CASE No.

36

People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III

GR. Nos. 140538-39, June 14, 2004

Doctrine (Dying Declaration):

Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty
the assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. In this case, the dying declaration of the
victim (Chavez) specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III nor Godofredo.

Facts:

The present petition was filed by the accused Godofredo and Diosdado Ador III, questioning
the finding of guilt by the RTC against them for two (2) counts of murder (the victims being
Ompong Chavez and Abe Cuya). The petitioners question the unreliable sets of evidence
made as basis for their guilt.

For context, the incident happened in Pacol, Naga City. A sudden fussilade of shots were
heard, and Ompong Chavez was seen gasping his last breaths was able to utter the words
“tinambangan kami na Ador” (We were ambushed by the Adors). Abe Cuya was found lifeless
on the pavement and died on the spot.

The RTC found Godofredo and Diosdado III guilty based on circumstantial evidence
established by the testimony of prosecution witness, the recovery and identification of the gun
used to kill the victims (which was found to belong to Godofredo) and the recovery also of the
slug on the head of one of the victims (which matches the caliber of the gun in custody of the
police), and also the dying declaration of Chavez. All taken together, the RTC found the
circumstances to point to the guilt of the accused and exclude the possibility of innocence of
the same. This caused the accused-appellants to file the present petition, questioning the
basis of their guilt, it being circumstantial.

Issue:

Whether or not the circumstantial evidence in this case (specifically the dying declaration of
Chavez) is enough to establish the guilt of the accused-appellants.

Ruling:

The Court reversed the ruling of the RTC and found the accused-appellants not guilty as
based on the evidence. The Court pointed out the inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimony of Pablo Calsis (Prosecution witness), wherein he identified that Diosdado, Jr. Was
among the assailants when it was established in court that Diosdado, Jr. was in another place.
Also, the Court pointed out that a doubt was cast as to the integrity of the gun identified as the
assailant’s weapon since there were conflicting reports as to the caliber of the gun between
the police who responded to the scene (who identified the gun to be .38 caliber) and the
firearms division of the police (who identified the gun to be .357 revolver). Lastly, and in
relation with the topic, the court pointed out that the dying declaration of Chavez is not
conclusive since the utterance “tinambangan kami na Ador” (We were ambushed by the Adors)
does not clearly identify Godofredo and Diosdado III to be the assailants. Thus, while a dying
declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the assailant.
Otherwise, it loses its significance. Since there were doubts raised by the inconsistencies and
defects of the circumstantial evidence, the Court now reversed the ruling and findings of the
RTC and acquits the accused-appellants.