Is It Going to Happen?

Regulatory Change and Renewable Electricity �

Paolo Agnolucci February 2006

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

Working Paper 101

Is It Going to Happen? Regulatory Change and Renewable Electricity
Paolo Agnolucci (1) Environment Group, Policy Studies Institute, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 3SR p.agnolucci@psi.org.uk

Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 101

Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are commented on by Tyndall researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer review. The accuracy of this work and the conclusions reached are the responsibility of the author(s) alone and not the Tyndall Centre. The data and interpretation given in this report are to be used only for the Tyndall Centre for climate change project. Requests to use this report for any other purpose must be directed to the British Geological Survey, who retains the rights for its use.

Abstract In the last decade or so the policies supporting renewable electricity have been changed several times in most European countries. Based on the experience of England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark this paper discusses some of the factors influencing the likelihood of such regulatory change. These are found to belong to a wide set of causes, ranging from economic efficiency and financial stability to equity of treatment through what has been called the Brussels effect. By considering how national polices deal with the issues discussed in this paper, one hypothetical investor can assess the risk of a regulatory change and therefore the likelihood of its investment being undermined by a policy change.

Keywords: Regulatory Risk, Renewable Electricity, Feed-in laws, Tradable Certificates, Renewable Obligation

1 Introduction In the renewable electricity sector, the regulatory risk is thought to be caused by “the fact that the markets are created by policy mechanisms, which are subject to changes in policy priorities and changes in government” (Iccept and E4tech (2003) p116). In case these changes apply to plants already built, economic agents who invested in renewable electricity can find themselves with a stranded asset, whose value is very different from what they previously anticipated. It is fair to say that investors will be reluctant to invest even when they are very likely to make a profit, should the policy not be altered 1 . It is worth noting that on many occasions existing plants have been shielded by a change in the regulatory regime, as they have normally been given the opportunity to benefit from the terms underlining their business model. An example is provided by the act introducing competition in the generation and transmission of electricity in England and Wales, the (NETA). When it was passed it was clear that the NFFO generators would still be paid their generation price agreed in the renewable policy, the Non-Fossil Fuel Orders (NFFO). In these conditions the importance of the regulatory risk is diminished. However, some inefficient situations could still prevail. If for example, investors foresaw a change in the policy and if they still had an opportunity to build plants under the old policy, they would rush to build plants. However, by doing so they would put useless strain on the industry providing material inputs and expertise for renewable technologies. This occurred in Denmark in 1999, before the amendment of the feed-in law. Based on the policies in England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark this paper discusses some of the factors that have influenced the likelihood of there being a regulatory change. The economics of the policy, the government commitment, the size and variety of the pro-renewable electricity coalition, the fairness of the treatment, the “Brussels effect” and the clarity of the policy help economic actors to foresee a change in the policy landscape. By affecting the regulatory risk they influence the willingness of investors to build plants and ultimately reach the target set by the governments

2 Effectiveness of the policy If a government has introduced a policy to help the diffusion of renewable electricity, one would assume that they would have a stake in making this happen. Although the effectiveness of a policy is important in determining the likelihood of there being a regulatory change, it is not clear which parameter should be used to form the judgement. Van Dijk et al. (2004) for example propose to use the amount of capacity (kW) or the amount of renewable electricity (kWh) added by the policy. One would also argue that costs are also important. However, since one has more than one criterion the issue of how to weigh them must be tackled 2 . In addition one also has to decide which institution – such as the Treasury, the Economic or the Environment Ministry, the renewable generators trade organization, etc. - should determine the criteria and their weights. Different actors have different interests and therefore different
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In economics this is the well-know hold-up problem. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992). For a brief discussion of how this problem has affected the wind policy in Denmark see Agnolucci (2004a). 2 This problem obviously applies also to the analysis undertaken in Van Dijk et al. (2004). While this paper considers effectiveness to be a property of a policy, Van Dijk et al. (2004) consider effectiveness to be a criterion to analyse “the success of policy instruments” which can be defined as the instruments’ contribution to a sustainable growth in the renewable energy market. Success is further broken down into a set of criteria, of which effectiveness, as defined by the authors is the first. Quite interestingly cost effectiveness is the second. Other criteria are certainty for industry, market efficiency (static and dynamic), transparency, transaction cost and administrative capacity, equity (fair distribution of benefits) and market conformity (Van Dijk et al., 2004; p. 16).

preferences for how to judge the effectiveness of a policy. While some of them would be willing to consider generation costs as a milestone, others could be interested in the additional generating capacity only. Private investors on the other hand could be simply interested in the amount of money they could make out of the policy. According to them an “effective” policy would be one stimulating a great deal of additional capacity paid at the highest possible tariff, maybe not the kind of scheme preferred by policy-makers. A change in government could also imply the use of different criteria or different importance attached to them. Because of all these reasons the effectiveness of a policy is not very helpful in determining the chances of there being a regulatory change.

3 Economics of the Policy Regardless of its effectiveness a policy has to be financially sustainable and reach a certain degree of economic efficiency. This is the rationale for considering economics as the first criterion in order to judge the regulatory risk of a policy. While this does not imply that a policy will be changed exclusively on the basis of its economics, a scheme not delivering value for money is very prone to be amended for any other factor, such as the election of a government with different views on renewable electricity. One example is provided by the Dutch REB Production Subsidy (Agnolucci submitted). As the incentive was paid to imported renewable electricity regardless of whether it was sold on the green or on the mainstream market, only the price of the interconnector could restrain the flow of cheap renewable imports from other countries. At the value of 20 Euros per MWh the subsidy made importing hydropower and biomass an extremely profitable business. The increased price for interconnection capacity meant that almost the whole Production Subsidy was paid to the system operator. In addition, as the interconnector was congested, the price of brown electricity might also have risen because of the decrease in import elasticity (Newbury et al., 2002) 3 . Not surprisingly, the REB Production Subsidy was substituted by a feed-in tariff and only Dutch generators were made eligible for this policy. Another example is provided by the so-called hardship clause in the German feed-in law, which limited the utilities’ obligation to take renewable electricity to the 5% of the electricity delivered in their area (Kuehn et al. 1999, Lauber 2002). By introducing this clause the government constrained the financial burden on utilities located in the windiest regions and also acknowledged, at least implicitly, that the law was distorting competition. However, the hardship clause was a highly instable and inefficient solution, its inefficiency deriving from the fact that windy sites from regions above the threshold would be discarded in favour of less productive sites in regions below the threshold. The inefficiency of the policy was responsible for its instability. While the threshold pacified utilities from the North, it made wind developers more vociferous as the 5% was quickly getting closer. Obviously, they would have preferred not to be forced to develop farms in the relatively windless South. Shortly after being elected the Red-Green government announced its intention to assess the conditions of renewable generators and the policy was changed. The change in the Danish feed-in law provides another example (Agnolucci forthcoming b, Morthorst 2002). When in 1998 the amount of the production incentive paid by the government to renewable generators reached 90 million Euros (about 703 million Krones) it became clear that the long-term financial feasibility of the system was compromised by the
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As another Dutch policy, the REB exemption, required utilities to balance sales and purchase of green electricity only in terms of monthly averages, they could buy the nearly zero-valued off-peak capacity in the interconnector to import electricity. In the case of production subsidy, utilities had to show a contract path from the source to the point of delivery, including the use of import capacity on all borders. For more details see Newbury et al. (2002).

increase in wind capacity. In addition, the burden imposed by the feed-in tariff had contributed to the financial problems incurred by public utilities. Another cost of the policy was due to the fact that the CO2 tax was refunded to the renewable generators. It can be noticed that while in Germany economic efficiency was the driver to revise the legislation, in Denmark the reason was concerns related to public finances. In the latter case one would expect a government to be more determined and responsive to implement a policy change.

4 The Commitment of the Government A policy that is not economically or financially sustainable points to the imminence of a change but it is not explicative of the direction of the amendment. The level of commitment of the government can give a hint on whether the finances of renewable generators will improve or worsen. An example is provided by the substitution of the German feed-in law by the Renewable Energy Act. As mentioned above, the inefficiency and un-sustainability of the previous policy were two reasons bringing about this change. However, when the policy changed the rates paid per kWh to most renewable generators increased. In Germany all major political parties and especially those forming the Red-Green coalition are in fact committed to diffusion of renewable electricity (Bischof, 2004). Another example is provided by the treatment of PV under the same law. The Renewable Energy Act originally covered only plants commissioned up to the year when a cumulative generating capacity of 350 MW would be reached. However, after the boom of the market in 2001, the limit was raised to 1,000 MW (Bechberger and Reiche, 2004). Obviously, a non-committed government would have taken the opportunity to restrain the market. Talking about level of commitment presumes that there is clarity on what the government wants to achieve and most of all that the government has only one objective. This is not always true. In fact, in Denmark when the proposal for the green certificates was announced the government wanted to secure the financial position of renewable generators but also increase that of utilities, which would be privatised soon (DEA, 2000). As utilities had to pay for renewable electricity there was a trade-off between the two objectives. In these circumstances it is obviously difficult to foresee the direction of the change. Another example is provided by Dutch renewable policy. According to van der Heule (2004), the creation of the voluntary green electricity market was not the outcome of a premeditated policy but of a fortunate series of coincidences, i.e. the increase of the REB, an energy tax, from which green electricity was exempted and the early opening of the green market to competition in 2001. Although the government was pleased with the buoyant demand for green electricity, the simultaneous presence of a supply and demand side policy in the Netherlands caused the stagnation of national renewable capacity and a surge in imports (Agnolucci submitted). Eventually, the REB exemption from renewable electricity was abandoned and only Dutch generators were made eligible for the feed-in law.

5 Size and Variety of the Coalition While the level of commitment of a government can give hints on direction of an imminent change, it would be naïve to think that the actions of the executive power are not influenced by the strength of coalitions having a stake in the matters affected by legislation. The size and diversity of the group supporting the diffusion of renewable electricity can be considered an indicator of its effectiveness in hindering or fostering a policy change. An example is provided by the proposal of the Renewable Electricity Directive. The European Commission in 1999 had a strong preference for green certificates as the system to harmonise the diffusion of renewable electricity in the Member States. However, when the Energy Commissioner submitted a draft for the renewable electricity Directive based on such an instrument, it was

forced to back off due to the opposition from some lobby groups and European governments, notably Germany and its wind industry (Lauber, 2002). Clearly, this was the result of a very well organised and influential group having the ear of the government of one of the biggest European countries. Had the opposition come from a small lobby group based in a less influential country, one could expect that the European Union would have managed to pass the proposal. One can argue that size and the diversity of the coalition supporting renewable electricity influence not only the policy direction of the government but also the resilience of the industry. A big and diverse group can act as a safety net for single investors. An example is provided by the recent amendment of the German Renewable Energy Act. This process lasted about two years, i.e. from August 2002 to June 2004, and has brought about a lengthy period of instability and uncertainty. The changes in terms of rates, eligibility and length of the scheme have been considerable from the start of the process to its end (Agnolucci, forthcoming a). The amendment has also been characterised by some relatively sterile confrontations between the two houses of the German Parliament. Yet the reaction of technologies varied. Although additional wind generating capacity slightly decreased from the previous year, it still managed to achieve about 2.5 GW in 2003. Biomass additional capacity however went down to about 75MW after reaching the height of 250 MW just two years earlier. Maybe wind generators, being part of an influential network, felt confident of the outcome of the process and were not worried about the policy uncertainty. On the other hand, biomass generators who so far constitute a less organised lobby organisation were perhaps warier of the government’s intentions, especially because the investment incentives for biomass had recently been terminated. Another example is provided by biomass in England. The variety of the actors with a stake in renewable electricity increases the effectiveness of the coalition, as they can use different networks to make their voice heard. In particular the presence of a national industry will make politicians wary of introducing a provision putting jobs and firms’ finances at risk. In Denmark for example the abandonment of the proposal to introduce a green certificate scheme coincided with a crisis in the industry due to the lowest number of orders in about a decade. The extent of involvement of citizens with renewable electricity is also important. For example, in Denmark an income tax rule encouraged families to invest in windpower (Haas, 2003); by 2001, about 150.000 families, 5% of the Danish population, owned a turbine or a share in one (Lauber, 2002) Another example is provided by the way in which the previous German feed-in law came about. Although at the end it was supported by all political parties, it was introduced as a private bill by two members of Parliament from the northern states. German farmers at that time were looking for ways to earn additional income and wind was considered one of such opportunities (Lauber, 2002). Maybe the northern German farmers simply looked at what was happening beyond the northern border. Denmark had several turbines already installed and a large number of small investors – farmers included – putting their money into the renewable electricity sector.

6 Fairness of the treatment Unfair treatment of different parties adds momentum to the forces aiming at changing the status quo. A policy for renewable electricity can discriminate between electricity sources and between economic actors. The previous German feed-in law is a good example of both cases. Introduced to support the diffusion of wind, as mentioned above, the tariffs granted under the law could not help any other source to gain a significant market share. In fact, although continuously increasing, the annual additional PV capacity has been relatively small all across the nineties while additional biomass capacity went up and down due to the presence of investment incentives (Agnolucci, forthcoming a). In the current German policy rates are based on the generating costs of technologies to ensure that all obtain a fair treatment (BMU,

2000). In addition the scheme comprises a biennial revision process to guarantee that the tariffs are moving according to the generating costs. Under the previous German feed-in law plants owned by utilities were excluded from the scheme. In addition, utilities had to finance the development of renewable electricity through the payment of a tariff that was higher than their avoided costs. Not surprisingly, utilities have been for some time fairly hostile to renewable generators. They challenged the law in the German courts and contributed to creating a climate of uncertainty. It can be noted that in 1996 when the case was brought in front of the Federal Constitutional Court and Federal High Court, the additional generating capacity decreased for the first time since the introduction of the law. As long as the “market” was free from competition, utilities, although reluctantly, could carry the financial burden as they were able to pass it on to their captive customers. However, with the introduction of competition in 1998, utilities from the North had to pay a bigger share of incentives while competing with those from the South. As mentioned above, the hardship clause limited the size of the problem although it increased the animosity of wind generators 4 . Quite curiously, few regulatory schemes adopted a balanced approach towards utilities. In Denmark, for example, utilities plants were not entitled to receive one of the two generation incentives paid by the government 5 . It is worth mentioning that the Danish feed-in law was introduced after utilities began to unilaterally alter the terms of a voluntary agreement to the disadvantage of wind turbine owners. In contrast, in the Netherlands utilities were not only allowed to build renewable plants but also received a higher rate than private and industrial generators (Dinica and Arentsen, 2001). It is worth pointing out that Dutch utilities’ attitude to renewable electricity has been sometimes ambivalent. While in 1998 they voluntarily agreed a target for renewable electricity consumption by 2000, one year later they made clear that they did not want similar schemes to have any significant role in the energy policy. Increases in the RES-E consumption should be driven only by consumers’ demand (Kwant and Ruijgrok, 2001). Needless to say, the regulatory risk of a policy in these conditions is very high. It is fair to say that as time went by, the attitude of utilities has become more favourable to renewable electricity. This can be due to the fact that after market liberalisation, utilities could not be obliged to finance the costs of renewable electricity policy in a way affecting their competitiveness. This is certainly a positive development for renewable electricity. When direct burdening of customers for the costs incurred in renewable electricity production was introduced, the resistance of utilities diminished. Hence, all regulatory and price uncertainty due to the court cases in Germany and Denmark vanished. In addition, utilities have also changed their mind about renewable electricity as they are now being given the opportunity to build plants and take part in the trade. Quite rightly, Kuehn et al. (1999) notes that if the promotion of renewable electricity is mainly motivated by environmental concerns, there is no obvious reason to discriminate against any market player, utilities included. It is very hard
It can be also noticed that while at the beginning the exclusion of utilities’ plants from the scheme was not a very important issue, under the introduction of the hardship clause utilities would have certainly preferred to have the opportunity to cover the 5% quote with their plants rather than with those belonging to independent generators. This does not deny that utilities under the feed-in law were paying tariffs higher than their avoided cost of renewable electricity. However, before the hardship clause this fact did not give any incentive to them to build renewable plants as the two financial flows, one negative for the utility and the other positive for its subsidiary producing renewable electricity, would cancel out in the consolidated balance sheet. After the introduction of the hardship clause, the construction of plants from utilities would have decreased the amount of money handed out to independent generators 5 The first consisted of the reimbursement of the CO2 tax, the so-called “10-oeren subsidy” (1.3 € c/kWh); the second was a production incentive, the so-called “17-oeren subsidy” (2.3 € c/kWh). Plants owned by electricity utilities were not entitled to receive the latter.
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to imagine that any country can achieve a significant share of renewable electricity without the involvement of large power companies.

7 The Brussels effect Quite interestingly, the introduction of tradable quota schemes and their withdrawal in many European countries mirrors the discussion held in Brussels on the harmonisation of national policies to support renewable electricity. According to Lauber (2002) the system based on green certificates was strongly favoured by the European Commission and by some member states until the end of 1999, on the grounds that competition among generators would reduce the rates and increase efficiency. However, when the Energy Commissioner submitted a draft proposal for the renewable electricity directive based on certificates, he was forced to back down 6 . The second proposal and the adopted directive are neutral with regard to the choice of instruments. Lauber (2002) notes that as time went by, the political framework became more and more favourable to the feed-in approach. In 1999 a review of the German feed-in law was initiated but after the European court ruled in favour of the German approach in 2001, the threats of the DG Competition against the feed-in law were no longer so threatening. Finally, the European Commission stated on May 2002 that the German laws do not constitute a state aid. The ruling and the decision from the Commission was a clear sign to utilities and to governments. One can notice that the Netherlands introduced a green certificate scheme in 1998 and another in 2001, while Denmark introduced a proposal in 1999. However, as noted by Agnolucci (forthcoming b), the Danish government needed more than three years to make preparations for the introduction of the scheme and in June 2002 the policy was indefinitely shelved. Brussels has influenced the Netherlands in two different ways. According to Dinica and Arentsen (2003), imported renewable electricity was finally re-admitted to the green certificates scheme, as it was the only way the government could reach the national indicative target envisaged by the EU Directive on Renewables. However, when it became clear that a large amount of subsidies caused simply a redirection of electricity to already built capacity (van Sambeek and van Thuijl, 2003) and did not lead to the building of additional capacity at home or abroad, the position of the government was untenable. As noted by Agnolucci (submitted), although the Dutch government adopted tradable certificates, the then preferred instrument in Brussels, the openness of the system to imports caused the inefficient crossborder trades that the European Commission wanted to eliminate by introducing a panEuropean support mechanism. Eventually, after Brussels saw the harmonisation of the support instruments as a less pressing issue, the Dutch government introduced a feed-in tariff.

Lauber et al. (2002) point out that one of the early formulations of this idea can be found in the Green Paper for a Community Strategy "Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy" (European Commission 1996) and in the White Paper of the subsequent year (European Commission 1997). After the withdrawal of the proposal a Commission working paper on the subject was published to provide the decisive arguments in favour of green certificates. However, according to Lauber (2002) the proof was not impressive and certainly not definitive as testified by the current debate in the literature. The author of the Commission paper showed that without competition between large utilities they could otherwise try to extract excessive support from the state for building renewable plants. However, Agnolucci (2004d) shows that this could also happen in the case of tradable quotas.

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8 Coherence of the Policy and of the Framework A final factor, which may influence the likelihood of there being a regulatory change, is the coherence of the policy and of the framework where the policy is inserted. For example, in the Netherlands Green Labels were introduced to verify the voluntary agreement between utilities and the government but they were also used to verify the REB Production Subsidy and Zero Rate. Although there was no clarity about the role of imports, as they qualified in the last two policies, they were given labels. Hence, one would have expected them to be counted towards the voluntary target. However, as utilities charged a fee on customers to finance the construction of renewable plants in the Netherlands, one would have expected imports to be excluded from the target, as otherwise the rationale of the fee would be somewhat unclear. At the end it was distinguished between Dutch and imported Green labels and the latter were not counted towards the target. Another example is provided by the policy in England and Wales. As noted by Mitchell and Connor (2004) the argument on whether to support renewables with a specific mechanism or through the imposition of a policy increasing the cost of carbon has been debated since 1990. Although there has been a specific economic policy to help the diffusion of renewables for about 15 years, i.e. first the Non-Fossil Fuel Order and then the Renewable Obligation, there has also been strong support for a sector-wide carbon reducing policy, especially from business and the Treasury. As a result, support for specific renewable energy policies has never been powerful or widespread in the government. The success of renewable energy policy and most of all the willingness of private investors to get involved is very likely to have been influenced by this lack of clarity. 9 Conclusions Based on the experience of four major players in the European market for renewable electricity, this paper has provided an initial discussion on the factors influencing the likelihood of a regulatory change in the policies supporting the diffusion of renewable electricity. Although all stakeholders want policies to be effective, it is not really clear if there is an agreement on which criteria to adopt and how different criteria on effectiveness can be traded-off. The economics of the policy provides a more clear-cut criterion in order to assess the likelihood of a change in the policy. In fact, a policy that is either financially not sustainable or clearly economically inefficient will be attacked by parties opposing it and will have to be altered sooner or later. Clearly, the commitment of the government to the rationale for introducing the policy can affect the time span and the modalities in which this change will eventually occur. One can assume that the government’s objectives mirror the composition of society and the strength of different lobbying groups. Bearing this in mind, the variety and not only the size of the lobbying groups supporting renewable electricity is important as different actors can use different networks in order to access policy-makers. In particular it was noticed that the presence of a national industry or the direct involvement of citizens in the renewable electricity sector, e.g. buying shares, increases the resonance of the arguments of the lobbying group. Another criterion to foresee a regulatory change is the fairness of the treatment of different parties. It has been noticed that utilities are very important actors in achieving any remarkable share of renewable electricity and therefore should be taken on board by the government. In addition, there is also the need to find a balance between the needs of cheaper technologies and more expensive ones, if one does not want the policy to come under attack by those generators, which have been excluded. Not surprisingly, national policies have been very sensitive in the recent past to the discussion being held in Brussels about the instruments to promote renewable electricity, i.e. the Brussels effect. As this caused various changes and a lengthy period of uncertainty in two of the countries surveyed, the next round of discussions should be carefully organised in order to

avoid so many regulatory changes in the national policies. Finally, renewable policies should not be seen on their own but in a larger context of the electricity market and CO2-reduction. As shown in the article, the lack of a clear link between policies has brought about several regulatory changes in one case and contributed to undermining the importance of the renewable policy in the other.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Paul Ekins for discussing previous drafts of this work, Ralf Bischof from the German Wind Energy Association and Willem van der Heule the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs for helping his understanding of the German and Dutch policies. The paper has drawn upon work completed for Tyndall Centre project T2.12 ETech+: Technology policy and technical change, a dynamic global and UK approach. Discussion with colleagues on this project is also gratefully acknowledged.

References

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Kwant K. W., and W. Ruijgrok, 1998. Deployment of Renewable Energy in a Liberalised Energy Market by Fiscal Instruments in the Netherlands; available at www.climatetech.net. Lauber V., 2002. The Different Concepts of Promoting RES-Electricity and their Political Career, In: Frank Biermann, Rainer Brohm and Klaus Dingwerth, eds. 2002. Proceedings of the 2001 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change “Global Environmental Change and the Nation State”. Potsdam: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, pp. 296-304. Milgrom P. and J. Roberts, 1992. Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J. Mitchell C. and P. Connor, 2004. Renewable Energy Policy in the UK 1990-2003, available on line at http://users.wbs.warwick.ac.uk/group/cmur/people/catherine_mitchell Morthorst P.E., 2000. The development of a green certificate market, Energy Policy, 28, p. 1085-94 Newbury D. van Damme E, von der Fehr N. M. and Naeije W, 2002. MSC analysis of high annual import prices and green tickets; available at www.nmanet.nl/en/Images/14_4019.pdf van Dijk, A.L., Beurskens L.W.M., Boots M.G., Kaal M.B.T., de Lange T.J., van Sambeek E.J.W. and M. A. Uyterlinde, 2003. Renewable Energy Policies and Market Developments, Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN), Petten van Sambeek E. J. W., and van Thuijl E., 2003. The Dutch Renewable Electricity Market in 2003, ECN Report No. C--03-037, Petten, The Netherlands; available at www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2003/c03037.pdf

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Tyndall Working Papers

2000 - 2007

• Stansby P, Kuang C, Laurence D, Launder B, (2006) Sandbanks for coastal protection: implications of sea-level rise. Part 1: application to East Anglia, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 86 • Bentham M, (2006) An assessment of carbon sequestration potential in the UK – Southern North Sea case study: Tyndall Centre Working Paper 85 • Anderson K., Bows A., Upham P., (2006) Growth scenarios for EU & UK aviation: contradictions with climate policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 84 • Williamson M., Lenton T., Shepherd J., Edwards N, (2006) An efficient numerical terrestrial scheme (ENTS) for fast earth system modelling, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 83 • Bows, A., and Anderson, K. (2005) An analysis of a post-Kyoto climate policy model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 82 • Sorrell, S., (2005) The economics of energy service contracts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 81 • Wittneben, B., Haxeltine, A., Kjellen, B., Köhler, J., Turnpenny, J., and Warren, R., (2005) A framework for assessing the political economy of post-2012 global climate regime, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 80 • Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) Can adaptation and mitigation be complements?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 79 • Agnolucci,. P (2005) Opportunism and competition in the non-fossil fuel obligation market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 78 • Barker, T., Pan, H., Köhler, J., Warren., R and Winne, S. (2005) Avoiding dangerous climate change by inducing technological progress: scenarios using a large-scale econometric model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 77 • Agnolucci,. P (2005) The role of political uncertainty in the Danish renewable energy market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 76 • Fu, G., Hall, J. W. and Lawry, J. (2005) Beyond probability: new methods for
Tyndall Working Papers

representing uncertainty in projections of future climate, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 75 • Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005) How do the costs of adaptation affect optimal mitigation when there is uncertainty, irreversibility and learning?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 74 • Walkden, M. (2005) Coastal process simulator scoping study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 73 • Lowe, T., Brown, K., Suraje Dessai, S., Doria, M., Haynes, K. and Vincent., K (2005) Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster narrative and public perceptions of climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 72 • Boyd, E. Gutierrez, M. and Chang, M. (2005) Adapting small-scale CDM sinks projects to low-income communities, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 71 • Abu-Sharkh, S., Li, R., Markvart, T., Ross, N., Wilson, P., Yao, R., Steemers, K., Kohler, J. and Arnold, R. (2005) Can Migrogrids Make a Major Contribution to UK Energy Supply?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 70 • Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. A. (2005) Natural hazards and climate change: what knowledge is transferable?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 69 • Bleda, M. and Shackley, S. (2005) The formation of belief in climate change in business organisations: a dynamic simulation model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 68 • Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A. and O’Riordan, T., (2005) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation: Part 2: Scenario creation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 67 • Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A., Lorenzoni, I., O’Riordan, T., and Jones, M., (2005) Mapping actors involved in climate change policy networks in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 66 • Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L. (2004) Why do resource managers make links to stakeholders at other scales?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65 • Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 64
2000 - 2007

• Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, S. (2004) Floods, health and climate change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 63 • Barker, T. (2004) Economic theory and the transition to sustainability: a comparison of approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62 • Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Sahel: long term perspectives and future prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61 • Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. (2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change response and coastal management in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60 • Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004) Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 59 • Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social Simulation of The Public Perceptions of Weather Events and their Effect upon the Development of Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 58 • Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S Public Perceptions of (2004) The Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57 • Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of social vulnerability to climate change for Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56 • Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe and the globe: the observed record (1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 55 • Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., and O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and local scenarios for climate change mitigation and adaptation Part 1: A framing of the East of England Tyndall Centre Working Paper 54 • Agnolucci, P. and Ekins, P. (2004) The Announcement Effect And Environmental Taxation Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53
Tyndall Working Papers

• Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex Post Evaluations of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey Tyndall Centre Working Paper 52 • Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2004) Hysteresis and Energy Demand: the Announcement Effects and the effects of the UK Climate Change Levy Tyndall Centre Working Paper 51 • Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. and Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working Paper 50 • Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our electricity networks to promote decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 49 • Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic structure under technological development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 48 • Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M., (2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation to climate change impacts, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47 • Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow, A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004) UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 46 • Purdy, R and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological carbon sequestration: critical legal issues, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45 • Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C. (2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 44 • Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003) Innovation and Threshold Effects in Technology Responses to Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43 • Kim, J. (2003) Sustainable Development and the CDM: A South African Case Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42 • Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 41 Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai, • S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate and development
2000 - 2007

policy: three research questions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 40 Tompkins, E. and Adger, W.N. (2003). • Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 39 Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk • and adaptation: a conceptual framework, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38 Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) • Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 37 Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. • (2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The Role of Technologies, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36 Tompkins E. L and Hurlston, L. (2003). • Report to the Cayman Islands’ Government. Adaptation lessons learned from responding to tropical cyclones by the Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 – 2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35 Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does • climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 34 Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and • Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33 Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. • (2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Electricity System: Investigation of the impact of network faults on the stability of large offshore wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32 Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, • T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the pilot-phase interactive integrated assessment process (Aurion Project), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31 Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate • change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 30 Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A • Multi-Criteria Assessment Framework for Carbon-Mitigation Projects: Putting
Tyndall Working Papers

“development” in the centre of decisionmaking, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29 Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M., • Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R. (2003). Defining and experiencing dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 28 Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003). • Building resilience to climate change through adaptive management of natural resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27 Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003). • Country level risk measures of climaterelated natural disasters and implications for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 26 Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and • Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of Network Splitting for Fault Level Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25 Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. • (2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK Transmission Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24 Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002). • Justice and adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23 Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T., • Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and Combined Heat and Power Resources in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22 Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and • CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 21 Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing • organisational use of scenarios: Case study - evaluating UK energy policy options, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20 Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The • role of hydrogen in powering road transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19 Watson, J. (2002). The development of • large technical systems: implications for hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18 Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy • Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17 Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, • D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to
2000 - 2007

climate change: Setting the Agenda for Development Policy and Research, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 16 Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical • change in an energy-environment-economy (E3) model for an IA system: A model of Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 15 Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The • Use of Integrated Assessment: An Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 14 Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002). • Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 13 Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime • from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 12 Barker, T. (2001). Representing the • Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 11 Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. • (2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Initial Exploration of Public Opinions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10 Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001). • Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9 Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and • Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 8

Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate • Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7 Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T. • (2001). The identification and evaluation of suitable scenario development methods for the estimation of future probabilities of extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 6 Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse • Effects and the Impacts of Response Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 5 Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High • are the Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4 Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J. • (2001). Socio-economic futures in climate change impact assessment: using scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall Centre Working Paper 3 Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated • Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 2 Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A • Country-by-Country Analysis of Past and Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 1
© Copyright 2007

For further information please contact Javier Delgado-Esteban

Tyndall Working Papers

2000 - 2007