Why do resource managers make links to stakeholders at other scales?

W. Neil Adger, Katrina Brown and Emma L. Tompkins November 2004

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

Working Paper 65

Why do resource managers make links to stakeholders at other scales?
W. Neil Adger1,3, Katrina Brown1,2 and Emma L. Tompkins3

(1) CSERGE, (2) School of Development Studies, and (3) Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK Email: n.adger@uea.ac.uk Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 65 November 2004

Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are commented on by Tyndall researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer review. The accuracy of this work and the conclusions reached are the responsibility of the author(s) alone and not the Tyndall Centre.

Summary This paper investigates the structure of interplay in cross-scale linkages between stakeholders in resource management. Cross-scale interactions emerge because of the benefits of individual stakeholder groups in undertaking them. Hence there are uneven gains from crossscale interactions. The political economy framework outlined in the paper suggests that inequality in power-weighted decision-making has consequences for winning and losing groups within cross-scale interactions. Cross-scale interactions by powerful stakeholders have the potential to undermine trust in resource management arrangements. If government regulators, for example, mobilise information and resources from cross-level interactions to reinforce their authority, this often disempowers other stakeholders such as resource users. Offsetting such impacts, some cross-scale interactions can be empowering for local level user groups in creating social and political capital. These issues are illustrated with observations on a fragile co-management system for resource management in a marine protected area in Tobago in the Caribbean. The case study illustrates that the structure of the cross-scale interplay in terms of relative winners and losers, determines its sustainability.

Introduction This paper addresses the political economy of the evolution of cross scale linkages. We suggest that cross-scale linkages evolve and are maintained by the organisations and institutions involved in resource management to further their own agendas. In a rational choice sense, collective action between directly interested parties does not come about without perceived gain, given the power relations between stakeholders in any bargain. By the same logic, cross-scale interactions come about only because it is in the interest of one or other of the parties to develop and maintain these linkages. Such an explanation does not explain all social interaction, of course. Nor can self-interest predict the shape of interactions in every context (see Richerson et al., 2002 on evolutionary theories of commons management). Yet we argue that it is important to recognise the winners and losers from cross-scale interactions. The nature of these interactions partly explains the structure of the interplay and perhaps also gives insight into the role of knowledge and construction of crisis. These issues have been hypothesised as central to understanding cross-scale linkages in the overview paper (Cash et al. 2004). An understanding of cross-scale linkages is important in managing multiple use resources. By linkages we mean direct interactions through networks to provide information or tangible resources related to the management system. Of course almost all possible natural resources systems involve multiple direct users. Even when direct users of resources are small in number or strictly limited, there are inevitably multiple external stakeholders making claims and calls on natural resources at numerous scales. Cross-scale institutional linkages are the norm and even universal in natural resource management (Berkes, 2002). Part of this trend towards multiple competing claims stems from processes of globalisation. In a globalised world, environmental services and functions are increasingly seen as public goods with claims to them at national and global levels. Carbon sequestration functions, the location of the world’s stock of genetic biological resources, and shared water resources are all portrayed as public goods with a value to global society (Dietz et al. 2003). Inevitably then, markets are created to generate incentives for conserving the atmosphere, water, habitats or species, for the benefit of stakeholders remote from the resources. Direct resource users are drawn into market exchanges where previously their relationship to resources may have been based on stewardship, self-interest, or other forms of value.

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In effect in this paper we question whether integrated and well-linked resource systems, nested within national and international agendas, regimes, networks and legal systems, are a priori more successful than those with greater autonomy and less linkages. Success in this context would be judged by the persistence and resilience of a management system and the ability to command legitimacy among its major stakeholders. In empirical research in the second part of this paper we examine the structure of interplay of cross-scale linkages in the context of a marine protected area in Tobago in the eastern Caribbean. We argue that the benefits from emerging and dynamic linkages are often uneven, often reinforcing existing inequalities. But at the same time offsetting linkages facilitate the empowerment of local user groups. A political economy of linkages The structure of interplay The overview paper to this special issue explores how cross-scale and cross-level dynamics can take different forms (Cash et al., 2004). From the realm of international agreements, through to local level governance of institutions, there are particular patterns or syndromes of interaction. These interactions between stakeholders are widely observed (Berkes, 2002). But they are also widely promoted as solutions to sustainability of community-based management (see discussions in Brown, 2003 and Berkes, 2004). They are promoted because shared responsibility for management of resources creates positive incentives for sustainable use and overcomes problems of legitimacy from traditional resource management. Such ‘traditional’ top-down resource management is illustrated in Figure 1. In this scenario government agencies of the state define social and environmental goals for resource management. They impose a traditional regulatory framework on resource users, often impervious to feedback or learning from resource users and civil society. Local level linkages for resource management, illustrated in Figure 1 as the arrows between individual agents in the communities, are independent of the regulatory framework and indeed often act to circumvent it (Pretty and Ward, 2001; Pretty, 2004).

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Figure 1 A representation of traditional resource management interactions between government and resource users.
The promotion of community-based management through decentralisation is to the fore in resource management. There are particular areas of resource conservation where participatory management is, in effect, a new received wisdom. But the devolution of responsibility often comes without devolution of rights and can consist of the promotion of inappropriate crossscale interaction (Brown, 2003; Adams et al., 2003). In the developing world in particular, the popularity of community-based management may have arisen because of the reduction of the resources and effectiveness of the state and its inability to mobilise resources to undertake public services (see Ribot, 2001). Thus the cross-scale interactions occur as a substitute rather than as a complement to good governance (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In the ideal situation, co-management of resources, shared responsibility between institutions of the state and of local resource users, leads to reduced enforcement costs, the sharing of knowledge and information on the resource, and systematic learning between all parties. This situation is portrayed in Figure 2, contrasting with ‘traditional’ resource management depicted in Figure 1, with the two main protagonists being institutions of the state (top) and the community (bottom). Under this scenario, the resource users retain their internal linkages and horizontal linkages to other resource users and markets. But with an approriate structure for sharing rights and responsibilities for management, there are more direct linkages between agents of government and resource users and information and learning processes flow between them (Figure 2). There is no agreed set of contributing factors among the successful

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examples of co-management (see for reviews Berkes et al. 2001; Brown et al. 2002) on the patterns of interaction and other factors that explain their persistence and sustainability sustainable co-management examples. At present Olsson et al. (2004) and Tompkins et al. (2002) have hypothesised pre-requisites for sustained interaction that include a) enabling constitutional order and legislation; b) the ability for organisations to monitor and adapt their co-management experiments; and c) the presence of leaders and agents for change.

Figure 2 Interactions between government and civil society in co-management arrangements Source: Adapted from Brown et al. (2002).
But design principles for cross-scale interaction are only part of the story. Berkes (2002) has set an ambitious agenda for research on cross-scale institutions arguing that virtually all resource management systems have some external linkages and drivers at different scales. He argues that a failure to recognise these linkages is a central reason for some unsuccessful interventions in resource systems and that the persistence of resource degradation may be in part related to ‘cross-scale institutional pathologies’: ‘it is useful to start with the assumption that a given resource management system is multi-scale and that it should be managed at different scales simultaneously’ (Berkes, 2002, p. 317). Interactions are sat different scales are of a different nature. They are contingent on the levels they are found within institutional interactions. The mechanisms for interaction and exchange depend on the relationship between actors at the different scales. So that, for example, jurisdictional scales are inclusive (the higher scale subsumes all elements in lower scale)

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while others scales are constituitive (villages and cities make up a national population) (see Gibson et al. 2000). The emergent properties of the linkages between resource stakeholders at different scales are then determined by (following Cash et al. 2004): the structure of the vertical and horizontal interplay between actors; the characteristics of the resource being managed; aspects of agency such as the emergence of leadership and the translation of knowledge at different levels; and the social construction of crisis to overcome inertia and trigger change. These hypotheses have yet to be formally tested. Some of the determinants of cross-scale interaction are better understood than others. The nature of the resources being managed clearly affects, to some degree, the institutional design. The size of the resources, the physical pressure on exploitation, the cost of enforcement and the static or fugitive nature of resources all play a part in determining the governance structures of collective resources (Dolšak and Ostrom, 2003). We would expect that these same factors are important in the overall shape of the cross-scale interactions that emerge in parallel with the institutions of governance. The structure of the interplay between levels is much less clear, and it is in this area that this paper offers some hypotheses. Cross-scale interactions can take different forms. Young (2004) classifies the interactions between institutions at different scales (i.e. vertical interplay – see also Young 2002) as being in the form of dominance, separation, merger, negotiated outcome, or systemic change of both parties interacting. Figure 3 portrays the type of crossscale interaction that is additional to the linkages between state and local community common to co-management arrangements portrayed in Figure 2. Thus local level resource users often make common cause with communities in the same situation (horizontal linkages between resource users and other civil society groups in Figure 3). Equally government agencies involved in resource management frequently have horizontal linkages to cognate departments and organisations. Vertical external linkages portrayed in Figure 3 include those by both communities and agencies to government and regulatory agencies at other levels as well as to scientific organisations, media and advocacy organisations both within and external to the locality and jurisdiction of the resources.

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Figure 3 Cross scale linkages in resource management. Co-management institutions instigate linkages to other regulators and users. They also promote vertical linkages to access knowledge, resources and other forms of legitimacy.
Vertical linkages tend to have higher transactions costs: it is costly for local resource users to co-ordinate and learn from international conservation organisations, for example, both in terms of direct resources, but also in terms of the scientific language and objectives of disparate organisation. But there are further costs and risks associated with vertical crossscale linkages. The case of rubber tappers in Amazonia provides a salutary lesson. Brown and Rosendo (2000) outline the strategies of community-based organisations of small scale rubbers tappers in Rondonia in Brazil. They show that the rubbers tappers successfully recruited the resources of international organisations, including the World Bank in ‘levelling the playing field’ with state and federal government agencies. But such international alliances are potentially fragile and posed, in this case, political risks domestically for the grassroots organisations in their dealings with government, with their ultimate sustainability (Conklin and Graham 1995). Winners, losers and knock-on effects in interplay The range of potential interactions outlined by Young (including coercive dominance and systemic change) highlights that the incentives and potentially the benefits from the interactions are uneven. Dominance of an institution of one at one level clearly leads to winners and losers. Institutions at all levels, however, from resource users to international organisations, utilise cross-scale linkages to further their own interests and agendas within

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their management systems. Where there are material conflicts over the distribution and allocation of resources cross-scale linkages provide a platform for their resolution. Yet we argue below that that the change in circumstances brought about by winning and losing in cross-scale interactions often results in feedback effects that further tilts the playing field of negotiated rights and outcomes away from the level. Inevitably the development of cross-scale interactions for institutional benefit and positioning leads to potential conflict and misconceptions of stakeholders on the objectives of the linkages. Differences in knowledge, priorities, and pre-conceptions of the ‘right way of doing things’ are hidden in dialogues between stakeholders at different scales (Adams et al., 2003). The presence of cross-scale linkages represent evidence that material conflicts may have been overcome to mutual benefits of the linking parties. Yet cognitive conflicts (Adams et al., 2003) can still be real. Brown and Corbera (2003), for example, outline the cognitive dissonance in the creation of markets for carbon credits in land use and forestry. While the biological carbon sequestration function of forests is universal, its appropriation by governments and private agents through carbon credits results in conflict and often reinforces local inequalities. At the same time there has been much analysis of the role of heterogeneity of benefits and outcomes on the sustainability of resource use. Much of that literature argues that material conflicts matter. Asymmetric information or persistent and uncompensated inequalities within the disbursement of benefits of commonly managed resources, can eventually undermine the governance structures (for differing views see Arnold, 1998; Baland and Platteau, 1999; Agrawal, 2001). Hence we argue that in exactly the same way, asymmetries in information brought about through linkages to outside advocacy groups, scientific networks, funding sources and other sources of power, can potentially represent barriers to successful comanagement. Horizontal and vertical linkages may simply promote the individual institutions without promoting the resilience, flexibility or trust of the overall management structure or its adaptability. There is one further stage which makes the role of inequality in cross-scale more critical. This is the impact of the vertical cross-scales linkages on the power relations between different stakeholders. In short, we hypothesise that if wealth and resources of the stakeholders are correlated with their power and status at individual and collective levels, then inequality in itself leads to less co-operative linkages and less desirable outcomes for the linkages that actually emerge. This hypothesis is based on the political economy work of Boyce (1994) and draws on the analysis of Baland and Platteau (1999) and others. Boyce (1994) demonstrates theoretically that in resource allocation decisions, the unequal power relationships that are inherent in unequal distributions of wealth lead to undesirable outcomes. If it is, in general, the powerful who gain most from environmentally damaging activities, then the bargained solution between these winners and the less-well off losers (sufferers of the impacts of the environmentally damaging activity) will be skewed towards the benefits of the powerful. This occurs for a number of reasons including the additional transactions costs of the bargaining on the less well off group. Power in decision- making is,. Of course, related to more than simply wealth or resources: it is circumscribed by cultural and other determinants of governance (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Scott, 1998). Whatever the source of power, in other words, the powerful tend to get their way.

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The impacts of inequality and ‘power-weighted decisions’, however, have knock-on implications. The more powerful stakeholders in any situation have the incentives to change the playing field and move the power weighted decisions in their own favour. They can do so by changing information environment further strengthening the asymmetry in access to knowledge. The income effects of retrogressive changes in power also mean a change in effective demand for environmental quality – users are forced to accept undesirable outcomes in the struggle to meet more immediate needs. This architecture of decision-making is played out at different scales. The selective enforcement of WTO rules on countries that do have the power to lobby within the system is a case in point. The observations by Boyce (1994) on the implications of inequality of power on standard bargaining and the transactions costs involved are also relevant for cross-scale linkages. This is the reality of the coercive dominance type of interplay identified by Young (2004). More powerful stakeholders may engage in cross-scale linkages to further strengthen their position. This is most striking in the use of linkages to gain access to scientific knowledge and information and to media and other institutions )see also Lebel, this volume). The negative implications of cross-scale linkages can, however, be offset by other types of linkage. Some forms of both vertical and horizontal interaction promote and facilitate socalled ‘political capital’ (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). Community interactions in comanagement and in vertical interplay with other institutions have been shown in particular circumstances to side benefits of politicising and empowering the local level institutions. Hence the vertical interplay, depending on its structure, can change the nature of the bargain and power relations between stakeholders. Birner and Wittmer (2003) argue that the high level of political mobilisation of the rural population of Thailand who were involved in community forestry practices was so significant that it helped to strengthen the nation’s democratic institutions at crucial periods over the past decades (though see Sneddon (2003) on the contested definitions of political power in this context). Birner and Wittmer (2003) show that social capital built through shared resource management can give impetus to political action through a number of mechanisms. Social interaction in resource management provide platforms for political participation, foster political ideas, as well as more fundamental issues of building skills for public debate, and knowledge of political processes. These potential gains from vertical interplay for the less powerful stakeholder groups are a counterpoint to the coercive dominance of some forms of linkage. The institutions of comanagement, in effect, exhibit cross-scale linkages that can potentially subvert assumed power hierarchies from top to bottom in institutional scale. A case study of gainers and losers from interplay The foregoing discussion suggests that not all interplay is equal in terms of its influence on action or in terms of its contribution to sustainable and resilient management of natural resources. Whether or not cross-scale vertical linkages are in fact sustainable in reality can be deduced from cases of where such interactions occur. The issues raised are examined in this case with respect to co-management arrangements of a marine protected area in Tobago in the eastern Caribbean. The decline of coral reef, water quality and fisheries resources over recent decades spurred the government of Trinidad and Tobago to initiate a marine protected area, the Buccoo Reef Marine Park, in the 1990s. Efforts to share responsibility and promote comanagement were also initiated and partially supported through action research in the late 1990s. The research attempted to identify conflicts and trade-offs between users of the Park and to seek consensus on ways forward in co-management. Both government and local user groups engaged in outreach activities making linkages to both the research and management processes and to other institutions at various levels (as portrayed in Figure 3).

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The research, carried out over four years, involved investigation of the techniques for identifying trade-offs and building consensus for co-management of the Park (see Brown et al., 2001, 2002). One of the identified constraints to co-management in the twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago is that various levels of government involved in management of coastal resources are often conflicting in their aims and in their attitudes to co-management and sharing responsibility. Thus we further investigated pre-requisites for sustainable and successful co-management at the scales involved in managing the marine park within its multiple jurisdictions. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1 (based on Tompkins et al., 2002). Table 1 Pre-requisites for successful co-management across scales Institutional scale I Constitutional order Internal spaces of dependence Relevant laws and sociallysanctioned norms External spaces of engagement International treaties, influence of international agencies and civil society Cross-departmental duties and integration in government; co-option and advocacy coalitions Contacts to international media, advocacy groups and information Source:

II Organisational structures

Agency duties, other regulations

III Operational arrangements and power relations

Resource user organisations – local councils, interest and trade groups

Adapted from Tompkins et al. (2002). Three relevant levels are important in the co-management efforts in this case. These are the constitutional, the organisational and the operational levels (Ostrom, 1990). The constitutional level reflects the requirement that co-management meets external requirements and has an enabling legal framework within which action can be taken. Organisational structure represents the level of agencies, the availability of resources to monitor and implement change, and the desire of those agencies to share responsibility and power as a set of prerequisites for co-management. The operational level includes the local-level institutions of participation in everyday decision-making. The immediate networks between actors at the same level are augmented by wider networks between institutions and organisations at various levels. In the terminology developed by Cox (1998) and others, the on-site everyday interactions represent spaces of dependence for stakeholders at each level. External linkages represent their spaces of exchange. Thus the comanagement of specific localised and bounded resources are subject to cross-scale constraints and influences as outlined in Table 1. While Trinidad and Tobago law outlines the rules governing National Parks and protected areas within the country, for example, the legal framework is increasingly steered and constrained by international guidelines and initiatives on protecting biodiversity and various other international agreements and aid donors. Indeed in the Trinidad and Tobago case the orthodoxy on participatory consultation on the

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establishment of new protected areas promoted by mutli-lateral donor agencies can be seen as a major driver of environmental legislation within the country. There are a large number of cross-scale linkages within the system of co-management of the local resource of Buccoo Reef Marine Park. Some of these are summarised in Table 2. Table 2 also demonstrates the level which these linkages cross and attempts to show how the linkages between the scales do not benefit all stakeholders equally. Table 2 Differential benefits of cross-scale linkages in Buccoo Reef Park Linkages 1. Regulator-community forum to facilitate co-management Links to resources for implementing participatory process Links to regional civil society examples of practice Links to scientific information that: Validates lay knowledge Attributes causal effects Access and influence over external regulatory frameworks Notes: * Levels refer to Levels crossed* Organisational (II) and Operational (III) Organisational (II) and Operational (III) Who benefits? Regulators and user groups equally User groups

Horizontal linkages at User groups Operational (III) level Mainly: Operational (III) Operational (III) Mainly within the Constitutional (I) level Specific user groups Regulators Regulators

I Constitutional order II Organizational structure III Operational arrangements

as outlined in Table 1.

The linkages include regular links to implement the organisations of co-management between the regulators and the resource users (linkage 1 in Table 2); links from newly empowered user groups to other best practices in the Caribbean (3) and to the facilitators of the participatory processes (2); and important links to sources of scientific information that validated lay knowledge (4) of processes of degradation and renewal within the reef system. The comanagement efforts, although fragile, spurred the formation of local user groups of the Park. These groups engaged in dialogue with other reef user groups in the Caribbean region (see Geoghegan et al., 1999 for a review of experience). Although such civil society links ostensibly represents a horizontal linkage at the operational level (Table 2), these linkages enabled access to resources and information beyond the direct interaction. The research project itself, and the trade-off analysis undertaken, represent a major source of linkage for both civil society groups and government agencies. Access to information became a key aspect of the power relations between stakeholders. To take an example, the blame for

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existing degradation of reef flats had for over twenty years been attributed the reef tour operators who take tourists to the reef. This was the highest profile and most visibly obvious reef degradation problem. Despite their previous marginalisation, the reef tour operators group became involved in the co-management process. Previous scientific information collated as part of the research process showed that the long-term health of the reef was more dependent on reducing pollution loadings from coastal development, than on changes in tourism practices that had very localised impacts (see Brown et al., 2001; Kumarsingh, 1998; Pastorok and Bilyard, 1985; Rajkumar and Persad, 1994; Rawlins et al.,1998; Siung-Chang, 1997). In this case the cross-scale linkage empowered a previously disparate local user of the resource to engage in the co-management process and altered the blame culture of the discourse. Other linkages appeared to have reinforced the unequal relations between regulators and community groups. The regulatory stakeholders retained a gatekeeper role to higher-level regulatory change throughout the negotiation and renegotiation of co-management responsibilities. The fisheries and planning authorities had exclusive knowledge and some influence over developments in legislation and planning policy that were the remit of Trinidad and Tobago national policy agencies. The local stakeholders remained effectively outside of such processes. Hence cross-level linkages by these powerful agents began to undermine trust in shared management arrangements. The regulator always appeared, in the perceptions of resource users, to have a ‘trump card’ of access to central government and higher level rule making bodies. There are many examples, in the case of Buccoo Reef Marine Park, of cross-scale linkages between resource users and external agents and between different levels of regulatory institutions. Table 2 also highlights examples of differential access to scientific information. Such linkages build the knowledge base and promote the interests of individual stakeholders. How do these observations tie with our hypothesis in the previous section on the roles of inequality and asymmetry in cross-scale linkages? It appears that once engaged in a process of co-management and rapidly evolving institutional structures, opportunities for cross-scale interactions and alliances abound. Government agencies tend to be have more resources to engage in such linkages and hence to benefit from them. This asymmetry may indeed skew the power relations between groups. They also have the potential to undermine trust between stakeholder groups. But the offsetting trend, that of empowerment of previously disengaged stakeholder groups is also apparent in this case. Thus the political economy of cross-scale linkages requires systematic empirical evaluation, recognising the role of power in all its manifestations within processes of negotiation.

Conclusions This paper has attempted to throw light on the structure of interplay as a major shaping force in cross-scale interactions. Clearly the cross-scale nature of resource management systems is under-researched. Many, if not all systems, are inherently cross-scale – there are constitutional, organisational and operational determinants of successful co-management. The example we outline in the paper, of the linkages that helped to shape a co-management arrangement for marine park management in Tobago, demonstrates that there many of the types of linkage identified by Young (2004) and Cash et al. (2004) exist simultaneously and evolve over time. The theoretical analysis presented in this paper suggests that the structure of interplay in cross-scale linkages is intertwined with the political economy of those linkages. There are winners and losers in cross-scale dynamics, though the linkages are by no means a zero-sum

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game. In addition some linkages emerge that radically alter the playing field while others reinforce existing inequalities between powerful and less powerful players. As linkages across scales and levels emerge, it is important, in terms of prescriptive ‘design principles’, to ensure that empowerment of cross-scale institutions is matched with the resources that enable aspirations for sustainable management to be fulfilled. The key is to identify, within a political economy framework, those linkages that promote the obvious potential for enhanced management and avoid those that have the potential to undermine trust between stakeholder groups.

Acknowledgements We thank the UK Department for International Development, the ESRC Programme on Environmental Decision-making in CSERGE, and the Leverhulme Trust for research support. We also thank the Resilience Alliance and the Initiative for Science and Technology for Sustainability for organising the meeting on Scale and Cross-scale Dynamics in Montreal, October 2003. We thank all the participants for stimulation and comments and David Cash in particular for insights and encouragement. This version remains our own responsibility.

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Tyndall Working Papers are available online at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/working_papers.shtml Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A Country-byCountry Analysis of Past and Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 1. Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 2. Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J. (2001). Socio-economic futures in climate change impact assessment: using scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall Centre Working Paper 3. Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High are the Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4. Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse Effects and the Impacts of Response Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 5. Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T. (2001). The identification and evaluation of suitable scenario development methods for the estimation of future probabilities of extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 6. Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7. Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 8. Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001). Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9. Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. (2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Initial Exploration of Public Opinions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10. Barker, T. (2001). Representing the Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 11. Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 12. Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002). Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 13. Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The Use of Integrated Assessment: An Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 14. Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical change in an energy-environment-economy (E3) model for an IA system: A model of Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 15. Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to climate change: Setting the Agenda for Development Policy and Research, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 16. Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17. Watson, J. (2002). The development of large technical systems: implications for hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18. Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The role of hydrogen in powering road transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19. Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing organisational use of scenarios: Case study - evaluating UK energy policy options, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20. Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 21. Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T., Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and Combined Heat and Power Resources in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22. Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002). Justice and adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23. Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Transmission Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24 Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of Network Splitting for Fault Level Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25 Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003). Country level risk measures of climate-related natural disasters and implications for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 26 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27

Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M., Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R. (2003). Defining and experiencing dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 28 Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A MultiCriteria Assessment Framework for CarbonMitigation Projects: Putting “development” in the centre of decision-making, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29 Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 30 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the pilotphase interactive integrated assessment process (Aurion Project), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31 Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Electricity System: Investigation of the impact of network faults on the stability of large offshore wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32 Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33 Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 34 Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. (2003). Report to the Cayman Islands’ Government. Adaptation lessons learned from responding to tropical cyclones by the Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 – 2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35 Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. (2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The Role of Technologies, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36 Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 37 Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: a conceptual framework, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 39

Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai, S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 40 Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 41 Kim, J. A. (2003), Sustainable Development and the CDM: A South African Case Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42 Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003), Innovation and Threshold Effects in Technology Responses to Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43 Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C. (2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 44 Purdy, R. and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological carbon sequestration: critical legal issues, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45 Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow, A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004) UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 46 Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M., (2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation to climate change impacts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47 Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic structure under technological development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 48 Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our electricity networks to promote decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 49 Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. & Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working Paper 50 Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. & Ekins, P. (2004) Hysteresis and energy demand: the Announcement Effects and the effects of the UK climate change levy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 51 Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex post evaluations of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 52

Agnolucci, P. & Ekins, P. (2004) The Announcement Effect and environmental taxation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53 Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., & O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation, Part 1: A framing of the East of England, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 54 Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe and the globe: the observed record (1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 55 Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of social vulnerability to climate change for Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56 Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S (2004) The Public Perceptions of Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57 Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social Simulation of The Public Perceptions of Weather Events and their Effect upon the Development of Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 58 Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004) Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 59 Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. (2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change response and coastal management in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60 Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Sahel: Long term perspectives and future prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61 Barker, T. (2004) The transition to sustainability: a comparison of economics approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62 Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, S. (2004) Floods, health and climate change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 63

Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L. (2004) The political economy of crossscale networks in resource comanagement, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65

Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 64