Congressional Oversight Panel

NOVEMBER
OVERSIGHT REPORT
*
November 16,
2010
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Examining the Consequences of Mortgage
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................4
Section One:
A. Overview..................................................................................................................7
B. Background..............................................................................................................9
C. Timeline .................................................................................................................10
D. Legal Consequences of Document Irregularities ...................................................14
1. Potential Flaws in the Recording and Transfer of Mortgages and
Violations of Pooling and Servicing Agreements............................................16
2. Possible Legal Consequences of the Document Irregularities to
Various Parties .................................................................................................24
3. Additional Considerations ................................................................................33
E. Court Cases and Litigation.....................................................................................34
1. Fraud Claims.....................................................................................................35
2. Existing and Pending Claims under Various Fraud Theories...........................40
3. Other Potential Claims......................................................................................42
4. Other State Legal Steps.....................................................................................44
5. Other Possible Implications t-e
Documentation Irregularities ...........................................................................46
F. Assessing the Potential Impact on Bank Balance Sheets.......................................51
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................51
2. Foreclosure Irregularities: Estimating the Cost to Banks .................................59
3. Securitization Issues and Mortgage Put-backs .................................................63
3
G. Effect of Irregularities and Foreclosure Freezes on Housing Market ....................73
1. Foreclosure Freezes and their Effect on Housing.............................................73
2. Foreclosure Irregularities and the Crisis of Confidence ...................................78
H. Impact on HAMP...................................................................................................79
I. Conclusion .............................................................................................................82
Section Two: Correspondence with Treasury....................................................................85
Section Three: TARP Updates Since Last Report .............................................................86
Section Four: Oversight Activities...................................................................................122
Section Five: About the Congressional Oversight Panel .................................................124
Appendices:
APPENDIX I: LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN TED KAUFMAN TO
SPECIAL MASTER PATRICIA GEOGHEGAN, RE: FOLLOW UP TO
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION HEARING, DATED NOVEMBER 1, 2010......125
4
Executive Summary
*
In the fall of 2010, reports began to surface alleging that companies servicing $6.4 trillion
in American mortgages may have bypassed legally required steps to foreclose on a home.
Employees or contractors of Bank of America, GMAC Mortgage, and other major loan servicers
testified that they signed, and in some cases backdated, thousands of documents claiming
personal knowledge of facts about mortgages that they did not actually know to be true.
-
federal and state investigations. At this point the ultimate implications remain unclear. It is
possib -
mortgage market that could potentially threaten financial stability and undermine the
to
determine whether such threats will materialize, the Panel urges Treasury and bank regulators to
take immediate steps to understand and prepare for the potential risks.
In the best-case scenario, concerns about mortgage documentation irregularities may
prove overblown. In this view, which has been embraced by the financial industry, a handful of
employees failed to follow procedures in signing foreclosure-related affidavits, but the facts
underlying the affidavits are demonstrably accurate. Foreclosures could proceed as soon as the
invalid affidavits are replaced with properly executed paperwork.
The worst-case scenario is considerably grimmer. In this view, which has been
- ts served to
cover up the fact that loan servicers cannot demonstrate the facts required to conduct a lawful
foreclosure. In essence, banks may be unable to prove that they own the mortgage loans they
claim to own.
The risk stems from the possibility that the rapid growth of mortgage securitization
outpaced the ability of the legal and financial system to track mortgage loan ownership. In
earlier years, under the traditional mortgage model, a homeowner borrowed money from a single
bank and then paid back the same bank. In the rare instances when a bank transferred its rights,
any individual mortgage could be easily demonstrated.
Nowadays, a single mortgage loan may be sold dozens of times between various banks
across the country. In the view of some market participants, the sheer speed of the modern
mortgage market has rendered obsolete the traditional ink-and-paper recordation process, so the
financial industry developed an electronic transfer process that bypasses county property offices.
*
The Panel adopted this report with a 5-0 vote on November 15, 2010.
5
This electronic process has, however, faced legal challenges that could, in an extreme scenario,
call into question the validity of 33 million mortgage loans.
Further, the financial industry now commonly bundles the rights to thousands of
individual loans into a mortgage-backed security (MBS). The securitization process is
complicated and requires several properly executed transfers. If at any point the required legal
steps are not followed to the letter, then the ownership of the mortgage loan could fall into
-
affidavits may have concealed extensive industry failures to document mortgage loan transfers
properly.
If documentation problems prove to be pervasive and, more importantly, throw into doubt
the ownership of not only foreclosed properties but also pooled mortgages, the consequences
could be severe. Clear and uncontested property rights are the foundation of the housing market.
If these rights fall into question, that foundation could collapse. Borrowers may be unable to
determine whether they are sending their monthly payments to the right people. Judges may
block any effort to foreclose, even in cases where borrowers have failed to make regular
payments. Multiple banks may attempt to foreclose upon the same property. Borrowers who
have already suffered foreclosure may seek to regain title to their homes and force any new
owners to move out. Would-be buyers and sellers could find themselves in limbo, unable to
know with any certainty whether they can safely buy or sell a home. If such problems were to
arise on a large scale, the housing market could experience even greater disruptions than have
already occurred, resulting in significant harm to major financial institutions. For example, if a
Wall Street bank were to discover that, due to shoddily executed paperwork, it still owns
millions of defaulted mortgages that it thought it sold off years ago, it could face billions of
dollars in unexpected losses.
foreclosure prevention effort, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Some
servicers dealing with Treasury may have no legal right to initiate foreclosures, which may call
into question their ability to grant modifications or to demand payments from homeowners. The
- dividual loans;
servicers may have been more willing to foreclose if they were not bearing the full costs of a
properly executed foreclosure. Treasury has so far not provided reports of any investigation as to
whether documentation problems could undermine HAMP. It should engage in active efforts to
monitor the impact of foreclosure irregularities, and it should report its findings to Congress and
the public.
In addition to documentation concerns, another problem has arisen with securitized
mortgage loans that could also threaten financial stability. Investors in mortgage-backed
securities typically demanded certain assurances about the quality of the loans they purchased:
for instance, that the borrowers had certain minimum credit ratings and income, or that their
6
homes had appraised for at least a minimum value. Allegations have surfaced that banks may
have misrepresented the quality of many loans sold for securitization. Banks found to have
provided misrepresentations could be required to repurchase any affected mortgages. Because
millions of these mortgages are in default or foreclosure, the result could be extensive capital
losses if such repurchase risk is not adequately reserved.
To put in perspective the potential problem, one investor action alone could seek to force
Bank of America to repurchase and absorb partial losses on up to $47 billion in troubled loans
due to alleged misrepresentations of loan quality. Bank of America currently has $230 billion in
lar-sized actions whether motivated by concerns about
underwriting or loan ownership were to succeed, the company could suffer disabling damage
to its regulatory capital. It is possible that widespread challenges along these lines could pose
risks to the very financial stability that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was designed to
protect. Treasury has claimed that based on evidence to date, mortgage-related problems
currently pose no danger to the financial system, but in light of the extensive uncertainties in the
danger. Bank regulators should also conduct new stress tests on Wall Street banks to measure
their ability to deal with a potential crisis.
The Panel emphasizes that mortgage lenders and securitization servicers should not
undertake to foreclose on any homeowner unless they are able to do so in full compliance with
applicable laws and their contractual agreements with the homeowner.
The American
the financial system through the Troubled Asset Relief Program has expired, and the resolution
authority created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
remains untested. The 2009 stress tests that evaluated the health of the financial system looked
only to the end of 2010, providing little assurance that banks could withstand sharp losses in the
years to come. The housing market and the broader economy remain troubled and thus
drawing to a close, severe threats remain that have the potential to damage financial stability.
7
Section One:
A. Overview
In the fall of 2010, with the Troubled Asset Relief P authority expiring,
reports began to surface of problems with foreclosure documentation, particularly in states where
foreclosures happen through the courts. GMAC Mortgage, a subsidiary of current TARP
recipient Ally Financial, announced on September 24, 2010 that it had identified irregularities in
its foreclosure document procedures that raised questions about the validity of foreclosures on
mortgages that it serviced. Similar revelations soon followed from Bank of America, a former
TARP recipient, and others. Employees of these companies or their contractors have testified
that they signed, and in some cases backdated, thousands of documents attesting to personal
knowledge of facts about the mortgage and the property that they did not actually know to be
true. Mortgage servicers also appeared to be cutting corners in other ways. According to these
banks, their employees were having trouble keeping up with the crush of foreclosures, but
additional training and employees would generally suffice to get the process in order again.
At present, the reach of these irregularities is unknown. The irregularities may be limited
to paperwork errors among certain servicers in certain states; alternatively, they may call into
question aspects of the securitization process that pooled and sold interests in innumerable
mortgages during the housing boom. Depending on their extent, the irregularities may affect
the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), was tasked with restoring. Further, the
mortgage market faces ongoing risks related to the right of mortgage-backed securities to force
banks to repurchase any loans. Losses stemming from these repurchases would compound any
risks associated with documentation irregularities.
Under EESA, the Congressional Oversight Panel is charged with reviewing the current
state of the financial markets and the regulatory system
foreclosure documentation irregularities stems from several distinct concerns:
If Severe Disruptions in the Housing Market Materialize, Financial Stability and Taxpayer
Funds Could Be Imperiled. If document irregularities prove to be pervasive and, more
importantly, throw into question ownership of not only foreclosed properties but also pooled
mortgages, the result could be significant harm to financial stability the very stability that the
TARP was designed to protect. In the worst case scenario, a clear chain of title an essential
element of a functioning housing market may be difficult to establish for properties subject to
mortgage loans that were pooled and securitized. Rating agencies are already cautious in their
outlook for the banking sector, and further blows could have a significant effect. The
implications could also be dire for their TARP investments. Treasury still
8
has $66.8 billion invested in the banking sector generally, and as the Panel discussed in its July
smaller banks are still uncertain and dependent, in great part, on a sector healthy enough to
attract private investment.
1
HAMP May Rely on Uncertain Legal Authority and Inaccurate Foreclosure Cost
Estimates, Potentially Posing a Risk to Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts. If irregularities in the
foreclosure process reflect deeper failures to document properly changes of ownership as
mortgage loans were securitized, then it is possible that Treasury is dealing with the wrong
parties in the course of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). This could mean
that borrowers either received or were denied modifications improperly. Some servicers dealing
with Treasury may have no legal right to initiate foreclosures, which may call into question their
ability to grant modifications or to demand payments from homeowners, whether they are part of
a foreclosure mitigation program or otherwise. also
have affected the determination to modify or foreclose upon individual loans. Because the net
present value (NPV) model compares the net present value of the modification to a foreclosure,
improper procedures that cut corners might have affected the foreclosure cost calculation and
thus might have affected the outcome of the NPV test.
TARP-Recipient Banks May Have Failed to Meet Legal Obligations. Many of the entities
implicated in the recent document irregularities, including Ally Financial, Bank of America, and
JPMorgan Chase, are current or former TARP recipients. Ally Financial, notably, remains in
TARP and is in possession of $17.2 billion in taxpayer funds. Bank of America received funds
rgeted Investment Program (TIP). Some of the banks
involved were also subject to the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), also known
Reserve) efforts to determine the health of the largest banks under a variety of stressed scenarios.
o
statutory mandate to
1
and Maiden Lane III vehicles, which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) created to hold assets
purchased from AIG, hold substantial amounts of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), most of which
are either sub-prime or Alt-
on these investments, and uncertainty
associated with the investments could hinder that process.
9
B. Background
In the fall of 2010, a series of revelations about foreclosure documentation irregularities
hit the housing markets. The transfer of a prop
to the mortgagee (typically a bank or a trust) necessary for a successful foreclosure requires a
series of steps established by state law.
2
As further described below, depositions taken in a
variety of cases in which homeowners were fighting foreclosure actions indicated that mortgage
servicer employees who were required to have personal knowledge of the matters to which
they were attesting in their affidavits were signing hundreds of these documents a day. Other
documents appeared to have been backdated improperly and ineffectively or incorrectly
notarized. While these documentation irregularities may sound minor, they have the potential to
throw the foreclosure system and possibly the mortgage loan system and housing market itself
into turmoil. At a minimum, in certain cases, signers of affidavits appear to have signed
documents attesting to information that they did not verify and without a notary present. If this
is the extent of the irregularities, then the issue may be limited to these signers and the
foreclosure proceedings they were involved in, and in many cases, the irregularities may
potentially be remedied by reviewing the documents more thoroughly and then resubmitting
them. If, however, the problem is related not simply to a limited number of foreclosure
documents but also to irregularities in the mortgage origination and pooling process, then the
impact of the irregularities could be far broader, affecting a vast number of investors in the
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market, already completed foreclosures, and current
homeowners. This latter scenario could result in extensive litigation, an extended freeze in the
foreclosure market, and significant stress on bank balance sheets arising from the substantial
repurchase liability that can arise from mistakes or misrepresentations in mortgage documents.
3
2
These steps depend on whether a state is a judicial foreclosure state or a non-judicial foreclosure state, as
further described below, in footnote 17.
3
-
the mortgage to its originator and require them to repurchase the mortgage. For a more complete discussion of this
possibility, see Sections D.1.b and D.2.
Several analysts and experts have speculated on the potential for widespread impact. Morgan Stanley,
Housing Market Insights: Washington, We Have a Problem (Oct. 12, 2010); Amherst Mortgage Insight, The
Affidavit Fiasco Implications for Investors in Private Label Securities (Oct. 12, 2010); FBR Capital Markets,
Conference Call: Foreclosure Mania: Big Deal or Not? nia
f Garcia, JPM on Foreclosures, MERS, Financial Times Alphaville Blog (Oct. 13,
2010) (online at ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/10/13/369406/jpm-on-foreclosures-
be a blip in the housing market. If it went on
10
C. Timeline
After the housing market started to collapse in 2006, the effects rippled through the
financial sector and led to disruptions in the credit markets in 2008 and 2009. In an economy
that had been hit hard by the financial crisis and soon settled into a deep recession, the housing
market declined, dragging down housing prices and increasing the likelihood of default. This put
pressure on a variety of parties involved in the mortgage market. During the boom, there were
many players involved in the process of lending, securitizing, and servicing mortgages, and
many of these players took on multiple roles.
4
The initial role of servicers was largely administrative.
5
They were hired by the MBS
investors to handle all back-office functions for existing loans, and generally acted as
intermediaries between borrowers and MBS investors.
6
However, when the housing bubble
burst, and the number of delinquencies began to rise, the role of servicers evolved
correspondingly.
7
Servicer focus shifted from performing purely administrative tasks to
engaging in active loss mitigation efforts.
8
Servicers found themselves responsible for
processing all defaults, modifications, short sales, and foreclosures.
9
The servicers themselves
have admitted that they were simply not prepared for the volume of work that the crisis
generated.
10
Thus, many servicers began subcontracting out much of their duties to so-called
contractors that had significant incentives to move foreclosures along
quickly.
4
For example, it was not uncommon for a commercial bank to perform both lending and servicing
functions, and to have established separate lending and servicing arms of its organization. As discussed later in this
report, the securitization process begins with a lender/originator, often but not always a commercial bank. Next, the
mortgage is securitized by an investment bank. Finally, the mortgage is serviced, often also by a commercial bank
or its subsidiary. Even where the same banks are listed as doing both lending and servicing, they did not necessarily
service only the mortgages they originated. Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.
5
See Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Quarterly Report to
Congress, at 157 (Oct. 26, 2010) (online at
www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/October2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Co
6
Servicer duties included fielding borrower inquiries, collecting mortgage payments from the borrowers,
and remitting mortgage payments to the trust. See Id. at 157, 164. See also Congressional Oversight Panel, March
Oversight Report: Foreclosure Crisis: Working Toward a Solution, at 40-42 (Mar. 6, 2009) (online at
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-
7
See March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 40.
8
See March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 40-42. See also October 2010 SIGTARP Report,
supra note 5, at 158.
9
See October 2010 SIGTARP Report, supra note 5, at 157-158. In the spring of 2009, when Treasury
announced its Making Home Affordable program, the centerpiece of which was HAMP, servicers took on the
additional responsibility of processing all HAMP modifications.
10
See March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 39.
11
Thus, as the boom in the housing market mutated into a boom in foreclosures,
11
banks
rushed to move delinquent borrowers out of their homes as quickly as possible, leading,
apparently, to procedures of which the best that can be said is that they were sloppy and cursory.
Concerns with foreclosure irregularities first arose when depositions of so- -
came to light.
12
In a June 7, 2010, deposition, Jeffrey Stephan, who worked for GMAC
Mortgage
13
as a limited signing officer, testified that he signed 400 documents each day. In at
least some cases, he signed affidavits without reading them and without a notary present.
14
He
11
Mortgages that are more than 90 days past due are concentrated in certain regions and states of the
country, including California, Nevada, Arizona, Florida, and Georgia. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Q3
Credit Conditions (Nov. 8, 2010) (online at www.newyorkfed.org/creditconditions/). Similarly, foreclosures are
concentrated in certain states, including the so-
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Report to Congress on the Root Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis,
subject of high concentrations of foreclosures in those regions. See Congressional Oversight Panel, Clark County,
NV: Ground Zero of the Housing and Financial Crises (Dec. 16, 2008) (online at
cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-121608-firsthearing.cfm); Congressional Oversight Panel, COP Hearing:
(Feb. 27, 2009) (online at
cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-022709-housing.cfm); Congressional Oversight Panel, Philadelphia Field
Hearing on Mortgage Foreclosures (Sept. 24, 2009) (online at cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-092409-
philadelphia.cfm).
12
-
transcriptions of depositions filed by robo-signers. See, e.g., The Florida Foreclosure Fraud Weblog, Jeffrey
(Sept. 15, 2010) (online at
floridaforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/jeffrey-stephan-affidavits-withdrawn-by-florida-default-law-group/). Some of
this information was made public in court documents. For instance, in an order issued by a state court in Maine on
September 24, 2010, the judge noted that it was undisputed that Jeffrey Stephan had signed an affidavit without
reading it and that he had not been in the presence of a notary when he signed it. Order on Four Pending Motions at
3, Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nicolle Bradbury, No. BRI-RE-09-65 (Me. Bridgton D. Ct. Sept. 24, 2010)
(online at www.molleurlaw.com/themed/molleurlaw/files/uploads/9_24_10%20Four%20Motions%20Order.pdf)
13
GMAC Mortgage is a subsidiary of Ally Financial. The Panel examined Ally Financial, then named
GMAC, in detail in its March 2010 report. See Congressional Oversight Panel, March Oversight Report: The
Unique Treatment of GMAC Under TARP (Mar. 11, 2010) (online at cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-031110-
report.pdf).
14
Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nicolle Bradbury, supra note 12. There are two primary concerns
with affidavits. First: are the affidavits accurate? For example, even if the homeowner is indebted, the amount of
the indebtedness is a part of the attestation. The amount of the indebtedness must be accurate because there might
be a subsequent deficiency judgment against the homeowner, which would require the homeowner to cover the
remaining amount owed to the lender. And even if there was no deficiency judgment, an inflated claim would
increase the recovery of the mortgage servicer from the foreclosure sale proceeds to the detriment of other parties in
the process. Second, even if the information in the affidavit is correct, it must be sworn out by someone with
personal knowledge of the indebtedness; otherwise it is hearsay and generally not admissible as evidence. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Court Proceedings, GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Debbie Viscaro, et al., No. 07013084CI (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 7, 2010) (online at floridaforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/040710.pdf) (discussing whether
affected affidavits were admissible). See generally Congressional Oversight Panel, Written Testimony of Katherine
Porter, professor of law, University of Iowa College of Law, COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation
Programs (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102710-
12
15
Similarly, faced with revelations that robo-signers had signed tens of thousands of foreclosure
documents without actually verifying the information in them, Bank of America announced on
October 8, 2010, that it would freeze foreclosure sales in all 50 states until it could investigate
and address the irregularities.
16
GMAC Mortgage took similar action, announcing that while it
would not suspend foreclosures, it had ed evictions and post-foreclosure
.
17
e are confident that the processing errors did not result in any
steps to address the problem: additional education and training for employees, the release of a
foreclosure processing.
18
15
Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nicolle Bradbury, supra note 12. In addition, a Florida court
May 1, 2006, TCIF RE02 v. Leibowitz
policies on affidavits filed in foreclosure cases). These actions, if true, would be inconsistent with the usual
documentation requirements necessary for proper processing of a foreclosure, giving rise to concerns that the
foreclosure was not legally sufficient. See generally Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14.
16
Bank of America Corporation, Statement from Bank of America Home Loans (Oct. 8, 2010) (online at
mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1480657&highlight=)
. At the same time, Bank of America agreed to
or local practice on both transactions in which foreclosure has already occurred or been initiated and those to be
See Fidelity National Financial, Fidelity National Financial, Inc., Reports EPS of $0.36
(Oct. 20, 2010) (online at files.shareholder.com/downloads/FNT/1051799117x0x411089/209d61a9-8a05-454c-
90d1-4a78e0a7c4ae/FNF_News_2010_10_20_Earnings.pdf). As further described below in Section D.2, title
insurance is a critical piece of the mortgage market. Generally, title insurance insures against the possibility that
title is encumbered or unclear, and thereby provides crucial certainty in transactions involving real estate. The
insurance is retrospective covering the history of the property until, but not after the sale, and is issued after a
review of the land title records. For a buyer, title insurance therefore insures against the possibility that a defect in
the title that is not apparent from the public records will affect their ownership. Industry sources conversations with
National Financial shifts the risk of covered losses arising from the foreclosure irregularities from Fidelity National
to Bank of America.
17
Twenty-two states require judicial oversight of foreclosure proceedings. In these judicial foreclosure
states the mortgagee must establish its claim show that a borrower is in default before a judge. In non-judicial
states a foreclosure can proceed upon adequate and timely notice to the borrower, as defined by statute. In non-
judicial states, a power of sale clause included in a deed of trust allows a trustee to conduct a non-judicial
foreclosure. Non-judicial foreclosures can proceed more quickly since they do not require adjudication. Mortgage
Bankers Association, Judicial Versus Non-Judicial Foreclosure (Oct. 26, 2010) (online at
www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/JudicialVersusNon-JudicialForeclosure.pdf). Typically,
states that rely on mortgages are judicial foreclosure states, while states that rely on deeds of trust are non-judicial
foreclosure states. St Structured Finance Research Week: How Will the Foreclosure Crisis Affect
U.S. Home Prices? (Oct. 21, 2010) .
18
Ally Financial, Inc., GMAC Mortgage Provides Update on Mortgage Servicing Process (Sept. 24, 2010)
(online at media.ally.com/index.php?s=43&item=417).
13
These voluntary, privately determined suspensions were brief.
19
On October 12, 2010,
GMAC Mortgage released a statement indicating that in cases in which it had initiated a review
process for its foreclosure procedures, it would resume foreclosure proceedings once any
problems had been identified and, where necessary, addressed.
evidence to date of any inapprop
20
On October 18, Bank of America
announced that it had completed its review of irregularities in the 23 states that require judicial
review of foreclosure proceedings and that it would begin processing foreclosure affidavits for
102,000 foreclosure proceedings in those states. It stated that it would review proceedings in the
remaining 27 states on a case-by-case basis and that foreclosure sales in those states would be
delayed until those reviews are complete. It further stated that in all states, it appeared that the
21
Various commentators, however, have
22
Then, on October 27, another large bank entered the fray when Wells Fargo announced that it
had uncovered irregularities in its foreclosure processes and stated that it would submit
supplemental affidavits in 55,000 foreclosure actions.
23
Meanwhile, as the revelations of irregularities quickly multiplied, some argued that over
nationwide moratorium on foreclosures.
24
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun
a national, blanket moratorium on all foreclosure sales
25
At the same time, on October 13, attorneys general from
19
To date, GMAC Mortgage and Bank of America have only resumed foreclosures in judicial foreclosure
states and are still reviewing their procedures in non-judicial foreclosure states.
20
Ally Financial, Inc., GMAC Mortgage Statement on Independent Review and Foreclosure Sales (Oct. 12,
.
21
Bank of America Corporation, Statement from Bank of America Home Loans (Oct. 18, 2010) (online at
mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1483909&highlight=)
.
22
See Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14
longstanding allegations and findings of inappropriate and illegal practices, I am unable to give weight to recent
statements by banks such as Bank of America that only 10 to 25 of the first several hundred loans that it has
23
Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Provides Update on Foreclosure Affidavits and Mortgage
Securitizations (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at www.wellsfargo.com/pr
24
See, e.g., Office of Senator Harry Reid, Reid Welcomes Bank of America Decision, Calls On Others To
Follow Suit (Oct. 8, 2010) (online at reid.sena
Foreclosure Moratorium: Cracking Down on Liar Liens,
Center for Economic and Policy Research (Oct. 18, 2010) (online at www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-
eds-&-columns/foreclosure-moratorium-cracking-down-on-liar-
25
Shaun Donovan, secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, How We Can Really
Help Families (Oct. 18, 2010) (online at portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/blog/2010/blog2010-10-18).
14
all 50 states
26
announced a bipartisan effort to look into the possibility that documents or
affidavits were improperly submitted in their jurisdictions.
Although the public focus today lies generally on foreclosures, the possibility of
document irregularities in mortgage transactions has expanded beyond their significance to
foreclosure proceedings. Recently, investors have begun to claim that similar irregularities in
origination and pooling of loans should trigger actions against entities in the mortgage
origination, securitization, and servicing industries.
27
D. Legal Consequences of Document Irregularities
The possible legal consequences of the documentation irregularities described above
range from minor, curable title defects for certain foreclosed homes in certain states to more
serious consequences such as the unenforceability of foreclosure claims and other ownership
rights that rely on the ability to establish clear title to real property, forced put-backs of defective
mortgages to originators, and market upheaval. The severity and likelihood of these various
possible consequences depend on whether the irregularities are pervasive and when in the
process they occurred.
Effective transfers of real estate depend on being able to answer seemingly
straightforward questions: who owns the property? how did they come to own it? can anyone
make a competing claim to it? The irregularities have the potential to make these seemingly
simple questions complex. As a threshold matter, a party seeking to enforce the rights associated
with the mortgage must have standing in court, meaning that a party must have an interest in the
property sufficient that a court will hear their claim and can provide them with relief.
28
For a
mortgage, [a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to
26
National Association of Attorneys General, 50 States Sign Mortgage Foreclosure Joint Statement (Oct.
13, 2010) (online at www.naag.org/joint-statement-of-the-mortgage-foreclosure-multistate-group.php) (hereinafter
27
Cases involved suits against Bank of America (as the parent of loan originator Countrywide) claiming
violations of representations and warranties and sought to enforce put-back provisions. Greenwich Financial
Services Distressed Fund 3 L.L.C. vs. Countrywide Financial Corp, et al., 1:08-cv-11343-RJH (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2010); Footbridge Limited Trust and OHP Opportunity Trust vs. Bank of America, CV00367 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 1,
2010).
28
See Stephen R. Buchenroth and Gretchen D. Jeffries, Recent Foreclosure Cases: Lenders Beware (June
2007) (online at www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/ereport/2007/6/OhioForeclosureCases.pdf); Wells Fargo v.
Jordan
Christopher Lewis
Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, University
of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, at 1368-1371 (Summer 2010) (online at
Foreclosu ; MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E. 2d 81 (N.Y. 2006). Accordingly, a second set of problems
relates to the chain of title on mortgages and the ability of the foreclosing party to prove that it has legal standing to
foreclose. While these problems are not limited to the securitization market, they are especially acute for securitized
loans because there are more complex chain of title issues involved.
15
enforce the obligation the mortgage secure
29
Thus, the only party that may enforce the rights
associated with the mortgage, with standing to take action on a mortgage in a court, must be
legally able to act on the mortgage.
30
Accordingly, standing is critical for a successful
foreclosure, because if the party bringing the foreclosure does not have standing to enforce the
rights attached to the mortgage and the note, that party may not be able to take the property with
clear title that can be passed on to another buyer.
31
Thus, if prior transfers of the mortgage were
unsuccessful or improper, subsequent transfers of the property, such as a foreclosure or even an
ordinary sale, could be affected. Further, failure to foreclose properly whether because the
foreclosing party did not actually hold the mortgage and the note, or because robo-signing
affected due process rights means that the prior homeowner may be able to
assert claims against a subsequent owner of the property.
32
In this way, documentation
irregularities can affect title to a property at a number of stages, as further described below.
29
Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Mortgages) § 5.4(c) (1997). Only the proven mortgagee may maintain a
foreclosure action. The requirement that a foreclosure action be brought only by the actual mortgagee is at the heart
of the issues with foreclosure irregularities. If the homeowner or the court challenges the claim of the party bringing
a foreclosure action that it is the mortgagee (and was when the foreclosure was filed), then evidentiary issues arise
as to whether the party bringing the foreclosure can in fact prove that it is the mortgagee. The issues involved are
highly complex areas of law, but despite the complexity of these issues, they should not be dismissed as mere
technicalities. Rather, they are legal requirements that must be observed both as part of due process and as part of
the contractual bargain made between borrowers and lenders.
30
behalf. Servicers acting on behalf of a trust or an originator do not own the mortgage, but by contract are granted
the ability to act on behalf of the trust or the originator. See Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Consumers
loans and the rights to service them often are bought and sold. In many cases, the company that you send your
See also October 2010 SIGTARP Report, supra note 5, at
160 (describing clients of servicers).
31
Laws governing the remedies available to a lender foreclosing on a property vary considerably. States
also differ markedly in how long it takes the lender to foreclose depending on the available procedures. In general,
claimants can seek to recover loan amounts by -
upon the property and other borrower assets. Most states are recourse states. A loan in a recourse state allows a
mortgagee to foreclose upon property securing a promissory note and, if that property is insufficient to discharge the
-recourse states, recovery of the loan amount is limited to the
-recourse state if the
property is insufficient to discharge the debt. It is worth noting that even in recourse states, given the current
may be minimal relative to the costs and delay in pursuing and collecting on a deficiency judgments. See Andra C.
Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper, No. 09-10, at 1-2 (July 7, 2009) (online at
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15051/website_ghent.pdf).
32
Christopher Lewis Peterson, associate dean for academic affairs and professor of law, S.J. Quinney
College of Law, University of Utah, conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 8, 2010).
16
1. Potential Flaws in the Recording and Transfer of Mortgages and Violations of
Pooling and Servicing Agreements
a. Mortgage Recordation, Perfecting Title, and Transferring Title
i. Title
r
assurance that the purchaser owns the property free of encumbrances or competing claims.
33
Laws governing the transfer of real property in the United States were designed to create a
public, transparent recordation system that supplies reliable information on ownership interests
in property. Each of the 50 states has laws governing title to land within its legal boundaries.
Every county in the country maintains records of who owns land there, of transfers of ownership,
and of related mortgages or deeds of trust.
basic requirements are the same, consistent with the notion that the purpose of the recording
system is to establish certainty regarding property ownership. In order to protect ownership
recorded in a grantor/grantee index at a county recording office.
34
In the case of a purchaser or
transferee, a properly recorded deed describing both the property and the parties to the transfer
establishes property ownership.
ii. Transfer
In a purchase of a home using a mortgage loan, required documents include (a) a
, (b) a mortgage evidencing the
security interest in the underlying collateral, and (c) if the mortgage is transferred, proper
assignments of the mortgage and the note.
35
There are a number of ways for a mortgage
33
34
See Cincinnati Law Review Paper on Foreclosure, supra note 28.
35
There are two documents that need to be transferred as part of the securitization process a promissory
note and the security instrument (the mortgage or deed of trust). The promissory note embodies the debt obligation,
while the security instrument provides that if the debt is not repaid, the creditor may sell the designated collateral
(the house). Both the note and the mortgage need to be properly transferred. Without the note, a mortgage is
unenforceable, while without the mortgage, a note is simply an unsecured debt obligation, no different from credit
card debt. See FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3. The rules for these transfers are generally
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), although one author states that the application of the UCC to
the transfer of the note is not certain. See Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary
Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It, Pepperdine Law Review, Vol. 37, at 758-759 (2010).
States adopt articles of and revisions to the UCC individually, and so there can be variation among states in
the application of the UCC. This report does not attempt to identify all of the possible iterations. Rather, it
describes general and common applications of the UCC to such transactions.
There are two methods by which a promissory note may be transferred. First, it may be transferred by
can be transferred via indorsement. See UCC §§ 3-201, 3-203. The pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) for
securitized loans generally contemplate transfer through negotiation. Typical language in PSAs requires the
17
originator to proceed upon entering into a loan secured by real property. They may keep the loan
on their own books; these are so- However, if the loan is sold in a
secondary market either as a whole loan or in a securitization process the loan must be
properly transferred to the purchaser. To be transferred properly, both the loan and
accompanying documentation must be transferred to the purchaser, and the transfer must be
recorded.
delivery to the securitization trust of the notes and the mortgages, indorsed in blank. Alternatively, a promissory
note may be transferred by a sale contract, also governed by whether a state has adopted particular revisions to the
UCC. In many states, in order for a transfer to take place under the relevant portion of the UCC, there are only three
requirements: the buyer of the promissory note must give value, there must be an authenticated document of sale
that describes the promissory note, and the seller must have rights in the promissory note being sold. UCC § 9-
203(a)-(b).
The first two requirements should be easily met in most securitizations; the transfer of the mortgage loans
at each stage of the securitization involves the buyer giving the seller value and a document of sale (a mortgage
purchase and sale agreement or a PSA) that should include a schedule identifying the promissory notes involved.
The third requirement, however, that the seller must have rights in the promissory note being sold, is more
plus their schedules are evidence of such a chain of title, they cannot establish that the loan was not previously sold
to another party.
Further, this discussion only addresses the validity of transfers between sellers and buyers of mortgage
loans. It does not address the enforceability of those loans against homeowners, which requires physical possession
of the original note. Thus, for both securitized and non-securitized loans, it is necessary for a party to show that it is
entitled to enforce the promissory note (and therefore generally that it is a holder of the physical original note) in
order to complete a foreclosure successfully.
Perhaps more critically, parties are free to contract around the UCC. UCC § 1-302. This raises the
question of whether PSAs for MBS provide for a variance from the UCC by agreement of the parties. The PSA is
the document that provides for the transfer of the mortgage and notes from the securitization sponsor to the
depositor and thence to the trust. The PSA is also the document that creates the trust. The transfer from the
originator to the sponsor is typically governed by a separate document, although sections of it may be incorporated
by reference in the PSA.
If a PSA is considered a variation by agreement from the UCC, then there is a question of what the PSA
itself requires to transfer the mortgage loans and whether those requirements have been met. In some cases, PSAs
appear to require a complete chain of indorsements on the notes from originator up to the depositor, with a final
indorsement in blank to the trust. A complete chain of indorsements, rather than a single indorsement in blank with
assets. A critical part of securitization is to establish that
could not be claimed by the bankruptcy estate of an upstream transferor of the assets. Without a complete chain of
indorsements, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish that the loans were in fact transferred from originator to
sponsor to depositor to trust, rather than directly from originator or sponsor to the trust. If the transfer were directly
from the originator or sponsor to the trust, the loans could possibly be claimed as part
. The questions about what the transfers required, therefore, involve both the question as
to whether the required transfers actually happened, as well as whether, if they happened, they were legally
sufficient.
18
iii. Mortgage Securitization Process
Figure 1: Transfer of Relevant Paperwork in Securitization Process
36
Securitizations of mortgages require multiple transfers, and, accordingly, multiple
assignments. Mortgages that were securitized were originated through banks and mortgage
brokers mortgage originators. Next they were securitized by investment banks the sponsors
through the use of special purpose vehicles, trusts that qualify for Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduit (REMIC) status. These trusts are bankruptcy-remote, tax-exempt vehicles
that pooled the mortgages transferred to them and sold interests in the income from those
mortgages to investors in the form of shares. The pools were collateralized by the underlying
real property, because a mortgage represents a first-lien security interest on an asset in the pool
a house.
37
A governing document for securitizations called a pooling and servicing agreement
(PSA) includes various representations and warranties for the underlying mortgages. It also
describes the responsibilities of the trustee, who is responsible for holding the recorded mortgage
36
FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
37
For an overview of REMICs, see Federal National Mortgage Association, Basics of REMICs (June 16,
2009) (online at www.fanniemae.com/mbs/mbsbasics/remic/index.jhtml). See also Internal Revenue Service, Final
Regulations Relating to Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 26 CFR § 1 (Aug. 17, 1995) (online at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/td8614.txt).
on the MBS. REMICs are supposed to be passive entities. Accordingly, with few exceptions, a REMIC may not
receive new assets after 90 days have passed since its creation, or there will be adverse tax consequences. Thus, if a
transfer of a loan was not done correctly in the first place, proper transfer now could endanger the REMIC status.
For an overview of residential mortgage-backed securities in general, see American Securitization Forum, ASF
Securitization Institute: Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (2006) (online at
www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/RMBS%20Outline.pdf).
19
documents, and of the servicer, who plays an administrative role, collecting and disbursing
mortgage and related payments on behalf of the investors in the MBS.
As described above, in order to convey good title into the trust and provide the trust with
both good title to the collateral and the income from the mortgages, each transfer in this process
required particular steps.
38
Most PSAs are governed by New York law and create trusts
governed by New York law.
39
New York trust law requires strict compliance with the trust
documents; any transaction by the trust that is in contravention of the trust documents is void,
meaning that the transfer cannot actually take place as a matter of law.
40
Therefore, if the
transfer for the notes and mortgages did not comply with the PSA, the transfer would be void,
and the assets would not have been transferred to the trust. Moreover, in many cases the assets
could not now be transferred to the trust.
41
PSAs generally require that the loans transferred to
the trust not be in default, which would prevent the transfer of any non-performing loans to the
trust now.
42
Furthermore, PSAs frequently have timeliness requirements regarding the transfer
in order to ensure that the trusts qualify for favored tax treatment.
43
Various commentators have begun to ask whether the poor recordkeeping and error-filled
work exhibited in foreclosure proceedings, described above, is likely to have marked earlier
stages of the process as well. If so, the effect could be that rights were not properly transferred
during the securitization process such that title to the mortgage and the note might rest with
another party in the process other than the trust.
44
iv. MERS
In addition to the concerns with the securitization process described above, a method
adopted by the mortgage securitization industry to track transfers of mortgage servicing rights
has come under question. A mortgage does not need to be recorded to be enforceable as between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee or subsequent transferee, but unless a mortgage is recorded, it
does not provide the mortgagee or its subsequent transferee with priority over subsequent
mortgagees or lien holders.
45
38
See Section D.1.a.ii, supra.
39
FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
40
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 7-2.4; FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
41
FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
42
Amended Complaint at Exhibit 5, page 13, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, No. 09-CV-
43
See FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
44
See, e.g., FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
45
Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Mortgages) § 5.4 cmt. B (1997).
20
During the housing boom, multiple rapid transfers of mortgages to facilitate securitization
made recordation of mortgages a more time-consuming, and expensive process than in the past.
46
To alleviate the burden of recording every mortgage assignment, the mortgage securitization
industry created the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), a company that
serves as the mortgagee of record in the county land records and runs a database that tracks
ownership and servicing rights of mortgage loans.
47
MERS created a proxy or online registry
that would serve as the mortgagee of record, eliminating the need to prepare and record
subsequent transfers of servicing interests when they were transferred from one MERS member
to another.
48
In essence, it attempted to create a paperless mortgage recording process overlying
the traditional, paper-intense mortgage tracking system, in which MERS would have standing to
initiate foreclosures.
49
MERS experienced rapid growth during the housing boom. Since its inception in 1995,
66 million mortgages have been registered in the MERS system and 33 million MERS-registered
loans remain outstanding.
50
During the summer of 2010, one expert estimated that MERS was
involved in 60 percent of mortgage loans originated in the United States.
51
Widespread questions about the efficacy of the MERS model did not arise during the
boom, when home prices were escalating and the incidence of foreclosures was minimal.
52
But
as foreclosures began to increase, and documentation irregularities surfaced in some cases and
raised questions about a wide range of legal issues, including the legality of foreclosure
proceedings in general,
53
some litigants raised questions about the validity of MERS.
54
There is
46
Christopher Lewis Peterson, associate dean for academic affairs and professor of law, S.J. Quinney
College of Law, University of Utah, conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 8, 2010).
47
MERS conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 10, 2010). See Christopher Lewis Peterson, Two Faces:
Demystifying the Mortgage Ele , Real Property, Probate, and Trust
Law Journal (forthcoming) (online at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684729).
48
MERS conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 10, 2010); John R. Hodge and Laurie Williams, Mortgage
, Norton Bankruptcy
Law Adviser, at 2
49
Members pay an annual membership fee and $6.95 for every loan registered, versus approximately $30
in fees for filing a mortgage assignment at a local county land office. MERSCORP, Inc., Membership Kit (Oct.
2009) (online at www.mersinc.org/membership/WinZip/MERSeRegistryMembershipKit.pdf); Cincinnati Law
Review Paper on Foreclosure, supra note 28, at 1368-1371. See also MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E. 2d 81
(N.Y. 2006).
50
MERS conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 10, 2010).
51
Cincinnati Law Review Paper on Foreclosure, supra note 28, at 1362.
52
See , supra note 48, at 3.
53
For instance, in a question-and-answer session during a recent earnings call with investors, Jamie Dimon,
Chase & Co., Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript (Oct. 13, 2010) (online at www.morningstar.com/earn-0/earnings--
18244835-jp-morgan-chase-co-q3-201 See also
21
limited case law to provide direction, but some state courts have rendered verdicts on the issue.
In Florida, for example, appellate courts have determined that MERS had standing to bring a
foreclosure proceeding.
55
On the other hand, in Vermont, a court determined that MERS did not
have standing.
56
In the absence of more guidance from state courts, it is difficult to ascertain the impact of
the use of MERS on the foreclosure process. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the
issue is rooted in state law and lies in the hands of 50 state judges and legislatures. If states
adopt the Florida model, then the issue is likely to have a limited effect. However, if more states
adopt the Vermont model, then the issue may complicate the ability of various players in the
securitization process to enforce foreclosure liens.
57
If sufficiently widespread, these
complications could have a substantial effect on the mortgage market, inasmuch as it would
destabilize or delegitimize a system that has been embedded in the mortgage market and used by
multiple participants, both government and private. Although it is impossible to say at present
what the ultimate result of litigation on MERS will be, holdings adverse to MERS could have
significant consequences to the market.
If courts do adopt the Vermont view, it is possible that the impact may be mitigated if
market participants devise a viable workaround. For example, according to a report released by
Standard & P
MERS-related problems by taking the mortgage out of MERS and putting it in the mortgage
JPM on Foreclosures, MERS, supra note 3. This, however, related only to the use of MERS to foreclose. MERS
conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 10, 2010).
54
See generally Cincinnati Law Review Paper on Foreclosure, supra note 28. Cases addressed questions as
to standing and as to whether, by separating the mortgage and the note, the mortgage had been rendered invalid (thus
invalidating the security interest in the property). See , supra
note 48, at 20-
worst possible fate for secured loan buyers that their mortgages were not effectively transferred or even that the
mortgages have been separated from the note and are no longer enforceable. ... Whether the MERS construct holds
water is being robustly tested in a variety of contexts. Given the pervasiveness of MERS, if the construct is not
viable, if MERS cannot file foreclosures, and, perhaps most importantly, cannot even record or execute an
55
See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registry Sys. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). See also A
, supra note 48, at 9.
56
Mortg. Elec. Registry Sys. v. Johnston, No. 420-6-09 Rdcv (Rutland Superior Ct., Vt., Oct. 28, 2009)
(determining that MERS did not have standing to initiate the foreclosure because the note and mortgage had been
separated).
57
MERS was used by the most active participants in the securitization market including the largest banks
(for example, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and
processed 60 percent of all MBS. See MERSCORP, Inc., SunTrust Becomes Third Major Mortgage Provider in
Recent Months to Require MERS System (Mar. 18, 2010) (online at
www.mersinc.org/newsroom/press_details.aspx?id=235). According to MERS, it has acted as the party foreclosing
for one in five of the delinquent mortgages on its system. MERS conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 10, 2010).
22
58
According to one expert, the odds
that the status of MERS will be settled quickly are low.
59
b. Violations of Representations and Warranties in the PSA
60
Residential mortgage- PSAs typically contain or incorporate a variety
of representations and warranties. These representations and warranties cover such topics as the
organization of the sponsor and depositor, the quality and status of the mortgage loans, and the
validity of their transfers.
More particularly, PSAs, whose terms are unique to each MBS, include representations
and warranties by the originator or seller relating to the conveyance of good title,
61
documentation for the loan,
62
underwriting standards,
63
compliance with applicable law,
64
and
58
See S&P on Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 17.
59
Christopher Lewis Peterson, associate dean for academic affairs and professor of law at the S.J. Quinney
College of Law at the University of Utah, conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 8, 2010).
60
This section attempts to provide a general description of put-backs. Put-backs have been an issue
throughout the financial crisis, typically in the context of questions about underwriting standards. See, e.g., Federal
National Mortgage Association, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2009, at 9 (Feb. 26, 2010)
(online at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000095012310018235/w77413e10vk.htm
have increased, we have accordingly increased our reviews of delinquent loans to uncover loans that do not meet our
underwriting and eligibility requirements. As a result, we have increased the number of demands we make for
lenders to repurchase these loans or compensate us for losses sustained on the loans, as well as requests for
irregularities may provide an additional basis for put-backs, although the viability of these put-back claims will
depend on a variety of deal-specific issues, such as the particular representations and warranties that were
incorporated into the PSA, which in turn often are related to whether the MBSs are agency or private-label
securities. Although private-label MBS PSAs typically included weaker representations regarding the quality of the
loans and underwriting, they still contain representations regarding proper transfer of the documents to the trust.
61
Failure to transfer the loans properly would create two sources of liability: one would be in rendering the
owner of the mortgage and the note uncertain, and the other would be a breach of contract claim under the PSA. For
an example of typical language in representations and warranties contained in PSAs or incorporated by reference
from mortgage loan purchase agreements executed by the mortgage originator, see Deutsche Bank v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 42 and that immediately prior to the transfer and assignment of the
Mortgage Loans to the Trustee, the Depositor was the sole owner and had good title to each Mortgage Loan, and had
full right to transfer and sell each Mortgage Loan to the Trustee free and clear
62
See Deutsche Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 42 ( Each Mortgage Note, each
Mortgage, each Assignment and any other document required to be delivered by or on behalf of the Seller under this
Agreement or the Pooling and Servicing Agreement to the Purchaser or any assignee, transferee or designee of the
Purchaser for each Mortgage Loan has been or will be livered to the Purchaser or any such assignee, transferee
or designee. With respect to each Mortgage Loan, the Seller is in possession of a complete Mortgage File in
compliance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement The Mortgage Note and the related Mortgage are genuine,
and each is the legal, valid and binding obligation of the Mortgagor enforceable against the Mortgagor by the
mortgagee or its representative in accordance with its terms, except only as such enforcement may be limited by
loan underwriting were not falsified and contain no untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact
required to be stated therein and are not misleading and that no error, omission, misrepresentation, negligence, or
ion or insurance.
23
delivery of mortgage files,
65
among other things.
66
In addition, the mortgage files must contain
specific loan and mortgage documents and notification of material breaches of any
representations and warranties.
If any of the representations or warranties are breached, and the breach materially and
adversely affects the value of a loan, which can be as simple as reducing its market value, the
- ing that the sponsor is required to
repurchase the loan for the outstanding principal balance plus any accrued interest.
67
If successfully exercised, these put-back clauses have enormous value for investors,
because they permit the holder of a security with (at present) little value to attempt to recoup
some of the lost value from the originator (or, if the originator is out of business, the sponsor or a
successor). Put-backs shift credit risk from MBS investors to MBS sponsors (typically, as noted
above, investment banks): the sponsor now has the defective loan on its balance sheet, and the
trust has cash for the full unpaid principal balance of the loan plus accrued interest on its balance
sheet.
68
This means that the sponsor may have to increase its risk-based capital and will bear the
63
See Deutsche Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 42
applic
the wake of the housing boom, such as lack of adequate documentation, lack of income verification,
misrepresentation of income and job status, and haphazard appraisals. Even before the more recent emergence of
the issue of document irregularities, institutions were pursuing put-back actions to address concerns over
underwriting quality. See Federal National Mortgage Association, Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended June
30, 2010, at 95 (Aug. 5, 2010) (online at
seller/servicers are obligated to repurchase loans or foreclosed properties, or reimburse us for losses if the foreclosed
property has been sold, if it is determined that the mortgage loan did not meet our underwriting or eligibility
64
See Deutsche Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 42
origination complied in all material respects with applicable local, state and federal laws, including, without
limitation, predatory and abusive lending, usury, equal credit opportunity, real estate settlement procedures, truth-in-
lending and disclosure laws, and consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby, including without
65
See Deutsche Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 42.
66
For examples of representations and warranties, see New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Form 8-K
for the Period Ending February 16, 2005, at Ex. 99.2 (Mar. 11, 2005) (online at
www.secinfo.com/dqTm6.zEy.a.htm#hm88).
67
See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2009, at 131 (Feb. 26,
2010) (online at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.htm) (hereinafter
- However, since every deal is different, there are a number of different methods for
extinguishing a repurchase claim that may not necessarily require the actual repurchasing of the loan. Industry
experts conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010).
68
See Citigroup Form 10-K, supra note 67, at 131.
24
risk of future losses on the loan, while the trust receives 100 cents on the dollar for the loan.
69
Not surprisingly, put-back actions are very fact-specific and can be hotly contested.
70
Servicers do not often pursue representation and warranties violations. A 2010 study by
Amherst Mortgage Securities showed that while private mortgage insurers were rescinding
coverage on a substantial percentage of the loans they insured because of violations of very
similar representation and warranties, there was very little put-back activity by servicers, even
though one would expect relatively similar rates.
71
One explanation for the apparent lack of
servicer put-back activity may be the possibility of servicer conflicts of interest. Servicers are
often affiliated with securitization sponsors and therefore have disincentives to pursue
representation and warranty violations. Trustees have disincentives to remove servicers because
they act as backup servicers and bear the costs of servicing if the servicer is terminated from the
deal. Finally, investors are poorly situated to monitor servicers. Whereas a securitization trustee
could gain access to individual loan files but typically do not
72
investors cannot review loan
files without substantial collective costs.
73
On the other hand, investor lawsuits have the
potential to be lucrative for lawyers, so it is possible that some investor groups may take action
despite their limited access to information.
74
2. Possible Legal Consequences of the Document Irregularities to Various Parties
In addition to fraud claims, discussed further below, and claims arising from whether the
loans in the pool met the underwriting standards required (which is primarily relevant to
69
Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo & Company Annual Report 2008, at 127
an
sales or securitizations, we provide recourse to the buyer whereby we are required to repurchase loans at par value
plus accrued interest on the occurrence of certain credit-
70
Compass Point Research & Trading, LLC, Mortgage Repurchases Part II: Private Label RMBS Investors
Take Aim Quantifying the Risks (Aug. 17, 2010) (online at
api.ning.com/files/fiCVZyzNTkoAzUdzhSWYNuHv33*Ur5ZYBh3S08zo*phyT79SFi0TOpPG7klHe3h8RXKKyp
hNZqqytZrXQKbMxv4R3F6fN5dI/36431113MortgageFinanceRepurchasesPrivateLabel08172010.pdf).
71
Amherst Mortgage Insight, PMI in Non-Agency Securitizations
have
averaged 40%, Alt-
72
Securitization trustees do not examine and monitor loan files for representation and warranty violations
and generally exercise very little oversight of servicers. Securitization trustees are not general fiduciaries; so long as
there has not been an event of default for the securitization trust, the trustee has narrowly defined contractual duties,
and no others. Securitization trustees are also paid far too little to fund active monitoring; trustees generally receive
1 basis point or less on the outstanding principal balance in the trust. In addition, securitization trustees often
receive substantial amounts of business from particular sponsors, which may provide a disincentive for them to
pursue representation and warranty violations vigorously against those parties. See Nixon Peabody LLP, Caught in
the Cross-fire: Securitization Trustees and Litigation During the Subprime Crisis (Jan. 29, 2010) (online at
www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=3131) (discussing the perceived role of the trustee in
mortgage securities litigation).
73
See Section D.2, infra.
74
See Section D.2, infra.
25
put-back and bank liability), the other primary concern arising out of
document irregularities is the potential failure to convey clear title to the property and ownership
of the mortgage and the note.
There are two separate but interrelated forms of conveyance that may be implicated by
documentation irregularities: conveyance of the mortgage and the note, and conveyance of the
property securing the mortgage. The foreclosure documentation irregularities affect conveyance
of the property: if the foreclosure was not done correctly, the bank or a subsequent buyer may
not have clear title to the property. But these foreclosure irregularities may also be further
compromised by a failure to convey the mortgage and the note properly earlier in the process. If,
during the securitization process, required documentation was incomplete or improper, then
ownership of the mortgage may not have been conveyed to the trust. This could have
implications for the PSA inasmuch as it would violate any requirement that the trust own the
mortgages and the notes as well as call into question the holdings of the trust and the collateral
underlying the pools under common law, the UCC, and trust law.
75
The trust in this situation
may be unable to enforce the lien through foreclosure because only the owner of the mortgage
and the note has the right to foreclose. If the owner of the mortgage is in dispute, no one may be
able to foreclose until ownership is clearly established.
If it is unclear who owns the mortgage, clear title to the property itself cannot be
conveyed. If, for example, the trust were to enforce the lien and foreclose on the property, a
buyer could not be sure that the purchase of the foreclosed house was proper if the trust did not
have the right to foreclose on the house in the first place. Similarly, if the house is sold, but it is
unclear who owns the mortgage and the note and, thus, the debt is not properly discharged and
the lien released, a subsequent buyer may find that there are other claimants to the property. In
this way, the consequences of foreclosure documentation irregularities converge with the
consequences of securitization documentation irregularities: in either situation, a subsequent
buyer or lender may have unclear rights in the property.
These irregularities may have significant bearing on many of the participants in the
mortgage securitization process:
Parties to Whom a Mortgage and Note Is Transferred If a lien was not
filed according to appropriate procedures participants in the transfer
process may no longer have a first-lien interest in the property and may be unable to
enforce that against third-parties (and, where the property has little value, particularly
in non-recourse jurisdictions, may not be able to recover any money). Similarly, if
75
Most PSAs are governed by New York trust law and contain provisions that override UCC Article 9
provisions on secured transactions. This report does not attempt to describe every possible legal defect that may
arise out of the irregularities, particularly given the rapidly developing nature of the problem, but addresses
arguments common to the current discussions. In addition, the Panel takes no position on whether any of these
arguments are valid or likely to succeed.
26
the notes and mortgages were not properly transferred, then the party that can enforce
the rights attached to the note and the mortgage right to receive payment and right
to foreclose, among others may not be readily identifiable. If a trust does not have
proper ownership to the notes and the mortgage, it is unclear what assets are actually
in the trust, if any.
76
Sponsors, Servicers, and Trustees Failure to follow representations and warranties
found in PSAs can lead to the removal of servicers or trustees and trigger
indemnification rights between the parties.
77
Failure to record mortgages can result in
the trust losing its first-lien priority on the property. Failure to transfer mortgages and
notes properly to the trust can affect the holdings of the trust. If transfers were not
done correctly in the first place and cannot be corrected, there is a profound
implication for mortgage securitizations: it would mean that the improperly
transferred loans are not trust assets and MBS are in fact not backed by some or all of
the mortgages that are supposed to be backing them. This would mean that the trusts
would have litigation claims against the securitization sponsors for refunds of the
value given by the trusts to the sponsors (or depositors) as part of the securitization
transaction.
78
If successful, in the most extreme scenario this would mean that MBS
trusts (and thus MBS investors) could receive complete recoveries on all improperly
transferred mortgages, thereby shifting the losses to the securitization sponsors.
79
76
The competing claims about MERS can also factor into these issues. If MERS is held not to be a valid
recording system, then mortgages recorded in the name of MERS may not have first priority. Similarly, if MERS
does not have standing to foreclose, it could cast into question foreclosures done by MERS.
77
It should be noted that while no claims have been made yet based on an alleged breach of representations
and warranties related to the transfer of title, claims have been made based on allegations of poor underwriting and
loan pool quality. See Buckingham Research Group, Conference Takeaways on Mortgage Repurchase Risk, at 2
that there will be put-back demands for breaches of representations and warranties relating to mortgage transfers.
78
Because the REMIC status and avoidance of double taxation (trust level and investor level) is so critical
to the economics of securitization deals, the PSAs that govern the securitization trusts are replete with instructions to
servicers and trustees to protect the REMIC status, including provisions requiring that the transfers of the mortgage
See, e.g., Agreement Among Deutsche Alt-A Securities,
Inc., Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Master Servicer and Securities Administrator, and HSBC
Bank USA, National Association, Trustee, Pooling and Servicing Agreement (Sept. 1, 2006) (online at
www.secinfo.com/d13f21.v1B7.d.htm#1stPage).
79
If a significant number of loan transfers failed to comply with governing PSAs, it would mean that
sizeable losses on mortgages would rest on a handful of large banks, rather than being spread among MBS investors.
Sometimes the securitization sponsor is indemnified by the originator for any losses the sponsor incurs as a result of
the breach of representations and warranties. See Id. at section 10.03. This indemnification is only valuable,
however, to the extent that the originator has sufficient assets to cover the indemnification. Many originators are
thinly capitalized and others have ceased operating or filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, in many cases, any put-back
liability is likely to rest on the securitization sponsors. Although these put-back rights sometimes entitle the trust
only to the value of the loan less any payments already received, plus interest, the value the trust would receive is
still greater than the current value of many of these loans. As a number of originators and sponsors were acquired
by other major financial institutions during 2008-2009, put-back liability has become even more focused on a
relatively small number of systemically important financial institutions. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
27
Successful put-backs to these entities would require them to hold those loans on their
books. Even if the mortgage loans are still valid, enforceable obligations, the
sponsors would (if regulated for capital adequacy) be required to hold capital against
the mortgage loans, and might have to raise capital. If these banks were unable to
raise capital, it might, again, subject them to risks of insolvency and threaten the
system.
Borrowers/homeowners Borrowers may have several available causes of action.
They may seek to reclaim foreclosed properties that have been resold. They may also
refuse to pay the trustee or servicer on the grounds that these parties do not own or
legitimately act on behalf of the owner of the mortgage or the note.
80
In addition,
they may defend themselves against foreclosure proceedings on the claim that robo-
signing irregularities deprived them of due process.
Later Purchasers Potential home-buyers may be concerned that they are unable to
determine definitively whether the home they wish to purchase was actually
conveyed with clear title, and may be unwilling to rely on title insurance to protect
them.
81
Financial institutions that may have been interested in buying mortgages or
mortgage securities may worry that the current holder of the mortgage did not
actually receive the loan through a proper transfer.
Investors Originators of mortgages destined for mortgage securities execute
mortgage loan purchase agreements, incorporated into PSAs, that, as mentioned
earlier, make representations and warranties the breach of which can result in put-
back rights requiring that the mortgage originator repurchase defective mortgages.
MBS investors may assert claims regarding issues that arose during the origination
and securitization process. For instance, they may assert that violations of
underwriting standards or faulty appraisals were misrepresentations and material
omissions that violate representations and warranties and may, in some cases where
the necessary elements are established, raise fraud claims.
82
They may also raise
issues about the validity of the REMIC, the bankruptcy-remote, tax-exempt conduit
that is central to the mortgage securitization process. A potential investor claim is
Preliminary Staff Report: Securitization and the Mortgage Crisis, at 13 (Apr. 7, 2010) (online at
www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0407-Preliminary_Staff_Report_-_Securitization_and_the_Mortgage_Crisis.pdf)
(table showing that five of the top 25 sponsors in 2007 have since been acquired). Overall, recovery is likely to be
determined on a deal-by-deal basis.
80
As noted above, the servicer does not own the mortgage and the note, but has a contractual ability to
enforce the legal rights associated with the mortgage and the note.
81
Th -
protect the later buyer. If the later buyer records an interest in the property and had no notice of the competing
claim, that interest in the property will be protected. Industry sources conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010).
82
See Section E.1, infra.
28
mortgages, consistent with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations and as
required by the New York State trust law, invalidating the REMIC. Some
commentators believe that inquiries by investors could uncover untimely attempts to
cure the problem by substituting complying property more than 90 days after
formation of the REMIC, a prohibited transaction that could cause loss of REMIC
status, resulting in the loss of pass-through taxation status and taxation of income to
the trust and to the investor.
83
Loss of REMIC status would provide substantial
grounds for widespread put-backs. Moreover, this type of litigation could be
extremely lucrative for the lawyers representing the investors. It may be expected
that,
litigate forcefully.
Title Insurance Companies In the United States, purchasers of real property (i.e.,
land and/or buildings) typically purchase title insurance, which provides a payment to
the purchaser if a defect in the title or undisclosed lien is discovered after the sale of
the property is complete. Given the potential legal issues discussed in this section,
title insurance companies could face an increase in claims in the near future. The
threat of such issues may also lead insurers to require additional documentation
before issuing a policy, increasing the costs associated with buying property.
84
Junior Lien Holders Second and third liens are not as commonly securitized as first
liens; therefore, their holders may not face the same direct risk as first lien holders.
Junior lien holders may, however, face an indirect risk if the rights of the first lien
holder cannot be properly established. If the property securing the lien is sold, all
senior liens must be paid first. If the senior liens cannot be paid off because it is
83
The majority of PSAs were created under the laws of New York state. Under New York law, there are
four requirements for creating a trust: (1) a designated beneficiary; (2) a designated trustee; (3) property sufficiently
identified; and (4) and the delivery of the property to the trustee. Joshua Rosner of Graham Fisher, an investment
research firm, has noted that there may not have always been pro In New
York it is not enough to have an intention to deliver the property to the trust, the property must actually be delivered.
So, what defines acceptable delivery? the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement (PSA). Thus, in order to have proper delivery the parties to the PSA must do that which the
PSA demands to achieve delivery SA
requires that property be conveyed to the trust within a certain timeframe, such conveyance would be void. N.Y.
Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law § 7-
84
Although title insurers appear to be poised for potential risk, one observer has noted that title insurance
lobbyists and trade groups have instead played down the possible effects of these legal issues. Christopher Lewis
Peterson, professor of law, S.J. Quinney School of Law, University of Utah, conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 8,
2010). Title insurers state that they do not presently believe that these legal issues will have much effect. Industry
sources conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 10, 2010). Professor Peterson suggested that the insurers may earn
sufficient remuneration from various fees to offset any potential risk. On the other hand, title insurers could stand to
suffer significant losses if some of the matters presently discussed in the market, such as widespread invalidation of
MERS, come to pass. It is too soon to say if such events are likely, but title insurers would be one of the primary
parties damaged by such an action.
29
impossible to determine who holds those liens, the junior lien holder may not be able
to claim any of the proceeds of the sale until the identity of the senior lien holder is
settled. On the other hand, document irregularities may offer a windfall for some
junior liens. If the first mortgage has not been perfected, the first lien holder loses its
priority over any other, perfected liens. Therefore, if a second lien was properly
recorded, it could take priority over a first lien that was not properly recorded. The
majority of second liens, however, were completed using the same system as first
liens and therefore face the same potential issues. Moreover, many mortgages that
were created during the housing boom were created with an 80 percent/20 percent
- simultaneously
and using the same system. If neither lien was perfected, there may be a question as
to which would take priority over the other.
85
Local Actions Despite the state attorney general national approach to
investigating document irregularities, there may be separate state initiatives. Under
traditional mortgage recording practices, each time a mortgage is transferred from a
seller to a buyer, the transfer must be recorded and a fee paid to the local government.
Although each fee is not large typically around $30 the fees for the rapid transfers
inherent in the mortgage securitization process could easily add up to hundreds of
dollars per securitization. The MERS system was intended in part to bypass these
fees.
86
Local jurisdictions, deprived of mortgage recording tax revenue, may file
lawsuits against originators, servicers, and MERS.
The primary private litigation in this area is likely to come from investors in MBS. These
investors are often institutional investors, a group that has the resources and expertise to pursue
such claims.
87
A major obstacle to investor lawsuits seeking put-backs has been a provision in
PSAs that limits private investor action in the case of breaches of representations and warranties
to certificate holders with some minimum percentage of voting rights, often 25 percent.
88
Investors also suffer from a collective-action problem in trying to achieve these thresholds, not
least because they do not know who the other investors are in a particular deal, and many
85
Christopher Lewis Peterson, professor of law, S.J. Quinney School of Law, University of Utah,
conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 8, 2010). If the mortgages were created at different times, the mortgage created
first would take precedence.
86
Cincinnati Law Review Paper on Foreclosure, supra note 28, at 1386-1371.
87
Institutional holders of RMBS include pension funds, hedge funds and other asset managers, mutual
funds, life insurance companies, and foreign investors. Data provided by Inside Mortgage Finance (Nov. 12, 2010).
88
See Buckingham Research Group Conference Takeaways, supra note 77, at 2.
30
investors are reluctant to share information about their holdings. Furthermore, the interests of
junior and senior tranche holders may not be aligned.
89
When investors do achieve the collective-action threshold, it is only the first step in a
complicated process. For example, if the trustee declines to declare the servicer in default, then
investors can either bring suit against the trustee to force it to remove the servicer, attempt to
remove the trustee (which often requires a 51 percent voting threshold), or remove the servicer
directly (with a two-thirds voting threshold). It bears emphasis that the collective-action
thresholds required vary from deal to deal. Two recent investor lawsuits started with a view to
enforce put-back provisions resulted in dismissals based on the -
percent threshold requirements.
90
The practical effect of such decisions is that the hurdle of
meeting this relatively high threshold of certificate holders can limit
the documents that would support their claims.
Recently, however, investors are beginning to take collective action, suggesting that the
25 percent threshold may not be an enormous burden for organized investors. A registry created
by RMBS Clearing House is providing a confidential data bank whose purpose is to identify and
organize certificate holders into groups that can meet threshold requirements.
91
Using the
registry data, a lawsuit has been initiated against JPMorgan Chase and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
92
both of which have assumed liabilities of failed bank
Washington Mutual, seeking to enforce put-backs and document disclosure. Recently, an
investor group composed of eight institutional investors, including the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (FRBNY), representing more than 25 percent of the voting rights in certain
Countrywide MBSs,
93
made a request of securitization trustee Bank of New York to initiate an
investigation of the offerings originated by Countrywide prior to its acquisition by Bank of
89
Also, to the extent that these MBSs have been turned into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the
collateral manager overseeing the CDOs may need to weigh actions that pose conflicts among the tranche holders
because of obligations to act in the best interests of all the securities classes. Panel staff conversations with industry
sources (Nov. 8, 2010).
90
Greenwich Fin. Serv. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 650474/08 (N.Y. Supp. Oct. 7, 2010); Footbridge
Ltd. Trust and OHP Opportunity Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09 CIV 4050 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28,
2010).
91
Based on conversations between Panel staff and the company, RMBS Clearing House claims to represent
more than 72 percent of the certificate holders of 2,300 mortgage-backed securities, more than 50 percent of holders
of 900 mortgage-backed securities, and more than 66 percent of the holders of 450 mortgage-backed securities
representing, in the aggregate, a face amount of $500 billion, or approximately one-third of the private label
mortgage-backed securities market. One industry participant likened them to a dating site for investors. RMBS
Clearing House conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 24, 2010).
92
See Deutsche Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 42.
93
Gibbs & Bruns represents eight institutional investors who collectively hold more than 25 percent of the
voting rights in more than $47 billion in Countrywide mortgage-backed securities issued in 115 offerings in 2006
and 2007. On Oct 20, 2010, FRBNY became a signatory to the letter.
31
America. After Bank of New York refused to act,
94
the group petitioned Bank of America
directly in an effort to review the loan files in the pool.
95
Some believe that the difficulty faced
by investors in gaining access to the loan files that support their claims of contractual breaches
and the cost of auditing them will make widespread litigation economically unrealistic.
96
Even
as put-back demands from investors are appearing, unless the investors can review loan
documents, they lack the information to know what level of put-backs should be occurring.
Moreover, at least one bank CEO has stated that his bank will challenge any determination that
underwriting standards were not met on a loan-by-loan basis, creating further hurdles.
97
At
present, it is unclear what litigation risk these proceedings are likely to pose for the banks.
98
There is good reason to assume, however, that the litigation will attract sophisticated parties
interested in the deep pockets of the sponsors.
Given the complexity of the legal issues, the numerous parties involved, and the
relationships between many of them, it is likely that any litigation will be robust, costly, and
lengthy. Nonetheless, it is possible that banks may see a financial advantage to delaying put-
backs through litigation and other procedural hurdles, if only to slow the pace at which they must
be completed and to keep the loans off of their books a little longer. In addition, as discussed
above, conflicts of interest in the industry may further complicate an assessment of litigation
risk: servicers, trustees, sponsors, and originators are often affiliated with each other, meaning
that each has a disincentive to proceed with an action against another lest it harm its own bottom
94
Under the PSA, the trustee is entitled to a satisfactory indemnity prior to allowing such a process to
continue. The trustee for the securities, Bank of New York, did not find the indemnity offered acceptable and
refused to allow the parties to proceed. The various trustees for these securities may therefore form an additional
barrier between investors and review of the loan files. For example, Fannie Mae explains in a prospectus for
mortgage-backed securities (REMIC certificates) that
funds or incur any liability if we do not believe those funds are recoverable or if we do not believe adequate
See Federal National Mortgage Association, Single-Family REMIC
Prospectus, at 44 (May 1, 2010) (online at
www.efanniemae.com/syndicated/documents/mbs/remicpros/SF_FM_May_1_2010.pdf).
95
Letter from Gibbs & Bruns LLP on behalf of BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. et al. to
Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, The Bank of New York, and counsel,
Master Servicer
including FRBNY alleges generally that the loans in the pools did not meet the quality required by the PSA and
have not been prudently serviced.
96
Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, commented during a recent quarterly earnings call that litigation
costs in foreclosure cases will be so large as to become a cost of doing business and that, in anticipation of such suits
JPMorgan Chase has raised its reserves by $1.3 billion. Transcript provided by SNL Financial (Nov. 3, 2010). See
also JPM on Foreclosures, MERS, supra note 3.
97
Chuck Noski, chief financial officer for Bank of America, stated during an earnings call for the third
-by-loan determination and we have, we believe, the resources to
Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript (Oct. 19,
2010) (online at www.morningstar.com/earnings/18372176-bank-of-america-corporation-q3-2010.aspx?pindex=1)
.
98
For a discussion of litigation risk, see Section F.2, infra.
32
line.
99
Moreover, there is the possibility that those who foresee favorable results from such
litigation, and who have the resources and stamina for complex litigation (such as hedge funds),
will purchase affected assets with the intent to participate as plaintiffs, intensifying the legal
battle further. TARP recipients, of course, were and are at the center of many of these
transactions, and predicting all of the possible litigation to which they might be subject as a
result of the irregularities (known and suspected) is virtually impossible. It is not unlikely that,
on the heels of highly publicized actions initiated by major financial institutions and the
increasing likelihood that investors can meet the 25 percent threshold requirements for filing
lawsuits, sophisticated institutional investors may become more interested in pursuing litigation
or even in investing in MBS in order to position themselves for lawsuits.
100
Some security
holders, such as large endowments and pension plans, have fiduciary duties to their own
investors that may lead them to try and enforce repurchase rights. In addition, if investors such
as hedge funds that have the resources to support protracted litigation initiate lawsuits, that could
intensify the legal battles that banks will face.
101
If litigation based on significant document
irregularities is successful, it may throw the large banks back into turmoil.
Similarly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may become embroiled in the controversies.
Fannie and Freddie have already been actively engaged in efforts to put-back nonconforming
loans to the originators/sponsors of the loans they guarantee. But they may also find themselves
on the other side, as targets of litigation. In addition to being embedded in the entire
securitization process, they are part owners of MERS,
102
which is becoming a litigation target.
99
See Section D.1.b, supra.
100
See discussion of collective action thresholds in this section, supra.
101
In its latest filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Citigroup acknowledged that
hedge fund Cambridge Place Investment Management, The Charles Schwab Corporation, the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Chicago, and the Federal Home Loan Bank of Indianapolis have filed actions related to underwriting
irregularities in RMBS. See Citigroup, Inc., Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2010, at 204
(Nov. 5, 2010) (online at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000104746910009274/a2200785z10-q.htm)
- . In addition, the hedge fund community has begun coalescing around
their investments in RMBS, forming a lobbying group called the Mortgage Investors Coalition. See Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Written Testimony of Curtis Glovier, managing director,
Fortress Investment Group, Preserving Homeownership: Progress Needed to Prevent Foreclosures (July 16, 2009)
(online at banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=18f542f2-1b61-4486-98d0-
c02fc74ea2c5).
102
See MERSCORP, Inc., MERS Shareholders (online at www.mersinc.org/about/shareholders.aspx)
pital
support, MERS was able to fund expenses related to development and initial start- See also Letter from R.K.
Arnold, president and chief executive officer, MERSCORP, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission, C -Backed Securities, at Appendix B
(July 30, 2010) (online at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-58.pdf) (attaching as an Appendix letters from
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which include the Fannie Ma
been an advocate and strong supporter of the efforts of MERS since its formation in 1996. The mission of MERS to
streamline the mortgage process through paperless initiatives and data standards is clearly in the best interests of the
33
Both Fannie and Freddie have recently ceased allowing MERS to bring foreclosure actions.
103
Further, Fannie and Freddie used at least one of the law firms implicated in the irregularities to
handle foreclosures.
104
Given that these two government-supported firms are perceived as the
,
liability to them, which, if successful, could further affect the taxpayers.
105
3. Additional Considerations
The participants described above are by no means the only parties affected by these
issues. Lenders may be reluctant to make new loans on homes that could have title issues.
Investors may likewise be reluctant to invest in mortgages and MBS that may be affected.
Uncertainty about the actions that federal and state governments may take to address the
documentation issues, how these actions will affect investment returns, and concerns that these
problems may be widespread in the mortgage industry may also discourage investors. Until
there is more clarity on the legal issues surrounding title to affected properties, as well as on the
extent of any title transfer issues, it may also become more difficult or expensive to get title
insurance, an essential part of any real estate transaction. In addition, put-backs of mortgages,
103
See Federal National Mortgage Association, Miscellaneous Servicing Policy Changes, at 3 (Mar. 30,
2010) (Announcement SVC-2010-05) (online at www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/svc1005.pdf)
(
foreclosure action, whether judicial or non-judicial, on a mortgage loan owned or securitized by Fannie Ma
104
On November 2, 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac terminated their relationships with a Florida
foreclosure attorney David J. Stern, who had processed thousands of evictions on their behalf and faces allegations
ce of improper foreclosure practices including false and misleading
documents. See Office of Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, Florida Law Firms Subpoenaed Over
Foreclosure Filing Practices (Aug. 10, 2010) (online at
www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/2BAC1AF2A61BBA398525777B0051BB30); Office of Florida
Attorney General Bill McCollum, Active Public Consumer-Related Investigation, No. L10-3-1145 (online at
www.myfloridalegal.com/__85256309005085AB.nsf/0/AD0F010A43782D96852577770067B68D?Open&Highligh
t=0,david,stern) (accessed Nov. 10, 2010); Nick Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie Cut Ties to Law Firm, Wall Street
Journal (Nov. 3, 2010) (online at online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704462704575590342587988742.html)
c, Sharon McHale, said it took the rare step on Monday of beginning to remove
105
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship
ent
condition. Treasury has guaranteed their debts, and FHFA has all the powers of the management, board, and
shareholders of the GSEs. House Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Written Testimony of Edward J. DeMarco, acting director, Federal Housing
Finance Agency, The Future of Housing Finance: A Progress Update on the GSEs, at 2 (Sept. 15, 2010) (online at
financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/DeMarco091510.pdf). One of the questions that has arisen is
whether there are likely to be differences in the quality of securitization processing for government-sponsored entity
(GSE) MBS compared to private-label MBS. Some industry sources believe that the process underlying GSE
securitizations is likely to have been more rigorous, but it is presently impossible to determine if this is correct, and,
accordingly, this report does not attempt to distinguish between GSE and private-label deals. However, if GSE
securitizations prove to have been done improperly, it might result in additional litigation for the GSEs either as
targets, or as the GSEs try to pursue indemnification rights.
34
damages from lawsuits, and claims against title companies, mortgage servicers, and MBS
pooling and securitization firms have the potential to drive these firms out of business. Should
these and other companies that provide services to the mortgage market either decide to exit the
market or go bankrupt, and no other companies opt to take their place in the current environment,
the housing market would likely suffer. Even the mere possibility of such losses in the future
could have a chilling effect on the risk tolerance of these firms, and could dim the housing
market expectations of prospective home buyers and mortgage investors, further reducing
housing demand and raising the cost of mortgages.
106
More generally, however, and as noted below, the efficient functioning of the housing
market is highly dependent on the existence of clear property rights and a level of trust that
various market participants have in each other and in the integrity of the market system.
107
If the
current foreclosure irregularities prove to be widespread, they have the potential to undermine
trust in the legitimacy of many foreclosures and hence in the legality of title on many foreclosed
properties.
108
In that case, it is possible that buyers will avoid purchasing properties in
foreclosure proceedings because they cannot be sure that they are purchasing a clean title.
Protections in the law, such as those for a bona-fide purchaser for value, may not ease their
anxiety if they are concerned that they will become embroiled in litigation when prior owners
appeal foreclosure rulings. These concerns would be likely to continue until the situation is
resolved, or at least until the legal issues surrounding title to foreclosed properties have been
clarified. Those buyers who remain will likely face less competition and will offer very low
bids. Even foreclosed homes that have already been sold are at risk, since homes sold before
these documentation issues came to light cannot be assumed to have a legally provable chain of
title. These homes will therefore likely be difficult to resell, except at low prices that attract risk-
tolerant buyers.
E. Court Cases and Litigation
The foreclosure documentation irregularities unquestionably show a system riddled with
errors. But the question arises: were they merely sloppy mistakes, or were they fraudulent?
Differing answers to this question may not affect certain remedies available to aggrieved parties
put-backs, for example, are available for both mistakes and for fraud but would affect
106
See Mortgage Troubles Continue To Weigh On
U.S. Banks (Nov. 4, 2010) (online at www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/events/FITcon11410Article5.pdf)
case scenarios).
107
Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere
Else, at 5-
108
The few foreclosed homes where a single bank originated the mortgage, serviced it, held it as a whole
loan, and processed the foreclosure documents themselves are very unlikely to be affected. The effect of the
irregularities on other types of loans and homes are, as discussed in this report, presently very difficult to predict.
35
potential damages in a lawsuit.
109
It is important to note that the various parties who may be able
to bring lawsuits may choose different causes of action for very similar sets of facts depending
on standing and a host of other factors. For example, on the same facts, an investor may try to
pursue a civil suit alleging violations of representations and warranties relating to underwriting
standards in a PSA instead of pursuing a securities fraud case where the burden of proof would
be higher. Put another way, plaintiffs will pursue as many or as few causes of action as they
believe serves their purpose, and one case does not necessarily preclude another.
1. Fraud Claims
a. Common Law Fraud
Property law is principally a state issue, and the foreclosure irregularities first surfaced in
depositions filed in state courts. Accordingly, one option for plaintiffs may be to pursue a
common law fraud claim. The bar for proving common law fraud, however, is fairly high. In
order to prove common law fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) that the
respondent made a material statement; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that the respondent
made the statement with the intent to deceive the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff relied on the
statement; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of that reliance.
110
Traditionally, in order to prove common law fraud under state laws, each element
detailed above has to be satisfied to the highest degree of rigor. has
somewhat different relevant interpretive provisions, and common law fraud is generally
109
See, e.g., Agreement Among Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc., Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, Master Servicer and Securities Administrator, and HSBC Bank USA, National Association, Trustee,
Pooling and Servicing Agreement (Sept. 1, 2006) (online at www.secinfo.com/d13f21.v1B7.d.htm
Repurchase or Substitution of Loans. (a) Upon discovery or receipt of notice ... of a breach by the Seller of any
representation, warranty or covenant under the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement ... the Trustee shall enforce the
Trust Agreement
Between GS Mortgage Securities Corp., Depositor, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-FM1 (Apr. 1, 2006) (online at
www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.v1Py.c.htm#1stPage
representation, warranty, or covenant under this Assignment Agreement ... the Assignee may enforce the Assignor's
obligation hereunder to purchase
110
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing W.
Prosser, Law of Torts, §§ 100-05 (3d ed. 1964) and 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3 (1943)).
36
perceived as a fairly difficult claim to make.
111
In particular, the requirement of intent has been
very difficult to show, since it requires more than simple negligence.
112
b. Securities Fraud
i. Foreclosure Irregularities
In the wake of the revelations about foreclosure irregularities, a number of government
agencies have gotten involved. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is reviewing
the mortgage securitization process and market participants for possible securities law violations.
It has also provided specific disclosure guidance to public companies for their quarterly
reports.
113
Since many of the mortgages potentially affected by faulty documentation practices
were put into securitization pools, there is an increased potential for lawsuits by investors,
including securities law claims.
In order for MBS investors to state a securities fraud claim against investment or
commercial bank sponsors under Rule 10b-5,
114
the most
common private litigant cause of action, the investors must prove: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission; (2) wrongful intent; (3) connection to the purchase or sale of the
111
See, e.g., Lynn Y. McKernan, Stric
Time, Arizona
attractive, common law fraud is generally difficult Assigning Common Law Claims for
Fraud
A Rose May Not Always Be a Rose: Some General Partnership Interests Should Be
Deemed Securities Under the Federal Securities Acts, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15, at 1313, 1318 (Jan. 1994)
112
See Seth Lipner & Lisa A. Catalano, The Tort of Giving Negligent Investment Advice, University of
Memphis Law Review, Vol. 39, at 697 n.181 (2009); Jack E. Karns & Jerry G. Hunt, Can Portfolio Damages Be
, Oklahoma City
University Law Review, Vol. 24, at 214 (1999).
113
See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera, , Financial Times (Oct. 15,
2010) (online at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1ff71c8-d887-11df-8e05-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=ffa475a0-f3ff-11dc-aaad-
the upcoming quarterly reports by affected companies. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Sample Letter
Sent to Public Companies on Accounting and Disclosure Issues Related to Potential Risks and Costs Associated
with Mortgage and Foreclosure-Related Activities or Exposures (Oct. 2010) (online at
on Disclosure
114
17 CFR 240.10b-5. It important to note that other causes of action are available under the Securities Act
of 1933 for registered offerings: under Section 11, a claim may be made for a false or misleading statement in the
registration statement, and the issuer of the security, the special purpose vehicle, underwriters, and auditors will all
be subject to potential Section 11 liability (with the latter two groups having due diligence defenses). With respect
to other communications made during the registered offering process, misleading statements can give rise to Section
12(a)(2) liability. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77m.
37
security; (4) reliance by the purchaser on the information; (5) economic loss to the plaintiff; and
(6) causation.
115
To be sure, private investor lawsuits have been ongoing since the end of 2006 without
much success.
116
Some argue that securities fraud was not at the heart of the financial crisis, and
securities fraud claims are bound to fail because of the typically extensive disclosure on risks
associated with these transactions.
117
A number of judges seem to agree: some important cases
suggest judicial skepticism to claims arising from the mortgage and financial crises
118
The
main hurdle in these securities claims beyond establishing that the misrepresentations were so
material that without them the investment would not have been made
, . Any losses
industry-specific conditi will not be recoverable.
119
Defendants in subprime litigation cases
are likely to argue that the crash of the housing market, for example, was just such an unexpected
new industry-specific condition.
120
Losses occurring as a result of th would be
non-recoverable even if there was a material misrepresentation. It remains to be seen how
securities fraud cases would play out in the context of the current documentation irregularities.
Of course, the SEC has other tools at its disposal should it choose to pursue action against
any of the financial institutions involved in potential documentation irregularities. For example,
115
See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). The SEC can bring enforcement
claims under a variety of theories, but private litigants typically litigate under Rule 10b-5. See Scott J. Davis,
Symposium: The Going-private Phenomenon: Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selection and Liability Help
, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 76, at 104
(Winter 2009); Palmer T. Heenan, et al., Securities Fraud, American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 47, at 1018
(Spring 2010).
116
For an extensive analysis of subprime mortgage-related litigation up to 2008 and potential legal issues
surrounding such litigation, see Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrel, and Gang Hu, Law and Economics Issues in
Subprime Litigation, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center For Law, Economics, and Business Discussion
its filed up to February 28, 2008 is included in Table 1
of the article, at 67-69.
117
See, e.g., Peter H. Hamner, The Credit Crisis and Subprime Mortgage Litigation: How Fraud Without
, UPR Business Law Journal, Vol. 1 (2010) (online at
www.uprblj.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/1-UPRBLJ-103-Hamner-PH.pdf).
118
A recent update on subprime and credit crisis-related litigation summarizes a number of cases and
analyzes why many of them failed (for example, lack of standing and lack of wrongful intent). Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, 2010 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update (Aug. 9, 2010) (online at
gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/SecuritiesLitigation2010Mid-YearUpdate.aspx#_toc268774214). The update
also references a report by NERA Economic Consulting on a decrease in securities law filings since 2009. See
National Economic Research Associates, Inc. Trends 2010 Mid-Year Study: Filings Decline as the Wave of Credit
Crisis Cases Subsides, Median Settlement at Record High (July 27, 2010) (online at www.nera.com/67_6813.htm).
119
See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005).
120
For a more complete discussion of this theory, see Harvard Law School Discussion Paper on Subprime
Litigation, supra note 116, at 42-44.
38
if a formal SEC investigation finds evidence of wrongdoing, the SEC may order an
administrative hearing to determine responsibility for the violation and impose sanctions.
Administrative proceedings can only be brought against a person or firm registered with the
SEC, or with respect to a security registered with the SEC. Many times these actions end with a
settlement, but the SEC often seeks to publish the settlement terms.
ii. Due Diligence Firms
There is also the possibility of distinct claims against the institutions that acted as
securitization sponsors for their use of third-party due diligence firms. Specifically, before
purchasing a pool of loans to securitize, the securitization sponsors, usually banks or investment
firms, hired a third-party due diligence firm to check if the loans in the pool adhered to the
ral, state, and local regulatory laws.
121
The sponsor would select a sample of the total loan pool, typically around 10 percent,
122
for the
due diligence firm to review. The due diligence firm reviewed the sample on a loan-by-loan
basis and categorized each as not meeting the guidelines, not meeting the guidelines but having
compensating factors, or meeting the guidelines. Those specific loans that did not meet the
guidelines, called exceptions, were returned to the sellers unless the securitization sponsors
waived their objections.
123
One due diligence firm found that, from the first quarter 2006 to
121
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Written Testimony of Vicki Beal, senior vice president, Clayton
Holdings, Impact of the Financial Crisis Sacramento, at 2 (Sept. 23, 2010) (online at
www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0923-Beal.pdf) (hereinafte
122
Id. at 2. A sample size of only around 10 percent of the total loans in the pool was low by historical
standards. In the past, sample sizes were between 50 percent and 100 percent. Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, Testimony of Keith Johnson, former president, Clayton Holdings, Transcript: Impact of the Financial
Crisis Sacramento, at 183 (Sept. 23, 2010) (online at fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0923-transcript.pdf) (hereinafter
Calling the testimony
three points. First, Mr. Johnson testified during the hearing about
Mr.
Bossidy stated that Clayton had never disclosed client data during these meetings and that Clayton had never
expressed concerns about the securitization process or the ratings being issued. Second, Mr. Bossidy cautioned that
These reports contain valid client-level
data, but are not standardized across clients. Different clients have different standards and guidelines, leading to
different exception rates. Thus, the aggregated results do not form a meaningful basis for comparison between
clients and the data cannot be used to draw conclusions. Finally, Mr. Johnson had stated that Clayton examined a
Mr.
Bossidy clarified that Clayton was not actively reviewing prospectuses but had begun only in 2007 in response to
specific questions from regulators. Letter from Paul T. Bossidy, president and chief executive officer, Clayton
Holdings, LLC, to Phil Angelides, chairman, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Re: September 23, 2010
Sacramento Hearing (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at fcic.gov/news/pdfs/2010-1014-Clayton-Letter-to-FCIC.pdf)
123
This description is just a summary. For a more complete d
process, see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Testimony of Vicki Beal, senior vice president, Clayton
Holdings, Transcript: Impact of the Financial Crisis Sacramento, at 156-158 (Sept. 23, 2010) (online at
fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0923-transcript.pdf
39
second quarter 2007, only 54 percent of the loans they sampled met all underwriting
guidelines.
124
Rejected loans from the sample were returned to the seller. The sample, though, was
only approximately 10 percent of the loans in the pool, and the low rate of compliance indicated
that there were likely other non-compliant loans in the pool. The securitization sponsors did not
then require due diligence on a larger sample to identify non-compliant loans.
125
Instead, some
assert that the sponsors used the rate of non-compliant loans to negotiate a lower price for the
pool of loans.
126
These loan pools were subsequently sold to investors but, reports claim, the
results of the due diligence were not disclosed in the prospectuses except for standard language
that there might be underwriting exceptions.
127
This behavior raises at least two potential securities fraud claims. The first is a Rule 10b-
5 violation.
128
Rule 10b-5 pro omit[ting] to state any material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
129
If the sponsors used the due diligence reports to negotiate a lower price, the
information may have been material. In addition, the reports were not publicly available.
130
On
the other hand, the courts may find the standard disclosures, that there might be underwriting
exceptions, to be sufficient disclosure. As yet, the 10b-5 claim is untested in the courts, and the
facts are still unproven.
Another potential claim is based on Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, which
makes it r or sale of any securities ... to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
124
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, All Clayton Trending Reports: 1st Quarter 2006 2nd Quarter
2007, Impact of the Financial Crisis Sacramento (Sept. 23, 2010) (online at www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-
0923-Clayton-All-Trending-Report.pdf). Eighteen percent of sampled loans did not meet guidelines but had
compensating factors. Eleven percent of loans were non-compliant loans, but objections were waived. Seventeen
percent of the loans in the sample were rejected. In his letter to the FCIC noted above, Mr. Bossidy cautioned the
FCIC from relying on aggregated exception information. The exception tracking data provided to the FCIC was
eports which contain valid client-level data, but are not standardized across clients. Different clients
use different standards and guidelines, leading to different exception rates. Letter from Paul Bossidy to Phil
Angelides, supra note 122.
125
Testimony of Keith Johnson before the FCIC, supra note 122, at 177-78; Testimony of Vicki Beal
before the FCIC, supra note 123, at 177.
126
Testimony of Keith Johnson before the FCIC, supra note 122, at 183, 210-211.
127
Written Testimony of Vicki Beal before the FCIC, supra note 121, at 3.
128
17 CFR 240.10b5.
129
17 CFR 240.10b5.
130
Written Testimony of Vicki Beal before the FCIC, supra note 121
Clayton is comprised of reports that include loan-level data reports and loan exception reports. Such reports are
40
131
This claim also depends on unproved facts, but if the securitization sponsors
used the due diligence reports to negotiate a lower price for the loan pools, the information is
arguably material. As such, the sponsors may have violated Section 17 when they omitted the
results of the due diligence reports from the prospectuses, though the proposition has not yet
been ruled on by a court. Section 17, however, can only be enforced by the SEC, and not by
private litigants.
There are suggestions in the press that authorities are examining the issue, with several
news reports referencing discussions with investigators or prosecutors.
132
2. Existing and Pending Claims under Various Fraud Theories
Currently, these issues are being explored at the state level and, as discussed above, the
private investor level. The recent disclosures about robo-signing may provide additional causes
of action and additional arguments for private lawsuits asking for put-backs of deficient loans.
r, one of
the witnesses indicated that he was not aware of any successful put-backs for foreclosure
procedure problems alone.
133
According to some consumer lawyers who are significantly
involved in these proceedings, while it is very unlikely that a national class action lawsuit based
on wrongful foreclosure claims could be successfully filed, it may be possible on a state-by-state
basis.
134
The outcome in these cases is uncertain, and consumer lawyers said that at this point it
would be difficult to quantify potential losses arising out of these actions or any similar
challenges in individual foreclosure procedures.
135
Various states are proceeding under a variety of theories. As noted above, on October 13,
2010, all 50 state attorneys general, as well as state bank and mortgage regulators, announced
131
15 U.S.C. §77q(a).
132
Gretchen Morgenson, Raters Ignored Proof of Unsafe Loans, Panel is Told, The New York Times
(Sept. 26, 2010) (online at www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/business/27ratings.html?pagewanted=all); Gretchen
Morgenson, Seeing vs. Doing, The New York Times (July 24, 2010) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/business/25gret.html?ref=fair_game).
133
Congressional Oversight Panel, Testimony of Guy Cecala, chief executive officer and publisher, Inside
Mortgage Finance Publications, Inc., Transcript: COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs (Oct.
27, 2010) (publication forthcoming) (online at cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-102710-foreclosure.cfm)
134
Consumer lawyers conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010). Several state class actions have been
filed alleging wrongful foreclosures and fraud on the court, see, e.g.
Affirmative Defenses and Individual and Class Action Counterclaims, Wells Fargo Bank NA, as Trustee for
National City Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-1 vs. William Timothy
Stacy, et al., No. 08-CI-120 (Commonwealth of Kentucky Bourbon Circuit Court Division 1 Oct. 4, 2010) See also
Class Action Complaint, -Souza, and Michael and Tina Unsworth, for themselves
and all persons similarly situated v. GMAC, LLC, n/k/a Ally Financial, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-02458-SCB-EAJ (United
States District Court Middle District of Florida Tampa Division Nov. 4, 2010).
135
Consumer lawyers conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010).
41
- foreclosure irregularities.
136
They are working together to investigate allegations of questionable and potentially fraudulent
foreclosure documentation practices, and may design rules to improve foreclosure practices.
They also may begin individual actions against some of the implicated institutions. On
October 6, 2010, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray filed a suit against GMAC Mortgage
and its parent Ally Financial, alleging that the companies committed common law fraud and
violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.
137
In response, GMAC referred to the
138
consumers and Ohio courts by signing and filing hundreds of false affidavits in foreclosure
Practices Act and constituted common law fraud.
139
The attorney general has asked the court to
halt affected foreclosures until defendants remedy their faulty practices and to require them to
submit written procedures to the attorney general and the court to ensure that no employee signs
documentation without personal knowledge.
Although Ohio is the first state to take action, it would not be surprising if others
follow.
140
Depositions have been taken in various foreclosure cases around the country that
point to questionable practices by employees at a number of banks.
141
Most of the large financial
institutions that service mortgages maintain that documentation issues can be fixed relatively
easily by re-submitting affidavits where appropriate and that based on their internal reviews there
is no indication that the mortgage market is severely flawed. Many of the banks that temporarily
suspended foreclosures have now resumed them. However, in their most recent earnings
136
50 States Sign Mortgage Foreclosure Joint Statement, supra note 26.
137
Complaint, State of Ohio ex rel. Richard Cordray v. GMAC Mortgage, CI0201006984 (Lucas Cnty
Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Oct. 6, 2010) (online at www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/GMACLawsuit). The complaint
signed thousands of affidavits without verifying their content that ignited the foreclosure documentation scandal.
138
Ally Financial, Inc., GMAC Mortgage Statement on Ohio Lawsuit (Oct. 6, 2010) (online at
media.ally.com/index.php?s=43&item=420).
139
The Ohio attorney general argues that the statements in the foreclosure affidavits were material and
false, and the employees making them were aware that they were false and were making them anyway to induce
Ohio courts and opposing parties to rely upon them, which, in turn, justifiably did so. He further argues that Ally
and GMAC financially benefitted from these fraudulent practices by completing foreclosures that should not have
employees signed false affidavits and when they attempted to assign mortgage notes on behalf of MERS.
Complaint, State of Ohio ex rel. Richard Cordray v. GMAC Mortgage, CI0201006984 (Lucas Cnty Ohio Ct.
Common Pleas Oct. 6, 2010) (online at www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/GMACLawsuit).
140
See Section E.3.
141
See, e.g., Deposition of Xee Moua, Wells Fargo Bank v. John P. Stipek, No. 50 2009 CA
012434XXXXMB AW (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2010).
42
statements, many of these institutions have indicated that they set aside additional funds for
repurchase reserves and potential litigation costs resulting from the foreclosure documentation
irregularities.
In addition to these potential lawsuits, s Financial Fraud Enforcement
Task Force (FFETF) is in the early stages of an investigation into whether banks and other
companies that submitted flawed paperwork in state foreclosure proceedings may also have
violated federal laws.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) they are actively participating in the work of
the FFETF led by the Department of Justice.
142
Treasury has otherwise indicated that they are
not presently engaged in any independent investigative efforts.
143
To date, little has been
disclosed about the investigation.
3. Other Potential Claims
Beyond the various fraud claims, there are also several other potential claims. For
example, those who signed false affidavits may be guilty of perjury. Perjury is the crime of
intentionally stating any fact the witness knows to be false while under oath, either in oral
testimony or in a written declaration.
144
Though the exact definition varies from state to state,
perjury is universally prohibited. Affidavits such as the ones involved in the foreclosure
irregularities are statements made under oath and thus clearly fall within the scope of the perjury
statutes.
145
Moreover, there are reports of robo-signers admitting in depositions that they knew
142
Congressional Oversight Panel, Written Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, chief of the Homeownership
Preservation Office, U.S. Department of the Treasury, COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, at
13 (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102710-
ting efforts with
other federal agencies and regulators, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Federal Reserve System,
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the FDIC, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), and the SEC.
143
Congressional Oversight Panel, Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, chief of the Homeownership
Preservation Office, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Transcript: COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation
Programs (Oct. 27, 2010) (publication forthcoming) (online at cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-102710-
foreclosure.cfm)
144
For ex (1) having taken an oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or
certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter
which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of
perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material
matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
145
43
they were lying when they signed the affidavits.
146
As a result, it is possible that these
individuals at least are guilty of perjury. Even without such an explicit admission, it is possible
that a court could find that a robo-signer was intentionally and knowingly lying by signing
hundreds of affidavits a day that attested to personal knowledge of loan documents.
147
It is
important to note, however, that perjury prosecutions are rare. For example, of the 91,835
federal cases commenced in fiscal year 2008, at most, only 342 charged perjury as the most
serious offense.
148
It is thus possible that robo-signers, though potentially guilty, will not be
charged.
By contrast, the state attorneys general are already investigating whether foreclosure
irregularities such as the use of robo-signers violated state unfair or deceptive acts or practices
(UDAP) laws. Each state has some form of UDAP law, and most generally, they prohibit
practices in consumer transactions that are deemed to be unfair or deceptive.
149
Individual state
laws, however, can be as broad as generally prohibiting deceptive or unfair conduct or as narrow
as prohibiting only a discrete list of practices or exempting all acts by banks.
150
As a result,
whether there has been a UDAP violation will depend heavily on the particularities of each
The state attorneys general, though, are already examining the matter. In
announcing their bipartisan multistate group, the attorneys general explicitly stated that they
-signing] may constitute a deceptive act and/or an unfair
151
146
A Florida Law Firm, The Ticktin Law Group, P.A. has taken hundreds of depositions in which
employees or contractors of various banks admitted to not knowing what they were signing or lying regarding their
personal knowledge of information in affidavits. See, e.g., Deposition of Ismeta Dumanjic, La Salle Bank NA as
Trustee for Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates WMABS Series 2007-HE2 Trust v. Jeanette Attelus, et al.,
No. CACE 08060378 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2009).
147
For testimony attesting to signing hundreds of affidavits a day, see Deposition of Xee Moua, at 28-29,
Wells Fargo Bank v. John P. Stipek, No. 50 2009 CA 012434XXXXMB AW (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2010);
Deposition of Renee Hertzler, at 25, In re: Patricia L. Starr, No. 09-41903-JBR (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2010).
148
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics, 2008 Statistical Tables, at Table 4.1 (Nov.
2008) (online at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/tables/fjs08st401.pdf).
149
Shaun K. Ramey and Jennifer M. Miller, State Attorneys General Strong-Arm Mortgage Lenders, 17
Business Torts Journal 1, at 1 (Fall 2009) (online at
www.sirote.com/tyfoon/site/members/D/6/E/D/0/7/0/4/3/C/file/S%20Ramey/Ramey-Miller_REPRINT.pdf).
150
Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the United States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes (Feb. 2009) (online at www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf).
151
50 States Sign Mortgage Foreclosure Joint Statement, supra note 26.
44
4. Other State Legal Steps
In addition to the Ohio lawsuit described above and the ongoing joint investigation, some
other state officials have taken concrete steps to address the foreclosure irregularities, including
but not limited to:
152
In New York, the court system now requires that those initiating residential
foreclosure actions must file a new affirmation to certify that an appropriate employee
has personally reviewed their documents and papers filed in the case and confirmed
both the factual accuracy of these court filings and the accuracy of the notarizations
contained therein.
153
In California, a non-judicial foreclosure state, the attorney general sent a letter to
JPMorgan Chase demanding that the firm stop all foreclosures unless it could
demonstrate that all foreclosures had been conducted in accordance with California
law.
154
The attorney general also called on all other lenders to halt foreclosures
unless they can demonstrate compliance with California law.
155
In Arizona, which is also a non-judicial foreclosure state, the attorney general sent
letters on October 7, 2010 to several servicers implicated in the robo-signing scandals
to demand a description of their practices and any remedial actions taken to address
potential paperwork irregularities. The attorney general wrote that if any employees
or agents used any of the questionable practices in connection with conducting a
of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, and the attorney general would have to take
appropriate action.
156
In Ohio, in addition to his lawsuit against GMAC, the attorney general filed an
amicus curiae brief in an individual foreclosure case asking the court to consider
152
This list is not a comprehensive list of state actions. States are becoming involved at a rapid pace, in a
variety of ways, and from a variety of levels.
153
New York State Unified Court System, Attorney Affirmation-Required in Residential Foreclosure
Actions (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at www.courts.state.ny.us/attorneys/foreclosures/affirmation.shtml); New York State
Unified Court System, Sample Affirmation Document (online at
www.courts.state.ny.us/attorneys/foreclosures/Affirmation-Foreclosure.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
154
Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., attorney general, State of California, to Steve Stein, SVP channel
director, Homeownership Preservation and Partnerships, JPMorgan Chase (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at
ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1996_jp_morgan_chase_letter_.pdf).
155
Office of California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Brown Calls on Banks to Halt
Foreclosures In California (Oct. 8, 2010) (online at ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=2000&).
156
Letter from Terry Goddard, attorney general, State of Arizona, to mortgage servicers, -
(Oct. 7, 2010) (online at
www.azag.gov/press_releases/oct/2010/Mortgage%20Loan%20Servicer%20Letter.pdf).
45
evidence that GMAC committed fraud that tainted the entire judicial process and to
consider sanctioning GMAC.
157
The attorney general also sent a letter to 133 Ohio
judges asking them for information on any cases involving the robo-signer Xee
Moua.
158
In addition, he asked Wells Fargo Bank to vacate any foreclosure
judgments in Ohio based on documents that were signed by robo-signers and to stop
the sales of repossessed properties.
159
In The District of Columbia, Attorney General Peter Nickles announced on October
27, 2010 that foreclosures cannot proceed in the District of Columbia unless a
mortgage deed and all assignments of the deed are recorded in public land records,
and that foreclosures relying on MERS would not satisfy the requirement.
160
MERS
responded the next day by issuing a statement that their procedures conform to the
laws of the District of Columbia and encouraged their members to contact them if
they experience problems with their foreclosures.
161
In Connecticut, the attorney general started investigating GMAC/Ally and demanded
that the company halt all foreclosures. He also asked the company to provide specific
information relating to its foreclosure practices.
162
In addition, the attorney general
asked the state Judicial Department on October 1, 2010 to freeze all home
157
Brief for Richard Cordray, Ohio attorney general, as Amici Curiae, US Bank, National Association v.
James W. Renfro, No. CV-10-716322 (Cuyahoga Cty Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Oct. 27, 2010); Office of Ohio
Attorney General Richard Cordray, Cordray Outlines Fraud in Cleveland Foreclosure Case (Oct. 27, 2010) (online
at www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/October-2010/Cordray-Outlines-Fraud-in-
Cleveland-Foreclosure-Ca).
158
Letter from Richard Cordray, attorney general, State of Ohio, to Judges, State of Ohio (Oct. 29, 2010).
159
Letter from Richard Cordray, attorney general, State of Ohio, to David Moskowitz, deputy general
counsel, Wells Fargo (Oct. 29, 2010).
160
Office of District of Columbia Attorney General Peter J. Nickles, Statement of Enforcement Intent
Regarding Deceptive Foreclosure Sale Notices (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at
newsroom.dc.gov/show.aspx?agency=occ&section=2&release=20673&year=2010&file=file.aspx%2frelease%2f20
673%2fforeclosure%2520statement.pdf).
161
MERSCORP, Inc., MERS Response to D.C. Attorney General's Oct. 28, 2010 Statement of Enforcement
take steps to protect the lawful right to foreclose that the borrower contractually agreed to if the borrower defaults on
actions. See K&L Gates LLP, DC AG Seeks to Stop Home Loan Foreclosures Based on Incomplete Legal Analysis,
Mortgage Banking & Consumer Financial Products Alert (Nov. 1, 2010) (online at
www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?publication=6737).
162
Office of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General Investigating Defective
GMAC/Ally Foreclosure Docs, Demands Halt To Its CT Foreclosures (Sept. 27, 2010) (online at
www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=466312).
46
foreclosures for 60 days to allow time to institute measures to assure the integrity of
document filings.
163
The Judicial Department refused this request.
164
5. Other Possible Implications: - and Documentation
Irregularities
Until the full scope of the problem is determined, it will be difficult to assess whether
banks, servicers, or borrowers knew of the irregularities in the market. However, there are
several signs that the problem was at least partially foreseeable. For example, numerous systems
had been developed to circumvent the slow, paper-based property system in the United States.
MERS, discussed in more detail above, represented an attempt to add speed and simplification to
the property registration process, which in turn would allow property to be transferred more
quickly and easily. MERS arose in reaction to a clash: during the boom, originations and
securitizations moved extremely quickly. But the property law system that governed the
underlying collateral moves slowly, and is heavily dependent on a variety of steps memorialized
on paper and thus inefficient at processing enormous lending volume. While systems like MERS
appeared to allow the housing market to accelerate, the legal standards underpinning the market
did not change substantially.
165
In some respects, the irregularities and the mounting legal
problems in the mortgage system seem to be the consequence of the banks asking the property
law system to do something that it may be largely unequipped to do: process millions of
foreclosures within a relatively short period of time.
166
The Panel emphasizes that mortgage
lenders and securitization servicers should not undertake to foreclose on any homeowner unless
they are able to do so in full compliance with applicable laws and their contractual agreements
with the homeowner. If legal uncertainty remains, foreclosure should cease with respect to that
homeowner until all matters are objectively resolved and vetted through competent counsel in
each applicable jurisdiction. Satisfaction of applicable legal standards and legal certainty is in
the best interests of homeowners as well as creditors and will enable all concerned parties to
exercise properly their legal and contractual rights and remedies.
This combination of factors a demand for speed, the use of systems designed to
streamline a legal regime that was viewed as out-of-date, and a slow, localized legal system
may have substantially increased the likelihood that documentation would be insufficient. As
163
Office of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General Asks CT Courts To
Freeze Home Foreclosures 60 Days Because of Defective Docs (Oct. 1, 2010)
(www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=466548).
164
Letter from Judge Barbara M. Quinn, chief court administrator, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, to
Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, State of Connecticut (Oct. 14, 2010).
165
See, e.g., Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nicolle Bradbury, supra note 12 (requiring that the
plaintiff provide, among other things, the book and page number of the mortgage, as well as the street address and
stating that failure to provide a street address is sufficient to preclude summary judgment in a foreclosure
proceeding).
166
See Section C, supra, discussing strains on servicers.
47
discussed above, some authorities are taking direct aim at MERS and the validity of its
processes. Coupled with business pressure exerted on law firms
167
and contractors
168
to process
rapidly foreclosure documents, the system had clear risks of encouraging corner-cutting and
creating substantial legal difficulties. Furthermore, even if these problems were not foreseeable
from the vantage point of the housing boom, the downturn in the housing market and the
foreclosure crisis made them much more likely. In 2008 and 2009, a vast amount of attention
was given to the difficulty of determining liability in the securitization market because of
problems with documentation and transparency.
169
At this time, servicers could have had notice
of the types of documentation problems that could affect the transfer of mortgage ownership. In
some cases, even when servicers were explicitly made aware of the shoddy documentation, they
did little to correct the problem.
inadvertent instance of misconduct
170
Some observers argue that current irregularities were not only foreseeable, but that they
mask a range of potential irregularities at the stage in which the mortgages were originated and
pooled. According to that view, current practices simply added to and magnified problems with
the prior practices. The legal consequences of foreclosure irregularities will be magnified if the
problems also plagued originations: after all, foreclosures are still a relatively limited portion of
the market. If all securitizations or performing whole loans were to be affected, the
consequences could be significantly greater. At this point, answers as to what exactly is the
source of the problems at the front end and how severe the consequences may be going forward
depend to a large degree on who is evaluating the problem. The Panel describes below the
perspectives of various stakeholders in the residential mortgage market.
167
Deposition of Tammie Lou Kapusta, In re: Investigation of Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. (Sept.
22, 2010).
168
Federal National Mortgage Association, Foreclosure Time Frames and Compensatory Fees for Breach
of Servicing Obligations, at 3 (Aug. 31, 2010) (Announcement SVC-2010-12) (online at
www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/svc1012.pdf) (stating that Fannie Mae might pursue
delay, and any additional costs that are directly attributable to the
169
See, e.g., Hernando de Soto, Toxic Assets Were Hidden Assets, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 25, 2009)
lain is the lack of trust in the paper on
which [subprime mortgages] and all other assets are printed. If we don't restore trust in paper, the next default
on credit cards or student loans will trigger another collapse in paper and bring the world
170
Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nicolle Bradbury, supra note 12
-volume and
Flor
See also Section C, supra. It is worth noting that the rights of a bona-fide purchaser for value are affected
by whether the purchaser had notice of a competing claim at the time of purchase. One possible source of conflict
will be what, under these circumstances, constitutes adequate notice. Panel staff conversations with industry sources
(Nov. 9, 2010).
48
a. Academics and Advocates for Homeowners
Many lawyers and stakeholders who have worked with borrowers and servicers on a
regular basis over the past few years, primarily in bankruptcy and foreclosure cases, maintain
that documentation problems, including potentially fraudulent practices, have been pervasive and
apparent.
171
These actors, including academics who study the topic, argue that bankruptcy and
foreclosure procedures have been revealing major deficiencies in mortgage servicing and
documentation for quite some time. Professor Katherine M. Porter, a professor of law who
The robo-signing scandal should not have
been a surprise to anyone; these problems were being raised in litigation for years now.
Similarly, I released a study in 2007 three years ago that showed that mortgage companies
who filed claims to be paid in bankruptcy cases of homeowners did not attach a copy of the note
to 40% of their claims.
172
According to this view, the servicing process was severely flawed,
falsify court documents not just to save time and money, but because they simply
have not kept the accurate records of ownership, payments, and escrow accounts that would
173
In 2008-2009 over 1,700 lost note affidavits were filed in
Broward County, Florida alone.
174
These affidavits claim that the original note has been lost or
destroyed and cannot be produced in court. It is important to recognize, however, that a lost
note affidavit may not actually mean that the note has been lost. In her written testimony to the
Panel, Professor Katherine Porter points out that her study of lost notes in
predecessors in a securitization lost the note, or whether someone other than the mortgage
175
171
For example, in her testimony submitted to the Congressional Oversight Panel, Julia Gordon of the
-
many ways in which servicers or their contractors elevate profits over customer service or duties to their clients, the
investors. Other abuses include misapplying payments, force-placing insurance improperly, disregarding
requirements to evaluate homeowners for nonforeclosure options, and fabricating documents related to the
See Congressional Oversight Panel, Written Testimony of Julia Gordon,
senior policy counsel, Center for Responsible Lending, COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs,
at 3 (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102710-
172
Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14, at 9 (referencing her paper: Katherine M. Porter,
Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, Texas Law Review, Vol. 87 (2008) (Nov. 2008) (online
at www.mortgagestudy.org/files/Misbehavior.pdf)). The paper gives an in-depth analysis of how mortgage servicers
frequently do not comply with bankruptcy law.
173
Written Testimony of Julia Gordon, supra note 171, at 11.
174
Legalprise Inc., Report on Lost Note Affidavits in Broward County, Florida (Oct. 2010). Legalprise is a
Florida legal research firm that uses and analyzes public foreclosure court records.
175
Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14, at 9.
49
could
mean that potentially millions of shoddily documented mortgages have been pooled improperly
into securitization trusts. Lawyers are using a lack of standing by the servicers due to ineffective
conveyance of ownership of the mortgage as a defense in foreclosure cases. Some of these
lawyers , with
the origination and documentation of mortgages, and the transfer requirements in the PSAs, is so
s are merely technical.
176
However, commentators who believe that the problem is widespread also believe that investors
in these securitization pools, rather than homeowners, may be the best placed to pursue the cases
on a larger scale successfully.
177
b. Servicers and Banks
Since the foreclosure irregularities have surfaced, the banks involved have maintained
that the problems are largely procedural and technical in nature. Banks have temporarily
suspended foreclosures in judicial foreclosure states in particular and looked into their practices,
but they state that they do not view these problems as fundamental either in the foreclosure area
or in the origination and pooling of mortgages. The CEO of Bank of America, Brian Moynihan,
Bank of America has resumed
foreclosures, it's going to take us three or five weeks to get through and actually get all the
judicial states taken care of. The teams reviewing data have not found information which was
inaccurate, would affect the frame factors of the foreclosure; i.e., the customer's delinquency,
etcetera.
178
He focused fixed the affidavit
signing problem or will be fixed in very short order
179
Many of the other large banks have
issued statements in the same vein.
180
Most of these banks have either not commented on the
issues around the transfer of ownership of the mortgage or maintain that alleged ownership
transfer problems are without merit or exaggerated.
181
176
Consumer lawyers conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 28, 2010).
177
Consumer lawyers conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010).
178
Bank of America Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 97, at 6.
179
Bank of America Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 97, at 6.
180
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Financial Results 3Q10, at 15 (Oct. 13, 2010) (online at
files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/1051047839x0x409164/e27f1d82-ef74-429e-8ff1-
7d6706634621/3Q10_Earnings_Presentation.pdf)
our processes and reviews to date, we believe underlying foreclosure decisions were justified by the facts and
Wells Fargo Update on Affidavits and Mortgage Securitizations, supra note 23
company has identified do not relate in any way to the quality of the customer and loan data; nor does the company
181
For example, the American Securitization Forum issued a statement questioning the legitimacy of
concerns raised about securitization p
standard industry methods of transferring ownership of residential mortgage loans to securitization trusts are
sufficient and appropriate. These concerns are without merit and our membership is confident that these methods of
50
c. Investors
As discussed above, securitization investors have been involved in lawsuits regarding
underwriting representations and warranties for some time. Investors in MBS or collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transactions have a variety of options to pursue a claim. Claims alleging
violations of representations and warranties have typically focused on violations of underwriting
standards regarding the underlying loans pooled into the securities. Another option may be to
pursue similar claims relating to violations of representations and warranties with respect to the
transfer of mortgage ownership. In the wake of the current documentation controversies, it
appears that private investors may become more emboldened to pursue put-back requests and
potentially file lawsuits. For example, and as discussed above, a group of investors including
FRBNY in its capacity as owner of RMBS it obtained from American International Group, Inc.
(AIG) sent a letter to Bank of America as an initial step to be able to demand access to certain
loan files.
182
Direct contact with the bank was initiated because the securitization trustee (Bank
of New York) had refused to comply with the initial request in accordance with the PSA.
FRBNY, as an investor, is on equal footing with all the other investors, and according to
representatives, they view this action and any potential participation in a future
lawsuit as one way to attempt to recover funds for the taxpayers.
183
While there may be a growing appetite for pursuing such lawsuits, these lawsuits still
have to overcome a fair number of obstacles built in to the PSAs,
184
as well as problems inherent
in any legal action that requires joint action by many actors.
185
As a general matter, what
appears to be a significant problem is that the operating documents for these transactions
transfer are sound and based on a well-established body of law governing a multi-trillion dollar secondary mortgage
See American Securitization Forum, ASF Says Mortgage Securitization Legal Structures & Loan
Transfers Are Sound (Oct. 15, 2010) (online at www.americansecuritization.com/story.aspx?id=4457) (hereinafter
the coming weeks to elaborate further on this statement.
182
See Letter from Gibbs & Bruns LLP to Countrywide, supra note 95. As noted above, the letter
predominantly alleges problems with loan quality and violation of prudent servicing obligations. See also Gibbs &
Bruns LLP, Institutional Holders of Countrywide-Issued RMBS Issue Notice of Non-Performance Identifying
Alleged Failures by Master Servicer to Perform Covenants and Agreements in More Than $47 Billion of
Countrywide-Issued RMBS (Oct. 18, 2010) (online at
www.gibbsbruns.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Press_Release_Gibbs%20&%20Bruns%20_10_18_10.pdf); Gibbs
& Bruns LLP, Countrywide RMBS Initiative (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at www.gibbsbruns.com/countrywide-rmbs-
initiative-10-20-2010/).
183
FRBNY staff conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 26, 2010).
184
For further discussion of these obstacles, see Section D.2. In addition, see description of PSAs in
Section D.1, supra.
185
For example, the investors taking action have to consider costs associated with their litigation such as
Another consideration is that non-participating investors may also ultimately benefit from legal actions without
contributing to the costs.
51
generally give significant discretion to trustees in exercising their powers,
186
and these third
parties may not be truly independent and willing to look out for the investors.
187
F. Assessing the Potential Impact on Bank Balance Sheets
1. Introduction
its role as the originator of the initial mortgage, its role as the issuer of the packaged securities,
its role as the underwriter of the subsequent mortgage trusts to investors, and/or its role as the
servicer of the troubled loan.
188
Through these various roles in the mortgage market, the banking
foreclosures, related concerns regarding title documentation, and mortgage repurchase risk
owing to breaches in representations and warranties provided to investors.
186
For example, in some PSAs, trustees are not required to investigate any report or, in many agreements,
request put-backs, unless it is requested by 25 percent of investors. See Pooling and Servicing Agreement by and
among J.P. Morgan Acceptance Corporation I, Depositor, et al., at 122 (Apr. 1, 2006) (online at
www.scribd.com/doc/31453301/Pooling-Servicing-Agreement-JPMAC2006-NC1-PSA). Absent that threshold
being met, the trustee has discretion to act. For further discussion, see Section D.2.
187
Amherst Securities Group LP,
(Oct. 28, 2010). If the investors wished to act against trustees they believe are not independent, there are
some legal avenues they could pursue. For example, the investors could remove the trustee using provisions that
are typically in PSAs that allow for such a removal. Such provisions, however, often require 51 percent of investors
to act. In addition, to the extent that the trustees are found to be fiduciaries, if the trustee takes a specific action that
the investors believe not to be in their best interest, they may be able to sue the trustee. If successful, investors could
be awarded a number of possible remedies, including damages or removal of the trustee. Greenfield, Stein, &
Senior, Fiduciary Removal Proceedings (online at www.gss-law.com/PracticeAreas/Fiduciary-Removal-
Proceedings.asp) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010); Gary B. Freidman, Relief Against a Fiduciary: SCPA §2102
Proceedings, NYSBA Trusts and Estates Law Section Newsletter, at 1-2, 4 (Oct. 13, 2003) (online at www.gss-
law.com/CM/Articles/SCPA%202102%20Proceedings%20-
comply with a court order directing that the information be supplied can be a basis for contempt under SCPA §606,
607-
188
There are also risks for holders of second lien loans, but these loans are not as directly impacted by
foreclosure irregularities as first-lien mortgages, since most second liens were not securitized, and are held on the
balance sheets of banks and other market participants. As discussed above, if second liens were perfected and first
liens were not, they may actually take priority. See Section D.2 for further discussion of effects on second lien
holders.
An analyst report from January 2010, values securitized second liens only at $32.5 billion of the $1.053
trillion of the total second liens outstanding. Amherst Securities Group LP, Amherst Mortgage Insight, 2nd Liens
How Important, at 12 (Jan. 29, 2010).
At the end of the second quarter of 2010, the four largest U.S. commercial banks Bank of America,
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo reported $433.7 billion in second lien mortgages while having total
equity capital of $548.8 billion. Amherst Securities Group LP data provided to Panel staff (Sept. 2, 2010); Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics of Depository Institutions (online at www2.fdic.gov/sdi/) (accessed Nov.
12, 2010). This figure is based on reporting by the banks, not their holding companies, and therefore may not
include all second liens held by affiliates.
52
Many investment analysts believe that potential costs associated with bank foreclosure
irregularities are manageable, with potential liabilities representing a limited threat to earnings,
rather than bank capital.
189
Market estimates stemming from foreclosure irregularities to a
potential prolonged foreclosure moratorium range from $1.5 to $10.0 billion for the entire
industry.
190
However, while the situation remains fluid, the emerging consensus in the market is
that the risk from mortgage put-backs is a potentially bigger source of instability for the banks.
191
Using calculations based on current market estimates of investment analysts, the Panel calculates
a consensus exposure for the industry of $52 billion. Aside from the potential for costs to far
exceed these market estimates (or be materially lower), the wild card here is the impact of
broader title documentation concerns across the broader mortgage market. In any case, the
fallout from the foreclosure crisis and ongoing put-backs to the banks from mortgage investors
are likely to continue to weigh on bank earnings, but are, according to industry analysts, unlikely
to pose a grave threat to bank capital levels.
192
However, there are scenarios whereby wholesale title and legal documentation problems
for the bulk of outstanding mortgages could create significant instability in the marketplace,
leading to potentially significantly larger effects on the balance sheets of banks. Under
significantly more severe scenarios that would engulf the broader mortgage market
encompassing widespread legal uncertainty regarding mortgage loan documentation as well as
the prospect of extensive put-backs impacting agency and private label mortgages bank capital
levels could conceivably come under renewed stress, particularly for the most exposed
institutions.
193
It is unclear whether severe mortgage scenarios were modeled in the Federal
189
FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
190
See Section F.2 for further discussion on costs stemming from a foreclosure moratorium.
191
However, to the extent that banks hold MBSs originated/issued by non-affiliates, they may themselves
benefit from put-backs.
192
Credit Suisse, US Banks: Mortgage Put-back Losses Appear Manageable for the Large Banks, at 4 (Oct.
- Revisiting Putbacks and
Securitizations, at 7
Capital Markets, Repurchase-Related Losses Roughly $44B for Industry Sensationalism Not Warranted (Sept. 20,
-
on U.S. Banks, supra note 106.
193
There are other mortgage risks that are difficult to quantify, such as the potential effect mortgage put-
backs may have on holders of interests in CDOs and the banks that serve as counterparties for synthetic CDOs . A
synthetic CDO is a privately negotiated financial instrument that is generally made up of credit default swaps on a
referenced pool of fixed-income assets, in these cases often including the mezzanine tranches of RMBSs. Large
banks served as intermediaries for clients wishing to shift risk and therefore structure a synthetic CDO. These banks
packaged and underwrote synthetic CDOs and may have retained a certain amount of liquidity risk. It is nearly
impossible, however, to measure the possible effect of this issue due to the fact that there is no reliable data that
estimates the size of the CDO market, and the fact that counterparty risk in synthetic CDOs is agreed to under a
private contract and therefore no data is publicly available. Panel staff conversations with industry sources (Nov. 4,
2010).
53
beyond 2010.
194
While the situation is still uncertain, the worst-case scenarios would have to presuppose
at a minimum a systemic breakdown in documentation standards, the consequences of which
would likely grind the mortgage market to a halt. However, it is important to note that, so far,
many of the experts who have spoken to the question (and the banks themselves) believe that
securities documentation concerns are unlikely to trigger meaningful broad-based losses. These
experts state that although put-backs owing to breaches of representations and warranties will
continue to exert a toll on the banks, it will largely be manageable, with costs covered from
ongoing reserves and earnings. Furthermore, as noted in Section D, there are a considerable
number of legal considerations that will likely lead to losses being spread out over time.
195
Residential U.S. mortgage debt outstanding was $10.6 trillion as of June 2010.
196
Of this
amount, $5.7 trillion is government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) or agency-backed paper, $1.4
trillion is private label (or non-GSE issued) securities, and $3.5 trillion is non-securitized debt
held on financial institution balance sheets.
197
For general information on the counterparty risk involved in synthetic CDOs, see Michael Gibson,
Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs (July 2004) (online at www.curacao-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/10/federal-reserve-cdo-analysis-2004.pdf).
194
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program:
Design and Implementation (Apr. 24, 2009) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf).
195
See Section D for a discussion on legal considerations of foreclosure document irregularities.
196
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistics & Historical Data: Mortgage Debt
Outstanding (Sept. 2010) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm).
197
Id.
54
Figure 2: Residential (1-4 Family) Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1985-2009 (millions of
dollars)
198
Industry-wide, 4.6 percent of mortgages are classified as in the foreclosure process. In
addition, 9.4 percent of mortgages are at least 30 days past due, approximately half of which are
more than 90 days past due.
199
198
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States: Data Download Program (Instrument: Home Mortgages, Frequency: Annually,
L.218) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=Z.1) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
199
Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey, Q2 2010 (Aug. 26, 2010) (hereinafter
See also Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies and
Foreclosure Starts Decrease in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Aug. 26, 2010) (online at
.
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
GSE and Agency MBS Private Label MBS Non-SĞĐƵƌŝƟnjĞĚ MŽƌƚŐĂŐĞ uĞďƚ
55
Figure 3: Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates (2006-2010)
200
a. Leading Market Participants
Troubled mortgages were largely originated in 2005-2007, when underwriting standards
were most suspect, particularly for subprime, Alt-A and other loans to low-credit or poorly
documented borrowers. Figure 4 below outlines the largest mortgage originators during this
period, ranked by volume and market share.
200
Delinquency rates include loans that are 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days or more past due. Foreclosure
rates include loans in the foreclosure process at the end of each quarter. See Id.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Delinquency Rate Foreclosure Inventory at End of Quarter
56
Figure 4: Largest U.S. Mortgage Originators, 2005-2007 (billions of dollars)
201
Company Volume
Market
Share
Bank of America 1,880 22.1%
Countrywide Financial 1,362 16.0%
Bank of America Mortgage & Affiliates 518 6.1%
Wells Fargo 1,324 15.5%
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 1,062 12.4%
Wachovia Corporation 262 3.1%
JPMorgan Chase 1,151 13.5%
Chase Home Finance 566 6.6%
Washington Mutual 584 6.9%
Citigroup 506 5.9%
Top Four Aggregate 4,861 57.0%
Total Mortgage Originations (2005-2007) 8,530
The four largest banks accounted for approximately 60 percent of all loan originations
between 2005 and 2007. Totals for Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, and
Citigroup include volumes originated by companies that these firms subsequently acquired. As
Figure 4 indicates, a mortgage loan portfolio is
comprised of loans assumed upon its acquisition of Countrywide Financial. Similarly, JPMorgan
Chase more than doubled its mortgage loan portfolio with its acquisition of Washington Mutual.
Figure 5, below, details the largest originators of both Alt-A and subprime loans between
2005 and 2007. The five leading originators of Alt-A and subprime loans represented
approximately 56 percent and 34 percent, respectively, of aggregate issuance volume for these
loan types. Alt-A and subprime loans represented approximately 30 percent of all mortgages
originated from 2005 to 2007.
201
Inside Mortgage Finance.
57
Figure 5: Leading Originators of Subprime and Alt-A Loans, 2005-2007 (billions of
dollars)
202
ALT-A ORIGINATIONS
Company Volume
Market
Share
Countrywide Financial (Bank of America) 172 16.2%
IndyMac 145 13.6%
JPMorgan Chase 102 9.6%
Washington Mutual 40 3.8%
EMC Mortgage 38 3.5%
Chase Home Financial 25 2.3%
GMAC 98 9.2%
GMAC-RFC 77 7.3%
GMAC Residential Holding 21 1.9%
Lehman Brothers
203
79 7.4%
Top Five Aggregate 596 56.0%
Total Alt-A Originations (2005-2007) 1,065
SUBPRIME ORIGINATIONS
Company Volume
Market
Share
Ameriquest Mortgage 112 7.7%
New Century 109 7.5%
Countrywide Financial (Bank of America) 102 7.0%
JPMorgan Chase 99 6.8%
Washington Mutual 66 4.5%
Chase Home Finance 33 2.3%
Option One Mortgage 80 5.5%
Top Five Aggregate 502 34.4%
Total Subprime Origination (2005-2007) 1,458
As shown in Figure 6, below, the five leading underwriters (pro forma for acquisitions) of
non-agency MBS between 2005 and 2007 accounted for 58 percent of the total underwriting
volume for the period. It is of note that the three firms with the largest underwriting volumes
during this period, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Countrywide Securities, have either
failed or been acquired by another company.
202
Inside Mortgage Finance.
203
Includes Alt-A originations from Lehman Brothers subsidiary, Aurora Loan Services, LLC.
58
Figure 6: Leading Underwriters of Non-Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2005-2007
(billions of dollars)
204
Company Volume
Market
Share
JPMorgan Chase 593 19.5%
JPMorgan Chase 143 4.7%
Bear Stearns 298 9.8%
Washington Mutual 152 5.0%
Bank of America 371 12.2%
Merrill Lynch 94 3.1%
Countrywide Securities 277 9.1%
Lehman Brothers 322 10.6%
RBS Greenwich Capital 273 9.0%
Credit Suisse 203 6.7%
Top Five Aggregate 1,762 58.0%
Total Underwriting Volume (2005-2007) 3,044
As noted above, banks either retain or securitize market conditions permitting the
mortgage loans they originate. In terms of mortgages retained on bank balance sheets, Figure 7
below lists banks with the largest mortgage loan books, as well as the concentration of foreclosed
mortgage loans, ranked by volume and as a percentage of overall residential mortgage balance
sheet assets.
Figure 7: Bank Holding Companies with 1-4 Family Loans in Foreclosure Proceedings,
June 2010 (billions of dollars)
205
Company
Total 1-4
Family
Loans
1-4 Family
Loans in
Foreclosure
Percent of 1-4
Family Loans
in Foreclosure
Bank of America 427.1 18.8 4.4%
Wells Fargo 370.7 17.6 4.7%
JPMorgan Chase 259.9 19.5 7.5%
Citigroup 178.4 6.0 3.3%
HSBC North America 72.9 6.6 9.0%
U.S. Bancorp 58.1 2.5 4.4%
PNC Financial Services Group 54.9 2.7 5.0%
SunTrust Banks 47.9 2.4 5.0%
Ally Financial (GMAC) 21.5 2.2 10.2%
Fifth Third Bancorp 21.4 0.7 3.2%
Total for All Bank Holding Companies 2,152.2 87.7 4.1%
204
Inside Mortgage Finance.
205
SNL Financial. These data include revolving or permanent loans secured by real estate as evidenced by
mortgages (FHA, FMHA, VA, or conventional) or other liens (first or junior) secured by 1-4 family residential
property.
59
The leading mortgage servicers are ranked below by loan volume serviced and market
share, including the percentage of the overall portfolio in foreclosure. During the second quarter
of 2010, the 10 largest servicers in the United States were responsible for servicing 67.2 percent
of all outstanding residential mortgages.
Figure 8: Largest U.S. Mortgage Servicers, June 2010
206
Company
Servicing
Portfolio
Amount
(billions)
Percent of
Total Loans
Serviced
Percent of
Portfolio in
Foreclosure
Bank of America 2,135 20.1% 3.3%
Wells Fargo 1,812 17.0% 2.0%
JPMorgan 1,354 12.7% 3.6%
Citigroup 678 6.4% 2.3%
Ally Financial (GMAC) 349 3.3% n/a
U.S. Bancorp 190 1.8% n/a
SunTrust Banks 176 1.7% 4.9%
PHH Mortgage 156 1.5% 1.8%
OneWest Bank, CA (IndyMac) 155 1.5% n/a
PNC Financial Services Group 150 1.4% n/a
10 Largest Mortgage Servicers Aggregate 7,155 67.2%
Total Residential Mortgages Outstanding 10,640
2. Foreclosure Irregularities: Estimating the Cost to Banks
Assessing the potential financial impact of foreclosure irregularities, including a
prolonged foreclosure moratorium, on bank stability is complicated by the extremely fluid nature
of current developments. For example, after unilaterally halting foreclosure proceedings, both
Bank of America
207
and Ally Financial (GMAC) announced their intention to resume foreclosure
proceedings in the wake of internal reviews that did not uncover systemic irregularities,
206
As a point of reference, as of June 2010, 63 percent of foreclosures occurred on homes where the loan
was either owned or guaranteed by government investors such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while the remaining
37 percent of foreclosures were on homes owned by private investors. Data on percentage of portfolio in
foreclosure unavailable for Ally Financial, U.S. Bancorp, OneWest Bank, and PNC Financial Services Group.
Inside Mortgage Finance.
207
Bank of America is frequently mentioned by analysts as having potentially high exposure, in part
because of its purchase of Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch, which was heavily involved in CDOs, and its
assumption of successor liability.
Finance noted that Bank of America was one of the few major mortgage lenders to steer away from the subprime
Bank of America became the holder of the
largest subprime mortgage portfolio (in the industry). See Testimony of Guy Cecala, supra note 133.
60
according to both firms.
208
Looking ahead, the chief variables are the extent and duration of
potential foreclosure disruptions or an outright moratorium, which would impact servicing and
foreclosure costs and housing market prices (and recovery values). Such scenarios would also
likely increase litigation and legal risks, including potential fines from state attorneys general, as
well as raising questions regarding the extent to which title irregularities may permeate the
system.
209
During recent conference calls for third quarter 2010 earnings and subsequent investor
presentations, the five largest mortgage servicers addressed questions regarding foreclosure
irregularities and potential liabilities stemming from these issues.
210
Bank of America
211
Bank of America initially suspended foreclosure sales on
October 8, 2010 across all 50 states after reviewing its internal foreclosure
procedures. On October 18, 2010, the bank began amending and re-filing 102,000
foreclosure affidavits in 23 judicial foreclosure states, a process expected to take three
to five weeks to complete. While asserting that it is addressing issues surrounding
affidavit signatures, the company claims that it has not been able to identify any
improper foreclosure decisions.
212
208
Bank of America Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 97
GMAC Mortgage Statement on Independent Review and
Foreclosure Sales, supra note 20
related to cases involving judicial affidavits in the 23 states continues and has been underway for approximately two
months. As each of those files is reviewed, and remediated when needed, the foreclosure process resumes. GMAC
.
209
See Section F.3 for further discussion on potential bank liabilities from securitization title irregularities
and mortgage repurchases or put-backs.
210
In October 2010, the SEC sent a letter to Chief Financial Officers of certain public companies to remind
them of their disclosure obligations relating to the foreclosure documentation irregularities. See Sample SEC Letter
on Disclosure Guidelines, supra note 113. The letter noted that affected public companies should carefully consider
a variety of issues relating to foreclosure documentation irregularities, including trends, known demands,
e letter notes a variety of areas
that would require disclosure, the quality of disclosure will depend on what the companies in question are able to
determine about the effect of the irregularities on their operations. Genuine uncertainty will result in less useful
disclosure. Once the information is provided in a report, however, companies have a duty to update it if it becomes
inaccurate or misleading.
211
Bank of America Corporation, 3Q10 Earnings Results, at 10-11 (Oct. 19, 2010) (online at
phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjY0MDd8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1);
Bank of America Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 97, at 6.
212
It was recently reported that Bank of America found errors in 10 to 25 foreclosure cases out of the first
several hundred the bank has examined. Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14, at 10 ); Jessica Hall
& Anand Basu, Bank of America Corp Acknowledged Some Mistakes in Foreclosure Files as it Begins to Resubmit
Documents in 102,000 Cases, the Wall Street Journal Said, Reuters (Oct. 25, 2010) (online at
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69O04220101025).
61
Citigroup
213
Citigroup has not announced plans to halt its foreclosure proceedings.
The bank has nonetheless initiated an internal review of its foreclosure process due to
increased industry-wide focus on foreclosure processes. It has not identified any
issues regarding its preparation and transfer of foreclosure documents thus far.
However, Citigroup noted in a recent filing that its current foreclosure processes and
financial condition could be affected depending on the results of its review or if any
industry-wide adverse regulatory or judicial actions are taken on foreclosures.
214
JPMorgan Chase
215
Beginning in late September to mid-October 2010, JPMorgan
Chase delayed foreclosure sales across 40 states, suspending approximately 127,000
loan files currently in the foreclosure process.
216
While the company, similar to Bank
of America, has identified issues relating to foreclosure affidavits, it does not believe
that any foreclosure decisions were improper. On November 4, 2010, JPMorgan
Chase stated that it will begin refiling foreclosures within a few weeks.
217
The firm
also stated in a recent filing that it is developing new processes to ensure it satisfies
all procedural requirements related to foreclosures.
218
Bank of America expects increased costs related to irregularities in its foreclosure affidavit procedures
during the fourth quarter of 2010 and into 2011. Costs associated with reviewing its foreclosure procedures,
revising affidavit filings, and making other operational changes will likely result in higher noninterest expense,
including higher servicing costs and legal expenses. Furthermore, Bank of America anticipates higher servicing
costs over the long term if it must make changes to its foreclosure process. Finally, the time to complete foreclosure
sales may increase temporarily, which may increase nonperforming loans and servicing advances and may impact
the collectability of s
Corporation, Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2010, at 95 (Nov. 5, 2010) (online at
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000095012310101545/g24513e10vq.htm).
213
Citigroup, Inc., Transcript: Citi Third Quarter 2010 Earnings Review, at 6-7 (Oct. 18, 2010) (online at
www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/qer103tr.pdf?ieNocache=128).
214
Citigroup 10-Q for Q2 2010, supra note 101, at 52.
215
JPMorgan Q3 2010 Financial Results, supra note 180, at 14-15; Q3 2010 Earnings Call Transcript,
supra note 53.
JPMorgan Chase anticipates additional costs from implementation of these new procedures, as well as
expenses associated with maintaining foreclosed properties, re-filing documents and foreclosure cases, or possible
declining home prices during foreclosure suspensions. These costs are dependent on the length of the foreclosure
suspension. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2010, at 93 (Nov. 9,
2010) (online at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310102689/y86142e10vq.htm) (hereinafter
rgan Chase Form 10-
216
JPMorgan Chase Form 10-Q, supra note 215, at 93, 200.
217
JPMorgan Chase & Co., BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, Charlie Scharf, CEO, Retail
Financial Services, at 33 (Nov. 4, 2010) (online at
files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/967802442x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-
846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf)
.
218
JPMorgan Chase Form 10-Q, supra note 215, at 93.
62
Wells Fargo
219
Wells Fargo expressed confidence in its foreclosure documentation
practices and reiterated that the firm has no plans to suspend foreclosures. The bank
added that an internal review identified instances where the final affidavit review and
some aspects of the notarization process were not properly executed. Accordingly,
Wells Fargo is submitting supplemental affidavits for approximately 55,000
foreclosures in 23 judicial foreclosure states.
220
Ally Financial (GMAC)
221
As of November 3, 2010, GMAC Mortgage reviewed
9,523 foreclosure affidavits, with review pending on an additional 15,500 files. The
company noted that its review to date has not identified any instances of improper
foreclosures. Where appropriate, GMAC re-executed and refiled affidavits with the
courts. GMAC stated that it has modified its foreclosure process, increased the size
of its staff involved in foreclosures, provided more training, and enlisted a
xpects to
complete all remaining foreclosure file reviews by the end of the year. Furthermore,
GMAC recently implemented supplemental procedures for all new foreclosure cases
in order to ensure that affidavits are properly prepared.
222
While a market-wide foreclosure moratorium appears less likely following comments
from the Administration and internal reviews by the affected banks, state attorneys general have
yet to weigh in on the issue. Market estimates of possible bank losses related to a foreclosure
moratorium have varied considerably, from $1.5 billion to $10 billion.
223
Industry analysts have
219
Wells Fargo & Company, 3Q10 Quarterly Supplement, at 26 (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at
www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/press/3Q10_Quarterly_Supplement.pdf); Wells Fargo & Company, Q3 2010
Earnings Call Transcript (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at www.morningstar.com/earn-023/earnings--earnings-call-
transcript.aspx/WFC/en-US.shtml).
220
Wells Fargo Update on Affidavits and Mortgage Securitizations, supra note 23.
The company has stated that it could incur significant legal costs if its internal review of its foreclosure
procedures causes the bank to re-execute foreclosure documents, or if foreclosure actions are challenged by a
borrower or overturned by a court. Wells Fargo & Company, Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended September
30, 2010, at 42-43 (Nov. 5, 2010) (online at
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000095012310101484/f56682e10vq.htm).
221
Ally Financial Inc., 3Q10 Earnings Review, at 10 (Nov. 3, 2010) (online at phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzQ2Nzg3NnxDaGlsZElEPTQwMjMzOHxUeXBlPTI=&t=1).
222
Ally Financial Inc., Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2010, at 75-76 (Nov. 9,
2010) (online at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40729/000119312510252419/d10q.htm).
223
A Credit Suisse research note estimated that Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo could
each face $500 million-$600 million in increased servicing costs and write-downs on foreclosed homes, assuming a
three-month foreclosure delay and associated costs and write-downs approximating 1 percent per month. An FBR
Capital Markets research note estimated $6 billion-$10 billion in potential losses from a three-month foreclosure
moratorium across the entire banking industry. This estimate assumes that there are approximately 2 million homes
currently in the foreclosure process, and that the costs of a delay on each foreclosed property is $1,000 per month.
Credit Suisse, Mortgage Issues Mount
FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
63
noted that a three-month foreclosure delay could increase servicing costs and losses on
foreclosed properties. In addition, banks could also face added litigation costs associated with
resolving flawed foreclosure procedures.
224
However, these estimates can of course become
quickly outdated in the current environment. As noted, firms that previously suspended
foreclosures are now beginning to re-file and re-execute foreclosure affidavits, and market
estimates accounting for shorter foreclosure moratoriums are currently unavailable.
Although they have not been implicated in the recent news of foreclosure moratoriums,
thousands of small to mid-level banks also face some risk from foreclosure suspensions if they
act as servicers for larger banks.
225
Generally, small community banks, as well as credit unions,
are more likely to keep mortgage loans on their books as opposed to selling them in the
secondary market. They primarily use securitization to hedge risk and increase lending power.
226
Accordingly, foreclosure moratoriums would prevent small banks and credit unions from
working through nonperforming loans on their balance sheets, limiting their capacity to originate
new loans.
227
As of June 2010,
portfolios and 55 percent of credit union portfolios.
228
3. Securitization Issues and Mortgage Put-backs
Foreclosure documentation issues highlight other potential and to some degree,
related mortgage market risks to the banking sector. Questions regarding document standards
and warranties to mortgage investors, as well as concerns regarding proper legal documentation
for securitized loans.
Given the lack of transparency into documentation procedures and questions as to the
capacity of disparate investor groups to centralize claims against the industry, market estimates
of potential bank liabilities stemming from securitization documentation issues vary widely.
224
FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3.
225
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
226
Third Way staff conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 29, 2010).
227
Jason Gold and Anne Kim, The Case Against a Foreclosure Moratorium, Third Way Domestic Policy
Memo, at 3-4 (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at content.thirdway.org/publications/342/Third_Way_Memo_-
_The_Case_Against_a_Foreclosure_Moratorium.pdf) (herein
228
Small banks are those with under $1 billion in total assets. Congressional Oversight Panel, July
Oversight Report: Small Banks in the Capital Purchase Program, at 74 (July 14, 2010) (online at
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-071410-report.pdf); SNL Financial. Credit union residential mortgage loan
portfolios include first and second lien mortgages and home equity loans. Credit Union National Association, U.S.
Credit Union Profile: Mid-Year 2010 Summary of Credit Union Operating Results, at 6 (Sept. 7, 2010) (online at
www.cuna.org/research/download/uscu_profile_2q10.pdf).
64
a. Securitization Title
As discussed above, documentation standards in the foreclosure process have helped
shine a light on potential questions regarding the ownership of loans sold into securitization
without the proper assignment of title to the trust that sponsors the mortgage securities. There
are at least three points at which the mortgage and the note must be transferred during the
securitization process in order for the trust to have proper ownership of the mortgage and the
note and thereby the authority to foreclose if necessary. Concerns that the proper paperwork was
not placed in the securitization trust within the 90-day window stipulated by law have created
uncertainty in MBS markets.
ownership of the underlying
mortgages creates an atmosphere of uncertainty in the market and a bevy of possible problems.
A securitization trust is not legally capable of taking action on mortgages unless it has clear
ownership of the mortgages and the notes. Therefore, possible remedies for loans that are
seriously delinquent such as foreclosure, deed-in-lieu, or short sale would not be available to
the trust.
229
Litigation appears likely from purchasers of MBS who have possible standing
against the trusts that issued the MBS. Claimants will contend that the securitization trusts
created securities that were based on mortgages which they did not own.
largest banks often created these securitization trusts or originated the mortgages in the pool, in a
worst-case scenario it is possible that these institutions would be forced to repurchase the MBS
the trusts issued, often at a significant loss.
On October 15, 2010, the American Securitization Forum (ASF) asserted that concerns
regarding the legality of loan transfers for securitization were without merit. The statement
onventional process for loan transfers
embodied in standard legal documentation for mortgage securitizations is adequate and
appropriate to transfer ownership of mortgage loans to the securitization trusts in accordance
with appli
230
229
A deed-in-lieu permits a borrower to transfer their interest in real property to a lender in order to settle
all indebtedness associated with that property. A short sale occurs when a servicer allows a homeowner to sell the
home with the understanding that the proceeds from the sale may be less than is owed on the mortgage. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Program (online at
makinghomeaffordable.gov/hafa.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
230
ASF Statement on Mortgage Securitization Legal Structures and Loan Transfers, supra note 181. Some
observers question whether, even if the procedures in the PSA were legally sound, they were actually accomplished.
Consumer lawyers conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010).
65
b. Forced Mortgage Repurchases/Put-backs
In the context of the overall $7.6 trillion mortgage securitization market, approximately
$5.5 trillion in MBS were issued by the GSEs and $2.1 trillion by non-agency issuers.
231
As
discussed above, and distinct from the foreclosure irregularities and securitization documentation
concerns, banks make representations and warranties regarding the mortgage loans pooled and
sold into GSE and private-label securities. A breach of these representations or warranties
allows the purchaser to require the seller to repurchase the specific loan.
While these representations and warranties vary based on the type of security and
customer, triggers that may force put-backs include undisclosed liabilities, income or
employment misrepresentation, property value falsification, and the mishandling of escrow
funds.
232
Thus far, loans originated in 2005-2008 have the highest concentration of repurchase
demands. Repurchase volumes stemming from older vintages have not had a material effect on
implemented at the end of
2008, it appears unlikely that loans originated after 2008 will have a high repurchase rate,
although the enormous uncertainty in the market makes it difficult to predict repurchases with
any degree of precision.
233
There are meaningful distinctions between the capacity of GSEs and private-label
investors to put-back loans to the banks. This helps explain why the vast majority of put-back
requests and successful put-backs relate to loans sold to the GSEs. This also helps estimate the
size of the potential risks to the banks from non-agency put-backs. GSEs benefit from direct
epresentations and warranties
due to the relatively higher standard of loan underwriting. Private label investors, on the other
hand, do not have access to loan files, and instead must aggregate claims to request a review of
loan files.
234
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, private label securities often lack some
of the representations and warranties common to agency securities. For example, Wells Fargo
indicated that approximately half of its private label securities do not contain all of the
representations and warranties typical of agency securities.
235
Also, given that private label
231
The non-agency figure includes both residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities. Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association, US Mortgage-Related Outstanding (online at
www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/SF-US-Mortgage-Related-Outstanding-SIFMA.xls)
(accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
232
Federal National Mortgage Association, Selling Guide: Fannie Mae Single Family, at Chapters A2-2,
A2-3 (Mar. 2, 2010) (online at www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/sg/pdf/sg030210.pdf).
233
It is unlikely that earlier vintages will pose a repurchase risk given the relatively more seasoned nature
of these securities.
234
For further discussion, please see Section D, supra.
235
Wells Fargo & Company, BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, at 13 (Nov. 4, 2010) (online
mitigated because approximately half of the securitizations do not contain typical reps and warranties regarding
66
securities are often composed of loans to borrowers with minimal to non-existent supporting loan
documentation, many do not contain warranties to protect investors from borrower fraud.
236
Since the beginning of 2009, the four largest banks incurred $11.4 billion in repurchase
quarter 2010.
237
Bank of America incurred a total of $4.5 billion in expenses relating to
representations and warranties during this period nearly 40 percent of the $11.4 billion total
that the top four banks have reported.
238
Figure 9: Estimated Representation and Warranties Expense and Repurchase Reserves at
Largest Banks (millions of dollars)
239
Estimated Representation and
Warranty Expense
Estimated Ending Repurchase
Reserves
FY2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010 FY2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010
Bank of America $1,900 $526 $1,248 $872 $3,507 $3,325 $3,939 $4,339
Citigroup 526 5 351 358 482 450 727 952
JP Morgan 940 432 667 1,464 1,705 1,982 2,332 3,332
Wells Fargo 927 402 382 370 1,033 1,263 1,375 1,331
Total $4,293 $1,365 $2,648 $3,064 $6,727 $7,020 $8,373 $9,954
GSE Put-backs
As of June 2010, 63 percent of foreclosures occurred on homes where the loan was either
owned or guaranteed by government investors such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while the
remaining 37 percent of foreclosures were on homes owned by private investors.
240
A large
borrower or other third party misrepresentations related to the loan, general compliance with underwriting
236
JPM Presentation at BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 217, at 24
Corporation, BancAnlaysts Association of
Boston, at 13 (Nov. 4, 2010) (online at phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9Njg5MDV8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1) (hereinafter
Bank of America Presentation at BancAnlaysts Association of Boston Conference ns
and warranties on these deals are less rigorous than those given to GSEs. These deals had generally higher LTV
237
Credit Suisse, Mortgage Put-back Losses Appear Manageable for the Large Banks, at 10 (Oct. 26,
2010).
238
Id. at 10.
239
Id. at 10.
240
Loans either owned or guaranteed by the GSEs have performed materially better than loans owned or
securitized by other investors. For example, loans owned or guaranteed by the GSEs that are classified as seriously
delinquent have increased from 3.8 percent in June 2009 to 4.5 percent in June 2010. In comparison, the percentage
of loans owned by private investors that are classified as seriously delinquent has increased from 10.5 percent in
June 2009 to 13.1 percent in June 2010. The same dichotomy is seen in the number of loans in the process of
67
As Figure 10
gest banks sold a total of $3.1 trillion in loans to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac from 2005-2008.
Figure 10: Loans Sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 2005-2008
241
GSEs have already forced banks to repurchase $12.4 billion in mortgages.
242
Bank of
America, which has the largest loan portfolio in comparison to its peers, has received a total of
$18.0 billion in representation and warranty claims from the GSEs on 2004-2008 vintages. Of
this total, Bank of America has resolved $11.4 billion, incurring $2.5 billion in associated
losses.
243
However, the bank believes that it has turned the corner in terms of new repurchase
requests from the GSEs.
244
JPMorgan Chase noted that breaches of representations and warranties generally occur within 24
foreclosure. As of June 2010, 2.3 percent of loans owned or guaranteed by the GSEs were in the foreclosure
process, whereas 8.0 percent of loans owned by private investors were classified as such. Staff calculations derived
from Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics
Report: Second Quarter 2010, at Tables 9, 10, 11 (Sept. 2010) (online at www.ots.treas.gov/_files/490019.pdf)
; Foreclosure completion information provided by
OCC/OTS in response to Panel request.
241
Credit Suisse on Mounting Mortgage Issues, supra note 223.
242
, supra note 106, at 2.
243
Bank of America Presentation at BancAnlaysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 236, at
12.
244
Bank of America Presentation at BancAnlaysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 236, at 12
-thirds through with GSE claims on 2004-
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2005 2006 2007 2008
Bank of America Wells Fargo JPMorganChase CŝƟŐƌŽƵƉ
68
months of the loan being originated.
245
JPMorgan Chase noted that delinquencies or foreclosures
on loans aged more than two years generally reflect economic hardship of the borrower.
246
Private-Label Put-backs
In comparison with the GSEs, private-label investors do not benefit from the same degree
of protection through the representations and warranties common in the agency PSAs.
247
There
were, however, representations and warranties in private-label securities that, if violated, could
provide an outlet for mortgage put-backs. In theory, systemic breaches in these securities could
prove a bigger and potentially more problematic exposure, although market observers have cited
logistical impediments to centralizing claims, in addition to the higher hurdles necessary to put-
back securities successfully to the banks.
248
Since the majority of subprime and Alt-A
originators folded during the crisis, the bulk of the litigation is directed at the underwriters and
any large, surviving originators. Thus far, however, subprime and Alt-A repurchase requests
have been slow to materialize. Relative to subprime and Alt-A loans, jumbo loans to higher-net
borrowers which were in turn sold to private label investors have performed substantially
better.
249
Bank of America offers a window into the comparatively slow rate at which private-label
securities have been put-back to banks. Between 2004 and 2008, Bank of America sold
approximately $750 billion of loans to parties other than the GSEs.
250
As of October 2010, Bank
of America received $3.9 billion in repurchase requests from private-label and whole-loan
245
JPM Presentation at BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 217, at 22
recent additions to 90 DPD [days past due] have longer histories of payment; we believe loans going delinquent
after 24 months of origination are at lower risk of ).
246
JPM Presentation at BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 217, at 24
losses-to- R&W:
Investor hurdles mitigate impact; GSE losses peaking
materially reduces the likelihood of repurchase from GSEs (or others, for that matter), since the likelihood of default
being caused by origination problems is much lower; instead, default was likely triggered by loss of employment,
247
, supra note 106, at 4.
248
, supra note 106
believe that the representation and warranties were not standard across all private-label securities and may have
provided differing levels of protection to investors. They do not appear to have the same basis on which to ask the
banks to buy back the loans because the banks did not, in our view, make similar promises in the representation and
249
As of June 2010, the OCC/OTS reports that 11.4 percent of the Alt-A and 19.4 percent of the subprime
loans it services are classified as seriously delinquent as compared to an overall rate of 6.2 percent. OCC and OTS
Mortgage Metrics Report, supra note 240. Also, for example, JPMorgan Chase noted that 41 percent and 32 percent
of its private-label subprime and Alt-A securities, respectively, issued between 2005 and 2008 had been 90 days or
more past due at one point as compared to only 13 percent of its prime mortgages. JPM Presentation at
BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 217, at 24 .
250
Bank of America Presentation at BancAnlaysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 236.
69
investors. To date, Bank of America has rescinded $1.9 billion in private-label and whole-loan
put-back claims and approved $1.0 billion for repurchase, with an estimated loss of $600 million.
This level of actual put-back requests highlights the difficulty in maneuvering the steps
necessary to put-back a loan, which begins with a group of investors in the same security or
tranche of a security banding together to request access to the underlying loan documents. For
example, the group of investors petitioning for paperwork relating to $47 billion in Bank of
America loans remain a number of steps away from being in a position to request formally a put-
back.
251
Figure 11, below, illustrates the dollar amount of non-agency loans originated by the
st banks between 2005 and 2008.
251
As part of its MBS purchase program, the Federal Reserve currently owns approximately $1.1 trillion of
agency MBS. Due to the nature of the government guarantee attached to agency MBS, loans that are over 120 days
past due are automatically bought back at par by the government agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that
guaranteed them. Theref -back risk
to the banking industry, however, if the loans are bought back by the agency guarantors, these agencies have the
right to take action against the entities that originally sold the loans if there were breaches or violations. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York also owns private-label RMBS in its Maiden Lane vehicles created under its 13(3)
authority.
-label RMBS are concentrated in the Maiden Lane II vehicle created as part
As of June 30, 2010, the fair value of
private-label RMBS in Maiden Lane II was $14.8 billion. The sector distribution of Maiden Lane II was 54.6
percent subprime, 30.8 percent Alt-A adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), 6.8 percent option ARM, and the remainder
The $47 billion action that FRBNY joined involves only the private-label RMBS it holds
in the Maiden Lane vehicles, and is primarily localized within Maiden Lane II. FRBNY staff conversations with
Panel staff (Oct. 26, 2010); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System staff conversations with Panel staff
(Nov. 10, 2010); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, at 19 (Oct. 2010) (online at
on Credit and Liq
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Nov. 12, 2010) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/)
.
13(3) authority, please see
if three conditions are met). See also Congressional Oversight Panel, June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its
, at 79-83 (June 10, 2010) (online at
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-061010-report.pdf).
70
Figure 11: Non-Agency Originations, 2005-2008
252
Put-back Loss Estimates
Losses stemming from mortgage put-backs are viewed as the biggest potential liability of
the banking sector from the foreclosure crisis. While it is difficult to quantify the impact this
issue may have on bank balance sheets, a number of analysts have compiled estimates on
potential risks to the sector.
The first step in estimating the
of loans, within the $10.6 trillion mortgage debt market. The 2005-2008 period is the starting
point for this analysis. Of the loans originated during this period, $3.7 trillion were sold by
banks to the GSEs and $1.5 trillion were sold to private label investors.
253
Accordingly, this $5.2
trillion in agency and non-agency loans and securities sold by the banks during the 2005-2008
period is the starting point for a series of assumptions loan delinquencies, put-back requests,
successful put-backs, and loss severity that ultimately drive estimates of potential bank losses.
The Panel has averaged published loss estimates from bank analysts in order to provide a
top-level illustration of the cost mortgage put-backs could inflict on bank balance sheets. The
estimate below represents a baseline sample of five analyst estimates for the GSE portion and six
252
There were no sales in 2009. Credit Suisse on Mounting Mortgage Issues, supra note 223.
253
Nomura Equity Research, Private Label Put-Back Concerns are Overdone, Private Investors Face
Hurdles -
Sachs, Assessing the Mortgage Morass
Mora
$0
$25
$50
$75
$100
$125
$150
$175
$200
$225
2005 2006 2007 2008
Bank of America Wells Fargo JPMorgan Chase CŝƟŐƌŽƵƉ
71
analyst estimates for the private-label approximation. Accordingly, realized losses could be
significantly higher or meaningfully lower.
As outlined below, there are numerous assumptions involved in estimating potential
losses from put-backs.
254
Projected Loan Losses Delinquent or non-performing mortgage loans provide the
initial pipeline for potential mortgage put-backs. Accordingly, estimates of
cumulative losses on loans issued between 2005 and 2008 govern the aggregate put-
back risk of the banks. The blended estimate for GSE loans is 13 percent, and the
blended private label estimate is 30 percent.
255
Gross Put-backs The next step is projecting what percentage of these delinquent or
nonperforming loans holders will choose to put-back to the banks. The average
estimate for gross put-backs for the GSEs is 30 percent, and private label loans is 24
percent.
Successful Put-backs Of these put-back requests, analysts estimate that 50 percent
of GSE loans and 33 percent of private label loans are put-back successfully to the
banks.
Severity The calculation involves the loss severity on loans that are successfully
put-back to the banks (i.e., how much the banks have to pay to make the aggrieved
investors whole). The blended average severity rate used by analysts for both GSE
and the private label loans is 50 percent.
254
Subsequent estimates loan delinquencies, put-back requests, successful put-backs, and loss severity
are surveyed from the following research reports: Bernstein Research, Bank Stock Weekly: Return to Lender? Sizing
Rep and Warranty Exposure (Se
Focus on Mortgage Repurchase Risk (Sept. 2, 2010); J.P. Morgan, Putbacks and
Foreclosures: Fact vs. Fiction s Capital Research Report on Putbacks and
Goldman Sachs on Assessing the Mortgage Morass, supra note 253; Nomura Equity Research on
Private Label Put-Back Concerns, supra note 253; Citigroup Global Markets, R&W Losses Manageable, but Non-
Agency May be Costly Wildcard -
Compass Point Research & Trading, LLC, GSE Mortgage Repurchase Risk Poses Future Headwinds: Quantifying
Losses (Mar. 15, 2010); Deutsche Bank Revisits Putbacks and Securitizations, supra note 192; JPM Presentation at
BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 217, at 26.
255
Four analyst estimates were used for the blended private-label loan losses percentage of 30%: Goldman
Sachs 28%, Bernstein Research 25%, Nomura Equity Research 25%, and Credit Suisse 40%. Goldman
Sachs on Assessing the Mortgage Morass, supra note 253; Nomura Equity Research on Private Label Put-Back
Concerns, supra note 253; Bernstein Research Report on Sizing Rep and Warranty Exposure, supra note 254; Credit
Suisse on Mortgage Put-back Losses, supra note 192.
72
Using the assumptions outlined above, the estimated loss to the industry from mortgage
put-backs is $52 billion (see Figure 12 below). This compares to industry-wide estimates of
base-case losses from mortgage put-backs of $43 billion to $65 billion.
256
Figure 12: Put-back Loss Estimates (billions of dollars)
257
Agency MBS
Private Label
MBS
Total (%) ($) (%) ($)
2005-2008 MBS Sold
258
$3,651 $1,358 $5,009
Projected Loan Losses 13% 475 30% 407 882
Gross Put-backs (Requests) 30% 142 24% 98 240
Successful Put-backs 50% 71 33% 32 103
Put-back Severity 50% 50%
Total Put-back Losses $36 $16 $52
The estimated $52 billion would be borne predominantly by four firms (Bank of
America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup), accounting for the majority of the
and projected losses.
259
In the aggregate these four banks have already
reserved $9.9 billion for future representations and warranties expenses, which is in addition to
the $11.4 billion in expenses already incurred.
260
Thus, of this potential liability, $21.3 billion
has either been previously expensed or reserved for by the major banks.
261
Given the timing
256
This range is comprised of a number of base-case or mid-point estimates for potential losses across the
industry from put-backs: Standard & P - $43 billion, Deutsche Bank - $43 billion, FBR Capital Markets - $44
billion in potential losses, Citigroup - $50.1 billion, J.P Morgan - $55 billion, Goldman Sachs - $71 billion, Credit
Suisse - $65 billion, The Deutsche Bank estimate is for $31 billion in remaining losses, the $12 billion in realized
losses thus far was added to create a consistent metric. FBR on Repurchase-Related Losses, supra note 192; Credit
Suisse on Mortgage Put-back Losses, supra note 192; Deutsche Bank Revisits Putbacks and Securitizations, supra
note 192; , supra note 106, at 4; Citigroup
Research Report on Non-Agency Losses, supra note 254; Barclays Capital Research Report on Putbacks and
Foreclosures, supra note 254; Goldman Sachs on Assessing the Mortgage Morass, supra note 253.
257
JPM Presentation at BancAnalysts Association of Boston Conference, supra note 217, at 26.
258
These figures represent the value of the MBS sold either to the GSEs or private-label investors during
this period that are still currently outstanding. Nomura Equity Research on Private Label Put-Back Concerns, supra
note 253; Goldman Sachs on Assessing the Mortgage Morass, supra note 253.
259
It is worth noting, however, that Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase are the more meaningful
contributor The mid-
point of each of these estimates was used to compute the range. Deutsche Bank Revisits Putbacks and
Securitizations, supra note 192, at 7; Credit Suisse on Mounting Mortgage Issues, supra note 223; FBR on
Repurchase-Related Losses, supra note 192.
260
The $11.4 billion in estimated expenses at the top four banks has been since the first quarter of 2009.
Credit Suisse on Mortgage Put-back Losses, supra note 192, at 10
261
Deutsche Bank Revisits Putbacks and Securitizations, supra note 192.
73
associated with put-back requests and associated accounting recognition, it is not inconceivable
that the major banks could recognize future losses over a 2-3 year period.
G. Effect of Irregularities and Foreclosure Freezes on Housing Market
1. Foreclosure Freezes and their Effect on Housing
In previous reports, the Panel has noted the many undesirable consequences that
foreclosures, especially mass foreclosures, have on individuals, families, neighborhoods, local
governments, and the economy as a whole.
262
Additionally, housing experts testifying at Panel
hearings have emphasized that mass foreclosures cause damage to the economy and social fabric
of the country.
263
Certainly, the injection over the past several years of millions of foreclosed-
upon homes into an already weak housing market has had a deleterious effect on home prices.
These effects are especially relevant in examining what repercussions foreclosure freezes would
have on the housing market, and the advisability of such freezes.
Questions remain as to how broadly the current foreclosure irregularities will affect the
housing market, and the scale of the losses involved. The immediate effect of the foreclosure
document irregularities has been to cause many servicers to freeze all foreclosure processings,
although some freezes have been temporary.
264
Some states have encouraged these foreclosure
freezes,
265
and government-imposed, blanket freezes on all foreclosures have been under
discussion.
266
The housing market may not be seriously affected by the current freezes on
pending foreclosures, which may actually cause home prices of unaffected homes to rise. Any
foreclosure moratorium that is not accompanied by action to address the underlying issues
associated with mass foreclosures and the irregularities, however, will add delays but will not
provide solutions. Beyond the effects of the current freezes, mortgage documentation
irregularities
confidence and trust in the housing market, all of which may drive down home prices.
In considering the possible effects foreclosure freezes may have on the housing market, it
is important to distinguish, as the Panel has in previous reports, between the effects these
foreclosures and foreclosure freezes may have on individuals versus effects that are more
262
March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 9-11.
263
See, e.g., Written Testimony of Julia Gordon, supra note 171, at 1-2.
264
See, e.g., Statement from Bank of America Home Loans, supra note 21.
265
See, e.g. Governor Martin O'Malley, Maryland
Congressional Delegation Request Court Intervention in Halting Foreclosures (Oct. 8, 2010) (online at
www.governor.maryland.gov/pressreleases/101009b.asp).
266
See, e.g., Reid Welcomes Bank of America Decision, supra note 24; Foreclosure Moratorium: Cracking
Down on Liar Liens, supra note 24.
74
systemic or macroeconomic, as these interests may come into conflict at times.
267
The Panel has
also repeatedly acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding some mortgages make
foreclosure simply unavoidable.
268
Additionally, the current housing market has, among other
difficult problems, a severe oversupply of housing in relation to current demand, which has
fallen substantially since the peak bubble years due to higher unemployment and other economic
hardships. This fundamental supply/demand imbalance has driven down home prices
nationwide, but especially in areas such as Nevada or Florida, where a great many new homes
were constructed.
269
There are numerous arguments both for and against foreclosure freezes at this time.
270
Freezing foreclosures may allow time for servicers, state governments, and courts to sort out the
irregularity situation and may avoid illegal or erroneous foreclosures in some cases. Voluntary,
limited freezes may be sensible for particular servicers. The costs associated with a mandatory
foreclosure freeze may also pressure servicers to resolve frozen foreclosures through
modifications.
271
Further, foreclosure freezes can temporarily reduce the number of real estate
owned by banks and pre-foreclosure homes coming to market, reducing excess supply, which
can be beneficial for home prices in the short term. The longer-term consequences of freezes
depend on the ultimate solution to the issues giving rise to the freezes.
In addition, foreclosures have many well-documented negative financial and social
consequences on families and neighborhoods that might be mitigated by a foreclosure freeze.
272
Vacant homes can attract thieves and vandals. If not maintained by the lender, properties
foreclosed upon and repossessed by the lender properties also known as real-estate owned
(REOs), often become eyesores, detracting from the appearance of the neighborhood and
267
March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 62-
raises the question of whether the economic efficiency of foreclosures should be viewed in the context of individual
foreclosures or in the context of the macroeconomic impact of widespread foreclosures. If the former, then caution
should be exercised about foreclosure moratoria and other forms of delay to the extent it prevents efficient
foreclosures. But if the latter is the proper view, then it may well be that some individually efficient foreclosures
268
March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 37 (Discussing loan modificatio
initial matter, however, it must be recognized that some foreclosures are not avoidable and some workouts may not
269
The oversupply of homes c
discussed in previous reports. See, e.g., March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 107-108. September 2010
for-sale housing inventory stands at 4.04 million homes, a 10.7 month supply at current sales rates, up from the 3.59
Association of Realtors, September Existing-Home Sales Show Another Strong Gain (Oct. 25, 2010) (online at
www.realtor.org/press_room/news_releases/2010/10/sept_strong).
270
The Panel has discussed some of the pros and cons of foreclosure freezes in prior reports, but not in the
context of the irregularities. March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 61-63 .
271
March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 61.
272
See, e.g., March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 9-11.
75
reducing local home values. The drop in the value of neighboring homes has been corroborated
by a recent study. Although the authors found that the impact of foreclosed homes on each
individual neighboring home is relatively small, these losses can amount to a considerable total
loss in value to the neighborhood. Not surprisingly, the researchers found a more dramatic
decline in value for the foreclosed home itself. The study indicated that foreclosure lowers a
bankruptcy, that also lead to forced home sales. The researchers attribute these losses primarily
to the urgency with which lenders dispose of REOs and to damage inflicted on vacant, lender-
owned homes.
273
In addition to lowering the value of the home itself, a foreclosure affects the surrounding
neighborhood, especially if the home is
A reduction in price from a foreclosed property can affect the values of surrounding homes if the
low price is used as a comparable sale for valuation purposes. Even if foreclosure sales are
excluded as comparable sales from appraisals, as is often the case, these sale prices are readily
accessible public information. For example, considering the popularity of real estate sites such
as Zillow and Trulia that show home sale prices, buyers can easily see these low foreclosure sale
prices and are likely to reduce their offers accordingly.
274
Furthermore, as Julia Gordon of the
Center for Responsible Lending and several academic studies observe,
275
minority communities
are disproportionately affected by foreclosures and their consequences.
276
These negative
externalities from foreclosures are borne not by any of the parties to the mortgage, but by the
neighbors and the community, who are innocent bystanders.
One of the most common arguments against foreclosure freezes concerns the effect that
freezes could have on shadow inventory properties likely to be sold in the near future that are
not currently on the market, and are therefore not counted in supply inventory statistics. A
273
John Campbell, Stefano Giglio, and Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House Prices, at 10, 18, 21,
Unpublished manuscript (July 2010) (online at econ-
period lowered the price of the foreclosed house by $44,000 and the prices of neighboring houses by a total of
274
Zillow does not include foreclosure data in its home price estimates; however, a person can click on a
home, including foreclosed homes, and see its sales price.
275
See, e.g., Vicki Bean, Ingrid Gould Ellen, et al., Kids and Foreclosures: New York City (Sept. 2010)
(online at
steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/lah431/Foreclosures_and_Kids_Policy_Brief_Sept_2010.pdf); Vanesa
Estrada Correa, The Housing Downturn and Racial Inequality, Policy Matters, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 2009) (online at
www.policymatters.ucr.edu/pmatters-vol3-2-housing.pdf).
276
Congressional Oversight Panel, Testimony of Julia Gordon, senior policy council, Center for
Responsible Lending, Transcript: COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs (Oct. 27, 2010)
(publication forthcoming) (online at cop.senate.gov/hearings/library/hearing-102710-foreclosure.cfm)
American and Latino families are much more likely than whites to lose their homes, and we estimate that
communities of color will lose over $360 billion worth of
76
prolonged freeze on foreclosures without a diminution in the number of homes in foreclosure
would add to the already substantial problem of shadow inventory. Of course, increased shadow
inventory can be addressed either by foreclosing and selling the homes, or by creating
circumstances that allow current homeowners to stay in their homes. Although there are no
reliable measures (or definitions) of shadow inventory, estimates range from 1.7 million to 7
million homes.
277
These homes represent additional supply that the market will eventually have
to accommodate, so long as the homes are not removed from the shadow inventory due to
circumstances such as loan modifications or an improvement in the financial condition of
borrowers.
278
Beyond shadow inventory, foreclosure sales consist of sales of homes immediately prior
to foreclosure and sales of REOs. In the 12 months between September 2009 and August 2010,
4.13 million existing homes were sold in the United States, approximately 30 percent of which
were foreclosure sales.
279
Further, lenders are estimated to own 290,000 properties as REOs.
280
Currently, approximately 2 million homes, or 4.6 percent of all mortgaged properties, are
classified as in the foreclosure process. Another 2 million, or 4.5 percent of mortgaged
properties, are more than 90 days past due.
281
The level of foreclosures is, further, expected to
rise: more than $1 trillion in adjustable-rate mortgages are expected to experience interest rate
277
First American CoreLogic,
American CoreLogic (Dec. 17, 2009) (online at
www.facorelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Newsroom/RES_in_the_News/FACL_Shadow_Inventory_121809.pdf);
Laurie Goodman, Robert Hunter, et al., Amherst Securities Group LP, Amherst Mortgage Insight: Housing
Overhang/Shadow Inventory = Enormous Problem, at 1 (Sept. 23, 2009) (online at matrix.millersamuel.com/wp-
content/3q09/Amherst%20Mortgage%20Insight%2009232009.pdf).
278
James J. Saccacio, chief executive officer of the online foreclosure marketplace RealtyTrac, expects that
activity to be followed by a parallel spike in activity as many of the delayed foreclosures move forward in the
foreclosure process. However, if the documentation issue cannot be quickly resolved and expands to more lenders
we could see a chilling effect on the overall housing market as sales of pre-foreclosure and foreclosed properties,
which account for nearly one-third of all sales, dry up and the shadow inventory of distressed properties grows
Foreclosure Activity Increases 4 Percent in Third
Quarter (Oct. 14, 2010) (online at www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/q3-2010-and-september-2010-
foreclosure-reports-
279
National Association of Realtors, Existing-Home Sales Move Up in August (Sept. 23, 2010) (online at
www.realtor.org/press_room/news_releases/2010/09/ehs_move); HOPE Now Alliance, Appendix Mortgage Loss
Mitigation Statistics: Industry Extrapolations (Monthly for Dec 2008 to Nov 2009) (online at
www.hopenow.com/industry-
data/HOPE%20NOW%20National%20Data%20July07%20to%20Nov09%20v2%20(2).pdf); HOPE Now Alliance,
Industry Extrapolations and Metrics (May 2010) (online at www.hopenow.com/industry-
data/HOPE%20NOW%20Data%20Report%20(May)%2006-21-2010.pdf); HOPE Now Alliance, Industry
Extrapolations and Metrics (Aug. 2010) (online at hopenow.com/industry-
data/HOPE%20NOW%20Data%20Report%20(August)%2010-05-2010%20v2b.pdf).
280
RealtyTrac Press Release on Foreclosure Activity, supra note 278.
281
MBA National Delinquency Survey, Q2 2010, supra note 199. See also MBA Press Release on
Delinquencies and Foreclosure Starts, supra note 199.
77
resets between 2010 and 2012, an event that is positively correlated with delinquency and
foreclosure.
282
Foreclosure sales therefore represent a very substantial portion of housing market
activity, with many more foreclosures either in the pipeline or likely to enter the pipeline in the
coming years.
Opponents of mandatory foreclosure freezes have also argued that a widespread freeze
would encourage defaults by eliminating the negative consequences of default; that foreclosure
freezes are bad for mortgage investors (including taxpayers, as owners of the GSEs)
283
because
they reduce investment returns by delaying the payment of foreclosure sale proceeds; and that
they would disproportionately harm smaller banks and credit unions, which are heavily invested
in home mortgages.
284
Further, when smaller banks and credit unions service loans, payments to
investors on non-performing loans must come from significantly smaller cash cushions than they
do for the largest banks and servicers.
285
James Lockhart, former regulator of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, has stated that freezes will also extend the time that homes in foreclosure
proceedings will be left vacant, with attendant negative effects on the surrounding
neighborhood.
286
Such cases would presumably involve already vacant, foreclosed-upon homes,
and homes with impending or ongoing foreclosure proceedings where the borrower has chosen
to vacate early, as occasionally happens.
287
282
Zach Fox, Credit Suisse: $1 Trillion worth of ARMs still face resets, SNL Financial (Feb. 25, 2010).
The Panel addressed the impact of interest rate resets in its April 2010 Report on foreclosures. Congressional
Oversight Panel, April Oversight Report: Evaluating Progress of TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, at 111-
115, 123 (Apr. 14, 2010) (online at cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-041410-report.pdf)
.
283
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be impacted directly by a freeze because they would have to
continue advancing coupon payments to bondholders while not receiving any revenue from disposal of foreclosed
properties, upon which they are already not receiving mortgage payments. These costs would almost certainly be
borne by taxpayers, and depending on the duration of the freeze and how the housing market responds to it, they
could be substantial.
Press reports and Panel staff discussions with industry sources have indicated that, as part of an effort to
restart foreclosures, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were until recently negotiating an indemnification agreement with
servicers and title insurers. This would have been along the lines of the recent agreement between Bank of America
and Fidelity National Financial, mentioned above in Section C, in which Bank of America agreed to indemnify
Fidelity National (a title insurer) for losses incurred due to servicer errors. However, industry sources stated that the
GSEs had recently cooled to this effort. Industry sources conversations with Panel staff (Nov. 9, 2010); Nick
Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie Seek End to Freeze, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 23, 2010) (online at
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304354104575568621229952944.html); see also Statement from Bank
of America Home Loans, supra note 16.
284
Third Way Domestic Policy Memo on the Case Against a Foreclosure Moratorium, supra note 227.
285
See Section F.2, supra.
286
Bloomberg News, Interview with WL (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at
www.bloomberg.com/video/64040362/).
287
JPMorgan Chase estimates that approximately one-third of the homes upon which it forecloses are
already vacant by the time the foreclosure process commences. Stephen Meister, Foreclosuregate is Quickly
Spinning Out of Control, RealClearMarkets (Oct. 22, 2010) (online at
78
2. Foreclosure Irregularities and the Crisis of Confidence
The apparently widespread nature of the foreclosure irregularities that have come to light
has the potential to reduce public trust substantially in the entire real estate industry, especially in
the legitimacy of important legal documents and the good faith of other market participants.
Under these circumstances, either buying or lending on a home will appear to be substantially
more risky than before. If buyers suspect that homes, especially foreclosed homes, may have
unknown title and legal problems, they may be less likely to buy, or at least they may lower their
offers to account for the increased risks. Since foreclosure sales currently account for such a
large portion of market activity, in the absence of solutions that reduce foreclosures, a reduction
in demand for previously foreclosed-upon properties would have negative effects on the overall
housing market. David Stevens, commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration, recently
entire generation of young people from homeownership.
288
Similar dynamics may impact the availability and cost of mortgages as well, as mortgage
investors, who provide the capital that ultimately supports home prices, reassess their perceptions
of risk. The exposure of foreclosure irregularities has raised a host of potential risks for
investors, such as the possibility that MBS trusts may not actually own the underlying loans they
claim to own, that servicers may not be able to foreclose upon delinquent borrowers and thus
recover invested capital, that borrowers who have already been foreclosed upon may sue, or that
other currently unknown liability issues exist. These new risks could cause some mortgage
investors to look for safer alternative investments or to increase their investment return
requirements to compensate for the increased risks. With wary investors making less capital
available for mortgages, and reevaluating the risk of residential lending, mortgage interest rates
could rise, in turn decreasing the affordability of homes and depressing home prices, as the same
monthly payment now supports a smaller mortgage.
Additionally, both the foreclosure freezes and the legal wrangling between homeowners,
servicers, title companies, and investors that appears inevitable at this point, and in the absence
of a solution to the problem of mass foreclosures could extend the time it will take for the
inventory of homes for sale to be cleared from the system, and thus could potentially delay the
recovery of the housing market.
289
Further, general uncertainty about the scope of these
www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2010/10/22/foreclosure-gate_is_quickly_spinning_out_of_control.html).
Similarly, there are reports about a type
borrower vacates the home and mails the servicer the keys in the hope that the servicer will accept the act as a deed-
in-lieu-of-foreclosure, or simply to get the foreclosure process over with.
288
David H. Stevens, commissioner, Federal Housing Administration, Remarks at the Mortgage Bankers
Association Annual Convention, at 7, 20 (Oct. 26, 2010).
289
Cf. The White House, Press Briefing (Oct. 12, 2010) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/10/12/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs- We also have pointed out, though, that
the idea of a national moratorium would impact the recovery in the housing sector, as anybody that wished to enter
79
problems and how they will be addressed by market participants and governments could have a
attitude. On the other hand, some delay could be beneficial in that it would provide the time
necessary to arrive at a more comprehensive solution to the many complex issues involved in, or
underlying, this situation.
290
The recent and developing nature of the foreclosure irregularities means that predicting
their effects, as well as those of any resulting foreclosure freezes, on the housing market
necessarily involves a high degree of speculation. Actual housing market movements will
depend on, among other things, the scope and severity of the foreclosure irregularities, the
resolution of various legal issues, government actions, and on the reactions of homeowners,
home buyers, servicers, and mortgage investors. It seems clear, however, that the many
unknowns, uncertain solutions, and potential liability for fraud greatly add to the risk inherent in
owning or lending on affected homes.
291
H. Impact on HAMP
HAMP is a nationwide mortgage modification program established in 2009, using TARP
funds, as an answer to the growing foreclosure problem. HAMP is designed to provide a
mortgage modification to homeowners in those cases in which modification, from the
perspective of the mortgage holder, is an economically preferable outcome to foreclosure. The
program provides financial incentives to servicers to modify mortgages for homeowners at risk
of default, and incentives for the beneficiaries of these modifications to stay current on their
mortgage payments going forward.
292
Participation in the program by servicers is on a voluntary
basis. Once a servicer is in HAMP, though, if a borrower meets certain eligibility criteria,
participating servicers must run a test, known as a net present value (NPV) test, to evaluate
whether a foreclosure or a loan modification would yield a higher value. If the value of the
modified mortgage is greater than the potential foreclosure value, then the servicer must offer the
borrower a modification.
into a contract or execute a contract to purchase a home that had previously been foreclosed on, that process stops.
290
In prior reports, the Panel has acknowledged that the delays caused by foreclosure freezes create
additional costs for servicers, but also have possibly beneficial effects for borrowers. March 2009 Oversight Report,
supra note 6, at 61-63 .
291
Mortgage lenders who make loans on formerly foreclosed homes where the legal ownership of the
property is uncertain due to foreclosure irregularities risk the possibility that other creditors could come forward
with competing claims to the collateral.
292
Servicers of GSE mortgages are required to participate in HAMP for their GSE portfolios. Servicers of
non-GSE mortgages may elect to sign a Servicer Participation Agreement in order to participate in the program.
Once an agreement has been signed, the participating servicer must evaluate all mortgages under HAMP unless the
participation contract is terminated. See Congressional Oversight Panel, October Oversight Report: An Assessment
of Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts After Six Months, at 44-45 (Oct. 9, 2009) (online at
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf).
80
Treasury asserts that the foreclosure irregularities have no direct impact on HAMP. With
regard to false affidavits, Phyllis Caldwell, chief of Homeownership Preservation
Office, noted that HAMP is a foreclosure-prevention program and therefore is separate from the
actual foreclosure sale process. As a result, HAMP is not directly affected by - or
false affidavits filed with state courts.
293
With regard to the issues around the transfer of ownership of the mortgage, Ms. Caldwell
to modify a mortgage, there is not a need to have clear title
294
In addition,
Treasury stated that it has not reviewed mortgage ownership transfer issues because the
modifications are private contracts between the servicer and the borrower.
295
Perhaps as a result,
Treasury is not doing anything independently to determine if the mortgages the servicers in
HAMP are modifying have been properly transferred into the trusts the servicers represent. It is
supporting other agencies in their efforts, but is taking no action on its own.
296
According to Ms.
the servicer is following the laws. [ ] If we learn
something after the fact that contradicts that, we do have the ability to go in and claw back the
incentive.
297
Treasury echoed this opinion in conversations with Panel staff.
298
sition that HAMP is unaffected by the foreclosure
irregularities. Although it is difficult to assess the exact consequences of the foreclosure
documentation crisis on HAMP at this point, there are several strong potential links which
Treasury should carefully consider. For example, if trusts have not properly received ownership
of the mortgage, they may not be the legal owner of the mortgage. If the trust does not own the
mortgage, the servicer cannot foreclose on it, and HAMP, a foreclosure prevention program, is
paying incentives to parties with no legal right to foreclose. At present, Treasury has no way to
293
Written Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 142, at 1.
294
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143.
295
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
296
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143
actually find out whether th -up on the fact that there
are mortgages out there do they actually have the mortgages and they actually have title to the land that they are
trying to foreclose on? CALDWELL: At this point, we are supporting all of the agencies that are doing
investigations of those servicers, including the GSEs, and are monitoring closely, and will take follow-up action
anything
independently to determine that mortgages modified under HAMP have all necessary loan documentation and a
of the folks at the banks and financial institutions
that they do have a they have loan documentation and a clear chain of title? ... CALDWELL:
foreclosure prevention process separate from the actual foreclosure sale process. And to modify a mortgage, there is
See also Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
297
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143.
298
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
81
determine if such payments are being made.
299
Treasury may well be paying incentives to
servicers that have no right to receive them.
Treasury has justified its relative inaction by noting that if ownership of the mortgage has
not been properly transferred, the legal owner will eventually appear, and at that time, Treasury
can claw back any incentive payments made to the wrong party.
300
Such a solution, however,
may not be feasible. It optimistically assumes that legal owners will be able to identify clearly
the mortgages they own, despite all of the potential litigation and complex transactions many
mortgages have been part of, and then navigate the bureaucracy to bring the matter before
Treasury. Inevitably, not all legal owners will manage this, in which case Treasury will be
giving money to parties that are not entitled to it. Moreover, if this is occurring, even in cases
where the legal owners do come forward, Treasury is essentially providing interest-free loans to
the wrong parties in the meantime.
standard in which borrowers must provide extensive documentation before benefiting from
HAMP, while servicers are allowed public money without having to prove their right to
foreclose.
In addition, although Treasury maintains that HAMP is unaffected by transfer of
mortgage ownership issues because modifications are private contracts between servicers and
borrowers,
301
a servicer cannot modify a
actual owner.
302
If legal owners then begin to come forward, as Treasury is relying on them to
do in order to clarify incentive payments, the legal owners will not be bound by the
modifications.
303
Abruptly, borrowers would no longer benefit from the reduced interest rates of
a HAMP modification. As a result, the length of time that a modification provides a borrower to
recover and become current on payment al
successes,
304
would be cut short. Indeed, borrowers may even suffer penalties for not having
been paying the monthly payments required prior to the modification.
Another concern involves how HAMP servicers have been calculating the costs of
. Foreclosures carry significant costs leading up to the
. If, by cutting corners in the foreclosure process, servicers were
able to lower the cost of foreclosure artificially, their own internal cost comparison analysis
299
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143.
300
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
301
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
302
Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14, at 8.
303
It is unclear what would happen if the true owner were also in HAMP. Under the HAMP standards, the
individual servicer should not matter, and a loan that qualified for a modification with one servicer should qualify
with another. The borrower, however, might have to reapply for a modification and enter a new trial modification.
It is also possible that Treasury could facilitate the transfer and not require a borrower to reapply.
304
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143.
82
might have differed from the official NPV analysis. In such instances, servicers would have an
incentive to lose paperwork or otherwise deny modifications that they would be compelled to
make under the program standards.
Conversely, foreclosure irregularities could have the perverse effect of encouraging
servicers to modify more loans through HAMP. If foreclosure irregularities lead to additional
litigation and delays in foreclosure proceedings, they will increase the costs of foreclosure.
305
Treasury may then update the HAMP NPV model to reflect these new realities. With the costs
of foreclosure higher, the NPV model will find more modifications to be NPV-positive, resulting
in more HAMP modifications.
I. Conclusion
Allegations of documentation irregularities remain in flux, and their consequences remain
uncertain. The best-case scenario, a possibility embraced by the financial services industry, is
that current concerns over foreclosure irregularities are overblown, reflecting mere clerical errors
that can and will be resolved quickly. If this view proves correct, then the irregularities might be
fixed with little to no impact on HAMP or financial stability.
The worst-case scenario, a possibility predominantly articulated by homeowners and
misbehavior on the part of banks and loan servicers that extends throughout the entire
securitization process. Such problems could throw into question the enforceability of legal rights
related to ownership of many loans that have been pooled and securitized. Given that 4.2 million
homeowners are currently in default and facing potential foreclosure, including 729,000 who
have been rejected from HAMP, the implications for the foreclosure market alone would be
immense. Much larger, of course, would be the implications of such irregularities for the
broader market in MBS, which totals $7.6 trillion in value. Losses related to documentation
issues could be compounded by losses related to MBS investors exercising put-back rights due to
poor underwriting of securitized loans.
Several investigations of irregularities are now underway, including a review by the 50
effort to review documentation for certain Countrywide loans led by PIMCO, BlackRock, and
FRBNY; and numerous other inquiries by private investors. These and similar efforts may
ultimately uncover the full extent of irregularities in mortgage loan originations, transfers, and
foreclosures, but the final picture may not emerge for some time if these actions founder in
protracted litigation.
In the meantime, the Panel raises several concerns that policymakers should carefully
consider as these issues evolve.
305
See Sections D and F, supra.
83
Treasury Should Monitor Closely the Impact of Foreclosure Irregularities. Treasury
so far has expressed relatively little concern that foreclosure irregularities could reflect deeper
problems that would pose a threat to financial stability. According to Phyllis Caldwell, Chief of
litigati
there is
that have not yet fully materialized, but their risks remain real. Despite assurances by banks and
Treasury to the contrary, great uncertainty remains as to whether the stability of banks and the
housing market might be at risk if the legal underpinnings of the real estate market should come
into question. Treasury should closely monitor these issues as they develop, both for the sake of
its foreclosure mitigation programs and for the overall health of the banking system, and
Treasury should report its findings to the public and to Congress. Further, Treasury should
develop contingency plans to prepare for the potential worst-case scenario.
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Should Stress Test Banks to Evaluate Their
Ability to Weather a Crisis Related to Mortgage Irregularities. The potential for further
instability among the largest banks raises the specter of another acute crisis like the one that hit
the markets in the autumn of 2008. If investors come to doubt the entire process underlying
securitizations, they may grow unwilling to lend money to even the largest banks without
implicit or explicit assurances that taxpayers will bear any losses. Further, banks could, in the
worst-case scenario, suffer severe direct capital losses due to put-backs. Bank of America holds
$230.5 billion in equity, yet the PIMCO and FRBNY action alone could ultimately seek up to
$47 billion in put-backs. If several similar-sized actions were to succeed, Bank of America
could suffer a major dent in its regulatory capital. In effect, a bank forced to accept put-backs
would be required to buy back troubled mortgage loans that in many cases had already defaulted
or had been poorly underwritten. As the Panel has noted in the past, some major banks have had
extensive exposure to troubled mortgage-related assets. Widespread put-backs could destabilize
financial institutions that remain exposed and could lead to a precarious situation for those that
were emerging from the crisis. Further, banks and loan servicers could be vulnerable to state-
based class-action lawsuits initiated by homeowners who claim to have suffered improper
raise capital.
The Panel has recommended in the past that, when policymakers are faced with uncertain
economic or as part of the regular bank
supervisory process to identify possible outcomes and to measure the robustness of the financial
system. Treasury and the Federal Reserve last conducted comprehensive stress tests in 2009, but
because those tests predated the current concerns about documentation irregularities and
major banks could survive further shocks in the months and years to come. Federal banking
regulators should re-run stress tests on the largest banks and on at least a sampling of smaller
84
institutions, using realistic macroeconomic and housing price projections and stringent
assumptions about realistic worst-case scenario bank losses. Any assumptions about the ultimate
costs of documentation irregularities would be necessarily speculative and the contours of the
problem are still murky. Stress tests may therefore need to account for a wide range of
possibilities and acknowledge their own limitations. Such testing, however, would nonetheless
illuminate the robustness of the financial system and help prepare for a worst-case scenario.
Policymakers Should Evaluate System-Wide Consequences of Documentation
Irregularities. As disturbing as the potential implications of documentation irregularities may
market. Among other concerns:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Present Significant Risks. Already Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac play an enormous role in the market for MBS. If investors develop new
concerns about the safety of the MBS market, then Fannie and Freddie backed by
their government guarantee could be forced to maintain or even expand their
dominant role for years to come. Because the American people ultimately stand
behind every guarantee made by these companies, the result could be greater and
prolonged financial risk to taxpayers.
Homeowners May Lose Confidence in the Housing Market. Buyers and sellers, in
foreclosure or otherwise, may find themselves unable to know with any certainty
whether they can safely buy or safely sell a home. Widespread loss of confidence in
clear ownership of mortgage loans would throw further sand in the gears of the
already troubled housing market especially since 31 percent of the homes currently
on the market are foreclosure sales, which may already have undergone an improper
legal process.
Public Faith in Due Process Could Suffer. If the public gains the impression that
the government is providing concessions to large banks in order to ensure the smooth
In short, actions by some of the largest financial institutions may have the potential to
threaten the still-fragile economy. The risk is uncertain, but the danger is significant enough that
Treasury and all other government agencies with a role to play in the mortgage market must
focus on preventing another such shock.
85
Section Two: Correspondence with Treasury
November 1, 2010 to Patricia Geoghegan, the Special Master for TARP Executive
Compensation under EESA.
306
The letter presents a series of questions to the Special Master,
TARP and executive compensation.
306
See Appendix I of this report, infra.
86
Section Three: TARP Updates Since Last Report
A. GM to Repurchase AIFP Preferred Stock
On October 27, 2010, Treasury accepted an offer by General Motors Company (New
Series A preferred stock at $25.50 per
share ublic offering (IPO) is completed. These
preferred shares were issued, a common stock, in July
2009 in exchange for extinguishing the debtor-in-possession loan extended to General Motors
Corporation (Old GM). The repurchase price represents 102 percent of the liquidation
preference. After the IPO is completed, New GM will repurchase the Series A preferred shares
total return from New GM through debt repayments, the preferred stock repurchase, and interest
and dividends will total $9.5 billion.
B. AIG: AIA Initial Public Offering and ALICO Sale
, AIG
completed an IPO for AIA Group Limited (AIA) and sold American Life Insurance Company
(ALICO) to MetLife, Inc. The AIA IPO raised $20.5 billion in cash proceeds and the ALICO
sale generated $16.2 billion in total proceeds. Of this amount, $7.2 billion represents cash
proceeds. The $36.7 billion in aggregate proceeds will be used to pay down the outstanding
balance on the revolving credit facility from FRBNY.
C. Sales of Citigroup Common Stock
On October 19, 2010, Treasury began a fourth period of sales for 1.5 billion shares of
Citigroup common stock. Treasury received 7.7 billion common shares in July 2009 in exchange
for its initial $25 billion investment in the company under the CPP. As of October 29, 2010,
Treasury has sold 4.1 billion shares (approximately fifty percent of its stake) for $16.4 billion in
gross proceeds. Of this amount, approximately $13.4 billion represents a repayment for
Morgan S
December 31, 2010 or upon the sale of the full allotment of 1.5 billion shares.
D. Legacy Securities Public-Private Investments Program Quarterly Report
On October 20, 2010, Treasury released its fourth quarterly report on the Legacy
Securities Public-Private Investments Program (PPIP). This program is intended to support
market functioning and facilitate price discovery in MBS markets through equity and debt capital
commitments in eight public-private investment funds (PPIFs). As of September 30, 2010, the
87
purchasing power of these funds totaled $29.4 billion.
307
Of this amount, $7.4 billion represents
equity commitments from private-sector fund managers and investors and $22.1 billion
represents both debt and equity commitments from Treasury. The total market value of
securities held by participating PPIFs was approximately $19.3 billion, with 82 percent of
investments concentrated in non-agency RMBS and 18 percent in commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS).
To date, cumulative gross unrealized equity gains for both Treasury and private investors
total $1.5 billion. The net internal rate of return for each PPIF is currently between 19.3 percent
and 52.0 percent.
E. Metrics
including Treasury, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special Inspector General for
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), and the Financial Stability Oversight Board,
stability and accomplish the goals of EESA. This section discusses changes that have occurred
in several indicato October 2010 report.
1. Macroeconomic Indices
The post-crisis rate of real GDP growth quarter-over-quarter peaked at an annual rate of
5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, but the rate has decreased during 2010. Real GDP
increased at an annualized rate of 2.0 percent in the third quarter of 2010, increasing from 1.7
percent in the second quarter of 2010.
308
The third quarter growth rate was unaffected by the
spike in employment resulting from the 2010 U.S. Census.
309
The year-over-year increase from
third quarter 2009 to third quarter 2010 was 3.1 percent, from 12.9 billion to 13.3 billion dollars.
307
The total purchasing power published in the PPIP quarterly report does not include the purchasing
power within UST/TCW Senior Mortgage Services Fund, L.P., which was wound up and liquidated on January 4,
2010. See endnote xlvi, infra, for details on the liquidation of this fund. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Legacy
Securities Public-Private Investment Program, at 3 (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/External%20Report%20-%2009-10%20vFinal.pdf).
308
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.6.: Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained Dollars (online at
www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=6&Freq=Qtr&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2010)
( -over-year
decrease from 2007 to 2008, nominal GDP had not decreased on an annual basis since 1949. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Table 1.1.5.: Gross Domestic Product (online at
www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&Freq=Qtr&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2010)
(accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
309
The Economics and Statistics Administration within the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that
the spending associated with the 2010 Census would peak in the second quarter of 2010 and could boost annualized
nominal and real GDP growth by 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2010 and 0.2 percent in the second quarter of
2010. As the boost from the Census is a one-time occurrence, continuing increases in private investment and
88
Figure 13: Real GDP
310
personal consumption expenditures as well as in exports will be needed to sustain the resumption of growth that has
occurred in the U.S. economy over the past year. It was expected that the drop in 2010 Census spending would then
reduce GDP growth by similar amounts in Q3 and Q4 2010. Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, The Impact of the 2010 Census Operations on Jobs and Economic Growth, at 8 (online at
www.esa.doc.gov/02182010.pdf).
310
Bureau of Economic Analysis Table 1.1.6, supra note 308 (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
$11,000
$11,500
$12,000
$12,500
$13,000
$13,500
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Q1
2010
Q2
2010
Q3
2010
89
underemployment has increased from 16.7 percent to
17.1 percent, while unemployment has remained constant. Median duration of unemployment
has increased by half a week.
Figure 14: Unemployment, Underemployment, and Median Duration of Unemployment
311
2. Financial Indices
a. Overview
St. Louis Financial Stress Index, a proxy for
financial stress in the U.S. economy, has continued its downward trend, decreasing by a
quarter.
312
The index has fallen by over half since the post-crisis peak in June 2010. The recent
311
It is important to note that the measures of unemployment and underemployment do not include people
who have stopped actively looking for work altogether. While the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does not have a
-6 category of Table A-
l unemployed, plus all persons
marginally attached to the labor force, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the
International
Comparisons of Annual Labor Force Statistics (online at www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab15.htm) (accessed
Nov. 3, 2010).
312
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Series STLFSI: Business/Fiscal: Other Economic Indicators
(Instrument: St. Louis Financial Stress Index, Frequency: Weekly) (online at
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/STLFSI) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010). The index includes 18 weekly data series,
beginning in December 1993 to the present. The series are: effective federal funds rate, 2-year Treasury, 10-year
Treasury, 30-year-Treasury, Baa-rated corporate, Merrill Lynch High Yield Corporate Master II Index, Merrill
Lynch Asset-Backed Master BBB-rated, 10-year Treasury minus 3-month Treasury, Corporate Baa-rated bond
minus 10-year Treasury, Merrill Lynch High Yield Corporate Master II Index minus 10-year Treasury, 3-month
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
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90
trend in the index suggests that financial stress continues moving toward its long-run norm. The
index has decreased by more than three standard deviations since October 2008, the month when
the TARP was initiated.
Figure 15: St. Louis Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index
LIBOR-OIS spread, 3-month TED spread, 3-month commercial paper minus 3-month Treasury, the J.P. Morgan
Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus, Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, Merrill Lynch
Bond Market Volatility Index (1-month), 10-year nominal Treasury yield minus 10-year Treasury Inflation
Protected Security yield, and Vanguard Financials Exchange-Traded Fund (equities). The index is constructed using
principal components analysis after the data series are de-meaned and divided by their respective standard deviations
to make them comparable units. The standard deviation of the index is set to 1. For more details on the construction
of this index, see Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Financial Stress Index (Jan. 2010) (online at research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/NETJan2010Appendix.pdf).
(2)
(1)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
91
Stock market volatility has decreased recently. The Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index (VIX) has fallen by more than half since the post-crisis peak in May 2010 and
has fallen 7 However, volatility is still 40 percent
higher than its post-crisis low on April 12, 2010.
Figure 16: Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
313
b. Interest Rates, Spreads, and Issuance
As of November 3, 2010, the 3-month and 1-month London Interbank Offer Rates
(LIBOR), the prices at which banks lend and borrow from each other, were 0.29 and 0.25,
respectively.
314
Rates have fallen by nearly half since post-crisis highs in June 2010 and have
Over the longer term, however,
interest rates remain extremely low relative to pre-crisis levels, indicating both efforts of central
ding to other banks.
313
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010. The CBOE VIX is a key measure
of market expectations of near-term volatility. Chicago Board Options Exchange, The CBOE Volatility Index VIX,
2009 (online at www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
314
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
92
Figure 17: 3-Month and 1-Month LIBOR Rates (as of November 3, 2010)
Indicator
Current Rates
(as of 11/3/2010)
Percent Change from Data
Available at Time of Last
Report (10/4/2010)
3-Month LIBOR
315
0.29 (1.6)%
1-Month LIBOR
316
0.25 (1.2)%
October report, interest rate spreads have decreased slightly. Thirty-
year mortgage interest rates have decreased very slightly and 10-year Treasury bond yields have
increased very slightly. The conventional mortgage spread, which measures the 30-year
mortgage rate over 10-year Treasury bond yields, has decreased slightly since late September.
317
The TED spread serves as an indicator for perceived risk in the financial markets. While
it has increased by about three basis points since , the spread is still
currently lower than pre-crisis levels.
318
The LIBOR-OIS spread reflects the health of the
banking system. While it increased over threefold from early April to July, it has been falling
since mid-July and is now averaging pre-crisis levels.
319
LIBOR-OIS remained fairly constant
Decreases in the LIBOR-OIS spread and the TED spread
suggest that hesitation among banks to lend to counterparties has receded.
315
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
316
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
317
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15: Selected
Interest Rates: Historical Data (Instrument: Conventional Mortgages, Frequency: Weekly) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Weekly_Thursda
Nov. 3, 2010).
318
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Measuring Perceived Risk The TED Spread (Dec. 2008)
(online at www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4120).
319
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
93
Figure 18: TED Spread
320
Figure 19: LIBOR-OIS Spread
321
The interest rate spread for AA asset-backed commercial paper, which is considered mid-
investment grade, has fallen by more than a tenth October report. The interest
320
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
321
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
94
rate spread on A2/P2 commercial paper, a lower grade investment than AA asset-backed
commercial paper, has fallen by nearly 11 percent October report. This
indicates healthier fundraising conditions for corporations.
Figure 20: Interest Rate Spreads
Indicator
Current Spread
(as of 11/1/2010)
Percent Change
Since Last Report
(9/30/2010)
Conventional mortgage rate spread
322
1.56 (13.3)%
TED Spread (basis points) 15.59 20.0%
Overnight AA asset-backed commercial paper interest rate
spread
323
0.07 (11.2)%
Overnight A2/P2 nonfinancial commercial paper interest
rate spread
324
0.14 (11.0)%
-year constant
maturity U.S. Treasury Bond yields doubled from late April to mid-June 2010. Spreads have
trended down since mid-June highs and have fallen over 6
report. This spread indicates the difference in perceived risk between corporate and government
bonds, and a declining spread could indicate waning concerns about the riskiness of corporate
bonds.
322
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, supra note 317 (accessed Nov. 3, 2010); Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15: Selected Interest Rates: Historical Data
(Instrument: U.S. Government Securities/Treasury Constant Maturities/Nominal 10-Year, Frequency: Weekly)
(online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Weekly_Friday_/H15_TCMNOM_Y10.txt) (accessed Nov. 3,
2010).
323
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Commercial
Paper Rates and Outstandings: Data Download Program (Instrument: AA Asset-Backed Discount Rate, Frequency:
Daily) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/DataDownload/Choose.aspx?rel=CP) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010); Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Commercial Paper Rates and
Outstandings: Data Download Program (Instrument: AA Nonfinancial Discount Rate, Frequency: Daily) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/DataDownload/Choose.aspx?rel=CP) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010). In order to provide a more
complete comparison, this metric utilizes the average of the interest rate spread for the last five days of the month.
324
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Commercial
Paper Rates and Outstandings: Data Download Program (Instrument: A2/P2 Nonfinancial Discount Rate,
Frequency: Daily) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/DataDownload/Choose.aspx?rel=CP) (accessed Nov. 3,
2010). In order to provide a more complete comparison, this metric utilizes the average of the interest rate spread
for the last five days of the month.
95
Figure 21 -Year U.S. Treasury Yield
325
Corporate bond market issuance data corroborate this analysis, with investment grade
issuance increasing over 50 percent between August and September 2010.
326
c. Condition of the Banks
asset value of $4.2 billion. With 139 failures from January through October 2010, the year-to-
date rate has nearly reached 140, the level for all of calendar year 2009. In general, banks failing
in 2009 and 2010 have been small- and medium-sized institutions;
327
while they are failing in
high numbers, their aggregate asset size has been relatively small.
325
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Series DGS30: Selected Interest Rates (Instrument: 30-Year
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Frequency: Daily) (online at research.st
Nov. 3, 2010). Corporate Baa rate data accessed through
Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010.
326
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, US Corporate Bond Issuance (online at
www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/Corporate-US-Corporate-Issuance-SIFMA.xls)
(accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
327
For the purposes of its analysis, the Panel uses four categories based on bank asset sizes: large banks
(those with over $100 billion in assets), medium banks (those with between $10 billion and $100 billion in assets),
smaller banks (those with between $1 billion and $10 billion in assets), and smallest banks (those with less than $1
billion in assets).
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
MŽŽĚLJΖƐ 8ĂĂ CŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ 8ŽŶĚ lŶĚĞdž ;ůĞŌ ĂdžŝƐͿ
30-?ĞĂƌ u͘S͘ 1ƌĞĂƐƵƌLJ 8ŽŶĚ ?ŝĞůĚ͕ CŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ MĂƚƵƌŝƚLJ ;ůĞŌ ĂdžŝƐͿ
Spread (right axis)
96
Figure 22: Bank Failures as a Percentage of Total Banks and Bank Failures by Total Assets
(1990-2010)
328
3. Housing Indices
Foreclosure actions, which consist of default notices, scheduled auctions, and bank
repossessions, increased 2.5 percent in September to 347,420. This metric is over 24 percent
above the foreclosure action level at the time of the EESA enactment.
329
While the hardest hit
states still account for 19 out of 20 of the highest metro foreclosure rates, foreclosure activity
grew less in the hardest-hit cities than in other states.
330
Sales of new homes increased to
307,000, but remain low.
331
The Case-Shiller Composite 20-City Composite decreased very
328
The disparity between the number of and total assets of failed banks in 2008 is driven primarily by the
failure of Washington Mutual Bank, which held $307 billion in assets. The 2010 year-to-date percentage of bank
failures includes failures through August. The total number of FDIC-insured institutions as of March 31, 2010 is
7,932 commercial banks and savings institutions. As of November 12, 2010, there have been 143 institutions that
failed. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Failures and Assistance Transactions (online at
www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010). Asset totals have been adjusted for
deflation into 2005 dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator. The quarterly values were averaged into a yearly
value. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Series DGS30, supra note 325 (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
329
RealtyTrac Press Release on Foreclosure Activity, supra note 278.
330
Hardest-hit cities are defined as those in California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona. Chicago, Houston,
and Seattle posted the largest increases in foreclosure activity. RealtyTrac, Third Quarter Foreclosure Activity Up
in 65 Percent of U.S. Metro Areas But Down in Hardest-Hit Cities (Oct. 28, 2010) (online at
www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/third-quarter-foreclosure-activity-up-in-65-percent-of-us-metro-areas-
but-down-in-hardest-hit-cities-6127).
331
Sales of new homes in May 2010 were 276,000, the lowest rate since 1963. It should be noted that this
number likely reflects a shifting of sales from May to April prompted by the April expiration of tax credits designed
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
$400
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
lĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ĂƐ Ă й ŽĨ 1ŽƚĂů lŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶƐ ;ůĞŌ ĂdžŝƐͿ Total Assets (right axis)
97
slightly, while the FHFA Housing Price Index increased very slightly in August 2010. The
Case-Shiller and FHFA indices are 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively, below their levels of
October 2008.
332
Additionally, Case-Shiller futures prices indicate a market expectation that home-price
values for the major Metropolitan Statistical Areas
333
(MSAs) will hold constant through
2011.
334
These futures are cash-settled to a weighted composite index of U.S. housing prices in
the top ten MSAs, as well as to those specific markets. They are used to hedge by businesses
whose profits and losses are related to any area of the housing industry, and to balance portfolios
by businesses seeking exposure to an uncorrelated asset class. As such, futures prices are a
composite indicator of market information known to date and can be used to indicate market
expectations for home prices.
to boost home sales. U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, New
Residential Sales in June 2010 (July 26, 2010) (online at www.census.gov/const/newressales.pdf); U.S. Census
Bureau, New Residential Sales New One-Family Houses Sold (online at
www.census.gov/ftp/pub/const/sold_cust.xls) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
332
The most recent data available is for July 2010. See S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price
Indices (Instrument: Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Seasonally Adjusted, Frequency: Monthly) (online at
www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us----)
- Nov. 3, 2010); Federal Housing Finance Agency,
U.S. and Census Division Monthly Purchase Only Index (Instrument: USA, Seasonally Adjusted) (online at
(accessed Nov. 3, 2010). S&P has cautioned that the seasonal adjustment is probably being distorted by irregular
factors. These factors could include distressed sales and the various government programs. See Standard and
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices and Seasonal Adjustment, S&P Indices: Index Analysis (Apr. 2010).
For a discussion of the differences between the Case-Shiller Index and the FHFA Index, see April 2010 Ovesright
Report, supra note 282, at 98.
333
A Metropolitan Statistical Area is defined as a core area containing a substantial population nucleus,
together with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with the core. U.S.
Census Bureau, About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas (online at
www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas/aboutmetro.html) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
334
Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010. The Case-Shiller Futures contract
is traded on the CME and is settled to the Case-Shiller Index two months after the previous calendar quarter. For
example, the February contract will be settled against the spot value of the S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index
values representing the fourth calendar quarter of the previous year, which is released in February one day after the
settlement of the contract. Note that most close observers believe that the accuracy of these futures contracts as
forecasts diminishes the farther out one looks.
98
Figure 23: Housing Indicators
Indicator
Most Recent
Monthly Data
Percent Change
from Data Available
at Time of Last
Report
Percent
Change Since
October 2008
Monthly foreclosure actions
335
347,420 2.5% 24.3%
S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 20 Index
336
146.99 (0.3)% (5.9)%
FHFA Housing Price Index
337
192.83 0.4% (4.5)%
Figure 24: Case-Shiller Home Price Index and Futures Values
338
335
RealtyTrac, Foreclosures (online at www.realtytrac.com/home/) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010). The most
recent data available is for September 2010.
336
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, supra note 332 (accessed Nov. 3, 2010). The most recent data
available is for August 2010.
337
U.S. and Census Division Monthly Purchase Only Index, supra note 332 (accessed Nov. 3, 2010). The
most recent data available is for August 2010.
338
All data normalized to 100 at January 2000. Futures data accessed through Bloomberg data service on
November 3, 2010. S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, supra note 332 (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
99
F. Financial Update
Each month, the Panel summarizes the resources that the federal government has
committed to the rescue and recovery of the financial system. The following financial update
provides: (1) an updated accounting of the TARP, including a tally of dividend income,
repayments, and warrant dispositions that the program has received as of September 30, 2010;
and (2) an updated accounting of the full federal resource commitment as of October 27, 2010.
1. The TARP
a. Program Updates
339
Though it can no longer make new funding commitments, Treasury can continue to provide
funding for programs for which it has existing contracts and previous commitments. To date,
$395.1
340
Of the total amount
disbursed, $209.5 billion has been repaid. Treasury has also incurred $6.1 billion in losses
associated with its CPP and Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) investments. A
significant portion of the $179.7
investments in AIG and assistance provided to the automotive industry.
CPP Repayments
As of October 29, 2010, 112 of the 707 banks that participated in the CPP have fully
redeemed their preferred shares either through capital repayment or exchanges for investments
under the Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI). During the month of October,
Treasury received a $12 million full repayment from 1st Constitution Bancorp, and a $100
million partial repayment from Webster Financial Corporation. A total of $152.9 billion has
been repaid under the program, leaving $49.5 billion in funds currently outstanding.
339
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report as of
September 30, 2010 (Oct. 11, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/dividends-interest-
reports/September%202010%20Dividends%20&%20Interest%20Report.p
Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program
Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/10-4-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%209-30-10.pdf)
340
The original $700 billion TARP ceiling was reduced by $1.26 billion as part of the Helping Families
Save Their Homes Act of 2009. 12 U.S.C. § 5225(a)-(b); Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-22 § 40. On June 30, 2010, the House-Senate Conference Committee agreed to reduce the amount
authorized under the TARP from $700 billion to $475 billion as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act that was signed into law on July 21, 2010. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010); The White House, Remarks by the President at Signing of
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act).
100
b. Income: Dividends, Interest, and Warrant Sales
In conjunction with its preferred stock investments under the CPP and TIP, Treasury
generally received warrants to purchase common equity.
341
As of October 29, 2010, 45
institutions have repurchased their warrants from Treasury at an agreed upon price. Treasury has
also sold warrants for 15 other institutions at auction. To date, income from warrant dispositions
have totaled $8.1 billion.
In addition to warrant proceeds, Treasury also receives dividend payments on the
preferred shares that it holds under the CPP, 5 percent per annum for the first five years and 9
percent per annum thereafter.
342
For preferred shares issued under the TIP, Treasury received a
dividend of 8 percent per annum.
343
In total, Treasury has received approximately $25.7 billion
in net income from warrant repurchases, dividends, interest payments, and other proceeds
deriving from TARP investments (after deducting losses).
344
For further information on TARP
profit and loss, see Figure 26.
341
For its CPP investments in privately held financial institutions, Treasury also received warrants to
purchase additional shares of preferred stock, which it exercised immediately. Similarly, Treasury also received
warrants to purchase additional subordinated debt that were also immediately exercised along with its CPP
investments in subchapter S corporations. Treasury Transactions Report, supra note 339, at 14 .
342
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program (Oct. 3, 2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/capitalpurchaseprogram.html).
343
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Targeted Investment Program (Oct. 3, 2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/targetedinvestmentprogram.html).
344
Treasury Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report, supra note 339; Treasury
Transactions Report, supra note 339. Treasury also received an additional $1.2 billion in participation fees from its
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Expiration of
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009) (online at
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg293.htm).
101
c. TARP Accounting
Figure 25: TARP Accounting (as of October 29, 2010) (billions of dollars)
i
Program
Maximum
Amount
Allotted
Actual
Funding
Total
Repayments/
Reduced
Exposure
Total
Losses
Funding
Currently
Outstanding
Funding
Available
Capital Purchase
Program (CPP)
$204.9 $204.9
ii
$(152.9)
iii
$(2.6) $49.5 $0
Targeted
Investment Program
(TIP)
40.0 40.0 (40.0) 0 0 0
Asset Guarantee
Program (AGP)
5.0
iv
5.0
v
(5.0) 0 0 0
AIG Investment
Program (AIGIP)
69.8
vi
47.5 0 0 47.5 22.3
Auto Industry
Financing Program
(AIFP)
81.3 81.3 (10.8)
vii
(3.5)
viii
67.1 0
Auto Supplier
Support Program
(ASSP)
ix
0.4 0.4 (0.4) 0 0 0
Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan
Facility (TALF)
x
4.3
xi
0.1 0 0 0.1 4.2
Public-Private
Investment Program
(PPIP)
xii
22.4
xiii
14.2
xiv
(0.4) 0 13.8 8.2
SBA 7(a) Securities
Purchase
0.4
xv
0.4 0 0 0.4
xvi
0
Home Affordable
Modification
Program (HAMP)
29.9 0.6 0 0 0.6 29.3
Hardest Hit Fund
(HHF)
xvii
7.6
xviii
0.1 0 0 0.1 7.5
FHA Refinance
Program
8.1
xix
0.1 0 0 0.1 8.0
Community
Development
Capital Initiative
(CDCI)
0.8
xx
0.6 0 0 0.6 0
Total $475.0 $395.1 $(209.5) $(6.1) $179.7 $79.5
102
i
Figures affected by rounding. Unless otherwise noted, data in this table are from the following source:
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending
October 29, 2010 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
ii
Total amount repaid under CPP includes $13.4 billion Treasury received as part of its sales of Citigroup
common stock. As of October 29, 2010, Treasury had sold 4.1 billion Citigroup common shares for $16.4 billion in
gross proceeds. Treasury has received $3 billion in net profit from the sale of Citigroup common stock. In June
2009, Treasury exchanged $25 billion in Citigroup preferred stock for 7.7 billion shares of the
stock at $3.25 per share. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for
the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 13-15 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-
reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf); U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two-Year Retrospective, at 25 (Oct. 2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf).
Total CPP repayments also include amounts repaid by institutions that exchanged their CPP investments
for investments under the CDCI, as well as proceeds earned from the sale of preferred stock and warrants issued by
South Financial Group, Inc. and TIB Financial Corp.
iii
On the TARP Transactions Report, Treasury has classified the investments it made in two institutions,
CIT Group ($2.3 billion) and Pacific Coast National Bancorp ($4.1 million), as losses. In addition, Treasury sold its
preferred ownership interests, along with warrants, in South Financial Group, Inc. and TIB Financial Corp. to non-
TARP participating institutions. These shares were sold at prices below the value of the original CPP investment.
current CPP investment is $49.5 billion due to the $2.6 billion in losses thus far. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29,
2010, at 13-14 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
iv
The $5 billion AGP guarantee for Citigroup was unused since Treasury was not required to make any
guarantee payments during the life of the program. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief
Program: Two-Year Retrospective, at 31 (Oct. 2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf).
v
Although this $5 billion is no longer exposed as part of the AGP, Treasury did not receive a repayment in
the same sense as with other investments. Treasury did receive other income as consideration for the guarantee,
which is not a repayment and is accounted for in Figure 26.
vi
AIG has completely utilized the $40 billion that was made available on November 25, 2008, in exchange
. It has also drawn down $7.5 billion of the $29.8 billion made available on April
17, 2009. This figure does not include $1.6 billion in accumulated but unpaid dividends owed by AIG to Treasury
-cumulative shares. AIG
expects to draw down up to $22 billion in outstanding funds from the TARP as part of its plan to repay the revolving
credit facility provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. American International Group, Inc., Form 10-Q
for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2010, at 119 (Nov. 5, 2010) (online at
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000104746910009269/a2200724z10-q.htm); American International Group, Inc.,
AIG Announces Plan to Repay U.S. Government (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at
www.aigcorporate.com/newsroom/2010_September/AIGAnnouncesPlantoRepay30Sept2010.pdf); U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 21
(Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
vii
On May 14, 2010, Treasury accepted a $1.9 billion settlement payment for its $3.5 billion loan to
Chrysler Holding. The payment represented a $1.6 billion loss from the termination of the debt obligation. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Chrysler Financial Parent Company Repays $1.9 Billion in Settlement of Original
Chrysler Loan (May 17, 2010) (online at www.financialstability.gov/latest/pr_05172010c.html). Also, following
the bankruptcy proceedings for Old Chrysler, which extinguished the $1.9 billion debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan
103
provided to Old Chrysler, Treasury retained the right to recover the proceeds from the liquidation of specified
collateral. To date, Treasury has collected $40.2 million in proceeds from the sale of collateral, and it does not
expect a significant recovery from the liquidation proceeds. Treasury includes these proceeds as part of the $10.8
billion repaid under the AIFP. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Assets Relief Program Monthly 105(a)
Report September 2010 (Oct. 12, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/105CongressionalReports/September
105(a) report_FINAL.pdf); Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Aug. 19, 2010); U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 18 (Nov.
2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
viii
On the TARP Transactions Report, the $1.9 billion Chrysler debtor-in-possession loan, which was
. U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 18 (Nov.
2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf). See note vii, supra, for details on losses from
ix
On April 5, 2010, Treasury terminated its commitment to lend to the GM SPV under the ASSP. On April
7, 2010, it terminated its commitment to lend to the Chrysler SPV. In total, Treasury received $413 million in
repayments from loans provided by this program ($290 million from the GM SPV and $123 million from the
Chrysler SPV). Further, Treasury received $101 million in proceeds from additional notes associated with this
program. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period
Ending October 29, 2010, at 19 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
x
For the TALF program, one dollar of TARP funds was committed for every $10 of funds obligated by the
Federal Reserve. The program was intended to be a $200 billion initiative, and the TARP was responsible for the
first $20 billion in loan-losses, if any were incurred. The loan was incrementally funded. When the program closed
commitments constituted $4.3 billion. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors agreed that it was appropriate for
Treasury to reduce TALF credit protection from TARP to $4.3 billion. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Federal Reserve Announces Agreement with the Treasury Department Regarding a Reduction of Credit
Protection Provided for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (July 20, 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100720a.htm).
xi
As of October 27, 2010, Treasury had provided $105 million to TALF LLC. This total includes accrued
payable interest. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Oct. 28, 2010)
(online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20101028/).
xii
As of September 30, 2010, the total value of securities held by the PPIP managers was $19.3 billion.
Non-agency Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities represented 82 percent of the total; CMBS represented the
balance. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program, Program Update
Quarter Ended September 30, 2010, at 4 (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/External%20Report%20-%2009-10%20vFinal.pdf).
xiii
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Assets Relief Program Monthly 105(a) Report September
2010, at 6 (Oct. 12, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/105CongressionalReports/September 105(a)
report_FINAL.pdf).
xiv
As of October 29, 2010, Treasury has received $428 million in capital repayments from two PPIP fund
managers. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period
Ending October 29, 2010, at 23 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xv
$324.9 million. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the
Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 22 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-
2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
104
xvi
Treasury will not make additional purchases pursuant to the expiration of its purchasing authority under
EESA. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two-Year Retrospective, at 43 (Oct.
2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf).
xvii
As part of its revisions to TARP allocations upon enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Treasury allocated an additional $2 billion in TARP funds to mortgage assistance for
unemployed borrowers through the Hardest Hit Fund (HHF). U.S. Department of the Treasury, Obama
Administration Announces Additional Support for Targeted Foreclosure-Prevention Programs to Help Homeowners
Struggling with Unemployment (Aug. 11, 2010) (online at www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg823.htm). Another
$3.5 billion was allocated among the 18 states and the District of Columbia currently participating in HHF. The
amount each state received during this round of funding is proportional to its population. U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective, at 72 (Oct. 2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf).
xviii
As of November 10, 2010, a total of $63.6 million has been disbursed to seven state Housing Finance
Agencies (HFAs). Data provided by Treasury staff (Nov. 10, 2010).
xix
This figure represents the amount Treasury disbursed to fund the advance purchase account of the letter
of credit issued under the FHA Short Refinance Program. Data provided by Treasury staff (Nov. 10, 2010).
xx
Seventy-three Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) entered the CDCI in September.
Among these institutions, 17 banks exchanged their CPP investments for an equivalent investment amount under the
CDCI. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending
October 29, 2010, at 1-13, 16-17 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf). Treasury closed the program on September 30,
2010, after investing $570 million in 84 CDFIs. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Special
Financial Stabilization Initiative Investments of $570 Million in 84 Community Development Financial Institutions
in Underserved Areas (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/latest/pr_09302010b.html).
105
Figure 26: TARP Profit and Loss (millions of dollars)
TARP
Initiative
xxi
Dividends
xxii
(as of
9/30/2010)
Interest
xxiii
(as of
9/30/2010)
Warrant
Disposition
Proceeds
xxiv
(as of
10/29/2010)
Other
Proceeds
(as of
9/30/2010)
Losses
xxv
(as of
10/29/2010) Total
Total $16,721 $1,052 $8,160 $5,833 ($6,034) $25,732
CPP 9,859 49 6,904
xxvi
3,015 (2,576) 17,250
TIP 3,004 1,256 4,260
AIFP
xxvii
3,418 931
xxviii
15 (3,458) 906
ASSP 15
xxix
101 116
AGP 440
xxx
2,246 2,686
PPIP 56
xxxi
180 236
SBA 7(a) 1 1
Bank of America
Guarantee
xxxii
276 276
xxi
AIG is not listed on this table because no profit or loss has been recorded to date for AIG. Its missed
dividends were capitalized as part of the issuance of Series E preferred shares and are not considered to be
outstanding. Treasury currently holds non-cumulative preferred shares, meaning AIG is not penalized for non-
payment.
xxii
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report as of
September 30, 2010 (Oct. 12, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/dividends-interest-
reports/September%202010%20Dividends%20&%20Interest%20Report.pdf).
xxiii
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report as of
September 30, 2010 (Oct. 12, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/dividends-interest-
reports/September%202010%20Dividends%20&%20Interest%20Report.pdf).
xxiv
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period
Ending October 29, 2010 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xxv
In the TARP Transactions Report, Treasury classified the investments it made in two institutions, CIT
Group ($2.3 billion) and Pacific Coast National Bancorp ($4.1 million), as losses. Treasury has also sold its
preferred ownership interests and warrants from South Financial Group, Inc. and TIB Financial Corp. This
represents a $241.7 million loss on its CPP investments in these two banks. Two TARP recipients, UCBH
Holdings, Inc. ($298.7 million) and a banking subsidiary of Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc. ($89.4 million), are
currently in bankruptcy proceedings. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions
Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-
reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf). Finally, Sonoma Valley Bancorp,
which received $8.7 million in CPP funding, was placed into receivership on August 20, 2010. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Westamerica Bank, San Rafael, California, Assumes All of the Deposits of Sonoma Valley
Bank, Sonoma, California (Aug. 20, 2010) (online at www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10196.html).
xxvi
This figure represents net proceeds to Treasury from the sale of Citigroup common stock to date. For
, see note ii, supra. U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 15 (Nov. 2, 2010)
106
(online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-
29-10.pdf); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two-Year Retrospective, at 25 (Oct.
2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf).
xxvii
This figure includes $815 million in dividends from GMAC preferred stock, trust preferred securities,
and mandatory convertible preferred shares. The dividend total also includes a $748.6 million senior unsecured note
. Data provided by Treasury.
xxviii
Treasury received proceeds from an additional note connected with the loan made to Chrysler
Financial on January 16, 2009. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions
Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 18 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xxix
Supplier Receivables LLC and Chrysler Receivables SPV LLC. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset
Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 19 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xxx
As a fee for taking a second-loss position of up to $5 billion on a $301 billion pool of ring-fenced
Citigroup assets as part of the AGP, Treasury received $4.03 billion in Citigroup preferred stock and warrants.
Treasury exchanged these preferred stocks for trust preferred securities in June 2009. Following the early
termination of the guarantee in December 2009, Treasury cancelled $1.8 billion of the trust preferred securities,
leaving Treasury with $2.23 billion in Citigroup trust preferred securities. On September 30, 2010, Treasury sold
these securities for $2.25 billion in total proceeds.
FDIC may transfer $800 million of $3.02 billion in Citigroup Trust Preferred Securities it received in consideration
for its role in the AGP to Treasury. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions
Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 20 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf);
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and Citigroup Inc., Termination Agreement, at 1 (Dec. 23, 2009) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/Citi%20AGP%20Termination%20Agreement%20-
%20Fully%20Executed%20Version.pdf); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Further Sales of
Citigroup Securities and Cumulative Return to Taxpayers of $41.6 Billion (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/latest/pr_09302010c.html); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2009 Annual Report, at 87
(June 30, 2010) (online at www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2009annualreport/AR09final.pdf).
xxxi
As of September 30, 2010, Treasury has earned $159.1 million in membership interest distributions
from the PPIP. Additionally, Treasury has earned $20.6 million in total proceeds following the termination of the
TCW fund. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report as of
September 30, 2010, at 14 (Oct. 12, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/dividends-interest-
reports/September%202010%20Dividends%20&%20Interest%20Report.pdf); U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 23 (Nov. 2, 2010)
(online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-
29-10.pdf).
xxxii
Although Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC negotiated with Bank of America regarding a
similar guarantee, the parties never reached an agreement. In September 2009, Bank of America agreed to pay each
of the prospective guarantors a fee as though the guarantee had been in place during the negotiations period. This
agreement resulted in payments of $276 million to Treasury, $57 million to the Federal Reserve, and $92 million to
the FDIC. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and Bank of America Corporation, Termination Agreement, at 1-2 (Sept. 21, 2009) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/AGP/BofA%20-%20Termination%20Agreement%20-%20executed.pdf).
107
d. CPP Unpaid Dividend and Interest Payments
345
As of September 30, 2010, 120 institutions have at least one dividend payment on
preferred stock issued under CPP outstanding.
346
Among these institutions, 95 are not current on
cumulative dividends, amounting to $114.8 million in missed payments. Another 25 banks have
not paid $8 million in non-cumulative dividends. Of the $49.5 billion currently outstanding in
CPP -current dividend payments total
$3.5 billion. A majority of the banks that remain delinquent on dividend payments have under
$1 billion in total assets on their balance sheets. Also, there are 21 institutions that no longer
have outstanding unpaid dividends, after previously deferring their quarterly payments.
347
Six banks have failed to make six dividend payments, while one bank has missed all
seven quarterly payments. These institutions have received a total of $207.1 million in CPP
funding. Under the terms of the CPP, after a bank fails to pay dividends for six periods,
348
Figure XX
below provides further details on the distribution and the number of institutions that have missed
dividend payments.
In addition, eight CPP participants have missed at least one interest payment,
in these non-public institutions represent less than $1 billion in CPP funding.
345
Treasury Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report, supra note 339, at 20.
346
Does not include banks with missed dividend payments that have either repaid all delinquent dividends,
exited TARP, gone into receivership, or filed for bankruptcy.
347
Includes institutions that have either (a) fully repaid their CPP investment and exited the program or
(b) entered bankruptcy or its subsidiary was placed into receivership. Treasury Cumulative Dividends, Interest and
Distributions Report, supra note 339, at 20.
348
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions Capital Purchase Program (CPP):
Related to Missed Dividend (or Interest) Payments and Director Nomination (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/CPP%20Directors%20FAQs.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
108
Figure 27: CPP Missed Dividend Payments (as of September 30, 2010)
349
Number of Missed Payments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Cumulative Dividends
Number of Banks, by asset size 29 19 17 17 10 3 0 95
Under $1B 20 15 12 11 5 1 0 64
$1B-$10B 8 4 4 6 5 2 0 29
Over $10B 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Non-Cumulative Dividends
Number of Banks, by asset size 2 5 6 3 5 3 1 25
Under $1B 1 5 5 3 5 3 1 23
$1B-$10B 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Over $10B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Missed Payments 120
e. Rate of Return
As of November 4, 2010, the average internal rate of return for all public financial
institutions that participated in the CPP and fully repaid the U.S. government (including
preferred shares, dividends, and warrants) remained at 8.4 percent, as no institutions exited the
program in October.
350
The internal rate of return is the annualized effective compounded return
rate that can be earned on invested capital.
349
Treasury Cumulative Dividends, Interest and Distributions Report, supra note 339, at 17-20. Data on
total bank assets compiled using SNL Financial data service. (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
350
Calculation of the internal rate of return (IRR) also includes CPP investments in public institutions not
repaid in full (for reasons such as acquisition by another institution) in the Transaction Report, e.g., The South
Financial Group and TIB Financial Corporation.
in public institutions recorded as a loss on the TARP Transaction Report due to bankruptcy, e.g., CIT Group Inc.
Going forward, the Panel will continue to include losses due to bankruptcy when Treasury determines any
associated contingent value rights have expired without value. When excluding CIT Group from the calculation, the
resulting IRR is 10.4 percent. Treasury Transactions Report, supra note 339.
109
f. Warrant Disposition
Figure 28: Warrant Repurchases/Auctions for Financial Institutions who have fully Repaid
CPP Funds (as of November 4, 2010)
Institution
Investment
Date
Warrant
Repurchase
Date
Warrant
Repurchase/
Sale Amount
Valuation
Estimate at
Disposition
Date
Price/
Estimate
Ratio IRR
Old National
Bancorp 12/12/2008 5/8/2009 $1,200,000 $2,150,000 0.558 9.3%
Iberiabank
Corporation 12/5/2008 5/20/2009 1,200,000 2,010,000 0.597 9.4%
Firstmerit
Corporation 1/9/2009 5/27/2009 5,025,000 4,260,000 1.180 20.3%
Sun Bancorp, Inc 1/9/2009 5/27/2009 2,100,000 5,580,000 0.376 15.3%
Independent Bank
Corp. 1/9/2009 5/27/2009 2,200,000 3,870,000 0.568 15.6%
Alliance Financial
Corporation 12/19/2008 6/17/2009 900,000 1,580,000 0.570 13.8%
First Niagara
Financial Group 11/21/2008 6/24/2009 2,700,000 3,050,000 0.885 8.0%
Berkshire Hills
Bancorp, Inc. 12/19/2008 6/24/2009 1,040,000 1,620,000 0.642 11.3%
Somerset Hills
Bancorp 1/16/2009 6/24/2009 275,000 580,000 0.474 16.6%
SCBT Financial
Corporation 1/16/2009 6/24/2009 1,400,000 2,290,000 0.611 11.7%
HF Financial
Corp. 11/21/2008 6/30/2009 650,000 1,240,000 0.524 10.1%
State Street 10/28/2008 7/8/2009 60,000,000 54,200,000 1.107 9.9%
U.S. Bancorp 11/14/2008 7/15/2009 139,000,000 135,100,000 1.029 8.7%
The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. 10/28/2008 7/22/2009 1,100,000,000 1,128,400,000 0.975 22.8%
BB&T Corp. 11/14/2008 7/22/2009 67,010,402 68,200,000 0.983 8.7%
American Express
Company 1/9/2009 7/29/2009 340,000,000 391,200,000 0.869 29.5%
Bank of New
York Mellon Corp 10/28/2008 8/5/2009 136,000,000 155,700,000 0.873 12.3%
Morgan Stanley 10/28/2008 8/12/2009 950,000,000 1,039,800,000 0.914 20.2%
Northern Trust
Corporation 11/14/2008 8/26/2009 87,000,000 89,800,000 0.969 14.5%
Old Line
Bancshares Inc. 12/5/2008 9/2/2009 225,000 500,000 0.450 10.4%
Bancorp Rhode
Island, Inc. 12/19/2008 9/30/2009 1,400,000 1,400,000 1.000 12.6%
110
Centerstate Banks
of Florida Inc. 11/21/2008 10/28/2009 212,000 220,000 0.964 5.9%
Manhattan
Bancorp 12/5/2008 10/14/2009 63,364 140,000 0.453 9.8%
CVB Financial
Corp 12/5/2008 10/28/2009 1,307,000 3,522,198 0.371 6.4%
Bank of the
Ozarks 12/12/2008 11/24/2009 2,650,000 3,500,000 0.757 9.0%
Capital One
Financial 11/14/2008 12/3/2009 148,731,030 232,000,000 0.641 12.0%
JPMorgan Chase
& Co. 10/28/2008 12/10/2009 950,318,243 1,006,587,697 0.944 10.9%
CIT Group Inc. 12/31/2008 562,541 (97.2)%
TCF Financial
Corp 1/16/2009 12/16/2009 9,599,964 11,825,830 0.812 11.0%
LSB Corporation 12/12/2008 12/16/2009 560,000 535,202 1.046 9.0%
Wainwright Bank
& Trust Company 12/19/2008 12/16/2009 568,700 1,071,494 0.531 7.8%
Wesbanco Bank,
Inc. 12/5/2008 12/23/2009 950,000 2,387,617 0.398 6.7%
Union First Market
Bankshares
Corporation (Union
Bankshares
Corporation) 12/19/2008 12/23/2009 450,000 1,130,418 0.398 5.8%
Trustmark
Corporation 11/21/2008 12/30/2009 10,000,000 11,573,699 0.864 9.4%
Flushing Financial
Corporation 12/19/2008 12/30/2009 900,000 2,861,919 0.314 6.5%
OceanFirst Finan-
cial Corporation 1/16/2009 2/3/2010 430,797 279,359 1.542 6.2%
Monarch Finan-
cial Holdings, Inc. 12/19/2008 2/10/2010 260,000 623,434 0.417 6.7%
Bank of America
10/28/2008
351
1/9/2009
352
1/14/2009
353
3/3/2010 1,566,210,714 1,006,416,684 1.533 6.5%
Washington Fed-
eral Inc./Washing-
ton Federal Savings
&Loan Association 11/14/2008 3/9/2010 15,623,222 10,166,404 1.537 18.6%
Signature Bank 12/12/2008 3/10/2010 11,320,751 11,458,577 0.988 32.4%
Texas Capital
Bancshares, Inc. 1/16/2009 3/11/2010 6,709,061 8,316,604 0.807 30.1%
351
Investment date for Bank of America in CPP.
352
Investment date for Merrill Lynch in CPP.
353
Investment date for Bank of America in TIP.
111
Umpqua Holdings
Corp. 11/14/2008 3/31/2010 4,500,000 5,162,400 0.872 6.6%
City National
Corporation 11/21/2008 4/7/2010 18,500,000 24,376,448 0.759 8.5%
First Litchfield
Financial
Corporation 12/12/2008 4/7/2010 1,488,046 1,863,158 0.799 15.9%
PNCFinancial
Services Group Inc. 12/31/2008 4/29/2010 324,195,686 346,800,388 0.935 8.7%
Comerica Inc. 11/14/2008 5/4/2010 183,673,472 276,426,071 0.664 10.8%
Valley National
Bancorp 11/14/2008 5/18/2010 5,571,592 5,955,884 0.935 8.3%
Wells Fargo Bank 10/28/2008 5/20/2010 849,014,998 1,064,247,725 0.798 7.8%
First Financial
Bancorp 12/23/2008 6/2/2010 3,116,284 3,051,431 1.021 8.2%
Sterling
Bancshares, Inc./
Sterling Bank 12/12/2008 6/9/2010 3,007,891 5,287,665 0.569 10.8%
SVB Financial
Group 12/12/2008 6/16/2010 6,820,000 7,884,633 0.865 7.7%
Discover
Financial Services 3/13/2009 7/7/2010 172,000,000 166,182,652 1.035 17.1%
Bar Harbor
Bancshares 1/16/2009 7/28/2010 250,000 518,511 0.482 6.2%
Citizens &
Northern
Corporation 1/16/2009 8/4/2010 400,000 468,164 0.854 5.9%
Columbia Banking
System, Inc. 11/21/2008 8/11/2010 3,301,647 3,291,329 1.003 7.3%
Hartford Financial
Services Group,
Inc. 6/26/2009 9/21/2010 713,687,430 472,221,996 1.511 30.3%
Lincoln National
Corporation 7/10/2009 9/16/2010 216,620,887 181,431,183 1.194 27.1%
Fulton Financial
Corporation 12/23/2008 9/8/2010 10,800,000 15,616,013 0.692 6.7%
The Bancorp, Inc./
The Bancorp Bank 12/12/2008 9/8/2010 4,753,985 9,947,683 0.478 12.8%
South Financial
Group, Inc./
Carolina First Bank 12/5/2008 9/30/2010 400,000 1,164,486 0.343 (34.2)%
TIB Financial
Corp/TIB Bank 12/5/2008 9/30/2010 40,000 235,757 0.170 (38.0)%
Total $8,148,332,166 $7,999,843,254 1.019 8.4%
112
Figure 29: Valuation of Current Holdings of Warrants (as of November 4, 2010)
Financial Institutions with
Warrants Outstanding
Warrant Valuation (millions of dollars)
Low
Estimate
High
Estimate
Best
Estimate
Citigroup, Inc.
354
$71.57 $1,479.30 $206.88
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 17.34 356.98 123.78
Regions Financial Corporation 5.94 172.60 63.27
Fifth Third Bancorp 96.96 390.18 170.52
KeyCorp 20.90 158.08 64.62
AIG 419.89 2,062.45 909.42
All Other Banks 379.97 1,210.32 812.63
Total $1,012.57 $5,829.91 $2,351.12
2. Federal Financial Stability Efforts
a. Federal Reserve and FDIC Programs
In addition to the direct expenditures Treasury has undertaken through the TARP, the
federal government has engaged in a much broader program directed at stabilizing the U.S.
financial system. Many of these initiatives explicitly augment funds allocated by Treasury under
specific TARP initiatives, such as FDIC and Federal Reserve asset guarantees for Citigroup, or
operate in tandem with Treasury programs, such as the interaction between PPIP and TALF.
Other pro
and special purpose vehicles (SPVs)
(TLGP), operate independently of the TARP.
b. Total Financial Stability Resources
Beginning in its April 2009 report, the Panel broadly classified the resources that the
federal government has devoted to stabilizing the economy through myriad new programs and
initiatives as outlays, loans, or guarantees. With the reductions in funding for certain TARP
programs, the Panel calculates the total value of these resources to be over $2.5 trillion.
do not appreciate; (2) no dividends are received, no warrants are exercised, and no TARP funds
are repaid; (3) all loans default and are written off; and (4) all guarantees are exercised and
subsequently written off.
354
Includes warrants issued under CPP, AGP, and TIP.
113
With respect to the FDIC and Federal Reserve programs, the risk of loss varies
significantly across the programs considered here, as do the mechanisms providing protection for
the taxpayer against such risk. 2009 report, the FDIC
assesses a premium of up to 100 basis points on TLGP debt guarantees.
355
In contrast, the
and the loans are over-collateralized and with recourse to other assets of the borrower. If the
assets securing a Federal Reserve loa
Federal Reserve is able to demand more collateral from the borrower. Similarly, should a
to make the Federal Reserve whole. In this way, the risk to the taxpayer on recourse loans only
materializes if the borrower enters bankruptcy.
c. Credit Union Assistance
Apart from the assistance credit unions have received through the CDCI, the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the federal agency charged with regulating federal credit
unions (FCUs), has also made efforts to stabilize the corporate credit union (CCU) system.
Corporate credit unions provide correspondent services, as well as liquidity and investment
services to retail (or consumer) credit unions.
356
Since March 2009, the NCUA has placed five
CCUs into conservatorship due to their exposure to underperforming private-label MBS. The
NCUA estimates that these five institutions, which have $72 billion in assets and provide
services for 4,600 retail credit unions, hold more than 90 percent of the MBS in the corporate
credit union system.
357
Temporary Corporate Credit Union
was created to help cover costs associated with CCU
conservatorships and liquidations. The Stabilization Fund was established on May 20, 2009, as
part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, and allows the NCUA to borrow up
355
Congressional Oversight Panel, November Oversight Report: Guarantees and Contingent Payments in
TARP and Related Programs, at 36 (Nov. 6, 2009) (online at cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-110609-report.pdf).
356
National Credit Union Administration, Corporate System Resolution: Corporate Credit Unions
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), at 1 (online at www.ncua.gov/Resources/CorporateCU/CSR/CSR-6.pdf).
357
National Credit Union Administration, Corporate System Resolution: National Credit Union
Administration Virtual Town Hall, at 14 (Sept. 27, 2010) (online at
www.ncua.gov/Resources/CorporateCU/CSR/10-0927WebinarSlides.pdf); National Credit Union Administration,
Fact Sheet: Corporate Credit Union Conservatorships (Sept. 14, 2010) (online at
www.ncua.gov/Resources/CorporateCU/CSR/CSR-14.pdf).
114
to $6 billion from Treasury on a revolving basis.
358
The NCUA had drawn a total of $1.5 billion
from the Stabilization Fund, and repaid the balance at the end of September.
359
d. Mortgage Purchase Programs
On September 7, 2008, Treasury announced the GSE Mortgage Backed Securities
Purchase Program. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 provided Treasury with
the authority to purchase MBS guaranteed by GSEs through December 31, 2009. Treasury
purchased approximately $225 billion in GSE MBS by the time its authority expired.
360
As of
October 2010, there was approximately $154.6 billion in MBS still outstanding under this
program.
361
In March 2009, the Federal Reserve authorized purchases of $1.25 trillion MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, and $200 billion of agency debt
securities from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.
362
The intended
purchase amount for agency debt securities was subsequently decreased to $175 billion.
363
All
purchasing activity was completed on March 31, 2010. As of November 10, the Federal Reserve
held $1.05 trillion of agency MBS and $150 billion of agency debt.
364
358
National Credit Union Administration, Board Action Memorandum (June 15, 2010) (online at
www.ncua.gov/GenInfo/BoardandAction/DraftBoardActions/2010/Jun/Item6aBAMSFAssessmentJune2010(1%20b
illion)FINAL.pdf).
359
National Credit Union Administration, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Board Member Gigi
Hyland at Grand Hyatt Washington (Sept. 20, 2010) (online at
www.ncua.gov/GenInfo/Members/Hyland/Speeches/10-0920HylandNAFCUCongrCaucus.pdf).
360
U.S. Department of the Treasury, FY2011 Budget in Brief, at 138 (Feb. 2010) (online at
www.treas.gov/offices/management/budget/budgetinbrief/fy2011/FY%202011%20BIB%20(2).pdf).
361
U.S. Department of the Treasury, MBS Purchase Program: Portfolio by Month (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/October%202010%20Portfolio%20by%20month.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
Treasury has received $65.7 billion in principal repayments and $14.3 billion in interest payments from these
securities. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, MBS Purchase Program Principal and Interest Received (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/October%202010%20MBS%20Principal%20and%20Interest%20Monthly%20Bre
akout.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
362
Federal Reserve Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, supra note 251, at 5.
363
Federal Reserve Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, supra note 251, at 5.
364
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, supra note 251.
115
e. Federal Reserve Treasury Securities Purchases
365
On November 3, 2010, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced that it
has directed FRBNY to begin purchasing an additional $600 billion in longer-term Treasury
securities. In addition, FRBNY will reinvest $250 billion to $350 billion in principal payments
from agency debt and agency MBS in Treasury securities.
366
The additional purchases and
reinvestments will be conducted through the end of the second quarter 2011, meaning the pace of
purchases will be approximately $110 billion per month. In order to facilitate these purchases,
FRBNY will temporarily lift its System Open Market Account per-issue limit, which prohibits
outstanding amount.
367
As of November 10, 2010, the Federal Reserve held $853 billion in
Treasury securities.
368
365
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release FOMC Statement (Nov. 3, 2010)
(online at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20101103a.htm); Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Statement Regarding Purchases of Treasury Securities (Nov. 3, 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/monetary20101103a1.pdf).
366
On August 10, 2010, the Federal Reserve began reinvesting principal payments on agency debt and
agency MBS holdings in longer-term Treasury securities in order to keep the amount of their securities holdings in
their System Open Market Account portfolio at their then-current level. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, FOMC Statement (Aug. 10, 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100810a.htm).
367
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FAQs: Purchases of Longer-term Treasury Securities (Nov. 3,
2010) (online at www.newyorkfed.org/markets/lttreas_faq.html).
368
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, supra note 251.
116
Figure 30: Federal Government Financial Stability Effort (as of October 27, 2010)
xxxiii
Program
(billions of dollars)
Treasury
(TARP)
Federal
Reserve FDIC Total
Total
Outlays
xxxiv
Loans
Guarantees
xxxv
Repaid and Unavailable TARP Funds
$475
232.2
23.4
4.3
215.1
$1,378.0
1,226.8
151.2
0
0
$690.9
188.9
0
502
0
$2,544.0
1,648.0
174.6
506.3
215.1
AIG
xxxvi
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
69.8
xxxvii
69.8
0
0
83.1
xxxviii
26.1
xxxix
57.1
0
0
0
0
0
152.9
95.9
57.1
0
Citigroup
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
11.6
xl
11.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11.6
11.6
0
0
Capital Purchase Program (Other)
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
37.8
xli
37.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
37.8
37.8
0
0
Capital Assistance Program N/A 0 0
xlii
N/A
TALF
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
4.3
0
0
xliii
4.3
38.7
0
xliv
38.7
0
0
0
0
0
43.0
0
38.7
4.3
PPIP (Loans)
xlv
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PPIP (Securities)
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
xlvi
22.4
7.5
14.9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22.4
7.5
14.9
0
Making Home Affordable Program/
Foreclosure Mitigation
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
45.6
xlvii
45.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
45.6
45.6
0
0
Automotive Industry Financing Program
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
xlviii
67.1
59.0
8.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
67.1
59.0
8.1
0
Automotive Supplier Support Program
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
0.4
0
xlix
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.4
0
0.4
0
117
SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
l
0.36
0.36
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.36
0.36
0
0
Community Development Capital Initiative
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
li
0.57
0
0.57
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.57
0
0.57
0
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
502.0
0
0
lii
502.0
502.0
0
0
502.0
Deposit Insurance Fund
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
188.9
liii
188.9
0
0
188.9
188.9
0
0
Other Federal Reserve Credit Expansion
Outlays
Loans
Guarantees
0
0
0
0
1,256.1
liv
1,200.7
lv
55.4
0
0
0
0
0
1,256.1
1,200.7
55.4
0
xxxiii
Unless otherwise noted, all data in this figure are as of October 27, 2010.
xxxiv
broadly classifiable as purchases of debt or equity securities (e.g., debentures, preferred stock, exercised warrants,
etc.). These values were calculated usi
funding levels as estimated by a variety of sources, including Treasury statements and GAO estimates. Anticipated
from initial announcements, and are subject to further
change. Outlays used here represent investment and asset purchases as well as commitments to make investments
and asset purchases and are not the same as budget outlays, which under section 123 of EESA are recorded on a
xxxv
Although many of the guarantees may never be exercised or will be exercised only partially, the
xxxvi
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Update on AIG Investment Valuation (Nov. 1, 2010)
(online at financialstability.gov/latest/pr_11012010.html). AIG values exclude accrued dividends on preferred
interests in the AIA and ALICO SPVs and accrued interest payable to FRBNY on the Maiden Lane LLCs.
xxxvii
This number includes investments under the AIGIP/SSFI Program: a $40 billion investment made on
November 25, 2008, and a $30 billion investment made on April 17, 2009 (less a reduction of $165 million
representing bonuses paid to AIG Financial Products employees). As of November 1, 2010, AIG had utilized $47.5
billion of the available $69.8 billion under the AIGIP/SSFI. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Update on
AIG Investment Valuation (Nov. 1, 2010) (online at www.financialstability.gov/latest/pr_11012010.html); U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29,
118
2010, at 13 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xxxviii
the amount available to AIG through the Revolving Credit Facility was reduced by $25 billion in exchange for
preferred equity interests in two special purpose vehicles, AIA Aurora LLC and ALICO Holdings LLC. These
SPVs were established to hold the common stock of two AIG subsidiaries: American International Assurance
Company Ltd. (AIA) and American Life Insurance Company (ALICO). As of October 27, 2010, the book value of
was $26.1 billion
in preferred equity ($16.7 billion in AIA and $9.4 billion in ALICO). Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Factors
Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Oct. 28, 2010) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20101028/).
xxxix
This number represents the full $29.3 billion made available to AIG through its Revolving Credit
Facility (RCF) with FRBNY ($18.9 billion had been drawn down as of October 27, 2010) and the outstanding
principal of the loans extended to the Maiden Lane II and III SPVs to buy AIG assets (as of October 27, 2010, $13.5
billion and $14.3 billion, respectively). The amounts outstanding under the Maiden Lane II and III facilities do not
reflect the accrued interest payable to FRBNY. Income from the purchased assets is used to pay down the loans to
the SPVs, o losses over time. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Factors
Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Oct. 27, 2010) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20101028/).
The maximum amount available through the RCF decreased from $34.4 billion to $29.3 billion between
March and September 2010
Group, Inc. common stock. The reduced ceiling also reflects a $3.95 billion repayment to the RCF from proceeds
earned from a debt offering by the International Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC), an AIG subsidiary. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity
Programs and the Balance Sheet, at 18 (Oct. 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monthlyclbsreport201010.pdf).
xl
repayment for CPP funding. The amount repaid comes from the $16.4 billion in gross proceeds Treasury received
from the sale of 4.1 billion Citigroup common shares. See note ii, supra for a further details of the sales of
Citigroup common stock to date. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions
Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 13 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xli
This figure represents the $204.9 billion Treasury disbursed under the CPP, minus the $25 billion
investment in Citigroup identified above, $139.5 billion in repayments (excluding the amount repaid for the
Citigr . This figure
does not account for future repayments of CPP investments and dividend payments from CPP investments. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29,
2010, at 13 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
xlii
On November 9, 2009, Treasury announced the closing of the CAP and that only one institution,
GMAC, was in need of further capital from Treasury. GMAC, however, received further funding through the AIFP.
Therefore, the Panel considers CAP unused. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announcement Regarding
the Capital Assistance Program (Nov. 9, 2009) (online at www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg_11092009.html).
xliii
This figure represents the $4.3 billion adjusted allocation to the TALF SPV. However, as of October
27, 2010, TALF LLC had drawn only $105 million of the available $4.3 billion. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20100930/); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program
Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 21 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
On June 30, 2010, the Federal Reserve ceased issuing loans collateralized by newly issued CMBS. As of this date,
investors had requested a total of $73.3 billion in TALF loans ($13.2 billion in CMBS and $60.1 billion in non-
CMBS) and $71 billion in TALF loans had been settled ($12 billion in CMBS and $59 billion in non-CMBS).
119
Earlier, it ended its issues of loans collateralized by other TALF-eligible newly issued and legacy ABS (non-CMBS)
on March 31, 2010. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Terms and
Conditions (online at www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_terms.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010); Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: CMBS (online at
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/cmbs_operations.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010); Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: CMBS (online at
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/CMBS_recent_operations.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010); Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: non-CMBS (online at
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_operations.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010); Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: non-CMBS (online at
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/TALF_recent_operations.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
xliv
This number is derived from the unofficial 1:10 ratio of the value of Treasury loan guarantees to the
value of Federal Reserve loans under the TALF. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Financial Stability
Plan, at 4 (Feb.10, 2009) (online at www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf) (describing the initial $20
billion Treasury contribution tied to $200 billion in Federal Reserve loans and announcing potential expansion to a
$100 billion Treasury contribution tied to $1 trillion in Federal Reserve loans). Since only $43 billion in TALF
loans remained outstanding when the program closed, Treasury is currently responsible for reimbursing the Federal
Reserve Board only up to $4.3 billion in losses from these loans.
exposure under the TALF is $38.7 billion. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Factors
Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Oct. 28, 2010) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20101028/).
xlv
It is unlikely that resources will be expended under the PPIP Legacy Loans Program in its original
design as a joint Treasury-FDIC program to purchase troubled assets from solvent banks. In several sales described
in FDIC press releases, it appears that there is no Treasury participation, and FDIC activity is accounted for here as a
. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC
Statement on the Status of the Legacy Loans Program (June 3, 2009) (online at
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09084.html).
xlvi
the Legacy Securities Public-
Private Investment Program (PPIP). As of October 29, 2010, Treasury reported commitments of $14.9 billion in
loans and $7.5 billion in membership interest associated with PPIP. On January 4, 2010, Treasury and one of the
nine fund managers, UST/TCW Senior Mortgage Securities Fund, L.P. (TCW), en -Up and
. Following the
funds on March 22, 2010. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report
for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 23 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-
reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
On October 20, 2010, Treasury released its fourth quarterly report on PPIP. The report indicates that as of
September 30, 2010, all eight investment funds have realized an internal rate of return since inception (net of any
management fees or expenses owed to Treasury) above 19 percent. The highest performing fund, thus far, is AG
GECC PPIF Master Fund, L.P., which has a net internal rate of return of 52 percent. U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program, at 7 (Oct. 20, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/External%20Report%20-%2009-10%20vFinal.pdf).
xlvii
As of October 29, 2010, the total cap for HAMP was $29.9 billion. The total amount of TARP funds
committed to HAMP is $29.9 billion. However, as of October 30, 2010, only $597.2 million in non-GSE payments
has been disbursed under HAMP. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions
Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 43 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf);
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Assets Relief Program Monthly 105(a) Report September 2010, at 6
(Oct. 1, 2010) (online at
financialstability.gov/docs/105CongressionalReports/September%20105(a)%20report_FINAL.pdf). Data provided
by Treasury staff (Nov. 10, 2010).
120
xlviii
A substantial portion of the total $81.3 billion in loans extended under the AIFP has since been
converted to common equity and preferred shares in restructured companies. $8.1 billion has been retained as first
lien debt (with $1 billion committed to old GM and $7.1 billion to Chrysler). This figure ($67.1 billion) represents
on under the AIFP after repayments and losses. U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 18 (Nov. 2, 2010)
(online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-
29-10.pdf).
xlix
. U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period Ending October 29, 2010, at 19 (Nov.
2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
l
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective, at 43 (Oct.
2010) (online at
www.financialstability.gov/docs/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf).
li
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report for the Period
Ending October 29, 2010, at 17 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/11-2-
10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2010-29-10.pdf).
lii
This figure represents the current maximum aggregate debt guarantees that could be made under the
program, which is a function of the number and size of individual financial institutions participating. $286.8 billion
of debt subject to the guarantee is currently outstanding, which represents approximately 57.1 percent of the current
cap. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Monthly Reports on Debt Issuance Under the Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program: Debt Issuance Under Guarantee Program (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at
www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/total_issuance09-10.html). The FDIC has collected $10.4 billion in fees
and surcharges from this program since its inception in the fourth quarter of 2008. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Monthly Reports Related to the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: Fees Under Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Debt Program (Sept. 30, 2010) (online at www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/fees.html).
liii
ses to its deposit insurance fund attributable to bank
failures in the third and fourth quarters of 2008, the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2009, and the first and
second quarters of 2010. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chief
Board: DIF Income Statement Second Quarter 2010 (online at
www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/corporate/cfo_report_2ndqtr_10/income.html). For earlier reports, see Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chief Financial (online at
www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/corporate/index.html) (accessed Nov. 12, 2010).
estimates of its future losses under loss-sharing agreements that it has entered into with banks acquiring assets of
insolvent banks during these eight quarters. Under a loss-
agreement to purchase the assets of an insolvent bank, the FDIC typically agrees to cover 80 percent of an acquiring
s future losses on an initial portion of these assets and 95 percent of losses on another portion of assets. See,
e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Purchase and Assumption Agreement Whole Bank, All Deposits
Among FDIC, Receiver of Guaranty Bank, Austin, Texas, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Compass
Bank, at 65-66 (Aug. 21, 2009) (online at www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/guaranty-
tx_p_and_a_w_addendum.pdf).
liv
Outlays are comprised of the Federal Reserve Mortgage Related Facilities. The Federal Reserve balance
sheet accounts for these facilities under Federal agency debt securities and mortgage-backed securities held by the
Federal Reserve. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1)
(Oct. 27, 2010) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20100930/). Although the Federal Reserve does not
employ the outlays, loans, and guarantees classification, its accounting clearly separates its mortgage-related
purchasing programs from its liquidity programs. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1), at 2 (Oct. 28, 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20101028) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
121
lv
Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities classified in this table as loans include primary credit, secondary
credit, central bank liquidity swaps, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility, loans outstanding to Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC, seasonal credit, term auction credit, the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, and loans outstanding to Bear Stearns (Maiden Lane LLC). Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (H.4.1) (Oct. 28, 2010) (online at
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20101028/) (accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
122
Section Four: Oversight Activities
The Congressional Oversight Panel was established as part of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA) and formed on November 26, 2008. Since then, the Panel has
produced 24 oversight reports, as well as a special report on regulatory reform, issued on
January 29, 2009, and a special report on farm credit, issued on July 21, 2009. Since the release
October oversight report, the following developments pertainin
oversight of the TARP took place:
The Panel held a hearing in Washington on October 21, 2010, discussing restrictions
on executive compensation for companies that received TARP funds. The Panel
heard testimony from Kenneth R. Feinberg, the former Special Master for TARP
Executive Compensation, as well as from industry and academic experts.
The Panel held a hearing in Washington on October 27, 2010. The Panel heard
program and the effects of recent foreclosure documentation irregularities on
Treas
mitigation efforts under the TARP.
Upcoming Reports and Hearings
The Panel will release its next oversight report in December. The report will discuss
HAMP, the most expansi
is
foreclosure mitigation efforts under the TARP.
Acknowledgements
The Panel would like to thank the following individuals for sharing their thoughts and
suggestions: Roger Ashworth, MBS Analyst, Amherst Securities; Guy Cecala, CEO and
Publisher, Inside Mortgage Finance; Chris Gamaitoni, Vice President, Compass Point Research
& Trading; Jason Gold, Senior Fellow for Housing and Financial Services Policy, Third Way;
Laurie Goodman, Senior Managing Director, Amherst Securities; Anne Kim, Domestic Policy
Program Director, Third Way; Paul Miller, Managing Director and Group Head of Financial
Services Research, FBR Capital Markets;
123
Securities; Christopher Peterson, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law,
University of Utah; Robert Placet, Associate Analyst, Deutsche Bank Securities; Joshua Rosner,
Managing Director, Graham Fisher & Co.; and, Jason Stewart, Managing Director, Compass
Point Research & Trading.
The Panel also wishes to acknowledge and thank the many individuals from the
academic, legal, consumer, analyst, and other communities who provided useful information and
views for this report.
124
Section Five: About the Congressional Oversight Panel
In response to the escalating financial crisis, on October 3, 2008, Congress provided
Treasury with the authority to spend $700 billion to stabilize the U.S. economy, preserve home
ownership, and promote economic growth. Congress created the Office of Financial Stability
(OFS) within Treasury to implement the TARP. At the same time, Congress created the
reports on actions taken by Treasury and financial institutions and their effect on the economy.
spending to stabilize the economy, evaluate market transparency, ensure effective foreclosure
people. In addition, Congress instructed the Panel to produce a special report on regulatory
system and its effectiveness at
this report in January 2009.
to produce a special report on the availability of credit in the agricultural sector. The report was
issued on July 21, 2009.
On November 14, 2008, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and the Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi appointed Richard H. Neiman, Superintendent of Banks for the State of
New York, Damon Silvers, Director of Policy and Special Counsel of the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), and Elizabeth Warren, Leo
Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, to the Panel. With the appointment on
November 19, 2008, of Congressman Jeb Hensarling to the Panel by House Minority Leader
John Boehner, the Panel had a quorum and met for the first time on November 26, 2008, electing
Professor Warren as its chair. On December 16, 2008, Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell named Senator John E. Sununu to the Panel. Effective August 10, 2009, Senator
Sununu resigned from the Panel, and on August 20, 2009, Senator McConnell announced the
appointment of Paul Atkins, former Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, to fill the vacant seat. Effective December 9, 2009, Congressman Jeb Hensarling
resigned from the Panel and House Minority Leader John Boehner announced the appointment
of J. Mark McWatters to fill the vacant seat. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
appointed Kenneth Troske, Sturgill Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky, to fill
the vacancy created by the resignation of Paul Atkins on May 21, 2010. Effective September 17,
2010, Elizabeth Warren resigned from the Panel, and on September 30, 2010, Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid announced the appointment of Senator Ted Kaufman to fill the vacant seat.
On October 4, 2010, the Panel elected Senator Kaufman as its chair.
125
APPENDIX I:
LETTER FROMCHAIRMAN TED KAUFMAN TO
SPECIAL MASTER PATRICIA GEOGHEGAN,
RE: FOLLOWUP TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
HEARING, DATED NOVEMBER 1, 2010
November 1, 2010
The Honorable Patricia Geoghegan
Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation
United States Department of the Treasury
Room 1039
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20220
Dear Ms. Geoghegan:
On behalf of the Congressional Oversight Panel, thank you very much for your
The hearing served as an important opportunity for the Panel to learn more about the work of the
Office of the Special Master, a subject the Panel will continue to examine in the months ahead.
this issue, it has identified several data issues that
are important to its ability to conduct its oversight responsibilities. During the hearing, I
requested that the former Special Master provide this information to the Panel. He responded
that much of this information is available in the Final Report. However, some relevant details
are not included in the report. Accordingly, the Panel requests your responses to the following
questions:
Turnover: How many employees left TARP exceptional assistance firms after the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was passed? After the Interim Final
Rule was passed in June 2009? After the Special Master issued his 2009
determinations? How does this data compare to expected turnover under
In total, how many employees have left exceptional
Individual compensation comparison
determinations for individual employees compare to their 2007 and 2008 salaries?
aggregate, but not at an individual level. Individual names are not necessary, so
long as some basis for comparison (such as employee identification numbers) is
provided.
2009 total compensation: What was the total compensation that covered
employees received between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009? How
much did each employee receive during the period between June 15, 2009 and the
2010 total compensation: What is the total compensation that you anticipate
covered employees will receive between January 1, 2010 and December 31,
2010?
General Motors determinations:
for General Motors does not provide employee ID numbers, making it difficult to
compare individual employee compensation in 2009 and 2010. How did
compensation for individual employees at General Motors change between 2009
and 2010?
The Panel seeks written responses to these questions by November 15, 2010. I would be
happy to answer any questions about this letter that you may have. If you would prefer, a
.
Sincerely,
Senator Ted Kaufman
Chairman
Congressional Oversight Panel
Cc: Dr. Kenneth Troske
Mr. J. Mark McWatters
Mr. Richard H. Neiman
Mr. Damon A. Silvers

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