A framework for assessing the political economy of post-2012 global climate regime

Bettina Wittneben, Alex Haxeltine, Bo Kjellen, Jonathan Köhler, John Turnpenny and Rachel Warren August 2005

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

Working Paper 80

A framework for assessing the political economy of post-2012 global climate regime

Bettina Wittneben1,2, Alex Haxeltine3*, Bo Kjellen3, Jonathan Köhler1,4, John Turnpenny3, Rachel Warren3
1: University of Cambridge 2: Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy 3: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia * Corresponding author. email: alex.haxeltine@uea.ac.uk

Tyndall Working Paper No. 80

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Summary We propose a dynamic framework that facilitates the evaluation of international climate change policy proposals in order to assess their viability in the current political environment. Our analysis encompasses three dimensions. Firstly, we define concerns and challenges at stake in the negotiations. Secondly, we break down policy options proposed in the literature into constituent building blocks. Thirdly, we analyse the spectrum of interests expressed in the past by prominent country groups in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. We present a dynamic framework that can be continuously updated to assess the political viability of policy proposals. To illustrate the functioning of our framework, we apply it to three highly-developed policy alternatives: the Kyoto Protocol, the Contraction and Convergence proposal and the US government’s Global Climate Change Policy Book. Our tool can be utilized for assessing the adequacy in terms of width of issues and depth of political support as well as developing new policy options in a participatory process. Keywords: climate policy, policy measures, political interests

Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are commented on by Tyndall researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer review. The accuracy of this work and the conclusions reached are the responsibility of the author(s) alone and not the Tyndall Centre.

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1 Introduction At the writing of this article, the Kyoto Protocol is about to come into force due to the move by Russia to ratify the treaty. Seven years of intense negotiations and political debate have shown that the main determinant of climate change policy is whether national interests have been met for the most powerful countries involved. Russia, for example, was able to negotiate a zero percent emission reduction target even though it was clear that Russia would be well below the emissions of the base year 1990 due to the collapse of its economy. This granted Russia an immense reserve of ‘hot air’, i.e., tradable emission credits. Russia was also able to gain a surprising deal on sinks during the negotiations in Marrakech. Rather than focusing on solving a pressing common problem, the negotiations have been dominated by a strong political dimension. It is not surprising then that the largest cumulative emitters, the USA, China and India, have not committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. There is therefore a requirement to develop climate change policy further in order to unite countries in an effort to slow climate change. In the literature, many policy options have been proposed to address this goal. However, although these proposals have enjoyed much theoretical attention, it is also pertinent to analyse how they fare in the international arena of policy making. In this paper, we have taken up the challenge of assessing policy options from the perspective of the international political process. This work is the result of an interdisciplinary effort to merge the political dimension with theoretical considerations about possible burden-sharing arrangements. Our analysis is intended to be thought-provoking in order to stimulate a discussion on policy options that are viable in the current political atmosphere. The proposed framework can be adapted to new political situations and therefore takes the dynamic characteristics of the policy situation into account. Since it is inevitably very difficult to find arrangements that are agreeable to all negotiators, we offer an analysis that can both provide insights into the implications of existing policy architectures as well as creatively explore alternative options. The notion of burden-sharing is based on an understanding that human-induced climate change can only be slowed through a coordinated, global effort. It is generally accepted that potential economic losses, investments in new technologies and costs of adaptation have to be identified and divided amongst the international community. This distribution entails equity considerations along the lines of responsibility, capacity and need (Sharma, 2003). Burdensharing arrangements can take into consideration a range of elements including global distribution of emissions, wealth of countries, vulnerability as well as adaptation needs of countries (Ringius, Frederiksen, & Birr-Pedersen, 2002). We refer to a “policy architecture” as a burden-sharing arrangement in combination with other agreements relating to issues such as the setting of targets, information transfer and compliance mechanisms. The architecture is made up of the policy regime in its entirety. Seen from this vantage point, the Kyoto Protocol functions within the architecture of the UNFCCC with its set of rules and practices. Although the architectures described in this paper all assume a global process based on governmental decisions, the particular characteristics of the implementation and enforcement of the procedures may differ substantially. Climate change burden-sharing arrangements and policy architectures have been proposed, reviewed and evaluated by scholars worldwide (see Kameyama, Forthcoming, for an in-depth discussion of the regional distribution of policy proposals). Baumert and Kete (2002) propose

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nine elements of a climate policy architecture. Their analysis combines both concerns at hand and mechanism to find solutions to these challenges. Aldy, Barrett and Stavins (2003) have defined six criteria on which to evaluate policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, equity, flexibility, and incentives / compliance. They subsequently discuss these characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen other policy proposals. However, the paper is limited to a US perspective in its assessment of the necessary criteria as well as the choice of policy proposals. Kameyama (Forthcoming) suggests that scholars are embedded in their political environment and thus are more acutely aware of the issues discussed around them. It also does not include a dimension of political viability in the negotiations. In fact, many reviews of climate policy such as Evans (2002) discuss policy proposals theoretically but do not venture to test how they would fare given the historical pattern of negotiating positions in the policy arena. The report by Ott et al. (2004) counteracts any regional bias by consulting fifteen researchers from twelve countries. They recommend cooperation amongst negotiating countries to arrive at an equitable and adequate policy framework. Their report, however, does not give clear guidelines for evaluating evolving policy architectures and neglects discussing the interests of each set of countries. Although Ott and his colleagues venture to break up the traditional way of distinguishing only between developing and industrialized countries, the country groups were set up according to quantitative characteristics, such as GDP, HDI and CO2 emissions. They did not consider the interests of the countries in the area of, for example, energy policy which might unite countries in a common negotiating position. This is a political dimension that cannot easily be quantified. Breaking the large block of G77 countries into groups of common interest in the negotiations, for example, is imperative to ensure an efficient policy process. This paper aims at defining country groups that help us gauge how acceptable a policy proposal is to the main parties in the negotiations. Bringing the US on board when discussing a policy proposal is critical, given that they have the highest total emissions globally and are one of the highest per capita emitters. This has been addressed in several policy reviews (e.g., Muller, Michaelowa and Vrolijk 2001; Grubb, Hourcade and Oberthur 2001). However, any global proposal needs to be assessed not only from a US and European position, but also from the position of other governments. What is lacking in the literature then is a comprehensive assessment of the concerns and challenges which policy-makers deal with and how they are addressed by policy elements or building blocks in combination with an assessment of the potential success of these building blocks in future negotiations, given prominent country groups and their interests. This paper reports on the development of a qualitative analysis framework that explicitly attempts to address the political dimension involved in finding an “adequate” solution to the design of a Post-Kyoto architecture. An architecture is considered adequate when it combines building blocks that are politically acceptable to a sufficient range of actors and still fulfills the majority of concerns expressed in the policy-makers’ concerns and challenges. In this paper, we develop a presentation of the issues in tabular form, with the objective of assisting analysts to be consistent in their evaluation of proposals. Breaking policy proposals into building blocks facilitates the recombination of aspects of proposals into new policy architectures. This is intended to encourage the creativity needed to further develop climate change policy. Burden-sharing arrangements have focused too heavily on the technical and economic side of policy development. We aim to expand this economic frame of mind with political analysis of the policy negotiations.

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The paper is organised in six sections. The following three sections set out the underpinning analysis for the framework: section 2 sets out the concerns and challenges suggested in the literature and present in the corridors of the climate policy negotiations; section 3 analyses current proposals and defines a set of “building blocks” for any potential architecture and section 4 develops a typology of actors, grouping together countries on the basis of their interests. This section is necessary to avoid having to perform the analysis for all individual countries involved in the negotiations. Then in section 5 we present our framework based around a set of three tables, and a procedure for analysing any potential proposal using them. The framework is then demonstrated through application to three “stylised” proposals. Finally section 6 concludes our paper with the recommondation that this qualitative framework is suitable for use in participatory integrated assessment exercises. Used in this way it could add clarity to discussions around possible Post-Kyoto architectures.

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2 Six key challenges We propose six key challenges in designing a policy architecture: environmental integrity, perceived costs, North-South issues, adaptation, public acceptability/participation and adaptability to new information. These issues build on previous classifications, e.g., Baumert and Kete (2002); Aldy et al. (2003), emphasising the need to recognize acting on climate change as a basis for negotiation. In this section, we frame the six challenges. These will later be used as a basis for analysis of architecture building blocks as well as strategic interests of actors. Each of the concerns is described below, setting out the issue and the ways in which it relates to the notion of political feasibility in the negotiations. 2.1 Environmental integrity: The most fundamental challenge of the negotiations is to avert the potentially devastating effects of climate change. The Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports a high level of scientific understanding of the positive relation between human activity, levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and climate change. Levels have increased substantially over the last 250 years and the current rate of increase is unprecedented during at least the past 20,000 years (IPCC, 2001). Given this analysis, it is clear that policy makers need to take a strong stance on emission reductions if they are serious about protecting the world from the adverse effects of climate change. The tightly negotiated text of the UNFCCC Article 2 sets out an ultimate objective "to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 9). However, the way this is to be achieved in not clearly laid out in the Convention. Countries could seek to attain a maximum level of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration or an overall target of emissions reductions related to a base year, for example. 2.2 Perceived Costs. Costs to the economy are the main political objection to mitigation action. On this basis, the US government has rejected taking on clear reduction targets and Russia has hesitated for so long to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. China, India and other large developing countries are strongly opposed to taking on binding reduction targets because they fear that these will slow their country’s economic development. However, since these costs are projected for events that will take place in the future, it is in the eye of the beholder to decide how damaging climate change mitigation action will be to the economy. Any comprehensive analysis should also include the cost of non-action and tackle the comparison of the cost of adaptation versus the cost of mitigation. Emerging research on technological learning has the potential to alter costs perceptions. Grubb, Koehler and Anderson (2002) suggest that technical change in the energy sector is often brought about by market circumstances and environmental policies. It is therefore conceivable that strong climate change policy will propel technological change, which may benefit the economy more than it does harm. In this paper, we speak of ‘perceived costs’ due to the great difficulty and uncertainty in predicting what the actual costs to society will be.

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2.3 North-South Issues The issue of equity between wealthy and poor countries has played a major role in the climate change negotiations (Najam, Huq, Sokona, 2003). There exists the perception that the wealth of the industrialized countries has been built on large emissions of greenhouse gases and that those countries should face the historical responsibility to act on the climate change threat (Brazilian Proposal 1997, Simms 1999, Baumert & Kete 2001)). Although this sense of responsibility has been present in the negotiating position of the EU, the US has taken the opposite stance and repeatedly rejected climate change action within its borders without a strong commitment to reduce emissions by the large developing countries such as China and India (Najam, Huq, Sokona, 2003). Industrialized countries, headed by the USA, Canada and Australia, have much higher per capita emissions than most developing countries, but highly populated states such as India and China nevertheless have high overall emissions that are growing at a rapid pace. It should be added, however, that a minority of developing countries also have high per capita emissions, such as Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The equity issue is very complex, as countries have various alliances between the global North and South as well as historical tensions. The production of weapons and military action also plays a large role in the emission of greenhouse gases. 2.4 Adaptation Countries and regions will be affected differently by climate change. An increase of intensity and frequency of flooding, droughts, pests and storms has been tracked and predicted by climate modelers. Although all countries will have to enhance their capacity to face adverse climate impacts (Tompkins and Adger, 2003), the global South, located mostly in warmer regions, will be not only harder hit but also less able to cope. There have been mechanisms suggested in the negotiations that deal with adaptation issues. Increasing countries’ adaptive capacity may, however, give society a false sense of security in continuing ways of industrial production and consumption that are detrimental to the climate. An increase in efforts in adaptation may thus take away from the urgency to combat climate change. Also, some adaptation action e.g. fitting more air conditioning may increase GHG emissions. Another option may be to find synergies between adaptation and mitigation efforts (Klein, Schipper, Dessai, 2003). The adaptation debate has also included calls for compensation for economic losses accrued by developing countries that depend on oil exports. 2.5 Public Acceptability and Participation Public acceptability relates to the extent that political decision-makers incorporate public concerns and represent their countries in terms of important economic and social aspects of a future framework for sustainability. Climate change policy should be conceived in a way that does not cause unnecessary harm to particular communities or generations. In order to ensure a continuous update on the effects of climate change action and non-action, a feedback loop is required that empowers local communities to address their concerns. In democracies, public support for strong mitigation action will influence the decisions that are made in the international policy arena. This public sensitivity to the concerns and challenges is highly influenced by the level of education and diversity of the media in the particular country. Broad participation is needed between countries and within countries to bring about effective climate change policy. This cannot be reached through decrees from above but instead has to

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be supported by important efforts of information sharing as well as the genuine opening up of consultation and decision-making processes. This is a challenge to political leaders and to political institutions. It has a close link to the discussion of ethics and ultimately to deepgoing cultural bases for societal structures. In order to ensure that commitments will be met and involvement is secured, agreements have to demonstrate a certain level of robustness, including communication of data and compliance. Whether the compliance regime established by the Kyoto Protocol will be robust will in fact only be tested after 2012. Nevertheless, it represents a stronger compliance system than most comparable agreements. In the work already accomplished after Kyoto, it is also notable that technical work on monitoring, reporting and communicating data has been relatively successful. This confirms the view that a reasonably robust climate regime can be established if there is enough political will. 2.6 Adaptability to New Information The relationship between science and politics is often ambiguous. Political processes are slow to integrate new research findings, but it is also often impossible for science to give the sort of clear-cut answers needed for political action. The IPCC and SBSTA have taken on the role of facilitating the link between science and politics. In the light of the rapidly evolving scientific understanding of climate change processes and the technological learning that enhances the possibilities of climate change action, a policy framework has to be flexible and open to absorb new information.

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3 Seven possible policy “building blocks” of an architecture The key challenges in the previous section are addressed in many different ways by different architectures. In order to creatively build a new policy framework for climate change, we have disassembled policy options into their elemental “building blocks”, to produce elements which can subsequently be re-assembled in various ways. Each building block offers a different solution to the key challenges outlined in Section 2 and includes both specific policy instruments and burden sharing methods. Our analysis is based on that of Baumert & Kete (2002), and classifies ‘building blocks’ of a policy architecture into seven groups: targets, market mechanisms, burden sharing, adaptation mechanisms, technology policy, information mechanisms, as well as policies and measures. 3.1 Targets Emission reduction targets can function at a global, regional, national or local level and can span different time scales. They may include only certain sectors (such as the energy sector) or may apply to all activities that produce greenhouse gas emissions. Targets may be calculated based on a single, globally negotiated, collective target where emission reductions are subsequently allotted to countries according to a formula or they may be set arbitrarily pertaining to a particular group of countries. They may limit emissions to an annual global cap or aim to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations. Targets also vary by the types of greenhouse gases they apply to. Also included in this group are the compliance mechanisms – the processes and sanctions to ensure that those targets are met and that defaulters are penalised. This depends heavily on accurate reporting. Stringent targets may be seen as the backbone of a climate policy that strives for environmental integrity. Opponents to setting targets argue, however, that they do not allow enough flexibility for businesses to adjust and action on climate change to focus on activities that bring most environmental value for the money spent. 3.2 Burden Sharing Burden sharing refers to the way responsibility for action on climate change is distributed. This can be pledge-based (for example fixed targets based on international agreement), or principle-based, such as “polluter-pays”, historical rates of emissions or equality of per capita emissions. It has also been suggested that participation can be based on reducing emissions per unit GDP (intensity targets), in order to prevent the slowing of economic growth. However, there are some serious concerns about statistical and conceptual problems with calculating intensity targets (Müller and Müller-Fürstenberger 2003). 3.3 Market Mechanisms Market mechanisms are based on the assumption that a market will allocate resources in the most efficient way and thus minimise costs of climate action. It is based on the premise that cutting emissions is critical no matter where on the globe this happens unless local air pollution is also affected by the measure. An international emissions trading regime is necessary to match the supply and demand of emission credits as well as investors and instigators of climate action projects. It is assumed that through emission trading the lowest cost will be realized by distributing cost cutting measures between high and low cost areas, creating a ‘bubble’ rather than forcing every country to use the same measures. Emission trading may also be limited to a particular sector. Such a regime necessitates emission targets to ensure environmental integrity and may include price caps.

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Opponents of emission trading fear that such a regime could allow rich countries to buy their way out of reducing their own harmful emissions and that it would undermine the sense of shared responsibility required in the negotiations. Allowing countries to trade emission credits implies that emitting greenhouse gases is not fundamentally wrong but in fact acceptable as long as the polluter can afford to pay the fee (Sandel 1997). Beside these moral arguments, an emissions trading regime is only environmentally effective if the targets are stringent and rigorously implemented and enforced. This presupposes a transparent market and industry infrastructure. Even the most elaborate emissions trading regime may not lower global emissions if there are numerous loopholes and lax targets. 3.4 Adaptation Mechanisms In order to cope with the adverse effects of climate change, some countries will have to be supported in their adaptation efforts. Climate change will not only affect countries and regions in different ways, but its impacts will also have different effects on the people of a country depending on their economic ability to cope. This building block deals with the question of how this inequity of impact and capability to cope will be handled in a policy framework. 3.5 Technology Policy Technological innovation has the potential to drive emissions down and lower the long-term cost of mitigation. Most parties to the negotiations agree that low greenhouse gas technologies should be promoted, but in which way to promote them and which ones to favour remain highly contested issues (Grubb and Steward, 2004). Energy efficiency methods and clean energy technology can act both as climate action and a boost to the economy. However, established technologies often have strong lobby groups and traditional means are also seen as more reliable and tested. Alternative, low-emission technology options have to be clearly assessed to avoid any dangerous negative side effects. The debate on encouraging nuclear power, for example, deals with this dilemma. Mitigation, adaptation and sequestration all have different types of technologies associated with them and their promotion depends on the country’s position on the urgency of these measures. Technology transfer is critical in supporting sustainable development efforts of the global South and can even facilitate their ‘leapfrogging’ into a future path of economic growth that is less harmful than the industrial revolution witnessed in the global North. 3.6 Information Mechanisms In the context of climate change, it is critical that information is transferred from science and technology to the policy making process. The IPCC reviews science and policy assessments on climate change that is communicated to policy makers through their assessment reports. Also, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) facilitates this information transfer. Encouraging climate research and economic modelling is another way for policy makers to increase the flow of information in the policy process. 3.7 Policies and Measures This building block includes carbon or energy taxes, any related regulations, efficiency standards and benchmarking. They can be short- or long-term policies and may require a country to take leadership in implementing such measures. Although a measure like the energy tax is a clear signal that a country is serious about environmental integrity, many governments worry that it could slow their economy.

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4 Eight types of actor groups
In order to ascertain which policy options are feasible, we have to consider who the key actors in the climate change policy arena are and discuss their positions and interests. At the forefront of the negotiations are traditionally the national governments who are signatory to the FCCC. Although these state actors seem to be increasingly giving way to local and global policy initiatives as well as non-state actor involvement (Strange, 1996), international climate change policy continues to be negotiated strictly by national governments. Representatives of special interest groups vie for power to influence policy makers and often the political and economic dimensions of climate change overlap when the same people hold offices in government and industry (Paterson, 1996). In this section we introduce a country typology that offers insight into the situation of the key state actors. In the Convention, countries are divided into two groups: Annex I (industrialised countries, mostly OECD) and Non-Annex I (developing countries, negotiating as Group 77 plus China). Although any country may decide to join Annex I, the fundamental divide between OECD and developing countries has nevertheless remained stable in the negotiations, even if temporary alliances have been struck. Paterson (1996) suggests that countries in the climate change negotiations can be classified along three aspects of their national situation: 1) their relationship to energy resources, 2) their position in the global economy and 3) their vulnerability to climate change impacts combined with their capacity to adapt. As for the first aspect, economies that depend on energy imports, such as Japan, will tend to promote a strict climate change regime. Economies that depend on energy exports, on the other hand, such as Saudi Arabia, will tend to oppose any mitigation action. Besides climate change policy efforts and the political power of energy lobbies, energy resource dependency also influences a country's energy efficiency record and the economic logic applied to the perceived cost of mitigation. As for the second aspect, economic strength influences how successfully a government can promote a particular policy to other actors. The last aspect that Paterson discusses is a country's vulnerability to climate impacts which is a combination of its physical aspects, such as coast line or desert, and its economic ability to adapt to climate change. Another aspect that will influence a country's position in the climate change negotiations is its strategic position in the world. Whether through history, economic or military might, some countries are in advantageous power positions reinforced through institutional arrangements. The composition of the UN Security Council or the G8 summit, for example, has more to do with historical events than the current situation. Using these criteria we have classified countries into eight categories of actors. This typology cannot account for all negotiating parties, but it represents countries that are critical in achieving effective climate change policy. Other countries will rally around one of these key actors depending on the issue at hand. Four categories represent industrialized countries: the United States, Japan, Russia and the European Union with its members. The other four categories are countries from the global South: China, India and Brazil, OPEC members as well as countries in the AOSIS and LDC groupings. 4.1 United States of America Responsible for almost one quarter of CO2 emissions worldwide, the United States of America is a key actor in climate change negotiations that cannot be ignored. Due to its economic and geopolitical position, the US policy preferences have a great impact on the negotiations. The United States was one of the first countries to ratify the FCCC and many ideas in the Kyoto Protocol, such as emissions trading, have their roots in US thought. However, in March 2001 it became clear that the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Baumert & Kete 2001). Nevertheless, current external as well as internal pressures may sway the US policy makers to once again opt for a climate change mitigation path.

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Mostly relying on indigenous energy reserves, the United States has a strong energy lobby that sometimes seems to blur the distinction between industry and government: many forceful representatives of oil interests are in leading positions in the US administration. The principal political aim of the Bush Administration seems to be to reaffirm the dominant position of the United States and avoid binding commitments in the international arena. In economic terms, the United States wants to maintain its high per capita energy consumption and stresses any negative impact of climate change action on the US economy. Although the USA is vulnerable to climate variability in its areas prone to drought or flooding, adaptation efforts are likely to be absorbed if necessary. Faced with a similar situation in terms of natural resources, vast distances, extreme weather and high per capita emissions, Australia and Canada often negotiate alongside the US position. A break in this relationship happened, however, when Canada decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol despite US explicit disapproval of the treaty. 4.2 The European Union and its Member States The European Union is highly diverse in its members' energy dependencies and economic positions. An essential challenge for this group is to coordinate positions and retain cohesion. The accession of ten new member states will complicate this further and EU priorities may change with the new members' economic concerns. Negotiating positions are worked out by the member states with the European Commission participating in the discussions. The European Union has been a strong promoter of the negotiations on climate change and an active supporter of the Kyoto Protocol, not least in promoting ratification and entry into force after the US refusal to ratify the treaty. 4.3 Russia The largest country in the world in terms of land mass has large reserves of natural resources as well as high energy demand especially for heating and transport. Nevertheless, Russia has reduced its emissions in the last decade mostly due to the dramatic collapse of its industrial base. The former super-power is eager to rebuild its industry and economic position in the world and for this reason the Russians are expecting to increase their greenhouse gas emissions drastically. After receiving many concessions in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Russia will now ratify and bring the treaty into effect. 4.4 Japan Despite being endowed with only limited natural resources and therefore highly dependent on the import of energy and raw materials, Japan has been able to grow into a significant regional as well as global economic power. Compared to other industrialised countries, Japan maintains its per capita emissions remarkably low. Its formidable position in producing high technology provides an advantage in finding new technological solutions to environmental problems. For example in regards to hybrid cars or carbon sequestration, Japanese companies are innovation leaders. 4.5 China, India and Brazil These three populous countries are home to almost forty percent of the world's population. Their governments have been distinctively vocal in the developing country group. Nevertheless, their situation is quite different from other developing countries. Their economies are relatively diversified and boast rapid economic growth. Although they are threatened by the potential impact of climate change, their major concern is following the traditional industrial development path which makes them reluctant to accept commitments that may hamper their economic progress. 4.6 Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) The very existence of some of these countries is threatened by climate change impact. They are the most vocal promoters of a strong climate regime and active participants in the negotiations. The alliance comprises almost forty Parties to the FCCC, although the countries usually have quite small populations. Through a unified stance they may be able to increase their bargaining power, but their limited resources and weak economic position will probably leave them as merely a moral force in the negotiations.

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4.7 Least Developed Countries (LCDs) This is a distinct group in the United Nations composed of nearly fifty countries. The majority of LDCs are African. Generally, these countries are struggling economically and often also politically. In the climate negotiations, the main interest of the LDC group has been in promoting reduction of emissions and seeking support for adaptation measures, not least in those countries experiencing desertification and drought. An LDC Fund has been created within the framework of the FCCC. Despite their formal recognition as a group, LDCs have had difficulties making their voices heard. Their influence has been mainly to reaffirm the need for the international community to combat poverty. 4.8 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) All eleven OPEC members are considered developing countries. They sometimes take a leading role in the G77 position. Their economies rely heavily on energy exports and the countries are thus some of the strongest opponents of any climate change mitigation action. Countries like Saudi Arabia tend to slow down the negotiation process and vehemently demand support for compensation should fossil fuels be phased out. The consensus structure of the FCCC negotiations gives an advantage to Parties that want to block action and makes it more difficult for parties that want to press for action. The members of OPEC are thus in a relatively strong bargaining position. Generally, these eight categories of key actors will allow us to estimate the feasibility of climate change policy options by getting past simple North-South divisions. An effective climate regime has to address concerns brought forth by the key actors discussed above. Non-state actors should also be followed closely, as they can be instrumental in bridging or dividing the fronts.

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5 A framework for contextual analysis of different architectures This section describes an adequacy framework for creating and analysing possible architectures. Through this framework it is possible to analyze what the building blocks of a particular proposal are, how these address the key challenges of the climate regime and how viable it is in the political arena. We have facilitated this process by developing three matrices that show the results of comparing three dimensions of climate policy: key challenges (discussed in Section 2), building blocks (outlined in Section 3) and country groups (developed in Section 4). This tabular form allows us to take in a three-dimensional approach to understanding the implications of policy proposals. Following the presentation of the three matrices, we apply our conceptual framework to three policy proposals.

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Table 5.1 Position of actor-group with respect to key challenges for a post-Kyoto architecture Environmental Integrity US • Strong pressure exists to downplay environmental integrity in current administration Perceived Costs • Perceives mitigation costs as high and adaptation costs as acceptable North – South Issues • Involved in war on terrorism • Pushes for developing country targets • Interest in Africa, partly because of oil resources Adaptation • Convinced of own ability to adapt, less priority on helping others adapt • Thorough studies warn of climate change impact in the US Public acceptability and participation • Despite strong regional concern, there is no concern on a national level • American way of life cannot be compromised or negotiated • Government has limited interest in public participation and believes that international process cannot add value to public awareness. • Active work by NGO's and Research institutions. • Increasing interest by corporate sector • Climate change action acceptable in some EU countries • It is easier to reduce emissions for some countries than others • Supports facilitating public awareness • Generally not concerned about public involvement nor public awareness Adaptability to new information • Scientific research may have new insights on climate change • An economic downturn could make it more difficult to cut emissions

EU

• Various pressures towards committing to environmental action

• Interested in lowering costs as well as increasing technological position by developing green technology

• Sense of responsibility • North versus South issues within the EU have been resolved using the EU bubble

Russia

• Economic concerns dominate • Not a priority issue

• Melting permafrost may cause damage • Interested in maintaining oil markets • Focussed on benefiting from any outcome

• Low interest in North South issues

• Climate change impacts perceived to be great threat after recent events • Expertise exists • Main emphasis is on mitigation instead • Supports efforts in global South • Potential benefits from climate change on agriculture • Overall, the climate change impact in Russia is unclear

• need to avoid lock-ins with new technologies

• Economic recovery eradicates potential for ‘hot air’ credits

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Japan

• Runs efficiently • Environmental disasters in the past

India / China / Brazil

• Interested in sustainable development • Their mitigation efforts have great impact on world emissions

• Interested in technological development • High energy efficiency makes further reductions of emissions costly • Energy efficiency increases independence from oil • Concerned with economic growth

• Regional conflicts • Particular interest in Asian region, but also Africa

• Experience in disaster prevention • Not very forthcoming with funding projects

• Public opinion aligned with government opinion • Environmental issues are concern in the population

AOSIS

• Very concerned (sea level rise) • Also needs economic development • National interest in line with global environmental interest

• Cost of adaptation much higher than costs of mitigation

• Refuse to take on an emission target • Not dependent on international cooperation • Internal economic and social tensions – large middle-class emerging • Acts as facilitator

• Not an immediate concern • Agriculture is threatened by possible extreme weather events

• Government has power to decide • Local pollution important issue, but otherwise low public awareness

• New emission data may force these countries to take on emission reduction target

• Critical: sea level rise

LDCs

• National interest coincides with global environmental interests • Threatened by desertification

• Concerned about growth • Agriculture could be hit hard • Food security • Costs of adaptation high

• Distinct group in the UN

• Critical: desertification

• Citizens care about environmental impact • Supports raising public awareness abroad because it could put pressure on OECD governments and could aid in changing people's practices. • Supports effective participation process. • Governments act independently • Low public awareness or interest, yet high awareness of local pollution; • lack of capacity to disseminate information

• New scientific observations may make climate threat more visible

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OPEC

• National interests oppose global environmental interests

• Costs of mitigation higher than adaptation

• Exploits the conflict for its own benefit • Connected to US

• Compensation for economic impact of mitigation for economic diversification • Interest in technology for adaptation

• •

Many gulf countries still feudal power structures. Little interest in disseminating information

New insights on carbon sequestration may decrease perceived climate change threat

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Table 5.2 ability of different mechanisms to address crunch issues Targets Environmental Integrity • • • Emission caps Absolute targets include all gases Burden sharing • polluter pays according to GDP/current emissions Market mechanisms • Trading systems comes with targets • Can make strong or weak volume of permits • Reduces costs • Price caps Adaptation mechanisms • endangered ecosystems Technology Policy • • no guarantee without targets policies can encourage certain types of technologies international competitiveness lowers costs may increase innovation technology transfer issues of accessability technology for adaptation (eg. sea defences) Information mechanisms • climate change research Policies & measures • strong policies may be more beneficial • • • •

Perceived Costs

• •

Intensity targets Strict compliance may raise costs

• •

North-South Issues

• •

Adaptation

Public acceptability/part icipation

• •

Phased targets Compliance may differ amongst countries Adaptation targets (eg. prepare people for CC) High adaptive capacity less perceived need to mitigate?1 Preferred target depends on country Strict compliance regime may alienate some

• • • •

grandfathering compliance mechanisms may allow for regional adjustment negotiation (pledge-based) principle based preference scores Special Adaptation Funds

costs of adaptation varies by region

• • • • • •

economic modelling

Policies can distribute costs Strong or weak taxes policies may vary according to circumstance s policies can enhance adaptive capacity

• • • • •

CDM Trading equity local impacts of global trading Adaptation levy on CDM

compensation mechanisms

NGOs

• •

GEF adaptation or compensation targets

UNHDP

Preference scores

public want to know market is fair

Measures should not have harmful side effects

depends on technology (eg. nuclear vs. wind power) technology can speed up public awareness

Need for education – how are tragets perceived?

• •

political leadership open to democratic mechanisms

1

Or a more sustainable society, therefore more likely to mitigate?

20

Adaptability to new information

• •

countries Problem with negotiated targets Temporal extent driven by confidence in information

Economic situation may change

• •

responsive markets but problems of vested interests

New scientific and technological findings influence adaptive efforts

danger of lock-in – a range of technology is important

• • •

SBSTA IPCC May have to be flexible to include unforeseen circumstances

long-term policies may have to be continuously updated flexibility for compliance

21

Table 5.3: Blocks vs. country groupings Targets Burden Sharing Market Mechanisms Adaptation mechanisms Technology Information Mechanism Policies & Measures

US

Opposes: argues that they are costly; should not be used as sole instrument; claims that developing country targets are prerequisite for own action; Favours a long-term strategy in terms of targets;

Opposes; not willing to share burden; sees this option as not politically viable

Supports, as can theoretically minimise costs and US can facilitate action by buying permits; Technology can solve climate change. Creates new markets for US industry

Willing to contribute • Recent US policy through World Bank position is technology and GEF funds, where as a solution US has influence; cautions developing countries to avoid higher costs of adaptation in the future

Promotes access to information

Opposes taxes. Every country has different needs. Regulations not excluded, especially on the state level, but considered of limited value.

22

EU and its member states

Supports. Willing Supports. Seeks to accept tougher leadership of targets than others international community by showing willingness. Supports developing country targets but underlines the need for flexible approach and compatibility with development needs.

Supports, as is believed to reduce costs of action, help achieve targets and involve companies This will help to meet targets and promote development; interest in market opportunities for industry; sceptical to sinks in CDM.

Supports, seen as part of support for sustainable development.

• Technology as part of the solution • Some countries have technological leadership (e.g. wind power and railway)

Supports, as gives moral imperative for action and it shows where mitigation is possible

Supports, some already in place, e.g. efficiency standards, carbon taxes, benchmarking. These tools may also help get developing countries to mitigate

Russia

Willing to support if not stringent, given Russia’s economic situation; opposes future targets; requires liberal rules on sinks; probably supports developing country targets

Probably ready to accept if own economic interests are recognized.

Supports, because of good opportunities for selling, but concerned about price level. Supports JI if encourages FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)

Not interested.

• Not a technological Does not promote access to information leader because of economic collapse • Oil interests

Gvt might be interested in energy taxes as a source of revenue; energy regulation may be way to control powerful companies

23

Japan

Supports, but not Supports. Willing willing to take lead in to accept tougher negotiations; supports targets than others developing country targets, open to flexible approach

Will support if Supports funding of environmental addressing impacts in integrity preserved, the South or enables consensus, sees interesting opportunities for Japanese industry Mixed – oppose if it Supports. means expensive action, support if source of foreign revenue if it increases FDI and their technological capability Supports, if Supports strongly. environmental integrity preserved Supports, even if limited possibilities to benefit, as long as it doesn't undermine the need for drastic reductions in developed countries..

• Strong tradition in technological development • Interested in technological leadership • Technological optimist

Supports.

Supports, some policies already in place

China, India Supports developed country targets, but and Brazil opposes strongly developing country targets, because this may threaten economic growth

Supports if measured by GDP/cap, otherwise strongly opposed.

• Await technology Supports. transfer but also advance their own technological developments • Fast growing economies allow for large scale investments • Pollution is immediate concern

Accepts principle, if compatible with development imperative.

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

Supports, as necessary Supports in to force action; principle. however it would be morally wrong to ask AOSIS to take on emission targets; cautious about developing country targets; Targets should be implemented rapidly.

Supports, as increases Supports, as underpins • Interested in fair moral pressure environmental distribution of effectiveness resources and acquiring technology for adaptation

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Least Developed Countries

Supports, but cautious Supports; promotes Supports in about developing the polluter pays principle. country targets principle However, business culture might clash with local culture. Supports, if promotes local economic development

Supports strongly, as will have to adapt (e.g. desertification). Promotes clear selection criteria

• Interested in fair distribution of resources and acquiring technology for adaptation

Supports, as increases moral pressure, monitoring and transparency

Supports in principle, however, concerned about low ability to collect taxes, enforce regulation. Energy consumption is very low.

OPEC

Opposes strongly, as reduces oil demand

Supports, if this means they get compensation for demand reduction.

Opposes, if reduces Yes, if this means they • Sequestration oil demand get compensation Little interest

Opposes, if part of negotiations for mitigation

Opposes, especially taxes, if decreases oil demand

25

5.1 Matrix Analysis The three dimensions developed in this paper are juxtaposed using tabular form. Table 5.1 sets out how country groupings interact with key challenges, Table 5.2 demonstrates how different building blocks can address certain key challenges and finally, Table 5.3 allows us to propose how different country groups perceive the building blocks. This information then provides the basis for identifying adequacy short-falls in terms of actoracceptability and ability to address the crunch issues. The three dimensions were chosen because of the need to understand policy proposals by breaking them down into building blocks and deciding whether they address the issues set out in the climate policy arena as well as taking note of the political dimension of climate change negotiations. The axes were determined by a review of the literature, as discussed above, and by using the combined experience of our interdisciplinary team of authors. The boxes in the tables were filled out through lengthy discussions of the intersections of the axes using our diverse backgrounds and consultations with policy makers. The background of the group of authors touches on natural sciences, social sciences and a wealth of experience in the climate policy field. The three matrices are a tool for both analyzing and synthesising a climate change policy proposal. A particular proposal can be discussed by running it past the three dimensions to see how it provides solutions to the key concerns and how it would fare in the international political arena. On the other hand, a new policy proposal can be constructed using the tables by choosing particular building blocks that provide the possibility of meeting the positions of the different countries (Table 5.3). This would allow support or willingness to negotiate towards an agreement to develop, rather than forcing countries to argue over mutually conflicting positions. In addition, Table 5.2 enables an analysis of the effectiveness or desirability of a proposal and also a negotiated outcome with respect to the main issues. Our conceptual framework allows the researcher and policy maker to develop and assess policy proposals not only on the basis of environmental integrity or economic efficiency, but rather on the basis of a complex array of issues and mechanisms as well as tests its political viability in the policy arena. We have thus included heavily debated issues, such as social justice, and not shied away from analyzing the impacts of the real political process on outcomes. 5.2 Applying the Conceptual Framework: Three Examples In this section we apply the methodology to three existing architectures, by first breaking the proposal into its component building blocks and second assessing each country grouping’s position on the proposal as a whole. Information is drawn from Tables 5.1 to 5.3 and from external sources, which are referenced when they appear. 5.2.1 US Administration Proposal: The Global Climate Change Policy Book (2002)

In terms of the building blocks, the proposals points to the following characteristics:

26

Targets: 18% reduction in greenhouse gas intensity, defined as greenhouse gas emissions divided by GDP, between 2003 and 2012. There will be a review in 2012. Burden Sharing: not mentioned. Market Mechanisms: allowed to build up a stock of CO2 credits to be used in future trading regimes. Voluntary domestic and international emission reductions are registered centrally. There is no indication of a market or a price for credits. Transferable credits give an incentive to provide information for the information mechanism. As an insurance against participation in future trading mechanism. CDM or JI are not mentioned. Adaptation Mechanisms: increase GEF allocation, increase USAID for technology transfer allocation, debt-for-nature agreements Technology Policy: research agreements with Japan, Italy and Central America. Most of the money in this program goes towards scientific research and technology development within the USA. Information Mechanism: intends to improve accuracy, reliability and verifiability of Voluntary Emission Reduction Registration Program, support developing countries in setting up observation systems Policies and Measures: no mention of taxes. There are tax incentives on investments in renewables and co-generation, household investment into solar and CHP (Combined Heat and Power systems), and for wind and biomass. Hybrid and fuel cell vehicle development is being encouraged through investment. CAFÉ standards are to be revised. Since this proposal comes straight from the US administration, we can use it as a test of our analysis of the US position in Table 5.3. According to our table, the United States government supports the position of: - not adopting emissions targets - not engaging in CO2 emissions trading - not participating in the CDM or JI (combination of these three points is consistent with not participating in the Kyoto Protocol) - not mentioning burden sharing - being willing to contribute to some funding of action in the South - promoting some information sharing - not proposing taxes, but allowing tax credits for investment and potentially new regulations - not mentioning public awareness Our analysis of the US position in Table 5.3 is therefore in line with the underlying statements of the Global Climate Change Policy Book. The anticipated attitudes of other country groupings towards this proposal is the follwoing:

27

EU - will oppose this proposal: firstly, it concentrates on action within the USA, secondly, does not include Kyoto mechanisms Russia – neutral or opposes, because there is no possibility to obtain benefits from international actions Japan – opposes, because it does not encourage international action; however, might benefit from research cooperation China, India and Brazil – neutral, not very much funding to the GEF and USAID and limited benefit from international technology transfer AOSIS – opposes, because it allows for a continuing increase of CO2 emissions LDCs – slightly supportive, because increase in GEF and USAID spending OPEC – supports, because it allows continuing economic growth and use of fossil fuels in the USA, this will keep international oil and gas prices high 5.2.2 Kyoto Protocol

In terms of building blocks, the Kyoto Protocol combines the following elements: Targets: Global mean -5.2% from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. Basket of six greenhouse gases. Burden Sharing: Bottom-up negotiation (‘pledge-based’) to differential targets even within negotiating blocks eg. UK – 12.5%; Iceland +10%. No developing country commitments. Market Mechanisms: Emissions trading and market mechanisms used as an ‘efficient’ method of minimising costs of mitigation. Adaptation Mechanisms: adaptation funding set up as part of CDM Technology Policy: CDM to encourage technology transfer. Information Mechanism: verification of CDM and JI projects, compliance mechanisms; SBSTA; IPCC; UNHDP Policies and Measures: depends on each country. No strict compliance mechanism The country positions can be analysed in the following way (although of course in this case, the policy proposal is already a signed treaty on its way to coming into force): US – does not support (also Australia) because of a) lack of developing country commitments; b) perceived costs too high; c) targets and taxes required to implement reductions EU – broadly supports; more likely to accept need for new technology and behavioural change to comply, but also desire to be flexible. Supports there being no developing country targets in Kyoto I; may change in Kyoto Plus Russia – interested in ratifying if targets are not stringent and can obtain FDI through JI. May be concerned about a second phase of Kyoto targets. Also using Kyoto to gain leverage in other political areas such as economic development. Japan – public and political support for action.

28

China/India/Brazil – Support – have all ratified Kyoto – but may revise if Kyoto Plus has developing country targets. AOSIS – would like more action by North both on mitigation and adaptation – Kyoto is too weak. Does not support inclusion of sinks LDCs – support but are concerned about equity implications and local impacts of emissions trading. Would like more on adaptation OPEC – oppose targets because they threaten oil demand, would prefer sequestration, and compensation. 5.2.3 Contraction and Convergence

This policy proposal exhibits the following building blocks: Targets: CO2 concentration 450 ppm by 2100 - Reduce global emissions by about 60% by 2100. Some consideration of measures for other GHGs using the same criteria Burden Sharing: Principle-based’: equal per capita emissions by 2045 (UN Centenary) Market Mechanisms: a proportion of annual emissions quotas can be traded, using a carbon-free ‘green currency’ to avoid inflation. Ensure that it operates fairly within countries as well as between countries. There is no provision for JI. Adaptation Mechanisms: Encourage damage compensation and Annex I countries’ historical carbon debt compensation. Funding from non-compliance to assist climate damage repair and green technology transfer. Technology Policy: Information Mechanism: IPCC and a SBSTA Scientific Panel to revise the contraction target every five years Policies and Measures: Global overseeing of trading to ensure equity is preserved. Tough global penalties for non-compliance, along the lines of WTO. Also potentially a tax on permit trading, and a phase out of fossil fuel subsidies. Forum for local governments to advise on implementation issues and facilitate sharing of technology. Increase education on danger of climate change and ecological debt. Introduce greenhouse gas labeling for every appliance/activity. The country groups’ potential approval of this proposal is discussed below: US – oppose because perceived costs too high (emissions –80% by 2050) EU – oppose; too radical; perceived costs too high Russia – sees economic development linked to carbon emissions. Likely to oppose Japan – oppose – perceived costs too high China/India/Brazil – Support in principle for now – but may not as their emissions increase. AOSIS – Support, but probably too late to save some of their member states

29

LDCs – support, especially the damage compensation OPEC – thoroughly oppose, not least because of the implication of within country equity! 6 Conclusions This paper outlined a conceptual framework that can be used both to assess and to develop an adequate climate change policy proposal. Three dimensions of policy analysis were developed: concerns in the climate policy arena, building blocks of policy architectures and a typology of actor groups. The framework was tested by applying it to three existing policy frameworks. The three examples demonstrate that it is a useful tool to indicate where political controversies will arise and which country grouping may be opposed to a certain set of building blocks that make up the policy proposal. The framework can therefore provide a semi-structured, qualitative exploration of the merits and disadvantages of any particular proposal, particularly in terms of potential political conflicts or issues of political unacceptability. The next step is to use the framework to devise a new adequate policy proposal that promises to address as many country interests and concerns as possible. It can serve as a tool in participatory exercises with policy makers and analysts. This framework was derived out of the interdisciplinary work of the authors and offers a common currency to compare policy frameworks. It can be very difficult to structure thinking about the many different aspects of any particular proposal. We intend to use the evaluation dimensions developed in this paper in our future work. It might also be suitable for use in participatory integrated assessment exercises with relevant stakeholders. However, it has to be noted that this model may be seen as mechanistic as it constrains the issues to a limited set of key challenges and policy building blocks. Researchers may consider expanding the categories as needed. Also, the perceived interests of the policy makers will change over time and the model needs to be updated after new negotiation outcomes. Due to its tabular form, allowing for this political dynamic is possible. Although policy makers from other countries were consulted during the process of writing this paper, the framework retains a European bias as all authors are situated in Europe. Kameyama (forthcoming) describes that researchers are prone to highlight issues and solutions that are currently present in their national context.

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Richard J.T. Klein, E. Lisa Schipper, Suraje Dessai, (2003). Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions. Tyndall Working Paper Kyoto Protocol www.unfccc.int Mueller, B.; Michaelowa, A.; Vrolijk, C. (2001) Rejecting Kyoto, Climate Strategies Report, London. Available at http://www.hwwa.de/Projekte/Forsch_Schwerpunkte/FS/Klimapolitik/PDFDokumente/M ueller%2c%20Michaelowa%2c%20Vrolijk%20(2001).pdf Muller B.; Muller-Furstenberger G. (2003) Price-related sensitivities of greenhouse gas intensity targets Climate Policy, vol. 3, no. 1002, pp. 59-74 Adil Najam, Saleemul Huq, Youba Sokona: "Climate Negotiations Beyond Kyoto: Developing Countries Concerns and Interests, Climate Policy, Volume 3, Issue 3, September 2003 (Abstract) Ott, H. E., Winkler, H., Brouns, B., Kartha, S., Mace, M. J., Huq, S., Kameyama, Y., Sari, A. P., Pan, J., Sokona, Y., Bhandari, P.M., Kassenberg, A., La Rovere, E. L., Rahman, A. (2004). South-North dialogue on equity in the greenhouse : a proposal for an adequate and equitable global climate agreement. - Eschborn [u.a.] : Ges. für Techn. Zusammenarbeit. Available at http://www.wupperinst.org/download/1085_proposal.pdf Paterson, Matthew (1996). Global Warming and Global Politics. London: Routledge. Ringius, L., Frederiksen, P. & Birr-Pedersen, K. 2002: Burden Sharing in the Context of Global Climate Change. A North-South Perspective. National Environmental Research Institute, Denmark. 90 pp. –NERI Technical Report No. 424. http://technical-reports.dmu.dk http://www2.dmu.dk/1_viden/2_publikationer/3_fagrapporter/rapporter/FR424.pdf accessed oct 2004-10-10 Sandel, Michael J. (1997). It's Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute. 15 December 1997 The New York Times Page 23 Sharma, Anju. 2003 Rough Weather Relationships. Rich and poor countries need to start taking climate change seriously. In New Economy IPPR Vol 10(3) September 2003, p. 161 – 165. Simms, Andrew (1999). Who owes who? Climate change, debt, equity and survival By http://www.jubileeplus.org/ecological_debt/Reports/Who_owes_who.htm 27 October 2004 Jubilee Report

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Strange, Susan (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Emma L. Tompkins and W. Neil Adger (2003). Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources; Tyndall Working Paper UNFCCC http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php accessed 23 October 2004

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The trans-disciplinary Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research undertakes integrated research into the long-term consequences of climate change for society and into the development of sustainable responses that governments, business-leaders and decision-makers can evaluate and implement. Achieving these objectives brings together UK climate scientists, social scientists, engineers and economists in a unique collaborative research effort. Research at the Tyndall Centre is organised into four research themes that collectively contribute to all aspects of the climate change issue: Integrating Frameworks; Decarbonising Modern Societies; Adapting to Climate Change; and Sustaining the Coastal Zone. All thematic fields address a clear problem posed to society by climate change, and will generate results to guide the strategic development of climate change mitigation and adaptation policies at local, national and global scales. The Tyndall Centre is named after the 19th century UK scientist John Tyndall, who was the first to prove the Earth’s natural greenhouse effect and suggested that slight changes in atmospheric composition could bring about climate variations. In addition, he was committed to improving the quality of science education and knowledge. The Tyndall Centre is a partnership of the following institutions: University of East Anglia UMIST Southampton Oceanography Centre University of Southampton University of Cambridge Centre for Ecology and Hydrology SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research (University of Sussex) Institute for Transport Studies (University of Leeds) Complex Systems Management Centre (Cranfield University) Energy Research Unit (CLRC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) The Centre is core funded by the following organisations: Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) UK Government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) For more information, visit the Tyndall Centre Web site (www.tyndall.ac.uk) or contact: External Communications Manager Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK Phone: +44 (0) 1603 59 3906; Fax: +44 (0) 1603 59 3901 Email: tyndall@uea.ac.uk

Tyndall Working Papers are available online at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/working_papers.shtml Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A Country-byCountry Analysis of Past and Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 1. Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 2. Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J. (2001). Socio-economic futures in climate change impact assessment: using scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall Centre Working Paper 3. Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High are the Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4. Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse Effects and the Impacts of Response Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 5. Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T. (2001). The identification and evaluation of suitable scenario development methods for the estimation of future probabilities of extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 6. Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7. Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 8. Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001). Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9. Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. (2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Initial Exploration of Public Opinions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10. Barker, T. (2001). Representing the Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 11. Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 12. Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002). Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 13. Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The Use of Integrated Assessment: An Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 14. Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical change in an energy-environment-economy (E3) model for an IA system: A model of Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 15. Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to climate change: Setting the Agenda for Development Policy and Research, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 16. Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17. Watson, J. (2002). The development of large technical systems: implications for hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18. Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The role of hydrogen in powering road transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19. Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing organisational use of scenarios: Case study - evaluating UK energy policy options, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20. Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 21. Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T., Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and Combined Heat and Power Resources in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22. Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002). Justice and adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23. Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Transmission Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24 Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of Network Splitting for Fault Level Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25 Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003). Country level risk measures of climate-related natural disasters and implications for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 26 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27

Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M., Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R. (2003). Defining and experiencing dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 28 Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A MultiCriteria Assessment Framework for CarbonMitigation Projects: Putting “development” in the centre of decision-making, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29 Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 30 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the pilotphase interactive integrated assessment process (Aurion Project), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31 Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Electricity System: Investigation of the impact of network faults on the stability of large offshore wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32 Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33 Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 34 Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. (2003). Report to the Cayman Islands’ Government. Adaptation lessons learned from responding to tropical cyclones by the Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 – 2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35 Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. (2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The Role of Technologies, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36 Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 37 Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: a conceptual framework, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 39

Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai, S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 40 Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 41 Kim, J. A. (2003), Sustainable Development and the CDM: A South African Case Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42 Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003), Innovation and Threshold Effects in Technology Responses to Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43 Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C. (2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 44 Purdy, R. and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological carbon sequestration: critical legal issues, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45 Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow, A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004) UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 46 Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M., (2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation to climate change impacts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47 Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic structure under technological development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 48 Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our electricity networks to promote decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 49 Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. & Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working Paper 50 Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. & Ekins, P. (2004) Hysteresis and energy demand: the Announcement Effects and the effects of the UK climate change levy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 51 Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex post evaluations of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 52

Agnolucci, P. & Ekins, P. (2004) The Announcement Effect and environmental taxation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53 Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., & O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation, Part 1: A framing of the East of England, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 54 Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe and the globe: the observed record (1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 55 Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of social vulnerability to climate change for Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56 Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S (2004) The Public Perceptions of Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57 Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social Simulation of The Public Perceptions of Weather Events and their Effect upon the Development of Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 58 Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004) Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 59 Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. (2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change response and coastal management in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60 Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Sahel: Long term perspectives and future prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61 Barker, T. (2004) The transition to sustainability: a comparison of economics approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62 Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, S. (2004) Floods, health and climate change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 63 Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 64

Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L. (2004) The political economy of cross-scale networks in resource co-management, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A., Lorenzoni, I., O’Riordan, T., and Jones, M., (2005) Mapping actors involved in climate change policy networks in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 66 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A. and O’Riordan, T., (2005) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation: Part 2: Scenario creation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 67 Bleda, M. and Shackley, S. (2005) The formation of belief in climate change in business organisations: a dynamic simulation model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 68 Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. A. (2005) Natural hazards and climate change: what knowledge is transferable?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 69 Abu-Sharkh, S., Li, R., Markvart, T., Ross, N., Wilson, P., Yao, R., Steemers, K., Kohler, J. and Arnold, R. (2005) Can Migrogrids Make a Major Contribution to UK Energy Supply?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 70 Boyd, E. Gutierrez, M. and Chang, M. (2005) Adapting small-scale CDM sinks projects to low-income communities, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 71 Lowe, T., Brown, K., Suraje Dessai, S., Doria, M., Haynes, K. and Vincent., K (2005) Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster narrative and public perceptions of climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 72 Walkden, M. (2005) Coastal process simulator scoping study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 73 Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) How do the costs of adaptation affect optimal mitigation when there is uncertainty, irreversibility and learning?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 74 Fu, G., Hall, J. W. and Lawry, J. (2005) Beyond probability: new methods for representing uncertainty in projections of future climate, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 75

Agnolucci,. P (2005) The role of political uncertainty in the Danish renewable energy market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 76 Barker, T., Pan, H., Köhler, J., Warren., R and Winne, S. (2005) Avoiding dangerous climate change by inducing technological progress: scenarios using a large-scale econometric model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 77 Agnolucci,. P (2005) Opportunism and competition in the non-fossil fuel obligation market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 78 Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) Can adaptation and mitigation be complements?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 79 Wittneben, B., Haxeltine, A., Kjellen, B., Köhler, J., Turnpenny, J., and Warren, R., (2005) A framework for assessing the political economy of post-2012 global climate regime, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 80