Fleet Problem XIII & Grand Joint Exercise No.

4:
Reconsidering Aircraft Carrier Doctrine
By Dylan Herts

November 15, 2010

Ideas and American Foreign Policy

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich

Introduction

On November 14, 1910 a civilian pilot from Iowa named Eugene Ely executed the first

take off in naval aviation.1 For some time, research and development focused on surface-

launched seaplanes, and it was not until 1919 that the United States Navy commissioned its first

converted aircraft carrier, CV 1 Langley.2 Yet in both annual interwar exercises and internal

considerations of naval strategy, the role of aircraft appeared limited to scouting and air defense.

Strategy struggled to integrate carriers alongside cruisers, and doctrine maintained that

battleships, dreadnoughts of the type seen at Jutland, formed the supportive framework of the

fleet.

Fleet doctrine persisted even as carriers began to feature prominently in the series of full-

scale, peacetime naval exercises conducted from 1923-1940, known as Fleet Problems.

Successful carrier operations proved to naval strategists only that a variety of support carriers

ought to be considered as assistance to battleships. Fleet Problem XIII and Grand Joint Exercise

No. 4, however, significantly affected the doctrinal role of carriers and the predicted need for

their construction. Operations during the exercises saw the significant use of naval air wings,

yielding high offensive scores for the carriers involved, and emphasized the importance of

fielding multiple carriers. As a result, Fleet Problem XIII and Grand Joint Exercise No. 4

challenged the central fleet role of the traditional battleship, illustrated the need for rapid

construction of large carriers, and further demonstrated the effectiveness of carrier-launched air

assaults against targets on both land and sea.

1
Roy A. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation 1910-1995 (Washington: Naval Historical
Center, 1997), 3
2
Ibid, 40

2
Early Skepticism: Fleet Problems & Conclusions 1923-1930

The Fleet Problems began in 1923 as an attempt to simulate free, full-scale wartime naval

maneuvers for training purposes. From 1889 until the United States entered World War I, the

navy had engaged in regular fleet maneuvers of steadily growing size and complexity. Two years

after the armistice, the Atlantic and Pacific fleets participated in joint maneuvers off the coast of

Panama; a year later the fleet was reorganized under one command, and the Fleet Problems were

conceived to continue large, joint exercises. The phrase “Fleet Problem” conveyed the idea that

these simulations were not merely rehearsed maneuvers, but instead actual “problems,” given to

opposing fleet commanders by command staff and the Naval War College, in the form of a

“statement of the problem” which contained the mission tasks. Given their assignments, fleet

commanders then assumed control of their opposing forces and began the exercise. Upon

simulated engagement, neutral “umpires” trained by the Naval War College judged the results

using standard metrics for calculating damage done, and noted the outcome for transmission and

records.3

Prior to 1929, the use of naval aviation in the Fleet Problems had been limited to

unimpressive involvement by the Langley. In Fleet Problem I, the Langley was relegated to

merely observing the exercise while two battleships, the Oklahoma and New York stood in as

simulated aircraft carriers.4 Beginning with Fleet Problem III, the Langley was given force

assignments but with a small complement of 30 planes and a maximum speed of 16 knots,

3
Albert A. Nofi, To Train The Fleet For War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems 1923-1940
(Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 2010), 1,18,26.
4
Ryan David Wadle, United States Navy Fleet Problems And The Development of Carrier
Aviation, 1929-1933, Texas A&M University Repository
http://repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/2658/etd-tamu-2005B-HIST-Wadle.pdf
(August 2005) [Accessed November, 2010), 30.

3
slower than the battle-line of the fleet itself, she could do little more than tag along.5Limited to a

role of basic fleet protection, her meager contributions could only serve to reinforce the opinion

that carriers would have little importance in naval conflicts.

The introduction of the Lexington and Saratoga in 1929 afforded the Fleet Problems with

two larger fleet carriers for experimentation. Joining the navy for Fleet Problem IX, the

Lexington and Saratoga participated in a scenario emulating an attack on the Panama Canal; the

Saratoga joined in the attack while Lexington assisted shore-based aircraft in the canal’s

defense.6 Commanded by Vice Admiral William V. Pratt, the attacking “Red” Fleet also

included the Pacific fleet’s battleships, destroyers, and a number of submarines.7 Rather than

keeping Saratoga close for fleet air defense, Red fleet sent “Big Sara” to launch a pre-dawn, pre-

emptive attack on the canal.8Accompanied by a lone cruiser escort, the Saratoga moved quietly

into position and launched her full detachment of dive bombers in a surprise assault that an

opposing radio operator described as “murder.”9 Meanwhile, the defending Blue Fleet’s

Lexington had stumbled into Red’s battleships, and had been promptly ruled “sunk.”10 Though

navigational miscalculations prevented the rest of Red Fleet from coming to Saratoga’s defense

after she had launched her assault, Adm. Pratt declared the operation “brilliantly conceived and

efficiently executed,” and expressed a desire “to know what makes the aircraft squadrons tick.”11

5
Wadle, 31
6
Eugene E. Wilson, “The Navy’s First Carrier Task Force,” US Naval Institute Proceedings,
Vol. 76 No. 2 (Feb. 1950), 163.
7
Wilson, 163
8
Wilson, 163
9
Wilson, 168-169
10
Wadle, 40
11
Wilson, 169

4
Operating in its new role, the Saratoga had demonstrated its potential for offensive applications

against land targets.

Still, despite Saratoga’s performance in Fleet Problem IX, fleet strategists remained

skeptical about naval air power. In a 1930 Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute

article, Rear Admiral J.M. Reeves, who had acted as commander of Red fleet’s air forces during

Fleet Problem IX, discussed what he considered to be the limitations of naval aviation. “Each

new weapon invented,” he generalized “has had overenthusiastic partisans who exaggerated its

capabilities and who prophesied that it would supersede or render obsolete existing weapons and

naval vessels.”12 Rejecting these “enthusiastic prophecies,” Reeves acknowledged that naval

aircraft, though of increasing importance to fleet strategy, “operate under several inherent

handicaps and disadvantages,” including limited operational range, the complexity of takeoffs

and landings, and small confines of the carrier.13 Without further training and development of

naval air operations, he declared that “efficiency in performing the various naval air missions

would be well-nigh impossible.”14 The Saratoga’s assault on Panama had proven arguable

efficacy against land targets, but in an engagement between two navies, Reeves contended that

the “major” exchange of ordinance would come from battleships.15

Another 1930 Proceedings article discussing carrier design and fleet roles concluded that

aircraft had “been taken to sea in ships in a manner just as haphazard as was the gun in the days

12
Joseph M. Reeves, “Aviation in the Fleet,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 55 No. 10
(Oct. 1929), 867.
13
Reeves, 867
14
Reeves, 868
15
Reeves, 869

5
of the Armada.”16 Battle-line carriers, Lt. Commander Forest Sherman contended, would prove

“entirely unsuitable” for major sea operations and necessitate the construction of small,

converted carriers like the Langley.17 Those smaller support carriers would conceivably serve the

same fleet air defense role that the Langley had been relegated to during its Fleet Problem

experimentations. Such carriers would operate in tandem with small cruisers, providing support

and assistance to the backbone of the fleet: armored battleships.

Fleet strategists remained unconvinced of carriers’ offensive efficacy in naval

engagements because recent operations and history had given no reason to believe otherwise.

Langley’s occasional points scored had been in either fleet air defense or, like Saratoga, a chance

land attack. Contemporary military campaigns had included few, if any, air attacks on warships,

and even those executed in the Sino-Japanese war and Spanish Civil War had been poorly

documented. Even occasional United States Navy dive-bombing drills’ statistics were considered

questionable. In the Fleet Problems, carriers had not been frequently utilized to attack enemy

surface ships and so, combined with the umpires’ lack of empirical data for damage calculations,

had not proven wildly successful at destroying fleets.18

In 1931 Fleet Problem XII, the last Problem before Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 and Fleet

Problem XIII again persuaded fleet command of the superiority of the old order of battle. Naval

observers reporting the results of the exercise to the New York Times observed that the battleship

remained the “backbone” of the navy. Hanson Baldwin, the Times’ military editor summarized

their conclusions:

16
Forrest Sherman, “Some Aspects of Carrier and Cruiser Design,” US Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 56 No. 11 (Nov. 1930), 998.
17
Sherman, 999
18
Nofi, 31

6
 Inevitably, as in recent years since the advent of the plane as an instrument of naval warfare, it

was questioned by a few whether the utility of the battleship as built today has not been nullified

by the development of aviation. The preponderant opinion in the fleet returns a flat negative in

answer to this question.19

During the exercise, Black Fleet’s battleships had sustained repeated air attacks from Blue

aircraft and, though damaged, were not prevented from completing their assault Citing the

Problem’s outcomes as well as recent bombing tests, Baldwin reported that the navy had

concluded that “giving aviation all due credit, it is still to the surface ships that the dominion of

the sea belongs.”20 Though carrier groups had proven mobile and effective at harassing Black

Fleet, battleships still reigned supreme and the construction of vulnerable carriers was given a

lower priority than building more heavily armed and armored battleships that were able to “take

as well as give punishment.”21

A Sunday Surprise: Grand Joint Exercise No. 4

Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 was conducted in February 1932 as a large-scale joint project

between the Army and Navy to simulate a naval attack on the base at Pearl Harbor. The island
19
Hanson Baldwin, “Battleship Stands as Navy’s Backbone,” New York Times, February 23,
1931.
20
Baldwin, “Battleship Stands”
21
Baldwin, “Battleship Stands”

7
was defended by Army air units and Black Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur Willard,

while Admiral Richard Leigh and Blue Fleet were given attack orders. 22 Langley was assigned

to Black Fleet while Lexington and Saratoga joined Blue Fleet’s line of battleships and

cruisers.23 Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell was given command of Blue Fleet’s Aircraft Battle

Force, with Admiral Arthur W. Radford as his aide and flag secretary.24 The design of the

exercise, Radford wrote, was to provide the Navy with an opportunity to “dramatize the fleet’s

carrier power.”25

Admiral Leigh assumed control of Blue’s Battle Force and the exercise began on

February 1st.26 Blue Fleet sent Lexington and Saratoga, with several destroyer escorts, ahead as

an Advanced Raiding Force under Adm. Yarnell’s command.27As the force continued towards its

initial designated launch point, 100 miles north northeast of Oahu, Yarnell’s radio intercept

watches painted “a very clear picture” of the island’s Army air defense due to a lack of

communication discipline among the island’s defenders.28After arriving at a new launch point 40

miles northeast of Oahu, revised due to inclement weather, the Saratoga and Lexington launched

their planes on Sunday, February 7 at dawn.29

22
Nofi, 155
23
Wadle, 80
24
Admiral Arthur W. Radford quoted by Paul Stillwell, Air raid, Pearl Harbor!, (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1981), 19.
25
Radford, 19
26
Radford, 19
27
Wadle, 80
28
Radford, 19
29
Wadle, 80

8
 Blue Fleet’s aircraft struck between 0400 and 0500, catching the island’s defenders “by

complete surprise” and scoring damage on Wheeler Field, Luke Field, and a number of strafing

runs on Ford Island.30 After waiting two hours for the defender’s search parties to land for

refueling, the Saratoga and Lexington’s air wings struck again at 0715, inflicting further losses

on defensive emplacements but losing an estimated 26 of their planes to patrolling Army

aircraft.31 During landing operations, Saratoga sustained a torpedo hit from a Black Fleet

submarine that incurred a 19 percent damage penalty.32Having recovered their aircraft,

Lexington, Saratoga and the Advanced Raiding Force moved to a refueling point south of

Oahu.33 Once there, the two carriers split into separate formations and continued their attack on

Pearl Harbor.

Lexington and her aircraft provided aerial support for the rest of Leigh’s fleet as Blue

Fleet’s landing commenced over the next four days. Meanwhile, Saratoga received further

damage while her aircraft struck Pearl Harbor; attacking Black squadrons hit Saratoga with a

one-ton bomb that left her flight deck inoperable for the duration of the exercise and forced her

aircraft to transfer to Lexington at the end of their sortie. Lexington continued to support Admiral

Leigh’s fleet as it landed troops and on February 12, the exercise came to a close.34

In the critique that followed the exercise, observers aboard the Saratoga declared the

Advanced Raiding Force’s performance “without doubt the greatest mechanical achievements of

30
Radford, 19
31
Wadle, 82; Radford, 19
32
Wadle, 82
33
Wadle, 82
34
Wadle, 83

9
the day.”35However, Army umpires had claimed minimal damage was inflicted by Admiral

Yarnell’s attack at dawn on February 7th.36 Black Fleet’s land-based counterparts had anticipated

a surprise landing rather than a Sunday-morning air assault, and had sent most of their 20,000

men to patrol Oahu’s coast.37 Caught unawares, their air stations claimed that the attack had been

successful only because the raid had been launched at dawn on a Sunday, which placed it “on the

dirty side” of tactics.38

Regardless of complaints about the legality of Blue’s February 7th assault, the exercise

and its critique produced a compelling outcome. President of the Naval War College Rear

Admiral Harris Laning, who had served as an umpire, concluded that aircraft carriers’ mobility

in fact gave them an advantage over land-based units, a stark reversal from Adm. Reeves’

observations in Proceedings.39Admiral Yarnell agreed, though he expressed considerable

discomfort with utilizing aircraft carriers, which were valuable and in short supply, for coastal

assaults. After all, Saratoga had been crippled during the Grand Joint Exercise and her aircraft

had been forced into an emergency diversion to Lexington. A carrier-based task force, in his

belief, was too valuable to risk assaulting an enemy coast “unless it were in possession of an air

force greatly superior to that which the enemy could put in action against it.”40 Grand Joint

Exercise No. 4 had demonstrated to fleet strategists the valuable mobility and offensive

capabilities of aircraft carriers in assaulting coastal emplacements. Concerns about carriers’

35
Grover Loening quoted by Wadle, 84
36
Radford, 19
37
”ARMY & NAVY: Grand Joint Exercse No. 4,"Time, February 15, 1932, 1.
38
Radford, 19
39
Nofi, 154
40
Admiral Harry Yarnell quoted by Wadle, 86

10
value and limited supply seemed likely to motivated construction orders, but long-term

considerations were tabled as the fleet prepared for its next task, Fleet Problem XIII.

Mobility vs. Power: Fleet Problem XIII

Fleet Problem XIII’s scenario simulated an offensive by United States (Blue Fleet)

against a string of islands held by a foe (Black Fleet). Geography was reversed for the Fleet

Problem, and Blue Fleet’s continental base of operations was presumed to exist west of

Longitude 180 while Black possessed an island empire redolent of Japan, with bases in Puget

Sound, Magdalena Bay and San Francisco. Orders were given to Blue Fleet to seize one of

Black’s positions for conversion into a base, while Black was instructed to respond and defend

its positions. As in Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, Blue Fleet was under the command of Admiral

Richard Leigh with Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell as air commander, and Black Fleet was

commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur Willard. Blue Fleet had nine battleships, Saratoga, thirty-

four destroyers, five light cruisers, and a number of support craft. Adm. Willard’s Black Fleet

had Lexington, Langley, eleven cruisers, twenty-eight destroyers, twenty-one submarines, and a

supporting supply flotilla; Black was also given an imaginary “small notional force” of

battleships and battlecruisers stationed east of their bases.41

On March 8th, Admirals Willard and Leigh took command and the Fleet Problem began.

Black Fleet deployed its complement of submarines ahead of the main formation in an attempt to

monitor Blue Fleet’s movements as both fleets advanced towards each other.42Blue Fleet,

meanwhile, set an ambiguous course for San Francisco that would permit the fleet to divert to
41
Nofi, 155
42
Wadle, 89

11
Magdalena Bay or Puget Sound with minor adjustments.43 Black Fleet’s submarines made

several attempts to approach and attack Blue Fleet as the two formations closed distance, but

Blue’s destroyers scored several fatal hits on submarines during March 10, 12, and 13th.44 After

sporadic submarine contact, Blue Fleet resolved her course on the afternoon of March 13th and

began to reform for a diversion to Puget Sound.45 On March 14th, the two fleets met in the first

significant contact of the Fleet Problem.

With Blue Fleet’s offensive screen closing on Black Fleet’s defensive scouting line, the

operating range of their air patrols overlapped. At 0830 on the 14th, scouting aircraft from

Saratoga made visual contact with several Black cruisers and were spotted in turn.46 That

afternoon, aircraft from Lexington and Saratoga flew sorties against each other’s carriers

simultaneously, resulting in 25 percent damage scored against Saratoga while Lexington was

dealt 38 percent damage. Both vessels’ commanding officers protested the scoring, arguing that

the simultaneity had confused the umpires and inflated the damage penalties dealt. Consequently,

umpires declared both ships repaired so that the carriers could continue participating in the Fleet

Problem. Lexington and Saratoga continued operations, and the fleets engaged the next day.47

March 15th brought the first surface combat operations, and the first scored casualties, of

Fleet Problem XIII. At Point Moren, about 1,000 miles southwest of San Francisco, both fleets

made contact. After daybreak, two scouting aircraft from Saratoga spotted and strafed a Black

cruiser, which was in fact Admiral Willard’s flagship Augusta. Soon after, his cruiser formation
43
Nofi, 156
44
Wadle, 90
45
Nofi, 158
46
Wadle, 90
47
Nofi, 158

12
sighted and began a surface engagement with Blue’s offensive screen. A Blue destroyer was

ruled sunk in the initial exchange of gunfire, and a full squadron Blue aircraft from Saratoga

appeared on the scene as the battle continued. Saratoga’s aircraft flew bombing runs on Black’s

formation, dropping one-ton bombs and “severely damaging” one cruiser which retreated to the

rear of the formation for escort and repair.48 Black and Blue continued to exchange gunfire as

reinforcements arrived well into the night. “The preliminary game of hide and seek”, an observer

aboard Augusta noted, was “largely over now.”49 In the days ahead, Hanson Baldwin of the

Times anticipated that Black Fleet’s “cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and planes [would] …

take nips at the enemy and rush back to safety” before Blue’s battleships could respond, “like a

pack of dogs worrying a bear.”50

Black Fleet’s subsequent assault, however, yielded much more than “nips” out of the

enemy. At sunset on the 15th, Lexington’s planes caught Saratoga unprepared and defenseless

with all of her planes on deck. The forty planes armed with one-ton bombs and accompanied by

a small complement of light bombers dealt severe damage to Saratoga with one-ton bombs,

leaving “her flight deck splintered and her hull torn.”51 Competition between the “Lex” and the

“Sara” had made the Problem an “almost personal feud” and so Black Fleet seized the moment.

That night, Black sent twenty destroyers forward in a direct “whirling attack” on Saratoga and

her battleship escorts. As the destroyers charged towards the Saratoga, three of Blue battleships

launched a salvo of sixty torpedoes, inflicting fatal hits on six of the twenty destroyers. Despite

48
Hanson Baldwin, “Black Planes ‘Sink’ Carrier Saratoga,” New York Times, March 18, 1932.
49
Baldwin, “Black Planes”
50
Baldwin, “Black Planes”
51
Baldwin, “Black Planes”

13
their losses, the remaining destroyers’ retaliating gunfire sank Saratoga and left the three

battleships “wallowing slowly…like wounded leviathans.”52

By dawn on the 16th, both fleets had sustained grave losses. In addition to Saratoga and

the three damaged battleships, Blue Fleet had lost one of its destroyers. Black Fleet had halted

Blue’s advance towards the coast, but at a high cost: two 10,000-ton cruisers, three light cruisers,

six destroyers, four submarines, and Lexington had taken enough damage to render a third of her

planes inoperable. Black Fleet’s losses notwithstanding, Blue had been dealt a considerable

defeat. With Saratoga at the bottom, Black now had “practically indisputable air superiority,” a

third of Blue’s vital battleship line was seriously damaged, and the announcement came down

that the fleet would have to change course.53 Admiral Schofield, the chief umpire, had ruled that

Puget Sound, Blue’s current destination, was closed to Blue assault. With no reason given, Blue

was forced to divert to either San Francisco or Magdalena Bay.54

Admiral Leigh ordered his fleet to Magdalena Bay, and Blue continued its push against

the Black defenses on March 17th.55 Foul weather prevented Black from utilizing its air

superiority as the battle continued. Saratoga’s three damaged escort battleships now formed the

point of Blue’s offensive screen, and exchanged constant gunfire with the brunt of Black’s

destroyer and cruiser flotilla. Surface engagements claimed seven more of Black Fleet’s

destroyers and one of Blue’s battleships, and Admiral Willard announced his intention to

“sacrifice the entire fleet if necessary to prevent” Blue from victory. Black Fleet was now left

52
Baldwin, “Black Planes”
53
Baldwin, “Black Planes”
54
Baldwin, “Black Planes”
55
Wadle, 91

14
with fifteen of its twenty-eight destroyers and six of its eleven cruisers, and Blue Fleet was able

to break contact and continue on its course as night fell.56

Once night had fallen, Captain King of Lexington ordered his aircraft up in spite of “a

stiff southwest wind and low visibility.” Though the fleets were drifting apart, Lexington’s

planes made visual contact with the two remaining forward battleships of Blue Fleet and

delivered a “severe bombing attack” that left them barely operable. Weather conditions,

however, grew steadily worse and squalls prevented further engagements during the night. With

Blue Fleet’s offensive screen slipping past and its main body on the way, Black moved to fortify

San Francisco.57

March 23rd was the scheduled end date of the exercise, but distance between the fleets

had grown such that no contact would be possible in the five remaining days.58 Chief Umpire

Admiral Schofield gave the order, and at 0800 on March 18th Fleet Problem XIII came to a close.

Black Fleet had made defensive preparations at San Francisco sufficient to inflict grave damage

on Blue Fleet, while Admiral Leigh’s forces had made another change in course towards San

Francisco. At the conclusion, the remnants of Blue Fleet’s offensive screen were no more than

one hundred miles from the city while the main body of the fleet was approximately two

hundred-fifty miles behind. Black Fleet had lost four cruisers, thirteen destroyers, four fleet

submarines, and Lexington had been seriously damaged; Blue Fleet had lost Saratoga, one

battleship, and one destroyer with two battleships and eight destroyers “sunk or severely

damaged.”59
56
Hanson Baldwin, “Blue Fleet ‘Sinks’ Seven Destroyers,” New York Times, March 19, 1932.
57
Baldwin, “Blue Fleet Sinks”
58
Nofi, 159
59
Hanson Baldwin, “Fleet ‘Foes’ Head For Port Reunited,” New York Times, March 20, 1932.

15
 Per operating procedure, the Navy did not declare a victor, but Black’s light force of

cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft had inflicted considerable losses on a heavily-armored and

heavily-armed enemy. Blue’s offensive screen had been “practically annihilated” by Black’s

combined aerial and surface assault, and Blue’s remaining fleet faced considerable defenses at

San Francisco, including simulated mine fields, submarine torpedo attacks, and the approach of

Langley to reinforce Black’s overwhelming air superiority.60 Without aerial or subsurface

support, Blue Fleet’s six battleships, four cruisers, and sixteen destroyers would have

conceivably suffered catastrophic losses in an attack on fortified San Francisco. In the absence of

a formal victor, Black possessed the “upper hand” at the end of the exercise and had succeeded

in frustrating Blue Fleet’s objectives.61

Doctrinal Revisions: Conclusions from Fleet Problem XIII

Fleet Problem XII, unlike GJE No. 4, did not include an immediate critique and detailed

dissection after the exercise, although individual officers’ discussed their conclusions in great

detail. Captain Ernest King of the Lexington wrote after the exercise:

In closing, I wish to say that I was a party to the first strategical problem the navy ever held, around Rico

and Culebra just thirty years ago this winter. I have been a party to most of the Fleet Problems held since

and I think that this problem in its wide scope and by reasons of its nature has been one of the most

interesting and profitable exercise in which the fleet has ever engaged.62

60
Baldwin, “Fleet Reunited”
61
Baldwin, “Fleet Reunited”
62
Captain Ernest King quoted by Wadle, 92

16
Undoubtedly, the exercise had proven “interesting and profitable” for Cpt. King given the

stunning victory of his airmen in the feud against Saratoga. Observers also remarked that,

despite some 141 vessels and 36,000 men participating in open maneuvers, often at night and in

bad weather, there was only one accidental casualty reported: two sea-planes had collided on the

water at Puget Sound, damaging one plane and slightly injuring its pilot.

In the months following Problem XIII, fleet strategists and commanders dissected the

events of March 8th-18th. The Problem’s size and geographical scope demonstrated to the

majority that a Pacific campaign would require far more aircraft carriers than were currently

scheduled for construction. Grand Joint Exercise 4, and the success of Lexington and Saratoga

only exacerbated that realization. Lexington's lethal strike against Saratoga during the Problem

had illustrated not just carriers’ offensive potential, but also their mutual vulnerability and their

efficacy as an initial strike weapon. Admiral Yarnell, along with Admiral William H. Standley,

pleaded with fleet command for the construction of more carriers, estimating that six to eight

carriers would be needed to conduct a campaign in the Pacific alone.63 Considering that the fleet

had built a total of three aircraft carriers, and only two in the previous two decades, this must

have struck fleet strategists and logisticians as an alarming request. Regardless, the navy’s first

purpose-designed aircraft carrier would be commissioned within two years, and two more

ordered built as a result of Admiral Yarnell’s request.

In addition to demand for aircraft carriers, Fleet Problem XIII had a profound immediate

influence upon aircraft carrier usage doctrine in the fleet. After Lexington’s performance in the

Problem as a strike weapon and Blue’s struggle after the loss of Saratoga, fleet commander and

strategists were reluctant to relegate carriers to their former supporting role. Admiral Yarnell

63
Wadle, 92

17
advised that “carriers should operate in company,” while Admiral Luke McNamee recommended

that the Saratoga and Lexington, and future carriers, should “normally be used as a striking

force.”64 Carriers were no longer the solely means of protection for battleships, but were now

worth consideration as offensive weapons in their own regard and merited protection.

With Fleet Problem XIII providing a catalyst, further Fleet Problems tested the power and

potential of aircraft carriers, and fleet strategy began to widely acknowledge their power. In

1936, Proceedings published an essay by Lieutenant J.C. Hubbard entitled “Aviation and

Control of the Sea.”65 Hubbard demonstrated how much fleet doctrine had changed with his

declaration that “the truth is that control of the sea must embrace control not only of the surface,

but also of the air.”66 Naval aviation, he argued, had never received a chance to prove its

importance to the fleet during warfare because of the delayed development of aircraft carriers

and theory until after World War I had concluded. Since then, he acknowledged that air

operations’ maturity and importance had expanded to “an untold degree.”67 Peacetime

maneuvers, like Fleet Problem XIII and those that followed, had illustrated that aircraft merited

inclusion as a vital tool in the offensive capability of the fleet. Aircraft carriers now presented a

critical offensive tool to the fleet, and would require a “powerful surface protective force” to

sustain aerial combat and, consequently, to ensure the security of the fleet.68 Hubbard’s article

marked an important shift: battleships were no longer the key to control of the seas, and aircraft

carriers had earned widespread recognition as an integral component of any naval undertaking.
64
Wadle, 92
65
J.C. Hubbard, “Aviation and Control of the Sea,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 62
No. 1 (Jan. 1936), 33.
66
Hubbard, 35
67
Hubbard. 37
68
Hubbard, 35

18
 By 1938, construction of the carriers ordered after Fleet Problem XIII was complete and

Yorktown and Enterprise themselves provided the closing statement in the argument for naval

aviation’s significance. Fleet Problems XVIII and XIX included simulations of multiple-carrier

assaults on collected formations of battleships and cruisers which produced statements that

“efficacy of this type of coordinated attack cannot be doubted.”69 As a direct result of the

conclusions found in Fleet Problem XIII and the quantity and usage of carriers envisioned

afterwards, naval aviation had conclusively proven its essential power. After five vessels,

nineteen Fleet Problems, and nearly twenty years since Langley’s construction, the aircraft

carrier was recognized as a weapon comparable to the battleship.70

Realization of the aircraft carrier’s potential had not come a year too soon, and it had

been no coincidence that the majority of Fleet Problems, including XIII, were conducted in the

Pacific Ocean. Fleet Problem XIII’s geographical and strategic scenario had been a barely-

disguised simulation of a Pacific campaign against Japan. The Problem had in fact been

conceived as a means by which to examine the problems associated with an offensive against the

recently-fortified Japanese Mandates. Similarly, Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 provided a chilling

premonition of the aerial dawn assault of Dec. 7, 1941.71

In addition to exercising the fleet and refining naval doctrine, the Fleet Problems had also

honed the United States’ strategy in the event of a trans-pacific war with Japan. Designated War

69
Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercise 1923-1940
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 57.
70
Felker, 57-59
71
Nofi, 155.

19
Plan Orange, this strategy evolved as the Fleet Problems revealed the complications and

innovations that would prove decisive in full-scale naval engagements in the Pacific.72

Conclusions & Closure

Prior to Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 and Fleet Problem XIII, naval aviation and aircraft

carriers had occupied a secondary, supporting role in naval doctrine. Langley had been

constructed as an experimental platform, and confined to a protective role in surface formations.

Limited to a top speed of 16 knots, and a small complement of aircraft, she was unable to

persuade fleet strategists that carriers and their aircraft were adequate for anything more than

defending battleships.

Fleet Problem IX provided an initial demonstration of the necessity and power of naval

aviation, while the introduction of Lexington and Saratoga set the stage for Fleet Problem XIII.

Lexington and Saratoga’s assault on the Panama Canal illustrated the efficacy of sea-based
72
Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1975), 28-
30.

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aircraft against land targets, and the merits of allowing carriers to operate alone as offensive

strike weapons. However, fleet commanders, including Admiral Reeves himself, acknowledged

the limitations on naval aircraft, their ineffectiveness against sea targets, and their carriers’

vulnerability. The battleship remained “the backbone of the fleet.”73

Between 1929 and 1932, naval thought persisted in imagining a supporting role for

aircraft carriers. Theories of carrier construction still envisioned a small flotilla of escort carriers

providing aerial defense for heavily-armored, heavily-armed battleships. Sporadic aerial attacks

dealt only bothersome damage to enemy battleships in Fleet Problem XII, and observers

remained unconvinced. Still, the battleship remained the backbone.

Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 repeated the events of Fleet Problem IX in greater degree.

Lexington and Saratoga’s aircraft executed a devastating surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, in

thanks to the carriers’ mobility. Discarding the Army’s claims concerning the unfairness of a

Sunday dawn assault, the carriers had effectively destroyed the island’s aerial defenses. Saratoga

fell inoperable after aerial retaliation, but Langley continued to provide critical support to Blue

Fleet’s landing force. Despite their vulnerability, the carriers proved surprisingly effective in

attacking land. Even so, their efficacy in naval engagements had yet to be proven.

Fleet Problem XIII provided decisive evidence of naval aviation’s indispensable power,

and its strategic importance at sea. Black Fleet, though outmatched and outgunned, operated

Lexington as a forward strike weapon while Saratoga formed with Blue Fleet’s battleships. In

the ensuing contest of mobility versus power, Lexington dealt a lethal blow to Saratoga and

Black Fleet seized on the consequent air superiority. Though they sustained significant losses,

Lexington and Black’s destroyer and cruiser flotilla inflicted staggering damage on Blue’s
73
Baldwin, “Battleship Stands”

21
offensive screen. Blue lost three battleships, and Black possessed the upper hand at the

conclusion of the exercise.

Immediately after the exercise, fleet strategists demanded the construction of more battle-

line aircraft carriers and advocated for their use as a striking force. Despite its relative

vulnerability, the carrier was a naval weapon that could no longer be ignored. Instead of a

protective support device, the carrier’s vulnerability and crucial role dictated that it should

receive close protection. Fleet Problem XIII had spurred the construction of multiple carriers,

and persuaded fleet doctrine that naval aviation merited further trials.

As Fleet Problems examined naval aviation and the fleet fielded the carriers built as a

result of Fleet Problem XIII, aircraft carriers became recognized as a naval weapon comparable

in their importance to battleships. World War II’s arrival, and the events of battles at Midway

and Coral Sea would serve as a final, wartime validation to this doctrinal revision.

Thus, Fleet Problem XIII and Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 offered the vital catalyst for the

United States Navy’s acceptance of aircraft carriers as a central element of the fleet. The

exercises of 1932 precipitated further examination and experimentation which would complete

the fleet’s transformation in thought. Fleet Problem XIII’s and GJE No. 4’s events and their

observers’ conclusions challenged the “backbone” role of the battleship and compelled fleet

strategists to call for the rapid construction of more aircraft carriers modeled upon Lexington and

Saratoga. Naval aviation was established as an effective weapon against targets on both land and

sea, and doctrine was revised to emphasize control of the air as well as control of the sea. World

War II’s Pacific Campaign soon validated this doctrinal revision, and American carrier power

would remain a core component of naval might for the rest of the 20th century, and beyond.

22
Bibliography

Primary Sources

”ARMY & NAVY: Grand Joint Exercse No. 4,"Time, February 15, 1932, 1.

Baldwin, Hanson. “Battleship Stands as Navy’s Backbone,” New York Times. February 23, 1931.

--. “Black Planes ‘Sink’ Carrier Saratoga,” New York Times. March 18, 1932.

--. “Blue Fleet ‘Sinks’ Seven Destroyers,” New York Times. March 19, 1932.

--. “Fleet ‘Foes’ Head For Port Reunited,” New York Times. March 20, 1932.

Hubbard, JC. “Aviation and Control of the Sea,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 62 No. 1 Jan.
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Radford, Arthur W. quoted by Paul Stillwell, Air raid, Pearl Harbor!, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
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Reeves, Joseph M. “Aviation in the Fleet,” US Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 55 No. 10 Oct. 1929.

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Sherman, Forrest. “Some Aspects of Carrier and Cruiser Design,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.
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Secondary Sources:

Abbazia, Patrick. Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1975.

Grossnick, Roy A. United States Naval Aviation 1910-1995. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1997.

Felker, Craig C. Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercise 1923-1940. College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 2007.

Wadle, Ryan David. United States Navy Fleet Problems And The Development of Carrier Aviation, 1929-
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tamu-2005B-HIST-Wadle.pdf (August 2005) [Accessed November, 2010).

Nofi, Albert A. To Train The Fleet For War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems 1923-1940. Washington:
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