence, the RTC erred in considering the excessive
caseload of respondent judge, as a mere pairing judge, to be an allowable
time exclusion under the Rules.
Petitioner also drew attention to the time gap of 253 days from
his arraignment up to the 2nd pretrial setting, which is beyond the
80-day time limit from arraignment to trial. He argues that this lapse
was not justified by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time
exclusions specified under Section 3 of Rule 119. The argument is
unavailing. The pretrial on May 28, 2003 which was later declared a
nonworking day; inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pretrial on
that date was beyond the control of the trial court. The Court stressed
that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized
principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily
involves a degree of flexibility. While the Constitution guarantees the
accused of his right to a speedy trial, it recognizes certain reasonable
delays as exclusions in the computation of the time limits set by the
Speedy Trial Act. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. Thus, in spite of the prescribed time
limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of
“speedy trial” is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus
preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the
situation. To the Court, the reasons for the postponements and delays
attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While
the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of
the resetting of the pretrial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to
have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence; the faux pas was
acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant
it had issued against petitioner.
The petition was denied.
Case Title: Cuenco v. Ricos
Date: August 28, 2008
Where Filed: RTC of Cebu City
Crime Charged: Estafa through Falsification of Public Document
Doctrine:
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be
conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus,
when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not
been too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial
court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court
for examination during the trial proper.
Facts:
Respondent was charged of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document because of the alleged falsification of a deed of
real estate mortgage committed to the petitioner Conception who
was the owner of the mortgaged property. On Sept 10, 1999,
Conception who is a resident of Cebu take a vacation to Manila.
Therein Manila, he was confined due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding wherein he was advised to stay in Manila. On August 16,
2000, The counsel of Conception filed a motion to take the
respondent’s disposition saying that there is a need perpetuate the
testimony of Conception due to weak physical situation and old
age. RTC granted the motion. The court said that procedural
technicalities must pave way because of the urgency of the
situation because Conception was already old.
Respondents then filed certiorari in the CA which where in
it ruled in favor of the them because Petitioner’s motion to take
respondent’s disposition is not impleaded by the people of the
Philippines. This notwithstanding, CA resolved the case by
declaring that the examination of the prosecution in this case is
governed by Sec 15, Rule 119 and not Rule 23 of ROC. Rule 23 of
ROC is applicable only to civil cases. Concepcion’s deposition
should have been taken before the judge or the court where the
case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed
order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
SC uphold that it is Sec 15, Rule 119 which should apply in
this case. t is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at
the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially
true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also
gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.
Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’
demeanor. This rule, however, is not absolute. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of ROC, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses. Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age
and health condition exempt her from the application of
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies n
this case. It is thus required that the conditional examination be
made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice.
Case Title: Jimenez, Jr. v People
Date: September 14, 2014
Where Filed: CA
Crime Charged: Certiorari
Doctrine:
- it is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’
qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms.
This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by
the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely
exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and
evaluation.
- in requiring a hearing in support of the discharge, the
essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence
for or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the
court’s tangible and concrete basis – independently of the fiscal's
or prosecution's persuasions – in granting or denying the motion
for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that actual hearing is
not required provided that the parties have both presented their
sides on the merits of the motion.
Facts:
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing
of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming Manuel J. Jimenez and several
others as co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the
alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was
dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the place which he
pointed. Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness
for the prosecution, to which Jimenez opposed. The motion to
discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the
prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the
said motion. Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that
the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to discharge because: (1)the requirements for granting a
motion were not properly complied; (2)there is no absolute
necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3)Montero’s testimony do
not corroborate with the prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero
is favored as a state witness though he appears to be the most
guilty.
Did Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he
granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness?
SC said “No”. Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of
discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner. To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it only require
that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.
A trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the
trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that
may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty
participation of the accused. It is still the trial court that
determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of
the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies
the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic
one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on
the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
Case Title: People v Sandiganbayan
Date: June 26, 2013
Where Filed:
Crime Charged:
Doctrine:
 The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado was part
of prosecutorial discretion in the determination of who should be
used as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses. Unless made in clear violation of the Rules, this
determination should be given great weight by our courts. As this
Court held in People v. Court of Appeals:
Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining
those conditions; the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the
suggestions and the considerations presented by the prosecuting
officer; A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform
himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to
everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission
of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or
possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. In
coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested, as to the availability or
non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to
which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one; and the like, the
judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer.
Facts:
Mercado (one of many respondents) was the president of
JAC liner. In year 200, he showed willing to testify against the
criminal syndicate allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF
One-Stop Shop. Mercado applied in the DOJ for immunity as state
witness under its witness protection program which was then
granted. However, since the case is within the authority still of
ombudsman, Mercado was charged of violations of Section 3(j) of
Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and two counts of falsification under
Article 171, paragraph 4, of the RPC. Mercado filed a motion for
reconsideration before the ombudsman citing the DOJ’s grant of
immunity to him. Ombudsman granted the motion but
Sandiganbayan denied Ombudsman’s motion.
Respondents De Vera and Diala, Mercado’s co-accused who
opposed the grant of immunity to him, contend that the immunity
that the Ombudsman gave Mercado does not bind the court, which
in the meantime already acquired jurisdiction over the case
against him. That immunity merely relieves Mercado from any
further proceedings, including preliminary investigation, which
the state might still attempt to initiate against him.
SC agreed but said that the filing of the criminal action
against an accused in court does not prevent the Ombudsman
from exercising the power that the Congress has granted him in
Section 17 of R.A. 6770. Ombudsman had already filed with the
Sandiganbayan the criminal action against Mercado and other
respondents prior to the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to
Mercado. Having already acquired jurisdiction over Mercado’s
case, it remained within the Sandiganbayan’s power to determine
whether or not he may be discharged as a state witness in
accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the ROC.
According to SC, Mercado has complied Sec 17, Rule 119.
the following requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 for the
discharge of an accused to be a state witness: (a) there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused
does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not
at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Case Title: Yu v Judge, RTC of Tagaytay
Date: June 30, 2006
Where Filed:
Crime Charged:
Doctrine:
The discharge of an accused under RA 6981 as availed by
the prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and
separate from discharge of an accused in Sec 17, Rule 119 of ROC.
The discharge of an accuse under RA 6981 is only one of the
modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state
witness. Rule 119, Sec 17 of ROC is another mode of discharge.
The immunity granted by RA 6981 is granted by DOJ while Sec 17,
Rule 119 is granted by the court.
Facts:
Atty. Tan and his driver were abducted by several persons.
Their bodies ware found after digging in a shallow grave in Cavite.
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) was charged to
investigate the abduction and killing. PACC filed charges before
the DOJ. On Dec 8, respondent Judge issued a resolution finding
probable cause against accused Eugene Yu as accomplice in the
instant case. In the meantime, prosecution filed Petition to
Discharge as State Witness and Exclude from the info accused
Ochoa and Delos Santos which was granted by the judge.
Yu opposed such and hence, he filed petition for certiorari
before the CA. His certiorari was not granted. CA said that there
was no necessity for a hearing to determine a person qualified as a
state witness after DOJ had attested to his qualification. RA 6981
conferred upon DOJ the sole authority to determine whether an
accused is qualified for admission to the program.
On SC, Yu contends the respondents were already charged
along with the other accused before they were admitted to the
witness protection program, and hence, their admission is a
judicial prerogative which requires application of Sec 17, Rule 119
of ROC. SC did not agree with the petitioner. According to it, the
discharge of an accused under RA 6981 as availed by the
prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and
separate from discharge of an accused in Sec 17, Rule 119 of ROC.
The discharge of an accuse under RA 6981 is only one of the
modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state
witness. Rule 119, Sec 17 of ROC is another mode of discharge.
The immunity granted by RA 6981 is granted by DOJ while Sec 17,
Rule 119 is granted by the court.
People v. Chaves
Feb. 11, 2003
Filed: RTC of Gingoog City, transferred to Cagayan De Oro
RTC
Crime charged: Multiple Murder
Doctrine:
The provision does not make any distinction as to the
kind of evidence the prosecution may present. What it
simply requires, in addition to the presentation of the sworn
statement of the accused concerned, is the presentation of
such evidence as are necessary to determine if the
conditions exist for the discharge, so as to meet the object
of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary
exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime
charged.
Sometime in October 1986, Informations for Multiple
Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog
City were filed against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit,
Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe,
with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City.[2] Venue of the case
was moved to Cagayan de Oro City by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 87-2-244. Thus, Criminal Case No. 86-39 was
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 18, presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other
accused were at large.
Two years later, in October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, also known as
Ely Roxas, Fely Roxas and Lolong Roxas, was identified as another
member of the group who was responsible for the slaying of the
Bucag family. An amended information was filed on October 6,
1988 to implead Roxas as a co-accused. He engaged the services
of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. In order to
give Roxas the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his
defense, a preliminary investigation was conducted. In his counter-
affidavit, Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of
the killings. Consequently, the amended information was again
amended to include private respondent Paderanga as one of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39.
Trial of the case ensued. At the hearing on May 18, 1993, the
prosecution called Felizardo Roxas as its first witness. Private
respondent objected to the presentation of Roxas testimony. The
trial court took the matter under advisement. The following day,
May 19, 1993, it sustained private respondents objection on the
ground that the presentation of Roxas testimony will violate his
right against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that
before Roxas can be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he
must first be discharged as a state witness. Otherwise put, the
prosecution cannot present Roxas as a hostile witness.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the
alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state witness. It also
manifested its intention to present Julito Ampo as another state
witness or ordinary prosecution witness.
Issue: Whether or not Roxas can testify to prove the conditions
that qualify him to be State Witness. (note: testify to prove to
become state witness, the other party contends that he cannot
testify yet since he is not yet a state witness).
Ruling: Yes. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (formerly Rule 119, Section 9), provides that the trial
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state after
requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support
of the discharge (underscoring ours). The provision does not make
any distinction as to the kind of evidence the prosecution may
present. What it simply requires, in addition to the presentation of
the sworn statement of the accused concerned, is the presentation
of such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions
exist for the discharge, so as to meet the object of the law, which is
to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint
of persons guilty of the crime charged. No exemption from the
term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude the
People v. Anabe
September 6, 2010
Filed in RTC of Quezon City
Anabe and Felecitas were charged of Robbery with Homicide
and Destructive Arson.
Doctrine:
The state witness cannot simply allege everything left
unproved and automatically produce a conviction of the
crime charged against the remaining accused.
Corroboration of the account of the state witness is key.
The facts:
On December 31, Felectias and Conrada saw Anabe in the Kitchen
holding a bloody knife. The three are house helpers. The victim,
Uy, is found dead with stab wounds. The three house helpers fled
and allegedly burned the house according to Felecitas who latter
turned to be state witness. When they were arrested, Anabe was
found to be wearing the Tag Heuer watch of the victim. Felecitas
and Anabe were charged of Robbery with Homicide and
Destructive Arson.
Felecitas, having become a state witness was the one who told the
story and the details.
Issue: Was Felicitas testimony regarding appellants confession
corroborated by the prosecutions other evidence?
Ruling: Turning an accused into a state witness is not a magic
formula that cures all the deficiencies in the prosecutions
evidence. The state witness cannot simply allege everything left
unproved and automatically produce a conviction of the crime
charged against the remaining accused. Corroboration of the
account of the state witness is key. It is in fact a requirement for
the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Section
17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given
can be substantially corroborated in its material points.
Although there is an exception where the straightforward, sincere
testimony if the state witness is sufficient even if uncorroborated,
this exception applies only for those who are eyewitnesses. Here,
Felecita is not an eyewitness to the stabbing so it cannot be
proven that Anabe used violence to get the tag heuer watch. As for
the Destructive Arson, it was likewise uncorroborated and since
the destructive arson to conceal evidence or crime cannot be
imputed when the accused ran away with the stolen good.
Felecita's testimony can only confirm existence of the crime of
arson but not its authorship.
Accused is only guilty of QUALIFIED THEFT for stealing the tag
heuer watch without violence and having done as a house servant
of the victim.
Rosales v. CA
Oct. 23, 1992
Filed in RTC of Lucena City
Charged of Murder
Doctrine: The rule is that the discharge of an accused is left to
the sound discretion of the lower court, which has the exclusive
responmsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the
Rules are met.
FACTS:
Rosales along with other co-conspirators were charged of the
Murder of the Mayor. Rosales, during the trial, was put on the
stand as ordinary witness of the prosecution. Then, the
prosecution moved to discharge Rosales and Bautista. Rosales'
discharge to be state witness was granted by the trial court. But,
upon petition by certiorari of the private respondents (co-accused)
to the CA, the CA nullified the discharge finding no reason for it
since Rosales already testified and admitted his guilt.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in nullifying the discharge
as state witness.
Ruling: The CA failed to consider that Rosales is still to take the
stand as witness on the separate Criminal Case against the alleged
masterminds (against the ex-mayor, which was filed only later so
not included in Rosales' case).
The trial court cannot be faulted to grant the motion to discharge
since the requirements to discharge as state witness under Sec. 9
(now Sec. 17) of Rule 119 of Rules of Court was complied with.
The CA has committed reversible error upon annulling the
discharge when there was no showing that Rosales actually failed
or refused to testify against his co-conspirators.
People v. Estacio, Jr.
July 22, 2009
Filed in RTC of Quezon City
Charge: Kidnapping for Ransom charged to Maritess,
amended to implead Estacio and charge became Kidnapping
with Murder, then further amended to implead Sumipo who
was subsequently discharged as state witness.
Doctrine:
Sumipo’s discharge as state witness is not erroneous since the
requirements provided by the rules are met and the testimony is
corroborated on material points. Even assuming arguendo that the
discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error
would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.
Facts: Estacio and Marites met with the Victim Charlie Chua to
settle debt to Chua. Sumip was with Estacio and Marites. When
Chua arrived on their meetig place in Quezon City, they boarded
Chua's car and tied him then ordered Sumipo to takeover the
wheel. They brought Chua to Bulacan and there killed him.
Then, they thought to ask ranson from the dead victim's mother.
After some months, Sumipo and Estacio surrendered to the NBI.
The RTC of Quezon City found Estacio and Marites guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for kidnapping and on the occassion, the victim
was killed.
Issue: Whether or not the discharge and testimony of Sumipo was
correct and sufficient to bring about the conviction.
Ruling:
These conditions to the discharge of an accused as state witness
was established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the only person
other than appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for
which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively
identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not
appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the
commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess
was joking when she said, Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie. He
tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not
participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself
from the attempts to extract ransom from the victims family.
Sumipos testimony was corroborated on material points. The
victims mother testified regarding the demands for ransom.[33]
Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing
the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day
and at the time in question.[34] Henry Hong, the victims cousin
who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victims brother
during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing
Estacio there with companions.[35] And the victims skeletal
remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacios
information and direction.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state
witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the
competency and quality of his testimony.
Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess disclaimer of
participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the hands
and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess company,
brought the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter
returned to the car, her and Estacios hands were bloodied.
However, the kidnapping was not proven, only the killing.
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was
qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken
from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to
prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.
CASE TITLE: PONTEJOS V. DESIERTO
DATE: July 7, 2009
CRIME CHARGED: Grave misconduct
WHERE FILED: RTC Quezon City
DOCTRINE: The power to choose who to discharge as state
witness is an executive function. Essentially, it is not a judicial
prerogative.
FACTS:
In a case decided by petitioner arbiter Pontejos, Rasemco,
through Aquino, asked for the nullification of all the proceedings
conducted before said petitioner for alleged extortion, bribery and
graft and corruption committed by him in conspiracy with Director
Wilfredo Imperial and Ms. Carmen Atos, both of HLURB and one
Roderick Ngo, officer of Hammercon, Inc.
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto issued an order placing
petitioner Pontejos under preventive suspension for 6 months
without pay and further directing him and Dir. Imperial to file their
counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence to the
complaint. Thereafter, the Evaluation and preliminary
investigation bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a joint resolution recommending that: an Information for Estafa
(one count), direct bribery and unauthorized practice of profession
in violation of RA 6713 be filed against respondent Pontejos;
complaint against Director Imperial and Ngo be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence; and respondent Atos be extended
immunity from criminal prosecution in accordance with Section 17
of R.A 6770 and be utilized as a state witness. So the Office of the
Ombudsman filed criminal informations for bribery and estafa
against respondent Pontejos. Then in a Resolution dated June 21,
1999, the Office of the Ombudsman granted Atos immunity from
criminal prosecution for bribery and estafa filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the above decision but was
denied by the Ombudsman. Filed Petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court in the CA, denied also and upheld the
Ombudsman's decision finding petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA
denied his motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Did CA err in not declaring that the grant of immunity to Ms. Atos
was improper.
HELD:
NO, the power to choose who to discharge as state witness
is an executive function. Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative.
It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to vest the
prosecutor with the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness and be granted immunity from prosecution. The Court has
previously upheld the discretion of the DOJ, Comelec, and the
PCGG to grant immunity from prosecution on the basis of the
respective laws that vested them with such power. The OMB was
also vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution.
According to Pontejos, the OMB's authority to grant
immunity is subject to the "pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court (Sec.17)." He claims that the procedural rules allow the
discharge of an accused as state witness only upon conformity of
the trial court. An information against the accused must first be
filed in court prior to the discharge. Moreover, the prosecution
could only recommend and propose, but not grant immunity. The
Court has already held that this provision is applicable only to
cases already filed in court. The trial court is given the power to
discharge an accused as a state witness only because it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The
fact that an individual had not been previously charged or
included in an information does not prevent the prosecution from
utilizing said person as a witness.
Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act requires conformity with
the Rules of Court, thus requiring the following circumstances
prior to the discharge: (1) absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused sought to be discharged; (2) no direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed
except the testimony of the said accused; (3) the testimony of the
said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points; (4) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (5)
said accused has not any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
There must be a standard to follow in the exercise of the
prosecutor's discretion. The decision to grant immunity cannot be
made capriciously. Should there be unjust favoritism, the Court
may exercise its certiorari power.
 In the present case, certiorari is not proper. Pontejos'
allegations do not show, much less allege, grave abuse of
discretion in the granting of immunity to Atos. The OMB
considered Atos' position, record and involvement in the case prior
to the discharge. DENIED.
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELMER DE LA
CRUZ and TRANGUILINO MARTINEZ
DATE: June 25, 2008
CRIME CHARGED: Kidnapping with Ransom
WHERE FILED: RTC Quezon City
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom were
accused-appellants De la Cruz and Martinez, along with three
others, namely, Aldrin Tano (Tano), Romeo Dano (Dano) and Rex
Tarnate (Tarnate).
Thereafter, while in the process of presenting its witnesses,
the prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Tano as a state
witness. The RTC granted the motion.
De la Cruz was employed by Erwin as a family driver. He
brought Aaron, then an eight-year-old third-grade student, to and
from Claret School. On November 9, 1998, De la Cruz fetched
Aaron from school. Martinez got inside the car and handcuffed
Aaron's left wrist. Martinez then drove the car all the way to
Batasan Hills where Dano resided. They fetched Dano who took
over control of the car from Martinez. They proceeded to Minuyan,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Upon arrival, they removed Aaron's
handcuff and entered a vacant house. Martinez and Tano left
Aaron with De la Cruz and proceeded to Tarnate's house. The
following morning, Martinez ordered Tano to call Erwin to prepare
P3 million for your son’s safety.
At the vacant house where Aaron and De la Cruz were
being kept, Quinano saw the two and asked them why they were
there. Quinano then brought the two to the barangay hall. Erwin
was then informed by phone that his son was already in the
custody of the barangay officials. The Police thereafter conducted
an investigation.
Tarnate immediately admitted his participation and
revealed information on the identities and whereabouts of the
other accused. The police proceeded to Batasan Hills to arrest the
three other accused but Dano and Martinez were able to escape in
the confusion and only Tano was arrested.
ISSUE:
Whether Tano appear to be the least guilty among the accused and
that his testimony was necessary
HELD:
For an accused to be discharged as a state witness, the following
conditions must be present:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of
the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they
may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
f)
The provision does not require that a state witness should
appear to be the "least guilty" among the accused. Rather, it
provides that he "does not appear to be the most guilty" the
finding of the lower court revealed that Tano merely facilitated the
commission of the crime. He merely boarded the car and sat
beside accused-appellant De la Cruz throughout the whole ride
and accompanied accused-appellant Martinez in going back to
Batasan Hills after leaving Aaron and accused-appellant De la
Cruz in Bulacan. True, he was the one who placed the call to
Erwin to demand ransom. However, he was neither the
mastermind nor the one who hatched the plan to kidnap Aaron in
exchange of money. Clearly, he did not appear to be the most absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within
guilty among the accused. the domain of the trial court, it being the competent to resolve
issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with
Moreover, his testimony was absolutely necessary as it was
respect to highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the
the only direct evidence establishing the presence of conspiracy,
appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion.
from the planning stage up to the commission of the crime.
Hence, no such grave abuse of discretion is present in this case.
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, De la Cruz and Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused
Martinez were found guilty of kidnapping for ransom. must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be addressed for
the first time on appeal.
CASE TITLE: GALO MONGE V. PEOPLE An order discharging an accused from the information in
DATE: March 7, 2008 order that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an
CRIME CHARGED: Illegal Possession of Processes Mahogany acquittal. Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any
(without permit) future development showing that any or all of the conditions
WHERE FILED: RTC Iriga City provided in Sec.17 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect
DOCTRINE: The discharge of an accused so he may turn state the legal consequence of an acquittal.
witness is left to the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion
Any witting or unwitting error of the Prosecution,
limited only by the requirements set forth in Sec. 17 and 25 of
therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the court in granting
Rule 119.
the motion (no question of jurisdiction being involved) will not
deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of
FACTS:
his right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly
On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found
be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be
by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and
faulted for a failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is
transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay
inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy
Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then,
of placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of
the tanods demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/
anyone who may handle the prosecution.
or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to Indeed, then only instance where the testimony of a
produce any. Petitioner fled the scene in that instant discharged accused may be disregarded is when he
whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance
interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community with his commitment (Sec 18). Potencio lived up to his
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). The commitment, with such, petition is denied.
DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of
lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of CASE TITLE: PEOPLE V. GO
mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized DATE: August 6, 2014
from Potencio. Later on, petitioner was arrested, CRIME CHARGED: Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time of Documents
the seizure until he surfaced on 3 January 1998. WHERE FILED: RTC Manila
DOCTRINE: Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a
RULING: demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount
Monge’s challenge against Potencio’s discharge as a state as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded 6
witness must also fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient
that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the
is left to the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the
limited only by the requirements set forth in Sec. 17 and 25 accused.” Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must
of Rule 119. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to
appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively an warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
Demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in
an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment
or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for
purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or
official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of
participation therein by the accused. Thus, when the accused files
a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution
evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not
be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.
[43] As to effect, the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to
an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by
certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions,
however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this
Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its
judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v.
Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order,
being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus,
when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an
appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the
right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as “that capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning
the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that
the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was
deprived of its authority to dispense justice.”
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the granting of a demurrer to
evidence should be exercised with caution, taking into
consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right
of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing
done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and
the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In
such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong,
the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus,
judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties as members of the Bench
Case Title: Antonio De Jesus, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan
Date: February 21, 2011
Where Filed: Sandiganbayan
Crime Charged: Falsification of Public Document and Violation of
R.A. 3019
Doctrine: Sec. 23 (Demurrer to Evidence)
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged the accused public officers
of falsification of public document. The information alleged that
accused local officials falsified the Requests for Quotation and
Abstract of Proposal of Canvass by making it appear that Cuad
Lumber and Hinundayan Lumber submitted quotations for the
supply of coco lumber, when they did not in fact do so. On April 12,
2005, all three accused filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence, but was denied; and rather than presenting evidence
they however, proceeded to file their demurrer which in effect
waived their right to present evidence. Hence, on March 7, 2007
the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the accused
local officials of the crimes charged.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred
in denying the accused local officials the opportunity to present
their defense after it denied their demurrer to evidence.
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan was justified in
denying their motion to be allowed to present evidence. In
this case, the accused local officials informed the court that they
would file a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court. The
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 23, Rule
119, provide:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. —
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of
court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
Case Title: People v. Louel Uy
Date: September 30, 2005
Where Filed: RTC of Misamis Orriental, Br. 44
Crime Charged: Murder
Doctrine: Sec. 23 (Demurrer to Evidence)
Facts:
On January 23, 2002, Atty. Bernales, Jr., District Agent-in-Charge
of the NBI, filed a case for murder against Panangin and Uy, based
on sworn statement-extrajudicial confession made by Panangin.
After arraignment and commencement of trial, both Panangin and
Uy, with leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence. After a month
from filing the demurrer to evidence, the trial court granted the
demurrer. The court reasoned that the grant was due to the
testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution which is just
hearsay and that Panangin’s extra-judicial confession-sworn
statement was not voluntary as it was subsequently retracted and
even if it were not, it is still inadmissible since it is a fruit of a
poisonous tree as it was obtained from Panangin as a result of his
illegal arrest.
Hence a petition for certiorari was filed questioning as to whether
or not the court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the extra-
judicial confession executed by the accused Panangin is
inadmissible in evidence after admitting the same to be part of the
evidence in chief of the prosecution.
The Court ruled that that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion, exceeding the parameters of its
jurisdiction, in holding that Panangin’s retracting of his
confession shows that the execution thereof was involuntary and
that in any event it was inadmissible as it was "a fruit of [a]
poisonous tree.” It is because a confession is presumed to be
voluntary until the contrary is proved and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. In
this case, since the accused presented no evidence to prove the
contrary, the trial court is said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in the grant of the defense’s demurrer to evidence.
Wherefore the petition is hereby Granted and the case is
Remanded to the said court for further proceedings.
Case Title: People v. Sayaboc
Date: January 15, 2004
Where Filed: RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya Br. 27
Crime Charged: Murder
Doctrine: Sec. 23 (Demurrer to Evidence)
Facts:
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin
Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel
Buenviaje with murder which was committed on December 2,
1994 by shooting and thereby inflicting a mortal wound at Joseph
Galam. On March 8, 1995, Sayaboc was brought to the police
station wherein he executed an extrajudicial confession,
confessing that he indeed killed Galam. Thereafter, the trial
commenced wherein the accused requested a motion for leave to
admit demurrer to the evidence but instead of filing such motion
first, the accused then filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The demurrer
was then denied by the court since the accused did not seek nor
were granted express leave of court prior to their filing of the
demurrer to evidence. Then on November 9, 2000, a decision was
rendered finding the accused guilty of the crime charged.
The issue in this case was whether or not the trial court erred in
denying the demurrer to evidence filed by accused on the ground
of failure to first file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the
evidence.
The Court held that the trial court did not err in their decision
of denying the motion. It must be remembered that their
demurrer to evidence was first filed before the motion for leave
was filed, as such the filing of the demurrer was clearly without
leave of court. The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave
of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence
for the accused. The rationale for this rule is that when the
accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that
said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for
him to present any evidence is negated. Hence, the trial court did
not err in their decision of denying the said motion.
Case Title: People v. Danilo Gole Cruz
Date: September 13, 1989
Where Filed: CFI of Sta. Maria Bulacan Br. V
Crime Charged: Rape with Homicide
Doctrine: Sec. 24 (Reopening)
Facts:
On December 22, 1977, witness Victores testified that he saw Cruz
running away from the washing area where the Teresita Gumapay
was found to have been stabbed and raped. Later that night, Cruz
accompanied by his father surrendered himself at the police
station. An information for rape with homicide was then filed
against him wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the trial
commenced but proceeded with some delays due to the medical
condition suffered by Cruz which made him unable to stand trial in
court. However during the trail B.P. 129 took effect which resulted
to the re-raffling of the case wherein a scheduled hearing was set.
At the scheduled hearing, both parties instead of filing their
comments, argued and opposed the reopening of the case and
reiterated their stand that they were submitting the case for
decision. However, about 5 months later, counsel for the accused
filed a "motion to reopen the case and allow accused to adduce
additional evidence”, however the motion was denied for lack of
merit since the promulgation of the decision has already been set.
The court then, promulgated the decision which found the accused
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide.
The issue in this case was whether or not the court erred in
denying the motion to reopen the case.
The Court held that the trial court did not err in finding the
accused guilty of the crime charged. The Court reasoned that
the failure of the accused to complete his testimony was of his own
making, on the initiation, confirmation and reiteration of his own
counsel; hence it cannot be said that he was not afforded full
opportunity to exercise his constitutional right to be heard and
present evidence. Filing of a motion to reopen a case must not in
any way automatically vacate an agreement and order submitting
the case for decision. While the court may reopen a case for
reception of further evidence after the parties have closed their
evidence, such action is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court and to be exercised only on valid and justifiable reasons
which undoubtedly are inexistent in this case.
Wherefore the judgment of the lower court is Affirmed.