2019 Deans Circle Criminal Law Perlas Bernabe Cases PDF

CRIMINAL LAW
I. REVISED PENAL CODE -BOOK I

A. General principles
1. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita
2. Applicability and effectivity of the RPC
a. Generality
b. Territoriality
c. Prospectivity
3. Pro reo principle
B. Felonies
1. Criminal liabilities and felonies
a. Grave vs. less grave vs. light felonies
b. Aberratio ictus, error in personae, and praeter intentionem
c. Impossible crime
d. Stages of execution
e. Continuing crimes
f. Complex crimes and composite crimes
2. Circumstances affecting criminal liability
a. Justifying circumstances
PEOPLE v. ERNIE INCIONG Y ORENSE

GR No. 213383| June, 22, 2015
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
The elements of self defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
The requisite unlawful aggression from the victim, Lumbera, is absent. Instead, it was accused-
appellant who was the aggressor, having fired the sumpak at Lumbera when they crossed paths by the
side of the road, and when the latter had fallen to the ground, hit his head twice with the said weapon.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, charged with Murder, was having a drinking spree with a certain Bico and
Eman in a restaurant or carinderia at around 11:30 in the morning of July 18, 2008, located at
Banay-Banay II, San Jose, Batangas opposite the building of Metro Batangas Concrete Mix
Corporation. Thereafter, victim Jumar Lumbera (Lumbera) crossed the street going to the
carinderia and, as he reached the other side, he encountered accused-appellant who suddenly
poked him with an iron pipe, which turned out to be a homemade firearm or sumpak. The accused-
appellant fired the sumpak, hitting Lumbera in the stomach, causing him to slowly fall down to the
ground. Then approached the fallen Lumbera and hit the latter's head twice with the sumpak.
Thereafter, accused-appellant hastily left.
Unfortunately, while Lumbera was immediately brought to the hospital for medical treatment, he
died as a result of the gunshot wound in his abdomen, as well as traumatic head injuries.
Prosecution witness Elena Villa de Leon (de Leon) witnessed the incident as she happened to be
near Lumbera while crossing the street headed towards the side of the carinderia. Upon reaching
the side of the road, they met accused-appellant, whom she duly identified in open court as the
person who poked and shot Lumbera with an iron pipe.
Accused-appellant admitted having shot Lumbera but claimed self-defense. He averred that on the
date and time in question, he was at the tricycle terminal near the Metro Batangas Concrete Mix
Corporation where Lumbera worked when the latter suddenly approached, boxed, and threatened
to kill him. Thereafter, Lumbera went inside his office. Then, someone shouted that Lumbera was
making his way back and when accused-appellant looked behind him, he saw Lumbera pointing a
sumpak at him. They struggled for the possession of the weapon and it was when accused-appellant
finally took hold of it that he fired at Lumbera. When accused-appellant saw that Lumbera had
fallen to the ground, he immediately left the place and went into hiding until he was finally arrested
in Tanay, Rizal.
The Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. In convicting accused-appellant, the RTC found that he failed to satisfy the first and most
important element of self-defense, i.e., unlawful aggression. Also, the RTC held that treachery
attended the killing because even if the attack had been frontally made, it did not preclude the
attendance of treachery, the attack being no less unexpected and sudden. The CA affirmed the
conviction.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of Murder? (YES)
HELD:
Inciong is guilty of Murder

In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;. and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
An accused who invokes self-defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements, the most
important of which is unlawful aggression, whether complete or incomplete. In this case, the
requisite unlawful aggression from the victim, Lumbera, is patently absent. Instead, and as aptly
pointed out by the CA, it was accused-appellant who was the aggressor, having fired the sumpak at
Lumbera when they crossed paths by the side of the road, and when the latter had fallen to the
ground, hit his head twice with the said weapon.
Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present

when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The assault on Lumbera
ensured that accused-appellant would be able to consummate the crime without risk to his own
person, hence, the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
b. Exempting circumstances
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER RINGOR UMAWID

G.R. No. 208719 | June 09, 2014
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the
same admits to have committed the crime, but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such
insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.
Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to substantiate his plea of
insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only showed that he evaluated
Umawid’s mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March 2003. As such, Dr. Quincina’s
testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity. Umawid’s defense of insanity remained unsubstantiated
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Vicente Ringor and his granddaughter, 2-year old Maureen were in the terrace of their house when
Umawid suddenly came and attacked Vicente with a panabas. Vicente was able to evade the blows,
but Maureen was hit on her abdomen and back causing her death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied,
he walked away.
Umawid then went to the next house where his nephew Jeffrey Mercado was sleeping. Jeffrey was
awakened by the commotion and saw his uncle charging towards him. He, along with his sister and
cousin rushed to a room, but Umawid was able to stop Jeffrey from closing the door. Jeffrey was
cornered by Umawid. The former covered his head with his arms as Umawid delivered fatal blows.
This caused the mutilation of Jeffrey’s fingers. Umawid only left when he saw Jeffrey, who
pretended to be dead, bloodied and leaning on the wall.
Umawid was charged with the crimes of Murder for the death of Maureen and Frustrated Murder in
the case of Jeffrey.
Umawid set up the defense of insanity but did not take the witness stand. Dr. Arthur Quincina
stated that Umawid was manifesting psychotic symptoms during May 2002, February 2003 and
March 2003. However, he could not tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time
of the commission of the crimes.
ISSUES:
1. Will Umawid’s defense of insanity prosper?
2. Is the qualifying circumstance of treachery present in both incidents?
3. Is aberratio ictus present in this case?
4. Can Umawid be convicted of the complex crime of Murder and Attempted Murder so far as
Maureen and Vicente is concerned?
HELD:
No. Umawid’s defense of insanity cannot prosper due to lack of clear and convincing evidence.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking
the same admits to have committed the crime, but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such
insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to substantiate
his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only showed that he
evaluated Umawid’s mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March 2003. As such, Dr.
Quincina’s testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity. Umawid’s defense of insanity remained
unsubstantiated and, hence, he was properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA as criminally liable.
Yes. Treachery is present in both cases for both the victims were minors during the time of the
commission of the crime.
While it was not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death of
Maureen, who was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an
adult of a minor child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureen’s killing to Murder. The killing of a
child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the
weakness of the victim due to her tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.
There was also treachery in the case of Jeffrey. While it is true that treachery may also be
appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, a
review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that it was not impossible for Jeffrey to put
up a defense against Umawid’s attacks.
In fact, Jeffrey was sufficiently informed of Umawid’s impending assault upon him as he saw the
latter charging at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent Umawid from entering the house, albeit he
was unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this, Jeffrey was still capable of mounting a defense against
Umawid’s attacks – but it was simply unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he crouched and
covered his head with his arms. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated on account of
Jeffrey’s minority, considering that he was just 15 years of age when Umawid attacked him.
Yes. Aberratio Ictus may be present in this case.

The Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow
therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente who was Umawid’s intended
target. In this regard, Umawid’s single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted Murder of
Vicente; and (b) Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as species of complex
crime defined under Article 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a compound crime
where a single act produces two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies. Based on the foregoing,
Umawid should have been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder and Attempted
Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1) of the RPC.
No. Umawid cannot be convicted with the aforementioned complex crime as it was not alleged
in the information.
However, considering that the information only charged him with the Murder of
Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a complex crime because to do so would
be violative of his right to due process. “An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him
of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
violation of this constitutional right.” (Burgos v. Sandiganbayan)
c. Mitigating circumstances
d. Aggravating circumstances
PEOPLE VS. DANIEL MATIBAG Y DE VILLA

G.R. No. 206381 |March 25, 2015
In People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the party attacked.
Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it
impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
DUHAN, who just came from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners’ association of
Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking in a street in the subdivision when MATIBAG confronted
DUHAN. Without a warning, MATIBAG delivered a fist blow on the left cheek of DUHAN causing him
to teeter backwards. MATIBAG then pulled out his gun and shot DUHAN who fell face-first on the
pavement. While DUHAN was in that position, MATIBAG shot him several times. In the autopsy
report, it was confirmed that DUHAN suffered gunshot wounds in the head and chest which lead to
his death.
In his defense, MATIBAG alleged self-defense – that he approached DUHAN and extended his hands
wanting to settle a previous misunderstanding, but DUHAN pushed it away provoking MATIBAG to
punch him in the face. MATIBAG saw DUHAN pulling pulling out something and fearing that it was a
gun, MATIBAG immediately drew his own gun and shot DUHAN.
The RTC and the CA found him guilty of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
ISSUES:
1. Is the qualifying circumstance of treachery present even if the attack was frontal? (YES)
HELD:
Treachery is present even if the attack of MATIBAG was frontal as it was done in a sudden and
unexpected maner which rendered it impossible for DUHAN to defend himself
Under Article 14, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack does not
necessarily rule out treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the party attacked.
The prosecution was able to prove that MATIBAG, who was armed with a gun, confronted DUHAN,
and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest. Although the attack was frontal,
the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for DUHAN to
defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed.
PEOPLE VS. EUGENE SAMUYA

G.R. No. 213214 |April 20, 2015
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the party attacked. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so
sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.
Eugene’s attack on Gabriel was so swift and sudden, and without any warning. Immediately upon his
arrival and without any exchange of words, Eugene pulled out his gun and shot Gabriel. Although the
attack was frontal, it was done so suddenly and unexpectedly.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
FLORENIO, ANTHONY, JONEL, and the victim GABRIEL were outside FLORENIO’s store when RUDY
arrived and asked the whereabouts of NAT-NAT. ANTHONY replied that NAT-NAT was not there.
RUDY approached ANTHONY and cocked his gun at him. At that time, EUGENE arrived and without
any warning, shot GABRIEL in the chest. GABRIEL was able to run away with EUGENE chasing him.
Eventually, GABRIEL was found dead.
EUGENE claimed self-defense. On their (with RUDY) way to FLORENIO’s store to buy whisky, he
saw GABRIEL rushing towards them with a knife in his hand and about to attack him. To defend
himself, he drew his gun and shot GABRIEL. EUGENE was charged and convicted of Murder with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
ISSUES:
1. Is EUGENE guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery?
2. Should self-defense as justifying circumstance be appreciated in EUGENE’s favor?
HELD:
EUGENE is guilty of Murder qualified by treachery penalized under Article 248, RPC.
Under Article 14, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
party attacked. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden
and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.
EUGENE’s attack on GABRIEL was so swift and sudden, and without any warning. Immediately
upon his arrival and without any exchange of words, EUGENE pulled out his gun and shot GABRIEL.
Although the attack was frontal, it was so sudden and unexpected which made it impossible for
GABRIEL to defend himself.
Self-defense cannot be appreciated in favor of EUGENE as there was absence of unlawful

aggression on the part of GABRIEL.
It is settled that without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. Unlawful aggression must be actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger,
and not merely threatening and intimidating attitude. It was found by the RTC that EUGENE’s
testimony remained uncorroborated and no witness was ever presented to support his story. Even
RUDY denied seeing GABRIEL rushing towards them.
MANNY RAMOS v. PEOPLE

GR No. 218466| January 23, 2017
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. There are two
(2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or
permit to carry it outside his residence
The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the
prosecution. In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which
led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to
recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was
recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot
simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo
Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon
accused-appellants having an altercation with the victim, Rolando Necesito (Rolando). From his
vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and
saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters
away from where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive gunshots, making
him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth
shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando's demise,
Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene.
The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to conduct
an investigation from which were gathered the following evidence and information: (a) a piece of
bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando purportedly had
a previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the same was settled before the
barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the time of the
incident. An autopsy was likewise conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there were four (4)
incised wounds on his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and five (5) gunshot wounds on his
body; that based on the nature and sizes of his wounds, it was possible that the firearm used was of
the same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been inflicted by a single person.
For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly invoked the defenses of denial and alibi.
Essentially, they insisted that they were somewhere else when the incident occurred. In addition,
Ramos maintained that the declarations of Reynaldo against him were motivated by a personal
grudge, while Nacional claimed that the corpus delicti was not proven with exact certainty since the
cadaver that was exhumed and examined was already in an advanced stage of decomposition,
having been interred for more than a month.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for the crime of
Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
RULING:
The accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple Murder, and not Murder with the
Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a) that
a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is
not parricide or infanticide
In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had established
beyond reasonable doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and eventually, killed
Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo
stick), which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks. Thus, such killing was attended
with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which warrants accused-appellants'
conviction for Murder.
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the
corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence.
The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the
prosecution. In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds
which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were
able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm
was recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. Having failed in this respect, the Court
cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
e. Alternative circumstances
f. Absolutory causes
3. Persons liable and degree of participation
a. Principals, accomplices, and accessories
b. Conspiracy and proposal
C. Penalties
1. Penalties that may be imposed and retroactive effect of penal laws
2. Classification
3. Duration and effects
JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205033 | June 18, 2013
Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory
penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. The use of the word “perpetual” in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend
on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty.
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision ― such as Article 41 in
this case ― directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence,
despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains
bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently,
disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City. Further, it is well to note that the use of the word
“perpetual” in the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect,
does not depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in People vs. Jalosjos, convicting Jalosjos
by final judgment of 2 counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently,
he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for
each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
pursuant to Art. 41 of the RPC.
On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term (Order
of Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison. On
April 26, 2012, Jalosjos applied to register as a voter. However, because of his previous conviction,
his application was denied by Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB)
prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the MTCC.
Pending resolution, he file a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City. In his CoC, petitioner
stated that he is eligible for said office and that he is a registered voter.
MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which
in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. RTC affirmed the denial of his petition.
Meanwhile, 5 petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions, praying for
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. COMELEC denied/cancelled the
CoC filed by Jalosjos due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply
with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Jalosjos is disqualified to run for mayor due to his perpetual absolute
disqualification. (YES)
HELD:
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for mayor.
Petitioner claims that Art. 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been
removed. The argument is untenable. The Supreme Court observes that the conflict between RPC
and LGC may be properly reconciled. Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be
construed in connection with those already exiting in relation to the same subject matter and
should be made to harmonize and stand together, if possible. In this case, while Section 40(a) of the
LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the
time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the
lawimposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,which has the effect of disqualifying the
convict to run for elective office.
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for
elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the
presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense
indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which
the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common
good.
Under the principle of lex specialis derogate generali, general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which
the special provisions are not applicable. This means that where two statutes are of equal
application, the one specially designed therefore should prevail. Consequently, section 40(a) of the
LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision ― such as Article 41 in this case ― directly
and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of
two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to
run as mayor for Zamboanga City. Further, it is well to note that the use of the word “perpetual” in
the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not
depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty.
4. Application
a. RPC provisions
b. Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103)
c. Three-fold rule d. Subsidiary imprisonmen
5. Graduation of penalties
6. Accessory penalties
7. Execution and service
a. RPC provisions
b. Probation Law (PD 968, as amended)
c. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (RA 9344, as amended)
D. Extinction of criminal liability
PEOPLE VS. TOUKYO

G.R. No. 225593| March 20, 2017
Criminal liability is totally extinguished: By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
Upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.Notably, there is no civil liability
that arose from this case, there being no private complainant to begin with.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Agent Peralta of the PDEA-CAR received information from an informant regarding the
illegal drug selling activities of Toukyo. After confirming via text message that Toukyo was indeed
selling a brick of marijuana for ₱2,000.00, the PDEA-CAR sent a buy-bust team to entrap Toukyo.
After Toukyo showed Agent Peralta the brick of marijuana, Agent Peralta executed the pre-
arranged signal, leading to Toukyo's arrest.
In a letter, Director General Atty. Benjamin C. De Los Santos of the Bureau of Corrections informed
the Court that Toukyo had already died on October 15, 2014, attaching thereto a Certification
issued by the Bureau's Officer-in-Charge for its Rehabilitation Operations Division, as well as the
Death Report issued by the Medical Officer.
ISSUES:
1. Is TOUKYO’s criminal liability extinguished?
HELD:
TOUKYO’s criminal liability is extinguished.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
Upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. Notably, there is no civil liability that
arose from this case, there being no private complainant to begin with.
PEOPLE v. AGAPITO DIMAALA Y ARELA

G.R. No. 225054 | July 17, 2017
The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. Corollarily, the claim for
civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on
a source of obligation other than delict.
In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other
than the subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of
accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
FACTS:
On May 8, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon found Agapito Dimaala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder for the treacherous killing of Rodrigo Marasigan. Accused-appellant
appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC's decision.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the CA's Decision, but later on filed a
Motion to Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of Entry of Judgment, which the
Court granted. Following the closure and termination of the case, the Court issued an Entry of
Judgment in its Resolution dated September 21, 2016. Meanwhile, the Court received a Letter from
the Bureau of Corrections informing it that accused-appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the
New Bilibid Prison Hospital.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto, is ipso facto extinguished in lieu of accused-appellant's death pending his
conviction
HELD:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon
In People v. Culas, citing People v. Layag, the Court explained the effects of the death of an accused
pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.
In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other
than the subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of
accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
PEOPLE v. ARMANDO DIONALDO Y EBRON

GR No. 207949 | September 9, 2015
As provided under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, Criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Renato's death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and
ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case insofar as Renato is
dismissed.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: On July 23, 2014, the Court rendered its Resolution in this case finding accused-appellants
Armando Dionaldoy Ebron, Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos, and
Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
Accused-appellants collectively moved for reconsideration thereof, which the Court denied with
finality in its Resolution dated September 24, 2014. On even date, the Court received a letter from
the Bureau of Corrections dated September 16, 2014 informing them of the death of one of the
accused-appellants in this case, Renato, on June 10, 2014.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the criminal liability of Renato Dionaldo y Ebron is extinguished by his
death?
HELD:
As Renato's death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution in this
case, i.e., when his appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, his criminal liability is
totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Amistoso, the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently,
Renato's death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and
ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case insofar as Renato is
dismissed.
DOLORES DIAZ v. PEOPLE

GR No. 208113 | December 02, 2015
An extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of
the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable
where the facts established by the evidence so warrant as in this case.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: An Information for estafa was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 5 (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from various
merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on consignment basis from
respondent. During arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
Respondent who claimed to be a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling

goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter
shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted.
Respondent averred that on February 20, 1996, she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas
and bath towels worth P35,300.00 to petitioner as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated
February 20, 1996 duly signed by the latter. However, on March 20, 1996, petitioner was only able
to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored
respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.
In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as
an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift
checks (GCs) from respondent on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign
a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last
transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled. However, she denied having
received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent on February 20, 1996.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Diaz is guilty of Estafa?
HELD:
Diaz is not guilty of Estafa
The RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa. The RTC found that the prosecution failed to
establish any intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud respondent and, thus, could not be held
criminally liable. However, it adjudged petitioner civilly liable. At the outset, it is noteworthy to
mention that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or
"greater weight of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant as in this case.
CULAS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 211166 | June 5, 2017

Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the accused
Death of the accused prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
case against him.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: In a Resolution dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the Decision of the Court of Appeals
finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory
Rape.
However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the Court received a
Letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's death as
evidenced by the Certificate of Death.
ISSUES:
1. Is CULAS’ criminal liability extinguished by reason of his death?
HELD:
CULAS’ criminal liability is extinguished
Accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused. Criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However,
it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the
victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil
action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules
E. Civil liability in criminal cases
II. REVISED PENAL CODE - BOOK II

A. Crimes against National Security and Laws of Nations
B. Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State
C. Crimes against Public Order
D. Crimes against Public Interest
HILARIO LAMSEN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 227069 | November 22, 2017
The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and
the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
The document examiner testified during cross-examination that the questioned signatures were not
written by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the subject deed was
falsified, the Court, however, found this declaration unreliable and inconclusive, as it is inconsistent
with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said Report, the document examiner found
that no definite conclusion can be rendered because the documents submitted by the prosecution were
mere photocopies of the original.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that Aniceta owned a parcel of land located at Barrio Malabo, Valenzuela
City, covered by TCT No. V-16641. When Aniceta passed away, one of her surviving heirs, Teresita,
went to the former's house to look for the owner's duplicate title of the subject property, but the
same was allegedly nowhere to be found. Accordingly, Teresita executed an affidavit of loss, which
was annotated on the title on file with the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City (RD). Teresita also
filed a petition for the issuance of second owner's duplicate copy before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
The said petition, however, was dismissed on the basis of the opposition of Lamsen, who claimed
that the original copy of the owner's duplicate title could not have been lost because it was with
him. Meanwhile, the RD informed Teresita that somebody requested for the registration of a deed
of sale involving the subject property. Thus, she proceeded to the RD but was informed that the
requesting party had withdrawn all the papers; hence, she asked for the Book of the RD to
photocopy the withdrawal aforementioned. Thereafter, she went to the Notarial Section of Manila
to get a certified true copy of the subject deed but was given a mere photocopy thereof, since the
original was no longer on file. She then submitted the photocopy of the deed to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination, as the signatures of spouses Aniceta and Nestor thereon appeared to
be forged. Upon examination, the document examiner confirmed that the deed was indeed falsified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lamsen is guilty of falsification of public documents under Article 172 (1) of the
RPC. (NO)
HELD:
Lamsen is not guilty of falsification of public documents under Article 172 (1) of the RPC.
The prosecution must establish the fact of falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and convincing
evidence, as the same is never presumed. Withal, the fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the
person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
The document examiner testified during cross-examination that the questioned signatures were not
written by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the subject deed was
falsified, the Court, however, found this declaration unreliable and inconclusive, as it is inconsistent
with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said Report, the document examiner
found that no definite conclusion can be rendered because the documents submitted by the
prosecution were mere photocopies of the original.
The document examiner further clarified that there are other handwriting elements which could
not be determined in the photocopy, such as minor details which could not be visibly detected by
the naked eye. Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used to examine the questioned
and standard signatures of spouses Aniceta and Nestor, no valid comparison can be had between
them, thereby rendering the document examiner’s declaration inconclusive to support a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.
ADINA B. MANANSALA v. PEOPLE

GR No. 215424 | December 09, 2015
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same
Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as
follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b)
he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated
by him are absolutely false.
Manansala is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as
UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the
documents she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along
that Siy never made any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c)
despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a
statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter
was terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy (Siy), former Vice President for
Finance of Urban Finance and Leasing Corporation, now UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation
(UMC), instructed her secretary, Marissa Bautista (Bautista), to withdraw via Automated Teller
Machine (ATM) the amount of P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands
bank accounts. However, Bautista was not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so
she took it upon herself to get such amount from the petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she
forgot to inform Siy where she got the money.
On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao (Lacanilao) informed Siy that as
per the Petty Cash Replenishment Report (subject report) of the same date prepared by UMC Petty
Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00 which
remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she
immediately rectified the situation by issuing two (2) checks to reimburse UMC's petty cash
account. Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the subject report by deleting the entry relating
to Siy's alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded.
On June 11, 1999, Lacanilao reported the incident to UMC President Conrado G. Marty (Marty) in
March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report, re-insert the entry
relating to Siy's alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and repeatedly
fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject document, Siy was
administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. Siy was terminated from her job
and Lacanilao succeeded the former.
The foregoing prompted Siy to pursue criminal charges against Lacanilao, and Manansala for
Falsification of Private Documents before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65
(MeTC). Manansala maintained that she was just following Lacanilao's orders as the latter is her
superior. She added that when Lacanilao instructed her to reprint the subject report.
The MeTC both found Lacanilao and Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
crime of Falsification of Private Documents. The MeTC tagged Lacanilao as the mastermind of the
crime as she benefited the most.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto. Manansala moved for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Undaunted, she elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for review. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling. Dissatisfied, Manansala moved for reconsideration, however, denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is Manansala guilty for the crime of Falsification of Private Documents?
HELD:
Manansala guilty for the crime of Falsification of Private Documents
The crime of Falsification of Private Documents is defined and penalized under Article 172 (2), in
relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC.
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code;
(b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage.
On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows: (a)
the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him
are absolutely false.
Manansala is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's
Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents
she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy
never made any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite
such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement
that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was
terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared.
E. Crimes against Public Morals

F. Crimes committed by Public Officers
G. Crimes against Persons
PEOPLE vs. GUILLERMO B. CADANO, JR.

G.R. No. 207819| March 12, 2014
RA 8353 introduced various qualifying circumstances that would increase the penalty for the crime of
rape from reclusion perpetua to death, e.g., when the offended party is a minor under 18 years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Thus, the aforementioned circumstance could not qualify the first two (2) rape incidents which
occurred prior to the enactment of RA 8353, but it could be properly appreciated in the third one. The
first two incidents occurred in 1996 when RA 8353 was not yet existent. The said law was promulgated
on July 28, 1997, hence, Cadano can only be held liable of statutory rape. Cadano can already be held
liable for qualified rape for the third incident as it occurred sometime in June 2000 – when RA 8353 is
already in effect (qualified by the relationship of Cadano to AAA).
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Cadano was the common-law spouse of AAA’s mother who, at the time of the first incident (Dec. 26,
1996), was recuperating in the hospital after giving birth to AAA’s sibling. Cadano asked AAA to go
home to clean their house as it was flooded. However, Cadano followed AAA and later on asked her
to lie down in the room. He removed her shorts and underwear, asked her to spread her legs, and
thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain and exclaimed "Aray!" but Cadano told
her to be quiet. After he was finished, Cadano, with the use of a knife, threatened her not to tell her
mother.
The next day, AAA was sleeping beside her siblings when she was awakened by Cadano who once
more, spread her legs, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made pumping movements. After he
was finished, he warned AAA to not speak of what had occurred.
In June 2000, AAA, who was already 11 years old, was playing with her siblings when Cadano asked
her to get money from his pants inside the house and buy food. Subsequently, Cadano followed her
and told her to lie down. AAA refused, but he pulled her down and asked her to remove her shorts
and panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina.
In October 2000, AAA and BBB went to Camp Crame for medical examination which yielded
positive results of penetration. Cadano was charged with three (3) statutory rape.
ISSUES:
1. Is the charge of three (3) statutory rape proper? (NO, but 2 statutory rape and 1 qualified
rape)
HELD:
No. The proper charge should be two (2) statutory rape and one (1) qualified rape
It is apt to discuss that RA 8353 introduced various qualifying circumstances that would increase
the penalty for the crime of rape from reclusion perpetua to death, e.g., when the offended party is a
minor under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim – a circumstance that was not present under the old rape provision, i.e., Article 335 of
the RPC. Thus, the aforementioned circumstance could not qualify the first two (2) rape incidents
which occurred prior to the enactment of RA 8353, but it could be properly appreciated in the third
one.
The first two incidents occurred in 1996 when RA 8353 was not yet existent. The said law was
promulgated on July 28, 1997, hence, Cadano can only be held liable of statutory rape under Article
335 of the RPC for the first two incidents. Cadano can already be held liable for qualified rape for
the third incident as it occurred sometime in June 2000 – when RA 8353 is already in effect. The
crime was qualified by the relationship of Cadano to AAA, the former being the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim (Article 266-B, paragraph 1, of the RPC as amended by RA 8353)
The Court likewise agrees that Cadano should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of statutory rape. And in light of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to RA 9346, the
imposable penalty for the third rape incident is lowered to reclusion perpetua, with the offender
being rendered ineligible for parole.
PEOPLE vs. MAURICIO HALLARTE

G.R. No. 207819| March 12, 2014
In People v. Soria, the Court stated that there must be independent evidence proving the age of
the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the
accused." Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age.
While the information alleged that BBB was "8 years of age, a minor," and the parties stipulated on
her minority during the pre-trial conference, the same are insufficient evidence of her age which must
be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. Apart from BBB's testimony and the
aforesaid stipulation, records are bereft of sufficient evidence to prove BBB's age.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
AAA, who was 7 years old, was playing at the second floor of the house with his cousin Charissa
Hallarte who is the daughter of defendant Mauricio Hallarte when Charissa went to the ground
floor to urinate. Mauricio approached AAA and removed her pants and underwear and later on
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain and tried to ask for help from Charissa. Mauricio let
AAA go when he realized that his daughter might come back. AAA did not tell the incident to anyone
until she complained to her mother of a pain in her vagina.
On the second incident, Mauricio’s other niece BBB who was 8 years old during that time, was in the
house with the defendant. Mauricio inserted his penis into her mouth and threatened her not to tell
anyone what he had done. BBB did not report the incident immediately because she feared
appellant.
Mauricio was charged with the crimes of Simple Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault. Both information
did not allege the relationship of Mauricio to AAA and BBB. Further, no evidence was submitted
that BBB was a minor during the incident.
As for Mauricio’s defense, he said he was in Novaliches Quezon City during the first incident which
was an hour and a half of travel from said place to their home. Meanwhile, he was in Kalayaan,
Quezon City during the second incident. Mauricio denied knowledge of why he was charged with
the said crimes.
The RTC and CA convicted Mauricio as charged.
ISSUES:
1. Is the RTC and CA correct in convicting Mauricio with Simple Rape and Rape by Sexual
Assault despite the qualifying circumstance of relationship? (YES)
2. Can the qualifying circumstance of minority be applied to the case of BBB despite the
absence of evidence on record that she was a minor during the incident? (NO)
3. Can Mauricio’s alibi prosper? (NO)
HELD:
Yes. The RTC and CA are correct
While it has been established that both private complainants were the nieces of appellant, the RTC
did not appreciate the special qualifying circumstance of relationship, not having been specifically
pleaded or alleged in the information under which appellant was separately charged.
No. The qualifying circumstance of minority cannot be appreciated on BBB’s case.
The prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the age of BBB. While the information alleged that
BBB was "8 years of age, a minor," and the parties stipulated on her minority during the pre-trial
conference, the same are insufficient evidence of her age which must be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself.
As the Court succinctly explained in People v. Soria:

"There must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by
the accused." Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of
her age.
Apart from BBB’s testimony and the aforesaid stipulation, records are bereft of sufficient evidence
to prove BBB’s age.
No. Mauricio’s defense cannot prosper.
The appellant’s defense of alibi is rejected, having failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offenses, and
(b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on both instances. Instead, by
his own testimony, appellant confirmed that his workplace in Novaliches (in relation to the June 4,
2000 Simple Rape incident) as well as his workplace in Kalayaan (in relation to the June 17, 2000
Rape by sexual Assault incident) were, at the most, only an hour and a half away from his house
where both incidents took place.
Moreover, "[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age
and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true.
PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN CASES Y VINTULAN
G.R. No. 212565| February 25, 2015
Among the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 is treachery and to appreciate treachery, it
must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Should
it appear that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met
it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.
Joel was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a
knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a
bamboo pole. It is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the
heat of the moment, it does not appear that Casas deliberately adopted the means in order to ensure
that JOEL had no opportunity to defend himself.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
CASAS, accompanied by a certain RON-RON, went to a certain taho factory in San Juan City, looking
for a certain Jesus. Failing to find Jesus CASAS took out a knife and stuck it into a pail used for
making taho. ELIGIO, an employee of the taho factory, confronted CASAS and told the him to get rid
of the knife and gave the knife to RON-RON. The two had a fistfight. During the fight, CASAS took the
knife from RON-RON and stabbed ELIGIO twice while the latter was fleeing.
CASAS, during the pursuit of ELIGIO, then ran into JOEL who tried to help ELIGIO with the use of
bamboo pole. However, JOEL slipped and fell face down. CASAS then stabbed JOEL twice.
Thereafter, proceeded to go after ELIGIO and managed to overtake him and stabbed the latter in the
stomach.
PO3 FRONDA saw a bloodied man who later on turned to be CASAS, and asked PO1 FUENTES for
assistance. CASAS admitted to PO3 FRONDA that he stabbed someone. After confirming that there
was a stabbing incident, the two police officers arrested CASAS.
CASAS was charged with Murder of JOEL and Frustrated Murder of ELIGIO. During the trial, CASAS
alleged self-defense to justify his action. The RTC and CA convicted him of Murder for the death of
JOEL as treachery was ruled to be present, but downgraded the Frustrated Murder to Attempted
Homicide for the case of ELIGIO for no qualifying circumstance was present.
ISSUES:
1. Is CASAS guilty of Murder? (NO, but of Homicide)
2. Is CASAS guilty of Attempted Homicide? (YES)
HELD:
CASAS is not guilty of Murder, but of Homicide because treachery, as ruled by the lower courts,
is not present.
The elements of Murder are: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c)
that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 is treachery and to appreciate treachery, it
must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Should it appear that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing
from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated.
JOEL, seeing that CASAS had stabbed ELIGIO, wanted to help the latter by using a bamboo pole, but
slipped and fell. JOEL was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting ELIGIO. He knew that CASAS
was armed with a knife and had just used the same on ELIGIO. JOEL elected to intervene, and even
armed himself with a bamboo pole. It is rather obvious that JOEL was aware of the danger to his life.
Further, acting in the heat of the moment, it does not appear that CASAS deliberately adopted the
means in order to ensure that JOEL had no opportunity to defend himself.
CASAS is guilty of Attempted Homicide, and not of Frustrated Murder as found in the
information filed before the court.
Though the intent to kill ELIGIO was present as shown by the weapon used, number of wounds
inflicted, CASAS’ resolution to chase and harm ELIGIO after the latter fled, and the parts of the body
of ELIGIO that CASAS injured, the circumstances that would qualify the case to Murder were not
attendant. Also, the crime was only attempted given that the prosecution was not able to prove that
he performed all the acts of execution which would consummate the Homicide.
PEOPLE VS. RICKY ARGUTA ALIS “JOEL” AND WILSON CAHIPE ALIAS “SIWIT”
G.R. No. 213216 | April 20, 2015
Under the old rape law provision (Article 335), whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When
either of these two are present, the crime will be Qualified Rape necessitating the imposition of the
higher penalty. If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as generic aggravating circumstance under
Article 14 of the RPC which enumerates the aggravating circumstances.
Arguta and Cahipe’s act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at
least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission.
Nevertheless, considering that the crime was committed by two persons, with the use of a bladed
weapon, the crime is Qualified Rape instead of Simple Rape.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: AAA was instructed by his father to fetch her sister in school. However, AAA failed to find
her sister and decided to go back home. On her way home, ARGUTA and CAHIPE intercepted AAA,
threatened her with a bladed weapon, dragged her to a cottage at a nearby resort and bound her
hands and feet. Thereafter, removed her clothes and placed her on the floor. ARGUTA inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina. CAHIPE took over and raped her. Subsequently, they left AAA at the
cottage. An hour later, CAHIPE returned and dragged AAA to a store and there, he raped her again.
ARGUTA was charged with one count of rape, while CAHIPE was charged with two counts of the
same crime.
ISSUES:
1. Is EUGENE and CAHIPE guilty of Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC? (NO, but under
Article 335 – the old rape law)
HELD:
EUGENE and CAHIPE are guilty not under Article 266-A, but under Article 335 – the old rape
law provision and are guilty of Qualified Rape instead of Simple Rape.
In the old rape law (Article 335), whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When either of
these two are present, the crime will be Qualified Rape necessitating the imposition of the higher
penalty. If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating
circumstance for either is not considered as generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of
the RPC which enumerates the aggravating circumstances.
ARGUTA and CAHIPE threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and tied her up before having
carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Force or intimidation need not be irresistible as long
as the accused’s objective is accomplished. In this regard, the act of holding a bladed instrument, by
itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the
same is sufficient to bring her into submission. Nevertheless, considering that the crime was
committed by two persons, with the use of a bladed weapon, the crime is Qualified Rape instead of
Simple Rape.
GUILLERMO WACOY Y BITOL v. PEOPLE

GR No. 213792| June 22, 2015
The elements of Homicide are the following: a person was killed; the accused killed him without any
justifying circumstance; the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and the killing was
not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide
There was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. Since
Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be
said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and
Quibac's act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the latter's death
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide. The above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of Elner Aro, thereby
inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death thereafter And, that the
offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength.
According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), he heard a commotion at a nearby

establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro),
already sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice,
after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood
up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro
was taken to the hospital.
Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and
was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum that
caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid
contents from the bile. Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived
through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation. Due to financial
constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died the
next day. Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest
antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an autopsy
performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary
to blunt traumatic injuries.”
Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They averred that while playing pool, they saw
Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table and
that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not for Quibac's intervention. Wacoy ran but
Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground.
The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that
Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither
categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his
death. The RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the RPC not for Homicide. Aggrieved, Wacoy
and Quibac appealed to the CA.
However, contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be
convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons
who inflicted harm on the victim. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown
that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration.
The CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration; hence, the instant petitions.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Wacoy and Quibac are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide? (YES)
HELD:
Wacoy and Quibac is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
The Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac's conviction from Death Caused
in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide
Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as
when, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and that it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased;
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC,
states that a person was killed, where the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance,
that had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.
In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of
which Aro died. Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the
latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. Therefore, the CA correctly
held that Wacoy and Quibac's act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the latter's death; and
as such, they must be held criminally liable therefor, specifically for the crime of Homicide.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to
the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.
PEOPLE v. RUPERTO RUBILLAR

GR 224631| AUGUST 23, 2017
The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-attendance of
force or intimidation. The "sweetheart theory" operates to impair the victim's testimony or create
doubt on her version of the facts when the defense presents sufficient evidence of a relationship
between the accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it.
In this case, Rubillar’s allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated
by his other witnesses. First, Odiongan testified that pior to the the alleged inicident, AAA introduced
Rubillar to him as his new boyfriend and that he saw them in an intimate embrace. Second, Laguardia
recalled that Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend through a text message, then, borrowed
his motorcycle, which Rubillar and AAA used for about an hour. Third, and most relevant is the
testimony of Kalan, AAA’s long time friend, who testified that AAA explicitly told her that Rubillar was
his boyfriend once before the alleged incident and a second time after AAA ran away.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
AAA was waiting for a jeepney to go to the public market when Rubillar, her father's kumpare,
arrived and offered her a ride, to which AAA assented.8 About four (4) kilometers from where they
left, Rubillar stopped the motorcycle and made AAA wear a helmet supposedly to avoid
apprehension by the traffic police. Thereafter, Rubillar drove at a fast speed without stopping at
traffic lights. This prompted AAA to tell Rubillar to already drop her off, but the latter drove faster
and told her to shut up. They eventually reached Davao Motel. AAA wanted to ask for help from the
man but he immediately left. When they were left alone, Rubillar dragged her upstairs and pushed
her to the bed.
Despite AAA's resistance, Rubillar placed himself on top of her, forcibly held her hands, undressed
her, and kissed her. He then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina and made a push and pull motion.
They then rode the motorcycle and Rubillar dropped her off at the public market. AAA proceeded to
buy groceries and rode a jeepney going home. Thereafter, AAA ran away from home due to fear and
embarrassment. They reported the incident to the police. Rubillar's claim that he had a relationship
with AAA was thereafter corroborated by numerous witnesses.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rubillar should be convicted of the crime of Rape. (NO).
HELD:.
Rubillar is not guilty of rape.
Rape under Article 226-A (1) (a) of the RPC, as amended, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed – Rape is committed-
1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a.) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
To be convicted of Rape under this provision, the prosecution must prove the following elements
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation.
In the present case, Rubillar’s invocation of the “sweetheart theory” is essentially an admission of
him having carnal knowledge with AAA, albeit maintaining that the same was consensual. Rubillar's
allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated by his other witnesses. The
"sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or
intimidation. The "sweetheart theory" operates to impair the victim's testimony or create doubt on
her version of the facts when the defense presents sufficient evidence of a relationship between the
accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it. Notably, a woman who was sexually abused
by a lover has no practicable reason to deny her relationship with the accused in a rape trial
because admitting such relationship would not negate her allegation of rape, as the Court has
consistently ruled that "a 'love affair' does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually
violated against her will." Nonetheless, if she denies the relationship but it was found existing, she
runs the risk of tainting her testimony when her version of the facts is inconsistent with the
presence of an intimate relationship between them.
In this case, Rubillar’s allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated by his
other witnesses. First, Odiongan testified that pior to the the alleged inicident, AAA introduced
Rubillar to him as his new boyfriend and that he saw them in an intimate embrace. Second,
Laguardia recalled that Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend through a text message,
then, borrowed his motorcycle, which Rubillar and AAA used for about an hour. Third, and most
relevant is the testimony of Kalan, AAA’s long time friend, who testified that AAA explicitly told her
that Rubillar was his boyfriend once before the alleged incident and a second time after AAA ran
away.
It appears from these testimonies that Rubillar and AAA mutually acknowledged their clandestine
relationship and revealed it to some people close to them. The court stresses that the finding of a
then subsisting relationship between the complainant and the accused raises suspicions on the
truthfulness of AAA’s testimony, wherein she vehemently denied having relationship with the
accused.
Considering the totality of the evidence presented in this case, the Court doubts whether Rubillar
employed force or intimidation upon AAA during their sexual encounter. It must be clarified,
however, that the Court's finding does not mean absolute certainty that Rubillar did not coerce AAA
to engage in the act. It is simply that the evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of the
quantum of proof required to support a conviction.
ROGELIO B. ANTONE v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES

GR 225146| NOVEMBER 20, 2017

Doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist.
Accordingly, Antone's failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter court's
Decision dated July 31, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 22, 2016 lapsing into finality.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor child,started living in the house of her Aunt Aniceta and her
husband, Antone. In August 1997, AAA was preparing dinner when she saw Antone staring
strangely at her. Initially, AAA ignored what Antone was doing, but after a while, Antone
approached her, grabbed her hand, and carried her into the master's bedroom.
Thereat, Antone locked the door, approached AAA, the former successfully had carnal knowledge
with AAA. Before leaving the room, Antone threatened AAA to kill her should she tell what just
happened. A similar incident happened in November 1997 when Antone commanded AAA to give
him a massage, to which the latter obliged.
After a while, Antone again brought AAA to the master's bedroom, locked the door, removed AAA's
shorts and panty, had carnal knowledge of her until he ejaculated, and threatened to kill her if she
revealed to anyone about what happened. In his defense, Antone denied the charges against him,
averring that it was impossible for him to rape AAA as there were a lot of people residing in their
house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antone is guilty for 2 counts of Statutory Rape. (YES)
HELD:
Antone is liable for 2 counts of Statutory Rape.
AAA's clear and straightforward testimony positively identifying Antone as her assailant is enough
to establish the fact of statutory rape, considering that she was just eleven (11) years of age when
the sexual abuses occurred. As a minor who has no ill motive to falsely testify against Antone, AAA's
testimony must be given full faith and credence.
Accordingly, Antone's failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter
court's Decision dated July 31, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 22, 2016 lapsing into finality.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that a decision that has acquires finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, known as the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
PEOPLE VS. RICO NIEBRES Y REGINALDO

G.R. No. 230975 | December 4, 2017
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of
rape is a special qualifying circumstance which must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and
proved during trial.
In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation
was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution.
Additionally, mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently create moral
certainty that the former knew of the latter's disability. By and large, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was aware of AAA's mental disability at the time he committed
the crime and, thus, he should be convicted of the crime of Simple Rape only.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that sometime in October 2010, Niebres, together with his wife
(AAA's sister) and six (6) children, went to the house of his parents-in-law in La Victoria, Bula,
Camarines Sur to participate in a traditional palay harvesting. When they arrived thereat, they
momentarily took a rest. Thereafter, Niebres joined the other members of the family on the fields
and began the palay harvesting, which lasted until 4:30 in the afternoon. After dinner, Niebres went
out to drink with his father-in-law and brother-in-law and came home at around midnight. He
directly went to the room where AAA and his family were sleeping and lied beside her. At about five
(5) o'clock in the morning of the following day, AAA suddenly woke up and noticed Niebres kissing
her on the cheeks, neck, and down her body. Niebres then proceeded to have carnal knowledge of
her. After repeatedly making a push and pull motion on AAA, Niebres finally pulled out his penis
and dismounted from her. AAA claimed that the incident caused her vagina to bleed profusely. This
notwithstanding, she could not tell anyone about it, as she was afraid of what Niebres and her
parents would do to her. According to AAA, this was not the first time Niebres sexually abused her,
claiming that Niebres also raped her several weeks before the said incident in his house.
Subsequently, when AAA complained of abdominal pains, her mother brought her to Naga Health
Care Diagnostic Center. After an ultrasound examination, the doctors discovered that she was
approximately five (5) to six (6) months pregnant. AAA finally admitted that Niebres raped her and
they reported the matter to the police and filed the instant Complaint. On February 7, 2012, AAA
went to a psychiatrist named Dr. Laguidao, who revealed that she was suffering from a mild mental
retardation with an intelligence quotient equivalent to a nine (9)-year old child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Niebres is guilty of the crime of qualified rape. (NO)
HELD:
Niebres is guilty of simple rape.
The Court deemed it proper to modify Niebres's conviction for the crime of Qualified Rape to
Simple Rape. A plain reading of the Information reveals that Niebres was charged of the crime of
Qualified Rape.
For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of
the RPC, it is necessary that the elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (a)
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through force,
threat or intimidation, when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by means
of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under 12 years of age
or is demented.
The prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape. However, the CA erred
in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres's knowledge of AAA's mental disability at the
time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient evidence to substantiate the same.
Notably, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of
the crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death. Such
qualifying circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during
trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court.
In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation
was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the
prosecution. Additionally, mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not
sufficiently create moral certainty that the former knew of the latter's disability.
By and large, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was aware of
AAA's mental disability at the time he committed the crime and, thus, he should be convicted of the
crime of Simple Rape only.
PEOPLE VS. CIRBETO

GR No. 231359 | February 07, 2018
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide
or infanticide.
Treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in this case. In order for treachery
to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The evidence in this case clearly
shows that the attack against Casipit was sudden, deliberate, and unexpected. He was completely
unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking with accused-appellant on the date and
time in question.
PERLAS- BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
On December 31, 2010, at around 3:15 in the afternoon, while prosecution eyewitness Roger
Dalimoos was outside a fast food restaurant in front of Marikina Sports Center he saw his friend
Casipit together with CIRBETO walking towards a nearby mall. Dalimoos was on his way home
then, so he boarded a jeepney by hanging on to its end railings. From a vantage point he could still
see Casipit and CIRBETO who were already in front of the mall, he saw CIRBETO pull a knife from
the right side of his back, hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife using his
right hand. CIRBETO was able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away. However,
he ran after Casipit and caught up to him, held the latter's shirt again, pulled him to the ground, and
stabbed him repeatedly, resulting in the latter's death.
Shortly after the incident, accused-appellant tried to flee, but he was seized by PO1 Rael and P/Sr.
Insp. Ribad of the Marikina City Police Station, who responded to a radio message relaying the
stabbing incident They were also able to recover the knife used to stab the victim.
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of "not guilty"and raised the defenses of denial
and alibi. He claimed that he was assisting a car parked in front of a fastfood restaurant in the area
when the police officers arrested him for allegedly killing Casipit.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Cirbeto is liable for the crime of murder. (YES)
HELD:
CIRBETO is liable for the crime of murder, for employing treachery in the commission of the
offense.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that
a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish a confluence of the foregoing elements,
considering the following: (1) the victim Casipit was killed; (2) accused-appellant was positively
identified as the one who killed him; (3) Casipit's killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying
circumstance; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.
Treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in this case. Treachery is the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tends directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be
properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The evidence in this case clearly
shows that the attack against Casipit was sudden, deliberate, and unexpected. He was completely
unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking with accused-appellant on the date and
time in question.
However, the Court is of a different view with respect to the purported presence of evident
premeditation. For evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying or an aggravating
circumstance, the prosecution must prove: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
In this case, nothing has been offered to establish when and how he planned and prepared for the
same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had lapsed between his determination and
execution. The Court stresses the importance of the requirement in evident premeditation with
respect to the sufficiency of time between the resolution to carry out the criminal intent and the
criminal act, affording such opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning
and the consequences of what accused-appellant had planned to do, where the interval should be
long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme.
PEOPLE v. ANTONIO BALCUEVA Y BONDOCOY

GR No. 214466 | July 01, 2015
The elements of Qualified Rape are as follows: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but
under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or
intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority.
A perusal of the records discloses the presence of the aforesaid elements in this case. Verily, a
young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own
father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: AAA just returned home from school and since Balcueva did not want her to leave the
house, she decided to just take an afternoon nap. At that time, Balcueva asked AAA's siblings to
leave the house and thereafter, approached AAA who was lying in bed, removed her shorts and
underwear, and threatened to spank her if she told anybody about this incident. Balcueva then
removed his shorts and underwear, mounted AAA, restrained her hands, and inserted his penis into
her vagina. AAA resisted and even told Balcueva that she was having her menstruation, but
Balcueva simply told her to keep quiet and that it was better as she will not get pregnant. While
Balcueva was ravishing AAA, the latter's sister sought the help of their neighbor, who then peeped
through a hole, interrupting Balcueva in his dastardly act. Thereafter, AAA's sister and their
neighbor reported the incident to the barangay hall, which led to Balcueva's apprehension.
Balcueva interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that he was repairing appliances
when AAA and a friend arrived from school and asked him if they can roam around. When he did
not allow them to do so, AAA and her friend got angry. In retaliation, they went to the barangay hall
and fabricated the story that he raped AAA.
The RTC found Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape. It found
that the prosecution was able to prove that Balcueva indeed raped AAA, pointing out that her
failure to shout for help while she was being ravished by her father does not mean she was not
raped; rather, it showed the moral ascendancy and influence Balcueva exerted over her, and that
the absence of injuries on AAA's hymen did not negate a finding of rape. In this relation, the RTC
observed that no woman would undergo the rigors of trial if she was not motivated to put her
culprit behind bars. Finally, it declared that Balcueva's defense of denial and alibi could not prevail
over AAA's positive identification.
Aggrieved, Balcueva appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto.

Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether Balcueva's conviction for Qualified Rape should be upheld?
HELD:
Balcueva's conviction for Qualified Rape should be upheld.
The Court sustains Balcueva's conviction.

The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows:
(a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age;
(b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and
(c) he offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or
when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority.
A perusal of the records discloses the presence of the aforesaid elements in this case. As correctly
ruled, AAA's clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she was indeed raped by
Balcueva, her own father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva's flimsy defense of denial and alibi cannot
prevail over AAA's positive and categorical testimony and identification of him as the perpetrator of
the crime.
Verily, a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her
very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence,
there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the
grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Antonio
Balcueva y Bondocoy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape
PEOPLE v. GODOFREDO COMBOY Y CRONICO

GR No. 218399| Mar 02, 2016
It has been long settled that "a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious
as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject
herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent
desire to seek justice.
In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that the prosecution
was able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her without her consent on two (2)
separate occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008; and (b)
attempted to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason other than
his own desistance, i.e., BBB's intervention.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that sometime in the year 2006, at around 11 o' clock in the
evening, AAA, who was sleeping beside her brother BBB, suddenly woke up with her father,
Comboy, already on top of her, and the latter's penis already inside her vagina. Startled by the pain
she felt in her vagina, AAA pushed Comboy and scampered away from him in order to move closer
to BBB. This left Comboy no choice but to leave the room.
The incident was repeated sometime in February 2008, when AAA, while sleeping beside her
brother, BBB, was similarly awakened by the presence of her father, Comboy, on top of her with his
penis already inside her vagina. During this time, Comboy told AAA not to make any noise so as not
to disrupt the sleep of the other members of their family. Finally, at around 2 o'clock in the morning
of May 17, 2009, AAA, while again sleeping beside her brother, BBB, woke up with her father,
Comboy, already on top of her and in the process of removing her underwear. However, AAA was
able to push Comboy away and thereafter, went closer to BBB, who was also awakened by the
commotion. This prompted Comboy to simply leave the room. BBB then reported the matter to
their stepmother.
On May 28, 2009, AAA finally had the courage to report the foregoing incidents to Barangay
Kagawad Donald Andres Briobo, who in turn, helped AAA seek police assistance. AAA was then
examined by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Sotera C. Copino, who found her to have sustained
lacerations in her hymen which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard object, such as
an erect penis.
For his part, Comboy interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Upon his arraignment on October
23, 2009, Comboy pleaded not guilty to each of the charges levelled against him.
ISSUES:
Is Comboy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape and one (1) count of
Attempted Rape?
HELD:
COMBOY is liable to TWO COUNTS OF QUALIFIED RAPE and ONE COUNT OF ATTEMPTED
QUALIFIED RAPE.
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify Comboy's conviction from two
(2) counts of Statutory Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape to two (2) counts of Qualified
Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Qualified Rape.
The elements of Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. The
gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. On the other hand, Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a woman below
twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force,
threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these are not elements of
statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the
victim is below the age of twelve.
The law presumes that the offended party does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving
intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to sustain a conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution
must establish the following: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c)
the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.The foregoing acts of Rape shall be
qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC if: (a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age; and (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that the prosecution was
able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her without her consent on two (2)
separate occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008; and (b)
attempted to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason other
than his own desistance, i.e., BBB's intervention. Suffice it to say that Comboy's flimsy defense of
denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as
the perpetrator of the crimes. In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would not
concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the
examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public
trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible
reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if
this crime did not happen," as in this case.
However, since a plain reading of the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. T-5006, T-5009, and T-5010
would readily reveal that Comboy was actually charged of raping his own biological minor
daughter, AAA, which facts of minority and relationship were already stipulated upon during pre-
trial, the Court finds it appropriate to modify Comboy's conviction from two (2) counts of Statutory
Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape to two (2) counts of Qualified Rape and one (1) count of
Attempted Qualified Rape.
PEOPLE VS. ALEJANDRO and ANGELES
G.R. No. 225608| March 13, 2017
Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as
when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape.
Both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive identification that
accused-appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that
thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her from
resisting.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on
the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and Angeles. Thereafter,
Angeles approached AAA and restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and
underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he
switched places with Angeles and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA.
AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her injuries.
ISSUES:
1. Are the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and Homicide
HELD:
ALEJANDRO and ANGELES are liable for the crimes of Qualified Rape and Homicide
Both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive identification that accused-
appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that
thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her from
resisting.
Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.
Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as
when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this
instance.
PEOPLE v. NORIETO MONROYO
G.R. No. 223708 | June 28, 2017
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the legal provision alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the information.
The erroneous reference to the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged
therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. Preliminarily, although the three
Informations designated the crime committed only as "Acts of Lasciviousness," the facts alleged
therein pertain not only to violations of Article 336 of the RPC but also of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." Common to both legal provisions is the element of lascivious conduct or lewdness
FACTS: On October 13, 2004, four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Monroyo of
the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA, a fourteen-year old virgin, and Qualified Rape
against AAA’s sister, BBB, a sixteen-year old virgin. Said Acts of Lasciviousness occurred on various
occasions (August 24, October 13 and 15, 2003) whereby accused Monroyo succeeded in touching
AAA’s private organ. On the other hand, Monroyo’s carnal knowledge of BBB allegedly happened on
the night of November 18, 2003, in the place of dwelling of the victim. In the commission of the
offenses, the qualifying circumstance of relationship is attendant, the accused being a relative of the
complainants by affinity within the 3rd civil degree and the complainants being then under
eighteen years of age.
The RTC found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness. In another Decision, the RTC similarly found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape. The RTC however, did not consider the special qualifying circumstances
of relationship and minority because these were not purportedly alleged in the Information. The CA
affirmed the RTC's ruling but it no longer discussed the attendant circumstances of relationship and
minority in the Rape case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the erroneous reference to the law violated vitiate the information
notwithstanding the clear recital of facts in the same
2. Whether or not the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erred in not considering the special
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority
HELD:
therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged
therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. Preliminarily, although the three
Informations designated the crime committed only as "Acts of Lasciviousness," the facts alleged
therein pertain not only to violations of Article 336 of the RPC but also of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." Common to both legal provisions is the element of lascivious conduct or
lewdness.
It is settled that a designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense. It is
important to note however, as the Court had ruled, that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
legal provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the information.
Contrary to the RTC's observation, the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
were sufficiently alleged in the Information
The presence of the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship is readily
verifiable from the records of this case. Meanwhile, the fact that Monroyo is BBB's relative by
affinity within the third civil degree was attested to by BBB, who testified that Monroyo is the
husband of her mother's half-sister. In fact, Monroyo admitted their relationship on cross-
examination, stating that "his wife is the sister of the mother of BBB."
Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for scrutiny on any
question, even one not raised by the parties as errors, and that the appeal confers the appellate
court with full jurisdiction over the case, enabling the court to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. Thus,
given that the circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven in this case, the
Court examines Monroyo's criminal liability for Qualified Rape as charged.
PEOPLE v. DOMINADOR LADRA

G.R. No. 221443 | July 17, 2017
After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of
a child - a young girl 12 years of age - could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd
or indecent design. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more so, "squeezing," in this
case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's genitalia clearly constitutes
lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a
quo.
FACTS: Private complainant AAA, the eldest of five (5) siblings, lived with her family in a remote
area in Misamis Oriental. Sometime when AAA was around five (5) years old, she and her siblings
were left at home with accused-appellant, a relative of AAA's mother, BBB. AAA was asleep beside
her brother when she was awakened when she felt accused-appellant, who was already naked, on
top of her, forced his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull movements, causing her pain.
Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Thereafter, accused-appellant
repeatedly molested her, each time bringing his bolo with him. The sexual abuse ceased in 2002,
when accused-appellant left their house.
Years later, when AAA was already twelve (12) years old, she was surprises to see accused-
appellant who subsequently, squeezed her vagina. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD,
about the incident. She also told DDD about the first rape incident and the subsequent ones
committed by accused appellant. Later, AAA filed criminal cases against accused-appellant, who
was subsequently arrested. Hence, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610. Likewise, accused-appellant was charged with Acts of Lasciviousness.
The RTC ruled on the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of Rape. It also found that
although the allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a case for child abuse, it also
constitutes Statutory Rape. The RTC opined, however, that the prosecution failed to establish the
element of lasciviousness or lewdness as would justify accused-appellant's conviction for the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness. Nonetheless, AAA was clearly annoyed by the act; perforce, the RTC found
accused-appellant guilty of Unjust Vexation. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC's Joint Decision
convicting accused-appellant of Rape and Unjust Vexation. Aggrieved, accused-appellant is now
before the Court seeking the reversal of his conviction.
ISSUE:
1. whether or not the presence of AAA's brother in the room negate the commission of the
crime of Rape
2. whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction Unjust Vexation
HELD:
The presence of AAA's brother in the room negate the commission of the crime of Rape
The Court finds no reason to reverse the CA's conclusions. AAA was a credible witness whose
testimony must be given great weight. The trial judge's evaluation, which the CA sustained, now
binds the Court, leaving to the accused-appellant the burden to bring to the fore facts or
circumstances of weight, which were otherwise overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted
that would materially affect the disposition of the case differently if duly considered. Unfortunately
for accused-appellant, he miserably failed to discharge this burden.
It cannot be denied that the presence of AAA's brother in the room does not negate the commission
of the crime. "Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the
roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the
same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible
for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual
assault is being committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is
known to happen in the most unlikely places."
The accused shall be held guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, not Unjust Vexation as erroneously
ruled by the CA
The Court disagrees with the CA's affirmance of the RTC's finding that accused-appellant can only
be held guilty of Unjust Vexation. The Court finds that he should instead be convicted of Acts of
Lasciviousness. A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have
been sufficiently established.
The Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child - a young girl 12 years of
age - could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must
not be forgotten that several years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for
which act he was appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more
so, "squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's genitalia
clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or vex her, as
opined by the courts a quo. As such, accused appellant's act of squeezing AAA's vagina was a lewd
and lascivious act within the definitions set by law and jurisprudence.
PEOPLE v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON

GR No. 214506 | October 19, 2015
The elements of the crime of Murder are (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide. One of the
circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery. There is treachery
when the of-fender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Parba's attack on Navaja was so sudden
and executed in such a manner that Navaja was caught off-guard on what Parba intended to do.
Eyewitnesses testified that at the time of the attack, Navaja was helping his child alight from the
motorcycle when Parba, without warning, shot him at the back of his head. It is inconceivable how
Navaja could have expected the attack since clearly, he merely intended to take his daughter to school.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Parba and a John Doe were charged with the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
The prosecution alleged that Jesus Catapan (Catapan), a security guard of the Salazar Institute of
Technology (SIT) in Natalio Bacalso Avenue, Labangon, Cebu City, was buying cigarettes from a
vendor stationed near the main gate of SIT Elementary Department. Suddenly, Parba, who was then
seated beside the vendor, stood up, pulled a gun from his belt bag, and shot a man at the back of the
head while the latter was helping his daughter disembark from a motorcycle. The victim, later on
identified as Mark P. Navaja (Navaja), fell to the ground, while Parba and a companion exited
towards the highway, chased by Nestor Buenavista (Buenavista) and Fernando Cuizon (Cuizon),
fellow security guards of Catapan. Eventually, Parba disembarked at Tabada Street and the two
security guards lost sight of him.
The following day, the policemen, who were only able to arrest Parba, subjected him to a paraffin
test, where the casts taken off his hands tested positive for the presence of gunpowder residue.
Likewise, Dr. Jesus Cerna, the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of Navaja, reported
that the latter died due to a gunshot wound at the back of the head.
In his defense, Parba denied committing the crime and interposed alibi, denial, and set-up as
defenses.
The RTC convicted Parba as charged. The RTC refused to give credence to Parba's alibi finding the
same to be weak and unsubstantiated. On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses positively
identified Parba as the one who shot Navaja at the back of his head had a good look at him when he
pointed a gun at them.. Further, the RTC appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance since
the attack was so sudden and unexpected, which rendered Navaja totally defenseless.
Aggrieved, Parba appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed Parba's conviction but modified the award of
damages. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Parba is guilty of Murder?
HELD:
Parba is guilty of Murder
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish the
following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide
One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Parba's attack on Navaja was so sudden and
executed in such a manner that Navaja was caught off-guard on what Parba intended to do.
Eyewitnesses testified that at the time of the attack, Navaja was helping his child alight from the
motorcycle when Parba, without warning, shot him at the back of his head. It is inconceivable how
Navaja could have expected the attack since clearly, he merely intended to take his daughter to
school.
Anent Parba's alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a
defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime.
As narrated, Catapan personally witnessed Parba pull out a gun and shoot Navaja in the head, which
led to his untimely demise, while Buenavista and Cuizon immediately chased Parba after the
shooting and further encountered him face-to-face when he turned around and pointed a gun at
them. Thus, there was no break in the chain of events that would cause any doubt as to the truth
and veracity of the facts which point to the guilt of Parba. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who
were merely bystanders at the time the crime occurred, were not impelled by any improper motive
to falsely testify against Parba. Thus, Parba's alibi fails to convince the Court.
H. Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security
PEOPLE VS. ARMANDO DIONALDO

G.R. No. 182130 | June 19, 2013
In People v. Ramos, the Court reiterated the rule that where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659. This is in view of the Edwin’s death, which was
specifically charged in the Information, and clearly established during the trial of this case.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Roderick Navarro dropped his Brother Edwin off a gym in Caloocan City. After 30 minutes,
Roderick’s brother messaged him that Edwin was kidnapped. Armando, Renato, and Mariano were
found dragging bloodied Edwin down the stairs of the gym and pushed him in a dark green Toyota
car.
The following day, Rodrick received a call from the kidnappers who demanded ₱15 million as
ransom. Rodrick told the kidnappers that he only had ₱50,000. Later on, they agreed on the amount
of ₱110,000. Rodrick was instructed to deliver the ransom to Batangas. When he was on his way to
deliver the money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to park beside the Libingan ng mga
Bayani.
However, when Rodrick arrived in the designated area, he saw one of the men take his phone and
uttered “alat,” went back to the car and drove away.
During the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was
part of the plan to kidnap Edwin. He was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a
certain Virgilio Varona on the condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money.
Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest. In the early
morning of the following day, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan
Laurel, Batangas.
Armando, Renato, Mariano as well as Varona were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide. The RTC convicted them of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal detention and did not
consider Edwin’s death in the judgment due to a fact in Edwin’s death certificate (which was not
mentioned in the case). This was affirmed by CA in toto.
ISSUES:
1. Is the RTC correct in convicting the accused of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention?
(NO)
2. Was there conspiracy between Armando, Renato, Mariano and Varona during the
commission of the crime?
HELD:
No. They must be convicted of the complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide
The crime the accused-appellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely
constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the Edwin’s death, which was specifically
charged in the Information, and clearly established during the trial of this case.
Citing, People v. Ramos, the Court reiterated the rule that where the person kidnapped is killed in
the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48,
nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
Yes. Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the
conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the
extent of their respective participations.
In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and
proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and
community of interests. Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-
appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts emanated
from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution, the CA, affirming the trial
court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
PEOPLE v. BRAHIM LIDASAN ET. AL

GR 227425| SEPTEMBER 4, 2017
Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention. The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b)
he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances are present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; ii) it is
committed by simulating public authority; iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv) the person kidnapped or detained
is a minor, female, or a public officer. Notable the duration of detention is immaterial if the victim if a
minor, or if the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom.
The elements of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom were established in this case as it was
undisputed that accused-appellant, among others, illegally detained the victim Ragos against her will
for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Michelle Ragos was in her family's office/residential compound at No. 5063 Modesto St., Mapulang
Lupa, Valenzuela City which was being guarded by security guards Bauting and Daliano, when
suddenly, Bansuan and two (2) companions entered her bedroom and declared "kidnapping ito."
Adil served as lookout, while the other men tied Ragos’ hands, sealed her mouth with packaging
tape, ransacked all the cabinets and drawers, and took with them cash and personal items
amounting to P200,000.00. Ragos was first brought to Novaliches, Quezon City and, eventually, to a
bungalow house located St. Joseph Subdivision, Las Piñas City where she spent the night. Thereat,
around six (6) persons took turns guarding her.
On the following day, October 31, 1998, she was transferred to a house located in Samantha Village,
Las Piñas City, and kept in a room on the second floor alternately guarded by around ten (10) to 20
persons, some of whom were identified to be Matoc, Kamir, Camsa, Rajid, Wahab, Hassan, Usman,
Lawan, Mocalam, Mohamad, and Lidasan. The kidnappers initially demanded ransom money in the
amount of P30 million, but they eventually settled to a reduced amount of P4.83 million. As security
guards Daliano and Bauting no longer reported for work following the kidnapping, the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) formed a team to monitor the activities of the
kidnappers until the agreed pay-off date.
On November 7, 1998, the PAOCTF team proceeded to Kitanlad Street, Quezon City to witness the
pay-off. P/Supt. Arnado saw Alunan and Adil arrive on board a motorcycle and take the bag
containing the ransom money from someone inside a "Nissan Blue Bird" car. Immediately
thereafter, the PAOCTF team chased the kidnappers, resulting in a shoot-out and the eventual
arrest of the kidnappers, except for Bansuan who remained at large, while the rest were brought to
Camp Crame for investigation. On the same day, PAOCTF operatives swooped in the kidnappers'
safe-house, resulting in Ragos's rescue, as well as the arrest of other suspects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants were guilty of kidnapping for ransom. (YES)
HELD:
The accused-appellants were guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention. The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual;
(b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances are present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; ii) it
is committed by simulating public authority; iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. Notable the duration of detention is immaterial if the
victim if a minor, or if the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom.
The elements of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom were established in this case as it was
undisputed that accused-appellant, among others, illegally detained the victim Ragos against her
will for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family.
In this regard, the Court tagged Alunan and accused-appellants as principals, considering that: (a)
the actual taking of Ragos was done by Bansuan and two unidentified men, with Adil acting as look-
out; (b) Daliano knew about the criminal plot way in advance, and aside from no longer reporting
for work after the incident, he was seen going to the kidnappers' safe-house in Las Piñas; (c) during
Ragos's first day of captivity, Adil and Kamir were among those who questioned Ragos as to whom
to contact for ransom; and (d) Alunan and Adil were the ones who collected the P4.83 million
ransom money in Quezon City.As to Lidasan, Mohamad, Mocalam, Usman, Matoc, Wahab, and Rajid,
the Court found them guilty as accomplices to the crime as they were positively identified by Ragos
as those who guarded her during her captivity until she was rescued by PAOCTF operatives.
I. Crimes against Property
PEOPLE VS. LAMSEN

G.R. No. 198338 | February 20, 2013

Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.It can be presumed from and proven by
acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action,
and community of interests.The events surrounding the commission of the crime would readily
establish conspiracy among the accused-appellants in committing robbery with homicide. Thus, they
were correctly convicted of the aforementioned crime.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:On February 19, 2001, PCI Bank Manager Fernando Sy, with his security guards, went to
Malasiqui, Pangasinan using Sy’s owner-type jeep to collect cash deposits in the amount of
P2,707,400.77 from their clients. On their way back to their office in San Carlos City, a white Toyota
car overtook the jeep. The car’s occupants then fired at Sy and his companions. Thereafter, a green
Lancer car chased and sideswiped the jeep, with its passengers also firing at Sy and his companions.
This resulted in the jeep going off the road and hitting two concrete posts. Sy and Mariado
succumbed to gunshot wounds, while Ferrer got away unscathed as he jumped out of the jeep
during the shooting. The malefactors then took the bag containing the cash deposits and
immediately fled towards the direction of San Carlos City.
After investigation, Lamsen, Abulencia, Ramos, and four John Does, were charged in an Information
dated March 1, 2001 for robbery with homicide. Accused-appellants pleaded “not guilty” then,
individually filed their respective petitions for bail. The RTC granted Abulencia’s petition for bail
while denying Lamsen’s and Ramos’ respective petitions. It found that the testimonies of
eyewitnesses, aside from positively identifying Lamsen and Ramos, were candid, straightforward,
and categorical. n its Decision dated May 7, 2008, the court a quofound accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, and jointly and severally liable to
pay actual damages, moral damages, loss of earning capacity, civil indemnity, temperate damages
and attorney’s fees. The court a quo found that the manner by which accused-appellants committed
the crime reveals a community of criminal design; thus, conspiracy exists and there is no need to
determine the individual participation of each of them. The CA affirmed the court a quo’s judgment
of conviction.
ISSUES:
Whether or not accused-appellants P/Supt. Artemio E. Lamsen, PO2 Anthony D. Abulencia, and
SPO1 Wilfredo L. Ramos are guilty of the crime robbery with homicide. (YES)
HELD:
Accused-appellants are guilty of the crime robbery with homicide.
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled
to great weight, sometimes even with finality, considering that it was the trial judge who personally
heard such witnesses, observed their demeanor, and the manner in which they testified during trial.
Considering the absence of either a mistake in the appreciation of material facts or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge who had the opportunity to directly observe the
eyewitnesses and ascertain their credibility, there is no reason to disturb the court a quo’s findings,
which the CA affirmed.
The manner by which the crime was perpetrated shows conspiracyamong the accused-
appellants.
It is settled that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred
from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. It can
be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint
purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests. In this case, the events surrounding
the commission of the crime would readily establish conspiracy among the accused-appellants in
committing robbery with homicide. Thus, they were correctly convicted of the aforementioned
crime.
PEOPLE VS. PALMY TIBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 209655-60 | January 14, 2015
A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to
existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by
promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk.
All the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case,
considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people,
including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the investing public
— in this case, the private complainants — regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity
with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were
made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of
TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's
prejudice.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered
with the SEC. In 2002, SEC discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a
registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code."
The TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer's Affidavit before the SEC. Hence, in 2003, the SEC
revoked TGICI's corporate registration for being fraudulently procured.
The complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as
the assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private
complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the
principal investment and the monthly interest earnings.
Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting
private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the
office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement
receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid.
In their defense, Tibayan, Puerto and many others denied conspiring with the TGICI incorporators
and claimed that their signatures were only forged in the TGICI Articles of Corporation.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in
the informations that accused-appellants and the other directors/incorporators formed a syndicate
with the intention of defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce documentary evidence
substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants committed Syndicated Estafa.
The CA modified accused-appellants' conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa.
ISSUES:
1. Is the CA’s ruling correct? (YES)
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals’ ruling is correct in convicting the accused with Syndicated Estafa.
The Court affirms the decision of the CA finding the two accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of Syndicated Estafa.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.:

1. There must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
2. That such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. That the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows: Any person or
persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the
swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
Hence, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are:

1. Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed;
2. That the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and
3. Defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
The accused used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI
investors. A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported
returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit
new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk.
Hence, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme, are
present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more
than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations
to the investing public — in this case, the private complainants — regarding a supposed lucrative
investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses
and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying
on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants'
investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
PEOPLE VS. ARNEL BALUTE Y VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 212932 | January 21, 2015
Robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain conviction, the following elements must be present: (1) taking of the
personal property of another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide was
committed. Moreover, it requires that the robbery was the main purpose of the accused and not the
killing.
The prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the
latter’s mobile phone, thereafter shoot him, resulting in his death despite medical intervention.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
SPO1 MANAOIS was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife and daughter. While on a stop
position due to heavy traffic, BALUTE and a certain BLASTER suddenly appeared on either side of
the vehicle, with BALUTE poking a gun on the side of SPO1 MANAOIS saying, “putang ina, ilabas
mo!” BALUTE grabbed the phone of SPO1 MANAOIS on the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the
left side of his torso.SPO1 MANAOIS tried to react by drawing his own firearm and alighting from
his vehicle, but failed to fire at the accused as he fell to the ground. He was taken to a hospital, but
died despite undergoing operation and medical intervention.
BALUTE was charged of the crime of Robbery with Homicide penalized under Article 294(1) of the
RPC.
In his defense, he alleged that he was at the shop where he worked as a pedicab welder at the time
of the incident and imputed liability to BLASTER and a certain INTOY.
ISSUES:
1. Is BALUTE guilty of Robbery with Homicide? (YES)
HELD:
BALUTE is guilty of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294(1) of the RPC
Special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either
by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain conviction for the said crime, the following
elements must be present: (1) taking of the personal property of another; (2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason
of the robbery, the crime of homicide was committed. It also requires that the robbery is the main
purpose, and the killing is merely incidental.
The prosecution was able to establish the fact that BALUTE poked his gun at SPO1 MANAOIS, took
the latter’s mobile phone, thereafter shoot him, resulting in his death despite medical intervention.
PEOPLE VS. JAY HINLO “INDAY KABANG”, RICHARD “INDAY ATET” PALMA Y VARCAS, RUVICO
“RUBY” SENIDO Y HAMAYBAY, AND EDGAR “LIBAT” PEDROSO Y PALASOL
G.R. No. 212151 | February 18, 2015
The elements for the crime of robbery with homicide are: (a) taking of personal property with the use
of violence or intimidation; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is with intent to gain;
and (4) by reason or on occasion of the robbery, homicide was committed. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.Accused
were all armed with knives when they broke into the house of Spouses Clavel, took certain personal
properties, and, in the course thereof, stabbed Freddie, resulting to his death.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
HINLO, PALMA, SENIDO, PEDROSO, and one DUMAGAT were drinking at the house of SENIDO when
the latter informed the others of the plan to rob the house of SPOUSES FREDDIE AND JUDY ANN
CLAVEL.
The following day, they proceeded to the house of the SPOUSES where they used a knife to cut the
cyclone wire fence. As they enter, they destroy the knob of the kitchen door and gained entry. They
took certain valuable items such as VCDs, microphone, and two leather bags.
Meanwhile, FREDDIE CLAVEL woke up to go to the bathroom which was located outside the
bedroom. SENIDO, who was outside the bedroom assaulted FREDDIE and the two wrestled. HINLO
approached FREDDIE and stabbed him using a bladed weapon which caused is death. All the
accused left the scene and left behind the part of the items they took on the railroad located behind
the property.
All the accused were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide punishable
under Article 294(1).
ISSUES:
1. Are all the accused guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide? (YES)
HELD:
The accused are guilty of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The elements for the crime of robbery with homicide are: (a) taking of personal property with the
use of violence or intimidation; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is with intent to
gain; and (4) by reason or on occasion of the robbery, homicide was committed. The intent to rob
must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
The lower courts found that the accused were all armed with knives when they broke into the
house of SPOUSES CLAVEL, took certain personal properties, and, in the course thereof, stabbed
FREDDIE, resulting to his death.
Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that
there was endeavor to prevent the killing.
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 203466 | February 25, 2015
A sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the

material possession of the employee. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did
not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise, and not Estafa under Article 315(1).
Benabaye, as a collector, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only
for the duration of the banking day. She had no juridical possession over the missing funds.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
BENABAYE was the loans bookkeeper of SIAM BANK INC. As such, she was authorized to collect
and/or accept loan payments and issue provisional receipts, accomplish a cash transfer slip at the
end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has received, and remit such
payments to TUPAG, her supervisor
In 2001, SIAM BANK conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions for the period of
December 2000 to June 15, 2001, and found out fraud and other irregularities. It discovered the
non-remittance of some loan payments. Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts amounting to
P470,768 were issued by BENABAYE, but were unreported and unremitted.
SIAM BANK directed BENABAYE to explain the discrepancies and it made a final demand to return
the amount involved. In her written explanation, she claimed that the discrepancies could be
explained by her supervisor to whom she submitted her daily cash transfer slips with the
provisional receipts.
Dissatisfied with the explanations, SIAM BANK terminated the employment pf both BENABAYE and
TUPAG and filed a case of Estafa under Article 315(1) against the two.
BENABAYE argued that she cannot be guilty of Estafa for her possession of the money was merely
material and not juridical.
ISSUES:
1. Is BENABAYE guilty of Estafa penalized under Article 315(1) of the RPC? (NO, but of)
HELD:
The accused is not guilty od Estafa under Article 315(1) of the RPC for her possession of the
money was merely material and juridical.
The elements of Estafa under Article 315(1) are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation
involving the duty to deliver or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the
offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received.
Under the first element, the offender acquires material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. However,
it bears stressing that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. So long as the juridical possession
of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains
to be theft, qualified or otherwise.
In this case, the Supreme Court agreed with BENABAYE that the first element was absent because
her possession was merely material. As a collector, the money merely passes into her hands and she
takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. She had no juridical possession over
the missing funds.
PEOPLE v. ERLINDA RACHO Y SOMERA

GR 227505 | OCTOBER 2, 2017
The same pieces of evidence that establish liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirm
culpability for Estafa. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.
Records show that Racho defrauded Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo by representing
that she can provide them with jobs in East Timor even though she had no license to recruit workers
for employment abroad. She even collected the irrelevant documents and placement fees of varying
amounts. Although complainants were able to fly to East Timor, they remained unemployed there due
to Racho’s failure to obtain their working visas. When they returned to the country and looked for
Racho, complainants could not locate her to recover the amounts they paid. Undeniably, the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Racho committed Estafa against the five
(5) complainants.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, Rodolfo, and Rex uniformly alleged that they heard either from a
radio advertisement or a friend about an employment opportunity in East Timor linked to Racho.
On separate dates, they went to meet with Racho either at her residence in Vigan, Ilocos Sur or her
office in Makati City where they were briefed about the available position for them and the
corresponding compensation.
They were then asked to provide documents, fill out bio-data forms, and pay placement fees, which
they did. They then left the Philippines on different dates and stayed in East Timor while waiting for
their working visas. However, two to three months passed and yet no working visas were issued
despite Racho's promises.
Thus, they went back to the Philippines, and after failing to find Racho, filed their complaints before
the Presidential Anti-Illegal Recruitment Task Force Hunter. The defense countered with the sole
testimony of Racho, who denied the charges against her and argued that she was an auditor of PET
Plans, Inc. from March 23, 2000 to August 31, 2005, making it highly unlikely for her to have
engaged in the business of recruitment and promised employment abroad. Rancho was charged of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Sec. 7(b) of RA 8042 and 6 counts of Estafa under Art 315
par 2(a) of the RPC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Racho is liable of illegal recruitment in large scale under Sec. 7(b) of RA
8042. (YES)
2. Whether or not Racho is liable of estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC. (YES)
3. Whether or not Racho cam be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
(YES)
HELD:
Racho is liable for illegal recruitment in large scale under Sec.7(b) of RA 8042.
The POEA certification, sufficiently established that Racho is neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment. A person or entity engaged in recruitment and
placement activities without the requisite authority is engaged in illegal recruitment. The definition
of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code includes promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. Racho's act of offering and
promising to deploy the complainants to East Timor for work and collecting placement fees from
more than three (3) persons, despite not being authorized to do so, renders her liable for Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale.
Racho is liable for estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC..
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
Racho defrauded Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo by representing that she can
provide them with jobs in East Timor even though she had no license to recruit workers for
employment abroad. She even collected the irrelevant documents and placement fees of varying
amounts. Although complainants were able to fly to East Timor, they remained unemployed there
due to Racho's failure to obtain their working visas. When they returned to the country and looked
for Racho, complainants could not locate her to recover the amounts they paid. Undeniably, the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Racho committed Estafa against the
five (5) complainants. However, the Court acquits Racho in 1 estafa case due to the prosecution's
failure to present any evidence to prove the crime charged.
Racho can be convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The same pieces of evidence that establish liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirm
culpability for Estafa. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.
Records show that Racho defrauded Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo by representing
that she can provide them with jobs in East Timor even though she had no license to recruit
workers for employment abroad. She even collected the irrelevant documents and placement fees
of varying amounts. Although complainants were able to fly to East Timor, they remained
unemployed there due to Racho’s failure to obtain their working visas. When they returned to the
country and looked for Racho, complainants could not locate her to recover the amounts they paid.
Undeniably, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Racho committed
Estafa against the five (5) complainants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 220685| November 29, 2017
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309, of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor of force upon things; and (j) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310
of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
The elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently absent in this case. To
recount, UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution established and owned by respondent's
family. His father, Virgilio, owned 70. 79% of the entire shares of stock of the UM, and respondent
himself claims 9.85%share thereof. Virgilio was the President and Chainnan of the BOT of UM at the
time material to this case, and respondent himself was a board member and stockholder. Records
disclose that respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI's electricity and water
supply. As such, respondent had no criminal intent - as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his father's
authority, on behalf of UM - to appropriate said personal property.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
In May 2007, respondent undertook the construction of the CTTL Building in Baguio City, adjacent
to the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn (BPTI) which is a business establishment owned by the University
of Manila (UM). At that time, respondent's father, Virgilio Delos Santos, who was the President and
Chairman of the Board of Trustees (BOT) of UM, allegedly ordered the employees of BPTI to assist
respondent in all his needs in the construction. Specifically, respondent was permitted to tap into
BPTI's electricity and water supply.
Respondent's father died on January 21, 2008, and was succeeded by Emily Dodson De Leon as
President of UM. On July 8, 2011, UM, represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint against
respondent for the qualified theft of the electricity and water supply of BPTI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause exists against respondent for qualified theft. (NO)
HELD:
There was no probable cause against herein respondent for the crime of qualified theft.
There was no probable cause against herein respondent for the crime of qualified theft, considering
the glaring absence of certain key elements thereof. Notably, "for the public prosecutor to
determine if there exists a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable
likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements,
without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense.
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309, of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without
the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (j) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
The elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently absent in this case.
To recount, UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution established and owned by
respondent's family. His father, Virgilio, owned 70. 79% of the entire shares of stock of the UM, and
respondent himself claims 9.85%share thereof. Virgilio was the President and Chainnan of the BOT
of UM at the time material to this case, and respondent himself was a board member and
stockholder. Records disclose that respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI's
electricity and water supply. As such, respondent had no criminal intent - as he, in fact, acted on the
faith of his father's authority, on behalf of UM - to appropriate said personal property.
CECILIA RIVAC VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 224673 | January 22, 2018
The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender's receipt of
money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the same; (b) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or
property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand
by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
The facts clearly show the existence of all the elements of the crime charged, considering
that: (a) Rivac received various pieces of jewelry from Fariñas on a sale-on-consignment basis, as
evidenced by the consignment document; (b) Rivac was under the obligation to either remit the
proceeds of the sale or return the jewelry after the period of seven (7) days from receipt of the
same; (c) Rivac failed to perform her obligation, prompting Fariñas to demand compliance therewith;
and (d) Rivac failed to heed such demand, thereby causing prejudice to Fariñas, who lost the pieces of
jewelry and/or their aggregate value of P439,500.00.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that on August 4, 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by
Fariñas where she received from Fariñas several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate amount of
P439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell. Fariñas and Rivac agreed that after seven (7) days,
Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return the unsold jewelry to
Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac
failed to perform what was incumbent upon her, causing Fariñas to send her a demand letter. This
prompted Rivac to go to Fariñas's store and offer her a parcel of land as partial payment for the
jewelry. However, Fariñas refused the offer as she discovered that the property was involved in a
land dispute, and instead, reiterated her demand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rivac is guilty of Estafa. (YES)
HELD:
Rivac is guilty of Estafa.
The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender's receipt
of money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the same; (b) misappropriation
or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money
or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
The facts clearly show the existence of all the elements of the crime charged, considering
that: (a) Rivac received various pieces of jewelry from Fariñas on a sale-on-consignment basis, as
evidenced by the consignment document; (b) Rivac was under the obligation to either remit the
proceeds of the sale or return the jewelry after the period of seven (7) days from receipt of the
same; (c) Rivac failed to perform her obligation, prompting Fariñas to demand compliance
therewith; and (d) Rivac failed to heed such demand, thereby causing prejudice to Fariñas, who lost
the pieces of jewelry and/or their aggregate value of P439,500.00.
PAZ CHENG Y CHU v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES

GR No. 174113| January 13, 2016
The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC:
(1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
return the same;
(2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or
denial of receipt of the money or property;
(3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as
defined and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez
delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was
required to either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from
delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d)
Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored
twice for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez
demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand;
(f)Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: The instant case arose from the filing of three (3) separate Informations[4] charging Cheng
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
According to the prosecution, private complainant Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng
entered into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter
to sell on commission basis.
After one month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry; or (b) return
the unsold jewelry to the former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997, and August 12,
1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of jewelry... to Cheng in the respective amounts of
P18,000.00, P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch of jewelry, Cheng issued a
check worth P120,000.00 as foil security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial security for
the last.
When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez
presented the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the same was dishonored
because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to confront Cheng, who then
uttered "Akala mo, babayaran pa kita?"
Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file the instant charges.
RTC found Cheng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa.
The CA affirmed Cheng's conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, with modification as to the
penalties.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for three counts of Estafa.
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC:
(1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return the
same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or
denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or
property received.
The essence of this kind of Estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver
the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as defined
and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered
the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required
to either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c)
Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez
attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored twice for
being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez demanded that
Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand; (f)Cheng's acts clearly
prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.
ESTATE OF ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR v. ROSARIO L. MANZANO

G.R. No. 192391 | June 19, 2017
When the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and
concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist.
The prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa The Court further clarified that
"whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any personal property
was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the
criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto,
which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the
liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
PERLAS-BERNABE J.
FACTS: Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings involving its property in Wack-Wack
Golf and Country Club Inc. Elsa A. Poblador (Elsa), the administrator appointed by the Probate
Court to negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner, instructed Rafael (one of the heirs of
the deceased) to look for interested buyers. Subsequently, Rafael engaged the services of Rosario
Manzano, a broker, for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner in the final net amount of
P15,200,000.00.
Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, and they entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale
with Elsa covering the Wack-Wack Share for the gross amount of P18,000,000.00. Out of the
P18,000,000.00 purchase price, Moreland directly paid Elsa the amount of P15,200,000.00. The
balance of P2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for the payment of taxes and other fees.
However, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. Thus, Elsa returned to
Moreland the amount of P18,000,000.00 and applied with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for
the refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise asked Manzano to return the
broker's service fee.
Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres (Torres), allegedly requested Manzano for
an accounting of the P2,800,000.00 he received. Rafael and Torres allegedly noticed a discrepancy
in the faxed Capital Gains Tax Return prompting them to demand Manzano to properly account for
the P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to her for the payment of taxes and broker's fees, but to no avail.
This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of Estafa.
The RTC granted Manzano's Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the complaint contending that
the element of deceit was absent, considering that both Manzano and Rafael were equally guilty of
defrauding the government of taxes actually due on the transaction. The CA affirmed the ruling of
the RTC, adding that the petitioner has failed to prove the alleged civil liability of Manzano in the
amount of P2,800,000.00.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC correctly ruled on the acquittal of accused-appellant of the charged of
estafa
2. whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto of
Manzano
HELD:
The prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa
The RTC granted Manzano's Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the complaint for Estafa for
failure of the prosecution to "prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined
in and penalized under paragraph 1 (b)[, Article 315] of the Revised Penal Code. As the RTC aptly
noted, Rafael, as the representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with the
entire arrangement, including those which had to be made with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself
admitted that it received the full amount of P15,200,000.00 – the full amount to which it was
entitled to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could
not claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be no
misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would justify the charge of Estafa.
When the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and
concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability
of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. As such, when the element of
misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil
liability ex delicto does not exist.
The Court further clarified that "whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the
delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from
the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the
contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the
crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal case.
J. Crimes against Chastity

K. Crimes against the Civil Status of Persons
L. Crimes against Honor
DIGNA RAMOS v. PEOPLE

GR 226454| NOVEMBER 20, 2017
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is
defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." In particular, it is a rule that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party
constitutes only a light felony.
Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo," which means "vulva of your
mother, prostitute, illiterate," against Dumaua. However, no evidence was presented to show that
Ramos indeed started the altercation by instructing her schoolchildren to throw leaves into Dumaua's
yard, and eventually, throwing dried banana leaves therein as well. Thus, it may safely be concluded
that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words against Dumaua, the utterances were made in the
heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation on the part of the latter. As such, the Court is
constrained to hold that Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Patrocinia Dumaua (Dumaua) was watering her plants in her yard, when suddenly, she noticed five
(5) schoolchildren pick up dried leaves and throw them into her yard. When Dumaua called the
attention of the schoolchildren, the latter ran towards the direction of Sto. Nifio Elementary School,
where Ramos works as a public school teacher.
A little later, Ramos arrived, picked up dried banana leaves, and allegedly threw them into
Dumaua's yard, while saying "ta sinnu ti pabasulem nga agilappak ti bulung, siguro dakayo ta
nagpabirthday kayo" which means "Whom do you blame throwing leaves? Maybe you did because
you hosted a birthday party." This prompted a quarrel between Ramos and Dumaua, during the
course of which Ramos uttered to the latter, "Ukininam, puta, awan ad-adalmo, nagbalay kayo ti
nagdakkelan, magaburan daytoy balay kon" which translates to "Vulva of your mother, prostitute,
illiterate, you built a very big house, it overshadows my house."
In her defense, Ramos denied making any derogatory remarks against Dumaua,
particularly "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo." She then narrated that on the time and date in
question, she was traversing a pathway located between Dumaua's house and that of another
neighbor when she saw Dumaua standing at her yard. Suddenly, Dumaua got angry at her, blamed
her for the garbage in her yard, and threatened her not to use the pathway or else something will
happen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos is liable for the crime of grave oral defamation. (NO)
HELD:
Ramos is only liable of slight oral defamation.
Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo," which means "vulva of your
mother, prostitute, illiterate," against Dumaua. However, no evidence was presented to show that
Ramos indeed started the altercation by instructing her schoolchildren to throw leaves into
Dumaua's yard, and eventually, throwing dried banana leaves therein as well. Thus, it may safely be
concluded that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words against Dumaua, the utterances were
made in the heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation on the part of the latter. As such,
the Court is constrained to hold that Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is
defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." The gravity depends upon: (1) the
expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the
special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and
the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a
rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the
offended party constitutes only a light felony."
M. Quasi-offenses (or Criminal Negligence)
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 195671 | January 21, 2015
To constitute reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. It is the
inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequence of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation
of the penal law.
Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve was the
proximate cause of the collision resulting to the death of DIONESIO, SR. and serious physical injuries of
the two children. Notably, the incident occurred in a road with a curve sloping upwards. The very fact
of speeding under the circumstances of the case indicates an imprudent behavior.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
DIONESIO, SR. was driving his motorcycle to bring his two minor children: DIONERSIO, JR. and
CHERRY to school. While they were ascending the curving road on their proper lane on the right
side of the road, a Land Cruiser driven by ROGELIO was descending the same lane from the
opposite direction. DIONESIO, SR. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the land cruiser to
return to its proper lane, but the Land Cruiser remained.
In order to avoid collision, DIONERSIO, SR. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly
swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the tricycle.
As a result of the collision, DIONESIO SR. and his two children were thrown off the motorcycle.
DIONESIO, SR. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while the two children were thrown over the
hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road causing injuries to their legs.
Siblings ROLF, CHERRY, AND JENNY ANN AQUINO stopped to help the victims while ROGELIO
remained inside the Land Cruiser. ROLF sought the help of KGD. DADIVAS who proceeded to the
site ad loaded the victims to his vehicle.
The victims were brought to a hospital. Operations were performed on the legs od DIONESIO, JR.
and DIONESIO, SR., but the latter eventually died. CHERRY’s leg was placed on a cast. The two
children were confined for more than one month and all the expenses were shouldered by their
mother.
ROGELIO was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property with the aggravating circumstance that accused
failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in his hands to give under Article
365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.
In his defense, with the help of two persons who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve the
victims and loaded them on board the Land Cruiser with the intent of bringing them to a hospital,
but it turned out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another vehicle
instead.
ISSUES:
1. Is ROGELIO guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property? (YES)
2. Is the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party
such help that was in his hands to give be appreciated?
HELD:
ROGELIO is guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown
that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. To constitute reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences
is required. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the
consequence of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence
and imprudence under the operation of the penal law.
ROGELIO’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve was
the proximate cause of the collision resulting to the death of DIONESIO, SR. and serious physical
injuries of the two children. Notably, the incident occurred in a road with a curve sloping upwards.
The very fact of speeding under the circumstances of the case indicates an imprudent behavior.
The qualifying circumstance of failure to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give should not be considered.
ROGELIO tried to extend help to the victims by trying to load the victims to his Land Cruiser so they
may be brought to the hospital, but when he started the engine, he discovered that the vehicle had
no brakes.
Considering that ROGELIO was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263, a complex crime, thus the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Absence of the qualifying circumstance mentioned in Article 365
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed to ROGELIO should be lowered
to two years of PC in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of PC in its maximum, as maximum.
III. SPECIAL LAWS

Punishable acts and circumstances affecting criminal liability of the following:
A. Anti-Arson Law (Secs. 1 to 5, PD 1613, as amended by PD 1744)
B. Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (Secs. 3[a-c], 4, and 5, RA 9775)
C. Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (Secs. 2 and 5, PD 1612)
D. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Sec. 3, RA 3019, as amended)
PEOPLE VS. FUENTES

G.R. No. 186421| April 17, 2017

To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense
by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Fuentes is liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith.
Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in
the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's
chandling operations that was refused issuance of a Business Permit.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Private complainant Valenzuela is the sole proprietor of Triple A Ship Chandling and
General Maritime Services (Triple A). Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A's
Business Permit, despite: (a) Valenzuela's payment of the renewal fees; (b) all the other municipal
officers of the LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying their approval thereto; and (c) a
Police Clearance certifying that Valenzuela had no derogatory records in the municipality.
Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist Order after receiving
Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum alleging that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug
trading. Valenzuela wrote to Fuentes pleading that she be issued a Business Permit, but the latter's
security refused to receive it. Valenzuela obtained certifications and clearances stating that she is of
good moral character, a law-abiding citizen, and has not been charged nor convicted of any crime.
Despite the foregoing, no Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage of its
goods and (b) the suspension of its operations from 2002 to 2006. Valenzuela filed a case against
Fuentes charging him of violation of Article 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
ISSUES:
1. Is Fuentes liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019?
HELD:
FUENTES is liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith. Fuentes
himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in the
Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's
chandling operations that was refused issuance of a Business Permit.
If Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading,
then he would not have issued Business Permits to the latter's other businesses as well. However,
Fuentes issued a Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security. Under these
questionable circumstances, the Court is led to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business
Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed committed with manifest partiality against the latter,
and in favor of the other ship chandling operators in the Port of Isabel.
Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance
of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship
chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of
Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations prevented
Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. Under prevailing case
law, "proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the
benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.
SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191219 | July 31, 2013
The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are: (a) the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
(A) Both petitioners were public officers discharging administrative functions at the time material
to this case.
(B) Vinluan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee, signed the
16 certificates of acceptance, inventory, and delivery of articles from the PNP SSS despite its
incompleteness or lack of material dates, while Lihaylihay certified to the correctness of the
Inspection Report Forms even if no such deliveries were made. Having affixed their signatures
on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were properly
found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the "ghost" purchases in the amount
of ₱8,000,000.00.
(C) Petitioners’ participation in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to an
₱8,000,000.00 loss on the part of the government.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Following a special audit report of the Commission on Audit, the PNP investigated an alleged
"ghost" purchases of combat, clothing, and individual equipment worth ₱133,000,000.00 which
were allegedly purchased from the PNP Service Store System (SSS) and delivered to the PNP
General Services Command (GSC).
Accused Gen. Nazareno, in his capacity as Chief and Board Chairman of PNP, surreptitiously
channeled PNP funds to the PNP SSS through "Funded RIVs" valued at ₱8 million and Director
Domondon released the additional subsistence allowance without approval from the NAPOLCOM
and DBM.
They caused it to appear that there were purchases and deliveries of combat clothing and
individual equipment to the GSC, by maliciously dividing the invoices of not more than ₱500,000
each.
Thereafter, Lihayhay and Marcelo Castillo III certified that the items were delivered, properly
inspected and accepted, and subsequently distributed to the end- users when in fact, no such
purchases of items were made and no items were delivered. Sr. Supt. Bernardo Alejandro, claimed
payment of the alleged items which were delivered while Sr. Supt. Arnulfo Obillos approved the
disbursement vouchers and checks.
Hence, the government, having been caused to pay for the inexistent purchases and deliveries,
suffered undue injury in the amount of 8 million pesos. 10 PNP officers including Lihayhay and
Vinluan were charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."The Sandiganbayan found Obillos, Vinluan, and
Lihaylihay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUES:
1. Is the petitioners’ conviction for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 proper?
(YES)
2. Can Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay invoke the doctrine in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, that
there should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher
to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction? (NO)
HELD:
Yes. All the elements of Section 3(e) of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" appear to be
present in this case.
The crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 which has the following essential
elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. All the elements are present in the case.
As to the first element, it is undisputed that both petitioners were public officers discharging
administrative functions at the time material to this case.
As to the second element, records show that Vinluan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Inspection
and Acceptance Committee, signed the 16 certificates of acceptance, inventory, and delivery of
articles from the PNP SSS despite its incompleteness or lack of material dates, while Lihaylihay
certified to the correctness of the Inspection Report Forms even if no such deliveries were made.
Having affixed their signatures on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found
therein, petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the
"ghost" purchases in the amount of ₱8,000,000.00. To note, their concerted actions, when taken
together, demonstrate a common design which altogether justifies the finding of conspiracy.
As to the third element, petitioners’ participation in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE
items resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss on the part of the government.
No. They cannot invoke the Arias doctrine for they should have exercised a higher degree of
care before signing or approving the items.
Arias v. Sandiganbayan cannot be applied to exculpate petitioners in view of the peculiar
circumstances in this case which should have prompted them to exercise a higher degree of
circumspection, and consequently, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. In particular,
the tampered dates on some of the RIVs, the incomplete certification by GSC SAO Mateo on the date
of receipt of the CCIE items, the missing details on the Reports of Public Property Purchased and the
fact that sixteen checks all dated January 15, 1992 were payable to PNP SSS should have aroused a
reasonable sense of suspicion or curiosity on their part if only to determine that they were not
approving a fraudulent transaction.
The Court explained in the Arias case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to the
case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective
were sufficiently established.
Further, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by rules and
regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to
sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash advance.
E. Anti-Hazing Act of 2018 (Secs. 2 and 3, RA 8049, as amended by RA 11053)

F. Anti-Hijacking Law (Secs. 1 and 3, RA 6235)
G. Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (Secs. 3 [a, b, d, f] and 4, RA 9995)
H. Anti-Plunder Act (Secs. 1 and 2, RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659)
RICHARD A. CAMBE v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

GR Nos. 212014-15 | December 6, 2016
That the belief that a private individual could not be charged for Plunder and violations of
Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the only offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete
misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have
conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle
that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95
assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. It is no dispute that Cambe was Sen.
Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control
over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures
explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen.
Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was
personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen.
Revilla.
PERLAS- BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr.
(Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John
Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution
of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause to indict them, for the crimes of Plunder,
defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and ( 6) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen
[16] counts).
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal
pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen.
Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.
As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen.
Revilla -with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a
"commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement
on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized,
the corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's
"commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in
the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to
the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request
to the DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission"
would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator. Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then
direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas
(Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that
will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the
identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for
the approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the
"commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.
Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle
the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office,
the IA, and the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA)
to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in tum, would expedite the transaction and release
of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent
(10%) share in the project cost. Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit
them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis.
Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to
facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter
would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then
decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig
City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's
residence.
Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of
beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar
documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in
fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under
this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his
PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received
"commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.
In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his
and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had
"always been regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited;
and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy
exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.
Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF
documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor
connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.
In a Joint Resolutiondated March 28, 2014 the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict the
petitioners. Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the
time material to the charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and
private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through their
intricate modus operandi as described above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least
P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of
Plunder..
Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen.
Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further
contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the
whistle blowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant
to the res inter alias acta rule.
Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4,
2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes
she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot
be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of
the criminal complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct.
RULING:
1. COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is not a condition to the filing of the criminal
complaint. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the
COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder
and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it
should have no effect on the filing of the latter.
2. THERE ARE PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE PETITIONERS
a. Probable Cause against Revilla.
At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen.
Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as
other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the
legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.
All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla -directly implicate him for the
crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines. Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary
evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the prosecutor on the
issue of forgery should be ventilated in a full-blown trial. The duty to determine the authenticity of
a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. It is significant to emphasize that
the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF
documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: “ the Special Panel members,
after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the
PDAF documents and the original signatures of Sen. Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-
affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written
by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.
The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -
are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on
the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be
pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen.
Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy: Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the
plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal
knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation -the epicenter of the
entire PDAF operation -and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare
the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with
the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.
In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during
preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by
the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant
statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence
as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the
involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their
respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.
b. Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. It is no dispute that Cambe was Sen.
Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational
control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s
signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to
transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs.
Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself
and for Sen. Revilla.
In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same
reasons above-discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF
documents and whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cambe
at this stage of the proceedings.
c. Probable Cause against Napoles.
Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the
mastermind of the PDAF scam.
Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers'
testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of
the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles
for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen.
Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus
operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks."
In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects
caused undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be
charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those
crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the
primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held
liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same.
This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the
pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the
aforementioned crimes.
I. Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (Sec. 3, RA 7877)
J. Anti-Torture Act of 2009 (Secs. 3 [a, b], 4, and 5, RA 9745)
K. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Secs. 3, 4, and 6, RA 9208, as amended)
L. Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (Secs. 3, 5, and 26, RA 9262)
MELGAR VS. PEOPLE

GR No. 223477 | February 14, 2018
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." In this case, while the prosecution had
established that MELGAR indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to
show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore,
MELGAR cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262.
.
PERLAS- BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with MELGAR, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. MELGAR freely acknowledged the paternity of
BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing
MELGAR with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with MELGAR turned sour as the latter had an
affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one year old, MELGAR stopped giving
support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This
notwithstanding, MELGAR still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against MELGAR. After arraignment, wherein MELGAR
pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreementon
the civil aspect of the case.
ISSUE:
1. Is MELGAR liable for violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262? (YES)
2. Is MELGAR liable for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262? (NO
HELD:
MELGAR is liable for the violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262 for his refusal to provide support
to his child.
RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse. As may be gathered from the
foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of the man-
accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.
MELGAR is not liable for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 since it cannot be proven that his
deprivation of support caused mental and emotional anguish.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." In this case, while the prosecution had
established that MELGAR indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to
show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore,
MELGAR cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that MELGAR is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5(e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
M. Bouncing Checks Law (Sec. 1, BP 22)

N. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Secs. 5, 11, 15, and 21, RA 9165, as amended
by RA 10640)
PEOPLE VS. LABA

G.R. No. 185527 | July 18, 2012

“Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean “to carry or convey from one
place to another”; While it may be argued that Laba was yet to board the aircraft or travel some
distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at
that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one
place to another.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: On July 18, 2005, at 10:45 in the morning, Camaloding Laba arrived at the Manila Dometic
Airport in Pasay City to take his flight bound for Davao City. Upon his arrival to the check-in area,
Mark Villocillo, a non-uniformed personnel frisker, physically searched Laba and suspected that the
latter’s oversized white rubber shoes seemed to contain what felt like rice. Upon inspection,
Villocillo discovered 3 plastic sachets of shabu. Laba tried to negotiate with Villocillo while handing
the latter rolled paper bills. Villociallo called the attention of his supervisor, PO2 Nolasco Peji, who
apprehended Laba and apprised him of his rights. Subsequently, Laba was brought to their office
and investigated by PO2 Caimoso, who thereafter indorsed Laba and the confiscated sachets to
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents.
On the same day, PDEA requested that a laboratory examination of the 3 plastic sachets be
conducted. The following day, the same confiscated sachets tested positive for methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Consequently, Laba was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of
RA 9165. During arraignment, Laba entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. He claimed
that SPO2 Peji and VIllocillo forced him to admit ownership of the shabu in the office of the former
and denied wearing the white rubber shoes where the sachets of shabu were allegedly found.
The RTC convicted Laba as charged upon a finding that all the elements for transportation of drugs
have been established by the prosecution. CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, holding that the
identity of the seized substance had been adequately proved and that the chain of custody was
properly established. While the CA conceded that the arresting officers were unable to strictly
comply with the requirements set forth under Sec. 21, Par. (1) of RA 9165 by failing to photograph
the seized items, it nonetheless found that the evidentiary value of the confiscated substance had
been preserved. It also did not find the non-presentation of the forensic chemist as fatal to the cause
of the prosecution.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the conviction of appellant Laba is proper. (YES)
HELD:
The conviction of appellant Laba was proper.
Under the Dangerous Drugs Act, “transport” means “to carry or convey from one place to another”.
While it is true that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal
drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular
instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to
another. In this case, Laba was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his
flight bound for Davao City with 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in
his possession.
In addition to that, it can be reasonably inferred from the deliberations of the Congress that if a
person is found to have more than five (5) grams of shabu in his possession, then his purpose in
carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it.
With respect to the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, the Supreme Court held that failure to
strictly comply with Sec. 21, Par. (a) of RA 9165 requiring the apprehending officers to physically
inventory and photograph the confiscated items shall not render the evidence inadmissible. Neither
will the non-presentation in court of the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory
examination on the confiscated substance, operate to acquit Laba. Corpus delicti has nothing to do
with the testimony of the chemical analyst, and the report of an official forensic chemist regarding a
recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its preparation. The prosecution
has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses.
PEOPLE VS. MARCELINO VITERBO

G.R. No. 203434 | July 23, 2014
The following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. Hence, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus
delicti. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance.
There were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items, particularly the events that
transpired from the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona and turned over to the possession of
"Captain Vargas," as well as the identity of the PDEA agent who brought them together with the
laboratory request to Garcia.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
An informant reported to the CIDG that there were persons peddling illegal drugs in Ligao, Albay.
P/S Inspector Victor Vargas formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. A 500-peso bill was
marked with initials “NL” and was given to SPO4 Cardona.
The buy-bust team went to the target area. SPO4 Cardona met with the accused and expressed his
intention to buy shabu worth 500 pesos. SPO4 Cardona handed the marked money to Marcelino
Viterbo, then the latter’s brother Ronald handed SPO4 Cardona 2 transparent plastic sachets of
shabu. Upon the receipt of the item, SPO4 Cardona executed the signal of scratching his head then
SPO2 Garcia and SPO2 Zamora rushed to apprehend them.
SPO4 Cardona marked the plastics with “FTC-1” and “FTC-2.” He and another policeman brought
the items and the laboratory request to the crime laboratory, but the chemist was not there. The
next day, the request and the plastic sachets were brought by another policeman to the same crime
laboratory.
Upon examination, P/Insp. Josephine Clemen found that the contents of the plastic sachets were
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The custody of the plastic sachets went from SPO4 Cardona, to a certain Captain Vargas. However, it
was not ascertained who was in custody of the items before it was brought to the crime laboratory.
It was only shown on the left portion of the request that it was delivered by “P02 Zamora.” After
that, it was only established that the items were received by the clerk Ofelia Garcia who turned
them over to P/Insp. Clemen, the forensic chemist.
Marcelino and Ronald were charged with the violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The RTC and CA convicted them as
charged.
ISSUES:
1. Is the conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA 9165
proper? (NO)
2. Is the amount of time between the buy-bust operation and the delivering of the items to the
laboratory for examination fatal to the cause of prosecution? (YES)
3. Is the absence of physical inventory or photographs, representative from media or any
elected office render the improper conviction of the accused? (YES)
HELD:
No. There exists a reasonable doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the
identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it. Hence, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it
was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
However, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from
the accused-appellants, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
From SPO4 Cardona to "Captain Vargas" who, unfortunately, did not testify in this case in order to
shed light on what happened to the seized items when they were turned over to his possession. His
testimony in this regard is significant, considering that the laboratory request, on its lower left
portion, reflects that it was delivered by a certain "PO2 Zamora" who, the Court notes, was likewise
not presented in court to explain his role in the chain of custody of the seized items. What was
established, instead, was that the seized items and the laboratory request were received by the
clerk of the crime laboratory, who turned them over to P/Insp. Clemen, the forensic chemist.
There were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items, particularly the events that
transpired from the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona and turned over to the
possession of "Captain Vargas," as well as the identity of the PDEA agent who brought them
together with the laboratory request to Garcia.
Yes. It is extremely fatal which may weaken the prosecution’s case.
The prosecution’s case is weakened by the fact that the seized items were delivered not on the
same day of the buy-bust operation, but only the following day. To the Court’s mind, the
considerable amount of time between the conduct of the buy-bust operation until the same were
brought for laboratory examination, especially when viewed together with the above-mentioned
considerations, figures into a gaping hiatus in the chain of custody of the said items, which is
extremely fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Yes. It casts doubt on the identity of the drugs confiscated.
The non-compliance with its provisions, i.e., that there was no physical inventory or photographs of
the seized evidence, nor was there any representative from the media, or the Department of Justice,
or any elected public official present during the subject seizure and confiscation, makes it clear that
the identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
hence, rendering improper accused-appellants’ conviction.
Verily, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the
necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right.
PEOPLE VS. DENNIS SUMILI

G.R. No. 212160 | February 4, 2015
In cases of violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It is important
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items be preserved. Simply put, the dangerous
drugs presented in court must be the same as that seized from the accused.
The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due
to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The buy-bust operation was conducted on June 7 which was claimed to be a Friday by SPO2
Englatiera, which in reality is a Wednesday, thus, the seized drugs should have been brought to the
PNP Crime Lab on June 8 and not on June 9 if it was really true that the lab was already closed on the
day the drugs were seized.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
On June 7, 2006, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Iligan City Sub-Office received a report that
SUMILI was selling shabu. SPO2 ENGLATIERA ordered the conduct of a surveillance on SUMILI,
which confirmed that truth and veracity of the report. Thereafter, SPO2 ENGLATIERA organized a
team for the buy-bust operation and prepared a marked money amounting to P200.
At around 5:10 of the same day, the buy-bust operation was conducted. After the sale was
consummated, the buy-bust team stormed the house of SUMILI, but the latter escaped by jumping
through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside his house.
SPO2 ENGLATIERA marked the sachet of suspected shabu and instructed NUP ONG to bring the
sachet to the PNP Crime Lab for examination, but NUP ONG failed to do so on the same day as the
lab was already closed. It was only on June 9 or two days after the buy-bust operation that the
sachet was brought and turned over to the lab. Upon examination, it was confirmed that the sachet
contained shabu.
ISSUES:
1. Is the conviction of SUMILI in violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA 9165 – relating to chain of
custody, proper? (NO)
HELD:
The conviction was in violation of Section 5, Article II of RA RA 9165 – chain of custody rule
The following elements must be established by the prosecution to convict an accused for violation
of RA 9165: (a) identity of the buyer, the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment. What remains material for conviction is the proof that
the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti. It is also important
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items be preserved. Simply put, the dangerous
drugs presented in court must be the same as that seized from the accused. The chain of custody
requirement removes any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.
Prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug,
from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of
the corpus delicti.
The chain of custody requirement outlines the procedure that the apprehending officers should
follow in handling the seized drugs. It requires: (a) immediate conduct of inventory and taking of
the photographs of the drugs seized in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such
items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a representative from
the media, the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall the sign the copies of the inventory; and
(b) seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Lab within 24 hours from the confiscation for
examination purposes. However, non-compliance with the procedure will not automatically
invalidate the seized drugs, so long as: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
seized items are properly preserved.
The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from SUMILI
due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The buy-bust operation was conducted on June 7 which was claimed to be a
Friday by SPO2 ENGLATIERA, which in reality is a Wednesday, thus, the seized drugs should have
been brought to the PNP Crime Lab on June 8 and not on June 9 if it was really true that the lab was
already closed on the day the drugs were seized. Undoubtedly, the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Hence, the conviction of Sumili should be set aside and
he must be acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. CHARLIE SORIN Y TAGAYLO

G.R. No. 212635 |March 25, 2015
SPO1 MUGOT stated that he did not mark the sachet seized from SORIN, and instead, marked the
“transparent plastic cellophane” wherein he placed the seized sachets.The act of marking only the
cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the corpus delicti highly susceptible to
tampering, switching, planting, and contamination – the very acts which the requirement of marking
seeks to prevent. Thus, acquitted SORIN on the ground of failure to mark the plastic sachets
confiscated during the buy-bust operation.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
PNP Intelligence Chief Section of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental received a report that SORIN was
selling illegal drugs at his residence. A test-buy was conducted, and as a result, a buy-bust operation
was performed.
PO2 DADOR and PO1 CAMBANGAY approached SORIN’s residence and asked if they could buy
shabu, and SORIN responded that each sachet costs P200. After the sale was consummated, PO2
DADOR examined the sachet and tapped SORIN’s shoulder, brought him outside the house where
the rest of the buy-bust team was introduced and arrested SORIN.
At the police station, PO2 DADOR turned over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1
MUGOT, who marked the same, prepared the inventory and request for laboratory examination,
and sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory which confirmed that the sachet, SORIN’s
hand and the marked money, and SORIN’s urine sample tested positive for shabu.
ISSUES:
1. Is SORIN guilty for violation of Section 5, Article 2 of RA 9165? (NO)
HELD:
SORIN is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the substance
allegedly confiscated due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody.
In order to convict an accused for violation Section 5, Article 2 of RA 9165, it must be shown that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized have been preserved. The dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him. The
chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed. Section 21 of RA 9165 requires that the apprehending team that has initial
custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same.
The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated due to
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.
It was found out that PO2 DADOR, the apprehending officer who seized the sachet from SORIN,
failed to mark the same, and instead turned them over unmarked to SPO1 MUGOT. Further,
PO2 DADOR admitted that he did not place any markings on the sachets or the marked money; and
SPO1 MUGOT stated that he did not mark the sachet seized from SORIN, and instead, marked the
“transparent plastic cellophane” wherein he placed the seized sachets.
The act of marking only the cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the corpus
delicti highly susceptible to tampering, switching, planting, and contamination – the very acts which
the requirement of marking seeks to prevent. Thus, acquitted SORIN on the ground of failure to
mark the plastic sachets confiscated during the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE v. JOHN PAUL CERALDE Y RAMOS

GR 228894 | AUGUST 7, 2017
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of
the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It
must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence.
An examination of the records reveals that while the prosecution was able to show that the seized
items were properly marked by PO3 Delos Santos immediately upon their confiscation at the place of
the arrest and in the presence of Ceralde, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public
official and a representative from the DOJ and the media.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
On July 23, 2011, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area to conduct and entrapment
operation on Ceralde. Shortly after, Ceralde arrived and handed three (3) plastic sachets of
suspected marijuana leaves to the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Yanes, who, in turn, gave Ceralde the
marked money. PO3 Delos Santos conducted a body search on Ceralde and found another plastic
sachet of marijuana in his pants.
PO3 Delos Santos immediately marked all four (4) plastic sachets at the place of arrest and in the
presence of Ceralde, and subsequently, brought the latter, together with the marked money and the
confiscated plastic sachets, to the police station for further investigation and proper
documentation.
Thereat, PO3 Pedro Vinluan, received the confiscated plastic sachets from PO3 Delos Santos and
prepared the request for laboratory examination. At around 12 o'clock noon of the same day, PO3
Delos Santos delivered the request for laboratory examination, together with the seized items, to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City, where they were tested
positive for the presence of marijuana. Afterwards, the seized drugs were submitted to Records and
Evidence Custodian Mercedita Velasco (REC Velasco) for safekeeping until such time that they were
presented to the court as evidence.
Ceralde denied the charges against him but opted not to present any evidence during trial, invoking
his constitutional right of presumption of innocence.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ceralde is guilty under Sections 5 and 11, Art 2 of RA 9165. (YES)
HELD:
Ceralde cannot be held guilty under sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
Chain of custody rule was not substantially complied with. The Court finds that deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule were unjustified, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Ceralde.
items were properly marked by PO3 Delos Santos immediately upon their confiscation at the place
of the arrest and in the presence of Ceralde, the same was not done in the presence of any elected
public official and a representative from the DOJ and the media. In an attempt to justify such
absence, PO3 Delos Santos claims that the instant buy-bust operation is a "confidential matter"
which requires them "not to tell other person about it," cannot be given credence, as the law
mandates their presence to ensure the proper chain of custody and to avoid the possibility of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of
the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It
must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence.
Since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of
RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items purportedly seized from Ceralde were already compromised. Perforce, Ceralde's acquittal is
in order.
PEOPLE v. JONAS GERONIMO Y PINLAC

GR 225500| SEPTEMBER 11, 2017

It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot
be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.
An examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of Geronimo and an elected public official, the same was
not done in the presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media. Moreover, records reveal
that the said inventory and photography of the seized items were not done at the place of arrest but at
the office of the apprehending officers in Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City. The plurality of the
breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
A tip was received from a confidential informant that Geronimo was peddling illegal drugs in
Caloocan City. Acting on the said tip, Intelligence Agent 1 Joshua V. Arquero (IA1 Arquero)
immediately organized a buy-bust operation, which was coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office and the Philippine National Police (PNP). IA1 Arquero
then instructed the informant to order P500.00 worth of shabu from Geronimo. Moments later,
Geronimo arrived, took out from his right pocket a transparent plastic sachet containing a
suspected shabu, and handed it over to the poseur-buyer.
When the transaction was complete, the team rushed towards the scene to arrest Geronimo. The
team recovered the marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper. The team proceeded to the
headquarters in Quezon City, and the confiscated items were supposedly marked, photographed,
and inventoried by IO1 Lorilla in the presence of Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz.
After conducting the inventory, IO1 Lorilla secured the letter-request for laboratory examination
from IO1 Jayson R. Albao and delivered the specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. The
examination revealed that the substance found in the plastic sachet tested positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride and mefenorex, while the other wrapped specimen tested
positive for the presence of marijuana, all dangerous drugs. Geronimo interposed the defenses of
denial and frame-up, maintaining that at the time of the incident, he was drinking at the house of his
friend Julian Faura, Jr. (Faura) when three (3) unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and forced
him to board a white Toyota Revo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Geronimo is liable under sections 5 and 11, Article 2 of RA 9165. (NO)
HELD:
Geronimo is not liable under sections 5 and 11, Article 2 of RA 9165.
It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in
order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution
has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in
the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
An examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of Geronimo and an elected public official, the same
was not done in the presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media. Moreover, records
reveal that the said inventory and photography of the seized items were not done at the place of
arrest but at the office of the apprehending officers in Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City. The
plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It is
well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot
be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable
grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its
IRR, Geronimo's acquittal is perforce in order.
PEOPLE v. MANUEL LIM CHING

GR 223556| OCTOBER 9, 2017
It is essential that the identity of the seized drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty.
Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an
unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
The fact of marking of the seized items was clear from such testimony and the inventory evidenced by
the attached Receipt for Property Seized, the same was glaringly silent as to the taking of photographs
and the conduct of an inventory in the presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ. It is
well to note that the delivery of the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory was made way beyond
the prescribed twenty four (24)-hour period from seizure. The breaches of the procedure contained in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and
accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
On June 29, 2003, and after the conduct of surveillance on the suspected illegal drug activities of
Ching, as well as a test-buy P/Supt. Tonog), formed a buy-bust team. At around four (4) o'clock in
the afternoon of even date, the team proceeded to Ching's house located at Purok 4, Barangay Jose
Abad Santos, Catarman, Northern Samar and upon arrival thereat, PO1 Lim approached Ching and
bought a sachet of suspected shabu worth ₱500.00, handing as payment the marked money. The
team followed Ching inside his house where he was eventually arrested for selling shabu.
Similarly, the following drug paraphernalia were recovered in an adjacent makeshift structure
outside the house.The sachets of shabu were sealed and labeled "MLC-1 to MLC-9" afterwhich, they
were brought to the Northern Samar Police Provincial Office, Camp Carlos Delgado. On July 9,
2003, P/Supt. Tonog delivered the drug specimens to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) office in Tacloban.
In Chemistry Report, the substance inside eight (8) out of the nine (9) sachet were positive for
methylamphetamine hyrdrochloride or shabu, an illegal drug. Ching pleaded not guilty, he claimed
that on said date, he was in his house with his nephews and was about to leave when policemen,
including P/Supt. Tonog, together with some barangay officials, arrived and roamed around his
residence. He later saw one of the men insert a plastic inside the chicken cage and thereafter,
gathered some things and placed them on top of a table.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 11, 12, and 5, Article II
of RA 9165. (NO)
HELD:
Ching is not liable for violating sections 11, 12 and 5 or Article 2 of RA 9165.
It is essential that the identity of the seized drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty.
Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an
unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation
in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of 9165 may not always be possible. the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under
justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items
so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.
The fact of marking of the seized items was clear from such testimony and the inventory evidenced
by the attached Receipt for Property Seized, the same was glaringly silent as to the taking of
photographs and the conduct of an inventory in the presence of a representative from the media
and the DOJ. It is well to note that the delivery of the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory was
made way beyond the prescribed twenty four (24)-hour period from seizure. The breaches of the
procedure contained in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
PEOPLE VS. NIÑO CALIBOD Y HENOBESO

G.R. No. 230230 | November 20, 2017
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment. Further, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Thus, in order to remove any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drug, the
prosecution must show an unbroken chain of custody over the same.
The prosecution was not able to establish whether or not the requisite inventory and photography
were properly conducted by the police officers. Based on PO2 Oruga’s testimony, he immediately
proceeded to the crime laboratory after marking the seized shabu. He did not state if the marking was
done within the view of Calibod, an elected public official, and a representative from the DOJ or media.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that a tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain "Toto,"
who was later identified as Calibod, was selling shabu along the railroad tracks in Barangay Parian,
Calamba City, Laguna.
The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and arrived thereat at around 5:30 in the
afternoon.Upon seeing Calibod, PO2 Oruga, the designated poseur buyer, approached him and said,
"To, pakuha ako ng piso." PO2 Oruga handed over the buy-bust money in the amount of P100.00 to
Calibod, who, in turn, gave him one (1) plastic sachet of shabu. After receiving the sachet, PO2
Oruga introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Calibod, and retrieved the buy-bust money
from him, prompting the buy-bust team to approach the scene. PO2 Oruga then marked the seized
sachet with his initials, "GAO."
After the marking, PO2 Oruga immediately brought Calibod, the buy-bust money, and confiscated
sachet, to the crime laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna.
After examination, Forensic Chemical Officer Huelgas confirmed that the sachet
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, and that Calibod's hands tested positive for ultra-violet
powder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calibod is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165? (NO)
HELD:
Calibod is not guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165.
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, it is essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to remove any unnecessary doubts
on the identity of the dangerous drug, the prosecution must show an unbroken chain of custody
over the same.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said
section, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there were unjustified gaps in the prescribed
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod.
The prosecution was not able to establish whether or not the requisite inventory and photography
were properly conducted by the police officers. Based on PO2 Oruga’s testimony, he immediately
proceeded to the crime laboratory after marking the seized shabu. He did not state if the marking
was done within the view of Calibod, an elected public official, and a representative from the DOJ or
media.
There were also procedural lapses on the second and third links of the chain. Since PO2 Oruga
immediately went to the crime laboratory without conducting the requisite inventory and
photography, there was no showing that the confiscated shabu was initially turned over to an
investigating officer. Additionally, the prosecution was silent as to how the specimen shabu was
received at the crime laboratory, considering that PO2 Oruga did not state if he submitted the same
directly to FCO Huelgas. No details were given as to the identity of the person who received the
specimen shabu on behalf of the crime laboratory, as well as how it was handled, preserved, and
managed before FCO Huelgas conducted an examination thereon. According to PO2 Oruga, he
simply left the plastic sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money at the crime laboratory and brought
Calibod to the police station.
PEOPLE VS. ALEXANDER ALVARO Y DE LEON

G.R. No. 225596 | January 10, 2018

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drugs presented as the corpus delicti of the offense must be
established with moral certainty to be the same illicit substance taken from the accused. Absent such
conclusive identification, there can be no finding of guilt on the part of the accused.
First, PO3 Castillo testified that they did not prepare the inventory at the place of the arrest.
Second, the prosecution failed to show that the inventory was made in the presence of the accused as
required by law. Third, The prosecution failed to show that the seized items were photographed.
Fourth, The sachet subject of the sale was purportedly marked by Siborboro as "JSJR" and the other
sachet confiscated from Geronimo was marked as "JSJR-1." However, the crime laboratory's report
shows that the forensic chemist examined two (2) sachets, one marked "JSJRND" and the other "JSJR-
1." Fifth, the records reveal that the request for laboratory examination was not delivered by PO1
Santos but by a certain Serrano. Siborboro and PO3 Castillo both failed to explain how Serrano came
to possess the seized items, while PO2 Orante's testimony shows that he had no personal knowledge of
the arrest and what transpired thereafter.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that in the afternoon of June 5, 2008, after receiving a tip from a
confidential informant about the drug peddling activity of an alias "Betchay," later identified as
Geronimo, a team composed of Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) and Station Anti Illegal
Drugs - Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF) operatives proceeded to the Laperal Compound,
Brgy. Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. MADAC Operative Siborborowas designated as the poseur-
buyer, while the rest of the team and the other operatives acted as back-up.
At the target area, Siborboro was introduced by the informant to Geronimo, who asked Siborboro
how much he intended to buy. Siborboro then handed the marked P500.00 bill to Geronimo, who, in
turn, gave the same to her companion, Alvaro. Thereafter, Geronimo took out two (2) plastic
sachets of suspected shabu, and handed one to Siborboro. Upon receipt of the sachet, Siborboro
gave the pre-arranged signal, prompting the back-up officers to rush in and arrest accused-
appellants.
Siborboro confiscated the remaining plastic sachet containing suspected drugs, while PO3 Castillo
recovered the buy-bust money from Alvaro. Siborboro immediately marked the sachet subject of
the sale with "JSJR," and the sachet he recovered from Geronimo with "JSJR-1." He also prepared an
inventoryof the seized items, which was signed by PO3 Castillo and Barangay Chairman
Bobier. Accused-appellants were brought to the SAID-SOTF office, where the seized items were
turned over to the investigator, PO1 Santos who then prepared the request for laboratory
examinationand submitted the seized sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic chemist
(S/Insp.) Engr. Mangalip examinedthe specimen, which tested positive for shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants are liable under Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9165? (NO)
HELD:
Accused-appellants are not liable under Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9165.
In order to secure a conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it is
essential that the identity of the confiscated drugs be established beyond reasonable doubt. To
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the same.
The SC concurred with accused-appellants that indeed, numerous lapses, and even inconsistencies,
taint the prosecution's account of how the arresting officers handled the subject confiscated drugs,
to wit:
First. Siborboro testified that he immediately marked and inventoried the seized items at the place
of arrest. This was, however, contradicted by PO3 Castillo who testified that they did not prepare
the inventory at the place of the arrest since Laperal Compound was teeming with people.
Second. The prosecution failed to show that the inventory was made in the presence of the accused
as required by law.
Third. The prosecution failed to show that the seized items were photographed.
Fourth. The sachet subject of the sale was purportedly marked by Siborboro as "JSJR" and the other
sachet confiscated from Geronimo was marked as "JSJR-1." However, the crime laboratory's report
shows that the forensic chemist examined two (2) sachets, one marked "JSJRND" and the other
"JSJR-1."
Fifth. The records reveal that the request for laboratory examination was not delivered by PO1
Santos but by a certain Serrano. Siborboro and PO3 Castillo both failed to explain how Serrano
came to possess the seized items, while PO2 Orante's testimony shows that he had no personal
knowledge of the arrest and what transpired thereafter.
PEOPLE VS. PHILIP MAMANGON Y ESPIRITU

G.R. No. 229102 | January 29, 2018
The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the
chain from the moment that the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.
The records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs were
conducted in the presence of Mamangon and the other apprehending officers, the same were not done
in the presence of an elected public official and any representative from the DOJ and the media. Thus,
considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under
Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs are seriously put
into question.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that in the evening of February 20, 2009, a tip was received from a
confidential informant that a certain "Pepe," who was later on identified as Mamangon, was selling
illegal drugs along the railroad track of Dagupan Extension and Antipolo Street in Tondo, Manila. A
buy-bust operation was organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), and the buy-bust team went to the target area that same evening.Upon arriving thereat, the
informant, together with PO3 Guzman, the designated poseur-buyer, approached Mamangon and
ordered P300.00 worth of shabu. Subsequently, Mamangon handed over one plastic sachet
containing shabu to PO3 Guzman, who simultaneously paid using the marked money. Shortly after,
PO3 Guzman removed his cap, which was the pre-arranged signal for the police to come in, and
consequently, Mamangon was apprehended. PO3 Guzman then recovered the marked money from
Mamangon and ordered him to empty his pockets, which purportedly contained another plastic
sachet of shabu. After securing the additional plastic sachet, PO3 Guzman marked it alongside the
other seized item in the presence of Mamangon. Thereafter, the team went to the barangay hall but
immediately left since no one was around. The team then proceeded to Police Station 7, where PO3
Guzman turned over Mamangon, as well as the seized items, to PO2 Dela Cruz. PO2 Dela Cruz then
conducted the requisite inventory, while PO3 Guzman took photographs of the confiscated items in
the presence of Mamangon and the other arresting officers. After conducting the inventory to which
were attached the photographs, PO2 Dela Cruz prepared the request for laboratory examination,
which was submitted together with the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Accordingly, they were received and examined by Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector Reyes,
who confirmed that they contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mamangon guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. (NO)
HELD:
Mamangon is not guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for
each link of the chain from the moment that the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court found that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity
and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Mamangon.
The records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs
were conducted in the presence of Mamangon and the other apprehending officers, the same were
not done in the presence of an elected public official and any representative from the DOJ and the
media. To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation - apart from
their unsubstantiated claim that "no one is around" the barangay hall when they arrived - in order
for the saving clause to apply. Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drugs are seriously put into question.
PEOPLE VS. JUGO

GR No. 231792 | January 29, 2018

RA 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides for the procedure that police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their integrity and evidentiary
value are preserved. Breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused since the corpus delicti of the crime has been
compromised.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the preparation of the inventory, i.e., Confiscation Receipt, and
taking of photographs were NOT done in the presence of: (a) the accused or his representative; (b) an
elected public official; and (c) a representative from the DOJ or the media. By and large, the breaches
of procedure committed by the police officers militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
PERLAS – BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
In the morning of August 5, 2011, a team, with PO2 Fernando Romero, Jr. as the poseur-buyer,
prepared for a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Barangay Sagud Bahley, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, PO2 Romero and the civilian informant met
with Jugo and his two companions, Lomibao and Zamudio in front of a carinderia. Afterwards, Jugo,
Lomibao, and Zamudio executed the transaction with PO2 Romero, who then gave the marked
money to Jugo; in turn, Jugo handed PO2 Romero one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance.
After the civilian asset left, PO2 Romero performed the pre-arranged signal, prompting the rest of
the team to approach them and arrest Jugo and his two companions. SPO1 Villegas conducted a
body search on Jugo and recovered the marked money PO2 Romero retained possession of the
subject plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
In his defense, Jugo testified that on August 5, 2011, he went with Lomibao and Zamudio to
Barangay Cayanga to borrow money from his uncle for his wife's delivery. While onboard the
motorcycle going back to Barangay Sagud Bahley, they were flagged down by PO2 Romero and
were subsequently brought to the police station for interrogation. Later on, Lomibao and Zamudio
were released, while Jugo remained in detention.
Jugo contended that there were various deviations from the chain of custody rule.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Jugo is liable for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165. (NO)
HELD:
Jugo is not liable for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs due to breaches in the chain of
custody rule as laid down under RA 9165
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. In such a crime, it is essential
that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to
obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides that the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or
his representative or counsel, a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and
any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from
confiscation for examination purposes. Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165- under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the preparation of the inventory, i.e., Confiscation Receipt,
and taking of photographs were NOT done in the presence of: (a) the accused or his representative;
(b) an elected public official; and (c) a representative from the DOJ or the media. By and large, the
breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.
Hence, the conviction of Jugo of the violation of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs must
be set aside and he must be acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. MIRANDA

GR No. 229671 | January 31, 2018
Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
provides that the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media or the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination purposes.
Records reveal that while the seized items were marked by Encarnacion in the presence of MIRANDA
and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of any representative from the
DOJ and the media. Despite the non-observance of this requirement, the prosecution did not even
proffer a plausible explanation therefor.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that on March 18, 2013, an informant tipped the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse
Council (MADAC) that Miranda was selling illegal drugs along Infanta Street, Barangay Olympia,
Makati City. After verifying the said tip, a buy-bust operation was organized in coordination with
the PDEA, and the team, together with the informant, proceeded to the target area along Infanta
Street at 10 o'clock in the evening. Upon arriving, the informant introduced MADAC operative Delno
A. Encarnacion, the designated poseur-buyer, to Miranda as the buyer of shabu worth P300.00.
Encarnacion then gave the marked money to Miranda, while the latter simultaneously handed over
one transparent sachet of suspected shabu. After inspecting the item, Encarnacion executed the pre-
arranged signal, prompting the buy-bust team to rush towards the scene and arrest Miranda.
Subsequently, a body search was conducted on Miranda, whose pockets purportedly yielded
another plastic sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money. Since Miranda allegedly resisted and
attempted to escape, the team was constrained to pull out from the site and bring him to the
barangay hall of Barangay Olympia. Thereat, Encarnacion marked and inventoried the seized
sachets of shabu in the presence of Miranda and Barangay Kagawad Noe Lyndon Gonzales, among
others. Photos of the seized drugs, together with the witnesses, were likewise taken. Encarnacion
turned over the items to SPO 1 Nildo T. Orsua, who prepared a letter-request for examination. The
same were received by forensic chemist PSI Sahagun and confirmed that they indeed contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
For his part, MIRANDA denied the allegations against him, claiming that at around 3:30 in the
afternoon of March 18, 2013, he was in Infanta Street, Makati City installing a window screen of a
house when two unidentified persons suddenly held his back, handcuffed him, and boarded him
inside a van. He averred that he was taken to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Office, where he was
photographed with two plastic sachets placed on a table. Thereafter, he was brought to the
barangay hall and was made to face a barangay kagawad. Shortly after, he was again photographed
together with said official and the plastic sachets.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Miranda is liable for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II or RA 9156? (NO)
HELD:
Miranda is not liable for the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs due
to breaches in the chain of custody rule as laid down under RA 9165.
In every prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Meanwhile, in order to
convict an accused charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish
the following elements also by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of
an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 provides that the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who
shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs
must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for
examination purposes. Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165-
under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.
Records reveal that while the seized items were marked by Encarnacion in the presence of
MIRANDA and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of any
representative from the DOJ and the media. Despite the non-observance of this requirement, the
prosecution did not even proffer a plausible explanation therefor.
Hence, the conviction of MIRANDA of the violation of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs
must be set aside and he must be acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. PAZ

GR No. 229512 | January 31, 2018
Under the Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately
after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.
The RTC noted that PO3 Balagasay, as the officer responsible for the arrest of Condes and Laceda,
failed to sign the inventory of the seized paraphernalia. As such, it was probable that the items seized
from them were not the same items listed in the inventory. Also, the amount or quantity of suspected
shabu found in the unsealed transparent plastic sachet - which was previously recovered from Condes
and Laceda - could barely be determined, as the sachet merely contained traces or residue of the
suspected drug. PO3 Balagasay clearly misconstrued the law and its application in buy-bust
operations. In addition, records reveal that the prosecution did not present any photographs of the
supposed conduct of inventory during trial. When asked during his cross-examination, PO3 Balagasay
merely stated that he "cannot recall already if there was a photograph of the evidence."
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that a tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain PAZ
was selling illegal drugs. Acting on the said tip, a buy-bust operation was organized in coordination
with PDEA. At about 11:35 in the evening, the buy-bust team, together with the informant,
proceeded to the target area, which was an ukay-ukay. Upon arriving thereat, the informant saw
PAZ and introduced him to PO1 Agbunag, the designated poseur-buyer. When PAZ asked PO1
Agbunag if he was going to buy, the latter replied, "I will score in the amount of P500.00." PAZ then
handed over a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, who, after inspecting the said
item, paid using the marked money. Shortly after, PO1 Agbunag introduced himself as a police
officer and arrested PAZ. PO1 Agbunag then signaled PO3 Balagasay for assistance, as there were
two other persons later on identified as Rolando Condes and Abner Laceda who were purportedly
sniffing shabu inside the shop. PO3 Balagasay immediately arrested Condes and Laceda. PO3
Balagasay noticed some drug paraphernalia – one unsealed transparent plastic sachet with traces of
white crystalline substance, an aluminium foil with traces of white crystalline substance, an
aluminium foil used as a tooter, and two disposable lighters, which he subsequently confiscated and
marked.
Meanwhile, PO1 Agbunag instructed PAZ to empty his pockets, which yielded three more heat-
sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance, the marked money, and three 100-peso bills.
Consequently, PO1 Agbunag marked all four plastic sachets. Thereafter, the buy-bust team took the
confiscated items to the Pasig City Police Station, where the requisite inventory was conducted by
PO1 Agbunag. PAZ, together with Condes and Laceda, was brought to the Rizal Medical Center for
medical examination, which was followed by a drug testing. The confiscated items were likewise
submitted to the EDP Crime Laboratory Service for qualitative examination. Accordingly, they were
received and examined and it was confirmed that they contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.
PAZ interposed the defense of denial, claiming that he was not caught in a buy-bust operation, for
there were no buy-bust money and dangerous drugs recovered from him. He maintained that he
was preparing to close the thrift shop with his wife and Condes, when three unidentified armed
men suddenly arrived and handcuffed him and Condes. When they asked about their violation, they
were told to just explain in the office. After they were brought to the precinct, they were placed
inside a detention cell, while PAZ's cellphone and money were taken away from him. The police
demanded the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for their release, which amount they
purportedly failed to provide. As for Condes and Laceda, they corroborated the testimony of PAZ,
further alleging that they did not file any administrative charges against the arresting officers out of
fear of reprisal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Condes and Laceda are liable for violation of Sections 13 and 14, Article II of
RA 9165. (NO)
2. Whether or noy Paz is liable for violation of Sections 5, 11, 13, and 14, Article II of RA 9165?
(NO)
HELD:
Condes and Laceda could not be convicted of violations of Sections 13 and 14, Article II of RA
9165.
The RTC noted that PO3 Balagasay, as the officer responsible for the arrest of Condes and Laceda,
failed to sign the inventory of the seized paraphernalia. As such, it was probable that the items
seized from them were not the same items listed in the inventory. Also, the amount or quantity of
suspected shabu found in the unsealed transparent plastic sachet - which was previously recovered
from Condes and Laceda - could barely be determined, as the sachet merely contained traces or
residue of the suspected drug.
PAZ could not be convicted of violations of Sections 5, 11, 13, and 14, Article II of RA 9165.
RTC held that PAZ could not be charged of Sections 13 and 14, Article II of RA 9165, considering
that he was not caught in the company of Condes and Laceda when he was selling shabu to PO1
Agbunag. In fact, PO1 Agbunag testified that Condes and Laceda were caught having a pot session
without PAZ around them.
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Meanwhile, in order to
PO3 Balagasay clearly misconstrued the law and its application in buy-bust operations. In addition,
records reveal that the prosecution did not present any photographs of the supposed conduct of
inventory during trial. When asked during his cross-examination, PO3 Balagasay merely stated that
he "cannot recall already if there was a photograph of the evidence."
Observably, the procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
Hence, due to breaches of procedure under RA 9165, PAZ’s conviction cannot prosper and he was
acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. GUIEB

GR No. 233100 | February 14, 2018
To reiterate, the law requires the presence of the enumerated witnesses — namely, an elected official,
as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media — to ensure the establishment of the chain of
custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Thus,
considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are seriously
put into question.
Records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs were
indeed conducted, a reading of the Certificate of Inventory shows that only an elected official, i.e., Brgy.
Capt. Bagay, was present and that there were no representatives from the DOJ and the media. To make
matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation as to why there was a complete
absence of an elected official and a representative from the DOJ and the media in order for the saving
clause to apply.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Upon the report of an informant, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group
(PAIDSOTG) of the Provincial Police Office of Ilocos Norte organized a buy-bust team operation
with the objective of apprehending GUIEB, who was verified to be fourth in PAIDSOTG and PDEA's
lists of drug personalities.
Upon arrival at the carinderia where the buy-bust was to be held, the poseur-buyer, PO2 Rarangol,
and the informant were approached by GUIEB. PO2 Rarangol gave the marked money to GUIEB,
who in turn, gave the former a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. When the
transaction was consummated, PO2 Rarangol performed the pre-arranged signal, prompting
backups PO2 Agtang and PO1 Waga to rush to the scene and arrest GUIEB. Upon frisking GUIEB,
PO1 Waga recovered another sachet containing white crystalline substance, which he gave to PO2
Rarangol. The buy-bust team then brought GUIEB and the seized items to the Municipal Police
Station of San Nicolas.Thereat, PO2 Rarangol conducted the marking, inventory, and photography of
the seized items in the presence of GUIEB and Brgy. Capt. Bagay. Thereafter, PO2 Rarangol brought
the seized sachets to the crime laboratory where a qualitative examination of the contents revealed
that the same were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In his defense, GUIEB denied the allegations against him. He maintained that when he was arrested,
he and his daughter went to a neighbor's house to invite the latter to his child's baptism. After
talking to said neighbor, GUIEB sought out his daughter who was then playing in front of the
carinderia where he was arrested. He further maintained that he and his daughter were about to go
home when two policemen arrested him and took him to the police station for allegedly running
away with the money of another policeman. At the police station, he was made to sit in front of the
table where PO2 Rarangol brought out two sachets appearing to contain shabu, and placed it on top
of the table. PO2 Rarangol also took out a piece of paper with the word "inventory" therein and
started filling out the same. Thereafter, PO2 Rarangol asked Brgy. Capt. Bagay to sign the paper, but
the latter refused as he did not see how GUIEB was arrested.
ISSUE:
Whether or not GUIEB is liable for the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs
under RA 9165? (NO)
RULING:
GUIEB is not liable the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165
due to procedural breaches.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said
section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
In the case of People v. Mendoza , the Court stressed that without the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ, or any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the seized drugs, the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 )
again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the said drugs that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
The Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from Guieb. First, records reveal that while the requisite inventory and
photography of the confiscated drugs were indeed conducted, a reading of the Certificate of
Inventory shows that only an elected official, i.e., Brgy. Capt. Bagay, was present and that there were
no representatives from the DOJ and the media. To make matters worse, the prosecution did not
proffer a plausible explanation as to why there was a complete absence of an elected official and a
representative from the DOJ and the media in order for the saving clause to apply. To reiterate, the
law requires the presence of the enumerated witnesses — namely, an elected official, as well as a
representative from the DOJ and the media — to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody
and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Thus, considering
the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are seriously put into
question.
PEOPLE VS. MANANSALA

GR No. 229092 | February 21, 2018
Under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. It is well-
settled that the procedure is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality.
items were marked by PO2 Magadia immediately upon confiscation at the place of arrest and in the
presence of MANANSALA, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public official, as well
as a representative from the DOJ and the media. Despite the failure to observe these requirements, no
justifiable ground was given to explain such lapse. Additionally, records are bereft of evidence showing
that a physical inventory of the seized items was made or that photographs of the same were taken.
Hence, Manansala was acquitted.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that on March 7, 2009, a buy-bust team composed of PSI Pederio, PI Pena,
PO2 Dela Rosa and PO2 Magadia was formed, in response to aninformation given by a confidential
agent that MANANSALA was selling shabu. After conducting a pre-operation procedure and
coordinating with PDEA, as well as the barangay officials of Parian, the buy-bust team together with
the confidential agent, proceeded to the target area. PO2 Magadia, the designated poseur-buyer,
approached MANANSALA and asked if he could purchase shabu. MANANSALA asked how much and
in turn, the latter gave the marked P500.00 bill, while MANANSALA simultaneously handed over
one plastic sachet of suspected shabu. After inspecting the same, PO2 Magadia introduced himself
as a police officer and arrested MANANSALA. Subsequently, a preventive search was conducted on
MANANSALA to ensure that he had no firearms. Not finding any, MANANSALA was ordered to
empty his pockets which yielded another plastic sachet of suspected shabu.
Upon confiscation and marking of the items at the place of arrest, PO2 Magadia brought
MANANSALA to the Parian Barangay Hall where a blotter of the incident was made. Thereafter,
MANANSALA was for medical examination, and then to the police station where PO2 Magadia
prepared a request for laboratory examination of the seized items. Confiscated items were sent to
the crime laboratory where it was confirmed that they tested positive methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
MANANSALA denied the charges against him, claiming that he was at home doing the laundry with
his daughter, when two persons entered, pointed a gun at him, and made him board a black car. He
averred that he was later transferred to a police mobile and interrogated about a certain "Iko."
When he replied in the negative, he was returned to the black car and brought to the Parian
Barangay Hall where two officers told the barangay officials that they recovered from his
possession the P500.00 bill and a tawas-like substance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MANANSALA is liable for violation of Section 5 and 11, Article 2, of RA 9165. (NO)
HELD:
MANANSALA cannot be held liable for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs under RA
9165.
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. [22] Meanwhile, in order to
items were marked by PO2 Magadia immediately upon confiscation at the place of arrest and in the
presence of MANANSALA, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public official, as
well as a representative from the DOJ and the media. Despite the failure to observe these
requirements, no justifiable ground was given to explain such lapse. Additionally, records are bereft
of evidence showing that a physical inventory of the seized items was made or that photographs of
the same were taken.
The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of
photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under the law, fails to approximate
compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165.
Hence, MANANSALA was acquitted for the non-compliance of the procedures laid down under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
PEOPLE VS.MAGSANO
GR No. 231050 | February 28, 2018
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides that the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official.
An examination of the records reveals that while the inventory of the seized drugs was conducted in
the presence of MAGSANO and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of a
representative from the media or the DOJ. Despite such admissions, the police officers did not provide
any plausible explanation as to why the presence of these required witnesses was not procured. Thus,
their unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
puts into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from the accused
which resulted to the acquittal of MAGSANO.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that an informant tipped the operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) that a certain MAGSANO, was engaged in illegal drug
activities. The SAID-SOTG team, together with the informant and in coordination with PDEA,
organized a buy-bust operation and thereafter, proceeded to the target area. Upon arriving thereat,
the informant introduced PO3 Marcelo, the designated poseur-buyer, to MAGSANO, who then asked
PO3 Marcelo how much shabu he intended to buy. When PO3 Marcelo informed MAGSANO that he
wanted to buy P500.00 worth of shabu, the former immediately handed over the marked money to
the latter. Afterwards, MAGSANO took out three small plastic sachets of white crystalline substance
and instructed PO3 Marcelo to choose one.
Accordingly, PO3 Marcelo took one sachet and after examining the same, executed the pre-arranged
signal. Consequently, PO1 Pagulayan rushed towards the scene and performed a body search on
MAGSANO, which search yielded two more sachets of suspected shabu and the buy-bust money.
Moments later, MAGSANO was taken to the barangay hall of Brgy. South Cembo, where the
confiscated drugs were marked and inventoried in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Achacoso.
After the inventory, PO3 Marcelo turned over the confiscated items to PO3 Esguerra, who prepared
the requests for laboratory examination and drug testing. Shortly after, PO3 Marcelo delivered the
seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where it was revealed that the specimen drugs
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.
MAGSANO simply denied the charges against him, claiming that some men suddenly barged into his
house, handcuffed him, and conducted a search therein. When the search proved futile, the men
took MAGSANO to the office of the SAID-SOTG. Subsequently, he was brought to the barangay hall of
Brgy. South Cembo, where he allegedly saw for the first time the sachets of shabu that were
supposedly recovered from him.
During trial, Shabina Agas testified in behalf of MAGSANO to corroborate his claims. She maintained
that she was outside their house when some men arrived and asked for Magsano's whereabouts.
She added that after learning where MAGSANO was, they forcibly entered his house and arrested
him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MAGSANO is liable for violation of Section 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165?
HELD:
MAGSANO cannot be held liable for violations of Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165 due to non-
compliance of the procedures under the chain of custody rule.
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. [22] Meanwhile, in order to
An examination of the records reveals that while the inventory of the seized drugs was conducted
in the presence of MAGSANO and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence
of a representative from the media or the DOJ. Despite such admissions, the police officers did not
provide any plausible explanation as to why the presence of these required witnesses was not
procured.
Thus, their unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 puts into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from
the accused which resulted to the acquittal of MAGSANO.
KEVIN BELMONTE Y GOROMEO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 224143 | June 28, 2017

Non-compliance with the requirements to the "chain of custody rule" will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground
for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In the case, as correctly reiterated by the CA, the subsequent signing of the Certificate of
Inventory undertaken after the arrest of the accused at a different place is not fatal to the case since
the prosecution was able to show the continuous whereabouts of the exhibits between the time it came
into their possession and until it was tested in the PDEA laboratory.
FACTS: A buy-bust team was formed after an informant notified Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Agent Sharon Ominga (Ominga) that a certain "Mac-Mac," later identified as Gumba,
was selling marijuana. On the day of the said buy-bust operation, Gumba arrived with two (2) male
companions. One of his companions, Belmonte, asked if they were the buyers. The agent confirmed
this, after which Gumba asked for the money. Gumban's third companion, Costales, took the money
from Ominga.
Gumba then took a bundle of dried marijuana leaves from the black bag he was carrying and
handed it to Ominga, who subsequebtly declared that they were PDEA agents. They were able to
arrest Gumba and Belmonte but Costales escaped with the marked money. Other police officers
arrived with police officers Barangay Captain Carlos D. Caoeng, while Ominga marked the items
seized. They also prepared an inventory, photographed the activity with the PNP and the barangay
officials. Later, the laboratory examination confirmed that the seized bricks and bundle contained
marijuana.
The RTC found Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5, Article II, of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and held that the subsequent signing of the
Certificate of Inventory undertaken after the arrest of the accused at a different place is not fatal to
the case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not non-compliance with the "chain of custody rule" will automatically render
the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid so as to warrant the acquittal of the
accused-appellants
HELD:
Divergence from the chain of custody rule is not fatal to the case since the prosecution was able
to show the continuous whereabouts of the items seized
While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section
21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence
nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be
justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
In the case, as correctly reiterated by the CA, the subsequent signing of the Certificate of Inventory
undertaken after the arrest of the accused at a different place is not fatal to the case since the
prosecution was able to show the continuous whereabouts of the exhibits between the time it came
into their possession and until it was tested in the PDEA laboratory.
PEOPLE VS. MACAPUNDAG

G.R. No. 225965| March 13, 2017
To obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has
to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the
chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.
MACAPUNDAG is acquitted for failure of the police officers to make any inventory and to take
pictures of the confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his arrest
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: An informant tipped the Caloocan City Police that a certain individual known as alias
"Popoy" was selling shabu. The Police Chief Inspector ordered the conduct of a buy-bust operation.
They proceeded to the target area where they saw Macapundag, who was then identified by the
informant as "Popoy."
P03 Ardedon approached Macapundag and retorted "Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod, paiskor
naman." Macapundag replied "Magkano?," to which P03 Ardedon responded "Tatlong piso fang,"
and simultaneously handed the three (3) marked ₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag then took four plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance, gave one to P03 Ardedon, and returned the other
three (3) back to his pocket. Upon receiving the sachet, P03 Ardedon gave the pre-arranged signal
by holding his nape and then held Macapundag, as the back-up officers rushed to the scene.
ISSUE:
1. Should Macapundag be acquitted in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section
21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
HELD:
MACAPUNDAG is acquitted for failure of the police officers to make any inventory and to take
pictures of the confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his arrest
The plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and
accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
The prosecution did not bother to explain why the inventory and photograph of the seized evidence
were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the police station, as required by the
IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place
of seizure in the presence of Macapundag.
It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
PEOPLE VS. JAO

G.R. No. 225634 | June 7, 2017
For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be
proven that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise,
and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and that the accused knowingly made
the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration. On the
other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that such
possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
the instant case, both the RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution had established
Jao's criminal liability for the aforesaid crimes, considering that: (a) Jao himself delivered a plastic
sachet containing 0.01 gram of shabu to the informant during a legitimate buy-bust operation; and
(b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers searched Jao and found six (6) more plastic sachets
containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06 gram. Similarly, both courts a quo found that there
was no break in the chain of custody of the sachets seized from Jao as SI Manzanaris had sole
possession of such sachets from the time of Jao's arrest until he turned them over to PO1 Tan, who in
turn, handed it over to Forensic Chemist PCI Llena for qualitative examination.
PERLAS-BERNABE J.
FACTS: On June 2, 2008, a buy-bust operation was conducted at Four Queens Motel in Negros
Occidental. Acting as poseur-buyer, the informant called Jao and ordered shabu. When the latter
arrived, the informant asked for the shabu and Jao handed over a plastic sachet. Thereafter, the
policemen arrested Jao, searched the latter and found six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu.
Special Investigator Manzanaris (SI Manzanaris) marked the plastic sachets seized from Jao who
informed the policemen that a certain Rogelio Catigtig was supplying him the illegal drugs. The
policemen planned the arrest of Catigtig. Due to this development, the conduct of the inventory was
suspended but SI Manzanaris retained custody of the items seized.
Catigtig arrived at the motel around 7:30 in the evening, he hand over a Marlboro cigarette pack
containing ten (10) plastic sachets of shabu to SPO2 Germodo. Upon signal of the latter, the other
policemen arrested Catigtig, and frisked him, resulting in the discovery of another sachet of shabu.
SPO2 Germodo then marked the sachets seized from Catigtig, and thereafter, he and SI Manzanaris
conducted a formal inventory of the items seized from both Jao and Catigtig. The examination of the
items seized revealed that the contents of the seized sachets from accused-appellants are indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
The RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged upholding
the validity of the arrest and the buy-bust operation. It also the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items as the policemen properly complied with the chain of custody rule. The CA
affirmed accused-appellants' respective convictions in toto. Hence, the instant appeal. whether or
not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA
9165
HELD:
The crimes of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Posession of Dangerous Drugs
were successfully proven by the prosecution
For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven
that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and
by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and that the accused knowingly made
the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration. On
the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove
that the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that
such possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution had established
Jao's criminal liability for the aforesaid crimes, considering that: (a) Jao himself delivered a plastic
sachet containing 0.01 gram of shabu to the informant during a legitimate buy-bust operation; and
(b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers searched Jao and found six (6) more plastic sachets
containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06 gram. Similarly, both courts a quo found that
there was no break in the chain of custody of the sachets seized from Jao as SI Manzanaris had sole
possession of such sachets from the time of Jao's arrest until he turned them over to PO1 Tan, who
in turn, handed it over to Forensic Chemist PCI Llena for qualitative examination.
ANTONIO GAMBOA Y DELOS SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES

GR No. 220333| November 14, 2016
As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto render
the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The
aforementioned saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 applies only where the
prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of the police officers or PDEA agents, and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.
In the instant case, PO1 Sahagun and SPO1 Manuel marked and inventoried the seized items upon
arrival at the police station. In order for the said saving clause to be effective, the prosecution must
first recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and justify the same. Here, the prosecution
failed to acknowledge the shortcomings of the apprehending team in complying with Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. It was silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ and an
elected public official to witness the inventory and receive copies of the same. Similarly unexplained
was the dearth of photographs of the seized items, which could have taken place in the police station
where they were marked and inventoried.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: PO1 Sahagun was designated as the poseur-buyer and was provided with two (2) P100.00
bills as buy-bust money, while the rest would serve as back-up officer. At around 6:30 o'clock in the
evening, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area at Hadrian Extension 3, Sitio Ipil-Ipil,
Pulung Maragul, Angeles City. Upon their arrival at the target area, PO1 Sahagun and the agent
encountered Negro. They approached him and the agent told him that they wanted to buy P200.00
worth of shabu.
Negro then handed a plastic sachet containing suspected shabu to PO1 Sahagun and, in exchange,
she gave him the buy-bust money. With the sale consummated, she executed the pre-arranged
signal – by placing her hand on top of her head – prompting the back-up officers to rush in and
arrest Negro. However, Negro sensed that something was afoot and ran into a nearby house. PO1
Sahagun gave chase, but Negro managed to escape. Inside a house where they entered, she
discovered Gamboa and Elizabeth seated by a table which had shabu paraphernalia on top, and
accordingly, arrested them with the assistance of the back-up officers
PO1 Sahagun frisked Elizabeth and recovered one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu residue from
her pockets, while SPO1 Manuel confiscated one (1) plastic sachet of shabu from Gamboa. They
were then brought to the police station together with the seized items. At the office, PO1 Sahagun
marked the sachet subject of the sale. Thereafter, they prepared the request for laboratory
examination dated May 2, 2003, among other necessary documents. The next day, SPO1 Manuel
delivered the seized items to the crime laboratory for examination who found that the seized
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, an illegal drug.
ISSUE: WON Gamboa's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
RULING: In this case, Gamboa was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession
of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for
each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary
value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.
The IRR of RA 9165 mirror the content of Section 21, Article II of the same law, but adds that the
said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II– under justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid
the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. The aforementioned saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 applies
only where the prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of the police officers
or PDEA agents, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution
must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.
In the instant case, PO1 Sahagun and SPO1 Manuel marked and inventoried the seized items upon
arrival at the police station. In order for the said saving clause to be effective, the prosecution must
first recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and justify the same. Here, the
prosecution failed to acknowledge the shortcomings of the apprehending team in complying with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. It was silent on the absence of a representative from
the DOJ and an elected public official to witness the inventory and receive copies of the same.
Similarly unexplained was the dearth of photographs of the seized items, which could have taken
place in the police station where they were marked and inventoried. Further, the items were
delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory beyond twenty four (24) hours from seizure. Worse, SPOI
Manuel and PO1 Sahagun both failed to identify the custodian of the seized items during the
intervening period, where they were kept, and how they were secured
When police officers do not tum over dangerous drugs to the laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from seizure, they must identify its custodian, and the latter must be called to testify. The
custodian must state the security measures in place to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated items were preserved, which did not take place in this case.
All told, the breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 committed by
the police officers left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised.
O. Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act (Secs. 28 and 29, RA 10591)
JOSELITO PERALTA Y ZARENO v. PEOPLE

GR 221991| AUGUST 30, 2017
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit
to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus
delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who
owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.
The prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements,
considering that the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a .45 caliber pistol
with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live ammunitions and the Certification issued by the
Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which declared that Peralta "is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
On November 18, 2008, a team consisting of Police Officers, responded to a telephone call received
by their desk officer-on-duty that there was a man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in
Pantal District, Dagupan City.
Upon arrival thereat, the police officers saw two (2) men walking, later identified as Peralta and his
companion, Larry Calimlim, holding a gun and a knife respectively. Upon seeing the police officers,
the men became uneasy, which prompted the police officers to swoop in. Upon apprehension, they
recovered a caliber .45 pistol.The men were then brought to the Region I Medical Center in
Dagupan City, and later, to the community precinct for paraffin and gun powder residue test.
In his defense, Peralta denied the accusation against him and presented a different narration of
facts. According to him, he was riding a motorcycle with Calimlim when they were flagged down by
the police officers. While admitting that the latter recovered a knife from Calimlim, Peralta
vigorously denied having a firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the same. Also that
there was no reason for the police officers to arrest him without a warrant and consequently
conduct a search incidental thereto.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a valid warrantless arrest on Peralta?

2. Is Peralta guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294?
HELD:
The police officers conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Peralta.
Three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had
just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Upon the police officers' arrival at Pantal District, Dagupan City, they saw Peralta carrying a pistol,
in plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to confront Peralta regarding the pistol,
and when the latter was unable to produce a license for such pistol and/or a permit to carry the
same, the former proceeded to arrest him and seize the pistol from him. Clearly, the police officer
conducted a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Peralta, thus, making the consequent
search incidental thereto valid as well.
Peralta is guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294.

The prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements,
considering that the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a .45 caliber
pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live ammunitions and the Certification
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which declared that
Peralta "is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45
Pistol.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or
permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish
the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess
or carry the same.
It is well to emphasize that the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum

prohibitum punished by special law and, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.
P. Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (Secs. 4 to 6, RA 10175)
Q. Human Security Act of 2007 (Secs. 3 to 6, RA 9372)
R. New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016 (Secs. 3 to 4, RA 10883)
JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 223833 | December 11, 2017
From the foregoing, it is evident that the crime of Carnapping, including all the elements thereof –
namely, that: (a) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (b) the vehicle belongs to a person other than
the offender himself; (c) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and
(d) the offender intends to gain from taking of the vehicle – did not occur in Valenzuela City, but in
Marilao, Bulacan. While the Court notes that Casanas was indeed arrested in Valenzuela City while in
the possession of the subject motorcycle, the same of no moment, not only because such is not an
element of the crime, but more importantly, at that point in time, the crime had long been
consummated. Case law provides that “unlawful taking” or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor
vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. It is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that in the evening of August 14, 2012, Christopher Calderon was
about to go inside the public market in Marilao, Bulacan when a passenger arrived and wanted to
ride his tricycle, made up of a Racal motorcycle with plate number 7539IJ and a sidecar. Casanas
volunteered to drive Calderon's tricycle for the passenger, to which Calderon obliged. However,
Casanas no longer returned the tricycle, prompting Calderon to report the incident to police
authorities.
A few days later, the Valenzuela Police Station received a report that a suspected stolen motorcycle
was being sold in Karuhatan, Valenzuela City. When PO2 Arañas and PO1 De Leon responded to the
report, they saw Casanas standing beside what turned out to be the subject motorcycle. The police
officers asked for proof of ownership of the motorcycle, but Casanas could not provide any. PO1 De
Leon then frisked Casanas and found a knife in the latter's possession. Thereafter, they brought
Casanas, the subject motorcycle, and the knife to the police station. The police officers discovered
that the subject motorcycle was registered under Calderon's name.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC-Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the case. (NO)
HELD:
The RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. As such, when it becomes apparent
that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
In this relation, Sections 10 and 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
also state that the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases shall be placed either where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place. Otherwise stated, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states
that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the crime of Carnapping, including all the elements thereof –
namely, that: (a) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (b) the vehicle belongs to a person other
than the offender himself; (c) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and (d) the offender intends to gain from taking of the vehicle – did not occur in
Valenzuela City, but in Marilao, Bulacan. While the Court notes that Casanas was indeed arrested in
Valenzuela City while in the possession of the subject motorcycle, the same of no moment, not only
because such is not an element of the crime, but more importantly, at that point in time, the crime
had long been consummated. Case law provides that “unlawful taking” or apoderamiento is the
taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
In view of the foregoing, the SC declared that it is clear that the RTC-Valenzuela had no authority to
take cognizance of the instant case as the crime was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the SC dismissed the instant case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and declared
that the dismissal of this case, however, shall not preclude the re-filing of the same criminal case
against Casanas before the proper tribunal which has territorial jurisdiction over the same, i.e., the
courts in Marilao, Bulacan.
S. Obstruction of Justice Law (Sec. 1, PD 1829)

T. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (Secs. 3[a],
5, and 10, RA 7610)
PEOPLE VS. MATIAS

G.R. No. 186469 | June 18, 2012
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory
rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua—on
the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code.
AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under
paragraph 1(d). The RTC concluded that AAA was the “victim of sexual abuse labeled ‘rape’,”
considering the established fact that there was sexual intercourse between him and AAA. Thus,
appellant’s conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for
rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:In the evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, having been born on April 23, 1991, was on her
way to the vegetable stall (“gulayan”) of a certain “Manuela” to buy something when, all of a sudden,
appellant pulled her towards a house that was under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a
bamboo bed (“papag”), removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted first, his finger, and then
his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she should report the incident to
anyone.
When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt what appellant did to her. Together,
they proceeded to the barangay to report the incident and, thereafter, to the Baler District Police
Station to file a complaint. A physical examination was conducted by Police Chief Inspector Pierre
Paul Figeroa Carpio upon AAA, who was found to have deep-healed lacerations and was in a non-
virgin state physically. Appellant was charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). The RTC convicted appellant for “rape” under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and directed him to pay civil indemnity and moral
damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding no compelling reason to depart from its findings
and conclusions as the RTC had the ability to observe firsthand the demeanor and deportment of
the witnesses on stand. Moreover, for appellant’s alibi to prosper, he should be able to show that he
was a great distance away from the place of the incident and that it was impossible for him to be
there or within its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that
it is highly unlikely for a young girl to fabricate a story that would destroy her reputation and her
family’s life and endure the discomforts of trial.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, which
convicted appellant of “rape” under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. (YES)
HELD:
The Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications as to penalty imposed.
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is
below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the
other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for “rape” under Sec. 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor
below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a
punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make
her 13 years oldat the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can
be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under
Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). The penalty for sexual abuse under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua,
while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua. The RTC concluded
that AAA was the “victim of sexual abuse labeled ‘rape’,” considering the established fact that there
was sexual intercourse between him and AAA. Thus, appellant’s conviction was clearly under Sec. 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
CABALLO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 198732 | June 10, 2013
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a “child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. To
note, the term “influence” means the “improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person
of free will and substitutes another’s objective.” Meanwhile, “coercion” is the “improper use of x x x
power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.” Caballo’s actuations may be
classified as “coercion” and “influence” within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 because
(1) of AAA’s minority, (2) Caballo’s seniority, (3) Caballo’s coercion and influence by repeatedly
assuring AAA that he would marry her and not get her pregnant, and (4) Caballo’s pursuing of AAA to
her room and pressing on her to have sex with him placed AAA in a position of duress.
Further, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with
a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is
a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our
civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23, in her uncles’s place in Surigao City. Caballo
was one of her uncle’s dancers. AAA was a sophomore student and resided at a boarding house in
Cebu. On January 17, 1988, Caballo went to Cebu to attend Sinulog Festival and to visit AAA. After
spending time together, they eventually became sweethearts. When AAA went home to Surigao and
stayed with her uncle, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was
followed by several more of the same, all of which happened in Surigao City, except one in August
which occurred in Cebu. In June 1998, AAA became pregnant and later gave birth.
Prosecution contends that Caballo was only able to induce AAA due to promises of marriage and his
assurance that he would not get her pregnant. Moreover, it claimed that Caballo advised AAA to
have an abortion which the latter heeded; however, her efforts were unsuccessful. On the other
hand, Caballo claimed that AAA was no longer a virgin and that AAA had 3 boyfriends prior him. He
alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but he was always rejected. He also claims
that he and AAA were sweethearts which made the sexual intercourse consensual.
The RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10(a), Article CI of RA
7610, in relation to Sec. 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. CA affirmed the RTC decision with
modification, finding Caballo guilty of violating Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610. The CA observed that
consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and
therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding Caballo guilty in violating Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610. (NO)
HELD:
The CA correctly found Caballo guilty of violating Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610.
The elements of said offense are the following:

a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
The existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. The only bone of contention lies
in the presence of the second element. To resolve this question, it must be noted that RA 7610 was
meant to advance the state policy of affording “special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.” A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult. As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides
that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.”
Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of
influence which manifests in a variety of forms. To note, the term “influence” means the “improper
use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s
objective.” Meanwhile, “coercion” is the “improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit
to the wishes of one who wields it.” In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s
actuations may be classified as “coercion” and “influence” within the purview of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 because (1) of AAA’s minority, (2) Caballo’s seniority, (3) Caballo’s coercion and
influence by repeatedly assuring AAA that he would marry her and not get her pregnant, and (4)
Caballo’s pursuing of AAA to her room and pressing on her to have sex with him placed AAA in a
position of duress.
In addition to that, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a

violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were
sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling states that a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child
who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
RIZALDO L. ORSOS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 214673| November 20, 2017
R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children
or those “persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.” The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are as
follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act
is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A meticulous perusal of the records reveals that all the elements of both acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been sufficiently
established in this case. AAA's minority, as she was only 14 years old at the time of the incident, had
been sufficiently established with the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth. It was likewise
established that petitioner, who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA's school, and
therefore, a person who exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her, committed lascivious or
lewd conduct against her.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: At the time material to this case, the victim (AAA) was only fourteen (14) years old. She was
then a student at Dumalag Central National High School (DCNHS), where petitioner was then
working as a teacher and Citizen's Army Training (CAT) Commandant.
In the morning of April 21, 2007, while the CAT trainees, including AAA, were at the Sohot Spring in
Dumalag for a clean-up drive, petitioner called AAA and asked her if she had decided on becoming a
CAT officer, to which she answered yes. Petitioner then instructed her to go to his house at 1:00 in
the afternoon of the same day for her supposed initiation. As she did not know where petitioner's
house was located, she went back to the school at around 12:30 in the afternoon instead and waited
for him to arrive. When petitioner saw AAA, he told her to follow him to his house and keep a little
distance between them.
Upon arrival thereat, petitioner instructed her to take a seat while he went to the bathroom for a
few minutes. AAA noticed that no one else was in the house. Thereafter, he emerged from the
bathroom and asked her if she was really determined to become a CAT officer, to which she replied
yes. Petitioner then told her that he had a crush on her, that he wanted her to become his mistress,
and that he will give her all her needs. Then, he pulled her to his lap and asked her to kiss him.
Thinking it was part of the initiation rites, AAA kissed his right cheek. Thereafter, petitioner asked
her to sit on the sofa and proceeded to kiss her on the lips, leading her to cry. Petitioner then
instructed her to lie down on the sofa, lifted her shirt and underwear, and sucked her right
breast. AAA was frightened and could not complain. Petitioner was about to unzip her pants when
she pleaded for him not to do so as she had her menstrual period then. At this point, petitioner
stood up and went back to the bathroom. When he re-emerged, he told her to stop crying and not to
report the incident if she truly wanted to become a CAT officer. Although AAA told her friend about
the incident, she decided not to tell her family. Instead, she told her parents that she wanted to quit
school and spend some time with her sisters in Manila. After a year, she went back to Dumalag,
Capiz and enrolled in fourth year high school.
Sometime in July 2008, several female CAT officers in DCNHS revealed that petitioner had molested
them and filed cases against him in court. Prompted by her mother's inquiry if petitioner had also
molested her, AAA finally disclosed the incident to her. Consequently, a complaint charging
petitioner with acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A.
No. 7610, was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended,
in relation to R.A. 7610 or "lascivious conduct'' under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610? (YES)
HELD:
Petitioner is guilty of "lascivious conduct'' under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
There must be a confluence of the following elements before conviction can be had for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that
it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; (b)
when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
On the other hand, RA 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or
discrimination are children or those “persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.”
The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A meticulous perusal of the records reveals that all the elements of both acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been
sufficiently established in this case. AAA's minority, as she was only 14 years old at the time of the
incident, had been sufficiently established with the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth. It
was likewise established that petitioner, who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA's
school, and therefore, a person who exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her, committed
lascivious or lewd conduct against her.

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CRIMINAL LAW

I. REVISED PENAL CODE -BOOK I

PEOPLE v. ERNIE INCIONG Y ORENSE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Inciong is guilty of Murder

Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER RINGOR UMAWID

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Yes. Aberratio Ictus may be present in this case.

PEOPLE VS. DANIEL MATIBAG Y DE VILLA

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

PEOPLE VS. EUGENE SAMUYA

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Self-defense cannot be appreciated in favor of EUGENE as there was absence of unlawful

MANNY RAMOS v. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Jalosjos is disqualified to run for mayor.

PEOPLE VS. TOUKYO

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

TOUKYO’s criminal liability is extinguished.

PEOPLE v. AGAPITO DIMAALA Y ARELA

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

PEOPLE v. ARMANDO DIONALDO Y EBRON

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

DOLORES DIAZ v. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Respondent who claimed to be a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling

Diaz is not guilty of Estafa

CULAS VS. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

CULAS’ criminal liability is extinguished

E. Civil liability in criminal cases

II. REVISED PENAL CODE - BOOK II

HILARIO LAMSEN VS. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

ADINA B. MANANSALA v. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Manansala guilty for the crime of Falsification of Private Documents

E. Crimes against Public Morals

PEOPLE vs. GUILLERMO B. CADANO, JR.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

PEOPLE vs. MAURICIO HALLARTE

The RTC and CA convicted Mauricio as charged.

No. The qualifying circumstance of minority cannot be appreciated on BBB’s case.

As the Court succinctly explained in People v. Soria:

No. Mauricio’s defense cannot prosper.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

GUILLERMO WACOY Y BITOL v. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), he heard a commotion at a nearby

PEOPLE v. RUPERTO RUBILLAR

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not Rubillar should be convicted of the crime of Rape. (NO).

Rubillar is not guilty of rape.

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed – Rape is committed-

a.) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

ROGELIO B. ANTONE v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not Antone is guilty for 2 counts of Statutory Rape. (YES)

Antone is liable for 2 counts of Statutory Rape.