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Emma L. Tompkins and Helene Amundsen James Martin Fellow Oxford University Centre for the Environment September 2005
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research
Working Paper 92
Perceptions of the effectiveness of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in prompting behavioural change Emma L. Tompkins1 and Helene Amundsen2
James Martin Fellow Oxford University Centre for the Environment Dyson Perrins Building South Parks Rd Oxford OX1 3QY Tel: +44 (0) 1865 275855 Fax: +44 (0) 1865 275885 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
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Abstract This paper aims to characterise some of the ways in which the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is trickling down to effect national level action on climate change. State and non state actors are interviewed at the 8th UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP8) during October and November 2002. The interviews reveal that climate change is already perceived to be a priority issue, or is becoming one. In all countries much legislation is already in place to facilitate climate change preparedness (both adaptation and mitigation), although respondents suggest that in the majority of cases these changes are not being developed in response to the UNFCCC but to other drivers. While changes were seen at the national level, mostly through planning and research, few saw action at the local level. Respondents agreed that climate risks must be managed through both national mitigation and adaptation, with many highlighting the importance of finding ways to participate in the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and managing the impacts of foreign direct investments. The majority of respondents focussed on in-country actions such as identifying the most vulnerable groups, few identified the need for greater global cooperation. To conclude, the Convention plays a role in shaping the discourse of climate change and in generating national level responses. These responses are played out differently according to the geographic, environmental, economic, social and cultural conditions of each country. The Convention is clearly important, but perhaps it is not adequate to shape a total response to climate change. There appears to be scope for additional initiatives, through collaboration, trade or aid, and through bilateral arrangements.
1. Introduction The full range of drivers of national environmental or climate change policy is often not identifiable. Sometimes, this is because the drivers are not stated explicitly or because there are multiple drivers which could have prompted the adoption of a policy (Tompkins, Boyd et al. 2005). Identifying the relative influence of an international environmental institution on national responses to climate change is therefore difficult to ascertain (Underdal 2001). Theories of policy change suggest that policy change can occur when: advocacy coalitions emerge with a driving agenda; windows of opportunity open in longer term policy streams; or following catalytic shocks which allow significant social change (see for example Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Examples of these include: desire to rebuild and recover following natural and man-made hazards; institutional evolution; socioeconomic change; cooperative behaviour; or the introduction of new technology and ideas (John 2003). In addition to political science theory, economics and psychology suggest that policy or behavioural responses to external drivers (e.g. international institutions) are more likely to occur when: there is support for the institutions; there is trust in the institutions, and there are supportive attitudes towards the solving the problem for which the institution is established (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; O'Riordan and Ward 1997; Beierle and Konisky 2000; Slovic 2000). As part of the many factors that influence national responses to global challenges, we assume that the attitudes of those negotiating the UNFCCC and associated rules and regulations (henceforth collectively referred to as the Convention) as well as those lobbying for changes in the Convention could influence national actions. We also assume that these actors may be able to describe the causal mechanisms through which influence occurs. Therefore this paper focuses on the perceptions of delegates as well as business, environmental and development NGOs who attended the 8th UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP8) during October and November 2002. The twenty nine state and non state actors were asked about their perceptions of the role of the Convention in influencing government, private sector and individual behavioural change. The second section of this paper considers the literature on regime effectiveness and methods to assess the effectiveness of the Convention and associated rules and regulations. The third section describes the survey instrument used at COP8, the characteristics of respondents, the quality of data collected and the underlying assumptions. Section four reports on the findings of the interviews, focussing on perceptions of reasons for national policy change, perceived motivators and drivers of change. Section five considers whether the Convention is adequately integrated into wider global and national institutions, and whether the Convention, the implementing agencies and the climate change management groups are operating at the appropriate scale to achieve a reduction in emissions. We conclude in section six that the issue of sovereignty needs to be considered when determining the optimal scale for climate policy. Policies need to be developed at the national or local scale to allow policy makers flexibility to ensure that local needs are being addressed in both adaptation and mitigation policies.
2. Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Convention) The Convention has now been in force for 12 years and questions about its effectiveness are increasing. However, not only is there no agreement on the effectiveness of the Convention, there is also no agreement on the best approach to evaluate its effectiveness. As Bernauer (1995) and Underdal (2001) note, institutional effectiveness or the effect of institutions on behaviour are both extremely difficult independent variables to measure. Over the past 20 years there has been a shift from research on the conditions that lead to the emergence of international environmental regimes, to research on drivers of behavioural change and the policy suitability of the institution. More recently there has been a greater focus on the equity and justice issues associated with environmental regimes (Paavola and Adger 2006). Nonetheless developing a systematic assessment of regime effectiveness still remains a challenge for researchers, see for example Helm and Sprinz (2000). Summaries of past advances in evaluating the effectiveness of international environmental institutions can be found in (Levy 1996; Helm and Sprinz 2000; Miles, Underdal et al. 2001; Wagner 2001; Young 2002). Evaluating effectiveness is difficult for three reasons. First, it is not clear which is the best dependent variable against which independent variables can be tested. The dependent variables most often used are described as output, outcome and impact e.g. Young (1999; 2002). Second, there is disagreement about the standard by which the evaluation is made (relative improvement or distance to optimum). Third, it is almost impossible to identify causality between the existence of an institution and behavioural change. Hence researchers still ask: what is the appropriate method of comparison and how do you measure change (Underdal 1992; Underdal 2001)? In dealing with these challenges this paper focuses on measuring the outcomes from the Convention. It considers relative improvements in national policy and behaviour towards climate change, and uses perceptions of those involved in the international negotiation process to measure change. This provides a starting point for assessing the effect of the Convention. Different methods are needed to assess the actual impact of the Convention on climate change. Whether or not the Convention will have an impact will be determined by the achievement of its objective as stated in Article 2:
“The ultimate objective of this Convention … is to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system….” (United Nations 1992).
Stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations to ‘prevent danger’ as opposed to a specified concentration in parts per million of various gases, creates difficulties. This is because danger is a subjective concept that can be defined by scientists or experts as a threshold, or by individuals who feel and experience the danger (Dessai, Adger et al. 2004). There is still no agreement on what is dangerous climate change (Oppenheimer 2005; Gupta and van Asselt 2006; Paavola and Adger 2006), nor on what actions would enable Article 2 to be achieved. Many speculate that we are a long way from avoiding dangerous climate change (Schellnhuber, Cramer et al. 2006) and hence it could be argued that the Convention is a long way from having an impact. In contrast the Convention has already produced outputs (i.e. rules, regulations and new organisational structures). By May 2004, 189 of 193 countries had ratified the UNFCCC (with the exception of Andorra, Brunei Darussalam, the Holy See, Iraq and 4
Somalia). In this regard the Convention could be perceived as effectively creating outputs as it has entered into force in all 189 countries. Annex 1 shows the dates of signature and ratification for all the countries of participants in this research. Since 1994, despite criticisms that the Convention is ‘the least ambitious programme that could have been developed’ (Miles, Underdal et al. 2001), the lack of stabilisation targets; the weak implementation systems, and the lack of penalties for noncompliance (Bodansky 1993), several mechanisms have been developed with a view to achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention (as stated in Article 2). These include: building an information base on what Parties are doing to achieve the objectives set out in the Convention through National Communications 1 and National Adaptation Plans of Action; the Kyoto Protocol; funding mechanisms for adaptation and annual discussion among the Parties to work towards the objective. On-going work by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as well as production of the National Communications have advanced knowledge about climate change and have begun the processes of national planning. Identifying the causal relationship between the Convention and the outputs described above on national policy and action, i.e. outcomes, is significantly more difficult. The Convention emphasises: research; national planning; public awareness and community building among states (Bodansky 1995). All these activities are designed to encourage wider social support for climate change action. This suggests that many responses to climate change may begin through non-state actions. Many actions may also be taken that are partly a response to awareness and partly in response to other factors such as cost savings or other business or personal motives (Tompkins, Boyd et al. 2005). The aim of this paper is to explore perceptions of outcomes and drivers of national action on climate change.
3. Surveys and data The UNFCCC COP8 took place at the Vigyan Bhawan centre, New Delhi, from 23rd October to 1st November 2002. During that 10 day period, 29 face to face interviews were completed using a prepared interview protocol (see Annex I). The small sample (n=29) is not representative of the composition of the annual UNFCCC COP. State as well as non-state actors were selected as there was some concern that interviews with delegates alone might result in perceptions that reflected the position of negotiating groups rather than national perspectives. Respondents were selected to reflect a variety of negotiating groups and continents. The respondents included 15 country delegates, 11 environmental, developmental and research non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 2 , and three business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) 3 . Of the 15 delegates, six were from Annex I countries, and nine were from Non-Annex I countries. At least one representative from all the main
National Communications comprise three major elements: a national greenhouse gas inventory, abatement analysis, and vulnerability and adaptation assessments. 2 NGO’s include development, environment, research and international non-governmental organisations. 3 BINGOs refer to business and industry NGOs.
negotiating groups 4 that existed in 2002 was interviewed. From the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) four individuals were interviewed; three from the Group of 77 (G77& China); one from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); one from the European Union; three from the Umbrella Group; one from the Central European Group of 11 (CG-11); one from the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG). The regional distribution of respondents was: five from Africa; four from the Americas; eight from Asia; two from Australasia; two from the Caribbean; seven from Europe and one from the Pacific. Annex 2 lists the codes used to refer to the respondent in the paper, their geographic region and negotiating group. The interviews were undertaken in the corridors of the Vigyan Bhawan centre, or vacant meeting rooms. The interviews were structured to identify how both delegates and lobbyists perceived the effect of the Convention on their countries. The interview protocol (see Annex 3) was structured to allow discussion about the effect of the Convention on national responses to climate change and the drivers and triggers of climate change responses within countries. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and returned to the original respondents to ensure that the transcribed dialogue reflected the views of that individual and that the individual was willing to have those views included in the research. The quality of the interviews varied according to many factors including: • time constraints on the respondent • interviewer’s ability to understand Spanish, French and Portuguese • respondent’s ability to speak English • location of the interview (privacy, back ground noise) These factors could not be controlled and as a result the interviews are of variable quality. The interview data were coded and organised using the software programme Atlas.
4. Findings from the interviews There were two main areas of interest in the interviews: the effect of the Convention on national responses to climate change and the drivers and triggers of climate change responses within countries. We assumed that by questioning interviewees about these areas that it would be possible to speculatively identify pathways by which the Convention was influencing national policy. The majority of the respondents noted that the Convention has effected their country through: • Producing outputs as required under the Convention (e.g. National Communications, or greenhouse gas reporting) • The forced development of an organisational framework in which to implement the obligations under the Convention
European Union (EU): EU countries. Umbrella Group (UG): Informal coalition of United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and Ukraine. G77/China: UN developing countries lobby (founded in 1964). China is not a member but an associate of the Group of 77. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Sub-set of G77 whose negotiating position is dominated by their interest in exporting oil and natural gas. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): Sub-set of G77 – consists of 42 low-lying and island developing countries. Environmental Integrity Group (EIG): recently formed: Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland. Central Group-11 (CG-11): no longer exists. Brought to together most Economy’s in Transition (EITs) included in Annex I.
• Annual COPs and IPCC reports, raising the profile of the issue (i.e. generating political will) • Creating a sense of duty to comply with the obligations of the Convention • Providing resources to start to respond to obligations within the Convention To assess qualitatively the biases inherent in the responses, we asked about perceptions of priority given to climate change and the annual international climate negotiations. As expected, delegates perceived that climate change was a higher priority than representatives of environmental, developmental and research NGOs. In addition the UNFCCC Annex I respondents had a greater perception of the importance of and profile of climate change and the Convention than non-Annex I respondents. Respondents who noted that climate change and the Convention had a high profile in their country in general explained that this resulted from either: daily exposure to weather and climate hazards (Delegate 15), a perceived business opportunity (NGO 12), or a general sense of environmental consciousness in the country (Delegate 12). Reasons given for low prioritisation of climate change included: a lack of salience of the problem (Delegate 5); more pressing government priorities (Delegate 2, Delegate 13, NGO 5, NGO 8), unwillingness to focus on emissions reduction is developing countries (Delegate 1). Respondents who noted that the annual COPs have low priority described a lack of political involvement, low levels of media reporting and low public awareness. The majority of the interview focussed on the influence of the Convention on government, private sector and individual behaviour, the findings are discussed below. 4.1 Role of the Convention on Government Respondents were first asked “Do you think The Convention has effected any government policies in your country over the past 10 years? If yes, which policies? And how?” Respondents were allowed to interpret the concept of ‘effect’ in whichever way they chose and were prompted about policies, legislation and organisational change within government. All respondents answered this question and described changes in regulations (including standards and targets) as well as in the production of action plans or strategies, economic instruments, voluntary agreements and to a lesser degree, organisational change. For most respondents their first response related to their National Communications 5 . Under Convention obligations, all Annex I countries had to produce National Communications. Many respondents noted that the process of developing National Communications built capacity within governments and helped focus thinking on managing climate change (Delegate 1, Delegate 2, Delegate 5, Delegate 8).
We’ve certainly gone through the whole national communication process and identified at the national level what it is that we can do to implement a national greenhouse gas strategy. (Delegate 8)
National communications (Annex I) are periodic submissions by developed countries describing how the countries are implementing the Convention, (Non-Annex I) submissions are from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.
‘The National Communications showed that we do have attitudes that are changing. That’s what we really could identify from the Convention so far’ (Delegate 2). ‘The public sector and even the private sector have been informed as well about what climate changes are and the impacts on human environment and physical environment because of their involvement and the impact of the studies conducted in the context of the national communication’ (Delegate 1).
A search of the National Communications showed that since this perceptions study was undertaken, a wide range of policies, from energy to agriculture, have been adopted, see Table 1. Others noted that the existence of the Convention together with scientific evidence in form of IPCC, has influenced national policy and action by leveraging national support for action (Delegate 1, Delegate 9, Delegate 15, NGO 1, NGO 3, NGO 12).
The international level provides us with an additional incentive to act domestically to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. (Delegate 12)
Table 1 Actual implementation of climate change policies and practices
Country Algeria Australia Barbados Belgium Burkino Faso Canada China Cuba Denmark France India Japan Malaysia Netherlands Philippines Rep of Korea Samoa Sao Tome Principe Saudi Arabia Slovenia Sri Lanka Switzerland UK USA Zimbabwe & Strategic planning Economic instruments Regulation (laws etc...) Voluntary agreements -
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
√ √ √
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
√ √ √ √
√ √ √
√ √ √ √
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
√ √ √ √ √
√ √ √ √ √ √
√ √ √
Source: National Communications to the UNFCCC accessed through UNFCCC website http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php on August 11th, 2006 Overall, there was a growing recognition of the importance of economic instruments, such as carbon taxes and subsidies, in the Annex I countries. National government Convention commitments are perceived to be influencing the business sector, largely through voluntary agreements, taxes and subsidies (Delegate 12). Environment taxes (Delegate 6, Delegate 7, Delegate 14), carbon taxes (Delegate 12, Delegate 13, Delegate 14), per-kilometre transport taxes (Delegate 12), emissions trading schemes (Delegate 6), taxes on waste produced and water consumption (Delegate 14) and emissions target setting were all cited as important in bringing about actual change. One European BINGO noted that the largest 19 emitting companies in their country were setting up a voluntary scheme to manage emissions (NGO 14). Governments have initiated partnership programmes with industry to raise awareness, to discuss the challenges and to bring about change, particularly with regard to emissions reductions (Delegate 7, Delegate 8). Environmental taxes are also credited with having a 9
significant impact on private sector behaviour (Delegate 5). By providing clear messages the Government can steer the private sector.
The sense I have is that climate change is now accepted by and large as an issue that has to be tackled and a lot of industry are willing to help. They want clear rules and guidance from government, they want to know what the playing field looks like, and I think a lot of them will respond. (Delegate 4)
Non-annex I countries also noted that economic instruments were being applied through sectoral policies and plans, such as agriculture, and coastal zone management plans to adapt to coastal flooding and sea level rise. A list of climate change responses identified by respondents is shown in Table 2, however as the information is based entirely on the responses of the interviewees many policies that are being implemented are not be reflected. Respondents suggested that a wide range of sectors were effected by the governments policy responses to climate change, particularly economic and regulatory policies affecting the energy sector (Delegate 5, Delegate 6, Delegate 7, Delegate 9, NGO 5, NGO 11). In general, it was perceived that private sector actions to manage emissions have been developed in response to the development of the CDM or in anticipation of carbon emissions trading. Since signing the Convention (or acceding in the case of Saudi Arabia) all interviewees noted that a variety of climate change related strategies and plans had been implemented, with the exceptions of (Delegate 2 and Delegate 3). Examples of strategies developed include: national greenhouse gas emissions reduction strategies (Delegate 8, Delegate 13); land use management strategies (Delegate 9); sustainable transport plans (Delegate 14); a metropolitan strategy for urban development (Delegate 9); and a water management strategy (NGO 1). 4.2 The influence of the Convention on the private sector? It was noted that the presence of a large contingent of businesses at COP8 might indicate that the Convention is acknowledged by some businesses as a driver of change (Delegate 6). The main influences of the Convention appear to come through national government action, notably: government laws, regulations and economic instruments and government statements and policies on national climate change mitigation. Individual businesses are more likely to be directly influenced by the Convention or climate change if: they perceive that their business is directly vulnerable to climate change; their company leader makes it a priority, or if economic opportunities can be envisaged. Indirectly actions appear to be mainly driven by: cost savings or economic efficiency; corporate social responsibility and ‘greening’; preempting government action (although businesses are also perceived as a barrier to change by some); and future energy prices and energy scarcity. Businesses appear more willing to recognise that there will be both opportunities and threats from climate change and the Convention. The annual COPs are already attended by many business and industry NGOs as it is recognised that decisions made at the COPs have implications for how businesses operate in the near future (Delegate 8, NGO 10, NGO 12). It was noted that several large business are already directly
involved in the annual COP process, acting as Business and Industry NGOs (BINGOs).
I think some of the biggest players are here [at COP8], taking direct note of some of the international developments and the Convention. (Delegate 8)
Table 2 Respondents perceptions of climate change responses developed by sector
Sector Agriculture Action plans, Strategies Action plans to reduce emissions of GHG (Delegate 6, NGO 1) Agriculture for carbon sinks (Delegate 5) Sustainable energy policy (Delegate 9) Programme for the use of renewable energy (NGO 5) Economic instruments (Subsidies/ Taxes) None mentioned Regulations (laws, standards, targets) Reducing GHG emissions from agriculture (Delegate 12) Law on energy use (Delegate 12) Renewable energy use (Delegate 14, NGO 5, NGO 6, NGO 10) Target for energy reduction (Delegate 14) Policies on forest cover (Delegate 12) Voluntary agreements None mentioned
CDM policies (Delegate 5) Energy taxes (Delegate 7, Delegate 12, Delegate 14, NGO 14)
Combined energy provision (Delegate 15)
Sustainable forest management (Delegate 5, Delegate 12) Native vegetation management (Delegate 9) GHG emissions reduction policy (Delegate 5, Delegate 8, Delegate 13) Emissions trading programme (NGO 10)
CDM policy (Delegate 5) Carbon trading (Delegate 6) Green taxes/ Industrial waste tax (Delegate 14, Delegate 7) Carbon tax (Delegate 7, Delegate 13, Delegate 14, NGO 7)
Emission of GHG (Delegate 6) Government environmental standard (Delegate 7, Delegate 12) CO2 reduction target (Delegate 12) Law on CO2 emissions (Delegate 12) Clean fuels in public transport (NGO 4) / Promoting public transport (Delegate 12) Ecological solid waste management (NGO 8)
Agreement with car importers to import cars that use less fuel (Delegate 12) Partnership with industry to reduce emissions (Delegate 8, Delegate 12) Voluntary scheme to manage emissions of largest companies (Delegate 12, NGO 14) None mentioned
Sustainable transport plan (Delegate 14) Metropolitan strategy (Delegate 9)
Direct fee on kilometre-tonnes of travel (Delegate 12)
Water /waste management
National strategy on water management (NGO 1)
Tax on water consumption / waste produced (Delegate 14)
The Convention and the annual COPs also shape public perceptions, so that companies can also expect new consumer demands resulting from the negotiations (NGO 12).
I often get calls from industrial bodies who want to talk to somebody, especially after an IPCC meeting, about the science and what it’s telling them, and I think they’re pretty much driven by potential, participating in trading issues and things like that, so there’s certainly been a response, definitely. (Delegate 8)
The sectors already experiencing weather and climate impacts (e.g. through temperature and precipitation changes) such as agriculture, forestry, insurance, and water supply are also perceived to have a greater awareness of climate change (NGO 3, Delegate 9). In some regions, such as low lying islands at risk of imminent sea level rise, the private sector generally is perceived to be more aware of the threats posed by climate change. In these cases, there appeared to be a greater chance for businesses and governments to develop constructive partnerships and voluntary programmes.
‘We’ve already started to design adaptation processes throughout the Caribbean through a multi-sectoral participatory approach’. (Delegate 11)
Opportunities are opening up through the Convention, such as the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, which are motivating companies to change their structures or behaviour in order to exploit possible business opportunities (Delegate 5).
There has been little influence by the private sector maybe in the renewable energy industry. The CDM may be a financing opportunity for them. And also from the perspective of the renewable industry, they are more interested in the Convention because the CDM might provide an opportunity for the development of renewable energy (NGO 3)
Company champions, type of industry and company size also appear to dictate how the Convention influences business. Company leadership was identified as an important element in participation in climate change initiatives. One interviewee suggested that the Convention had directly led to technological development through pressure from their president. He cited a large car company that had recently introduced emission reduction policies so that its new initiatives focus on lower emitting cars and a new type of hybrid cars (NGO 7).
The president is very much committed to sustainable development and I’ve actually been quite surprised, as an employee about how strong his commitment was. (…) Because of the policies coming from the main board, we’re now seeing climate change issues and emissions being brought into the business thinking and at the current time really climate change emissions and energy use is one of the topics that are being reviewed when a new major project comes towards the group, so that has to be covered. (NGO 14)
Energy intensive industries, the mining industry and the renewable energy sector were perceived to be most likely to have a high level of awareness. For example, some oil companies are changing their organisational structure and investigating alternative sources of energy (NGO 9). The tourism industry in some countries is becoming more aware of climate change, partly as a result of the government producing public awareness materials (Delegate 11).
Climate change is really a threat to tourism and I think that’s why it’s [climate change] being very much perceived as a threat, through coastal
erosion, damage to coral reefs, disappearance or reduction of biodiversity. (Delegate 15)
There was agreement among several of the respondents that company responses to climate change also depend on the size of the company. Large companies were perceived to be more active in responding to climate change than small and medium sized companies (Delegate 8, NGO 5, NGO 14). In one country it was perceived that the multinational corporations were changing their behaviour directly in response to the Convention and expected outcomes (NGO 5). Although small companies are perceived to be aware of climate change issues, it was not expected that they would become involved in Kyoto Protocol mechanisms as they would not be able to see what benefit it would bring them.
I don’t believe that the small companies would be interested by the process, and if you add the problems of this process in terms of efficiency, I don’t know if it [the Kyoto Protocol] would convince any small or medium partner to get involved. (NGO 1)
The opportunity to benefit financially from climate change and the obligations under the Convention are driving some action. Environmental protection in this regard can be perceived by business as an opportunity rather than a constraint, leading to technological progress and new economic activities (Delegate 5, Delegate 8, Delegate 12, NGO 10). For example, Delegate 9 noted that climate change predictions have led to research into technologies that they would not have investigated otherwise. Another delegate noted that businesses in his country were keen to adopt CDM mechanisms, motivated by increasing their own revenues, but also creating benefits for the global environment (Delegate 5).
If the people and partners in [my country] are convinced that there are potential benefits, social and economic benefits, then this [carbon trading] could happen (NGO 1). The prospects of getting involved in a CDM exercise. There are benefits for industry, for local people and long term benefits for the climate itself (NGO 2). The solutions are going to come from industry, and we need industry to be economically strong to continue to research and develop those products and then bring them to the market (NGO 14)
Anticipation of future regulation or legislation appears to have led to some companies investigating new technology. Although it was speculated that this investment was both for cost efficiency and with a view to meeting future environmental standards, or paying carbon taxes (Delegate 8, NGO 10, NGO 12).
We [industry] understand what a huge impact policy decisions could have on our businesses, on our customers, on a whole variety of issues (NGO 12).
To improve their public image, some companies are adopting a greener image and implementing general corporate social responsibility actions, some of which relate to climate change (Delegate 4). One business representative of a large energy intensive company said that his company had been reducing its emissions of greenhouse gases since 1991 and had been one of the first companies to stop using CFCs (NGO 13). 14
Other companies are reducing emissions in response to perceived energy security issues. Perceived depletion of the fossil fuel stock has led some companies to search for alternative sources of energy (NGO 5). One country delegate said that energy policy in his country had been influenced by the oil crisis in the 1970s resulting in a shift to gas and renewable energy (Delegate 14).
The three big influences on energy policy at the moment are: 1) climate change [and] environment; 2) security of supply; and 3) market liberalisation. (NGO 10)
4.4 Role of the Convention in influencing community level behaviour Many respondents noted that even though their countries were undertaking actions to meet their obligations as stated in the Convention, climate change still had a low profile at the community level (Delegate 2, Delegate 10, NGO 2, NGO 4, NGO 12). There appear to be many reasons for this low level of behavioural change: changing behaviour takes a long time (Delegate 5, Delegate 7, Delegate 9, NGO 4); there is a lack of salience and urgency about the climate change issue (Delegate 1, Delegate 7, Delegate 13, NGO 8); people fail to make the link between climate change and human behaviour (NGO 10); some people believe that the government is responsible for dealing with climate change (Delegate 8, NGO 13); scientific uncertainty may confuse some individuals (NGO 11); people appear to suffer cognitive dissonance due to desire to participate in the consumer culture and yet reduce emissions (NGO 6, NGO 10). The potential for inaction due to local discourses which challenge the climate change consensus is of concern to many. Two very different limiting discourses emerged in the interviews. One discourse is that poverty is an impediment to a sustainable lifestyle, as only the wealthy can afford to care for the environment. So, for example, Delegate 3, Delegate 7 and NGO 8 (from non-Annex I countries) noted that environmental degradation was occurring in their countries and a lack of resources nationally prevented individual behavioural change.
I think if people have more money then they have more consideration about the quality of water, air and soil. That is a very important factor, and makes people think about more environmental things. (Delegate 7) [People] know we have to do something to change, both at government and local level. All understand this process. Now, the real difficulty for this country, is poverty, it doesn’t allow anyone to say “I’ll stop doing this now”, because I know there are no alternatives (Delegate 3). Well, the argument is that the problems are the results of deforestation, so people put the blame on these poor people, but they are disempowered, they have no access to decision making or resources and they have a low level of environmental awareness. (NGO 8)
The other discourse is that when people are rich they are much less likely to care for the environment as they become entrenched in a world of consumerism and consumption and they are less close to the environment. Several respondents
perceived that higher levels of affluence had led to higher levels of consumption of goods and less sustainable lifestyles (Delegate14, NGO 6, NGO 8, NGO 10, NGO 12).
Climate change is a critical issue. But it’s at odds with market expectations and the aspiration of people. And business knows this. There are two billion people without commercial energy and they want it and they are going to use oil, gas and coal. They are not going to use solar, they are not going to use wind. (…) And so there is a mismatch between the posturing and aspirations of the political process and where the world and markets are going (NGO 12).
While individual behaviours were not perceived to have changed, most respondents felt that there had been an increase in awareness about climate change. As the Convention has contributed to the introduction of awareness programmes by many governments, and NGOs, the Convention can be seen to indirectly affect behaviour (Delegate 8, Delegate 10, Delegate 11, Delegate 13, NGO 1, NGO 12). The examples provided of how climate change is being communicated include: inclusion in the national curricula; public education and awareness programmes (including publishing articles in the media and broadcasting public awareness programmes on TV); encouraging energy efficiency; and linking weather disasters to climate change (Delegate 10). There was a general agreement among the respondents that past experiences of extreme weather events (including storms, droughts, floods and heat waves), as well as local pollution and scientific projections of the impacts of future climate change had motivated change (Delegate 2, NGO 4). The perceived effects of climate change are important for policy makers and the public (NGO 3). At the local level people are adapting to changes, and then pressurising governments to take action. One delegate said that although his country is not obliged under the Convention to reduce emissions, the experience of droughts, desertification and climate change had motivated the country to put in place measures to adapt (Delegate 1). All four AOSIS respondents argued that motivation to address climate change in their states came from the occurrence of extreme weather events coupled with the predictions of more extreme weather and sea level rise. In their case, it was not the Convention, but the perceived threat of climate change that motivated action (Delegate 3, Delegate 10, Delegate 11, Delegate 15).
The vulnerability to cyclones, to extreme weather events, people are very, very aware of it, and they react to it either because of automatic adaptation or because they have to for insurance. (…) People are incredible, because they are faced with climate change and the effects of climate change every day, so people have learnt to live with it. (Delegate 15)
Nonetheless in some countries it was felt that the climate change information campaigns have not yet reached their target audiences (NGO 9, NGO 11). Others suggested that a lack of trust in the government meant that government education on climate change may not be effective (NGO 7, NGO 14). There was some suggestion that behavioural change was being encouraged through private sector activity, with more firms selling carbon-neutral or environmentally friendly goods (Delegate 7, NGO 10).
So although the Convention might not have led to identifiable direct changes in individual behaviour, the international process of negotiations, conferences and agreements have led to some changes in ways of thinking about climate change:
I wouldn’t say it affects them, but it has altered something (…), even though people haven’t changed their lives, at least now they are starting to reflect on their ways of being and living in a society that has the possibility of being altered in environmental terms, according to what they do, their forms of pollution (Delegate 3).
The factors that influence individual, group, and national behaviour are so vast that they themselves are the subject of study in psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, human geography, to name but a few areas of academic thought. We do not hope to suggest that we can identify what motivates all individuals to change. However, we felt that it would be useful to summarise the factors (as identified by respondents) that encourage or discourage adaptive and mitigative behaviour to climate change. These factors are shown in Table 3. Table 3 Perceived motivating factors on different parts of society
Motivators International agreements and regulations (UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol) Government Duty to comply with Convention. Pressure from international community to adhere to Convention Resources made available to assist national compliance Global commodity trends Private sector Motivation to be involved in negotiations because they have implications for policies restricting industry action Individuals Media reporting of events raises profile of climate change issues Participation in NGO lobbying
Resource scarcity / national security (e.g. oil) may prompt search for alternatives Potential benefits from Kyoto Protocol mechanisms to national economy.
MNCs’ corporate environmental responsibility policies positively influencing national and local companies. Market competitiveness Economic instruments (taxes and subsidies) Corporate social responsibility Potential benefits from Kyoto Protocol mechanisms Increased R&D because of anticipated future legislation
Consumer power in influencing global trade (e.g. Fair Trade demand, and UK response to GMOs) Public awareness campaigns Green taxes, carbon taxes Desire for wealth (consumption) can lead to unsustainable lifestyles.
National social conditions
Employment possibilities in new sectors, e. g. renewable energy Increased occurrence of extreme weather events
Corporate social responsibility actions Drives businesses to develop alternatives Encourages adaptation
Poverty restricts individuals’ ability to live sustainably Direct adaptation to extreme weather events
It thus seems that official government structures (organisations, policies, ministries) are changing. Large private companies and multinational corporations in affected sectors are changing. Yet there is still not much evidence that individuals, small companies, or organisations that do not feel themselves to be affected by the Convention or the climate, are changing their behaviour. To conclude, we cannot make a definitive statement that that Convention produces outcomes that will have an impact, we can only say that the Convention is leading to action through a variety of mechanisms both direct and indirect. Direct mechanisms are the Convention obligations and the provision of resources. Through the obligations rules are being created, new organisations formed, focal points identified and action is occurring. Through the provision of resources for adaptation and reporting, some countries are starting to produce documentation to assist their response. The process of producing this creates adaptive capacity within the nation. We cannot comment on the appropriateness or quantity of adaptation funds, but acknowledge that they are having a direct impact on government action. Indirect mechanisms are: the participation in a high profile event by national governments and the shaping of the discourse on climate change. Ministerial participation in the annual COPs provides delegates with time to think through the issues in a supportive environment, and allows delegates the opportunity test and then rehearse arguments that they may make in their home country. Participation in the annual COPs also requires some preparation and then feedback. The process of preparing for and then reporting back on the Convention is an important part of the knowledge transfer process. The media presence at the annual COPs, and their reporting also raises the profile of climate change in home countries, thereby drawing attention to the actions needed in each country. Finally, the Convention and the annual COPs can shape the thinking of the state and non-state participants. Large businesses and multinational corporations that attend are given a preview of the possible changes in legislation that may be imminent. Corporations are given the chance to be an early entrant in the development of new technology, in greening their business or in changing their product mix or advertising strategies. The environmental and developmental NGOs receive information to enable them to communicate the most current responses to climate change. This is not to say that the Convention is the most appropriate tool for managing climate change, simply that these are routes through which the Convention appears to be influencing national policy. The next section considers how appropriate the Convention is and will continue to be to manage climate change.
5. How effective is the Convention? Some respondents suggested that there might be a policy mismatch, between the scale of the problem, the scale and design of the international regimes, and domestic policy agendas and the issues that shape them. Academics have also argued that national compliance with binding greenhouse gas emission targets may not be the most effective means of managing the climate change problem (Victor and Salt 1995), and that more attention should be given to assessing national emissions, policies and plans. In particular two questions arise: is the Convention adequately integrated into wider global and national institutions to manage climate change? Are the Convention, the implementing agencies and the climate change management groups operating at the appropriate scale to achieve a reduction in emissions? First, is the Convention integrated into wider institutions to manage climate change? It has been effectively argued in the literature on multiple-use, open access or communally used natural resources that management appears to function better when institutions are fully integrated. (e.g. see for example Brown, Tompkins et al. 2002). Integration here is used in the sense of integration of institutions, both horizontally (i.e. across institutions operating at the same scale of hierarchy), and vertically (across hierarchical levels), following Young (2002). In many countries the Ministry for the Environment is responsible for climate change policies, but this ministry is often perceived to be a weak ministry (Delegate 11, Delegate 13, NGO 14), having less access to resources than Finance, Energy or Transport. These other ministries often have better established links with policy makers, making it difficult for the environment ministry to push their agenda or to compete for funds.
Even though we have the wealth and resources to take the whole concept of sustainable development seriously, our key driving factors is basically economic growth. Full stop. So things like climate change and all that are not seen as our concern, because after all we are not a major polluter, we are not a major contributor of greenhouse gases. (NGO 5)
To cope with this weakness some countries have established inter-governmental institutions to understand the linkages between climate change, development and environmental issues (Delegate 4, Delegate 5, Delegate 6, Delegate 8, Delegate 10). This was not only relevant in terms of climate change and meeting commitments of the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention, but it also helped establish a clear view on international negotiations among the different government departments (Delegate 9). As Ostrom (1990), Young (2003) and Cash et al. (2006) conclude, institutions that manage global environmental problems need to be fit for purpose and are likely to require some moulding and reshaping to ensure that they develop appropriate crossscale linkages, intra-scale linkages and avoid policy mis-matches at different political scales. This does not mean that new institutions are needed, simply that more effort may be required in evaluating the appropriateness of existing institutions, with a view to improving them (Von Moltke 2001; Najam 2003). Second, we ask whether the Convention, the implementing agencies and the climate change management groups are operating at the appropriate scale? Although all nations agree that they are concerned about climate change, there is no agreement
about the appropriate solution. Issues of national sovereignty and distrust among parties make the actual search for universally agreed upon measures hard to find. Negotiations have intermittently stalled over disagreements about the costs of adapting to climate change, the costs of participating in the Convention, the distribution of benefits from participating, and adverse impacts from participation. In part this is due to different ways in which climate change will be experienced, but also due to differing world views in terms of how the problems can best be solved. This argument often revolves around who should be responsible for taking action, and whether power to act should be vested in the private sector, or national and international governments. It could be argued that the future direction of the Convention should be shaped by future needs, i.e. what do we need to do now to best manage climate change. Five important areas were frequently repeated during the interviews as areas that need to be better addressed, each of these are national level problems: 1. lowest cost solution: focussing on an economically efficient solution 2. information sharing and support: finding ways for states to engage in regional networks and information sharing and policies 3. communication and engagement: continuing to invest in raising awareness across government and wider society, especially religious and community figures, to leverage support for action 4. monitoring mechanisms: mechanisms to monitor the transition from building adaptive capacity to delivering action 5. expand the discourse: re-situate the debate outside the environment department in government The Convention is addressing these issues 6 yet action is still not occurring at the local level. This suggests that the institutions for implementation may not be appropriate, and prompts a further question: should the next phase of global management of climate change focus on initiatives at the community or local level rather than at the international level? If the existing international institutional framework is used then the challenge becomes how to set the optimal level of emissions reduction and how to implement these targets. Some countries argue that the Kyoto targets are too low (e.g. Delegate 14), others that they are too high (e.g. NGO 13). Whichever targets are chosen, each country government is then faced with the challenge of convincing their citizens and businesses of the need fulfil the obligations of the Convention for the betterment of all. To some, the adoption of international obligations is akin to giving up aspects of sovereignty to a global government. To do so, requires trust in the global institution. Unwillingness to participate can reflect distrust in the institution or in the distribution of costs and benefits from implementation. Power struggles between the EU and the USA were cited by NGO 6 and NGO 13, who noted that both groups were aiming to force their agenda in the negotiations, the EU opting for a ‘global government’ solution, while the USA is pushing for a market-based solution. None of the respondents talked about the need for more international institutions, either rules or organisations to implement change. Many referred to the need for freedom of policy
Article 4, for example deals with many: section 4.1 (c) deals with technology transfer; section 4.1 (e) deals with cooperation in adaptation to the impacts of climate change; sections 4.1 (g) and (h) relate to information sharing and support; section 4.2 (a) refers to mitigation and so on
making within the domestic policy arena, and for the need to shape any climate change response according to local political, social and cultural factors. Very clear differences could be observed in the responses of those from countries with more centralised state-driven political decision making processes, as opposed to those from countries with more distributed or corporatist approaches. In the latter, respondents suggested that government alone can not drive social change; that involvement by the private sector, advocacy coalitions, and individuals is essential (NGO 6, NGO 12). For example in one country, business is the powerful lobby driving the development of mitigation technology (NGO12). Environmental groups in other cases have been successful in driving change, but in many countries they remain outside the main sphere of influence (NGO5). Yet in state-driven countries the role of Government was clearly more significant. There the government was providing guidance and restricting actions through policies and assisting change in wider society (Delegate 4). Government is also perceived as a driver in the sense that it is can take the lead and give priority to climate change in policy making and strategies.
I think the government will lead the climate change issues in [my country] and then companies will learn a lot about their actions and measures. (Delegate 6) Ultimately, I think it will be the government that plays the critical role, and I think it’s probably the governments that are, if you like, farthest out ahead on this issue. (…) government policy is what is going to have to provide the signals to business and industry (NGO 10)
The power relations between the state, the private sector and individuals also have an important role to play in shaping action on climate change. It was suggested by several respondents that collective action or public pressure is needed to push the state to take action, particularly where public opinion shapes the political discourse (NGO 6, NGO 7). In one country, the NGOs were the drivers for increasing the renewable energy supply and when the business realised the business opportunities attached to this, they became involved (Delegate 14). In states with less opportunity for public discourse and debate, pressure from public was not perceived to be adequate to push ahead policy change, but still necessary (NGO 9).
The environment consumer groups are trying very much to promote a more sustainable lifestyle but with very limited success really, because the whole other machinery is much more effective. You know, the consumption encouraging machinery (NGO 5)
We conclude that sovereignty needs to be considered when determining the optimal scale for climate policy. Policies need to be developed at the national or local scale to allow policy makers flexibility to ensure that local needs are being addressed in both adaptation and mitigation policies.
6. Conclusions In this paper, we have provided data revealing perceptions of the pathways through which know-how, science, technology and resources are trickling down from the Convention to nations. The method used cannot provide a complete explanation of the route through which the Convention influences each nation’s response to climate
change. However the findings can be used to guide future research through the insights that have been gleaned into how international environmental negotiations metamorphose into national policy and action. From the data collected it was very apparent that the social conditions and the culture of each country shape not just responses to climate change, but also perceptions of the effectiveness of the Convention. For some countries, writing their National Communications was a great achievement, for other countries, forcing an actual change in industry production patterns and reduction in energy consumption is the greatest challenge. Some of these responses (notably Convention obligations) can be attributed directly to the existence of the Convention, such as the National Communications. The cause and effect relationship between the Convention and other initiatives, such as transport taxes, energy security policies, or cost saving initiatives is much less tangible as it is arguable that many factors have led to these initiatives. For example, within the energy sector, the limited fossil fuel stocks are likely to be driving industry investment in low carbon energy technology. In this example, the existence of the Convention may be speeding up the adoption of new technology, although it should be recognised that in the absence of the Convention, other drivers could have lead to this change. The question remains, is the Convention the most effective use of international resources to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to prevent damages from anthropogenic climate change? From the findings we can see that despite the range of changes that have been implemented, most relate the developing legislation, far fewer relate to reorganising institutions which could support the regulations. As Noble (2000) notes, the introduction of new laws does not ensure their effectiveness unless they are fully implemented. Failure to develop a supporting organisational framework could have implications for implementing climate policies. The effectiveness of the Convention may also be hampered by the challenge of matching the scale of problem (global emissions) with the scale of solution (individual emissions and local responses to weather and climate). Reducing reliance on carbon-intensive industry is probably best achieved through initiatives at the national scale. To change individual behaviour, local options need to be available, affordable and accessible. The international scale of the Convention may not be appropriate to generate these local level initiatives, where local education campaigns; locally targeted pilot projects; investment in local support networks; or having a local focal point may not be identified as a priority. To conclude, the Convention plays a role in shaping the discourse of climate change and in generating national level responses. These responses are played out differently according to the geographic, environmental, economic, social and cultural conditions of each country. The Convention is clearly important, but perhaps it is not adequate to shape a total response to climate change. There appears to be scope for additional initiatives, through collaboration, trade or aid, and through bilateral arrangements.
This survey would not have been possible without the participation of the delegates and NGOs who were willing to share their views during COP8 in New Delhi. Thanks go to Suraje Dessai of UEA for assisting with the data collection at COP8 and to all the transcribers and translators who assisted in various iterations of the interview transcription process to ensure that the interviews were correctly transcribed and translated, especially Katharine Vincent, Sarah Cornell and Alejandro de las Heras. We are particularly indebted to three anonymous reviewers from Global Environmental Politics who offered detailed comments for improvement of the paper. Any errors that remain are the authors own.
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Annex 1. Date of signature, ratification and entry into force of UNFCCC in respondents countries
Country Algeria Australia Barbados Belgium Burkino Faso Canada China Cuba Denmark France India Japan Malaysia Netherlands Philippines Rep of Korea Samoa Sao Tome & Principe Saudi Arabia Slovenia Sri Lanka Switzerland UK USA Zimbabwe Signature 13/06/1992 04/06/1992 12/06/1992 04/06/1992 12/06/1992 12/06/1992 11/06/1992 13/06/1992 09/06/1992 13/06/1992 10/06/1992 13/06/1992 09/06/1993 04/06/1992 12/06/1992 13/06/1992 12/06/1992 12/06/1992 ---13/06/1992 10/06/1992 12/06/1992 12/06/1992 12/06/1992 12/06/1992 Ratification 09/06/93 (R) 30/12/92 (R) 23/03/94 (R) 16/01/96 (R) 02/09/93 (R) 04/12/92 (R) 05/01/93 (R) 05/01/94 (R) 21/12/93 (R) 25/03/94 (R) 01/11/93 (R) 28/05/93 (At) 13/07/94 (R) 20/12/93 (At) 02/08/94 (R) 14/12/93 (R) 29/11/94 (R) 29/09/99 (R) 28/12/94 (Ac) 01/12/95 (R) 23/11/93 (R) 10/12/93 (R) 08/12/93 (R) 15/10/92 (R) 03/11/92 (R) Entry into force 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 21/06/1994 15/04/1996 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 05/04/1994 21/03/1994 23/06/1994 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 11/10/1994 21/03/1994 31/10/1994 21/03/1994 27/02/1995 28/12/1999 28/03/1995 29/02/1996 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 21/03/1994 21/03/1994
Annex 2 Information about respondents and corresponding codes
Geographic region Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa Americas Americas Americas Americas Asia Asia Asia Asia Asia Asia Asia Asia Australasia Australasia Caribbean Caribbean Europe Europe Europe Europe Europe Europe Europe Pacific Role delegate delegate delegate RNGO RNGO delegate ENGO BINGO BINGO delegate delegate delegate ENGO ENGO ENGO ENGO DNGO delegate delegate delegate delegate delegate delegate delegate ENGO ENGO DNGO BINGO delegate Negotiating group G77&China OPEC AOSIS UG G77&China EIG G77&China UG UG AOSIS AOSIS EIG CG-11 EU AOSIS Code used in text Delegate 1 Delegate 2 Delegate 3 NGO 1 NGO 2 Delegate 4 NGO 3 NGO 12 NGO 13 Delegate 5 Delegate 6 Delegate 7 NGO 4 NGO 5 NGO 6 NGO 7 NGO 8 Delegate 8 Delegate 9 Delegate 10 Delegate 11 Delegate 12 Delegate 13 Delegate 14 NGO 9 NGO 10 NGO 11 NGO 14 Delegate 15
Notes: ENGO = Environmental non-governmental organisation BINGO = Business and industry non-governmental organisation RNGO = Research non-governmental organisation
Annex 3: Interview protocol
How institutions and people respond to climate change?
SECTION 1: GENERAL 1 In your country or region how high a profile do you think these climate policy negotiations have? SECTION 2: INFLUENCE OF THE CONVENTION AND OTHER FACTORS ON GOVERNMENT 2a. Do you think The Convention has affected any government policies in your country over the past 10 years? If yes, which policies? And how? 2b. Are there any other important factors that are driving change (for better or worse) in these government policies? If yes, what are they? SECTION 3: INFLUENCE OF THE CONVENTION AND OTHER FACTORS ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR 3a. Thinking again about your country, do you think The Convention has affected private sector behaviour in any way? If yes, how? 3b. Are there any other factors that have improved private sector behaviour towards the environment? 3c. What are the negative factors that are making the private sector act less responsibly towards the environment in your country? SECTION 4: INFLUENCE OF THE CONVENTION AND OTHER FACTORS ON INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR/LIFESTYLES 4a How do you think the Convention has affected individual lifestyles and behaviours over the past 10 years in your country? 4b In your country, in the past, what other factors have proven most successful in encouraging people to adopt more sustainable lifestyles? 4c What negative factors do you think are making people’s behaviour / lifestyle less sustainable? SECTION 5: IMPORTANT STAKEHOLDERS
5a Who is it vitally important to engage to ensure that your country meets its FCCC/KP obligations? 5b Who or what do you think has the most power to ensure FCCC/KP obligations are met? Are these people different to those who are important (in 5a)? 5c How do you think these important groups can be best engaged to ensure that the FCCC obligations are met? What mechanisms? SECTION 6: RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6 If we have not discussed it already, how do you think that your country can best respond to the threats from climate change? Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. Do you have any additional thoughts about our ability to respond to climate change or the drivers of change in your country?
The trans-disciplinary Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research undertakes integrated research into the long-term consequences of climate change for society and into the development of sustainable responses that governments, business-leaders and decision-makers can evaluate and implement. Achieving these objectives brings together UK climate scientists, social scientists, engineers and economists in a unique collaborative research effort. Research at the Tyndall Centre is organised into seven research programmes that collectively contribute to all aspects of the climate change issue: International Climate Policy; Energy Futures; Adaptation and Resilience; International Development; Coasts, Cities and Integrated Modelling. All programmes address a clear question posed to society by climate change, and will generate results to guide the strategic development of climate change policies at local, national and global scales. The Tyndall Centre is named after the 19th century UK scientist John Tyndall, who was the first to prove the Earth’s natural greenhouse effect and suggested that slight changes in atmospheric composition could bring about climate variations. In addition, he was committed to improving the quality of science education and knowledge. The Tyndall Centre is a partnership of the following institutions: University of East Anglia Manchester University SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research (University of Sussex) Southampton Oceanography Centre University of Southampton University of Cambridge University of Newcastle University of Oxford Institute for Transport Studies at the University of Leeds The Centre is core funded by the UK Research Councils: Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) For more information, visit the Tyndall Centre Web site (www.tyndall.ac.uk) or contact: Communications Manager Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK Phone: +44 (0) 1603 59 3900; Fax: +44 (0) 1603 59 3901 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Tyndall Working Papers are available online at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/working_papers.shtml Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A Country-byCountry Analysis of Past and Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 1. Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 2. Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J. (2001). Socio-economic futures in climate change impact assessment: using scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall Centre Working Paper 3. Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High are the Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4. Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse Effects and the Impacts of Response Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 5. Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T. (2001). The identification and evaluation of suitable scenario development methods for the estimation of future probabilities of extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 6. Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7. Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 8. Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001). Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9. Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. (2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Initial Exploration of Public Opinions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10. Barker, T. (2001). Representing the Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 11. Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 12. Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002). Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 13. Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The Use of Integrated Assessment: An Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 14. Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical change in an energy-environment-economy (E3) model for an IA system: A model of Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 15. Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to climate change: Setting the Agenda for Development Policy and Research, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 16. Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17. Watson, J. (2002). The development of large technical systems: implications for hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18. Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The role of hydrogen in powering road transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19. Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing organisational use of scenarios: Case study - evaluating UK energy policy options, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20. Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 21. Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T., Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and Combined Heat and Power Resources in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22. Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002). Justice and adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23. Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Transmission Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24 Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of Network Splitting for Fault Level Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25 Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003). Country level risk measures of climate-related natural disasters and implications for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 26 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27
Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M., Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R. (2003). Defining and experiencing dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 28 Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A MultiCriteria Assessment Framework for CarbonMitigation Projects: Putting “development” in the centre of decision-making, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29 Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 30 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the pilotphase interactive integrated assessment process (Aurion Project), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31 Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Electricity System: Investigation of the impact of network faults on the stability of large offshore wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32 Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33 Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 34 Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. (2003). Report to the Cayman Islands’ Government. Adaptation lessons learned from responding to tropical cyclones by the Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 – 2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35 Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. (2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The Role of Technologies, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36 Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 37 Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: a conceptual framework, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 39
Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai, S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development policy: three research questions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 40 Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 41 Kim, J. A. (2003), Sustainable Development and the CDM: A South African Case Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42 Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003), Innovation and Threshold Effects in Technology Responses to Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43 Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C. (2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 44 Purdy, R. and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological carbon sequestration: critical legal issues, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45 Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow, A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004) UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 46 Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M., (2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation to climate change impacts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47 Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic structure under technological development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 48 Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our electricity networks to promote decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 49 Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. & Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working Paper 50 Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. & Ekins, P. (2004) Hysteresis and energy demand: the Announcement Effects and the effects of the UK climate change levy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 51 Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex post evaluations of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 52
Agnolucci, P. & Ekins, P. (2004) The Announcement Effect and environmental taxation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53 Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., & O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation, Part 1: A framing of the East of England, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 54 Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe and the globe: the observed record (1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 55 Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of social vulnerability to climate change for Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56 Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S (2004) The Public Perceptions of Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57 Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social Simulation of The Public Perceptions of Weather Events and their Effect upon the Development of Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 58 Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004) Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 59 Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. (2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change response and coastal management in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60 Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Sahel: Long term perspectives and future prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61 Barker, T. (2004) The transition to sustainability: a comparison of economics approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62 Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, S. (2004) Floods, health and climate change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 63 Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 64
Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L. (2004) The political economy of cross-scale networks in resource co-management, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A., Lorenzoni, I., O’Riordan, T., and Jones, M., (2005) Mapping actors involved in climate change policy networks in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 66 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A. and O’Riordan, T., (2005) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation: Part 2: Scenario creation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 67 Bleda, M. and Shackley, S. (2005) The formation of belief in climate change in business organisations: a dynamic simulation model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 68 Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. A. (2005) Natural hazards and climate change: what knowledge is transferable?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 69 Abu-Sharkh, S., Li, R., Markvart, T., Ross, N., Wilson, P., Yao, R., Steemers, K., Kohler, J. and Arnold, R. (2005) Can Migrogrids Make a Major Contribution to UK Energy Supply?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 70 Boyd, E. Gutierrez, M. and Chang, M. (2005) Adapting small-scale CDM sinks projects to low-income communities, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 71 Lowe, T., Brown, K., Suraje Dessai, S., Doria, M., Haynes, K. and Vincent., K (2005) Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster narrative and public perceptions of climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 72 Walkden, M. (2005) Coastal process simulator scoping study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 73 Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) How do the costs of adaptation affect optimal mitigation when there is uncertainty, irreversibility and learning?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 74 Fu, G., Hall, J. W. and Lawry, J. (2005) Beyond probability: new methods for representing uncertainty in projections of future climate, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 75
Agnolucci,. P (2005) The role of political uncertainty in the Danish renewable energy market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 76 Barker, T., Pan, H., Köhler, J., Warren., R and Winne, S. (2005) Avoiding dangerous climate change by inducing technological progress: scenarios using a large-scale econometric model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 77 Agnolucci,. P (2005) Opportunism and competition in the non-fossil fuel obligation market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 78 Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) Can adaptation and mitigation be complements?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 79 Wittneben, B., Haxeltine, A., Kjellen, B., Köhler, J., Turnpenny, J., and Warren, R., (2005) A framework for assessing the political economy of post-2012 global climate regime, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 80 Sorrell, S., (2005) The economics of energy service contracts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 81 Bows, A., and Anderson, K. (2005) An analysis of a post-Kyoto climate policy model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 82 Williamson, M. Lenton, T. Shepherd, J. and Edwards, N. (2006) An efficient numerical terrestrial scheme (ENTS) for fast earth system modelling Tyndall Centre Working Paper 83 Kevin Anderson, Alice Bows and Paul Upham (2006) Growth scenarios for EU & UK aviation: contradictions with climate policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 84 Michelle Bentham, (2006) An assessment of carbon sequestration potential in the UK – Southern North Sea case study Tyndall Centre Working Paper 85 Peter Stansby, Cui-Ping Kuang, Dominique Laurence and Brian Launder, (2006) Sandbanks for coastal protection: implications of sealevel rise - Part 1: Application to East Anglia Tyndall Centre Working Paper 86 Peter Stansby and Cui-Ping Kuang, (2006) Sandbanks for coastal protection: implications of sea-level rise – Part 2: current and
morphological modelling Tyndall Centre Working Paper 87 Peter Stansby and Cui-Ping Kuang, (2006) Sandbanks for coastal protection: implications of sea-level rise – part 3: wave modelling Tyndall Centre Working Paper 88
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