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Is It Going to Happen?

Regulatory Change
and Renewable Electricity

Paolo Agnolucci

February 2006

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 101

Is It Going to Happen? Regulatory
Change and Renewable Electricity

Paolo Agnolucci (1)

Environment Group, Policy Studies Institute,

100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR

Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 101

Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are commented on by
Tyndall researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer review.
The accuracy of this work and the conclusions reached are the responsibility of the author(s) alone and
not the Tyndall Centre.

The data and interpretation given in this report are to be used only for the Tyndall Centre for climate
change project. Requests to use this report for any other purpose must be directed to the British
Geological Survey, who retains the rights for its use.

In the last decade or so the policies supporting renewable electricity have been changed
several times in most European countries. Based on the experience of England and Wales,
Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark this paper discusses some of the factors influencing
the likelihood of such regulatory change. These are found to belong to a wide set of causes,
ranging from economic efficiency and financial stability to equity of treatment through what
has been called the Brussels effect. By considering how national polices deal with the issues
discussed in this paper, one hypothetical investor can assess the risk of a regulatory change
and therefore the likelihood of its investment being undermined by a policy change.

Keywords: Regulatory Risk, Renewable Electricity, Feed-in laws, Tradable Certificates,

Renewable Obligation
1 Introduction

In the renewable electricity sector, the regulatory risk is thought to be caused by “the fact that
the markets are created by policy mechanisms, which are subject to changes in policy
priorities and changes in government” (Iccept and E4tech (2003) p116). In case these changes
apply to plants already built, economic agents who invested in renewable electricity can find
themselves with a stranded asset, whose value is very different from what they previously
anticipated. It is fair to say that investors will be reluctant to invest even when they are very
likely to make a profit, should the policy not be altered 1 . It is worth noting that on many
occasions existing plants have been shielded by a change in the regulatory regime, as they
have normally been given the opportunity to benefit from the terms underlining their business
model. An example is provided by the act introducing competition in the generation and
transmission of electricity in England and Wales, the (NETA). When it was passed it was
clear that the NFFO generators would still be paid their generation price agreed in the
renewable policy, the Non-Fossil Fuel Orders (NFFO).

In these conditions the importance of the regulatory risk is diminished. However, some
inefficient situations could still prevail. If for example, investors foresaw a change in the
policy and if they still had an opportunity to build plants under the old policy, they would
rush to build plants. However, by doing so they would put useless strain on the industry
providing material inputs and expertise for renewable technologies. This occurred in
Denmark in 1999, before the amendment of the feed-in law.

Based on the policies in England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark this
paper discusses some of the factors that have influenced the likelihood of there being a
regulatory change. The economics of the policy, the government commitment, the size and
variety of the pro-renewable electricity coalition, the fairness of the treatment, the “Brussels
effect” and the clarity of the policy help economic actors to foresee a change in the policy
landscape. By affecting the regulatory risk they influence the willingness of investors to build
plants and ultimately reach the target set by the governments

2 Effectiveness of the policy

If a government has introduced a policy to help the diffusion of renewable electricity, one
would assume that they would have a stake in making this happen. Although the effectiveness
of a policy is important in determining the likelihood of there being a regulatory change, it is
not clear which parameter should be used to form the judgement. Van Dijk et al. (2004) for
example propose to use the amount of capacity (kW) or the amount of renewable electricity
(kWh) added by the policy. One would also argue that costs are also important. However,
since one has more than one criterion the issue of how to weigh them must be tackled 2 . In
addition one also has to decide which institution – such as the Treasury, the Economic or the
Environment Ministry, the renewable generators trade organization, etc. - should determine
the criteria and their weights. Different actors have different interests and therefore different

In economics this is the well-know hold-up problem. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992). For a brief
discussion of how this problem has affected the wind policy in Denmark see Agnolucci (2004a).
This problem obviously applies also to the analysis undertaken in Van Dijk et al. (2004). While this
paper considers effectiveness to be a property of a policy, Van Dijk et al. (2004) consider effectiveness
to be a criterion to analyse “the success of policy instruments” which can be defined as the instruments’
contribution to a sustainable growth in the renewable energy market. Success is further broken down
into a set of criteria, of which effectiveness, as defined by the authors is the first. Quite interestingly
cost effectiveness is the second. Other criteria are certainty for industry, market efficiency (static and
dynamic), transparency, transaction cost and administrative capacity, equity (fair distribution of
benefits) and market conformity (Van Dijk et al., 2004; p. 16).
preferences for how to judge the effectiveness of a policy. While some of them would be
willing to consider generation costs as a milestone, others could be interested in the additional
generating capacity only. Private investors on the other hand could be simply interested in the
amount of money they could make out of the policy. According to them an “effective” policy
would be one stimulating a great deal of additional capacity paid at the highest possible tariff,
maybe not the kind of scheme preferred by policy-makers. A change in government could
also imply the use of different criteria or different importance attached to them. Because of all
these reasons the effectiveness of a policy is not very helpful in determining the chances of
there being a regulatory change.

3 Economics of the Policy

Regardless of its effectiveness a policy has to be financially sustainable and reach a certain
degree of economic efficiency. This is the rationale for considering economics as the first
criterion in order to judge the regulatory risk of a policy. While this does not imply that a
policy will be changed exclusively on the basis of its economics, a scheme not delivering
value for money is very prone to be amended for any other factor, such as the election of a
government with different views on renewable electricity. One example is provided by the
Dutch REB Production Subsidy (Agnolucci submitted). As the incentive was paid to imported
renewable electricity regardless of whether it was sold on the green or on the mainstream
market, only the price of the interconnector could restrain the flow of cheap renewable
imports from other countries. At the value of 20 Euros per MWh the subsidy made importing
hydropower and biomass an extremely profitable business. The increased price for
interconnection capacity meant that almost the whole Production Subsidy was paid to the
system operator. In addition, as the interconnector was congested, the price of brown
electricity might also have risen because of the decrease in import elasticity (Newbury et al.,
2002) 3 . Not surprisingly, the REB Production Subsidy was substituted by a feed-in tariff and
only Dutch generators were made eligible for this policy.

Another example is provided by the so-called hardship clause in the German feed-in law,
which limited the utilities’ obligation to take renewable electricity to the 5% of the electricity
delivered in their area (Kuehn et al. 1999, Lauber 2002). By introducing this clause the
government constrained the financial burden on utilities located in the windiest regions and
also acknowledged, at least implicitly, that the law was distorting competition. However, the
hardship clause was a highly instable and inefficient solution, its inefficiency deriving from
the fact that windy sites from regions above the threshold would be discarded in favour of less
productive sites in regions below the threshold. The inefficiency of the policy was responsible
for its instability. While the threshold pacified utilities from the North, it made wind
developers more vociferous as the 5% was quickly getting closer. Obviously, they would have
preferred not to be forced to develop farms in the relatively windless South. Shortly after
being elected the Red-Green government announced its intention to assess the conditions of
renewable generators and the policy was changed.

The change in the Danish feed-in law provides another example (Agnolucci forthcoming b,
Morthorst 2002). When in 1998 the amount of the production incentive paid by the
government to renewable generators reached 90 million Euros (about 703 million Krones) it
became clear that the long-term financial feasibility of the system was compromised by the

As another Dutch policy, the REB exemption, required utilities to balance sales and purchase of green
electricity only in terms of monthly averages, they could buy the nearly zero-valued off-peak capacity
in the interconnector to import electricity. In the case of production subsidy, utilities had to show a
contract path from the source to the point of delivery, including the use of import capacity on all
borders. For more details see Newbury et al. (2002).
increase in wind capacity. In addition, the burden imposed by the feed-in tariff had
contributed to the financial problems incurred by public utilities. Another cost of the policy
was due to the fact that the CO2 tax was refunded to the renewable generators. It can be
noticed that while in Germany economic efficiency was the driver to revise the legislation, in
Denmark the reason was concerns related to public finances. In the latter case one would
expect a government to be more determined and responsive to implement a policy change.

4 The Commitment of the Government

A policy that is not economically or financially sustainable points to the imminence of a

change but it is not explicative of the direction of the amendment. The level of commitment
of the government can give a hint on whether the finances of renewable generators will
improve or worsen. An example is provided by the substitution of the German feed-in law by
the Renewable Energy Act. As mentioned above, the inefficiency and un-sustainability of the
previous policy were two reasons bringing about this change. However, when the policy
changed the rates paid per kWh to most renewable generators increased. In Germany all
major political parties and especially those forming the Red-Green coalition are in fact
committed to diffusion of renewable electricity (Bischof, 2004). Another example is provided
by the treatment of PV under the same law. The Renewable Energy Act originally covered
only plants commissioned up to the year when a cumulative generating capacity of 350 MW
would be reached. However, after the boom of the market in 2001, the limit was raised to
1,000 MW (Bechberger and Reiche, 2004). Obviously, a non-committed government would
have taken the opportunity to restrain the market.

Talking about level of commitment presumes that there is clarity on what the government
wants to achieve and most of all that the government has only one objective. This is not
always true. In fact, in Denmark when the proposal for the green certificates was announced
the government wanted to secure the financial position of renewable generators but also
increase that of utilities, which would be privatised soon (DEA, 2000). As utilities had to pay
for renewable electricity there was a trade-off between the two objectives. In these
circumstances it is obviously difficult to foresee the direction of the change. Another example
is provided by Dutch renewable policy. According to van der Heule (2004), the creation of
the voluntary green electricity market was not the outcome of a premeditated policy but of a
fortunate series of coincidences, i.e. the increase of the REB, an energy tax, from which green
electricity was exempted and the early opening of the green market to competition in 2001.
Although the government was pleased with the buoyant demand for green electricity, the
simultaneous presence of a supply and demand side policy in the Netherlands caused the
stagnation of national renewable capacity and a surge in imports (Agnolucci submitted).
Eventually, the REB exemption from renewable electricity was abandoned and only Dutch
generators were made eligible for the feed-in law.

5 Size and Variety of the Coalition

While the level of commitment of a government can give hints on direction of an imminent
change, it would be naïve to think that the actions of the executive power are not influenced
by the strength of coalitions having a stake in the matters affected by legislation. The size and
diversity of the group supporting the diffusion of renewable electricity can be considered an
indicator of its effectiveness in hindering or fostering a policy change. An example is
provided by the proposal of the Renewable Electricity Directive. The European Commission
in 1999 had a strong preference for green certificates as the system to harmonise the diffusion
of renewable electricity in the Member States. However, when the Energy Commissioner
submitted a draft for the renewable electricity Directive based on such an instrument, it was
forced to back off due to the opposition from some lobby groups and European governments,
notably Germany and its wind industry (Lauber, 2002). Clearly, this was the result of a very
well organised and influential group having the ear of the government of one of the biggest
European countries. Had the opposition come from a small lobby group based in a less
influential country, one could expect that the European Union would have managed to pass
the proposal.

One can argue that size and the diversity of the coalition supporting renewable electricity
influence not only the policy direction of the government but also the resilience of the
industry. A big and diverse group can act as a safety net for single investors. An example is
provided by the recent amendment of the German Renewable Energy Act. This process lasted
about two years, i.e. from August 2002 to June 2004, and has brought about a lengthy period
of instability and uncertainty. The changes in terms of rates, eligibility and length of the
scheme have been considerable from the start of the process to its end (Agnolucci,
forthcoming a). The amendment has also been characterised by some relatively sterile
confrontations between the two houses of the German Parliament. Yet the reaction of
technologies varied. Although additional wind generating capacity slightly decreased from the
previous year, it still managed to achieve about 2.5 GW in 2003. Biomass additional capacity
however went down to about 75MW after reaching the height of 250 MW just two years
earlier. Maybe wind generators, being part of an influential network, felt confident of the
outcome of the process and were not worried about the policy uncertainty. On the other hand,
biomass generators who so far constitute a less organised lobby organisation were perhaps
warier of the government’s intentions, especially because the investment incentives for
biomass had recently been terminated. Another example is provided by biomass in England.

The variety of the actors with a stake in renewable electricity increases the effectiveness of
the coalition, as they can use different networks to make their voice heard. In particular the
presence of a national industry will make politicians wary of introducing a provision putting
jobs and firms’ finances at risk. In Denmark for example the abandonment of the proposal to
introduce a green certificate scheme coincided with a crisis in the industry due to the lowest
number of orders in about a decade. The extent of involvement of citizens with renewable
electricity is also important. For example, in Denmark an income tax rule encouraged families
to invest in windpower (Haas, 2003); by 2001, about 150.000 families, 5% of the Danish
population, owned a turbine or a share in one (Lauber, 2002) Another example is provided by
the way in which the previous German feed-in law came about. Although at the end it was
supported by all political parties, it was introduced as a private bill by two members of
Parliament from the northern states. German farmers at that time were looking for ways to
earn additional income and wind was considered one of such opportunities (Lauber, 2002).
Maybe the northern German farmers simply looked at what was happening beyond the
northern border. Denmark had several turbines already installed and a large number of small
investors – farmers included – putting their money into the renewable electricity sector.

6 Fairness of the treatment

Unfair treatment of different parties adds momentum to the forces aiming at changing the
status quo. A policy for renewable electricity can discriminate between electricity sources and
between economic actors. The previous German feed-in law is a good example of both cases.
Introduced to support the diffusion of wind, as mentioned above, the tariffs granted under the
law could not help any other source to gain a significant market share. In fact, although
continuously increasing, the annual additional PV capacity has been relatively small all across
the nineties while additional biomass capacity went up and down due to the presence of
investment incentives (Agnolucci, forthcoming a). In the current German policy rates are
based on the generating costs of technologies to ensure that all obtain a fair treatment (BMU,
2000). In addition the scheme comprises a biennial revision process to guarantee that the
tariffs are moving according to the generating costs.

Under the previous German feed-in law plants owned by utilities were excluded from the
scheme. In addition, utilities had to finance the development of renewable electricity through
the payment of a tariff that was higher than their avoided costs. Not surprisingly, utilities have
been for some time fairly hostile to renewable generators. They challenged the law in the
German courts and contributed to creating a climate of uncertainty. It can be noted that in
1996 when the case was brought in front of the Federal Constitutional Court and Federal High
Court, the additional generating capacity decreased for the first time since the introduction of
the law. As long as the “market” was free from competition, utilities, although reluctantly,
could carry the financial burden as they were able to pass it on to their captive customers.
However, with the introduction of competition in 1998, utilities from the North had to pay a
bigger share of incentives while competing with those from the South. As mentioned above,
the hardship clause limited the size of the problem although it increased the animosity of wind
generators 4 .

Quite curiously, few regulatory schemes adopted a balanced approach towards utilities. In
Denmark, for example, utilities plants were not entitled to receive one of the two generation
incentives paid by the government 5 . It is worth mentioning that the Danish feed-in law was
introduced after utilities began to unilaterally alter the terms of a voluntary agreement to the
disadvantage of wind turbine owners. In contrast, in the Netherlands utilities were not only
allowed to build renewable plants but also received a higher rate than private and industrial
generators (Dinica and Arentsen, 2001). It is worth pointing out that Dutch utilities’ attitude
to renewable electricity has been sometimes ambivalent. While in 1998 they voluntarily
agreed a target for renewable electricity consumption by 2000, one year later they made clear
that they did not want similar schemes to have any significant role in the energy policy.
Increases in the RES-E consumption should be driven only by consumers’ demand (Kwant
and Ruijgrok, 2001). Needless to say, the regulatory risk of a policy in these conditions is
very high.

It is fair to say that as time went by, the attitude of utilities has become more favourable to
renewable electricity. This can be due to the fact that after market liberalisation, utilities could
not be obliged to finance the costs of renewable electricity policy in a way affecting their
competitiveness. This is certainly a positive development for renewable electricity. When
direct burdening of customers for the costs incurred in renewable electricity production was
introduced, the resistance of utilities diminished. Hence, all regulatory and price uncertainty
due to the court cases in Germany and Denmark vanished. In addition, utilities have also
changed their mind about renewable electricity as they are now being given the opportunity to
build plants and take part in the trade. Quite rightly, Kuehn et al. (1999) notes that if the
promotion of renewable electricity is mainly motivated by environmental concerns, there is
no obvious reason to discriminate against any market player, utilities included. It is very hard

It can be also noticed that while at the beginning the exclusion of utilities’ plants from the scheme
was not a very important issue, under the introduction of the hardship clause utilities would have
certainly preferred to have the opportunity to cover the 5% quote with their plants rather than with
those belonging to independent generators. This does not deny that utilities under the feed-in law were
paying tariffs higher than their avoided cost of renewable electricity. However, before the hardship
clause this fact did not give any incentive to them to build renewable plants as the two financial flows,
one negative for the utility and the other positive for its subsidiary producing renewable electricity,
would cancel out in the consolidated balance sheet. After the introduction of the hardship clause, the
construction of plants from utilities would have decreased the amount of money handed out to
independent generators
The first consisted of the reimbursement of the CO2 tax, the so-called “10-oeren subsidy” (1.3 €
c/kWh); the second was a production incentive, the so-called “17-oeren subsidy” (2.3 € c/kWh). Plants
owned by electricity utilities were not entitled to receive the latter.
to imagine that any country can achieve a significant share of renewable electricity without
the involvement of large power companies.

7 The Brussels effect

Quite interestingly, the introduction of tradable quota schemes and their withdrawal in many
European countries mirrors the discussion held in Brussels on the harmonisation of national
policies to support renewable electricity. According to Lauber (2002) the system based on
green certificates was strongly favoured by the European Commission and by some member
states until the end of 1999, on the grounds that competition among generators would reduce
the rates and increase efficiency. However, when the Energy Commissioner submitted a draft
proposal for the renewable electricity directive based on certificates, he was forced to back
down 6 . The second proposal and the adopted directive are neutral with regard to the choice of

Lauber (2002) notes that as time went by, the political framework became more and more
favourable to the feed-in approach. In 1999 a review of the German feed-in law was initiated
but after the European court ruled in favour of the German approach in 2001, the threats of
the DG Competition against the feed-in law were no longer so threatening. Finally, the
European Commission stated on May 2002 that the German laws do not constitute a state aid.
The ruling and the decision from the Commission was a clear sign to utilities and to
governments. One can notice that the Netherlands introduced a green certificate scheme in
1998 and another in 2001, while Denmark introduced a proposal in 1999. However, as noted
by Agnolucci (forthcoming b), the Danish government needed more than three years to make
preparations for the introduction of the scheme and in June 2002 the policy was indefinitely

Brussels has influenced the Netherlands in two different ways. According to Dinica and
Arentsen (2003), imported renewable electricity was finally re-admitted to the green
certificates scheme, as it was the only way the government could reach the national indicative
target envisaged by the EU Directive on Renewables. However, when it became clear that a
large amount of subsidies caused simply a redirection of electricity to already built capacity
(van Sambeek and van Thuijl, 2003) and did not lead to the building of additional capacity at
home or abroad, the position of the government was untenable. As noted by Agnolucci
(submitted), although the Dutch government adopted tradable certificates, the then preferred
instrument in Brussels, the openness of the system to imports caused the inefficient cross-
border trades that the European Commission wanted to eliminate by introducing a pan-
European support mechanism. Eventually, after Brussels saw the harmonisation of the support
instruments as a less pressing issue, the Dutch government introduced a feed-in tariff.

Lauber et al. (2002) point out that one of the early formulations of this idea can be found in the Green
Paper for a Community Strategy "Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy" (European
Commission 1996) and in the White Paper of the subsequent year (European Commission 1997). After
the withdrawal of the proposal a Commission working paper on the subject was published to provide
the decisive arguments in favour of green certificates. However, according to Lauber (2002) the proof
was not impressive and certainly not definitive as testified by the current debate in the literature. The
author of the Commission paper showed that without competition between large utilities they could
otherwise try to extract excessive support from the state for building renewable plants. However,
Agnolucci (2004d) shows that this could also happen in the case of tradable quotas.
8 Coherence of the Policy and of the Framework

A final factor, which may influence the likelihood of there being a regulatory change, is the
coherence of the policy and of the framework where the policy is inserted. For example, in
the Netherlands Green Labels were introduced to verify the voluntary agreement between
utilities and the government but they were also used to verify the REB Production Subsidy
and Zero Rate. Although there was no clarity about the role of imports, as they qualified in
the last two policies, they were given labels. Hence, one would have expected them to be
counted towards the voluntary target. However, as utilities charged a fee on customers to
finance the construction of renewable plants in the Netherlands, one would have expected
imports to be excluded from the target, as otherwise the rationale of the fee would be
somewhat unclear. At the end it was distinguished between Dutch and imported Green labels
and the latter were not counted towards the target.

Another example is provided by the policy in England and Wales. As noted by Mitchell and
Connor (2004) the argument on whether to support renewables with a specific mechanism or
through the imposition of a policy increasing the cost of carbon has been debated since 1990.
Although there has been a specific economic policy to help the diffusion of renewables for
about 15 years, i.e. first the Non-Fossil Fuel Order and then the Renewable Obligation, there
has also been strong support for a sector-wide carbon reducing policy, especially from
business and the Treasury. As a result, support for specific renewable energy policies has
never been powerful or widespread in the government. The success of renewable energy
policy and most of all the willingness of private investors to get involved is very likely to
have been influenced by this lack of clarity.

9 Conclusions

Based on the experience of four major players in the European market for renewable
electricity, this paper has provided an initial discussion on the factors influencing the
likelihood of a regulatory change in the policies supporting the diffusion of renewable
electricity. Although all stakeholders want policies to be effective, it is not really clear if there
is an agreement on which criteria to adopt and how different criteria on effectiveness can be
traded-off. The economics of the policy provides a more clear-cut criterion in order to assess
the likelihood of a change in the policy. In fact, a policy that is either financially not
sustainable or clearly economically inefficient will be attacked by parties opposing it and will
have to be altered sooner or later. Clearly, the commitment of the government to the rationale
for introducing the policy can affect the time span and the modalities in which this change
will eventually occur. One can assume that the government’s objectives mirror the
composition of society and the strength of different lobbying groups. Bearing this in mind, the
variety and not only the size of the lobbying groups supporting renewable electricity is
important as different actors can use different networks in order to access policy-makers. In
particular it was noticed that the presence of a national industry or the direct involvement of
citizens in the renewable electricity sector, e.g. buying shares, increases the resonance of the
arguments of the lobbying group. Another criterion to foresee a regulatory change is the
fairness of the treatment of different parties. It has been noticed that utilities are very
important actors in achieving any remarkable share of renewable electricity and therefore
should be taken on board by the government. In addition, there is also the need to find a
balance between the needs of cheaper technologies and more expensive ones, if one does not
want the policy to come under attack by those generators, which have been excluded. Not
surprisingly, national policies have been very sensitive in the recent past to the discussion
being held in Brussels about the instruments to promote renewable electricity, i.e. the
Brussels effect. As this caused various changes and a lengthy period of uncertainty in two of
the countries surveyed, the next round of discussions should be carefully organised in order to
avoid so many regulatory changes in the national policies. Finally, renewable policies should
not be seen on their own but in a larger context of the electricity market and CO2-reduction.
As shown in the article, the lack of a clear link between policies has brought about several
regulatory changes in one case and contributed to undermining the importance of the
renewable policy in the other.

The author would like to thank Paul Ekins for discussing previous drafts of this work, Ralf
Bischof from the German Wind Energy Association and Willem van der Heule the Dutch
Ministry of Economic Affairs for helping his understanding of the German and Dutch
policies. The paper has drawn upon work completed for Tyndall Centre project T2.12 -
ETech+: Technology policy and technical change, a dynamic global and UK approach.
Discussion with colleagues on this project is also gratefully acknowledged.

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assessment: Tyndall Centre Working Paper 99 change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 92

• Warren R., Hope C, Mastrandrea M, Tol R S

• Lowe T.,(2006) Is this climate porn? How J, Adger W. N., Lorenzoni I., (2006)
does climate change communication affect Spotlighting the impacts functions in
our perceptions and behaviour?, Tyndall integrated assessments. Research Report
Centre Working Paper 98 Prepared for the Stern Review on the
Economics of Climate Change, Tyndall Centre
• Walkden M, Stansby P,(2006) The effect of Paper 91
dredging off Great Yarmouth on the wave
conditions and erosion of the North Norfolk • Warren R., Arnell A, Nicholls R., Levy P E,
coast. Tyndall Centre Working Paper 97 Price J, (2006) Understanding the regional
impacts of climate change: Research
• Anthoff, D., Nicholls R., Tol R S J, Vafeidis, Report Prepared for the Stern Review on
A., (2006) Global and regional exposure to the Economics of Climate Change, Tyndall
large rises in sea-level: a sensitivity Centre Working Paper 90
analysis. This work was prepared for the Stern
Review on the Economics of Climate Change:
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 96 • Barker T., Qureshi M, Kohler J., (2006)
The Costs of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
with Induced Technological Change: A
• Few R., Brown K, Tompkins E. L, (2006) Meta-Analysis of Estimates in the
Public participation and climate change Literature, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 89
adaptation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 95
• Kuang C, Stansby P, (2006) Sandbanks for
• Corbera E., Kosoy N, Martinez Tuna M, coastal protection: implications of sea-level
(2006) Marketing ecosystem services rise. Part 3: wave modelling, Tyndall Centre
through protected areas and rural Working Paper 88
communities in Meso-America:
Implications for economic efficiency, • Kuang C, Stansby P, (2006) Sandbanks for
equity and political legitimacy, Tyndall coastal protection: implications of sea-level
Centre Working Paper 94 rise. Part 2: current and morphological
modelling, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 87

Tyndall Working Papers 2000 - 2007

• Stansby P, Kuang C, Laurence D, Launder B, representing uncertainty in projections of
(2006) Sandbanks for coastal protection: future climate, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
implications of sea-level rise. Part 1: 75
application to East Anglia, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 86 • Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005)
How do the costs of adaptation affect
• Bentham M, (2006) optimal mitigation when there is
An assessment of carbon sequestration uncertainty, irreversibility and learning?,
potential in the UK – Southern North Sea Tyndall Centre Working Paper 74
case study: Tyndall Centre Working Paper 85
• Walkden, M. (2005) Coastal process
• Anderson K., Bows A., Upham P., (2006) simulator scoping study, Tyndall Centre
Growth scenarios for EU & UK aviation: Working Paper 73
contradictions with climate policy,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 84 • Lowe, T., Brown, K., Suraje Dessai, S.,
Doria, M., Haynes, K. and Vincent., K (2005)
• Williamson M., Lenton T., Shepherd J., Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster
Edwards N, (2006) An efficient numerical narrative and public perceptions of climate
terrestrial scheme (ENTS) for fast earth change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 72
system modelling, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 83 • Boyd, E. Gutierrez, M. and Chang, M. (2005)
Adapting small-scale CDM sinks projects to
• Bows, A., and Anderson, K. (2005) An low-income communities, Tyndall Centre
analysis of a post-Kyoto climate policy Working Paper 71
model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 82
• Abu-Sharkh, S., Li, R., Markvart, T., Ross,
• Sorrell, S., (2005) The economics of N., Wilson, P., Yao, R., Steemers, K., Kohler, J.
energy service contracts, Tyndall Centre and Arnold, R. (2005) Can Migrogrids Make a
Working Paper 81 Major Contribution to UK Energy Supply?,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 70
• Wittneben, B., Haxeltine, A., Kjellen, B.,
Köhler, J., Turnpenny, J., and Warren, R., • Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. A. (2005)
(2005) A framework for assessing the Natural hazards and climate change: what
political economy of post-2012 global knowledge is transferable?, Tyndall Centre
climate regime, Tyndall Centre Working Paper Working Paper 69
• Bleda, M. and Shackley, S. (2005) The
• Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) formation of belief in climate change in
Can adaptation and mitigation be business organisations: a dynamic
complements?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper simulation model, Tyndall Centre Working
79 Paper 68

• Agnolucci,. P (2005) Opportunism and • Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A. and O’Riordan,

competition in the non-fossil fuel T., (2005) Developing regional and local
obligation market, Tyndall Centre Working scenarios for climate change mitigation
Paper 78 and adaptation: Part 2: Scenario creation,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 67
• Barker, T., Pan, H., Köhler, J., Warren., R • Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A., Lorenzoni, I.,
and Winne, S. (2005) Avoiding dangerous O’Riordan, T., and Jones, M., (2005) Mapping
climate change by inducing technological actors involved in climate change policy
progress: scenarios using a large-scale networks in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working
econometric model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 66
Paper 77
• Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L.
• Agnolucci,. P (2005) The role of political (2004) Why do resource managers make
uncertainty in the Danish renewable links to stakeholders at other scales?,
energy market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65
• Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel
• Fu, G., Hall, J. W. and Lawry, J. (2005) Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall
Beyond probability: new methods for Centre Working Paper 64
Tyndall Working Papers 2000 - 2007
• Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex Post Evaluations
• Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey Tyndall
S. (2004) Floods, health and climate Centre Working Paper 52
change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 63 • Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. and Ekins, P.
(2004) Hysteresis and Energy Demand: the
• Barker, T. (2004) Economic theory and Announcement Effects and the effects of
the transition to sustainability: a the UK Climate Change Levy Tyndall Centre
comparison of Working Paper 51
approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62
• Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. and
• Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a
Sahel: long term perspectives and future Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working
prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61 Paper 50

• Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. • Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our
(2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change electricity networks to promote
response and coastal management in the decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working
UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60 Paper 49

• Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic

• Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004)
structure under technological
Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects
development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 59
• Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M.,
• Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social
(2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational
Simulation of The Public Perceptions of
adaptation to climate change impacts,
Weather Events and their Effect upon the
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47
Development of Belief in Anthropogenic
Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
• Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow,
A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004)
UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall
• Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S
Centre Working Paper 46
(2004) The Public Perceptions of
Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A • Purdy, R and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological
Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57 carbon sequestration: critical legal issues,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45
• Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of
social vulnerability to climate change for
Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56 • Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C.
(2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon
Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working
• Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Paper 44
Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A
comprehensive set of high-resolution grids • Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003)
of monthly climate for Europe and the Innovation and Threshold Effects in
globe: the observed record (1901-2000) Technology Responses to Climate Change,
and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43
Centre Working Paper 55
• Kim, J. (2003) Sustainable Development
• Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., and and the CDM: A South African Case Study,
O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42
local scenarios for climate change
mitigation and adaptation Part 1: A • Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity
framing of the East of England Tyndall Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working
Centre Working Paper 54 Paper 41

• Agnolucci, P. and Ekins, P. (2004) The • Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai,
Announcement Effect And Environmental S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and
Taxation Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53 adaptation into climate and development

Tyndall Working Papers 2000 - 2007

policy: three research questions, Tyndall “development” in the centre of decision-
Centre Working Paper 40 making, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29

• Tompkins, E. and Adger, W.N. (2003). • Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M.,
Defining response capacity to enhance Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R.
climate change policy, Tyndall Centre (2003). Defining and experiencing
Working Paper 39 dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 28
• Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk
and adaptation: a conceptual framework, • Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003).
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38 Building resilience to climate change
through adaptive management of natural
• Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27
Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and
the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre • Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003).
Working Paper 37 Country level risk measures of climate-
related natural disasters and implications
• Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall
(2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising Centre Working Paper 26
Transport: The Role of Technologies,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36 • Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and
Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of
• Tompkins E. L and Hurlston, L. (2003). Network Splitting for Fault Level
Report to the Cayman Islands’ Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25
Government. Adaptation lessons learned
from responding to tropical cyclones by the • Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G.
Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 – (2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables
2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35 and CHP into the UK Transmission
Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24
• Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does
climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall • Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002).
Centre Working Paper 34 Justice and adaptation to climate change,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23
• Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and
Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, • Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T.,
Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33 Combined Heat and Power Resources in
the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22

• Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. • Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and

(2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall
into the UK Electricity System: Centre Working Paper 21
Investigation of the impact of network
faults on the stability of large offshore • Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing
wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32 organisational use of scenarios: Case study
- evaluating UK energy policy options,
• Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20
T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs
for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the • Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The
pilot-phase interactive integrated role of hydrogen in powering road
assessment process (Aurion Project), transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31
• Watson, J. (2002). The development of
• Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate large technical systems: implications for
change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18
Working Paper 30
• Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy
• Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17
Multi-Criteria Assessment Framework for
Carbon-Mitigation Projects: Putting • Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway,
D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to
Tyndall Working Papers 2000 - 2007
climate change: Setting the Agenda for
Development Policy and Research, Tyndall • Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate
Centre Working Paper 16 Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7

• Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical • Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T.
change in an energy-environment-economy (2001). The identification and evaluation of
(E3) model for an IA system: A model of suitable scenario development methods for
Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working the estimation of future probabilities of
Paper 15 extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 6
• Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The
Use of Integrated Assessment: An • Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse
Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall Effects and the Impacts of Response
Centre Working Paper 14 Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 5
• Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002).
Technological Change, Industry Structure • Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High
and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working are the Costs of Kyoto for the US
Paper 13 Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4

• Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime • Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J.
from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or (2001). Socio-economic futures in climate
sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre change impact assessment: using
Working Paper 12 scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 3
• Barker, T. (2001). Representing the
Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, • Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated
Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working
Working Paper 11 Paper 2

• Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. • Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A

(2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Country-by-Country Analysis of Past and
Initial Exploration of Public Opinions, Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10 Working Paper 1

• Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001).

Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, © Copyright 2007
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9

• Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and

Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper

For further information please contact

Javier Delgado-Esteban

Tyndall Working Papers 2000 - 2007

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