THIRD DIVISION In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.5 Trial ensued. Meantime, Saraum was released on bail.6
G.R. No. 205472 January 25, 2016
AMADO I. SARAUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse the Decision2dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution3 elated December 19, 2012
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the judgment of
conviction against petitioner Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737.
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, and without being authorized by law, did then and there have in his
possession the following:
1 = One (1) lighter
2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper
3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil
which are instruments and/or equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the prosecution while the
defense presented no witness other than Saraum.
According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3
Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City.
A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel
Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana
was designated as the poseur-buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the
back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter security. PO1 Aniñon
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation.
After preparing all the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation report and submitting
the same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the
house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum
and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to
have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum’s possession a lighter, rolled
tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them
in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for
Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the
paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were
turned over to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that
on the date and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the
house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were already with
"Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not committed
anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was
brought to the court.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a fine of Php20,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The drug paraphernalias (sic) are ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this petition.
We deny.
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness
on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight
and are deemed conclusive and binding.9 Besides, a review of the records reveals that the
CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit
or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. 10 In this
case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug
paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were
offered and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a
warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment
he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence
of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.12
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum’s statement that he was not committing a crime
at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend
him, who was then holding a disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled
tissue paper in his left hand,13 while they were in the course of arresting somebody. The case
is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where
Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum
did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the
buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless,
lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the
respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia. 14 There is,
thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and finding as to the presence or
absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said items since
possession itself is the punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects
relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found.1âwphi1 In the course of
their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items
were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.
The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are,
therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure.
Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection
thereto when he did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that
an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for
the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving
the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed
waived."15 In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the
seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of
evidence by the prosecution.16
In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court
as the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the
prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with
or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165;17 and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect
link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items.18
Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must
immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph them, non-
compliance therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team.19 While nowhere in the prosecution evidence show the "justifiable
ground" which may excuse the police operatives involved in the buy-bust operation from
making the physical inventory and taking a photograph of the drug paraphernalia confiscated
and/or seized, such omission shall not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground" will remain
unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum to specifically challenge the custody
and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drug
paraphernalia before the trial court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the
police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal.20
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the
time they are presented in court.21 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items should
be established, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.23
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.24 Thus, failure to strictly comply with
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's
arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible.25
x x x Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law
or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will be
accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the
non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be
given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.26
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items.27 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised because
it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they
were first discovered until they were brought to the court for examination. Even though the
prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug
paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by the police as to the required procedure on
the custody and control of the confiscated items. The succession of events established by
evidence and the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals all show that
the evidence seized were the same evidence subsequently identified and testified to in open
court.
Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation are
generally accorded full faith and credit in view of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties and especially so in the absence of ill-motive that could be
attributed to them.28 The defense failed to show any odious intent on the part of the police
officers to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an
innocent person.29 Saraum’s mere denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
identification and declarations of the police officers. The defense of denial, frame-up or
extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.30 As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime
committed.31 To merit consideration, it has to be substantiated by strong, clear and
convincing evidence, which Saraum failed to do for presenting no corroborative evidence. 32

Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and
conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing
their deportment and manner of testifying.33 The rule finds an even more stringent application
where said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case.34 In this case, the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove Saraum 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been sufficiently
met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did not rely on the weakness of the
defense. 'The prosecution was able to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision elated

September 8, 2011 and Resolution dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011
and the Resolution 3dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment 4dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting
petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, 5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation
of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic)
of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LA W. 6
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03
Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at
Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the
other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and
approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two
(2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory
examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. 8
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted
by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer
to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his
evidence.9
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who
was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just
standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station.
There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked
money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were
brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 10
The RTC Ruling
In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00.12
The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which
yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there
was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain
view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and
apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag
was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his
duty when he arrested Comerciante.13
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held
that P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given
that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the
latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw
a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every
reason to inquire on the matter right then and there.15
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution 17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition. 18
The Issue before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect a valid
warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal
warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered
inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal. 19
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the
Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to
the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of illegal drugs. 20
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides
an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion
of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. 23
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. 24 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made - the process cannot be reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may
be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
another. 26
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident that
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, happened if any?
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone.
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand,
Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
xxxx
just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it.28
Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you
already identified?
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime;
while in Section (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 29 A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?
no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was
aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw A: They were quite facing me then.
Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the 0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo,
foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is Mandaluyong City?
revelatory:
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.
Pros. Silao:
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court where were
you? A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.

A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am. Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do?

xxxx A: We stopped ma'am.

Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling? Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?

A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am. A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.

Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan? Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these
two male persons?
A: They were surprised, ma'am. Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the
plastic sachet?
xxxx
A: From his hand ma'am.
Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?
Q: Left or right hand?
A: They were surprised.
Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan,
Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? 30
surprised?
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A: They were stunned.
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even
Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer? assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy -
especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a
speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside
A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.
two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other
overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple Lang ng P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
tanong ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything? crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to
the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
Court: companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the
same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens. Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable
suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po. possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still
assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw
in Comerciante was indeed shabu. 32
Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5
Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa
(b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed
kanila?
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit? that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by
Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to
Witness: Wala po. believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 33
xxxx
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk"
search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had an
opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves
observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxxx
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with
a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest
cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with
the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes
of the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must
not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures."
Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search. [35]] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal
acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of
criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop
and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante
should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu
is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted
and exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated October 20, 2011
and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y
Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution
dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the
prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City
Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around
3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle;
that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and
so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to
the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24
September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of
planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient
to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain
shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving
and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court
required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its
Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was
not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by
Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance
requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga
and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In
other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x. 8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor
a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part
of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of
other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation
of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver
to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and
date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from
the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This
rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew
shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic
Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument
with the driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized
merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that
the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
"almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length
whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop
should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not
fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of
time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of
action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of
most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once
having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be
enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary
and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s
expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be
obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end
he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to
an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist
feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an
armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding
whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond
to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps
most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop,"
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion
in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily
detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v.
Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody"
for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis
supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to
modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed
under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither
can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal
arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his
traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine
only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take
the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then
the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant
of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may
also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling
pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for
a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for
him to be arrested for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the
drugs—as he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a
moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk"
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned
instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered,
was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s
pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution
claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does
not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone
at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons.20
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person
for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest
the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering
the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest"
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the
need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales
for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present
case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’"
x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less
than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234,
n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more
analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there
is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take
conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But
while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion
of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may
gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and
even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein,
pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—
the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and
issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained.
No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the
offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object
to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February
2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the
police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.
The Facts and the Case
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the
accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in
Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried her in
absentia. 3
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1
Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two
civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol
on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number
107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from
where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1
Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside
him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised
burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to
enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box
atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic
sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused
strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and
Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further
investigation and testing.5
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them
positive for traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he
and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When
he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them
shoved him and said, "D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and someone
instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera
and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They
were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his house.7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months
and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 each and the
costs of the suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught
accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their
possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the
court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of
Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera’s claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan’s credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and
Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police
officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007
affirming in full the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the
CA denied it.11 The accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence
of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
Ruling of the Court
The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the
door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the
officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus
seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they
were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165.
That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the
crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of
dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused
was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of
not guilty.12
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had
been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two
fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after
the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the
house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from
the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door,
they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:
Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door,
how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A – It was partially open Your Honor.
Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was
only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped
inside it, as a police officer?
A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…
Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can
search the interior of the house?
A – Yes, Your Honor.
Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching
the interior of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate
the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong
inside the house?

A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through
its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?

A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the
arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering
that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found
in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21,
2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937
and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged
for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 The
Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his
provisional liberty.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald
Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs
under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams
and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-
EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be committed in this
manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without
being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully],
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1.61
grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24
grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four
point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent
plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon
motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal
Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was held on July
27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of
facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and
(3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the defense presented in court the
testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and
(3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution’s version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of P/Insp.
Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to
their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity.
This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission
if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the
information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of
their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-
bust against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2
Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp.
Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting
with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindy’s
Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet alias Don that
night but she decided to bring the team along for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place
with the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside the
restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She
asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative.
They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu for ₱250,000.00.
They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00
p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindy’s
Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she
arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She
brought five genuine ₱500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play money
to make it appear that she had ₱250,000.00 with her. After she showed the money to alias
Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take
place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s apartment at 765
Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD)
Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing
before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for
P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated
and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to the address
given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles
they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant
walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate. Around
1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded
to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias
Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof.
Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline
substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was
indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to
signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a
narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from
doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter
had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her
initials "JSF" on the genuine ₱500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the
arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The
suspects’ rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald
Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being
booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellant’s companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo
explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter handed the
same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon
receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents
thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the
same to the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1
Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over
to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the
drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed the specimen
again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust
operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown
envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials
"JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read
"DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were
for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she
found out that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also
learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets
she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was
arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded
12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes
and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on
the envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed
by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardo’s. PO2 Trambulo
testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them about
the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form
a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindy’s
Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp.
Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team that she
convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a second
meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt.
Domantay about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo
was furnished with five genuine ₱500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp.
Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr."
Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindy’s Restaurant past 10:00 p.m.,
alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle money to alias Don and
after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided
that the drug deal would take place in front of alias Don’s rented apartment on Valdez St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with
the area. They then proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter,
P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the
immediate back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo
to scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal
the same to the other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998.
P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Don’s apartment,
while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from
the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street perpendicular to
Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw
alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured
that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown
envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic
bag containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo
saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He
was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Don’s male companion. Upon frisking
alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The
same were placed inside a white envelope that was tucked inside alias Don’s waist. PO2
Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police
officers then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police
headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained
possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline
substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress of their
operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the required
documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the Request for Laboratory
Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one who
brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug specimens. 25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination of
the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr.
initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office.
The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report
No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report
No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their logbook
RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white crystalline
substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as
"A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s examination revealed that the
white crystalline substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also
examined the contents of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained
crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white
crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequito’s findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-
17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1)
photocopies of the five original ₱500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2)
Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory
Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for examination tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order 31 dated
September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April 3,
1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope
(Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits
R-CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of
Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico
Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar
(Exhibit JJ).
The Defense’s Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events. The appellant’s
brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defense’s counter-
statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at the
NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk,
receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to have their
specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and during
regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the
specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When
there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to
the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between 6:00
to 9:00 o’clock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo.
From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 o’clock that evening, where he
saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant of the
narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s household help, Anatolia Caredo,
who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard
a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered,
poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door to Donald’s room
was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp.
Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room,
picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in
[Donald’s] possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two
(2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-
1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the
policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet containing ₱2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment and
apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form 41 dated April 3,
1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan 42 (Exhibit 2); (3)
Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A.
Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald
Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave
more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial
court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the police
officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and
falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in
this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal
possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the
possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the
illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latter’s bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the police,
the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked help
from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox
copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit dated April
17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy
Director, Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the said
Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he was
indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be presented or turned over to
the Court as evidence, and he should have filed the proper charges against those police
officers who were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the
same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and
Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in
Court could not be given weight and credence considering that the said persons were not
presented in Court to identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity
to cross-examine the same, thus, it has no probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
 2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of ₱5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case
No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as
Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of
FOUR THOUSAND (₱4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor
of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause
the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the
finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate
court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-
bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any
evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge
the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties on the part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6,
2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases
No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its medium period,
as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two
grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police
officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him. 51 He
argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time
he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample
time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the
appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As
the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove
that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an
employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring
drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we resolve
to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to
move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants
are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured
upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact
of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an
undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of
Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant
is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
(Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest
and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs,
"what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs
are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a
buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap
the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the
one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope
for the price of ₱250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which
contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the appellant.
When subjected to laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the
plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s testimony on the events
that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and straightforward.
She was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing
counsel’s cross-examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens
seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the
appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested,
P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This
search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the contents of which also
tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2
Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the former’s narration of events. Both police
officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from
the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of
the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily
prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would
falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have
any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact
did not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed
to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to
criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for
selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting task for
the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant
could have easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office
to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were
mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep
drug specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the testimonies of the
signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellant’s case.
To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the
positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught
red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night
of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked
or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will
not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since
the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the
trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments
of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the
appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of
shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the
imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death
penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes
a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.1âwphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attended the appellant’s violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s imposition of
reclusion perpetua. The ₱5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on the appellant is also in
accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
the Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the proper
imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant
amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in
this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of
six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within
the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is
imposable considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed
as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65

Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a
regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be
taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance
with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66 Such a special aggravating
circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for
the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus,
the same was properly disregarded by the lower courts.

All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked
if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall
be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting
counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to
such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be
null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession
shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in
writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the
waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be
allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the
President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé
or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of
law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following
fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
 (c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where
the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city
cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay
the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds
are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said
fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby
repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ

Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or
both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or

anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails
to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter
cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of
the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him
or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and
conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from
ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of
the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years
nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00).lawphi1©