Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation, Part 2: Scenario creation

John Turnpenny, Tim O'Riordan and Alex Haxeltine �� January 2005

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

Working Paper 67

Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation Part 2: Scenario creation

John Turnpenny, Tim O’Riordan, Alex Haxeltine
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ Contact email: j.turnpenny@uea.ac.uk

Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 67 Jan 2005

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Summary • This is the second major part of the Tyndall Centre case study creating a set of scenarios of how the East of England Region may look in 2050 under large greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions and with adaptation to residual climate changes. In the first part we set out an assessment (a ‘framing narrative’) of the region from the perspective of climate change. • We have used the East of England as a case study and this method can be extended to other regions and localities • The scenarios are a way to aid decision-makers by scoping out the issues and indicating, at a very broad scale, possible ways large emissions reductions might be achieved. They should not be used as predictions, or as detailed planning tools. • Three scenarios were developed based on national-scale work for the Research Councils, the OST Foresight Programme and the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. These examine how the Region may look in 2050, and all reach a 60% emission reduction by 2050. • As well as climate change research, the Region’s strategies, such as on the environment, economy and spatial planning (RPG14) also set an important context for the work. A fourth scenario examines the results of following current regional policies and plans; this scenario does not achieve a 60% emission reduction by 2050. Indeed it only reaches 20%. This offers an indication of the substantial challenge that lies ahead for the region to even reduce the trends in current emission growth, let alone reverse them. • Each scenario assumes that under climate change we will have warmer drier summers and warmer winters with more rainfall, and that sea level rise will accelerate, with increased coastal flooding and erosion. The scenarios differ in the way society deals with these impacts. • The Region does not act in isolation: each scenario assumes that the UK and the EU also move along the same paths. However, not all scenarios assume the rest of the world does so as well. • Each scenario description indicates a different pathway for reaching the 2050 emissions reduction target. The transformation from the current state happens gradually over the intervening period. • For research results to be credible and useful, they need to be embedded in a process of interaction with these users of the results. We have worked with several organisations, including Norfolk County Council, and the East of England Sustainable Development Round Table through joint workshops to develop the research. This has contributed particular knowledge of the Eastern Region and helped the scenarios’ legitimacy with the users. The scenarios are intended for a wide range of audiences, but primarily regional and local government officers. The storylines represent sectors important to regional policymakers, addressing economy, societal values, the role of energy efficiency, the scale and strength of regional governance, the type and scale of the energy supply system and the balance and location of economic activity. Note that “Market Fix” and “Guided Change” are similar in world views, and share some common text. The main differences between them relate to the style of governance, and the steps along the way to the 2050 scenario. Given the nature of the assumptions, the accuracy of emission reductions is at best ±10%, and no more should be read into the numbers than this. In this Summary we summarise the scenarios as a series of bullet points, with accompanying graphs to show a summary of emission reductions from the current situation. Note that all emissions are CO2 equivalent, which accounts for the effects of different greenhouse gases. For ease of comparison with other work, the total reduction in CO2 alone for each scenario is also given. In the full report we give the full storylines, and more detailed breakdown of emissions from different sectors.

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“Local and Green”: local sustainable lifestyles and energy demand reductions

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In response to the challenge of dealing with climate change, transformation to localised, distributed, integrated institutions is chosen as the mechanism rather than market delivery or strong regulation within the current institutional structure.

General characteristics • Green world view • Use fewer natural resources and energy • Localisation of governance, and strong regulation and planning. Strong community leadership • Stabilised regional population • Planned adaptation to climate change. Social insurance. • Social equity as a goal • ‘Welfare Indicator’ replaces GDP and grows • Progressive taxes rise, especially on environmentally damaging activities • Local production and procurement increases Sectoral descriptions • Energy efficient buildings; carbon neutrality of new houses becomes mandatory; 50% reduction in electricity & heat demand, partly through technology but mostly by changing lifestyles. Natural ventilation, shading and behaviour change cope with hotter summers • Reduced energy use through lower energy consumption • Development spread through the region, sited to avoid flood-prone and environmentally sensitive areas and maximise water efficiency. Water prices are moderate (though higher than today). • More hi-tech development, especially surrounding renewable energy, with local markets • High-density mixed use developments with a mix of income earners reduces need to travel • Transport demand reduced and energy efficiency increased; increase in public transport as share of total • Tourism increases in a warmer climate • Some coastal areas revert to wetlands, enhancing biodiversity • Agriculture remains important to the Region; more organic production. Crops suited to warmer drier climates are grown • Large cuts in waste produced • Small scale/localised/embedded energy supply technologies: 70% energy from renewables (600 new wind turbines); 30% from fossil fuels; no nuclear or carbon sequestration
Summary of changes in emissions - Local and Green scenario
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14000 2000 values Local and Green 12000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent

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Local and Green emission changes by sector, 2050: Domestic -60% Industry and Commercial -60% Public Sector -40% Road transport -70% Waste -80% Agriculture 0% Total emission change: CO2 alone -60% TOTAL EMISSION CHANGE by 2050: -60%

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“Market Fix”: energy demand grows but the market delivers green energy supplies
The market delivers large scale low carbon energy supply technologies. This is in response to fossil fuel price rises caused by resource depletion and by disruption from conflict. However, energy demand also increases, and massive amounts of low carbon energy are required to reach 60% emission reduction.

General characteristics • Market-driven world view • Increased material consumption • Weak regional and local governance • Market is the primary driver • Increased regional population • Impact-driven adaptation to climate change, privately financed. “Hard” engineering solutions, such as higher defences, are favoured • Strong economic growth, unevenly divided across society • Taxes are lowered Sectoral descriptions • Energy use increases but overall demand rise is slowed due to energy efficient technologies (demand at 2000 levels by 2050). Air conditioning use rises significantly • Knowledge industries increase while manufacturing declines significantly • Globalisation of production; increased volume of imports and exports • Development concentrated in the south of the region, regardless of vulnerability to flooding, water supply pressure or subsidence. Water abstraction increases, causing problems for supply and wetland habitats. Water prices high. • Low-density socially stratified developments increases need to travel • Transport demand increased but with major transport efficiency improvements; public transport declines then rises as share of total • Tourism in the region increases, mainly from overseas • Coasts maintained by ‘hold the line’ where local communities can afford it • Land is used for leisure with less area cultivated, but irrigation rises in summer. Environmental protection is not a priority, except in pockets of private ‘heritage’ preservation • Cuts in waste produced • Massive national-scale low-carbon energy supply technologies stimulated by rising fossil fuel prices. Major new nuclear and carbon sequestration programmes, with some increases in renewables. By 2050, 40% of energy comes from renewables (including 2200 new wind turbines) about 50% from nuclear or fossil fuel with sequestration, and about 10% regular fossil fuel.

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Summary of changes in emissions - Market Fix scenario
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14000 2000 values 12000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent Market Fix

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Market Fix emission changes by sector, 2050: Domestic -60% Industry and Commercial -80% Public Sector -60% Road transport -60% Waste -30% Agriculture -10% Total emission change: CO2 alone -70% TOTAL EMISSION CHANGE by 2050: -60%

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“Guided Change”: massive greening of energy achieved by regulation
Large scale low-carbon energy supply technologies develop in response to government legislation. Public acceptance of the need to act on climate change is partly swung by large climate impact events.

General characteristics • Material growth-driven world view • Increased consumption • Very strong national, regional and local governance with more planning for sustainability • Increased regional population • Mixture of impact-driven and planned adaptation to climate change, privately and publicly financed • Strong economic growth, with some stratification across society, but more social investment generally than ‘Market Fix’ • Some levies are raised on fossil fuel use Sectoral descriptions • Some energy efficiency improvements help counteract increased energy use; (energy demand at 2000 levels by 2050) • Knowledge industries increase while manufacturing declines significantly • Development concentrated in the south of the region, driven by government incentives and market encouragement to develop away from climate vulnerable areas. Water prices are moderate (though higher than today), and there is more efficient use of water • Mainly low-density developments, but with government action to reduce stratification • Transport demand increased but also major transport efficiency improvements; public transport rises slightly as share of total • Tourism in the region increases

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• • • • •

Coastal defences mix ‘hold the line’ and ‘managed retreat’ depending on local circumstances Intensive cash-crop agriculture but best practice observed to reduce emissions and make best use of water. Environmental protection is traded off with cost. Cuts in waste produced Massive large-scale low-carbon energy supply technologies driven by government planning and concern over climate change Some increases in renewables, major new nuclear and carbon sequestration programmes. Similar energy mix to Market Fix.
Summary of changes in emissions - Guided Change scenario
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14000 2000 values Guided Change 12000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent

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Guided Change emission changes by sector, 2050: Domestic -60% Industry and Commercial -80% Public Sector -70% Road transport -60% Waste -50% Agriculture 0% Total emission change: CO2 alone -70% TOTAL EMISSION CHANGE by 2050: -60%

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“More of the Same”: current trends and strategies are implemented Not a 60% reduction scenario - current trends continue in some areas, but effort is made in others to move towards a sustainable region

General characteristics • Material growth-driven world view • Increased consumption • Growing regional and local governance with more planning for sustainability • Increased regional population • Mixture of impact-driven and planned adaptation to climate change, privately and publicly financed • Strong economic growth, with uneven distribution of resulting wealth, but more social investment generally than ‘Market Fix’ • Some levies are raised on fossil fuel use

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Sectoral descriptions • Some energy efficiency improvements but increased energy use cancel these out; small increase in electricity and heat demand • Rate of growth of domestic energy use slowed by some new carbon neutral developments • Knowledge industries increase while manufacturing declines significantly • Globalisation of production; increased volume of imports and exports • Development concentrated in the south of the region, driven by government incentives and market encouragement to develop away from climate vulnerable areas. Water prices are moderate (though higher than today), and there is more efficient use of water • Mainly low-density developments, but with government action to reduce stratification • Transport demand increases, in line with current projections and plans, but there are some transport efficiency improvements and road charging reduces the rate of growth. Public transport declines as share of total. • Tourism in the region increases • More intensive cash-crop agriculture but best practice attempted to reduce emissions and make more efficient use of water. Environmental protection is traded off with cost. • Coastal defences mix ‘hold the line’ and ‘managed retreat’ depending on individual cases • Large cuts in waste produced to meet current regional target • Use of Renewables Obligation policy to meet the regional target for renewable energy by 2010, and continuing beyond. Energy demand grows but there is not enough renewable energy to meet it all. 40% energy from renewables, 60% from current fossil fuel mix by 2050
Summary of changes in emissions - More of the Same scenario
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14000 2000 values More of the Same 12000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent

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More of the Same emission changes by sector, 2050: Domestic 0% to -10% Industry and Commercial -30% Public Sector -20% Road transport -20% Waste -30% Agriculture +10% Total emission change: CO2 alone -20% TOTAL EMISSION CHANGE by 2050: -20%

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1 Introduction – backcasting scenarios as research tools This document details work carried out as part of a Tyndall Centre research project creating integrated analysis of climate change responses at the regional and local level. It forms the main substance of the case study, and sets out the development and refining of a set of scenarios for policymakers in the East of England. Scenario analysis "provides hypothetical future states of a system, and help gain insight into a system and its dynamics" (Scholz & Tietje, 2002, p. 65), often with purpose of helping organisations plan for the future and ‘navigate through their business environment’ (van der Heijden, 2004). The method of carrying out a scenario exercise is reasonably well-established (eg. Godet, 1990; Robinson, 1990; Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Berkhout & Hertin, 2002b). The basics include: 1) assess current state; 2) build scenarios; 3) evaluation of options; 4) action. Step (1) includes identifying the main driving variables and analysing actor roles; Step (2) includes elaborating assumptions about how the key variables relate to each other (eg. Olson, 1994). An example of early 1990s scenario analysis includes Shell’s two different images of energy futures: Global Mercantilism (fragmented, regional deregulated markets) and Sustainable World (cohesive international cooperation, clean fuels, tightened regulation) (Kahane, 1992). These scenarios are not radically different – they present an image of what was thought possible rather than what targets were deemed desirable. In a major review, Greeuw et al (2000) assessed many different scenario approaches across different sectors and spatial scales to bring out clusters of scenarios. Again, many of these exercises were exploring potential futures (“what might happen”) rather than setting a normative target. Backcasting (Robinson, 1990; Dreborg, 1996) involves "working backwards from a particular desired future end-point to the present in order to determine the physical feasibility of that future and what policy measures would be required to reach that point" (Robinson, 1990, p. 823). As Robinson states, an explicitly normative, goal orientated analysis is required for issues such as reducing CO2 emissions. The general approach of a backcasting exercise is similar to the exploratory scenario approach, but with important differences, as outlined below. Backcasting is more appropriate for certain issues where major changes are required. A forecasting methodology is limited by the observation that “our perception of what is possible or reasonable may be a major obstacle to real change" (Dreborg, 1996; p. 816). Characteristics of a problem which favours backcasting includes "when dominant trends often the basis of forecasts are part of the problem" (Dreborg, 1996, p. 816). In order to carry out a backcasting exercise, it is important to free the mind from what is seen as “feasible”, at least at the initial stages, to allow freedom in creating scenarios. "Backcasting, while depending on scientific methods for its credibility, is a way to promote creativity" (Dreborg, 1996, p. 819) ie. not trying to prove a result. There is a need for transparency of process, but no prescribed tools for carrying it out - the methods chosen should be appropriate for the problem under consideration. 2 Scenario context The context for this study comes from several often inter-connected pieces of scenario research. The Foresight scenarios (DTI, 2002) were developed by the University of Sussex over a period of several years, to provide a framework around which organisations might plan for the future. They build on, among other work, the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC, 2000), and show alternative ways major issues, such as population, economy, regional development and the environment may change over the next 20 – 30 years. Further work published by the UK Climate Impacts Programme (2001) developed the Foresight scenarios for use in climate change impacts, following Lorenzoni et al (2000a,b) and IPCC (2000) in enabling links to be made between sociocultural actions, greenhouse gas emissions and climate change impacts. The UKCIP02 climate change scenarios for the UK (Hulme et al., 2002) provided an example of how these links can be integrated. Also based on the Foresight scenarios, the REGIS (Regional Climate Change Impact Response Studies) project produced stakeholder-led assessments of regional climate change impacts and

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adaptation, integrating socio-economic changes, climate, agriculture, water, biodiversity and coasts and inland flooding (Holman et al (2002). REGIS focussed on the North West of England and East Anglia as two contrasting case studies. The follow-on REGIS II project aims to expand the number of scenarios and carry out further analysis of user needs. In the East of England another key document on climate change is the ‘Living with climate change’ study, launched in March 2004 (SDRT, 2004). This study comprehensively addresses the potential future climates of the Region, their potential impacts on a wide range of regional sectors and activities, and appropriate measures to address these impacts within the regional planning framework. There is an important difference between the Foresight approach, which is exploratory (Berkhout & Hertin, 2002b), examining “what might happen", with no 'good or bad' targets set for the future, and approaches which enshrine a normative target. The second approach is often used in scenarios examining pathways for greenhouse gas reduction. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2000) examined four scenario pathways for the UK reaching a 60% GHG reduction by 2050. Tyndall Centre work at the University of Sussex applied the RCEP scenarios to the UK electricity system (Watson, 2003). A major project within Tyndall’s Decarbonisation Research Theme, due for completion in September 2005, is using a backcasting approach in combination with a diverse range of results from Tyndall Centre research to create integrated scenarios of 60% CO2 reduction at the UK scale. 2.1 Aims of the current study Little research has been done so far on integrating mitigation and adaptation at the regional and local scales. The aim of the current study was to create a set of scenarios which builds on the above work to describe how the East of England may achieve a 60% greenhouse gas emission reduction by 2050, and what action to adapt to climate change may be implied by those futures. The aim was to reduce the infinite number of ways different sectors such as transport, housing energy use and agriculture may change to reach an overall 60% reduction to a manageable number of broad storylines. The problem was a perfect one for applying a backcasting approach. A major aim of the exercise was to ensure integration between scenarios of future changes in climate and scenarios of how society and the economy may change. In addition, human behavioural responses to climate change, and to information on likely future changes in climate, are currently not explicitly incorporated into climate change scenarios. We use a co-development approach to scenario building, developing them jointly with inputs from researchers and users. The resulting scenarios contain information such as different policies for taxing carbon emissions, cultural attitudes to travel or different planning policies for housing development. The principal aim was to encourage and stimulate a learning process (Berkhout et al (2002: 94) within regional and local policymaking . Current thinking on climate change generally separates impacts and adaptation from mitigation, and there is little appreciation at the local and regional level of the scale or types of changes which will be needed in order to reach the 60% reduction ambition. As with a previous study of climate change impacts and adaptation in the East of England, the scenarios were 'employed to encourage stakeholders to assess the adequacy of their existing climate change strategies for longer than their normal planning periods' (Lorenzoni et al, 2000b, p. 154). The scenarios were not intended as predictors of future, or to make value judgement of which is 'best' (see evaluation debate later), but to start a debate on a little-researched issue. 2.2 What tools/methods do we use? In our study, which involves a large number of variables, and will requires a mixture of descriptive (eg. socio-cultural) as well as quantitative (eg. transport emissions) states of the future, we propose as most appropriate a combination of methods based on Scholz & Tietje (2002)'s Formative Scenario Analysis with Robinson (1990)'s procedure for backcasting exercises: 1) Determine objectives (purpose, scope, spatial focus, number and type of scenarios) 2) Specify goals, constraints and targets (both for scenario analysis and exogenous variables)

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3a) Describe present system; identify "impact variables" ie. what variables are most valid for describing current state and dynamics (eg. no of road miles, domestic gas use) 3b) Specify exogenous variables; identify drivers of unsustainability 4) Assess how different impact variables interact 5) Scenario analysis (generation, analysis of end point and mid point, iterate) 6) Impact analysis (social economic, environmental impacts - do we reach our goals? if not, iterate from step 2) 7) scenario evaluation

3 Our application of the scenario development method In this section we describe how each of the steps above was carried out, and the consequent results and issues raised. 3.1 Steps 1 and 2 These Steps are completed and described in the definition of the problem in the Aims above. The number and type of scenarios were not, however, determined at this stage, since we believed it more appropriate to see how many scenarios were needed to fully address the problem before cutting them down to a manageable number. This process is discussed in Step 5 (Section 3.3) below. 3.2 Steps 3a, 3b and 4 Step 3a was carried out through the Framing Narrative, which describes the current state of emissions from the East of England Region, and the main drivers of emissions change (Turnpenny et al (2004). For Step 3b, it is important to appreciate the diversity of drivers for change in the whole socioeconomic system, rather than just those leading to increased emissions. Berkhout & Hertin (2002b), in developing the Foresight socio-economic scenarios, found five main dimensions of change: demography and settlement patterns, economic growth, technological change, governance, and social and political values. The first three were seen as endogenous to the last two - ie. outcomes rather than drivers. The Foresight scenarios therefore used governance and values as the two dimensions of change. A brainstorming session with a small group of researchers set out to do a similar exercise for the current study, adapting the findings of Berkhout and Hertin to the specific problem of emissions reduction and adaptation at regional and local spatial scales. These drivers were seen as: • • • • • Regional distribution of development (spread vs. concentrated in south) Type of development (high vs. low density) Energy supply technology (large vs embedded) Energy demand (behaviour change vs. technology) Scale of governance (strong vs weak regional/local government)

It was decided to analyse emissions and impacts for all the sectors inventoried: Domestic, Industry and Commercial, Transport, Public Sector, Agriculture, Waste and Tourism. Since there are many variables and the relationships between them difficult or impossible to quantify, and which will change with time, we did not carry out a full matrix analysis of cross-impact interactions (Step 4). However, some of the more obvious links (such as links between housing density and need to travel) were included in the full scenario descriptions in a qualitative way (Section 5). The robustness of these descriptions were tested by input and revision from experienced regional and local policymakers during the scenario development. 3.3 Steps 5 and 6

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During the project we became aware of a new set of scenarios being developed for the UK Research Councils (RCUK) to stimulate thinking about what research may be required to support transition to a sustainable energy future (IAF & IoIR, 2004). These scenarios (henceforth “the RCUK scenarios”) qualitatively outline four different views of how the energy system will evolve at the national (UK) scale, framed around the normative target of reaching a 60% GHG reduction target by 2050. These scenarios were based on previous work, including RCEP (2000) and DTI (2002), and provide a good example of a backcasting approach. The drivers identified in the RCUK scenario creation included supply system technology, energy-using technologies, economy (economic growth, fuel costs, role of financial markets), society (demographics, location, consumption and lifestyle patterns, values and attitudes, perception of risks, transport, worldviews), Climate change/environment, politics and government (energy policy, political institutions, ‘game-changing’ events). 3.3.1 How did the regional stories emerge? The RCUK scenario drivers were obviously very similar to ours, and we decided to use the RCUK scenarios as the basis for the regional ones. This is partly because the national scale provides the context for the region, but also because basing work on existing scenarios enhances the trust among users and provides continuity. In adaptation of the RCUK scenarios for the East of England region, we had to go beyond the focus on the energy system and integrate adaptation and mitigation and also to add more detail, especially to the climate change/environment sections, and include analysis of nonenergy emissions like agriculture, waste and industrial processes. The storylines had refer to sectors important to regional policymakers, especially the scale and strength of regional governance, and the balance and location of economic activity. The national storylines were interpreted using specific phrases relevant to the Region, to bring an essentially esoteric visioning ‘down to earth’. Another important consideration was the importance of using local input (Lorenzoni et al, 2000a) and also that “scenarios should take different world views into account, not just those currently making the most political or business sense" (Lorenzoni et al, 2000a). There are several ‘overarching issues’ which govern the direction of the region today, which transcend the actions taken at the regional scale. First, many decisions about emission reductions are beyond the control of the region. These include changes to the global economy (eg. will manufacturing industry return to the UK?) and global impacts of climate change, as well as many technological developments. Part of this issue is understanding what drives the move to each scenario in a general sense - what changes happen, when, and what are interactions of policy and behavioural change. Second, there is a clear distinction between responding to climate change primarily through technological change. Other overarching issues include a) implementation of EU directives such as on water and waste, b) decentralisation of government, c) increased use of partnerships for delivery of policy, d) a developing sustainability strategy and e) an ageing population. These issues provide a context within which action can be taken at the regional and local level. The drivers from our brainstorming initially yielded six scenarios, which were collapsed to three widely differing (an important criterion – see Lorenzoni et al (2000b)) scenarios with different forms of governance as the primary driver, given its critical nature in the responsibilities of Regions. These three corresponded very closely with three of the RCUK scenarios (More Is Better Tech; More Is Better Gov and Small Is Elegant), and hence these national storylines were used as the context for the regional scenarios. Three scenarios were seen as a reasonable number, since more than four scenarios is usually unmanageable in short planning exercises (Berkhout & Hertin, 2002b). The three scenarios are: “Local and Green”: local sustainable lifestyles and energy demand reductions “Market Fix”: energy demand grows but the market delivers green energy supplies “Guided Change”: massive greening of energy achieved by regulation

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Each scenario starts from the question: “what will a 60% reduction1 at the EU and UK scale mean for the Region?”. As near as possible, we have assumed this also means a reduction in Regional emissions of 60% (ie. the national policies and picture will be adopted by the Region). However, not all scenarios assume the rest of the world does so as well. Note that “Market Fix” and “Guided Change” are similar in world views, and share some common text. The main differences between them relate to the style of governance, and each scenario description indicates a different pathway for reaching the 2050 emissions reduction target. The transformation from the current state happens gradually over the intervening period. These are expanded in Section 5. It is important to emphasise that the scenarios are extremes – for example Market Fix assumes the market is in control of virtually every area of life. 3.3.2 Summary: how do our scenarios relate to previous work? Since the RCUK scenarios are themselves based on other scenarios, it is helpful to examine how we see our regional scenarios in the bigger picture. The table below indicates how our scenarios correspond to others: Scenario Market Fix Guided Change Local and Green RCUK scenario More is Better (Tech) More is Better (Gov) Small is Elegant RCEP scenario 1 1 4 Foresight scenario World Markets (with a little REGIS Regional Enterprise) elements of Global Sustainability, World Markets and REGIS Regional Enterprise Local Stewardship (with some REGIS Global Sustainability)

Note that this does not imply an exact correspondence between every scenario and every other on a row, merely an indication of some of the similarities for reference. 3.3.3 Steps to quantifying the scenarios The RCUK scenarios explicitly contained no quantification. One of our challenges was to add quantitative analysis to the scenarios. This was done by following the procedure outlined below: Note that all emissions were CO2 equivalent, which accounts for the effects of different greenhouse gases. All the scenarios also reach a reduction of at least 60% in CO2 alone. The scenarios are intended to be used primarily as ‘high level’ strategic planning tools for regional and local government officers to think through what the issues might be in reducing emissions, and the quantitative indicators are intended to illuminate magnitudes of changes (Berkhout et al (2002) rather than as specific predictions about changes in each sector. Indeed, given the nature of the assumptions, the accuracy of emission reductions is at best ±10%, and no more should be read into the numbers than this. 1) change sectoral numbers in the GRIP emissions inventory (Turnpenny et al., 2004) in ways consistent with storylines The quantitative changes in emissions for each sector were estimated on the basis of the storylines, and created by altering the emissions, and hence deducing change in emission-producing activity, in each sector described in the Framing Narrative of current regional emissions. The proportions of energy from different sources were estimated from the UK Electricity Scenarios, and then all figures successively revised to ensure internal consistency. Use was made of Tyndall and other research on the feasibility of different efficiency improvements and demand changes to inform this quantification.

Note that since our baseline is for 2000, the 60% reductions are also from 2000. This is different to the conventional use of 1990 as a baseline. However, the nature of very large changes in emission reductions mean that this difference will have little influence on exploring what the key issues are.

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2) check the emissions totals This included ensuring that the overall total was reduced by 60% from the baseline, and also checking a range of other things (such as whether the proportion of CO2 from transport was consistent with the research which informed the scenario transport emissions changes). 3) revise changes, and if necessary the storylines, repeat from (1) This consistency check or triangulation ensured that the scenario narratives were internally consistent and still distinct and spanned a wide range. 4) add adaptation to climate change impacts and revise scenarios again This step was novel and raised some of the difficult issues of combining the forecasting and backcasting approaches implicit in linking mitigation and adaptation. It was important to link these scenarios with the Foresight approach, which has been used extensively in the UK to assess climate change impacts and adaptation (Holman et al. (2002); Downing et al. (2003); Evans et al (2004); SDRT (2004)), mostly based on the Foresight scenarios (DTI, 2002), which explicitly link different climates with different socio-economic futures. Since our principal policy driver is that all scenarios must reach 60% emission reductions, there is no one-to-one mapping between any of the scenarios and any of the Foresight ones, since Foresight does not include this driver. Our societal descriptions are derived partly from the Foresight worlds, and climate change adaptation is part of how each society responds to the 60% challenge, but some of the required policies and societal changes lead to departure from Foresight in the details. All the Foresight scenarios assume much higher greenhouse gas emissions than implied by a 60% emission reduction by 2050. By 2050, however, differences in climates between any emissions scenarios are small, due to the inertia of the atmosphere, but there are still some differences. We have assumed that climate changes are similar in all our scenarios, but the level of climate change assumed was necessarily rather arbitrary, since we have not specified in detail the emissions pathways between 2000 and 2050, so total effect on the climate cannot be determined. All scenarios assume some changeover period between 2000 and the path to low emissions, especially Market Fix and Guided Change, so cumulative emissions to 2050 will still be reasonably high. We assume climate change follows a moderate Foresight emissions scenario (the UKCIP02 “Medium High Emissions” scenario). All scenarios assumes that under climate change we will have warmer drier summers and warmer winters with more rainfall, and that sea level rise will accelerate, with increased coastal flooding and erosion (Hulme et al. (2002); SDRT (2004); Evans et al (2004)). In the East of England, the Thames Gateway and Coast are especially vulnerable to impacts of riverine and sea flooding, and the southern heartland to stress on water supply (SDRT, 2004). The Fens are threatened with flooding and saline water intrusion (Holman et al, 2002). Extreme river flood flows in winter are greater than today. Conversely, the shortened period of groundwater recharge with drier summers and more evaporation lead to reduced summer river flows, increases in pollutants and decline in groundwater resources (Holman et al, 2002). Demand for water increases, especially in agriculture, where climate change impacts (changes in plant physiology, soil water balances and carbon dioxide enrichment) act to increase demand further (Downing et al, 2003). Lowland species and habitats (including lowland heath) fare reasonably under climate change, except where sensitive to drought. Coastal grazing marsh is threatened, but may appear further inland depending on management strategies (Holman et al, 2002). The scenarios differ in the way society deals with these impacts. To maintain as close a consistency as possible, we have used Foresight socio-economic descriptions as the basis for these differing adaptation strategies, and have indicated this in each scenario. However, it must be emphasised that we cannot use any economic conclusions about costs of impacts from Foresight-based studies in the current scenarios. Our scenarios are driven by the need to reduce emissions significantly, and this quite different policy goal will significantly affect any economic calculations. 3.3 Step 7

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There are three components to evaluation: 3.3.1 Evaluation of current trends and plans This is assessment of what Ravetz (2000) calls the ‘trend-target gap’ - how current trends and plans fall short of the 60% target. We have done this by creating a fourth scenario, different from the others in that it is not a backcast. This scenario (“More of the Same”) is a world in which current trends continue in some areas, but effort is made in others to move towards a sustainable region, though, for example, implementing some of the regional environmental targets and strategies. The style and approach is somewhat similar to Guided Change, without the success of that scenario. Emissions reductions by 2050 reach only 20% below 2000 levels. 3.3.2 Revision of scenarios with policymaker input More details of the choice of group and evaluation of the interaction process can be found in the project Final Report2, but we give brief details here to show how the final versions of the scenarios were obtained. Building on the lessons of the COOL project (Tuinstra et al, 2002), which aimed to "develop strategic notions of how drastic reductions of GHG emissions in the Netherlands can be achieved in the longterm using a method of participatory integrated assessment", we developed the scenarios with input from a group of policymakers in the Region and in one of the Region’s counties, Norfolk. As in COOL, scenarios were first developed by the project team, then reviewed by potential users. This was done at their request since their resources were limited for creating the scenarios from the beginning. These first drafts were revised with policymaker input during summer 2004 through two facilitated workshops: the first with participants mainly concerned with the Regional scale, and the second concerned with the county scale. The first drafts were deliberately grounded in previous scenario work to give legitimacy with potential users. Lessons for carrying out the actual process were learned from COOL and Berkhout & Hertin (2002b), and included: • To stimulate creativity, the process needs structure and participants should feel at ease. We sent out the scenarios drafts three weeks before, which presented information in as compact and simple a way as possible. Participants were given specific questions to think through when reading, such as “What policies or mechanisms might be employed in reaching each of the scenarios?”. The meetings were logistically well-organised, discussion was facilitated by trained facilitator, and chaired by a project team member known to and respected by participants. We also followed the “Chatham House Rule” – anything said in the workshop could be quoted but not attributed. The agenda was prepared in cooperation with participants. The workshops encouraged the participants to own the work rather than see it as simply the project team informing participants of research activity. This was encouraged by the use of an outside facilitator. The need to balance science and discussion of issues was achieved by having the scenario creation team in the meeting ready to clarify technical questions, not to steer the participants towards any one scenario but to allow them to express their views freely. Notes were taken on a flip chart for visible recording of what was said. During the meeting, a short oral presentation was used to summarise the scenarios and what the meeting was about, giving very specific aims. The project team also provided support to participants' discussion.

• •

Following the meetings, the scenarios were revised and re-sent for comments to the participants and to a selection of researchers and wider potential users. The results presented below represent the final versions emerging at the end of this process.
For project T2.14 “The creation of a pilot phase interactive integrated assessment project for managing climate futures”, obtainable from www.tyndall.ac.uk
2

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3.3.3 Evaluation of the desirability of scenarios and pathways Evaluation of the scenario results based on different criteria, using tools such as multicriteria mapping (Stirling, 1997) give a systematic way of eliciting utility judgements associated with options. However, there are many theoretical issues which must be addressed in doing such analyses, including issues of aggregation of preferences and changing of preferences with time (Tompkins (2003). Such an evaluation using our group of policymakers would not involve a wide group of stakeholders, and hence be part of a non-participatory decision process. We did not have resources to address these issues properly, and hence we chose not to formally evaluate the different scenarios, leaving them as four potential futures with no value judgements attached. Subsequent research may address these issues. However, as part of the policymaker workshop, the participants gave their feedback on the scenarios, and in doing so outlined what they believed was the most ‘plausible’ or ‘likely’ pathway. This creation of an informal “Shared Vision” scenario (see Section 5) indicates how this particular group saw the presentation of extreme scenarios, and how they would use them to make decisions. It raises the important question, debated in the IPCC process, of whether it’s possible to present scenarios without any assessment of ‘likelihood’ without policymakers trying to create a ‘most likely’ amalgam and using that to inform decisions rather than considering each scenario as equally likely.

4 Detailed scenario descriptions Introduction In the Detailed Descriptions following, we give the full storylines, and a detailed breakdown of emissions from different sectors. For each scenario there is a brief picture of the national (and international) world views, and then more details of the Eastern Region divided into different sectors and activities. These subsections have been kept as close as possible to the sectors introduced and defined in the Framing Narrative. In the “Energy” sections, we discuss the changes in energy supply for heating and electricity. Within each sub section, a short quantitative summary of the story is given, with figures representing changes from the 2000 values.

Scenario 1: "Local and Green"
General description There is a shift towards much more sustainable lifestyles and behaviour, partly driven by the move to a new measure of growth, a complex welfare indicator which includes measures of environmental and social progress, equity and quality of life as well as financial transactions. This replaces GDP. Widespread advanced technology, along with increased use of recycled resources shift employment patterns to recycling and process industries, sustainable resource management, knowledge industries and renewable energy will evolve. Changes in perception of growth, and the ‘triple bottom line’ of the welfare indicator, lead to less concern with global growth as currently measured, and per capita consumption levels go down. Leading from this is an increased focus on the local scale as the main forum for decision-making and manufacturing. There is initially some fragmentation and a rise in global instability but these issues begin to be addressed by a gradual global move to sustainability led by the EU and UN, in tandem with devolution to the most appropriate local levels. a) Demographics There is a general stabilization in population growth and in the numbers of new households, reinforced by taxation in favour of higher residency per property. Migration to other parts of the UK from the south east stabilises the East of England’s population at 2000 levels and the region’s population as a share of the UK total falls. The number of people aged over 70 rises, but they are more likely to live with family than now, contributing further to the decline in household numbers. In summary:

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Regional Population: as 2000 Number of households: -5% Ratio of regional to national population: 8% b) Politics and Governance Much stronger regional governance develops in the UK, and local communities and regions become a more important focus of participation and decision-making. The significant institutional transformation required to deliver this scenario is initiated in the 2010s in response to the challenge of dealing with climate change; institutional transformation is chosen as the mechanism rather than market delivery or strong regulation within the current institutional structure. International trade continues to a certain extent, but within a more sustainable framework – there is a World Sustainability Organisation which subsumes the World Trade Organisation. Overall, “trade at the least distance” is generally favoured, encouraging UK engagement with the EU rather than the rest of the world. More participation in political debate and more use of IT by citizens and local governments leads to more informed decisions. As a result, there is greater readiness to accept the need for action on climate change. Strongly environmentally and socially sustainable policies and actions by the East of England Regional Parliament support energy efficiency and renewable energy. A key policy is the introduction by 2010 of Domestic Tradable Quotas (Anderson & Starkey, 2004). A national annual limit to greenhouse gas emissions is determined using the latest climate change science, and reduced annually to achieve mid-century emissions targets. Each year, the proportion of these emissions resulting from fuel and electricity consumption are divided equally between all adult citizens; the remainder are allocated to businesses and other organisations. A market is established for buying (and selling) of extra (or excess) units. Efforts also focus on providing information, removing institutional barriers, and setting standards. Energy demand declines by 30% by 2050, through a combination of developed energy efficient technologies and demand reduction. There is also a strong move towards regeneration and community renewal across the UK, and local and national government plays a role, especially in the large urban areas. Many more local sustainability strategies complement the regional policy direction. Taxes on environmentally damaging activities (e.g. transport) increase, while those on activities to be encouraged (e.g. employment) fall; the cost of labour falls relative to the cost of resources. However, tax policy is set to ensure progressive outcomes. Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Local impacts of climate change are a key focus of concern, especially in the areas of water resources, climate change, and soil degradation. These risks are most ‘manageable’ and ‘tangible’ at the local level, and regional and local authorities, and local communities, are proactive in addressing these. There is some community ‘pulling together’ in response to crisis, and, supported by national policy, creates a high level of adaptive capacity in the Region. This is somewhat different to the Guided Change scenario, where state planning and taxes are much more prominent. Adaptation policy is largely seen as part of a redistributive policy to reduce vulnerability to both environmental and social shocks. Community pooled premiums cover a scheme for affordable insurance (Evans et al, 2004). Development is located away from areas identified as likely to be worst hit – illustrating the preference for working with impacts rather than to fight them. The focus on the local has downsides – primarily a somewhat less coordinated overview from the national scale (Evans et al, 2004). This UK expertise is shared as part of development aid to poor countries. Various climate-related disasters around the world promote efforts to hold down carbon emissions. This scenario is most like the “Local Stewardship” Foresight scenario, with elements of the "Global Sustainability" REGIS scenario. Domestic National Building Regulations are modified to raise standards for energy efficiency in new buildings and refurbishments. Climate change objectives are written into reforms of the design and construction industry, allowing a more integrated design process to flourish and replace the current linear sequence

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of largely separate operations (architects, construction company, inspectors etc.). This minimises the adversarial multi-contract approach and reduces incentives for oversizing equipment. It also encourages consideration of whole-life costs (Sorrell, 2003). Education programmes promote energy conserving behaviour and low-cost, do-it-yourself improvements in home energy efficiency. Houses require a low energy certificate by 2010, and fuel poverty is completely eliminated by the 2020s. Replacement of the housing stock accelerates, and many buildings built in the 19th and 20th century are replaced by buildings with high thermal mass and energy-efficient heating and lighting systems. Under a changed climate, housing is designed to reduce the need for mechanical air conditioning through simple preventative technologies such as shading, thoughtful building alignment and use of PV cladding and groundwater cooling. Adaptation to a warmer outdoor climate leads to comfort levels at higher indoor temperatures. District heating networks supplied by Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants appear in most cities and towns. The number of appliances used decreases. Those that are used benefit from energy efficiency labelling adopted for a wider range of products and equipment. Higher EU standards improve the efficiency of tradable goods such as refrigerators and personal computers. The combination of efficiency and demand savings, and the requirement by 2030 that all new houses are carbon neutral, leads to major reduction in domestic energy consumption. Energy consumption in domestic sector: -50% Industry & Economy a) economic growth The EU moves to a complex welfare indicator (WI) by 2015, and changing worldviews make economic growth maximisation less important. However, WI grows steadily. Government policy is to even out disparities in regional growth across the UK, so there is a general convergence to the benefit of the East. b) Type of industry More local production and manufacturing emerges in response to concerns about over-extended supply-chains, local jobs and food miles. There is also major expansion in micro-grid and local generation technologies. At the same time, government encourages international investment in R&D on issues such as networks and zero-carbon technology innovation to help spread costs and get better economies of scale. Investors increasingly act locally due to government incentives to invest in local initiatives. More local and regional banking develops with favourable interest rates for local and regional capital investment. Tax incentives accelerate a shift toward more efficient equipment and processes in the construction industry. Government also provide information on “best buy” technologies to industrial and commercial consumers. Revenue from levies is recycled into energy-saving, and into stimulation of new sustainability enterprise schemes. Markets have fairly high levels of capital available, and a shift in energy investment toward smallerscale technologies reduces investment risks. Investors are willing to accept longer pay-back times for some investments due to both favourable government regulations. (e.g., tax incentives for longer-term investments in sustainable technologies – paid for by environmental taxation) and value-shifts (more emphasis on the well-being of future generations). The insurance industry initially suffers badly due to increased climate-related claims. This partly drives the state to develop public insurance strategies. Other industries which are hit by climate change mitigation legislation include heavy industry, with chemicals, minerals and metals industries especially affected by higher energy taxes. Industries such as hi-tech manufacturing grow, especially

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manufacturing and fabricating photovoltaics (PV) and other renewable energy related technologies. These products are made in the Region, and generally used within the Region. Energy use from these sectors does not reduce as much as other industries, but improvements in efficiency still deliver 60% reductions below today’s values. With climate change, by the mid 2020s about 10 – 15% of occupied hours in office buildings will be above 25°C (Levermore et al, 2004). However, the response is similar to that in the domestic sector: significant refurbishment, and also accelerated replacement, of 19th and 20th century buildings, and changed perceptions of acceptable levels of comfort. High-energy air conditioning units are not generally adopted, and together with reduced winter heating bills, the energy consumption reduces from current levels overall. In summary: Percentage Change in energy consumption for different industry sectors: (note the same sectoral classification as used in the framing of current emissions) FOOD TEXTILES PAPER; CHEMICALS; MINERALS; METALS ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL ENGINEERING VEHICLES CONSTRUCTION COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE OTHER INDUSTRIES -40 -60 -70 -60 -50 -60 -40 (inc. +5 for increased tourism) -50 -50

Location of development The national policy of dispersed development benefits the Region. There is an initial backlash against concentration of development in the South and associated blight in certain parts of the region, leading to development being spread across many towns and villages, with more local services providing jobs. Smaller towns revive, with expanding work opportunities. Worker shortage in the south of the Region lessens considerably as population density evens out across the region. Stringent planning ensures that people live close to their workplaces or public transport as a way of reducing demand. High-density communities contain a mix of different income earners. Plans are also made to ensure development is kept away from climate-vulnerable areas. Most pressure is in coastal areas, with erosion and flooding, in combination with sea-level rise, in areas such as the Thames Gateway. Public purchasing of coastal and floodplain land for abandonment/habitat creation helps to preserve and extend wildlife and plant habitats (Holman et al, 2002). With spreading the development across the region, there is less pressure to develop in at-risk areas. The low climate change scenario, combined with integrated flood management and prevention measures, such as Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems (SUDS) substantially reduce the risks from non-coastal flooding (Evans et al, 2004). The Southern Heartland is especially vulnerable to strained water supply (SDRT, 2004). More waterefficient dwellings, with use of grey water and rain water, domestic and business metering, storage of water from winter rainfall and fewer new houses mean there is also less pressure on scare summer water resources in the south of the Region. Water prices are moderate rather than high (Downing et al, 2003). Transport

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a) Efficiency 3 Direct consumer incentives and higher vehicle efficiency standards drive a rapid shift to fuel-electric hybrids. This begins with the compulsory implementation by 2010 of ACEA/EC (1998) - the (initially voluntary) agreement between the European Commission and European car manufacturers to reduce average carbon dioxide emissions from new cars 25% below the 1995 level. Following this, further developments in the efficiency of fuel-electric hybrids and a general switch to buying the most efficient vehicles, helped by a steep price differential between the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ vehicles, help reduce emissions further. By 2050, 70% of road vehicles are electric hybrids. Vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells begin to be introduced in the 2020s, but they do not displace fuel-electric hybrids. This is partly due to the problem of making hydrogen. Growing biofuels in large amounts for this purpose is not popular with a population concerned with biodiversity; crops also suffer from low water availability under the changing climate. Where biofuels are used, technology has developed to utilise vegetable waste, with some woody biomass crops, and some renewable electricity, to produce hydrogen. About 30% of road vehicles are fuel cell-powered by 2050. Further improvements in efficiency are achieved, initially by technological measures and eventually by behavioural change, through reducing speeds, limiting acceleration rates and ensuring the correct tyre pressures are used. These measures alone improve fuel efficiency by 10%. Together, these measures allow emissions from road vehicles improves by a factor of 2.5 by 2050. It is assumed that similar magnitude improvements in technological efficiency are made for other transport modes. b) Demand Growth in road traffic and air travel ceases by 2020 and absolute levels then fall as a result of rising transportation costs and the expansion of electronic communication, which facilitates more flexible working patterns. There is less need to travel, as spatial development facilitates walking, cycling and bus travel as realistic options for work and shopping. The larger number of retired people also reduces demand for work-related transport. The main roads in the Region such as M11 and A47 are not expanded, and no new roads are built after 2010. Domestic Tradable Quotas, combined with 5% increases in road user charging year on year, both discourage road travel and maintain tax revenue. The 20% reduction in road traffic demand by 20504 represents a huge decrease from the DETR’s National Road Traffic Forecast (1997), whose Central Scenario predicts a 60% increase in road miles by 2050 (Bristow et al, 2004). There is an overall slowdown and reduction in long-range transport demand, although modern rail travel between cities increases. New rail links are opened to complete the loop from Norwich via Sheringham and Fakenham, and from Cambridge to Oxford, and existing rail links are vastly improved. The fast train from London – Norwich takes 30 minutes. In spite of increase in rail miles, the use of more renewable sources of electricity reduces emissions overall. Rails are designed to adapt to hotter climates with larger gaps. There is a sharp increase in local public transport, and in semicovered cycle ways for push bikes and small electric mopeds. Having grown into the 2010s, aviation begins to stabilise and then to decline as a result of much higher taxation of aviation fuels, landing fees, restriction on capacity, and general changes in lifestyle. c) Transport - summary: Changes in emissions from transport modes: DISTANCE (% change) EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT FACTOR OVERALL EMISSION REDUCTION (%)

3 4

This and section c) informed by Bristow et al (2004); Kroger et al (2003); Potter et al (2004) Based on Bristow et al (2004) “Strategy 3”

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ROAD AIR MARINE RAIL

-20 (inc. +5% for increased tourism) -10 -10 +10

2.5 2.5 2.5 more electricity use

-70 -70 -70 -25

Public Sector All regional and local government buildings and activities follow best-practice for energy efficiency and waste minimisation. In line with the localisation in the rest of society, there are more, but smaller and distributed schools and hospitals, reducing the need to travel. The increases in building energy use from increasing the number of buildings is more than offset by the higher efficiency of insulation and energy-using equipment. Energy demand by the public sector: -30% Tourism Tourism increases under a warmer drier climate, becoming a very significant part of the Region’s economy. People are happier to visit revitalised resorts and towns in the East than travel on expensive flights to over-hot parched southern Europe. However, this means increased pressure on water resources, and increased GHG emissions from travel and tourist services. Add 5% to transport and services emissions to account for these changes. Agriculture, land use and biodiversity Agriculture remains important to the East. Some of the Region is taken up with biofuel crops, but much of the Region is devoted to growing a range of food for consumption within the Region. Organic methods of arable farming increase, and where nitrogen-based fertiliser is used it is subject to best-practice usage, minimising contact with air and only using where necessary (O’Hara et al, 2003). Further tightening of European legislation on nitrate pollution of water5 and definitions of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) provide a driver to limit fertiliser use. Livestock farming decreases, but where it occurs, good manure management and animal feeding strategies, better housing methods and lower stocking densities, driven initially by CAP reforms, lead to reductions in emissions. Increases in methane emissions through more use of organic fertilisers, and through the growing importance of agriculture, are more than cancelled by these other strategies. Efficient irrigation techniques and storage of heavier winter rainfall are essential to counter the impacts of climate change on water supplies. Environmental protection and habitat diversity are actively encouraged, for example through returning agricultural land in sensitive areas to the original heathland (Holman et al, 2002). Emissions changes from agriculture: Methane -10%; Nitrous Oxide –10% Waste The principle of ‘reduce-reuse-recycle’ is rigorously applied. Waste is one of the first areas of concern, since the landfill capacity of the Region is small, and there is an aversion to exporting waste. Waste amounts to landfill fall by 70% from current levels by 2020, and 90% by 2040, as the amount of goods disposed of, and packaging, reduces. Landfill methane is used as a small source of energy, and vegetable waste is used commercially as a biomass fuel source. Faster decomposition rates under a warmed climate are managed through reduced volumes and re-use of waste. Emissions changes from waste: Landfill methane –90%; CO2 from incineration: no change Energy a) distribution system
5

such as EC Nitrates Directive 91/676/EC, to reduce nitrate pollution of water

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Much of the energy supply technology is small-scale and distributed, associated with a far more efficient and intelligent use of energy. All the national and local regulatory arrangements that were created for a world of large-scale, centralised power stations are restructured to support distributed generation. Community sustainable energy initiatives – micro-grids, renewable energy, housing improvement, etc.- become widespread. The East has significant control over the energy mix, and makes full use of its offshore and onshore wind resources. However, high energy-efficiency and lower demand makes it possible to meet demand with a much smaller deployment of supply technologies. This facilitates public acceptance, since there is less pressure so renewables sites can take account of local environmental impacts. Engagement of local people with plans and decisions achieve ‘buy-in’ and trust in the projects, and the local use of the power generated bolsters support (Christensen & Lund, 1998). Large-scale nuclear and fossil fuel power plants are replaced over time by smaller local generators and microgrids interconnected with the larger grid. This shift minimises transmission and conversion losses and allows waste heat to be utilised in combined heat and power systems, making the energy system more efficient. Fuel prices increase through an Carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS) on a planned schedule due to measures to reduce carbon emissions undertaken through the post-Kyoto process. Higher fossil fuel prices promote energy efficiency and R&D on low- or zero-Carbon technologies. There is a EU-wide Carbon ETS with ambitious carbon reduction targets set for 5 yearly periods. This sends strong economic signals on the need for low-C innovation. Emissions from fugitive losses: -75% b) Type – amounts of renewable and fossil The early stage of the shift to distributed generation is dominated by gas-powered microturbines; over time, the whole range of renewable electric technologies play a growing role. Gas provides a similar proportion of energy to now (about two thirds). Biomass, especially recycled vegetable waste, is used to a smaller extent as a source for make transportation fuels and for use in local boilers, CHP plants, and micro-CHP. Methane produced from anaerobic digestion of waste feeds into local networks. Hydrogen fuel cells play a major role in stationary generation. Wind energy is the largest renewable source, but with a shift to small local production the other environmental and visual impacts of large wind farms are minimised. Photovoltaic (PV) panels cover many flat roofs, the south-facing side of most pitched roofs on houses, and the upper parts of the south-facing walls of multi-story office buildings. There is major development of PV in the region for local sustainable sourcing. Public opinion supports improvements in energy efficiency rather than supply side technologies. As a result, much less energy is required overall than in Market Fix and Guided Change scenarios, and the majority of demand can be met without too large an amount of new renewables. Nuclear technologies, even if small-scale versions are successfully developed, are excluded from this scenario because of the problem of proliferation and waste. Coal gasification with carbon capture and sequestration proves too expensive for widespread use. Domestic production begins to substitute for imports by the 2020s. Electricity: (data adapted from Watson, 2003, based on RCEP Scenario 4. Note the number of units required is lower than in RCEP Sc 4, since our demand reductions, especially for transport, are much higher) 33% from wind power (63% offshore) – 600 new wind turbines 33% other renewables – 30 000 PV units, 100 000 micro-CHP units 33% fossil fuel for back up and peak demand Heat: Demand mostly met from gas

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Scenario 2: “Market Fix”
General description The range of worldviews in UK society remains broadly similar to those held today. The dominant worldview is centred on the idea of material progress and the ethic of continuous growth. High consumption lifestyles continue, but this is coupled with the emergence of new technologies able to deliver low- or zero-C energy supply. As the early decades of the 21st century pass, imports of fossil fuels are increasingly vulnerable to disruption by conflict, and also through scarcity. Price rises hence drive the technological development towards a much lower carbon society. There is a strong belief in the ability of new technology to ‘solve’ major problems as and when they arrive; the emphasis is on the technological fix rather than value changes. There is scepticism about the ability to anticipate what the major problems really are until they are evident, and also about the possibility of predicting much in advance what new technologies are going to be most appropriate. a) Demographics The trend towards a smaller number of people per household continues up to the 2030s, driving up the required number of new residences. The figures are similar to the average of the RPG14 household growth scenarios. The population of the Region increases relative to the rest of the country due to migration from other parts of the UK. However, after 2030, with an increasingly elderly and retired population on low incomes, and rising costs of energy, the trend towards smaller households reverses as the cost of living increases substantially. Regional Population: +20% by 2050 Number of households: +0% by 2050 Ratio of regional to national population: 15% b) Politics & Governance The UK North-South divide increases, with the exception of selected high growth cities in the north. This means that the majority of new housing is in the South East and London. Strains grow within the UK as England opposes the creation of a single European political system while Scotland and Wales pass their sovereign rights in a number of policy areas to the EU after gaining home rule. Within England, regional and local governance is weak, with very little substantive independent power. Global trade dominates the UK market, particularly with the US and China, whose trade influence is almost equivalent to the rest of the EU. Development is increasingly market-led and less controlled by planning regulations. There is higher development in areas of high demand and ‘planning blight’ in low demand areas. UK energy demand stays almost the same as in 2000 by 2050. This is driven by increasing affluence, largely unimpeded by concerns about global climate change and attempts to limit CO2 emissions. The government’s response to growing concerns about energy security and climate change is primarily focused on expanding energy supplies. Unsurprisingly all the major energy industries support this approach. Proportional representation brings to the fore political movements that oppose energy conservation as well as ‘greens’ who support it strongly. As a result, conservation gains political support, but there is a great deal of wariness about pushing it too hard too fast. Energy policies are strongly market-oriented. For example, an emissions trading scheme is established with a modest cap on carbon emissions. Changes are made in the UK’s regulatory regime to help ensure that regulation is not an impediment to supply system expansion and innovation. When the price of fossil fuels rises significantly, public-private partnerships are established to speed the development of alternative energy supplies.

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Generally, government acts on a shorter and shorter timescale and responds to immediate corporate and public pressures rather than consistently pursuing long-term goals. Government has aspirational long-term targets, but does not believe in attempting to plan exactly how they are to be achieved. In this scenario, it is the market which manages to respond rapidly and effectively to the emerging need for non-fossil fuel sources of energy when the first significant price rises in fossil fuels occur around about 2020 to 2030. Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation There are a number of large climate-related shocks and disasters, providing continual reminders of the need for reducing GHG emissions. Large-scale technological solutions such as enhanced sea defences are the primary response. The costs of adaptation are mainly borne privately, with little strategic planning. Those able to afford insurance, able to move to less vulnerable locations, or are in businesses or activities which are not significantly affected do well; the others suffer. The net result is a crude piecemeal sort of adaptation which only occurs when forced, enhances social inequalities and does not address the causes of the problem. This scenario is most similar to a mixture of the REGIS “Regional Enterprise” and Foresight “World Markets” scenarios. Domestic Technological improvements enhance energy efficiency of household appliances, and there is improvement in the insulation of housing, but energy conservation is not a priority in this scenario. Changes to National Building Regulations are not accompanied by sustainability reforms of the design and construction industry. This maintains the current linear sequence of largely separate operations (architects, construction company, inspectors etc.) (Sorrell, 2003). Rapid expansion of more energy-intensive products (for example there is far greater use of electronic and electrical devices and robotics in the home) offset improvements in efficiency. Energy intensive air conditioning is fitted as standard to ameliorate the hot summers, with temperatures reaching 38°C in the Region every year; there is no change in the socially-acceptable indoor comfort temperature. However, after 2030, the cost of living increases substantially with higher energy prices and an ageing population, and the trend to smaller households reverses, allowing a reduction from trend over the 50 year period. Energy consumption in domestic sector: +0% Industry & Economy a) economic growth Economic growth is relatively high (2.5 to 3% per year) but variable across the UK, with higher rates occurring in the southeast and London, and lower rates in the north of England. The result is a regionally and socially stratified economy. Many towns in the Region away from London decline. b) Type of industry Most parts of the UK economy are highly competitive, but there is a continuing shift towards services, with losses in manufacturing. Many products such as paper, textiles and minerals are sourced more cheaply abroad and imported. The Region’s strengths are in the higher-value added knowledge-based industries associated with genomics and biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, nanotechnology, and software. Cambridge expands as a centre for these industries. Food processing as a service also increases, although these products are produced for export from the region. Current standards of indoor environment are maintained, and by 2025 office buildings in the Region are simply not comfortable without air conditioning (Levermore et al, 2004). Winter heating energy falls but this is offset by rising summer energy use. However, since much of the demand is met by zero-carbon electricity in the Market Fix scenario, this has a minimal net effect.

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Investment initially focuses upon the more ‘tried and tested’ technologies such as wind, but energy needs and climate policy combine to accelerate investment in a wide range of new supply technologies. There is generally high fluidity in capital markets, so that capital is readily available wherever risks are perceived as sufficiently low. As fuel price rises, however, investment switches rapidly to non-fossil fuel energy technologies and efficient demand side technologies. The economy rebounds from the effects of climate change by ensuring that the full large costs of damage to vulnerable development are paid by those affected. This provides an effective deterrent to such future development. There are also jobs and investment created by adapting to climate change, such as in the leisure industry. In summary: Percentage Change in energy consumption for different industry sectors: (note the same sectoral classification as used in the framing of current emissions) FOOD TEXTILES PAPER; CHEMICALS MINERALS; METALS ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL ENGINEERING VEHICLES CONSTRUCTION COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE OTHER INDUSTRIES +20 -30 -30 -50 +10 -10 -10 +0 -20 -10

Location of development The migration from North to South continues into the 2020s, and is supplemented by population flow in to the UK from Europe and further afield. The majority of new housing is in the South East and London. Much of the new development in the East of England is in the south of the Region and up the M11 corridor, leading to increased cross-regional commuting. Development is generally low-density, with more out-of-town retail complexes, and socially stratified, overcoming attempts at decarbonisation. The Region is vulnerable to flooding and water supply stress. However, planning for climate change is left to individual responses; development follows patterns of economic strength rather than precautionary advice. Localised flooding increases, exacerbated by only limited use of Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems (SUDS) with the increase in numbers of properties (Evans et al, 2004). Hard engineering solutions such as higher defences, where cost effective, increases risks by stimulating urban development in flood-prone areas and failing to develop plans for strategic retreat of vulnerable sea defences (Holman et al, 2002). The predominant coastal management strategy is “hold the line”, where individuals can afford it. Future management costs will be much higher under this scenario than under Guided Change, partly due to the higher costs of major structural engineering compared with prudent land use planning (Evans et al, 2004). Water abstraction increases, causing problems for water supply and wetland habitats. Water charging becomes widespread, with large-scale import of water from other regions (Holman et al, 2002) if it is cheaper, leading to increased transport emissions. Water prices are high (Downing et al, 2003). Eventually, development in flood-risk and water stress areas, as well as low-lying coastal regions, becomes non-viable, and relocates. Parts of the Thames Gateway are eventually abandoned as the cost of their protection is even vaster than the cost of compensating residents and businesses for leaving it to the sea.

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Transport a) Efficiency6 There are some improvements in technology to make more efficient use of energy, but initially the voluntary agreement between the European Commission and European car manufacturers to reduce average carbon dioxide emissions from new cars 25% below the 1995 level (ACEA/EC (1998) is only slowly taken up. After the price rises of the 2020s, however, growth of (mainly woody) biomass to produce hydrogen for fuel cells becomes the cheapest technology and hence is widespread. Some of the East of England’s arable land is used for this purpose, but, at first, much of the biomass is imported, since this is still cheaper than growing it in the Region. Later, however, up to two thirds of the Regions’ arable land is used for woody biomass crops. This meets just under half the demand for transport fuel (Eyre et al, 2002), and about 50% of vehicles are hydrogen fuel cell-powered by 2050. Fossil-electric hybrids, and a small number of pure fossil vehicles (mainly at the high end of the market) account for the other 50%. Overall, there is a factor of three improvement in emissions by 2050, and it is assumed that similar magnitude improvements in technological efficiency are made for other transport modes. b) Demand There is greater use of teleworking and teleconferencing as ICT develops. This slows –but does not stop— growth in demand for transport. Demand increases sharply for long-haul aviation and highspeed train journeys. Increased globalisation of production driven by cheapest costs, including the low cost of transport fuel into the 2020s, means corresponding increases in transport emissions. Roads in the UK are still generally congested. Cars become even more necessary for those living in rural areas as rural public transport virtually vanishes. However, after the 2020s, the cost of fossil fuel increases by 2% per year, enough to reduce car use well below the DETR’s National Road Traffic Forecast (1997) of +60% road miles by 2050. Combined with increased investment to revitalise rail and bus networks to ensure that transport needs are met, this results in an increase in demand of 20% above 2000 levels by 20507. c) Transport - summary: Changes in emissions from transport modes: DISTANCE (% change) ROAD AIR MARINE RAIL +20 +20 +20 +10 EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT FACTOR 3 3 3 use of clean electricity OVERALL EMISSION REDUCTION (%) -60 -60 -60 -90

Public Sector Local and regional government is focussed on smoothing the market environment (eg. enforcement of property rights) as the best way of ensuring improvements. Reduced size of government, and fewer but larger schools and hospitals means a stabilisation in energy use from this sector. However, transport to these places increases, and many of the public sector emissions savings appear in the private sector instead. Energy demand by the public sector: as 2000 levels Tourism Tourism by people within the Region does not really benefit from a warmer climate, since many people fly abroad, taking advantage of the lower costs (eventually raised by the market when fuel
6 7

This and Section c) informed by Bristow et al (2004); Kroger et al (2003); Potter et al (2004) Based on Bristow et al (2004) “Strategy 2”

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supplies run low) of air travel. However, more overseas tourists visit the Region, and there are some increases in the service sector related to more day trips, and continued presence of second homes especially in Norfolk. Increased emissions are inevitable under this scenario. Agriculture, land use and biodiversity Some of the Region is used for intensive agriculture to grow biofuel crops (this area increases after the 2020s), which are the only competitive crops in the East after CAP reforms remove subsidies in 2008. Irrigation use rises, with some improvements in efficiency of use (Downing et al, 2003). Most food is imported from the rest of the world, leading to increases in food miles and a decline in traditional land use. The land is used principally for amenity and leisure, as well as for commuter and second homes8, including areas in the north of the Region favoured by retired affluent southeasterners. This reduces agricultural emissions but increases them in other sectors. Land is used for enhancing biodiversity as part of the leisure culture, with more nature reserves and wildlife gardens for tourists. However, apart from these pockets, environmental protection is not a priority. The coastal ‘hold the line’ policy, with accompanying major artificial sea defences, results in salt marsh loss, and reduced availability of muddy sediment to build marshes (Holman et al, 2002). Adaptation to climate change is mostly market and technology driven: water-hardy crops, and farmers which can afford the water storage technology, prosper. Emissions changes from agriculture: Methane -20%; Nitrous Oxide -20% Waste The volume of waste is reduced, brought on by pressures of space and political arguments about exporting. More is incinerated than landfilled, which reduces methane but increases CO2 emissions. Emissions changes from waste: Landfill methane -40%; CO2 from incineration: +10% Energy “Market Fix” is a scenario which achieves decarbonisation through extensive development of largescale energy supply technologies which are zero- or low-carbon, e.g. nuclear power, off-shore wind, carbon capture & storage, biofuels, etc. This change is achieved through assuming very optimistic types and levels of technological innovation. a) distribution system Supply of energy continues at the national scale through national grid systems. In spite of the reliance on technology, there is not much technological innovation – most of the technology used is tried and tested. The costs of links to renewable sources offshore are reflected in increased fuel prices. Emissions from fugitive losses: -50% b) Type – amounts of renewable and fossil Dependence on imports of transportation fuels grows rapidly and the electricity market is increasingly based on natural gas imports from Russia and Central Asia. The UK shifts from being a net energy exporter to an energy importer. By 2020 the UK is dependent on imported energy for three-quarters of its primary energy needs. Fuel prices remain low into the 2020s, so there is little incentive for energy efficiency and there is slow development of renewables. As a result, oil and gas resources are used rapidly, causing gradual cost increases after 2020, accelerating in the late 2030s and 2040s. By 2050, much of the heat supplied by gas must be supplied from electricity. Carbon emission trading schemes are put in place. Cost increases send a market signal to support technological innovation and the market is able to respond rapidly.

8

This scenario shares some common ground with the ‘Vibrant Variety’ scenario in the report Rural Futures: Scenario Creation and Backcasting – part of the Defra Horizon Scanning Programme http://www.futurefoundation.net/ruralfutures/index.html

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The nuclear power industry revives, and new power stations open to supplement revitalised Sizewell. Public engagement with this issue is minimal, and people are less than happy about this reliance, but the costs are competitive compared with fossil fuels and the technology is proven and easily available. A new generation of large-scale coal-fired power plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) are built, fired by mostly imported coal. The East of England, with large areas of agricultural land and wind resources, is a prime site for energy resources - biofuel growth and wind farms - development at lowest cost. Nearly 2% of the region is covered with wind farms and there are many tidal stream farms operating near the coast. This massive and environmentally intrusive deployment of energy supply technologies reduces carbon dioxide emissions substantially. However, the East does not benefit directly from the resources used, since electricity is nationally distributed. There is strong opposition by the Region to its use as a resource by the rest of the UK, but this is overcome through financial inducements and by weakening of the planning regime, including opportunities for local opposition to have influence. Companies are permitted to use more inducements to facilitate development and do so successfully. Electricity: (data adapted from Watson, 2003, based on RCEP Scenario 1) 16% from wind power (two thirds offshore) – 2200 new wind turbines 23% other renewables – 1.2 million PV units, no micro-CHP 48% nuclear or fossil fuel with carbon capture 13% fossil fuel for backup and peak demand Heat: Much of the demand is met by electricity

Scenario 3:

“Guided Change”

General description The range of worldviews in UK society remains broadly similar to those held today. The dominant worldview is centred on the idea of material progress and the ethic of continuous growth. However, there is a growing belief in the necessity for a more secure and sustainable energy system with a high level of low- or zero-C sources. This sentiment is originally found mostly in the government, stakeholders and expert community. However, gradually the case is sold to the public and there is growing recognition and acceptance of the need for real change. Climate change impacts, which begin to bite into smooth running of the Region by 2020, encourage the belief that change must happen. This provides the mandate that government requires to use taxation, other economic instruments, regulation, public-private partnerships, R&D investment and planning to implement changes. Some ‘deep’ green public opinion does exist, but unlike in “Local and Green”, it does not drive policy. a) Demographics The trend towards a smaller number of people per household continues, driving up the required number of new residences. The figures are similar to the average of the RPG14 household growth scenarios. The average age of the Region rises, along with the rest of the country, and the population of the East increases relative to the rest of the country due to migration from other parts of the UK, especially people from other parts of the south east retiring to the Region. Regional Population: +20% by 2050 Number of households: +50% by 2050 Ratio of regional to national population: 15% b) Politics & Governance Values are similar, but governance in the “Guided Change” world is a very different place to “Market Fix”. The emissions reductions are achieved through high levels of coordinated government policy, regulation and other forms of intervention in the market place.

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Government takes an explicit long-term view on the need for change. It sticks with targets to 2050 of a 60% reduction and plans in some detail how this is to be achieved in 5 yearly intervals. Rapid EUwide growth makes the English electorate increasingly amenable to full integration into the Union, and this finally occurs by 2030. Strength of governance extends to the Regional and local levels, there is substantial devolution of power and autonomy rather than simply powers to implement national policy, and more harmonisation between national, regional and local governance structures. However, in practice, little inter-regional differences in policy result, and there is hence no drive to split the East of England region into smaller units. National government takes a generally agreed strategic approach to climate change which informs many Regions’ outlooks. As in “Market Fix”, the response to growing concerns about energy security and climate change is primarily focused on expanding energy supplies. However, in “Guided Change” energy policies are much more led by government mandate and edict. A strong partnership emerges between government and big business, which stands to benefit from the large investment in supply-side technologies. Public-private partnerships are, therefore, established to speed up the development of biomass fuels, carbon sequestration from coal, and offshore wind, amongst others. The government progressively raises the Renewables Obligation as one way of achieving the necessary renewables amounts. However, regulation and intervention by government is employed to reduce actual consumption through increasing cost or prohibiting certain energy inefficient products or processes. The government makes far greater use of the planning system to encourage and promote the development of higher levels of energy efficiency in end-user products, and integration of renewables in buildings. UK energy demand increases by 2050 and would be higher, except that growing concerns about climate change lead to policies designed to promote moderate efficiency improvements without risking economic disruption. NIMBYism continues at the local level, with concern over effects of developments on house and land prices. The planning system is used to get developments regarded as ‘in the public good’ through planning and regulation. Government takes a very direct role in working with big business to get its way in terms of new supply-side developments. This is, in effect, a return to the more interventionist role of government in the era of nationalised industries. Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation There are a number of largish climate-related shocks and disasters, providing continual reminders of the need for reducing GHG emissions. There is acceptance that climate-related disasters are more than likely to be attributable to human influence. This provides a powerful driver for government policy making and company strategy, which is formed by a mixture of reactive and planned adaptation. Large-scale technological solutions such as enhanced sea defences are a primary response, although ‘managed retreat’ is used in some cases. The costs of adaptation are partly borne privately and partly by the public sector, and strategic planning, using economic tools such as CBA, is employed to decide on priorities. Subsidies and taxes are used much more than in Market Fix to protect the environment, compensate flood damage and bolster emergency planning resources (Holman et al, 2002; Evans et al, 2004). Strong planning guidance acts to reduce exposure to flooding in new properties, but many old properties become more vulnerable as climate changes. This scenario contains elements of the “Global Sustainability” and "World Markets" Foresight scenarios, and the REGIS "Regional Enterprise" scenario. The reason for this mix of scenarios is that Guided Change, although with a large-scale, technological focussed approach, has a very strong environmental governance underpinning, and assumes that the 60% emission reduction policies are extended to other environmental policies, unlike in "Regional Enterprise". Domestic New construction is increasingly energy efficient even though the size of homes increases. Replacement of the housing stock continues at its present rate, but modest efficiency improvements are made in much 19th and 20th century housing. Reform of the design and construction process

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(Sorrell, 2003) has some limited success in encouraging a more integrated, whole-life cost approach. “Green buildings” become the norm and tend to work to be both low energy and sustainable in other areas such as indoor air quality and water economy. This is stimulated by an EU ‘grading’ system of properties (similar to that currently done in household appliances) which requires energy efficiency to be disclosed when buying and selling. However, continuing proliferation of electronic devices in homes and offices, and the growth of robotics after 2030, increases the demand for electricity, and household size continues to shrink in the absence of proactive demographics policy. Energy intensive air conditioning is fitted as standard to ameliorate the hot summers, but increased water prices and, in some years, water rationing, drive down water use. Energy consumption in domestic sector: +0% Industry & Economy a) economic growth Economic growth is relatively high (2.5 to 3% per year) but variable across the UK, with higher rates occurring in the southeast and London, and lower rates in the north of England. By the 2020s, however, disparities in growth are reduced as a new generation of high-speed trains cut commuting times, and the trend is towards a less polarised economy and society than under “Market Fix”. b) Type of industry Technical progress and the structural shift from manufacturing toward services reduce industrial energy use, but fewer industries move away than in “Market Fix”. However, those that stay are somewhat more efficient in energy use, which overall results in a general decrease in energy demand greater than “Market Fix”. As in “Market Fix”, higher-value added knowledge-based industries expand associated with genomics and biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, nanotechnology, and software. Cambridge expands as a centre for these industries. The approach to air conditioning is similar to that in Market Fix, in spite of government attempts to discourage the practice. Winter heating energy falls but this is offset by rising summer energy use. However, since much of the demand is met by zerocarbon electricity in the Market Fix scenario, this has a minimal net effect on emissions. The tourist and leisure industry flourishes, with help from government, following initial climate-change-related flood and disruption losses. The investment markets respond quickly to the opportunities arising from new energy technologies which are zero- or low-carbon. It actively promotes innovation in firms and venture capital is facilitated by generous government rules. In summary: Percentage Change in energy consumption for different industry sectors: (note the same sectoral classification as used in the framing of current emissions) FOOD TEXTILES PAPER; CHEMICALS MINERALS; METALS ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL ENGINEERING VEHICLES CONSTRUCTION COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE OTHER INDUSTRIES Location of development +0 -40 -40 -50 +0 -20 -30 +0 +10 -20

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The migration from North to South continues into the 2020s, and is supplemented by population flow in to the UK from Europe and further afield. The majority of new housing is in the South East and London. Much of the new development in the East of England is in the south of the Region and up the M11 corridor, leading to increased cross-regional commuting. There are attempts to increase development density and limit out-of-town retail complexes, and these have reasonable success. Extreme flood flows are greater than today's, and most pressure is in coastal areas, in combination with sea level rise and storms (Holman et al, 2002). There is also concerted effort to avoid costs associated with climate-related events, and strong planning guidance, government incentives and market encouragement, effectively enforced, minimises vulnerability of development sites. Pressure for development of industry (mainly environmental technology) at vulnerable flood risk sites in Cambridgeshire are dealt with on a case by case basis. A mix of ‘hold the line’ and ‘managed retreat’ policies at the coast are implemented depending on local circumstances. Some areas revert to coastal wetlands and natural habitat, encouraging biodiversity. Where coastal habitat is lost to the sea, it is sometimes replaced with inland sanctuaries, for example for migratory birds (Holman et al, 2002). Water is conserved and used more efficiently, along with protection and restoration of wetlands and river habitats (Holman et al, 2002). Water prices are moderate (Downing et al, 2003), although still higher than today's. Water transfer from other regions in times of shortage is seen as unsustainable (Holman et al, 2002); demand management programmes, including storage of winter rainfall and rationing in some dry years, are necessary.

Transport a) Efficiency9 By 2050, private car use and air travel are considerably higher than today, but this is partly offset by improvements in the efficiency of vehicles and aircraft, and the use of new low-carbon aviation fuels. The agreement between the European Commission and European car manufacturers to reduce average carbon dioxide emissions from new cars 25% below the 1995 level (ACEA/EC (1998) is made mandatory by 2010. Further improvements in efficiency are achieved, initially by technological measures and legislation, and eventually by behavioural change, through reducing speeds, limiting acceleration rates and ensuring the correct tyre pressures are used. These measures alone improve fuel efficiency by 10%. By 2050, 60% of road vehicles are petrol-electric hybrids. 40% are powered by hydrogen fuel cells, a step which requires significant areas of the Region to be used for woody biomass growth. However, use of a more diversified mix of energy sources for producing hydrogen than under Market Fix (including vegetable waste, extra electricity from renewable sources and a less overall fuel cell penetration) mean that somewhat less than half of the arable land is used for biomass. Overall, emissions from efficiency and technological progress reduce by a factor of three by 2050. b) Demand There is greater use of teleworking and teleconferencing as ICT develops. This slows – but does not stop— growth in demand for transport. However, government implements a range of demandmanagement policies: for example, pricing and supply-side constraints in order to limit the growth in demand for aviation. The ‘predict and provide’ approach is replaced by an assessment of what is a sustainable level of provision, given a fair allocation of future carbon emissions to different sectors of the UK. High speed train is promoted, and the electricity increasingly provided from renewable sources. Combined with these measures, a road user charge, designed to maintain tax revenues as well

9

This and Section c) informed by Bristow et al (2004); Kroger et al (2003); Potter et al (2004)

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as encourage fewer road miles, increasing by 2% per year, limits demand to a 10% increase from 2000 levels by 2050. c) Transport - summary: Changes in emissions from transport modes: DISTANCE (% change) ROAD AIR MARINE RAIL +10 +10 +10 +10 EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT FACTOR 3 3 3 use of clean electricity OVERALL EMISSION REDUCTION (%) -65 -65 -65 -90

Public Sector Government leads strongly by example and acts to reduce energy use from all buildings and activities. However, pressures of cost under traditional economic measures limit the ability to adhere to the best practices. Energy demand by the public sector: -10% Tourism A strong regional identity for the East based on historical heritage and natural environment is promoted by regional and local government. This draws more tourists, especially on short breaks. More affluent retired residents means more spent on travel for leisure purposes. Add 5% to transport and services emissions to account for these changes. Agriculture, land use and biodiversity Land is used to grow biofuel crops, which are the only competitive crops in the East after subsidies are removed following reform of the CAP. They are an extensive presence in the countryside, but where nitrogen-based fertiliser is used it is subject to best-practice usage, minimising contact with air and only using where necessary (O’Hara et al, 2003). European legislation on nitrate pollution of water10 and definitions of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) provide a stabilising driver limiting fertiliser use. This reduction in intensity enhances wildlife numbers and diversity (Holman et al, 2002), but environmental protection is traded off with cost in many cases. Most food is imported from the rest of the world, leading to increases in food miles. Adaptation to climate change is partly market and technology driven but there is government help and regulation to ensure efficient water use. Detrimental impacts of climate change on the agriculture sector, such as winter flooding and summer droughts, are guarded against using hard engineering solutions: river defences and large-scale water transfer from wetter areas of the UK as well as desalination plants. These latter two add to the increases in energy use. Emissions changes from agriculture: Methane -10%; Nitrous Oxide -10% Waste The volume of waste is reduced, brought on by pressures of space and political arguments about exporting and also government initiatives to promote recycling and some use of vegetable waste as direct and indirect energy sources. More is incinerated than landfilled, which reduces methane but increases CO2 emissions. Faster decomposition in a warmer climate prompts new ways of collection and processing of waste and encourages reduction in waste volume. Emissions changes from waste: Landfill methane -60%; CO2 from incineration: +10%
10

such as EC Nitrates Directive 91/676/EC – to reduce nitrate pollution of water

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Energy a) distribution system Supply of energy continues at the national scale through national grid systems. Emissions from fugitive losses: -50% b) Type – amounts of renewable and fossil Dependence on imports of transportation fuels grows rapidly and the electricity market is increasingly based on natural gas imports from Russia and Central Asia. The UK shifts from being a net energy exporter to an energy importer. By 2020 the UK is dependent on imported energy for three-quarters of its primary energy needs. As concern over climate change grows, major efforts are initiated to develop additional energy supplies. The technology used is extensive but not particularly innovative, depending on bringing to market tried and tested approaches. The nuclear power industry revives and new power stations open to supplement revitalised Sizewell. There is a serious and wide-ranging debate in the early 2020s about nuclear, and improvements in the technology and practice of waste disposal and decommissioning, coupled with a large energy supplydemand gap convince the majority that this is least worst option, A new generation of large-scale coalfired power plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) appear. The Region, with large areas of agricultural land and wind resources, is a prime site for energy resources - biofuel growth and wind farms - development at lowest cost. Nearly 2% of the region is covered with wind farms and there are many tidal stream farms operating near the coast. Under this scenario, planning permission for renewables is much easier to come by. The Renewables Obligation is progressively and significantly increased. This massive and environmentally intrusive deployment of energy supply technologies reduces carbon dioxide emissions substantially. The public are generally opposed to the ‘railroading’ of renewables options in this way, but the need to respond to climate change leads to grudging acceptance. Government imposes new taxes on fossil fuels or equivalent through Carbon Emissions Trading schemes (ETS) to internalise external costs to the global climate. This sends a strong economic signal to firms to invest in zero- and low-C technologies. Electricity: (data adapted from Watson, 2003, based on RCEP Scenario 1) 16% from wind power (two thirds offshore) – 2200 new wind turbines 23% other renewables – 1.2 million PV units, no micro-CHP 48% nuclear or fossil fuel with carbon capture 13% fossil fuel for backup and peak demand Heat: Much of the demand is met by electricity

Scenario 4:

“More of the Same”

This scenario is different from the others in that it does not describe a future with large emission reductions. Some current trends continue, but some regional environmental targets are implemented and there is a move towards sustainability in some areas, although there is no commitment to a 60% emission reduction. In many ways, this future does not describe a radically different world from today, in world views, or in the approaches made to solving problems. General description The worldviews in UK society remain the same as today. The dominant worldview is centred on the idea of material progress and the ethic of continuous growth. High consumption lifestyles continue.

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There is a strong belief in the ability of new technology to ‘solve’ major problems as and when they arrive; the emphasis is on the technological fix rather than value changes. There is much scepticism, especially in the US, about the ability to anticipate what the major problems really are until they are evident, and also about the possibility of predicting much in advance what new technologies are going to be most appropriate. Within Europe, however, there is a growing belief in the necessity for a more secure and sustainable energy system with a high level of low- or zero-C sources. This sentiment found mostly in the government, stakeholders and expert community. However, this is very difficult to translate into public action and progress towards a low carbon future remains slow. a) Demographics The trend towards a smaller number of people per household continues, driving up the required number of new residences. The figures by 2020 are similar to the average of the RPG14 household growth scenarios. The population of the East increases relative to the rest of the country due to migration from other parts of the UK. The ageing population is split between the affluent and poor retired. Regional Population: +20% Number of households: +50% Ratio of regional to national population: 15% b) Politics & Governance The UK North-South divide increases, with the exception of selected high growth cities in the north. This means that the majority of new housing is in the South East and London. Strains grow within the UK as England opposes the creation of a single European political system while Scotland, Wales and the Regions become increasingly important policy-making players. However, the regions and local authorities have little substantive independent power, instead being driven by national policy. Development is market-led with some planning regulations. There is higher development in areas of high demand and gradual encroachment of the greenbelt. Energy policies are led by government mandate and edict but rely on market mechanisms as instruments of delivery. For example, an emissions trading scheme is established with a modest cap on carbon emissions. Changes are made in the UK’s regulatory regime to help ensure that regulation is not an impediment to supply system expansion and innovation. Public-private partnerships are established to speed up the development of biomass fuels, carbon sequestration from coal, and offshore wind, amongst others. However, progress is slow, and barriers to growth of these technologies are not removed. UK energy demand increases by 6% by 2050. Due to increasing affluence it would be higher, except that growing concerns about climate change lead to policies designed to promote moderate efficiency improvements without risking economic disruption. Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation There are a number of largish climate-related shocks and disasters, providing continual reminders of the need for reducing GHG emissions. There is acceptance that climate-related disasters are more than likely to be attributable to human influence. This provides a powerful driver for government policy making and company strategy, which is informed primarily by reactions to events rather than forward planning. Large-scale technological solutions such as enhanced sea defences are the primary response. The costs of adaptation are partly borne privately and partly by the public sector, and strategic planning, using economic tools such as CBA, is employed to decide on priorities. Planning guidance aims, not completely successfully, to reduce exposure to flooding in new properties, but many old properties become more vulnerable as climate changes. This scenario is similar to Guided Change in adaptation, but is less successful.

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Domestic Technological improvements enhance energy efficiency of household appliances, and there is some improvement in the insulation of housing, but energy conservation is not a priority in this scenario. Replacement of the housing stock continues at its present rate, but modest efficiency improvements are made in much 19th and 20th century housing. Some newer houses are built as ‘carbon neutral’, but there is no legal obligation for all houses to be thus accredited. EU ‘efficiency disclosure’ rules for properties, coupled with proactive regional policy approach through Planning Guidance, contribute to slowing of current trends in emissions increases. However, continuing proliferation of electronic devices in homes and offices increases the demand for electricity. Energy intensive air conditioning is fitted as standard to ameliorate the hot summers, but increased water prices and, in some years, water rationing, drive down water use. Energy consumption in domestic sector: +10% Industry & Economy a) economic growth Economic growth is relatively high (2.5 to 3% per year) but variable across the UK, with higher rates occurring in the southeast and London, and lower rates in the north of England. The result is a regionally and socially stratified economy, but efforts are made to reverse the decline in areas of the East away from London. Targeted European and national government funding helps in this. b) Type of industry Many products such as paper, textiles and minerals are sourced more cheaply abroad and imported. Technical progress and the structural shift from manufacturing toward services reduce industrial energy use, and some manufacturing industries continue to decline. There are improvements in the efficiency of energy use from developments in technology. Higher-value added knowledge-based industries expand associated with genomics and biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, nanotechnology, and software. Cambridge expands as a centre for these industries. The tourist and leisure industry gains with the warmer drier summers, but insurance suffers initial losses from flooding-related disasters. However, with limited government subsidy the industry manages to continue virtually as at present. In summary: Percentage Change in energy consumption for different industry sectors: (note the same sectoral classification as used in the framing of current emissions) FOOD TEXTILES PAPER; CHEMICALS MINERALS; METALS ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL ENGINEERING VEHICLES CONSTRUCTION COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE OTHER INDUSTRIES +20 -30 -30 -50 +10 -10 -10 +20 +10 -10

Location of development The migration from North to South continues into the 2020s, and is supplemented by population flow in to the UK from Europe and further afield. The majority of new housing is in the South East and London. Much of the new development in the East of England is in the south of the Region and up the

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M11 corridor, leading to increased cross-regional commuting. There are attempts to increase development density and limit out-of-town retail complexes but with variable success. Extreme flood flows are greater than today's, and most pressure is in coastal areas, in combination with sea level rise and storms (Holman et al, 2002). There are attempts to avoid costs associated with climate-related events, and planning guidance, government incentives and market encouragement are employed to try to minimise vulnerability of development sites. However, pressure for development of industry at convenient locations in the Region leads to difficult trade-offs. A mix of ‘hold the line’ and ‘managed retreat’ policies at the coast are implemented depending on individual cases. Water is conserved and used more efficiently, but there is a preference for import of water from other regions in times of shortage over strict demand management measures. Transport a) Efficiency11 There are some improvements in technology to make more efficient use of energy, and some fuel substitution, such as use of hybrid cars. The agreement between the European Commission and European car manufacturers to reduce average carbon dioxide emissions from new cars 25% below the 1995 level (ACEA/EC (1998) is made mandatory by 2020. Further improvements in efficiency are achieved through some price differentials between the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ vehicles, and a labelling scheme. However, there are no steep penalties for driving less efficient vehicles. Hydrogen fuel cells do not become competitive, but biodiesel and bioethanol from sugar beet are used as fuel additives or, later, substitutes for conventional fossil fuel in some vehicles. These crops cover wide areas of the region. Overall, however, the traditional petrol engine remains the vehicle of choice well into the 21st century. The overall improvement in emissions is a factor of 1.5 by 2050. b) Demand There is greater use of teleworking and teleconferencing as ICT develops, and there are fewer work trips due to the ageing population. This slows –but does not stop— growth in demand for transport. In line with current plans, Fuel Excise Duty (FED) and Vehicle (VED) are replaced with road user charging by 2030 (Pridmore et al, 2003), which helps to slow the massive increases seen in current trends. Demand increases sharply for long-haul aviation. Increased globalisation of production driven by cheapest costs, including the low cost of transport fuel means corresponding increases in transport emissions. Roads are still generally congested and cars remain necessary for those living in rural areas as the rural public transport network is limited. c) Transport - summary Changes in emissions from transport modes: DISTANCE (% change) ROAD AIR MARINE RAIL +20 +20 +20 +10 EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT FACTOR 1.5 1.5 1.5 more use of electricity OVERALL EMISSION REDUCTION (%) -20 -20 -20 -10

Public Sector Government leads by example and tries to reduce energy use from all buildings and activities. Reduced size of government, and fewer but larger schools and hospitals means a stabilisation in energy use from this sector. However, transport to these places increases.
11

This and Section c) informed by Bristow et al (2004); Kroger et al (2003); Potter et al (2004)

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Energy demand by the public sector: -10% Tourism A strong regional identity for the Region based on historical heritage and natural environment is promoted by regional and local government. This draws more tourists, especially on short breaks and by second home owners. However, for longer breaks many people prefer to fly abroad. Agriculture, land use and biodiversity Intensive agriculture is used to grow financially competitive biofuel crops. Much food is imported from the rest of the world, leading to increases in food miles. Nitrogen-based fertiliser is used with the aim of current best-practice usage, minimising contact with air and only using where necessary (O’Hara et al, 2003), but this is not fully achieved. European legislation on nitrate pollution of water12 and definitions of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) provide a stabilising driver limiting fertiliser use. Some sensitive heath land is protected, and attempts to limit fertiliser and pesticide use benefit wildlife. However, environmental protection is often traded off with cost. Adaptation to climate change is partly market and technology driven but there is government help and regulation to ensure efficient water use. Detrimental impacts of climate change on the agriculture sector, such as winter flooding and summer droughts, are guarded against using hard engineering solutions: river defences and large-scale water transfer from wetter areas of the UK as well as desalination plants. These latter two add to the increases in energy use. Emissions changes from agriculture: Methane -5%; Nitrous Oxide –5% Waste The volume of waste decreases, with initiatives to promote recycling, and implementation of the regional target: by 2015, value is recovered from 70% of municipal waste through recycling. Methane is reduced but CO2 from incineration increases: pressures of space mean more waste is incinerated than landfilled. Faster decomposition in a warmer climate prompts new ways of collection and processing of waste and encourages reduction in waste volume. Emissions changes from waste: Landfill methane -40%; CO2 from incineration: +20% Energy Supply of energy continues at the national scale through national grid systems. In spite of the reliance on technology, there is not much technological innovation – most of the technology used is tried and tested. Large-scale energy supply technologies which are zero- or low-carbon, e.g. off-shore wind, carbon capture & storage, biofuels, etc. develop through implementation of the Eastern Region renewable energy target: 14% of electricity comes from renewable sources by 2010. Beyond this, the Renewables Obligation is extended, and helps to bring down emissions further. Emissions from fugitive losses: -0% b) Type – amounts of renewable and fossil Dependence on imports of transportation fuels grows rapidly, but government is active in reducing dependence on energy imports. Fuel prices remain low, so there is little incentive for energy efficiency. The nuclear industry declines, and a new generation of large-scale coal- and gas-fired power plants are built, fired by mostly imported coal. Planning and public acceptability constraints limit growth of wind power; since planning procedure remains broadly as present, objections to local siting and environmental concerns are simply avoided by not building many wind turbine sites. Biofuel crops are used widely, but the technology does not develop beyond sugar beet/wheat use and large areas are required to reduce GHG emissions by even small amounts.

12

such as EC Nitrates Directive 91/676/EC – to reduce nitrate pollution of water

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Electricity by 2010: (data adapted from Hams et al., 1999) 10% from wind power (40% offshore) – 700 new wind turbines 4% other renewables – very few PV units, significant proportion of region covered with biofuel crops 86% from current fossil fuel mix Heat: Much of the demand is met by gas, as at present. Electricity by 2050: 30% from wind power (40% offshore) 10% other renewables – PV units become competitive, biofuel crops 60% from current fossil fuel mix Heat: Much of the demand is met by gas, as at present.

5 Conclusions We have presented a set of scenarios for how the East of England Region may achieve a 60% greenhouse gas emission reduction and adapt to climate change. There are several main points which emerge from the analyses: • • The scenarios outlined here demonstrate the magnitude of the 60% challenge. Since growth in the economy would tend to increase emissions over the period to 2050, 60% represents a reduction in emissions of great proportion compared to a future where no action was taken. Although three of the scenarios reach the emissions target, the policies and changes they contain all have other social, environmental and economic consequences. It should be emphasised that low carbon does not necessarily equate to ‘sustainable’. Assessing the overall sustainability of such low-carbon futures would make a useful follow-on piece of research. Integrating mitigation and adaptation at the Regional scale is difficult, partly due to the mismatch in spatial scales at which the two processes occur, but also because there are no ready scenarios of climate change impacts based on 60% emission reduction pathways using the latest climate models. Scenarios at the Regional level are complicated by overlapping scales of governance and ability to influence. There are some things which cannot be influenced at the Regional scale, such as transport technology development or oil prices. However, the Region and county can influence some issues such as planning and transport demand. The scenarios aimed to help encourage ways of exploring how these areas may change and the consequences, within the wider national and global context. One issue raised by this is the need for integrated governance structures to help deliver lowcarbon sustainable futures. In separate papers (Turnpenny et al (2005); Final project report, Annex 213) we discuss the current regional governance arrangements and a proposal for refining these which was developed in conjunction with our workshop participants.

Using the scenarios – one example One way of using the scenarios was explored in workshops with regional and local policymakers. A problem of presenting four potential futures is they can be perceived as mutually exclusive, and that all the components within each are tied to that scenario alone. Using the scenarios above, the group defined a ‘most plausible scenario’ on the basis of their experience and personal preferences, which was named “Shared Vision”. This outlined what the group believed was the ‘most likely’ pathway
13

For project T2.14 “The creation of a pilot phase interactive integrated assessment project for managing climate futures”, obtainable from www.tyndall.ac.uk

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towards reaching large emission reductions between 2004 and 2020, and is summarised below, with a commentary in italics on which of the scenarios above each statement most closely mirrors. This approach can use the components of the scenarios to help inform strategic decisions without forcing a choice between one scenario and another. • Up to 2010, it is likely that some measures will be introduced such as environmental resource taxes and energy efficiency certificates for houses, but the public are unlikely to act unless in selfinterest. Congestion charging could become commonplace, but the polycentric nature of settlement in the Region will make it difficult for increased public transport use to contribute to reducing emissions. [More of the Same (MotS) with some attempt at Guided Change (GC)] By 2020, the UK will be a net importer of fossil fuel. During the 2020s, there is a major shock in fuel prices, driven by international conflict and resource scarcity, and there is a profitable “dash for green” energy. [Market Fix] Serious climate change impacts are beginning to affect the Region, and this provides an additional spur to a more sustainable public attitude. [GC]. This provides a spur for development of energy efficient technology, zero emissions from transport and new housing. Domestic carbon trading relating to transport and home energy use further reduce energy demand [mix of GC and MF] In summary, although energy demand grows initially, it is eventually reduced by the need to conserve energy, which filters through to public attitudes about energy conservation and sustainability generally. Together with new low-carbon energy supply, a 60% target is within reach by 2050 without the need for nuclear power, which proves to be less acceptable to the public than energy conservation.

It appears from this exercise that only a price shock (caused by conflict or resource scarcity), coupled with climate change impacts, is perceived to provide enough of a driver to get to 60% emission reductions with the default (MotS) more likely. This is a ‘very light green scenario’ with little influence from Local and Green-type futures. Evidently another group would provide a very different set of conclusions, but the value lies less in the results as a ‘prediction of the future’ but in the process of using and developing the scenarios. There is great value in using the scenarios to discuss what future we would like and the choices available to the region for achieving this. Using the scenarios – development for the sub-regional scale Although the participants in one of the workshops were made up of Norfolk policymakers, the scenarios presented still related explicitly to the wider East of England Region. It was not appropriate to use the emissions inventory method (Turnpenny et al, 2004) to create a separate emissions inventory for Norfolk within the context of this project; the data required for a top-down approach with a full breakdown of industry sectors are not easily available. In any case, a bottom-up approach is rather more appropriate for the county scale, where specific details not resolved by a top-down approach can make a large difference to the emissions total. The workshop instead addressed through qualitative discussion what the scenarios might mean for Norfolk, and how the Norfolk Community Strategy “Norfolk Ambition”, the main county-scale policy instrument for long-term strategic planning, could be used to deliver some of these changes. The workshop both yielded insights into revisions of the scenarios, and helped to focus on the need for more directed research to inform and inspire action. From the workshop has come an ongoing collaboration between the Tyndall Centre and the Norfolk Ambition process, carried out through Ruth Wood’s Tyndall Centre PhD studentship examining links between decarbonisation and air pollution policies at the city/region scale. This project is: 1) creating a bottom-up emissions inventory of greenhouse gases and other air pollutants for Norfolk, in collaboration with CRed. These build on previous inventory work for Norfolk and Suffolk County Councils (eg. Chatterton, 1998). 2) using the new inventory to interpret the Regional scenarios above for Norfolk-specific activity, focussing on links between greenhouse gas reduction and air quality.

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This project is due to end in mid 2006.

Acknowledgements We would like to thank all those in the Region and Norfolk who participated in the creation and revision of these scenarios. Thanks go especially to Ruth Wood, Asher Minns, the CRed project, Sebastian Carney, Kevin Anderson, Simon Shackley, Alice Bows, Sarah Mander, Frans Berkhout, and for reviews from Katharina Kowalski, Irene Lorenzoni, Jess Milligan, Ian Holman, Iain Brown, Michelle Colley and Mike Hulme

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Holman, I.P.; Loveland, P.J.; Nicholls, R.J.; Shackley, S.; Berry, P.M.; Rounsevell, M.D.A.; Audsley, E.; Harrison, P.A.; Wood, R. (2002) REGIS – Regional Climate Change Impact Response Studies in East Anglia and North West England. UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) Hulme, M., Jenkins, G.J., Lu, X., Turnpenny, J.R., Mitchell, T.D., Jones, R.G., Lowe, J., Murphy, J.M., Hassell, D., Boorman, P., McDonald, R., Hill, S. (2002) Climate Change Scenarios for the United Kingdom: The UKCIP02 Scientific Report, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK IAF; IoIR (2004) Scenario exercise on moving towards a sustainable energy economy. Institute for Alternative Futures; Institute for Innovation Research, University of Manchester, June 2004. [www.altfutures.com/sust_energy.asp] IPCC (2000) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). Cambridge University Press Kahane, A. (1992) Scenarios for energy: sustainable World vs. Global Mercantilism. Long Range Planning 25 (4), pp. 38-46 Kröger, K.; Fergusson, M.; Skinner, I. (2003) Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The Role of Technologies. Tyndall Working Paper No. 36, October 2003 Levermore, G.; Chow, D.; Jones, P.; Lister, D. (2004) Accuracy of modelled extremes of temperature and climate change and its implications for the built environment in the UK. Final Report of Tyndall Project IT1.8 (Tyndall Centre Technical Report No. 14), April 2004. Lorenzoni, I.; Jordan, A.; Hulme, M.; Turner, R.K.; O’Riordan, T. (2000a) A co-evolutionary approach to climate change impact assessment: Part 1. Integrating socio-economic and climate change scenarios.. Global Environmental Change 10, pp. 57-68 Lorenzoni, I.; Jordan, A.; O’Riordan, T.; Turner, R.K.; Hulme, M. (2000b) A co-evolutionary approach to climate change impact assessment: Part 2. A scenario-based case study in East Anglia (UK). Global Environmental Change 10, pp. 145-155 O’Hara, P.; Freney, J.; Ulyatt, M (2003) Abatement of Agricultural non-Carbon Dioxide Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A study of research requirements. Report for the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. ISBN 0-478-07754-8 Olson, R.L. (1994) Alternative images of a sustainable future. Futures 26 (2), pp. 156-169 Potter, S.; Lane, B.; Warren, J.; Parkhurst, G.; Nijkamp, P.; Ubbels, B.; Peeters, P.; Enoch, M. (2004) Taxation Futures for Sustainable Mobility. Final Report – ESRC Environment and Human Behaviour Programme. Ravetz, J. (2000) City-region 2020: Integrated Planning for long-term sustainable development. Earthscan, London Robinson, J.B. (1990) Futures under glass: a recipe for people who hate to predict. Futures 22 (8), pp. 820-842 Scholz, R.W.; Tietje, O. (2002) Embedded case study methods - integrating qualitative and quantitative knowledge. Sage Publications

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SDRT (2004) Living with climate change in the East of England. Prepared for the East of England Sustainable Development Round Table by Land Use Consultants, in association with CAG Consultants and SQW Ltd. Sorrell, S. (2003) Making the link: climate policy and the reform of the UK construction industry. Energy Policy 31, pp. 865-878 Pridmore, A.; Bristow, A.; May, T.; Tight, M. (2003) Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Working Paper No. 33. June 2003. RCEP (2000) Energy – the changing climate. 22nd Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, June 2003. Stirling, A. (1997) Multi-Criteria Mapping: Mitigating the Problems of Environmental Valuation? In: Foster, J [ed] Valuing Nature? Economics, Ethics and Environment. Routledge, London, pp. 186-210 Tompkins, E. (2003) Using stakeholder preferences in multi-attribute decision-making: elicitation and aggregation issues. CSERGE Working Paper EDM 03-13. Tuinstra, W.; Berk, M.; Hisschemöller, M.; Hordijk, L.; Metz, B.; Mol, A.P.J. [eds] (2002) Climate Options for the Long Term – Final Report. Volume A: Synthesis Report. Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University; Institute for Environmental Studies, Free University of Amsterdam; National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven. Published as NRP report 954281 Turnpenny, J.R.; Carney, S.; Haxeltine, A.; O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Part 1: A framing of the East of England. Tyndall Working Paper 54, June 2004. Turnpenny, J.R.; Haxeltine, A.; Lorenzoni, I.; O’Riordan, T.; Jones, M. (2005) Mapping actors involved in climate change policy networks in the UK. Tyndall Centre Working Paper, January 2005. Submitted to Climate Policy, autumn 2004 UK Climate Impacts Programme (2001) Socio-economic scenarios for climate change impact assessment: a guide to their use in the UK Climate Impacts Programme. UKCIP. Oxford. van der Heijden, K. (2004) Can internally generated futures accelerate organizational learning? Futures 36, pp. 145-159. Watson, W.J. (2003) UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Working Paper No. 41, November 2003

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The trans-disciplinary Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research undertakes integrated research into the long-term consequences of climate change for society and into the development of sustainable responses that governments, business-leaders and decision-makers can evaluate and implement. Achieving these objectives brings together UK climate scientists, social scientists, engineers and economists in a unique collaborative research effort. Research at the Tyndall Centre is organised into four research themes that collectively contribute to all aspects of the climate change issue: Integrating Frameworks; Decarbonising Modern Societies; Adapting to Climate Change; and Sustaining the Coastal Zone. All thematic fields address a clear problem posed to society by climate change, and will generate results to guide the strategic development of climate change mitigation and adaptation policies at local, national and global scales. The Tyndall Centre is named after the 19th century UK scientist John Tyndall, who was the first to prove the Earth’s natural greenhouse effect and suggested that slight changes in atmospheric composition could bring about climate variations. In addition, he was committed to improving the quality of science education and knowledge. The Tyndall Centre is a partnership of the following institutions: University of East Anglia UMIST Southampton Oceanography Centre University of Southampton University of Cambridge Centre for Ecology and Hydrology SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research (University of Sussex) Institute for Transport Studies (University of Leeds) Complex Systems Management Centre (Cranfield University) Energy Research Unit (CLRC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) The Centre is core funded by the following organisations: Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) UK Government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) For more information, visit the Tyndall Centre Web site (www.tyndall.ac.uk) or contact: External Communications Manager Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK Phone: +44 (0) 1603 59 3906; Fax: +44 (0) 1603 59 3901 Email: tyndall@uea.ac.uk

Tyndall Working Papers are available online at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/working_papers.shtml Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A Country-byCountry Analysis of Past and Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 1. Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 2. Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J. (2001). Socio-economic futures in climate change impact assessment: using scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall Centre Working Paper 3. Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High are the Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4. Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse Effects and the Impacts of Response Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 5. Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T. (2001). The identification and evaluation of suitable scenario development methods for the estimation of future probabilities of extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 6. Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7. Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 8. Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001). Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9. Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. (2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Initial Exploration of Public Opinions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10. Barker, T. (2001). Representing the Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 11. Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 12. Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002). Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 13. Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The Use of Integrated Assessment: An Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 14. Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical change in an energy-environment-economy (E3) model for an IA system: A model of Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 15. Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to climate change: Setting the Agenda for Development Policy and Research, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 16. Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17. Watson, J. (2002). The development of large technical systems: implications for hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18. Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The role of hydrogen in powering road transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19. Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing organisational use of scenarios: Case study - evaluating UK energy policy options, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20. Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 21. Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T., Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and Combined Heat and Power Resources in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22. Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002). Justice and adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23. Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Transmission Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24 Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of Network Splitting for Fault Level Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25 Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003). Country level risk measures of climate-related natural disasters and implications for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 26 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27

Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M., Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R. (2003). Defining and experiencing dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 28 Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A MultiCriteria Assessment Framework for CarbonMitigation Projects: Putting “development” in the centre of decision-making, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29 Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 30 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the pilotphase interactive integrated assessment process (Aurion Project), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31 Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Electricity System: Investigation of the impact of network faults on the stability of large offshore wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32 Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33 Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 34 Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. (2003). Report to the Cayman Islands’ Government. Adaptation lessons learned from responding to tropical cyclones by the Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 – 2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35 Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. (2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The Role of Technologies, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36 Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 37 Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: a conceptual framework, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 39

Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai, S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 40 Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 41 Kim, J. A. (2003), Sustainable Development and the CDM: A South African Case Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42 Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003), Innovation and Threshold Effects in Technology Responses to Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43 Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C. (2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 44 Purdy, R. and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological carbon sequestration: critical legal issues, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45 Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow, A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004) UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 46 Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M., (2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation to climate change impacts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47 Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic structure under technological development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 48 Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our electricity networks to promote decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 49 Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. & Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working Paper 50 Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. & Ekins, P. (2004) Hysteresis and energy demand: the Announcement Effects and the effects of the UK climate change levy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 51 Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex post evaluations of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 52

Agnolucci, P. & Ekins, P. (2004) The Announcement Effect and environmental taxation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53 Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., & O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation, Part 1: A framing of the East of England, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 54 Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe and the globe: the observed record (1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 55 Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of social vulnerability to climate change for Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56 Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S (2004) The Public Perceptions of Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57 Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social Simulation of The Public Perceptions of Weather Events and their Effect upon the Development of Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 58 Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004) Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 59 Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. (2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change response and coastal management in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60 Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Sahel: Long term perspectives and future prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61 Barker, T. (2004) The transition to sustainability: a comparison of economics approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62 Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, S. (2004) Floods, health and climate change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 63 Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 64

Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L. (2004) The political economy of cross-scale networks in resource co-management, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A., Lorenzoni, I., O’Riordan, T., and Jones, M., (2005) Mapping actors involved in climate change policy networks in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 66 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A. and O’Riordan, T., (2005) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation: Part 2: Scenario creation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 67