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Ţ 19

CommLlnitarization with Hesitation
Sandra Lavenex
lntroduction 458 The proliferation of selni-autonOlTIOUS
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The institutionalization of justice and
agencies ancl bodies 467
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hOlne affairs coopera tiOl1 459
lntergovernillental fornlaliza ti on:
Maastricht's Lhird pillar 460
Uneasy C01lllllunitarization: the TreaLies
of Amsterdan1 and Nice 460
Kevaetors
. J
Organization and capacities of EU
institutions ....
. Thereinvention of'
.' in tergovernn1cntalism •
• · •.·.m·.··Summary
463
463
. 466
The flo\v of paliey 470
Asylunl and immigration polie)' 471
Police and judicial cooperatioll in
crinlinal lllatters 473
The agenda for reforn1 475
COllclusiollS 476
FU RTH ER R EADJ N G
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477
.... The control 'ofentry ta, a nd . residence with i n, . national territory, citîzenshipi civil
. - . . , ...
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.' .... liberties,law,justice, and order lie very clase to thecoreofthe state. Nevertheless,the
··.permeabilityofborders.in Europe has prompted cooperation amonggovernments, .
--
and in less than ,twenty years, ·justîce and home affairs (JHA) have moved from a
peripheral aspect ta a of European integration. Cooperation among na-
tionaLagencies .·concerned·with combatîngcrime,fighting .terrorism,.managing .. '
·.···.··,ders,i:mmigration 'and ·.asylum,·.·and •. with 'tl1e judicîa! .and···legalimplications.·()frising.
. -.. .
cross-bardermovement, has thusbeen 9 radua I Jy·movedfromlooseintergovernmen-·
.. tai cooperation -to'more supranatîonal governance within the European UnÎon{EU) .
. These deve!opments,however, continue to bemarked by reservationsand arguments .
aboutthe roleofEU institutions, resulting in ahybridinstitutional structurerand poliey
measureswhichareriddled with delicate compromisesand flexiblearrangements
. among themember governments.·
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458 Sandra Lavenex
Introduction
The an1bition involved in creating an 'arca of frcedom, security and justice' (AFSJ)
vvithin the EU may be c0I11pared with thal which propelled the single n1C1rket (sec
Chapter 5). Ihe 1997 Treat)' of Amsterdam (IoA) declared the AFSJ a fundamental
EU objective CArt. 2 IEU), and justice and home affairs UHA) has been one of the
busiest policy areas, vvith the Council adopting an average of ten texts a month in
thi5 field since 1999 (Monar forthcoming). ln contrast to econolnic integration, ho\v-
ever) which bas becn at the core of the European integration projectJHA touches on
many issues that are deeply entrenched in national political and judicial systelus and
have strong affinities to questions of state sovereignty: since the seventeenth century,
the state has drawn legitinlacy from its capacity to provide security for its inhabit-
ants (Mitsilegas et al. 2003: 7). Cooperation in]HA also has direct in1plications for
-
democratic values and for the balance between liberty and security in the l}nion and
its member states, and security considerations have hitherto received more attention
than those relating ta 'freedom' or justice'.
Ihe development of a common response to immigration and asylum-seekers, the
joint management of the external borders, the increasing coordination of national
police forces in the fight against crime, the'approximation of national crinlinal and
civillaw, and the creation of specialized EU bodies such as Europal, Eurajust, and
Frontex to deal \\Tith these matters thus constitute a l1e\v stage in the trajectory
of European integration. These processes reflect the increasing involven1ent of EU
institutions in core fUllctions of statehood and, conco111itantly, the transforn1ation of
traditional notions of sovereignty and democracy in the member states.
Notwithstanding the strong symbolislll inherent in the creation of a European
area of freedoTI1, security, and justice, the EU 15 [ar fronl having unified: integrated
conlnlon policies in ]HA. As in ather areas of EU policy integration has been
increlnental, riddled with delicate cOlllpr0111ises and reservations by luember
governlnents. Reservations about transfers of responsibilities ta the EU and the
donlestic sensitivity of issues such as imllligration and organized crilne in national
political debates and electoral campaigns have sustained transgovernlnental gov-
ernance as the dominant mode in ]HA. Transgovernmentalism combines elen1ents
of the traditional 'Community nlethod' with more intergovernn1ental ones: it is
characterized by the relative weakness of legal harmonization and a foeus an 1110re
operational aspects of coordinatiol1 bet\veen national authorities. This has gener-
ated a peculiar pattern of sharcc1 cOlllpetences bet\\'een sub-national, national, ancl
European levels of govcrnance, with lhc continuity of a significant levcl of coopera-
tion outside the EU1s fonnal institutions.
This chaptcr starts with a shon revie\ll,' of the enlcrgence and insrir.utionalization
of]HA cooperation in the EU treaties
1
before presenting its key aClors and institu-
tional set-up, and discussing the lllain policy developluents in re1ated f1e1cls and
recent proposals for reform.
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Justice and Home Affairs 459
The institutionalization of justice and home
affairs cooperation
The dynan1ics of this ne\v area of European integration reside both within and outside
the EU and its member states. One important interna1 motor has been the spill-over
from the realization of freedom of n10veluent in the single market (see Chapter 5).
The decision in the 1985 Schengen Agreenlent to extel1d the elimination of internal
border controls that had been in place among the Benelux countries since 1948
to the five contracting meluber states Belgiuru, Gernlany, Luxelnbourg,
and The Netherlands spurred concern about safeguarding internal security and
prolnpted closer cooperation on questions relating to cross-border phenomena such
as ilTIluigration, organized crinle, and drug trafficking. The surge of asylu111-seekers
from outside \vestern Europe in the 1980s which followed the closure of legal chan-
nels for econOlllic ilnmigration, the phenomena of organized crime and terrorisffi:
and the enel of the cold \-var: \vhich opened the EU's previously closed eastern bor-
der to hopeful immigrants and criluinal net,vorks, generated external pressures for
closer cooperation.
Ihi5 intensified cooperation could draw an informal caoperation among security
senrices and la\v-enforcelnent agencies that had developed since the 1970s. These
included the Pompidou Group on drugs) set up in 1972 withiTI the wider Council
of Europe) and the Trevi Group created at the December 1975 European Council in
Rome ta coordinate anti-terrorist work among EU govemments faced with lri5h,
Italian: German, and Palestinian groups operating within and across their borders.
After 1985 Trevi's mandate \vas extended to other issues of cross-border public arder
and serious international crill1e such as drug trafficking, bank robbery, and arms
traffi c king.
In 1990 t\-va important international treaties set the guidelines for [uture European
cooperation. The Schengen hnplementing Convention (SIC) devised \colnpensatory
measures' for the removal of frontier controls, covering asyluln, a common visa
reginle, illegal in1migratiol1: cross-border police C0111petences, and a COInmon
computerized system for the exchange of personal data (Schengen lnformation
Systen1 (SIS»). The Dublin Convention on Asylum, concluded among all EU lnember
states: ineorporated the asylum rules a1so included in the SIC and established the
responsibility of the state in \vhjch an asylun1-secker 11rs1. enters for the exanTination
of an 3svluTI1 claim.
,
Ihus: prior to lhc [ornlal establishlncnt of cooperation in j ustice and hOlile
affairs in the 1992 ("l\'1aastricht) Treaty 011 European Union (IEU) an extensivc
net\vorkofcooperation had alreadyc1eveloped which opcrated both outsideand under
thc overall atlthority of rhe European Council. Cooperation took place on seveTal
political ancJ executive levcls, ranging fron1 ministers through dircclors-gencral of
thc relcvanllninislries ta lniclcl1c-ranking civil servants, and reprcsentatives of poliee
460 Sandra Lavenex
forees and otheT agencies. Cooperation an10ng the init.ially five Schengen states vvas
to turn into a 111otor for and (laboratori of integration and had an influential in1pact
on thc su bsequent comn1unitarization of cooperation (1'vtonar 2(01).
Intergovernmental formalization: Maastrichfs third pillar
During the intergovernmental conference (IGC) leading to the TElT \ the Dutch
Council Presidencyls draft, which proposed to bring bath the common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) and ]HA into a single integrated structurel \vas
dismissed and instead [oreiun policv and internal securitv relnained prima-
, l b) )
rily intergovernmental; in separate (pillars' (on CFSP see Chapter 18). Asyluill
policy, rules and controls on external border-crossing, in1111igration and
police aud judicial cooperation in civil and crhuinal lnatters \vere il1cluded as
(matters of COn11TIOn interest' in the third pillar of the IEU. In this vvay the exist-
-
ing network of committees '}las fonnalized without transfonning the frame\vork
of authority and accountabihty (see Lavenex and \Vallace 2005).
The loose intergovernmental structure clid not prevent]H.A from becoming the
most active field for meetings convened under the Council of l'viinisters in the late
19905. The frequency and intensity of interaction, especially in the area of police
cooperation and organized crÎlne, induced a transfonnation of the ·working practices
of interior ministries and of police forees, which had remained among the Ieast in-
ternationally minded \vithin national governments, and led ta the emergenee of an
intensive transgovernnlental network (see Chapter 4).
By the 1996-7 IGC, the third pillar hacl developed an extensive set of instruments
and institutions. Europol \vas taking shape as a coordinating agency for coaperation
aUlong national poli ce forces, even though the Europal Convention had not yet been
ratified by aU lllember states. Four comnl0n databases ""vere being set in place: the SIS
\vas already up and the CUstOlllS Inforn1ation Systelu \vas being conlpu terizecL
and the Europollnforn1ation Systen1 aucl Eurodac, the finger-plint database for asy1u1l1-
seekers, were being developed. Ministries ofjustice \vere dra\vn in 1110re 510\\71)'; it \vas
not until the revival of the concept of a European judicial Arca, after the IoAl that
justice l11inistries began ta be drawn inta a sin1ilar European netvvork.
Uneasy communitarization: the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice
Thc cun'ent fran1ework of cooperation in ]HA \-vas shapccl by the treaties of
An1stcrJan1 and Nice. This frame\vork, vvhich shifted parts ofJl-IA ta the C01TI1TIUni Ly
pinar \vhile ll1aintaining a 'streall1lined' third pi l1ar 011 policc ancl juclicial cooperation
in crin1inal n1atters (P.J CCM), reflecls the delicate con1pro111isc bel\veen intensive
transgovernluental cooperatioI1) on the onc and lhe incr011en lal consolidation
of supranational structures, on the other (sec Box 19.1). Thc 2007 ToL introduces
significant changes to J HAl 1110rc far-reaching than thc change.s Vi,Thich that ucaty
lnakes ta anv other areas of EU 1a\\1 (see section) (The agenda for reform' belo\v).
" -

...
, . ,
Justice and Home Affairs 461
Changes to JHA 'in the Treaty of Amsterdam '
and the Treaty otNice
Title IV. Articles 61-9 TEC
• Articies 62-3 TEC !Ist 'flanking measures' to be adopted within five years (byMay
2004) to cOMpensate for free movement within the EU, including common proce-,
ciures for contro!s on oersons at the EU's external borders, common visa policy,
common measures on asylum seekers, 'temporary protection' of refugees, and im-
migration polic\"
e .Artic:es 64, 67-8 TEC maintain the intergovernmental decision-making procedures
(shared right of initiative, consultation procedure with the unanimity voting) until
:he end of the transition period in 2004 and impose strict limits on reference to the
ECJ.
• Jitferem opt-outs for Denmark, the UK, and Ireland.
Tîtie VI, Articies 29-42 TE U
• Articles 29-34 TEU provide more detail an 'common actîon' in police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, including references to 'operational cooperation'
among la\l'/ enforcement agencies, and collection and storage of data. The ToN speci-
fied in Artic;e 31 TEU the functions of Eurojust.
e Tne opaque iegal ilistruments of the TEU were replaced by well-established, legally
brndirg but some of these, the framework decisions, are excluded ,
from di!'ect effect.
• ,D,rticles 35-9 TEU reflect parallel unresolved disputes on the involvement of the EU
:nstitutions (Commission, Ep, ECJ) in this field; a lengthy section on the ECJ reflects
sensitivi::y of extending cooperation in legal administration and law enforcement
without providing for judicial review.
• Artic!e 40 TE'J extends provision for 'closer cooperatÎon' among smaller groups of
member states and registers the integrat ion of the Schengen acquis 'into the frame- ,
work of the Europear Union' (set out in more detail in an attached protocol).
The 'An1sterdam' reforms \vere motivated by widespread dissatisfaction with the
\vorking of the intergovernmental procedures. Three \\7eaknesses, in particular, stood
out: anlbiguity about thc legal and constitutional fran1cvvork, evident in the frequeney
wirh \vhich institutional issues were entangled with policy proposals; the 10\,\J den1o-
el'atie accountabjlity anei political visihility of th1S essentially bureaucratic fran1ework
for polie\" Y\Jhic}l allc)\vcd the practice of cooperation to develop far beyond what \vas
.. .
reportecl ro rhe European and the national parlianlents or to national pubhcs; anei
1.hc absencc of 11lechanisllls for cnsuring national ratification or inlplenlentation. The
prospect of eastern enIargCll1cnt aelded to the poHtical sahence of the policy fields
covercd by JI-IA cooperation aud exacerbated the lirnits of decision-lnaking structures
based 011 unaninlity
462 Sandra Lavenex
InHuenceu by these consic1cratiollS, the Wcstendorp RefLection Group preparing
the 1996 IGC agenda stressed thc imponance of]HA refon11 by fran1ing il as one
aspect of 'making Europe Inorc reicvant for iLS citÎzens' (M.onar 1997; lvlcDonagl1
1998). Thcsc ideas inspired the phraseology of thc Treaty, ,vhich fral11ed
]HA in terms of cstablishing an 'area of freedonl, securitJ: and jusricc'. The. justific8-
tion of integration with rcference to citizens' concerns has rernained a 111ajor argu-
rnent behind recent rc[ornls, as evident in thc Constitutional Convention and the
IGC that prepared the ToL.
The ToA contained substantial changes to the framework for ]l-L:\ (see Box 19.1).
A new Title IV transferred migration and other related policies ta the hrst pillar.
Poliee cooperation and judicial eooperation in criminal matters remained in a
revised aud lengthened Iitle VI and the Schengen acquis \vas integrated into
the treatjes. It is in1portant to note that the treaties do not provide for cOlnprehensive
competences in the sense of creating 'c1assic' EU 'cammon policies', even in the case
of the 'common visa pobey' ar the 'common asylum system', \vhich corne closest to
this idea.
While prepaling the ground for a greater involvement of sU'pranational actors
in ]HA, the ToA broke with the traditional doctrine of the Comn1uniry method by
introducing important intergovernn1ental elements into the first pillar while inter-
governmental procedures persisted in the third piUar, though the Conlmission \vas
now given a right of initiative shared with the member states.
National sensitivities about sovereignty encouraged a high degree of flexibility
in the application of common rules. Denn1ark, for example, is a 5chengen member
and participates in the free movement area, but is free ta adopt relevant European
provisions as internationallaw rather than EU law (thereby avoiding its direct effect
and European Court of ]ustice (EC]) jurisdiction). lreland and the UK maintain
their opt-out from Schengen and the lifting of interna1 frantier controls, but adhere,
on a se1ective basis, and 5ubject to unanilllOUS agreement by 'insiders', to the flank-
ing measures of the ]HA acquis sueh as asylum, poliee and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters CPJ CCM), and the SIS (Kuijper 2000: 354).
Apart fronl these voluntary exen1ptions [rorn the JHA acquis; the conditionality
of the Schengen accession mechanisms adds a more cOlnpulsory fonn of flexibility
Not\vithstanding their obligation to adopt the]HA acquis including the Schengen
provisions in fuU, the twelvc new Inen1ber states have to first prove their capacity ta
in1plelnent effectively these tight border-management provisions before being recog-
nized as having achieved what is aftcn referred to as 'Schengen by the old
111c111bcrs. At the cnd of 2008 111ne of lhe twelve new 111Clnber statcs had passed thc
but Bulgaria and R0I11ania (becausc of capacity dcficits) and Cyprus (bccause
of problen1s relating ta the partirion of the island) currently renlaln ou rside of the
integrated border control systen1.
Exisling opt-ouL provisions and cxtended opportunities for enhanccd
cooperation under the Treat.ies of Anlsterdalll and Nice have not prcvcntecl
individual menlber fronl engaging in selectivc foruls of intcrgovcrnmcntal
., ..."..
Justice and Home Affairs 463
cooperat.ion ou lside the rnovisions of rhe lrcaties. The InOSl prolnincnt exarnplc
15 thc Prum Tr:aty an Gernlan i.nitiarive \vith Austria, Belgiu111, France,
fhc (\iethcrlands, ane! Spain in 2005. Facihtating and \videning the
condIllons for thc excbange of data incl.l1decl in thc various ]HA databases (sec
belo\v) and intcnsifying operational cooperation betwcen poIice, law cnforcenlcnt
anei offices, this treaty is also s0l11ctinlcs referred to as <Schengen III':
a laboratory for deeper police cooperation among a vanguard of a fe"l member
states. As vvith the integration of Schengen inta the Treaty of Amsterdalu the
Gernlan CounciJ Presidency in 2007 succeeded in extending these intens'ified
form.s .of co.operation to thc rest of the member states by incorporating the Prum
prOVISlons Into EU legislation.
, The association of nOn-111enlber states exacerbates the variable geometry of the
.of security and justice'. Norway and Iceland, as lneulbers of the pre-
eXlsnng NordIC con11110n travel area, have been incIuded within the Schengen area,
and are [u11v associated \vith the Schengen and Dubl]'n C t' S' 1 d J
• onven 10115. \vItzer an
entirely surrounded by Schengen rnelnbers, but not (like Norway and Iceland) ;
of the European Economic Area, has negotiated a bilateral agreement
e.ntered foree in March 2008. Liechtenstein ratified a Schengen!Dublin
aSSOClatlon treatv In 2008.
-
Keyactors
The cooperation in ]HA is a150 reflected in the ll1ultiplication of
actors deahng \vlth lts development; both inside and outside formal EU structures.
Organizatio" and capacities of EU institutions
\\iith the ttributed ta it under the IoA, the C0l11D1ission gradually
expanded lts organIza nonai basis in JHA. One of the first moves of the nev,' Presi-
dent of the COlTIll1ission (1999-2004), Ron1ano Prodi, was to transform the small
Iask Force \vhich had been established 'within the Secretariat of the Commissiol1
under thc TEU into a ne,\' Directorate-General on ]ustice aud Home Affairs, later
renamed Liberty and Security (DG JLS). It was widc1y recognized that thc
task farce, \vlth onlv fortv-six fuJJ-tin1C:' en1JJ1o)'c"'c.s 1·11 1()98 h ·1 b 1 J
' - ...... ." . - ,ac. cen (espcra le y
unc1crstaficd and therefore had had hule inlJ1act ()n t l·11·rd Pl'J]- - d 1 . .-. 1. -tJ . al cve opmcnts.
,:lllce lhc crcalJon of thc nc\v DG, the IlUlllbcr of personnel has bcen constantly
lIlcreasccL la 283 onplovees in 2002 and 440 in 2000 a 51'Z(' t]1at· I·S (' Il
. .. /_
. U, .-, . .0111paraJe
ta th8t 01 DG Tradc (4)(-) Ţ 81·1d DC' Markt (423 1· ) 1
.
. . . / 1.. CJnp oyees . ts ex-
pendHurcs a]50 el sterp incrcasc, fronl €219.4 111illion in 2000 to €461.7
lnillion in 2006 wj th ;-, 5 . j" .J 1 fI' . . ., .. ,).J._ per cent o. L 1e tota O\Vlng to bordcr controllneasures
(COJ11111 iS5ion 2008./).
464 Sandra Lavenex
The rcsponsible unit in the Council Secretariat, DG H, \vas 1110fC gcnerously
staffed than the COll1mission Task Forte on JH!\ during the 19905, \vith additional
ş recruited in 1998-9. The ToA furthern10re provided for the separate Schengcn
Secretariat to be integrated i11to DG H. Pern1anent rcprcsentations of th(' lllcn1ber
states in Brussels \\-'cre also drawn aelding legal advisors and afflclais secondecl
frOTIl interior lninistries ta their staffs.
The ]HA Council inherited from Trevi and from the TEU's third piUar a heavily
hierarchical structure of PolicY-lnaking. It i5 one of the fev/ areas in the Council
that has four decision-n1aking Iayers. Agendas for JH-.'\ Councils are prepared by
Coreper II, \vhich meets vveekly at ambassadoriallevel. Bet\veen Corerer and the
working groups, the]HA structure has an additional intern1ediary level cOlnposed of
special coordinating cOlnmittees, vvhich bring togetherin Brussels senior officials froln
national nonnal1y lneeting once a month. The Iov/est level is cOlnposed
_ of working groups of specialists fronl and operational bodies (see
Figure 19.1).
The forn1er 'Coordinating Comlnittee) (the K4 Comlnittee) \vas renamed the
Artic1e 36 Comlnittec) and then the Coordinating COlnmittee for Police andJudicial
Cooperation in Crilninal Matters (CATS). At the Sall1e tiule, its 111andate \vas nar-
rowed to cover only the relnaining issues. 1vvo ne\v comn1ittees \\Tere
created for those issues falling under the Comnlunity pillar: the Strategic Conlmittee
on Imlnigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and the COlnmittee an Civil La\v
Matters. Set up initially for a five-year transitiona1 period, these ne\\' comn1ittees of
senior national officials were another sign of the intergovernmentallegacy of ] HA_
cooperation) anel an anomaly under first-pillar procedures. Rather than phasing out
this additionallayer of consultatiol1) in SUlTImer 2002 a ne\v 'external borders practi-
conln1011 unif, the 'SCIFA+', regrouped the members of the SCIFA \vith the
heads of national border control authorities.
_Although not [oreseen by the treaties, the European Councils gro\ving in1portance
has been particularly salient in ]I--IA where it has developed a leacl function through
multi-annual strategic progran1lning. The ground \vas laid \\'1th the first European
Council focused speciflcally on]HA heJ.d under the Finnish Council Presidency in
Tampere in 1999, \vhich set out far-reaching objectives and fixed deadlines for their
adoption. The 2004 European Council in The Hague follovi.'ed \vith a ne\\', an1bitious
]HA multi-annual progralnme; it is expected that the ne\\' ]HA .. 111ulti-annual pro-
grammc \\1i11 be adoprcd by thc European Couneii under the Svveuish Council Presi-
clcncy in autunl11 2009. Thesc strategic planning clocunlcnts \vere devised ta counLer
thc incrClnentalisn1 of cooperation under the Maastricht Treaty and to assure a greater
efficiency in agreed cOlluninnents. Ho\vever, thc Henv of polieies s110\vS
that under thc current institutional procedures aneI given thc cloll1esLic sensitivity of
the fidel, a cerLain gap betV\wen anlbitions and in1pletnentaLion persists (sec bdo\v).
The n10st rcmarkable change in the fo rIn al decision-lnaking structllre bas
been the slrengthening of thc role of the European Parlialnent CEP-) vvith the
rcalization of the co-clecisioll proccdure for lnOSL aspccts of ]H/\ that fall uncler
, . ""'.. .
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Justice and Home Affairs 465
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466 Sandra Lavenex
thc first pillar: visas, bordcr control, irrcgular migratlon, asyluffi policy, and jucli-
ciaI coopcration in civi113\v. Until 2005, v.,rhen the transitional pcriocl of thc IoA
expircd, the EP had not been granted any powers to all1encl or block legislation
hy the Coullcl1 and lhe Council had onl1' 1.0 consult thc EP prior to adopting a
11lCaSure a requirclllent that was repcatedly violated (lavcnex 2006a), In ilS
. June 2006 Rcsolutiol1 on the AF5j, thc EP explicitly cOll1plained that il oben chel
not get a11 of the preparatory dOeUTI1cnts neeessary to participate in the decision-
making process from the outset. The Council's failure to comply \vith the con-
sultation requirements had been a topie of contention during severallegislati've
proc·edures and had led the EP to file legal complaints before the EeJ, including
concerning the 2003 Family Reunification Directive and the 2005 Asylum Pro-
cedures Directive.
As co-decision has not been extended to the third pillar, the EP's involvement
in matters under the third pillar has been even less satisfactory. In arder ta allo\v
it a real oppartunity ta exan1ine and, where necessary, ta 5uggest amendn1ents to
proposed measures, the EP n1ust be given al least three monlhs. Despite a n1uch
ilnproved inter-institutional dialogue, relations between the EP and the Counei}
continue to be contentious, and the EP has tried ta enhance its grip also an third-
piUar legislation. Given that third-pillar legislation of ten has elements that eould
faH under the first pillar, sueh as \vith regard to the access by laVvT-enforcement
authorities to the Visa Infonnation Systeln (VIS; see belo·v;)) lhe EP has sought ta
link its assent ta the issues under co-decision to the Councirs consideration of its
positions an the third-pillar issues negotiated under the consultation procedure,
thus de facto widening its right to co-decision to poliee and judicial cooperation in
criminalluatters. Associated quarrels have repeatedly led ro delays in the legislative
process.
The reinvention of intergovernmentalism
Faced with the increasingly assertive rale of the Ep, but also \vith the expansion of
ll1ember states participating in ]HA Council meetings 'in a Iargc: \vindo\vlcss COl1-
ference hall of the CouneiI building in Brussels' acconln10dating 'same 1jO repre-
sentatives of the Presidency, the European Comlnission, the Council Secretariat and
national delegations
l
and speaking in twenty-three different official languages (OeI
and Rapp-Lucke 2008: 23), several 111enlber states, under Gern1an leadl have n1ade
recourse ta intergovcrnluental fonus of cooperation outside EU structures, The
Prllill Treaty m.entioned abovc is but one manifestation of thi5 trend. In lvlay 2003
the interior lninisters of the five higgest mClnber states Franee, ItaIy
Spain, and the UK created the so-called GS in order la try to spred up the lnove
towards operational goa1s and to circumvent the lengthy dccision-lnaking processes
of 1.hc CouneiI of Ministers. ln 2006 PolaneI joincd the group} nlaking it the G6.
Ihe G6 Incet l\vice a yeal' al the 11linisterial 1evel and have a rotating presiclcncy
: :-,.. . -. . .
.. ..,.-. . .... - .
. v .
,
. .
. _. . _...
Justice and Home Affairs 467
Over tilnc, 1.hc)' have devclopcd cxtensivc substructures and expert working groups
charged with 1hc ilnplelnentation of proj eCls. ]n 2(09) cighteen projects in the L-ielels
of counter-terrorisnl, organized crilne, and nligration were being conducted basecl
an t11e of 1hc 111inisterial n1eetings in Heiligendamnl and Stratrord-upon-
Avoll i Il 2006.
A second inte.rgovernn1en1.al forun1 in]HA is 1.he Salzburg Fonlill [ounded in 2000
on the initiative of Austria and involving Austria, the Czech
Poland; Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2006 Ron1allÎa and Bulgaria joined the group and
Croatia has been participating as an observer since 2006. Like the G6, this group
lneels t-vvice a year at ministerial level and has a rotating presidency. It has created
substructures for operational cooperation including working groups on \vitness pro-
country of origin infornlation, traffic police, Schengen evaluation, exehange
of DNA data, and n1ajor events.
Both groups see their role in the elaboration and testing, in a smaller context of
like-n1inded sta les OI con tiguous neighbours, of n1easures that ean subsequently
be exponed to alI member states. \:\/hereas both face criticislU fOI CirCUlTIVent-
ing the oHicial in5titution5 of the EU and for their lael<. of transparency and
accountability, the composition of the G6 based on country size has faced par-
ticular contention. This not\vithstandina , the 2007 Gerrnan Council Presidencv
b j
expanded this ll10del of enhanced intergovernmental eooperation by ereating,
\vith the support of DG ]LS, the so-called Future Group, vvhich is charged "vith
elaborating priorities for ]HA cooperation after expiry of the Hague Programme,
i.e. frOlTI 2010 to 2014. Lilze the G6 and the 5aIzburg Forum, the Fu ture Group
gathers only the of the interioL and not their partners froln the justice
11linistries. In order to avoid an arbitran
T
selection of Inen1ber states the Group
j )
i5 composed of the 'troi1(a' 1 including the outgoing and ineon1ing Presidencies
\\1ith the acting Council Presidency and the Conu11ission serving as co-chairs.
These intergovernnlental structures are renliniscent of the 'Schengen
that drove ]HA cooperation froul 1995 to 1999. vVith the Future Group, the
C0111mission has accepted the perpetuation of variable geollletries in ]HA, even if
lin1ited ta strategic planning, justified on the basis of efficiency.
The proliferation of semi-autonomous agencies arid bodies
Another special characteristic of Lhe governance of the JHA 1S the proliferation of
selni-autono1l10US special agencies and bodies. The multiplication of actors and
thc '\videning of thcir C0111petences over the past eight years have been impressive
and il1ustrale· lhe clynamis111 of thi5 fidd of cooperation. Yet, given that thc n1Cll1-
L
bcr 51atcs havc 50 far Dot tran5ferred an)' operational powers to thesc agencies,
thei1' capabiliLies havc repeatcclly failed lo Ineet thc expectations. As it stands, thc
JJ-1A agencics and bodies are 111ainly concerned \vith infonnation cxehange and eo-
ordination bct\veen nationallavv-enforccnlenl authoritics, often supported by tlle
468 Sandra Lavenex
establishment of databases. The model of governance by this type of agency illus-
trates the choice for prolnoting European integration through the better coordina-
tion of systems rather than by replacing them with new
supranational structures.
The earliest agencies were established an the basis of first-pillar secondai-y
legislation; the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EM-
CDDA) set up in 1993 in Lisbon, and the European Monitoring Cen tre on Rac-
ism and Xenophobia (EUMC) established in 1997 in Vienna, which in 2007 was
replaced by the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). Most subsequent
developments, however, have taken place in the framework of the third pillar.
Here the earliest agencywas UCLAF (Unite de coordination de Ia lutte al1ti-fraude) ,
the predecessor of OLAF, the now communitarized European Anti-Fraud Office
(see Chapter 4). The Europol Convention had been adopted in 1995, but it was
not until 1998 that it entered into force, after lengthy national ratification pro-
cedures, and Europoi became operational a year later. In 1998 the European
Judicial Network was launched, as a predecessor ta Eurojust, the 'college' of
senior magistrates, prosecutors, and judges which became operational in 2002,
to coordinate cross-horder prosecutions. The European Counci! in Tampere in
1999 proposed the creation of two new bodies: the European Police College
(CEPOL), based in the UK, to develop cooperation between the national train-
ing institutes for senior police officers in the member states; and the European
Police Chiefs' Task Force (PCTF) to develop personal and informallinks alnong
the heads of the various law-enforcement agencies across the EU and ta promote
information exchange. In 2009 an Asylum Support Office was created to gather
and exchange inforlnation an countries of origin and asylum proceedings in the
member states. The hope is to thereby not only assist countries in implement-
ing EU asylum directives but also ta promote the approximation of recognition
practices through closer coordination.
The most dynamic agency is the Agency for the Managelnent of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex), which was established in War-
saw in 2005. \iVhile Frontex is primariIy for coordination and risk analysis,-
, i ts mandate was extended considerably in 2007 through the creation of Rapid
Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) as a means of providing rapid operational
assistance for a limited period ta a requesting member state facing a situation of
'urgent and exceptional pressure' at external borders. The creation of RABITs was
a reaction to the difflculties encountered in mabilizing the necessary personnel
and equiplnent froln the member states for joint operations such as the HERA
I-III operations (2006-7) to tackle irregular lnigra tion from West Africa to the
Canary Islands. Frontex's operational burden-sharing cliluension has been fur-
ther enhanced through the European PatroI Network (EPN) for Mediterranean
and Atlantic coastal waters. This organizational expansion has been backed by
a steep rise of the agency's budget from € 19 million in 2006 to €70 million in

: ... ,.
. -
...... :;" .. .... ' ..
Justice and Home Affairs 469
2008, thU5' indicating the enduring political salience of border management in
Europe. :This political priority which is attributed ta securing the EU's exter-
nal borders has again been stressed in the European Pact an In1ffiigration and
Asylum adopted under the French Council Presidency in October 2008, vvhich
caUs for strengthening Frontex's own operational resources. Together with the
suggestion of examining the creation of a European border-guard system, this
declaratory document hints at the possibility of developing more collective
capabilities in this area.
With these new common bodies, the number of comnlon databases has also
proliferated. These cammon databases constitute the core coordination instru-
ment betvveen domestic law-enforcelnent and immigration authorities and are
meant ta boost their surveillance capacities over ll10bile undesired individuals
in the common territory. The data of EU and third-country nationals are stored
and scrutinized partly under Commission supervision (Eurodac, Customs
lnformation System) , but mostly monitored by a specialjoint supervisory author-
ity within the Council Secretariat (Europal and Eurojust databases). The most
recent development is the establishment of a Visa Information System (\lIS), a
database with personal information Cincluding biometrics) on every visa applica-
tion. Due ta unexpected technical problems and pa ar strategic planning, the idea
of a revamped SIS II has not yet materialized, and interior and justice ministers
have extended the deadline for establishing the system ta June 2009; failing that,
they will opt for a revision of the current SIS. The last step in this technological
surveillance race has been the decision, in the Pact for Asylum and hnmigration
adopted in autumn 2008, ta establish an electronic recording of entry and exit
into the EU, covering both EU and non-EU and inspired by siInilar de-
velopments in the United States.
As in most other areas of ]HA cooperation, security prerogatives in developing
the databases have been granted more attention than the concurrent civil liber-
ties or human rights aspects. Member states have taken more than three years to
agree an the Framework Decision 2008/977/jI-IA an the protection of personal
data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters adopted on 27 November 2008. This instrulnent is widely seen as crucial
for ensuring adequate personal data protection under these information systems.
. Yet, in its Decision, the Council has neither taken account of the three verv criti-
.1
cal reports issued by the EP, nor the criticism of the European Data Protection
Supervisor.
The proliferation of actors indicates the strong impetus for lnore intensive co-
operation in internal security, but it also reflects the tension between, on the one
hand, the case for tighter collective policy management and legislative harmo-
nization by the EU institutions and, on the ather, the persistence of integration
by looser transgovernlnental coordination with low levels of transparency and
accountability.
4'.70 Sandra Lavenex

JHA agenciesand bodies_
• European Monitonng Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), set up in
1993 in Lisbon to provide factual information on the Europear"', drug problems, http://
www.emcdda.europa.eu.
• European Police Oftice (Europa!), set up in 1999 in The Hague to share and pool intel-
ligence ta prevent and combat serious international organized crime, http://www.
europol.europa.eu.
• European Police College (CEPOL), set up in 2000 in Bramshill UK to approximate
national police training systems, http://wwwcepol.net.
• European Police Chiefs' Task Force (PCTF), set up in 2000 ta oramote exchange, in
cooperation wrth Europal, of best practices and informai.lon on cross-border crime
and to contribute to the planning of operative actions, vl/ithout headouarters and
v'leb page.
• Eurojust, set up in 2002 in The Hague to coordinate cross-boraer prosecutians,
http://www.eurojust.europa,eu.
• Frontex, set up in 2005 in Warsaw ta coordinate operational cooperation at the exter-
nal border, http://www.frontex.europa.eu.
• European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), set up in 2007 in Vienna as the suc-
cessor to the European Monitoring Centre on Racisrn and Xenophobia (EUMC) to
provide the Community and its member states when impiementing CommJnity iaw
with assistance and expertise relating to fundamerita! rights, htto./lfra.europa.eu/.
....• European Asylum Support Office, proposed in 2009 to promote the approxima:ion
: of national asyl um recognition practices.
.. ". -. . :
The fiow of policy
The flow of poliey has evolved in the context of the multi-annual \vork prograll1lneS
an the AFS] adopted since 1999. Actual policy developnlents have,
reInained responsive to the changing conjuncrures of external events and
national priorities. COffilnission monitoring and evaluation reports
have repeatedly highlighted delays in and deviations frorn the realization of agreed
eOlUlni tmcnts.
The extensive use of non-bind ing texlS by the Connei!, the cxpansion of policy
objcctives, and thc lack of infringenlcnl procedures in thc third pillar 111otivatcc! the
Ccnnrnission to introduce half-yearly 'scoTeboards' reports 111onitoring progress
in inlplelTICnting the treaty aud progralnnlC provisions. The initial reports \;>,'crc
quite general and had linIe ilTlpact on the Couneil's \vork. 1v10ni ho\vever,
v/as reinvigorated 011 the basis of an extensive mandate of the European Council
in 2005 with the so-called 'Scoreboarcl Plus' for rhe inlplenlcntation of thc ll.ague
.',::' ..
__ '- '!r :-
, -
- - ,
Justice and Honle Affairs 471
PrograllJn1C. Thcse seconcl-gencraliol1 scorcboarels, which are published openly
on thc COTIln1isSlon's \vebsitc, eont:ain detailed infonnation on inlplenlcntation
deficits by inclj.Yidual nleIuber states, aud thus try to induce c0111pliance by 'nanl-
ing anei shaming:.
The. scoreboards regularly give a rather mixed picLure of progress in in1.plement-
ing the VvTork progran11TIes. The COlTIlnission's 2007 ilnpleluentation report con-
cluded that, ;The general overall aSSeSS111ent is rather unsatisjactory. A significant
number of actions envisaged in the Action Plan ... had to be abandoned or delayed'
-
(Coffilnission 2007i: 2).
. The shortcomings of implenlenting cooperation in JHA are perhaps not surpris-
ing. A constant [ea ture of ]HA cooperation is the pre-elninence of national concerns
over Cornmission initiatives and, hence, the jostling of short-term national priorities
\vith 10ng-tern1 common objectives. Generally speaking, cooperation has focused
1110St consistently an the fight against irregular nligration and cross-border crime,
-
\vhile measures of operational cooperation have been easier to achieve than legisla-
tive harmonization. Insofar as harmonization measures have been adopted, they
have been limited to setting minimum standards, allow nlany exceptions, and leave
large margins of discretion to the member states.
Asyium and immigration policy
In contrast to the protracted progress of internal communitarization, particularly
since 2001,JHA has developed a dynalnic external dimension. It now has a foreign-
policy agenda of ils O"\VD. One of the most advanced areas of]HA integration i5 asy-
lurn poliey. Substantive harmonization towards a 'common European asylum system
1
(CEAS) by as provided in the Hague Programme, has, however, proved lnuch
more difficult than agreement an the alloeation of responsibility for the examination
of asylum c1aims (see Box Lavenex 2006a).
Agreement on \vhich forrus of ilnmigration to classify as legal has proved even
more controversial. The main achievements \vere the adoption of t'\1\'0 directives:
Couneil Directive 2003/109IEC an the status of third-country nationals who are
long-term residents in a member state of the European Union and Council Direc-
tive 2003/86IEC an the right ta falnily reunification, both adopted an 22 SepteTIlber
2003. The Councifs failure to consult the EP and the possibility that children over
the age of 12 could be excluded froIn the right to, fanlily reunification led the EP
to file el eonlplaint \vith thc EL], \vhich was however rejected (Case C-540/03 of
27.6.2006). A COI111nission proposal on the adnlission of inl111igrants for tl1c pur-
posc of \vo1'k ancl Self-elTlploYll1ent, likc the two before it, has founcllittle support in
thc Council. In October 2007 thc COJIlmission proposed the so-called 'Blne Card',
\\'hich \voulcl introduce a fast-track procedurc for thc adnlission of highly qualihed
third-countrv \vorkcrs and \vould allOVvr thenl econ01l11C lnobilitv within the EU
J - /
after an initial stay of t\\'O years in thc first country of admission. The COlll111ission
justificd the proposal on the grounds of needing to offer attractive conditions in the
472 Sandra Lavenex
Common Europeanasylum system
. - '
• The cornerstone of EU asylum policy is the system of exclusive rBSponsibility for.
the examination of asylum claims based an Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February
2003, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the rnember state
responsible for examining an asy!um application. This instrument replaces the Dublin
Convention and its implementation is linked ta the Eurodac database,
• The mutual recognition of asylum determination outcomes im:::liied by the system of
responsibi!îty allocation necessitated minimum standards on reception conditions,
the definition of the term refugee, and asylum procedures. These 'Phase l' directives
were adopted only arter significant delays, and are riddied with delicate compro-
mises and open questions.
• A Commission Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System
(CEAS) of 2007 (Commission 2007J) gives a critica! assessment of progress achieved
so far and identîfies the need for fuller harmonization of substenti've and procedural
asylum law in order to realize a CEAS by 2010. It also cails for a re-examination of
the cornerstone of EU asylum cooperation, the Dublin s\,stemJ when it st2t8S that
this system 'may de facto result in additional burdens on Member St8tes tnat have
limîted reception and absorption capacities and that find themseives under particular
migratory pressures because of their geographicalloeation',
• The reluctance to accept supranational rules in this sensitive field of domestic poliey
has shîfted asylum cooperation ta more operational aspects, e,g. through the crea-
tion of a European Asylum Support Oftice.
o Burden-sharing remains a ehallenge, although the European Refugee =und ta sup- I
port reception, integration, and voluntary return measures in the member states has
more than tripled from €216 million (2000-4) ta just under €7CO million (2005-10),
More significant sums of money have been allocated for border controls i:'] the bor-
der fund (€ 1,820 million for the same period), as well as to Frontex activities,
• Particular attention is now pa'ld to cooperation with countiies of transit and origin of
. asylum-seekers. Mainly geared toward enhancing migration control in tnose coun-
tries, this cooperation has focused on the conclusion of readmission agreements as
·.wellas, more hesitantly, the promotion of asylum procedures and receplion capaci-
ties(Lavenex 2006b; Lavenex and Kunz 2008).
global competition for highly skil1ed workers. The proposal has) raised
objections fr0111 several member states. New 111ember states, particularly the Czech
government in the 2009 Council presidency, have claimed that a schcrne favouring
third-country nationals should he introduced only after the [uU inlplcnlentation
of free-TI10Venlent Tights for their own nationals. Several other lllclnber states havc
opposed thc proposal because they \vant 1.0 prioritize their d0111CStic programnlcs
(the LJK) or they are hostile to EU cOlnpetencc over econo111ic il1ll11igratîon (A.usrria,
Gennanv. and Thc Netherlands).
J '
. ",", .....
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. .'
. "
Justice and Home Affairs 413
In the absence of a COlnmon policy, cooperatjon regarding the integration of
third -coun trv na tiona15 1S deal t V.r1 th bv a (soft) mode of eoordination betVvTen the
j J
ll1enlber states. These deliberationc; Ho,",v into an EU l-landbook on lntegration for
Policy-1\-1.akers; the second edition of Vv'hich was published in 2007 (European Com-
munities 2007). By the end of 2007 a11 11lelnber states were inregrated in the network
of '\Jational Contact Points' an integration. The 'Colnmon Basie Principles an lnte-
gration), adopted on a Dutch initiative in 2004) have remained declaratory and have
not led to any legislative action.
Froln the outset of cooperation in the nlid-1980s) the emphasis has been on the
fight against illegal immigration rather than on which legal imlnigrants to accept
(Lavenex and V/allace 2005). Most instrun1ents relate to cntry controls. A 2007
Comn1ission proposal for a directive providing for sanctions against etnployers of
illegal third-country nationals (Comlnission 2007h) has faced the opposition of sev-
eraI menlber states, because of sovereignty concerns, particularly over European
provisions for criminal sanctions in serious cases.
In the light of enduring inlll1Îgration pressure and of the internal resistance
to stronger legislative integratioTI, the emphasis of cooperation has moved out-
vvards to the attempt ta engage countries of transit and origin in the management
of migration flo\vs. Initially focused on coerclve measures and the conclusion of
readmission agreements, the failure to ensure con1pliance by third countries has
led to the re-emergence of a more comprehensive vision of ext.ernal migration
cooperation and the launch of the so-called 'Global in December 2005.
Consequently, immigration has become a main focus of the European Neighb?ur-
hood Poliey (see Chapter 17), and consultations have also intensified with Afri-
can countries. given internal bloekages against EU conlpetence aver economic
migratioll) the EU has httle to oHer to these countries in return for their coopera-
tion in secu ring the EU)s borders. The visa facilitation agreements offered to eastern
neighbours, in exchange for their agreen1ent to readmit their own as well as foreign
nationals \\'ho stay irregularly in the EU, remain limited.
The ne\vest device in impleluenting the 'global approach: has been the conclusion of
'mobility in \vhich opportunities for that is temporaIJ\ labour
migration into the EU and development cooperation are linked as well as cooperation
on readlnission and the fight against irregular migration. The first mobility partnerships
\vere conduded v.ith Cap Verde and Moldova in 2008. Negotiatiolls an such a partner-
ship \vith Senegal v/ere suspended in 2009 because Senegal was dissatisfied with the
oHer. Indeed, the existing partnerships reflect velY little innovation as they largely
sUlumarize existjng bilateral cooperation progran1111CS "With individual member states
undeI' a nev\' heading (Lavenex 2006h; L1venex and Kunz 2008).
Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matfers
The dOlninance ofnon-binding instnlnlcnts and the focus on operational cooperation
l._
havc been even stronge.r in the third pillar. One of the lnain developn1ents in police

!
i ,
.1
j
I
Î
j
,
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I
47-4 Sandra Lavenex
eooperation was the decision by thc.JHA Conneil to replace the Europol Convention
with a 'thircl pillar' Decision by 2010 (Council DOCUlnent 5055/07 EUROPOL 2
of ] 9 April 2(08). This will facilitate adaptation of E uropol's lnandate by omitting
(somctilnes lengthy) ratiucation procedures by national parlialnents and turn it into
a regulaT EU agency. Apart [ro111 1.he facilitation of infonnation exchangc betwecn
nationallaw-enforcement authorities through Europal and its network of European
Liaison Officers (ELOs), as well as expertise and technical support activities,
integration in police matters has focused on networking and the development of
C0111mOn operational practices such as through the Police Chiefs: 1as1<. Force and
the European Police College. These networks are to address the main ilnpedilnent
ta more effective cooperation betvveen national police \vhich is the need for
Inutual understanding and trust between highly diverse domestic systenls of la\v
enforcement (Occhipinti 2003). With enlargement
1
both issues the need for tn1st
.
and problems associated with diversity have clearly increa5ed: pro111pting concern
about how to invigorate the operational aspects of police cooperation. In the
meantime, the Prum Treaty and the proliferation of intergovenunental consultations
confirm the continuity of concentric circles in thi5 area of cooperation.
In cOluparison, while cooperation in the judicial sphere was initially slo\ver to
develop, it has been one of the lllost dynamie aspects of JHA cooperation since the
Tampere European Council (de Kerchove aud Weyeu1bergh 2002). It has, hov.,rever,
also faced problems of a lack of trust and complex interaction. Thi5 cooperation cen-
tres on the principle of mutual recognition, which fonns thc basis of the Inain instru-
ment adopted so far in this area, the European arrest "varrant (EA\\I, see Box 19.4).
TelTorist attacks have also spurred cooperation. 1revi had its roots in fighting
terrorislll, and just ten days after the 9/11 attacks on the US in 2001, the European
Council adopted the EU Aetion Plan on Combating Terrorism. The bon1bings in
Madrid (March 2004) and London Ouly 2005) indueed l1eN initiatives, such as the
establishment of a special EU Counter- Terrorism CoordinatoL 1hi5 ne\v office has,
however, had to contend "VITith problems, siInilar to those faced by the other EU agcn-
cies. Ils first representative, Gijs de Vries, stood do\vn fro111 the post in 2007 partly
over his lack of operational powers and partly because of the overall reluctance
\vithin lllelllber states ta supply inforn1ation regarding anti-ten'or activities ar to
develop the legal instruments specified in the Aetion Plan. In 2007, Gilles de
Kerchove, a senior Council official "VIrith extensive]HA experience and international
contacts, was appointed to fiU the post.
The extern al dilnension of poliee and judicial eooperation has also expanded.
Europol, Eurojust , and rrontex havc aU concludccl coopcration agreenlc:nts \vith
a series of European and non-European countries; ancl at thc end of 2005 the
.IBA Couneil aclopted a Strategy on the externa} aspects of ]HA (Council Docu-
ment 14366/3/05 REV 3). Cooperation wi th thc US 11a5 been particularly clase
and has spurrecl rnajor controversies both between ElJ institutions and bet\veen
the EU and civil-rights activists, especial1y in thc arca of clata protection. The
2004 US-EU passenger nan1e record (PNR) agrcement: \vhich requires European
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Justice and Home Affairs 475
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European arrest warrant -
• The Ţ European Counei! adopted four basic princip!es for establishing el com-
mall E'Jropean judicial space: mutual recognition of judicial decisions; approxinlation
of national substantive arid procedural laws; the creation of Eurojust; and the devel-
- opment of the exter-nal dimension of criminal law.
• The 11 September :errorist attacks in the US spurred the adoption of the Frame-
'vvork Decision on the European arrest warrant in 2002.
- • The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a member state with a
vievv tO -rhe arrest and surrender by another member state of a person being sought
for a c(,minal orosecution or a custodia! sentence, It e!iminates the use of extradition

ano is oased an the princiDle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters.

o Ir: the absence of EU harmcnization of criminal law, the implementation of the EAW
has encountered difficulties (Lavenex 2007) .
• in surn, as in the case of migration, restrictive measures, such as the EAW, have
been easier to adopt tha:1 those harmonizing the rights of individuals, as illustrated
by the protracted process of agreeing the Framework Decision on certain procedural
-·I-ights in criminal proceedings that has been on the table since 2004 (Commission
- -2004d) .
airlines flying ta the US ta provide US authorities with information an their pas-
sengers, \vas annulled by the Ee] in 2006 because the EP had not been adequately
consulted. The successor agreement, which ren1ains the same in substancc, was
adopted under treat)' provisions that do not require the EP's opinion. PNR has
raised grave concerns o.U10ng the EP, the European Data Protection Supervisor
(PeteI H,ustinx), and civil liberties groups for failing to comply with European
data protection rules.
These developments underhne the blurring of distinctions between nations of in-
ternal and external security. As with efforts ta combat imn1igration, they move]HA
cooperation closer and closer into traditional dOlnains of the CFSP (sec Chapter 18),
The agenda for reform
JH_A occupiecl a central stagc in recent European integration efforts, and the
Trcaty of Lisbon (ToL), having largely to.ken over thc far-rcaching changes pro-
posed by the Constitutional TIeaty) continucs that trend. Thc justification for the
Lisbon refornls dra\vs hcavily on public concerns about internal security and citi-
ze.ns' cxpe.ctations that the EU should do something about it (e.g. Eurobaron1eter
2008). _A second 111otivation is dissatisfaction "VIrith thc implclllcntation of agrced
cOInn1itlllents
1
in particu lelr in third-pi1lar issues.
4Jb ndra Lavenex
The ToL inclucles far-reaching reform proposals that centre on thc'reun111cation'
of Jl-IA .1nto a COll1mon general legal frarnework, and, here\vith) rhe abolition
of the piUar stt:.uClure. The final cOlupromise wiU bring the AFSJ as an arca of
(shared cOlllpetence' closer to the Comn1unity methoc.1 and cxtend qualified
nlajority voting and co-decision to legal lnigration ancl Inost arcas of crin11nal
law and policing. Germany's support for this shifl coulel be won, hcnvevcr, only
by inserting an explicit clause on the right of lnenlber states to deternline the
nunlbers of economic in11nigrants. It is generally expected that cxtending (first
pillar\ decision-making rules will reduce the risks of blockages and lo\vest-
common-denominator agreements in the Council, thereby increasing the EU's
decision-making capacity and the quality of those decisions. Furthern10re, the
abolition of current res1rictions an Ee] powers should enhance compliance \vith
]HA legislation.
Apart from _co-decision \vith the Ep, democratic control \vill be enhanced by in-
creasing scrutiny by national parhaments) both as guardians of the principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity and as participants in the evaluation of the vvork
of the ]HA bodies and agencies. The possibihty for national parliaments to block
a legislative process when it is deen1ed to be in breach of the subsidiarity principle
has, however, also raised concerns about the potential obstructive use of thi5 right in
deeply pohticized issues such as migration and criminalla\v.
Most of these changes can be introduced also irrespective of the ToL through the
use of the so-called of the existing Article 42 TEU, \vhich allo\vs for the
transfer of third-pillar matters ta the first piUar by a unanimous vote in the Council
of Ministers. In using thi5 possibility, however, the Council 1S free to 'determine the
relevant voting conditions', which means that this 501ution could go beyond or re-
main below the level of communitarization foreseen in the ToL,
Conclusions
Initially justified in limited terms as compensatory nleasures ta the abolition of inter-
nal border contro1s, cooperation in]HA, now metaphorically fralned as the creation
of an 'area of freedolll, security, and has been elevated to a central o bj ective
of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon lists it second after the overall comlnitment to peace
promotion, and before the internal market, environn1entaL 01' social policies,
Beyond these symbolic steps, integration in these sensitive fields of state sover-
eignty renlains cOllstrained by n1ultiple tensions and difficult comproDlises. Anl0ng
these tensions the relationship betvveen integration through increased harnl0niza-
. tiOll and centralized ElI structures on the one hand and through enhaneed coordina-
tion of national structures on the other renlains unsettled,
There are linlitations an what can be achievcd through dependence an
transgovernmenta] networks, Inutua1 recognition, and initiatives by menlber
,
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governrnents. In a fidel \vherc conccrns abolIt civil liberties are povverful) these
lnethods have regulaTIy favourccl 'security' aver 'freedoll1' and 'justicc'., and they
posc major problems for scrutin)' and transparency. Cooperation among twentv-
- .1
seven 111cnlbcr govcrnnlents 111ay increase pressures for comnlon rules and effective
n1onitorÎng of their implementation, and play in [avour of the cxploitation of the
ToL OI' the use of the 'passerel!e' for nl0ving towards thc COlnmunity 11lethocl of
decision-n1aking. In the absence of political \viU, however, the opposit.e could
equally \ve11 oeeur. Thc re-elnergence of intergovernnlcntal cooperation outside the
EU and the preference of operational coordinatian over legislative harmonization
both point in this direction.
FURTHER READING
For a fairly com.orehensive overview ofthe JHA acquis see Peers (2007} and Mitsilegas ...
ei: aÎ.(2003). On the development of immigration policy, see Geddes (2008), and onthe
effects of EU policies on themember states see Ette and Faist(2007).Mitsilegas (2009)'·
gives an excellent introduct'lon Înto EU criminallaw'cooperation,and Occhipintî(2003) an
.. .. . .
poiice cooperation,
Etts, A., and Falst, T. (2007) (eds,), The Europeaniza tionof National Policies andPoJÎtics of> .
o • • • •• ••• • •••• •
ImrnigratÎon (Basingstoke: PaJgrave Macmillan), ... .... ... .. ..... ... .. .. .
Geddes, A, (2008), /mmigration and European In tegra tion: TowardsFortressEurope?, 2nd ... .
edn, (fv1 a nchester: fViB nchesterUn iversity Press). •. .. ..' .. . .
. . . .. .
Mitsiiegas,V(2009), EU Criminal Lav./ (London:Hart).·
. rvlitsilegas, V, Monar) J.,and ReesJ 'J\I(2003),The EuropeanUnionand InternalSecurity:·
Guardian of the People? (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan), .
OcchipintÎ, J D. (2003), The Politics of EU PoliceCooperation: Towards a European FBI?
( Bou J d e r, C O : LV n neR i e n ner) .
Peers, S.(2007), EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford:. Oxford University Press).
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.. The Schengen hnplementing Convention (SIC) devised \colnpensatory measures' for the removal of frontier controls. organized crinle. 2003: 7). - Italian: German. ln contrast to econolnic integration. . national.. .vorks. In 1990 t\-va important international treaties set the guidelines for [uture European cooperation. :... the state has drawn legitinlacy from its capacity to provide security for its inhabitants (Mitsilegas et al.. . One important interna1 motor has been the spill-over from the realization of freedom of n10veluent in the single market (see Chapter 5). ho\vever) which bas becn at the core of the European integration projectJHA touches on many issues that are deeply entrenched in national political and judicial systelus and have strong affinities to questions of state sovereignty: since the seventeenth century. ranging fron1 ministers through dircclors-gencral of thc relcvanllninislries ta lniclcl1c-ranking civil servants. conco111itantly. illegal in1migratiol1: cross-border police C0111petences. Transgovernmentalism combines elen1ents of the traditional 'Community nlethod' with more intergovernn1ental ones: it is characterized by the relative weakness of legal harmonization and a foeus an 1110re operational aspects of coordinatiol1 bet\veen national authorities.. and a COInmon computerized system for the exchange of personal data (Schengen lnformation Systen1 (SIS»). This has generated a peculiar pattern of sharcc1 cOlllpetences bet\\'een sub-national. and security considerations have hitherto received more attention than those relating ta 'freedom' or justice'. and drug trafficking. the EU 15 [ar fronl having unified: integrated conlnlon policies in ]HA. 458 Sandra Lavenex Justice and Home Affairs 459 Introduction The an1bition involved in creating an 'arca of frcedom. . and Palestinian groups operating within and across their borders. . . Eurajust.. a common visa reginle. and arms traffi c king. covering asyluln. . with lhc continuity of a significant levcl of cooperation outside the EU1s fonnal institutions. Reservations about transfers of responsibilities ta the EU and the donlestic sensitivity of issues such as imllligration and organized crilne in national political debates and electoral campaigns have sustained transgovernlnental governance as the dominant mode in ]HA. ~ of]HA cooperation in the EU treaties before presenting its key aClors and institutional set-up. 1 .utionalization and The Netherlands spurred concern about safeguarding internal security and prolnpted closer cooperation on questions relating to cross-border phenomena such as ilTIluigration. concluded among all EU lnember states: ineorporated the asylum rules a1so included in the SIC and established the responsibility of the state in \vhjch an asylun1-secker 11rs1. . . . security. .. Luxelnbourg. the increasing coordination of national police forces in the fight against crime. the transforn1ation of traditional notions of sovereignty and democracy in the member states. enters for the exanTination of an 3svluTI1 claim. :. Ihus: prior to lhc [ornlal establishlncnt of cooperation in j ustice and affairs in the 1992 ("l\'1aastricht) Treaty 011 hOlile European Union (IEU) an extensivc net\vorkofcooperation had alreadyc1eveloped which opcrated both outsideand under thc overall atlthority of rhe European Council. and discussing the lllain policy developluents in re1ated f1e1cls and recent proposals for reform. . . security and justice' (AFSJ) vvithin the EU may be c0I11pared with thal which propelled the single n1C1rket (sec Chapter 5). 2 IEU). and justice and home affairs UHA) has been one of the busiest policy areas. and justice. Cooperation took place on seveTal political ancJ executive levcls. and Frontex to deal \\Tith these matters thus constitute a l1e\v stage in the trajectory of European integration. Cooperation in]HA also has direct in1plications for democratic values and for the balance between liberty and security in the l}nion and its member states. .. ancl European levels of govcrnance.:r. Ihe 1997 Treat)' of Amsterdam (IoA) declared the AFSJ a fundamental The institutionalization of justice and home affairs cooperation The dynan1ics of this ne\v area of European integration reside both within and outside the EU and its member states. ~.. riddled with delicate cOlllpr0111ises and reservations by luember governlnents. EU objective CArt. and the creation of specialized EU bodies such as Europal. The Dublin Convention on Asylum. This chaptcr starts with a shon revie\ll. vvith the Council adopting an average of ten texts a month in thi5 field since 1999 (Monar forthcoming).... These processes reflect the increasing involven1ent of EU institutions in core fUllctions of statehood and. and reprcsentatives of poliee .. generated external pressures for closer cooperation. The surge of asylu111-seekers from outside \vestern Europe in the 1980s which followed the closure of legal channels for econOlllic ilnmigration... . bank robbery. As in ather areas of EU policy integration has been increlnental.. the phenomena of organized crime and terrorisffi: and the enel of the cold \-var: \vhich opened the EU's previously closed eastern border to hopeful immigrants and criluinal net. Ihi5 intensified cooperation could draw an informal caoperation among security senrices and la\v-enforcelnent agencies that had developed since the 1970s. These included the Pompidou Group on drugs) set up in 1972 withiTI the wider Council of Europe) and the Trevi Group created at the December 1975 European Council in Rome ta coordinate anti-terrorist work among EU govemments faced with lri5h. Ihe development of a common response to immigration and asylum-seekers. France~ Gernlany. '. the'approximation of national crinlinal and civillaw. The decision in the 1985 Schengen Agreenlent to extel1d the elimination of internal border controls that had been in place among the Benelux countries since 1948 to the five contracting meluber states Belgiuru. -. Notwithstanding the strong symbolislll inherent in the creation of a European area of freedoTI1..' of the enlcrgence and insrir. After 1985 Trevi's mandate \vas extended to other issues of cross-border public arder and serious international crill1e such as drug trafficking. the joint management of the external borders.

including references to 'operational cooperation' among la\l'/ enforcement agencies. which had remained among the Ieast internationally minded \vithin national governments. Cooperation an10ng the init.~ . Articles 61-9 TEC Intergovernmental formalization: Maastrichfs third pillar During the intergovernmental conference (IGC) leading to the TElT \ the Dutch Council Presidencyls draft.s Vi. 'temporary protection' of refugees. a lengthy section on the ECJ reflects sensitivi::y of extending cooperation in legal administration and law enforcement without providing for judicial review. Three \\7eaknesses. reportecl ro rhe European and the national parlianlents or to national pubhcs. and immigration polic\" e . Asyluill policy. and Ireland.Thich that ucaty \vorking of the intergovernmental procedures. " - unaninlity . Tne opaque iegal ilistruments of the TEU were replaced by well-established. but some of these. The loose intergovernmental structure clid not prevent]H. even though the Europal Convention had not yet been ratified by aU lllember states. ciures for contro!s on oersons at the EU's external borders. The ToN specified in Artic.D. and led ta the emergenee of an intensive transgovernnlental network (see Chapter 4). common measures on asylum seekers. stood out: anlbiguity about thc legal and constitutional fran1cvvork. The 'An1sterdam' reforms \vere motivated by widespread dissatisfaction with the Uneasy communitarization: the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice Thc cun'ent fran1ework of cooperation in ]HA \-vas shapccl by the treaties of An1stcrJan1 and Nice. evident in the frequeney wirh \vhich institutional issues were entangled with policy proposals. and collection and storage of data. the third pillar hacl developed an extensive set of instruments and institutions.J CCM). the UK. legally brndirg legallnstrumen~s.e 31 TEU the functions of Eurojust. in1111igration policy~ and police aud judicial cooperation in civil and crhuinal lnatters \vere il1cluded as (matters of COn11TIOn interest' in the third pillar of the IEU. the framework decisions.. The frequency and intensity of interaction. after the IoAl that justice l11inistries began ta be drawn inta a sin1ilar European netvvork. ECJ) in this field.hc absencc of 11lechanisllls for cnsuring national ratification or inlplenlentation. ~ . the 10\. Changes to JHA 'in the Treaty of Amsterdam ' and the Treaty otNice Title IV. rules and controls on external border-crossing. By the 1996-7 IGC.ially five Schengen states vvas to turn into a 111otor for and (laboratori of integration and had an influential in1pact on thc su bsequent comn1unitarization of cooperation (1'vtonar 2(01). Tîtie VI. in particular.Artic:es 64.~ . . vvhich shifted parts ofJl-IA ta the C01TI1TIUni Ly pinar \vhile ll1aintaining a 'streall1lined' third pi l1ar 011 policc ancl juclicial cooperation in crin1inal n1atters (P. were being developed. . l • Articies 62-3 TEC !Ist 'flanking measures' to be adopted within five years (byMay 2004) to cOMpensate for free movement within the EU. especially in the area of police cooperation and organized crÎlne. 67-8 TEC maintain the intergovernmental decision-making procedures (shared right of initiative. In this vvay the exist- unanimity voting) until :he end of the transition period in 2004 and impose strict limits on reference to the • Jitferem opt-outs for Denmark. • . in separate (pillars' (on CFSP see Chapter 18). Ministries ofjustice \vere dra\vn in 1110re 510\\71)'. common visa policy. E~ rily intergovernmental.rticles 35-9 TEU reflect parallel unresolved disputes on the involvement of the EU :nstitutions (Commission. • Artic!e 40 TE'J extends provision for 'closer cooperatÎon' among smaller groups of member states and registers the integrat ion of the Schengen acquis 'into the framework of the Europear Union' (set out in more detail in an attached protocol).···-"-T.. which proposed to bring bath the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and ]HA into a single integrated structure l \vas dismissed and instead [oreiun policv and internal securitv relnained primab ) ) ..1). including common proce-. Thc 2007 ToL introduces significant changes to JHAl 1110rc far-reaching than thc change. on the other (sec Box 19. Articies 29-42 TE U • Articles 29-34 TEU provide more detail an 'common actîon' in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.A from becoming the most active field for meetings convened under the Council of l'viinisters in the late 19905. it \vas not until the revival of the concept of a European judicial Arca. from di!'ect effect. consultation procedure with the ECJ. Europol \vas taking shape as a coordinating agency for coaperation aUlong national poli ce forces. The prospect of eastern enIargCll1cnt aelded to the poHtical sahence of the policy fields covercd by JI-IA cooperation aud exacerbated the lirnits of decision-lnaking structures based 011 lnakes ta anv other areas of EU 1a\\1 (see section) (The agenda for reform' belo\v). Four comnl0n databases ""vere being set in place: the SIS \vas already up and running~ the CUstOlllS Inforn1ation Systelu \vas being conlpu terizecL and the Europollnforn1ation Systen1 aucl Eurodac. reflecls the delicate con1pro111isc bel\veen intensive transgovernluental cooperatioI1) on the onc hand~ and lhe incr011en lal consolidation of supranational structures. anei 1. are excluded . the finger-plint database for asy1u1l1seekers. 460 Sandra Lavenex Justice and Home Affairs 461 forees and otheT agencies. Ep. induced a transfonnation of the ·working practices of interior ministries and of police forees. e ing network of committees '}las fonnalized without transfonning the frame\vork of authority and accountabihty (see Lavenex and \Vallace 2005). This frame\vork. .\J den1oel'atie accountabjlity anei political visihility of th1S essentially bureaucratic fran1ework for polie\" Y\Jhic}l allc)\vcd the practice of cooperation to develop far beyond what \vas . .

0111paraJe ta th 8t 01 DG Tr ad c (4)(-) clnŢl]ovcPS) 81·1d DC' M ar kt (4 23 CJnp 1· ee s ) . .Ge ne ra l on ]u sti ce au d Ho me Affairs. Th e as so cia tio n of nOn-111enlber sta tes ex ac erb ate s the va ria ble ge om etr y of th e 'ar~a . . bo th ins ide an d ou tsi de form al EU str uc tu re s. U. Ron1ano Pr od i. Luxe~~bourg. ha ve be en in cI ud ed wi th in th e Sc he ng en area. as ev id en t in thc Co ns tit ut io na l Co nv en tio n an d th e IGC tha t pr ep ar ed th e ToL. on a se1ective basis.. co op era t. .i on ou lsi de th e rn ov isi on s of rhe lrc ati es .4 111illion in 20 00 to €4 61 .20 04 ). ane! Sp ain in 20 05 . lvlcDonagl1 19 98 ).J . law cn fo rc en lcn t anei inlInigraL~. Ap art fronl the se vo lu nt ar y ex en 1p tio ns [rorn the JH A acquis. bu t is fre e ta adopt rel ev an t Eu ro pe an pr ov isi on s as in ter na tio na lla w ra th er th an EU law (th er eb y av oid ing its dir ec t effect an d Eu ro pe an Co ur t of ]u sti ce (E C] ) ju ris di cti on ).s 1·11 1()98 h ·1 ~ 1 . Denn1ark. th ou gh the Co nl mi ss io n \vas no w given a rig ht of ini tia tiv e sh ar ed wi th th e me mb er sta tes ._ pe r ce nt o.n itiarive \vi th Au str ia... fronl €2 19 . - Keyactors Th e fragm~ntati~n ~f co op er ati on in ]H A is a150 reflected in th e ll1ultiplication of ac to rs de ah ng \v lth lts de ve lo pm en t. . Fr an ce . the co nd iti on ali ty of the Sc he ng en ac ce ssi on me ch an ism s ad ds a mo re cOlnpulsory fo nn of flexibility No t\v ith sta nd ing th eir ob lig ati on to ad op t th e] HA acquis in clu di ng the Sc he ng en pr ov isi on s in fuU.. Th cs c id ea s ins pir ed the ph ra se ol og y of thc Amsterd~ln1 Tr eaty.on offices.vh ich fral11ed ]H A in ter ms of cs tab lis hin g an 'ar ea of fre ed on l. wa s to tra ns fo rm the sm all Ia sk Fo rc e \v hi ch ha d be en es tab lis he d 'w ith in th e Se cr eta ria t of th e Co mm iss iol 1 un de r th c TE U in to a ne . . an d the SIS (K uij pe r 20 00 : 35 4) . bu t no t (li ke No rw ay an d Ic ela nd ) . Na tio na l se ns iti vit ies ab ou t so ve rei gn ty en co ur ag ed a hi gh degr ee of fle xib ili ty in th e ap pl ica tio n of co mm on ru les . . b ce n (e sp cr a le Jy unc1crstaficd an d th er ef or e ha d ha d hu le inlJ1act ()n t l·11·rd Pl'J].".7 lni lli on. ~ j" .d cv 1 e op mc nt s. 5 . .op era tio n to th c re st of th e me mb er sta tes by in co rp or ati ng th e Pr um prOVISlons In to EU leg isl ati on . th e W cs ten do rp RefLectio n Gr ou p pr ep ar in g the 19 96 IG C ag en da str es se d th c im po na nc e of ]H A refon11 by fran1ing il as on e as pe ct of 'm ak in g Eu ro pe Inorc re icv an t for iLS cit Îze ns ' (M.. has ne go tia ted a bi lat er al ag re em en t \VhlC~ e.462 Sa nd ra La ve ne x Ju sti ce an d Ho me Af fa irs 463 In Hu en ce u by the se consic1cratiollS. is a 5c he ng en me mb er and pa rti cip ate s in th e free mo ve me nt are a. /_ Il .. A ne w Ti tle IV tra ns fer red mi gr ati on an d ot he r re lat ed po lic ies ta th e hr st pillar. / 1 . Ex isl in g op t-o uL pr ov isi on s an d cx ten de d op po rtu ni tie s for en ha nc cd co op er ati on un de r th e Treat. se cu rit J: an d jus ric c'. the IlU lll bc r of pe rso nn el ha s bc en co ns tan tly lIlcreasccL'~28 3 on pl ov ee s in 20 02 an d 44 0 in 20 0 0 a 51'Z(' t]1 la . . at· I·S (' . th e ToA br ok e wi th th e tra di tio na l do ctr in e of th e Comn 1uniry me th od by in tro du cin g im po rta nt int erg ov ern n1 en tal ele me nt s in to th e first pil lar wh ile intergo ve rn me nt al pr oc ed ur es pe rsi ste d in th e th ird piUar.. Belgiu111. Th e InOSl pr ol ni nc nt ex ar np lc 15 th c Pr um Tr :a ty c~ncJud.. As vvith th e in teg ra tio n of Sc he ng en in ta th e Tr ea ty of Am ste rd alu th e Ge rn lan Co un ciJ Pr es id en cy in 20 07 su cc ee de d in ex ten di ng th es e int en s'i fie d form.). It wa s widc1y re co gn ize d th at th c tas k far ce .. ./).' Pr es ide nt of th e COlTIll1ission (1 99 9.. rd cr co nt ro lln ea su re s bo (COJ11111 iS5ion 2008. No rw ay an d Iceland.of co . lat er re na me d Jus~ice~ Li be rty an d Se cu rit y (D G JL S) .-. L 1e to ta 1 f IVl O\ ' ng to .\' Di re cto ra te. \vh ich corne clo se st to this idea. At the cn d of 20 08 111ne of lhe tw elv e ne w 111Clnber sta tcs had pa ss ed thc lest~ bu t Bu lga ria an d R0I11ania (b ec au sc of ca pa cit y dc fic its ) an d Cy pr us (bccause of pro ble n1 s rel ati ng ta the pa rti rio n of the isl an d) cu rre nt ly ren lal n ou rside of the int eg rat ed bo rd er co ntr ol systen1.on ar 19 97 . lre lan d an d th e UK ma in tai n the ir op t-o ut from Sc he ng en an d th e lifting of interna1 fra nt ier co ntr ols . Li ec ht en ste in ratified a Sc he ng en !D ub lin aSSOClatlon tre atv In 2008.ies of An lst erd all l an d Nice ha ve no t prcvcntecl in di vi du al me nl be r st~ncs fronl en ga gi ng in selectivc foruls of in tcr go vc rn mc nt al . . oy ts ex pe nd Hu rc s a]50 s~nv el ste rp in cr ca sc .. in 20 06 wj th .1). ~ .. po lie e an d ju di cia l co op er ati on in cri mi na l ma tte rs CPJ CC M )..~. fh c (\i eth cr lan ds . justific8tio n of in teg ra tio n wi th rcf ere nc e to cit ize ns ' co nc er ns ha s re rn ain ed a 111ajor arg urn en t be hi nd re ce nt rc[ or nls .a c.:lllce lh c crc alJ on of th c nc \v DG . .l1decl in thc va rio us ]H A da tab as es (se c be lo\ v) an d in tcn sif yi ng op er ati on al co op er ati on be tw ce n po Iic e.' \vl th on lv fo rtv -si x fuJJ-tin1C:' en1JJ1o)'c"'c. Fa cih tat in g an d \v id en in g th e co nd Ill on s fo r th c ex cb an ge of da ta incl. -tJ . an d 5u bje ct to unanilllOUS ag re em en t by 'insid ers'. Organizatio" and capacities of EU institutions \\i ith th e ~ew po\v~rs ~ ttr ib ut ed ta it un de r th e Io A. Poliee co op er ati on an d ju di cia l eo op er ati on in cr im in al ma tte rs re ma in ed in a revised au d len gt he ne d Iit le VI TEU~ an d the Sc he ng en acquis \va s in teg ra ted in to the tre atj es . th e C0l11 D1ission gr ad ua lly ex pa nd ed lts or ga nI za no na i ba sis in JH A. bu t ad he re. . al . .cd an Ge rn lan i. se cu rit y an d ju sti ce '. S ' tze r 1 d 101 \vI an en tir ely su rro un de d by Sc he ng en rn eln be rs. 1. for ex am ple . . It is in1 po rta nt to no te th at th e tre ati es do no t pr ov ide fo r cOlnprehensive co mp ete nc es in th e se ns e of cr ea tin g 'c1assic' EU 'ca m m on policies '. an d are [u11v as so cia ted \vith th e Sc he ng en an d Dubl]'n C on ve n t' 15." . On e of the first mo ve s of th e nev.of fr~edo_ln. 1 . Th e ToA co nt ain ed su bs tan tia l ch an ge s to th e fra me wo rk for ]l-L:\ (see Box 19. .-.J . thi s tre aty is also s0l11ctinlcs re fe rre d to as <Schengen III': a lab or ato ry for de ep er po lic e co op er ati on am on g a va ng ua rd of a fe"l m em be r sta tes . . The. . as lne ulb ers of the pr eeX lsn ng NordIC con11110n tra ve l are a. th e tw elv c ne w Ine n1 be r sta tes ha ve to first pr ove the ir ca pa cit y ta in1plelnent effectively the se tig ht bo rd er -m an ag em en t pr ov isi on s be fore be ing rec og niz ed as ha vi ng ac hie ve d wh at is af tcn ref err ed to as 'Sc he ng en maturity~ by the old 111c111bcrs. to the flankin g me as ur es of th e ]H A acquis su eh as as ylu m. J • W hi le pr ep ali ng th e gr ou nd fo r a gr ea ter in vo lv em en t of sU'pr anational ac tor s in ]H A. ev en in the case of the 'co mm on vis a po be y' ar the 'co mm on as yl um sy ste m' . . .ntered lnt~ foree in M ar ch 20 08 . me~nber of th e ~:Vider Eu ro pe an Ec on om ic Area.s .

. the European Councils gro\ving in1portance has been particularly salient in ]I--IA where it has developed a leacl function through multi-annual strategic progran1lning. I I • . \vhich set out far-reaching objectives and fixed deadlines for their adoption.. _Although not [oreseen by the treaties..- o - ~ .Ul . Thesc strategic planning clocunlcnts \vere devised ta counLer thc incrClnentalisn1 of cooperation under the Maastricht Treaty and to assure a greater efficiency in ilnplenH~nting agreed cOlluninnents.- > -.-! i I .. CD E ~U '- ----' ro.d under the Finnish Council Presidency in Tampere in 1999. oU '._- O) !CJE I (!) o .. • . . The forn1er 'Coordinating Comlnittee) (the K4 Comlnittee) \vas renamed the Artic1e 36 Comlnittec) and then the Coordinating COlnmittee for Police andJudicial Cooperation in Crilninal Matters (CATS). U 2. Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and the COlnmittee an Civil La\v Matters. The ground \vas laid \\'1th the first European Council focused speciflcally on]HA heJ. .- c ~ UEu8~ -- I I I >- E E >(j) ---1- . Bet\veen Corerer and the working groups. ---____ o _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ •• _ _ _ _. a cerLain gap betV\wen anlbitions and in1pletnentaLion persists (sec bdo\v). -ro . . __ '_'-' _--_ _ -1 I I . Set up initially for a five-year transitiona1 period. \vith additional 1998-9. '-. I / (/) u c o M E Z6 o '+J "'(1) E -(/'J 1-... .." " ' .-! O) '-- m -c CL o '- o D.1)._ _ . o .- '- (1) « -. . Pern1anent rcprcsentations of th(' lllcn1ber o __ - c 1 I '" ' 1 states in Brussels \\-'cre also drawn in~ aelding legal advisors and afflclais secondecl frOTIl interior lninistries ta their staffs.. the 'SCIFA+'..L ~ I 1 Ou =:l J W o o.'\ Councils are prepared by Coreper II. 465 The rcsponsible unit in the Council Secretariat. .~u f . \vhich meets vveekly at ambassadoriallevel. it is expected that the ne\\' ]HA. . . .::.'ed \vith a ne\\'. .L u o .D C/) ----' U)-- C I I I I I >o. . o- '> o W I (]) o o o C u -- The n10st rcmarkable change in the fo rIn al decision-lnaking structllre bas o o. _ _ •• _ - Justice and Home Affairs -----------_.-.c C ca +---' (/) ~ ~ i . ""O ~-i u~c .~ o '0) Q) 1-' 2 LL U) U) "+-' ro ---- -- (/) ro > 0). . Ho\vever..- o o ::J u I .--. thc Henv of polieies s110\vS . ---r-: ~ 8o.. / / / I I I / / l .--• ___ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ •• _ ._. Q) 0_ been the slrengthening of thc role of the European Parlialnent CEP-) vvith the rcalization of the co-clecisioll proccdure for lnOSL U aspccts of ]H/\ that fall uncler _____ . I I -o c 1- '-- Q) !J! c -_.-::::. • +---' Q) • Z heads of national border control authorities. Rather than phasing out this additionallayer of consultatiol1) in SUlTImer 2002 a ne\v 'external borders practitioners~ conln1011 unif. vvhich bring togetherin Brussels senior officials froln national ministries~ nonnal1y lneeting once a month.. The ToA furthern10re provided for the separate Schengcn I I Secretariat to be integrated i11to DG H.. i . c cu . Agendas for JH-. The Iov/est level is cOlnposed _ of working groups of specialists fronl nationallninistrie~ and operational bodies (see Figure 19.m (l) (l) -.- (!) o C L- "'O+---' '- «Q)<t ro >o (/) c rou E ::J o o <t - U E Q) o c (/) « >(/) .. .- U o . o '---'---- CD I I Q) fU) ro -' --> - ro <: ~ I I .-. 5: t::<J . I (1) o. ! (1)-- ro -ro '- C .0+---''U} _::: __ .~ Q) Cl) I J I I I o ~ .ştaff recruited in 1110fC gcnerously staffed than the COll1mission Task Forte on JH!\ during the 19905.. / - .. . its 111andate \vas narrowed to cover only the relnaining third~pillar issues. (Q L- that under thc current institutional procedures aneI given thc cloll1esLic sensitivity of the fidel. c - m E '----""O Q) U) <t o U +---' '-- Q.J Q)"D . 1vvo ne\v comn1ittees \\Tere created for those issues falling under the Comnlunity pillar: the Strategic Conlmittee on Imlnigration.. .(J)+---' c c o C Q) :J o .. an1bitious ]HA multi-annual progralnme. It i5 one of the fev/ areas in the Council that has four decision-n1aking Iayers... -o ti) ----' o (1) U - i I I I I <::: 1 .D C .. 464 Sandra Lavenex . . The 2004 European Council in The Hague follovi.o o '-'-t-L-- C L0(1) --i::. DG H. ..L =:l E c =:l li.-ro 1-' c c -ro r +---' Q) ._ W C ----' ro > . -+---' - (9 I --.c .. =:l -.cu '-' .. the]HA structure has an additional intern1ediary level cOlnposed of special coordinating cOlnmittees. . . _S2 5: .-) I . ~.. regrouped the members of the SCIFA \vith the +---' cu I i I Q'+J m -.J \. The ]HA Council inherited from Trevi and from the TEU's third piUar a heavily hierarchical structure of PolicY-lnaking.cu U) ~ >1- -. I .... o c Cf) -... \vas . / ! . ::::::.- Q... I i I . :J n U CD o O I s (Q I I -' c ..'- U o . At the Sall1e tiule. these ne\\' comn1ittees of senior national officials were another sign of the intergovernmentallegacy of ] HA_ cooperation) anel an anomaly under first-pillar procedures.U) '-- rC ~ Q) +-' (j) E CI) - -. 111ulti-annual programmc \\1i11 be adoprcd by thc European Couneii under the Svveuish Council Presiclcncy in autunl11 2009.. +---' ti) o E c ' .c o >u '+.i--' m '--- c: u -.1 J .._ .

1.: :-. and the EP has tried ta enhance its grip also an thirdpiUar legislation.he Salzburg Fonlill [ounded in 2000 on the initiative of Austria and involving Austria. several 111enlber states. often supported by tlle L l . . \:\/hereas both face criticislU fOI CirCUlTIVenting the oHicial in5titution5 of the EU and for their lael<.rgovernn1en1. justified on the basis of efficiency. ]n 2(09) cighteen projects in the L-ielels of counter-terrorisnl. this group lneels t-vvice a year at ministerial level and has a rotating presidency. .. of n1easures that ean subsequently be exponed to alI member states. ln 2006 PolaneI joincd the group} nlaking it the G6.. In order to avoid an arbitran selection of Inen1ber states the Group i5 composed of the 'troi1(a' including the outgoing and ineon1ing Presidencies \\1ith the acting Council Presidency and the Conu11ission serving as co-chairs. but also \vith the expansion of ll1ember states participating in ]HA Council meetings 'in a Iargc: \vindo\vlcss COl1ference hall of the CouneiI building in Brussels' acconln10dating 'same 1jO representatives of the Presidency. .._~. ta 5uggest amendn1ents to proposed measures. the EP had not been granted any powers to all1encl or block legislation hy the Coullcl1 and lhe Council had onl1' 1. irrcgular migratlon. thus de facto widening its right to co-decision to poliee and judicial cooperation in criminalluatters. Like the G6. In lvlay 2003 the interior lninisters of the five higgest mClnber states Franee. where necessary. under Gern1an lead have n1ade recourse ta intergovcrnluental fonus of cooperation outside EU structures. .al forun1 in]HA is 1.v . the so-called Future Group. the EP's involvement in matters under the third pillar has been even less satisfactory.rhen the transitional pcriocl of thc IoA expircd. _. . the C0111mission has accepted the perpetuation of variable geollletries in ]HA. the 2007 Gerrnan Council Presidencv expanded this ll10del of enhanced intergovernmental eooperation by ereating. frOlTI 2010 to 2014. . Until 2005.entioned abovc is but one manifestation of thi5 trend. organized crilne. see belo·v. .. and n1ajor events. Given that third-pillar legislation often has elements that eould faH under the first pillar. the European Comlnission. relations between the EP and the Counei} continue to be contentious.hc)' have devclopcd cxtensivc substructures and expert working groups charged with 1hc ilnplelnentation of proj eCls. and nligration were being conducted basecl an t11e conclusion~ of 1hc 111inisterial n1eetings in Heiligendamnl and Stratrord-uponAvoll i Il 2006. and the UK created the so-called GS in order la try to spred up the lnove towards operational goa1s and to circumvent the lengthy dccision-lnaking processes of 1. Slovakia. i.~. exehange of DNA data. Lilze the G6 and the 5aIzburg Forum. \vith the support of DG ]LS. Schengen evaluation.)) lhe EP has sought ta link its assent ta the issues under co-decision to the Councirs consideration of its positions an the third-pillar issues negotiated under the consultation procedure. j T j ) 1 The proliferation of semi-autonomous agencies arid bodies Another special characteristic of Lhe governance of the JHA 1S the proliferation of selni-autono1l10US special agencies and bodies. . thei1' capabiliLies havc repeatcclly failed lo Ineet thc expectations.. In arder ta allo\v it a real oppartunity ta exan1ine and.. The multiplication of actors and thc '\videning of thcir C0111petences over the past eight years have been impressive and il1ustrale· lhe clynamis111 of thi5 fidd of cooperation. given that thc n1Cll1bcr 51atcs havc 50 far Dot tran5ferred an)' operational powers to thesc agencies. As co-decision has not been extended to the third pillar. 466 Sandra Lavenex Justice and Home Affairs 467 thc first pillar: visas. . vVith the Future Group. _. The reinvention of intergovernmentalism Faced with the increasingly assertive rale of the Ep.. Both groups see their role in the elaboration and testing.hc CouneiI of Ministers. In 2006 Ron1allÎa and Bulgaria joined the group and Croatia has been participating as an observer since 2006. in a smaller context of like-n1inded sta les OI con tiguous neighbours. thc JJ-1A agencics and bodies are 111ainly concerned \vith infonnation cxehange and eoordination bct\veen nationallavv-enforccnlenl authoritics.. the Fu ture Group gathers only the ministrie~ of the interioL and not their partners froln the justice 11linistries. Gern1any~ ItaIy Spain. asyluffi policy.. Ihe G6 Incet l\vice a yeal' al the 11linisterial 1evel and have a rotating presiclcncy l Over tilnc. thc EP explicitly cOll1plained that il oben chel not get a11 of the preparatory dOeUTI1cnts neeessary to participate in the decisionmaking process from the outset. This not\vithstandin b .. sueh as \vith regard to the access by laVvT-enforcement authorities to the Visa Infonnation Systeln (VIS. . June 2006 Rcsolutiol1 on the AF5j..0 consult thc EP prior to adopting a 11lCaSure a requirclllent that was repcatedly violated (lavcnex 2006a). In ilS .e. even if lin1ited ta strategic planning. traffic police. including concerning the 2003 Family Reunification Directive and the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive. vvhich is charged "vith elaborating priorities for ]HA cooperation after expiry of the Hague Programme. and Slovenia. v.. of transparency and accountability. .. and jucli- ciaI coopcration in civi113\v.-. . Despite a n1uch ilnproved inter-institutional dialogue. These intergovernnlental structures are renliniscent of the 'Schengen laborat~ry' that drove ]HA cooperation froul 1995 to 1999... The Prllill Treaty m. Associated quarrels have repeatedly led ro delays in the legislative process. Yet. -. the EP n1ust be given al least three monlhs. A second inte. As it stands. . . the composition of the G6 based on country size has faced para ticular contention.. bordcr control. . the Council Secretariat and national delegations and speaking in twenty-three different official languages (OeI and Rapp-Lucke 2008: 23). the Czech Republic~ Hungar)~ Poland. It has created substructures for operational cooperation including working groups on \vitness protec[ion~ country of origin infornlation. The Council's failure to comply \vith the consultation requirements had been a topie of contention during severallegislati've proc·edures and had led the EP to file legal complaints before the EeJ.

however. and the European Police Chiefs' Task Force (PCTF) to develop personal and informallinks alnong the heads of the various law-enforcement agencies across the EU and ta promote information exchange.- Justice and Home Affairs 469 establishment of databases. on the ather. they will opt for a revision of the current SIS. the Council has neither taken account of the three verv critical reports issued by the EP. . nor the criticism of the European Data Protection Supervisor. The proliferation of actors indicates the strong impetus for lnore intensive cooperation in internal security. The Europol Convention had been adopted in 1995. The model of governance by this type of agency illustrates the choice for prolnoting European integration through the better coordination of nationalla\~l-enforcement systems rather than by replacing them with new supranational structures.1 . this declaratory document hints at the possibility of developing more collective capabilities in this area. the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) set up in 1993 in Lisbon. have taken place in the framework of the third pillar. the persistence of integration by looser transgovernlnental coordination with low levels of transparency and accountability.i::->. These cammon databases constitute the core coordination instrument betvveen domestic law-enforcelnent and immigration authorities and are meant ta boost their surveillance capacities over ll10bile undesired individuals in the common territory. ~. the predecessor of OLAF. . Most subsequent developments. :. the now communitarized European Anti-Fraud Office (see Chapter 4). the case for tighter collective policy management and legislative harmonization by the EU institutions and. The earliest agencies were established an the basis of first-pillar secondai-y legislation. security prerogatives in developing the databases have been granted more attention than the concurrent civil liberties or human rights aspects. Member states have taken more than three years to agree an the Framework Decision 2008/977/jI-IA an the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted on 27 November 2008. in its Decision. the idea of a revamped SIS II has not yet materialized.. i ts mandate was extended considerably in 2007 through the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) as a means of providing rapid operational assistance for a limited period ta a requesting member state facing a situation of 'urgent and exceptional pressure' at external borders. In 1998 the European Judicial Network was launched.. after lengthy national ratification procedures. Together with the suggestion of examining the creation of a European border-guard system. the number of comnlon databases has also proliferated. . vvhich caUs for strengthening Frontex's own operational resources. which was established in Warsaw in 2005. which in 2007 was replaced by the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). and Europoi became operational a year later. Frontex's operational burden-sharing cliluension has been further enhanced through the European PatroI Network (EPN) for Mediterranean and Atlantic coastal waters.. in the Pact for Asylum and hnmigration adopted in autumn 2008.. but mostly monitored by a specialjoint supervisory authority within the Council Secretariat (Europal and Eurojust databases). and the European Monitoring Cen tre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) established in 1997 in Vienna.. The data of EU and third-country nationals are stored and scrutinized partly under Commission supervision (Eurodac. and interior and justice ministers have extended the deadline for establishing the system ta June 2009. Here the earliest agencywas UCLAF (Unite de coordination de Ia lutte al1ti-fraude) .:. Yet. Customs lnformation System) . covering both EU and non-EU citizens~ and inspired by siInilar developments in the United States. failing that. This instrulnent is widely seen as crucial for ensuring adequate personal data protection under these information systems. to coordinate cross-horder prosecutions. ta establish an electronic recording of entry and exit into the EU.. The creation of RABITs was a reaction to the difflculties encountered in mabilizing the necessary personnel and equiplnent froln the member states for joint operations such as the HERA I-III operations (2006-7) to tackle irregular lnigra tion from West Africa to the Canary Islands.. As in most other areas of ]HA cooperation. The hope is to thereby not only assist countries in implementing EU asylum directives but also ta promote the approximation of recognition practices through closer coordination.. This organizational expansion has been backed by a steep rise of the agency's budget from € 19 million in 2006 to €70 million in . In 2009 an Asylum Support Office was created to gather and exchange inforlnation an countries of origin and asylum proceedings in the member states. a database with personal information Cincluding biometrics) on every visa application. With these new common bodies.. thU5' indicating the enduring political salience of border management in Europe.:. Due ta unexpected technical problems and pa ar strategic planning. as a predecessor ta Eurojust. and judges which became operational in 2002. but it was not until 1998 that it entered into force. The most dynamic agency is the Agency for the Managelnent of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex).... the 'college' of senior magistrates.~ 2008.~. .. but it also reflects the tension between. '~ . The European Counci! in Tampere in 1999 proposed the creation of two new bodies: the European Police College (CEPOL). The most recent development is the establishment of a Visa Information System (\lIS). '. \iVhile Frontex is primariIy for coordination and risk analysis. :This political priority which is attributed ta securing the EU's external borders has again been stressed in the European Pact an In1ffiigration and Asylum adopted under the French Council Presidency in October 2008. on the one hand. 468 Sandra Lavenex . prosecutors." .. . The last step in this technological surveillance race has been the decision. based in the UK. to develop cooperation between the national training institutes for senior police officers in the member states...

1v10ni toring~ ho\vever.eu. The fiow of policy The flow of poliey has evolved in the context of the multi-annual \vork prograll1lneS an the AFS] adopted since 1999. hence. eont:ain detailed infonnation on inlplenlcntation deficits by inclj. has.-:. . ~1.eu. however. The COlTIlnission's 2007 ilnpleluentation report concluded that. has founcllittle support in thc Council. the cxpansion of policy objcctives. of best practices and informai. ".europa. likc the two before it.~. scoreboards regularly give a rather mixed picLure of progress in in1..eurojust..eu/. allow nlany exceptions.3~ Lavenex 2006a). The initial reports \.europa.frontex. both adopted an 22 SepteTIlber 2003.net. proposed in 2009 to promote the approxima:ion ..>. set up in 2000 ta oramote exchange. . set up in 2005 in Warsaw ta coordinate operational cooperation at the external border. The extensive use of non-bind ing texlS by the Connei!. cooperation has focused 1110St consistently an the fight against irregular nligration and cross-border crime. which are published openly on thc COTIln1isSlon's \vebsitc. http://www.. • Eurojust.'crc quite general and had linIe ilTlpact on the Couneil's \vork. and thc lack of infringenlcnl procedures in thc third pillar 111otivatcc! the Ccnnrnission to introduce half-yearly 'scoTeboards' reports 111onitoring progress in inlplelTICnting the treaty aud progralnnlC provisions. The shortcomings of implenlenting cooperation in JHA are perhaps not surprising. in cooperation wrth Europal. http:// PrograllJn1C.JHA has developed a dynalnic external dimension. . \\'hich \voulcl introduce a fast-track procedurc for thc adnlission of highly qualihed third-countrv \vorkcrs and \vould allOVvr thenl econ01l11C lnobilitv within the EU after an initial stay of t\\'O years in thc first country of admission. europol. set up in 2002 in The Hague to coordinate cross-boraer prosecutians. :of national asyl um recognition practices. http://www.'. • European Police Oftice (Europa!). The main achievements \vere the adoption of t'\1\'0 directives: Couneil Directive 2003/109IEC an the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in a member state of the European Union and Council Directive 2003/86IEC an the right ta falnily reunification. they have been limited to setting minimum standards. The.6.eu. In October 2007 thc COJIlmission proposed the so-called 'Blne Card'./lfra. Generally speaking. www. proved lnuch -. set up in 1993 in Lisbon to provide factual information on the Europear"'. • European Police Chiefs' Task Force (PCTF).'!r .The general overall aSSeSS111ent is rather unsatisjactory. • European Police College (CEPOL).. htto. The COlll111ission justificd the proposal on the grounds of needing to offer attractive conditions in the J / -.oreover.• European Asylum Support Office. Insofar as harmonization measures have been adopted. It now has a foreignpolicy agenda of ils O"\VD.2006). . Thcse seconcl-gencraliol1 scorcboarels. __ '. set up in 2007 in Vienna as the successor to the European Monitoring Centre on Racisrn and Xenophobia (EUMC) to provide the Community and its member states when impiementing CommJnity iaw with assistance and expertise relating to fundamerita! rights. : 1 more difficult than agreement an the alloeation of responsibility for the examination of asylum c1aims (see Box 19. drug problems. A COI111nission proposal on the adnlission of inl111igrants for tl1c pur- the basis of an extensive mandate of the European Council in 2005 with the so-called 'Scoreboarcl Plus' for rhe inlplenlcntation of thc ll.europa.. \vhich was however rejected (Case C-540/03 of 27. Substantive harmonization towards a 'common European asylum system (CEAS) by 2010~ as provided in the Hague Programme. . One of the most advanced areas of]HA integration i5 asylurn poliey.emcdda.. A constant [ea ture of ]HA cooperation is the pre-elninence of national concerns over Cornmission initiatives and.europa.. • European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). v/as reinvigorated Agreement on \vhich forrus of ilnmigration to classify as legal has proved even more controversial.Yidual nleIuber states. :- 4'. the jostling of short-term national priorities \vith 10ng-tern1 common objectives. and leave large margins of discretion to the member states. .of operational cooperation have been easier to achieve than legisla\vhile measures tive harmonization. A significant number of actions envisaged in the Action Plan .. had to be abandoned or delayed' (Coffilnission 2007i: 2).70 Sandra Lavenex --~-------------~------ Justice and Honle Affairs 471 JHA agenciesand bodies_ • European Monitonng Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). COffilnission monitoring and evaluation reports have repeatedly highlighted delays in and deviations frorn the realization of agreed eOlUlni tmcnts. fanlily reunification led the EP to file el eonlplaint \vith thc EL]. Actual policy developnlents have.ague 011 - posc of \vo1'k ancl Self-elTlploYll1ent.. ho\ve'ver~ reInained responsive to the changing conjuncrures of external events and national priorities.- . The Councifs failure to consult the EP and the possibility that children over the age of 12 could be excluded froIn the right to. set up in 2000 in Bramshill UK to approximate national police training systems.::' .plementing the VvTork progran11TIes.. http://www. vl/ithout headouarters and v'leb page. http://wwwcepol. Asyium and immigration policy In contrast to the protracted progress of internal communitarization. • Frontex. aud thus try to induce c0111pliance by 'nanling anei shaming:.europa. particularly since 2001. set up in 1999 in The Hague to share and pool intelligence ta prevent and combat serious international organized crime.eu.lon on cross-border crime and to contribute to the planning of operative actions.

as well as to Frontex activities. particularly over European provisions for criminal sanctions in serious cases. cooperatjon regarding the integration of third -coun trv na tiona15 1S deal t V. particularly the Czech government in the 2009 Council presidency. immigration has become a main focus of the European Neighb?urhood Poliey (see Chapter 17). establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the rnember state responsible for examining an asy!um application.- . I • this system 'may de facto result in additional burdens on Member St8tes tnat have limîted reception and absorption capacities and that find themseives under particular migratory pressures because of their geographicalloeation'.. ".. By the end of 2007 a11 11lelnber states were inregrated in the network of '\Jational Contact Points' an integration. Yet~ given internal bloekages against EU conlpetence aver economic migratioll) the EU has httle to oHer to these countries in return for their cooperation in secu ring the EU)s borders. 472 Sandra Lavenex Justice and Home Affairs 413 Common Europeanasylum system . • The reluctance to accept supranational rules in this sensitive field of domestic poliey has shîfted asylum cooperation ta more operational aspects. integration.' In the absence of a COlnmon policy.r in the third pillar. the examination of asylum claims based an Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003. and Thc Netherlands). the Dublin s\. • Particular attention is now pa'ld to cooperation with countiies of transit and origin of . Several other lllclnber states havc opposed thc proposal because they \vant 1. adopted on a Dutch initiative in 2004) have remained declaratory and have not led to any legislative action. L1venex and Kunz 2008). The first mobility partnerships \vere conduded v. A 2007 Comn1ission proposal for a directive providing for sanctions against etnployers of illegal third-country nationals (Comlnission 2007h) has faced the opposition of severaI menlber states.\. have claimed that a schcrne favouring third-country nationals should he introduced only after the [uU inlplcnlentation sUlumarize existjng bilateral cooperation progran1111CS "With individual member states undeI' a nev\' heading (Lavenex 2006h.. . e. Negotiatiolls an such a partnership \vith Senegal v/ere suspended in 2009 because Senegal was dissatisfied with the EC~s oHer.stem when it st2t8S that J ll1enlber states. the emphasis of cooperation has moved outvvards to the attempt ta engage countries of transit and origin in the management of migration flo\vs.. I I The ne\vest device in impleluenting the 'global approach: has been the conclusion of 'mobility pannerships~ in \vhich opportunities for (circular~.1 j I Burden-sharing remains a ehallenge. and consultations have also intensified with African countries.. that is temporaIJ\ labour migration into the EU and development cooperation are linked as well as cooperation on readlnission and the fight against irregular migration. the promotion of asylum procedures and receplion capacities(Lavenex 2006b. Initially focused on coerclve measures and the conclusion of readmission agreements. in exchange for their agreen1ent to readmit their own as well as foreign nationals \\'ho stay irregularly in the EU. the failure to ensure con1pliance by third countries has led to the re-emergence of a more comprehensive vision of ext. although the European Refugee =und ta support reception.g. . and are riddied with delicate compromises and open questions.". Froln the outset of cooperation in the nlid-1980s) the emphasis has been on the fight against illegal immigration rather than on which legal imlnigrants to accept (Lavenex and V/allace 2005)." . Most instrun1ents relate to cntry controls.::'.r1 th bv a (soft) mode of eoordination betVvTen the j J • The cornerstone of EU asylum policy is the system of exclusive rBSponsibility for. The proposal has) ho\vever~ raised objections fr0111 several member states. More significant sums of money have been allocated for border controls i:'] Consequently. " .820 million for the same period).~"'. the definition of the term refugee.' - "" \?' .. the existing partnerships reflect velY little innovation as they largely global competition for highly skil1ed workers.usrria. because of sovereignty concerns. and asylum procedures. the bor- l der fund (€ 1.~ ~.ernal migration cooperation and the launch of the so-called 'Global Approach~ in December 2005. asylum-seekers.0 prioritize their d0111CStic programnlcs (the LJK) or they are hostile to EU cOlnpetencc over econo111ic il1ll11igratîon (A. Ho... These deliberationc.. One of the lnain developn1ents in police l. more hesitantly. The visa facilitation agreements offered to eastern neighbours._ . J ' Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matfers The dOlninance ofnon-binding instnlnlcnts and the focus on operational cooperation havc been even stronge. .". These 'Phase l' directives were adopted only arter significant delays. . The 'Colnmon Basie Principles an lntegration). and voluntary return measures in the member states has more than tripled from €216 million (2000-4) ta just under €7CO million (2005-10). Indeed. through the creation of a European Asylum Support Oftice. This instrument replaces the Dublin Convention and its implementation is linked ta the Eurodac database. of free-TI10Venlent Tights for their own nationals.wellas.". It also cails for a re-examination of the cornerstone of EU asylum cooperation. Lavenex and Kunz 2008). • The mutual recognition of asylum determination outcomes im:::liied by the system of responsibi!îty allocation necessitated minimum standards on reception conditions. remain limited. Gennanv.ith Cap Verde and Moldova in 2008. New 111ember states. this cooperation has focused on the conclusion of readmission agreements as ·. • A Commission Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System (CEAS) of 2007 (Commission 2007J) gives a critica! assessment of progress achieved so far and identîfies the need for fuller harmonization of substenti've and procedural asylum law in order to realize a CEAS by 2010. In the light of enduring inlll1Îgration pressure and of the internal resistance to stronger legislative integratioTI. Î j .akers. Mainly geared toward enhancing migration control in tnose countries.::-. the second edition of Vv'hich was published in 2007 (European Communities 2007).v into an EU l-landbook on lntegration for Policy-1\-1. . . o ! i .

. which ren1ains the same in substancc. Thi5 cooperation centres on the principle of mutual recognition. while cooperation in the judicial sphere was initially slo\ver to develop. and the devel. especial1y in thc arca of clata protection. .. . approxinlation of national substantive arid procedural laws. . Force and the European Police College. had to contend "VITith problems. it has been one of the lllost dynamie aspects of JHA cooperation since the Tampere European Council (de Kerchove aud Weyeu1bergh 2002). . as well as expertise and technical support activities . Thc justification for the Lisbon refornls dra\vs hcavily on public concerns about internal security and citize. . and civil liberties groups for failing to comply with European data protection rules. . Gilles de Kerchove. PNR has raised grave concerns o.IBA Couneil aclopted a Strategy on the externa} aspects of ]HA (Council Document 14366/3/05 REV 3). having largely to. Cooperation wi th thc US 11a5 been particularly clase and has spurrecl rnajor controversies both between ElJ institutions and bet\veen the EU and civil-rights activists. siInilar to those faced by the other EU agcncies. '-~'_. the Prum Treaty and the proliferation of intergovenunental consultations confirm the continuity of concentric circles in thi5 area of cooperation. as illustrated . It e!iminates the use of extradition • a regulaT EU agency. also faced problems of a lack of trust and complex interaction. restrictive measures. . i ! I - - been easier to adopt tha:1 those harmonizing the rights of individuals..• The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a member state with a vievv tO -rhe arrest and surrender by another member state of a person being sought for a c(. - . 1 .. . \vas annulled by the Ee] in 2006 because the EP had not been adequately consulted.. These developments underhne the blurring of distinctions between nations of internal and external security. ~..g. 1revi had its roots in fighting terrorislll. Ils first representative.ns' cxpe. was appointed to fiU the post.. In the meantime. _A second 111otivation is dissatisfaction "VIrith thc implclllcntation of agrced • . As with efforts ta combat imn1igration.----------------_.. hov. they move]HA cooperation closer and closer into traditional dOlnains of the CFSP (sec Chapter 18). The bon1bings in Madrid (March 2004) and London Ouly 2005) indueed l1eN initiatives. . Europol. Apart [ro111 1. .. such as the establishment of a special EU Counter. It has.. and problems associated with diversity have clearly increa5ed: pro111pting concern about how to invigorate the operational aspects of police cooperation.~ =- 1<<". which fonns thc basis of the Inain instrument adopted so far in this area. These networks are to address the main ilnpedilnent ta more effective cooperation betvveen national police forces~ \vhich is the need for Inutual understanding and trust between highly diverse domestic systenls of la\v enforcement (Occhipinti 2003). . as in the case of migration. i airlines flying ta the US ta provide US authorities with information an their passengers. In cOluparison.:. 1 .4).. Eurobaron1eter 2008). With enlargement both issues the need for tn1st . . ancl at thc end of 2005 the . by the protracted process of agreeing the Framework Decision on certain procedural -·I-ights in criminal proceedings that has been on the table since 2004 (Commission I -I I - • I .ken over thc far-rcaching changes proposed by the Constitutional TIeaty) continucs that trend.he facilitation of infonnation exchangc betwecn nationallaw-enforcement authorities through Europal and its network of European Liaison Officers (ELOs).Terrorism CoordinatoL 1hi5 ne\v office has. . >* 47-4 Sandra Lavenex Justice and Home Affairs ---------------------. stood do\vn fro111 the post in 2007 partly over his lack of operational powers and partly because of the overall reluctance \vithin lllelllber states ta supply inforn1ation regarding anti-ten'or activities ar to develop the legal instruments specified in the Aetion Plan. I '~. • The 11 September 200~i :errorist attacks in the US spurred the adoption of the Frame'vvork Decision on the European arrest warrant in 2002. have . TelTorist attacks have also spurred cooperation._--- 475 eooperation was the decision by thc. .. Eurojust .~ . the European Data Protection Supervisor (PeteI H. the European arrest "varrant (EA\\I. a senior Council official "VIrith extensive]HA experience and international contacts. The 2004 US-EU passenger nan1e record (PNR) agrcement: \vhich requires European .- .ustinx). . and the Trcaty of Lisbon (ToL).U10ng the EP.ctations that the EU should do something about it (e.JHA Conneil to replace the Europol Convention with a 'thircl pillar' Decision by 2010 (Council DOCUlnent 5055/07 EUROPOL 2 of ] 9 April 2(08). however.. - . see Box 19. 1 ano is oased an the princiDle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters. and just ten days after the 9/11 attacks on the US in 2001. integration in police matters has focused on networking and the development of C0111mOn operational practices such as through the Police Chiefs: 1as1<.minal orosecution or a custodia! sentence.:. the implementation of the EAW has encountered difficulties (Lavenex 2007) .. the creation of Eurojust. such as the EAW. The agenda for reform JH_A occupiecl a central stagc in recent European integration efforts. ' .. '.- • in surn. _. . • o Ir: the absence of EU harmcnization of criminal law. Gijs de Vries. i.rever. In 2007. .':· ._~--. The successor agreement.. This will facilitate adaptation of E uropol's lnandate by omitting (somctilnes lengthy) ratiucation procedures by national parlialnents and turn it into European arrest warrant • The Ţampe~e European Counei! adopted four basic princip!es for establishing el com- mall E'Jropean judicial space: mutual recognition of judicial decisions. cOInn1itlllents in particu lelr in third-pi1lar issues. The extern al dilnension of poliee and judicial eooperation has also expanded. the European Council adopted the EU Aetion Plan on Combating Terrorism.opment of the exter-nal dimension of criminal law. was adopted under treat)' provisions that do not require the EP's opinion.. and rrontex havc aU concludccl coopcration agreenlc:nts \vith a series of European and non-European countries. ! .-2004d) .

~'<o. edn. · _.:< -.· - t -:1. . Cooperation among twentv. . . · . . \vhich allo\vs for the transfer of third-pillar matters ta the first piUar by a unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers." ..: . .· . ~. J . .. . • ..The EuropeanUnionand InternalSecurity:· Guardian of the People? (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan). ~ . . .:_:·_. . . _. - .: :". ... here\vith) rhe abolition of the piUar stt:.' :"::: :~~". . ~. .. .. however. . . 1·:. .:. Monar) J.uClure.. . . . Inutua1 recognition.. '. J:.--- -. .... '." : .-:~' · -... --. . ~-' . Germany's support for this shifl coulel be won...:: .:--. . . It is generally expected that cxtending (first pillar\ decision-making rules will reduce the risks of blockages and lo\vestcommon-denominator agreements in the Council... <-:. ~. and initiatives by menlber ••• _ ••• _ . .. ._- " Etts.<. . . . .":. democratic control \vill be enhanced by increasing scrutiny by national parhaments) both as guardians of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and as participants in the evaluation of the vvork of the ]HA bodies and agencies. . ." · . In the absence of political \viU.' :.. - . -t~-:--.•• •• . . . . The final cOlupromise wiU bring the AFSJ as an arca of (shared cOlllpetence' closer to the Comn1unity methoc. ~i ". .. ' o. .. .-. .. · "..' . . '. A. . -- - - · · · -'f:·:... · :: . ' " ' • • • •~ .. .. JUSlIce cH1U nUfTle I-\IIdlrS 'U I The ToL inclucles far-reaching reform proposals that centre on thc'reun111cation' of Jl-IA ... . and before the internal market.. • J . : . - '.. T. :j j : .... I .. .~~:. .. . thereby increasing the EU's decision-making capacity and the quality of those decisions.. FURTHER READING For a fairly com. see Geddes (2008)..~. . :.·~ · ..--~'~.: - '.:... :. . A.. .. : /. · . -' .. 1'..' .1nto a COll1mon general legal frarnework.. (2003). and onthe effects of EU policies on themember states see Ette and Faist(2007).. . V. 1 i ·i.. however. ..~ ".. ~: :'1-' . ~.. and play in [avour of the cxploitation of the ToL OI' law and policing. '-. - - . -. ~ - - . • o_~:.. tiOll and centralized ElI structures on the one hand and through enhaneed coordination of national structures on the other renlains unsettled.I·~·:. .- '...": ·. . :~ . .. " ' . •. . EU Criminal Lav.. The Europeaniza tionof National Policies andPoJÎtics of> . :. '. . . .' .orehensive overview ofthe JHA acquis see Peers (2007} and Mitsilegas . . .' :. '. 0' . EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford:.Mitsilegas (2009)'· gives an excellent introduct'lon Înto EU criminallaw'cooperation. Mitsiiegas. /mmigration and European In tegra tion: TowardsFortressEurope?. security. .and Rees 'J\I(2003).:. ~ · .I -:-:J:-.. ... -'_.." ~... . .. OcchipintÎ. 0 •• '- :. . ! - · .. -' . deeply pohticized issues such as migration and criminalla\v. (2007) (eds. . .":'." Conclusions Initially justified in limited terms as compensatory nleasures ta the abolition of internal border contro1s.:.-:~ :.. _ .. .' - ." . There are linlitations an what can be achievcd through dependence an transgovernmenta] networks.. Apart from_co-decision \vith the Ep.. 1-<.... . . . ' . .. - .- ":... . . and they posc major problems for scrutin)' and transparency. and Falst.--.. J D. : . -" ... . . The Politics of EU PoliceCooperation: Towards a European FBI? (Bou de r. I social policies. now metaphorically fralned as the creation of an 'area of freedolll.-. CO: LV nneR ie n ner) .:·. - · - -' '.' ~-"~ . _.. .-' -.'. Most of these changes can be introduced also irrespective of the ToL through the use of the so-called (passerelle~ of the existing Article 42 TEU.-::·----. Thc re-elnergence of intergovernnlcntal cooperation outside the EU and the preference of operational coordinatian over legislative harmonization both point in this direction... Beyond these symbolic steps...4Jb ~a ndra Lavenex · .. . l·'· --_.. ..-- -:::t. "::-.-:-. '...:: : : -. Geddes. '.. :.' : '. i. ~ . .. ..:--.. ~... ei: aÎ..--' .. . ~ .:' -:':. '.. . On the development of immigration policy.":. . . rvlitsilegas.and Occhipintî(2003) an poiice cooperation.: "<... .~. . S. . _.' . • . · /'-:. '. :. .e could equally \ve11 oeeur.. · . -'. ...~. ". -: . Anl0ng these tensions the relationship betvveen integration through increased harnl0niza. ...:.. '.1 seven 111cnlbcr govcrnnlents 111ay increase pressures for comnlon rules and effective n1onitorÎng of their implementation... : . .. the Council 1S free to 'determine the relevant voting conditions'. and. The possibihty for national parliaments to block a legislative process when it is deen1ed to be in breach of the subsidiarity principle has.' . which means that this 501ution could go beyond or remain below the level of communitarization foreseen in the ToL.. . ... "- - .' .· · . .. and justice~.-.. . (fv1 anchester: fViB nchesterUn iversity Press). .." · ·. '. . In a fidel \vherc conccrns abolIt civil liberties are povverful) these lnethods have regulaTIy favourccl 'security' aver 'freedoll1' and 'justicc'.' ~ " I i .1 and cxtend qualified nlajority voting and co-decision to legal lnigration ancl Inost arcas of crin11nal governrnents. . . .' .. •• · . the abolition of current res1rictions an Ee] powers should enhance compliance \vith ]HA legislation. environn1entaL 01' . integration in these sensitive fields of state sovereignty renlains cOllstrained by n1ultiple tensions and difficult comproDlises.. · . ~ · .. '.'. " :.' . ." . '. .· ~. - · T<~:"'. ..J...V(2009).. . J - -.. ' :~- :.. Furthern10re." " ." .::. In using thi5 possibility. · -" ... _. ': ... . . cooperation in]HA. . also raised concerns about the potential obstructive use of thi5 right in · · · the use of the 'passerel!e' for nl0ving towards thc COlnmunity 11lethocl of decision-n1aking. however. i .. - :. · - . (2008).": ~. o • • • •• ••• • • • • • • ImrnigratÎon (Basingstoke: PaJgrave Macmillan).' ... _: . : :. "." •..!! - . .(2007). . has been elevated to a central o bj ective of the EU. Peers . 2nd .. ::.). · :-. ._ ..~ :"." · :".":-. · . '" ~. ·. hcnvevcr.......' . ... The Treaty of Lisbon lists it second after the overall comlnitment to peace promotion..:. ~ . only by inserting an explicit clause on the right of lnenlber states to deternline the nunlbers of economic in11nigrants... . -. · ':"'. the opposit.-> .. ... .' . . -.. ..(2003).. Oxford University Press). .. :... "./ (London:Hart). .~. . . - ..

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