Renewables and CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020

Jim Watson

January 2002

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

Working Paper 21

Renewables and CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020

Jim Watson
Energy and Environment Programme SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research University of Sussex, Falmer, East Sussex, BN1 9RF w.j.Watson@sussex.ac.uk Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 21 January 2002

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Contents 1. Introduction........................................................................................................................3 2. Policy Drivers to 2020 .......................................................................................................5 2.1 World Markets .............................................................................................................5 2.2 Provincial Enterprise....................................................................................................5 2.3 Local Stewardship........................................................................................................6 2.4 Global Sustainability....................................................................................................6 3. The Deployment of Renewables and CHP to 2020 ...........................................................7 3.1 Electricity Supply Growth ...........................................................................................7 3.2 Proportion of Electricity from Renewables and CHP..................................................8 3.3 Dominant Technologies ...............................................................................................9 3.4 Centralised, Embedded or Micro Generation ?..........................................................10 4. Contrasts with the PIU Scenarios for 2020......................................................................11 4.1 Policy Drivers ............................................................................................................11 4.2 Deployment of Renewables and CHP to 2020 ..........................................................11 5. Conclusions......................................................................................................................13

The author would like to thank all those who participated in the scenario workshop summarised in this report, and those who commented on earlier drafts. Particular thanks are due to Frans Berkhout and Julia Hertin of SPRU for their assistance in designing and running the workshop.

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1. Introduction
This report summarises the results of a scenario workshop held at SPRU, University of Sussex on 19th July 2001. The workshop was held as part of an ongoing research project being conducted with UMIST under the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. The project’s aim is to assess the consequences for the electricity distribution network of the Government’s 2010 targets for renewable energy and CHP. The scenario exercise is designed to explore the possible future development of renewable energy and CHP in the UK to 2020. Its results will inform the technical, economic and regulatory analysis of distribution networks to be conducted in subsequent stages of the project. The workshop included a small number of invited participants with relevant expertise from the following institutions: • • • • • • Combined Heat and Power Association Confederation of Renewable Energy Associations SEEBOARD plc Energy Review, Performance and Innovation Unit, The Cabinet Office Manchester School of Management, UMIST SPRU, University of Sussex

The scenarios used in this exercise are adapted from a framework developed by SPRU to examine environmental futures over the next 20 to 50 years. They were originally commissioned by the Office of Science and Technology for the Foresight Programme1 and have subsequently been used in projects for other government departments. One of the most recent examples of direct uses of the SPRU scenarios framework is the Fuelling the Future study by the Energy Future Task Force of the Energy and Natural Environment Panel of Foresight2. Since the workshop was conducted, the SPRU scenarios have been employed further by the UK Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU). As part of its enquiry into UK energy policy, the PIU has produced its own results for 2020 and 2050. The PIU results for renewable energy and CHP in 2020 provide an interesting contrast to those from the workshop, both in terms of their assumptions and empirical projections3. These contrasts are explored further in Section 4 of this report. The starting point for the SPRU scenarios is the construction of logical and consistent 'storylines' about the future. These storylines can be applied at a number of different levels from sub-national to global. For present purposes, we are mostly interested in using them as a way of exploring future UK policies for renewables and CHP and their effects on deployment. The scenario construction assumes that the whole world is subject to the forces described within them. This is no more or less realistic than the assumption that any one country will conform strictly to any one scenario over time. The scenarios represent pictures of the future in 'possibility space', representing a range of credible future states of the world. The world will not in practice conform to any one scenario even over a short time period.
Office of Science and Technology Environmental Futures Foresight Programme (March 1999). See Energy Futures Task Force Fuelling the Future Foresight (2000). 3 Energy Review Team Energy Scenarios to 2020 Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit (October 2001). See http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/2001/energy/AGmeet3webrev2020.pdf
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However by systematically imagining a range of possible future states, the robustness of particular policies or technologies currently under consideration can be examined. For this particular exercise, the feasibility of the government’s targets for renewables and CHP can be assessed with respect to a range of policy approaches. The SPRU scenarios are developed from two main variables or dimensions of a largely qualitative nature. The first dimension is values (individuals/consumers vs. community) and the second is governance (autonomy vs. interdependence). This means that technology is not viewed as autonomous and following its own independent path. It is rather viewed as mainly the product of the combination of dominant values and governance systems being explored. This allows the degree of success of renewables and CHP to vary according to different scenario circumstances. When the two dimensions of the SPRU scenarios are combined, they yield four possible future states (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 – The Four Contextual Futures Scenarios
GLOBALISATION

WORLD MARKETS

GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY

CONSUMERSISM

CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

COMMUNITY

PROVINCIAL ENTERPRISE

LOCAL STEWARDSHIP

REGIONALISATION

These four scenarios can be characterised as follows: • World Markets. This combines emphasis on the individual and consumer with a highly interdependent governance structure. This world is dominated by private consumption and a highly developed and integrated trading system Provincial Enterprise. Here a similar emphasis on private consumption is combined with a more fragmented governance system which emphasises more local-level and variable decision processes, emphasising national and regional decision-making Global Sustainability. This combines social and ecological values with a more interdependent and collective governance structure, producing a strong world regime interested in dealing with environmental issues. Local Stewardship. In this scenario, the governance structure is fragmented, as in provincial enterprise, but predominant values emphasise the social and to a degree ecological, rather than consumers and individuals.

The scenario exercise summarised in this report was conducted in two parts. The first focused on the international and national policy context in which UK renewables and CHP capacity might develop. The second sought to quantify the contribution of renewables and CHP to UK electricity supply, and identify those renewable energy technologies that might be dominant.

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2. Policy Drivers to 2020
The aim of this part of the scenario exercise is to define the policy landscape within which renewables and CHP could develop. It focuses on three aspects of policy: the international climate policy regime, UK energy policy goals and UK targets and instruments for renewables and CHP. 2.1 World Markets Under this scenario, the international climate regime has a low priority, and is secondary to trade. The environment is seen as a trade barrier and the Kyoto Protocol is not implemented. There is little impetus for binding action on economic grounds since the effects of climate change are not expected to increase significantly by 2020. Where effects are felt, rich countries will pursue an adaptation strategy. Some voluntary agreements to mitigate emissions are possible, and emissions trading may develop between private firms. UK energy policy is dominated by the drive for lower prices for consumers. The energy system as a whole is governed by markets. Energy policy is defined narrowly as a subset of competition policy. The energy regulators are abolished. Supply security is not a matter for government policy and there is no fundamental objection to a relatively high level of fuel imports. Trade between countries is enhanced by the construction of new electricity and gas interconnectors. The electricity industry is dominated by gas-fired generation plant. Capital stock turnover may continue to be high with the effect that the efficiency of electricity production increases rapidly. There are no UK targets for the deployment of renewable energy sources or CHP. The policy emphasis is on enabling tools such as the dissemination of information etc. The government may play a role in promoting the export of UK expertise in renewables and CHP. This scenario is not particularly good for distributed power and micro generation since this implies increased regulation of distribution companies and new infrastructures with significant cost implications. 2.2 Provincial Enterprise Under this scenario, it would be difficult to construct an international policy regime to combat climate change. National interests are the main concern leading to mistrust of multilateral initiatives. Nevertheless, some coalitions may emerge if climate change appears to be enough of a threat. It is unlikely that this will happen before 2020, and the current negotiation process may collapse. UK energy policy places great emphasis on supply security, perhaps at the expense of energy prices. A likely policy goal is an electricity generation fuel mix similar to the current situation (e.g. 30% gas, 30% coal and 30% nuclear with renewables and hydro accounting for the remainder). Under this ‘national interest’ scenario, there may be incentives for energy efficiency and the use of indigenous renewable energy resources. The need for supply security is likely to give rise to an active policy for the promotion of renewable energy and CHP. Targets for both renewables and CHP are likely. Their extent will depend partly on the strength of lobbies for the use of other fuels. It is unlikely that a strong coal lobby will re-emerge due to the high costs of increasing production capacity. 5

2.3 Local Stewardship Under this scenario, the world is fragmented into networked local communities that are linked on a national and global scale. Whilst these local communities are expected to be very interested in sustainable development, environmental goals may not always take priority over other goals such as local employment. It is probable that a Europe of the regions would be a strong advocate of an international climate policy regime. Any agreements in this area will emphasise local autonomy in implementation. As a result, action will vary from region to region. Whilst it will be difficult for national governments to enforce action by regional administrations, they will still have an oversight role. UK energy policy will operate under a loose national framework with an emphasis on regional security and the use of local resources. As a consequence, there will be incentives to use local renewable resources and generate energy from waste in areas where other resources are scarce. It is likely that regional administrations will have considerable taxation and planning powers, and these will be applied differently from region to region. One probable consequence is the development of local energy and heat grids in many regions to facilitate household-scale micro generation and distributed generation. Targets and incentives for renewables and CHP will be developed regionally on a case by case basis. It is expected that CHP will do well in most areas, either for industrial or for domestic and community heating schemes. The development of renewables will be throughout the UK, though the extent will depend on the availability of local resources and on each region’s attitude to planning issues. 2.4 Global Sustainability This scenario gives rise to a strong, enforceable climate policy regime. Through international co-operation, it is likely that mitigation of emissions will focus on the lowest cost opportunities first. As a result, mechanisms such as emissions trading and joint implementation will emerge. The overall aim might be to follow a ‘contract and converge’ strategy to equalise per capita emissions between different countries and regions. For the UK, this may mean moving strongly in the direction of the Royal Commission’s recommendation of a 60% cut in emissions by 2050. UK energy policy will tend to focus less on low energy prices – particularly for fossil fuels due to the desire to internalise environmental costs. One of the overriding goals is decarbonisation of the economy and a decrease in energy intensity. It is possible that carbon sequestration will receive serious attention as a mitigation option. It is also possible that nuclear power might experience a revival in fortunes if it is considered to be a sustainable way of reducing carbon emissions. UK targets for renewables and CHP are likely to be statutory and ambitious under this scenario. Policy instruments to achieve these targets are likely to include both market based measures (e.g. taxes and trading schemes) and command and control measures (e.g. obligations on energy suppliers to buy certain amounts of renewable energy).

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3. The Deployment of Renewables and CHP to 2020
This second part of the scenario exercise aims to quantify the expected deployment of renewables and CHP over the next 20 years. Whilst it is was also thought desirable to produce indicators for 2010 (the year of the current policy targets), it proved to be difficult to separate the current situation from that only ten years ahead. The analysis focused on three indicators for the year 2020: expected growth in the supply of electricity, the proportion of electricity supplied from CHP and renewables, and the renewable technologies that might be dominant. It is important to note that these indicators are not meant to be precise, rather they are designed to provide a general ‘ballpark’ indication of the position of renewables and CHP under each scenario. For this draft report, all figures are provisional and may be modified following consultation with stakeholders. 3.1 Electricity Supply Growth Future growth in the volume of electricity supplied in the UK will depend on two main factors – economic growth and the elasticity of electricity demand growth with respect to economic growth. For each scenario, there is an assumed average economic growth rate for the UK to 2020 (see Table 1). For the base year, the gross amount of electricity supplied in the UK was 389TWh.
Table 1 – Growth in UK Electricity Supplied Scenario World Markets Provincial Enterprise Local Stewardship Global Sustainability Economic Growth 3% 2.5% 1.5% 2% Electricity Growth Moderate-High Moderate Very Low Low 2.4% 1.8% 1.0% 1.2% Electricity Supply in 2020 625TWh 556TWh 475TWh 494TWh

For each scenario, a broad judgement was made about the likely growth in electricity supplied – i.e. whether it would be low, moderate or high. Following the scenario workshop, further analysis was conducted to obtain rough figures for annual electricity supply growth rates and the consequent amount of electricity supplied in 2020. To carry out this analysis, an assumption was made about the relationship between growth in UK electricity use and growth in national economic output. Historically, this relationship has been that electricity demand has grown faster than output. At a global level, every 1% of economic growth has been accompanied by electricity growth of 1.5%. This corresponds to an elasticity of 1.54. However it is widely agreed that this relationship will change in future to one of lower incremental electricity intensity, due to saturation effects in richer countries and overall efficiency effects from technological improvements and deliberate policy interventions. In its own scenarios for energy to 2020, the European Commission assumes that electricity growth will be around 0.7% for each 1% growth in output (an elasticity of 0.7).

European Commission DG for Energy European Energy to 2020: A Scenario Approach Special Issue, Energy in Europe (Spring 1996).

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For this scenario exercise, the Commission’s elasticity value of 0.7 was used as a starting point, and it was assumed that the precise value for each scenario would vary as follows5: • In World Markets, there will be low prices for fossil fuels and electricity, rapid change towards electricity with high growth and little discouragement from environmental policy. This leads to an assumed elasticity of 0.8. In Provincial Enterprise, less rapid technological change and higher average prices will balance relaxed environmental policies and lead to a slightly lower elasticity of 0.7. In Global Sustainability, high energy prices, discouragement of some forms of electricity production plus demand side management will reduce the elasticity to 0.6 In Local Stewardship, variable energy prices will be combined with local efforts to reduce environmental impacts and lead to an assumed elasticity of 0.65.

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The range of figures for electricity supply in 2020 is generally higher than those in the UK government’s latest energy projections. These assume a lower annual growth rate of around 0.8%6. However, they use annual growth rates that are lower than the long term average of 2.5%7. 3.2 Proportion of Electricity from Renewables and CHP Having established rough estimates of growth in electricity supply to 2020, attention turned to the probable contribution from renewables and CHP. The most recent figures show that renewable energy sources generated 10.2TWh and CHP plants generated 30.4TWh of electricity in 19998. As a result, renewables supplied 2.8% of the UK’s electricity whilst CHP plants supplied 8.4%. With these figures in mind, judgements were made about the likely percentage of electricity supplied from renewables and CHP in 2020 for each scenario. The results, together with calculations of the amount of electricity supplied, are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 – The Contribution of Renewables and CHP to Electricity Supply in 2020 Scenario World Markets Provincial Enterprise Local Stewardship Global Sustainability Renewables 5% 5-15% 15% With Nucs.: 3-4% No Nucs.: 20-25% 31TWh 28-83TWh 71TWh 15-20TWh 99-124TWh CHP 5% Up to 15% 25% 15-20% 31TWh Up to 83TWh 119TWh 74-99TWh

These values were first used in a previous unpublished scenario exercise by SPRU and Mott MacDonald during a review of funding for small gas turbine R&D for the Department of Trade and Industry in Autumn 2000. 6 Department of Trade and Industry Energy Projections for the UK The Stationery Office (2000) 7 Between 1960 and 1999, total gross electricity supplied in the UK increased at an average annual rate of 2.5%. See Department of Trade and Industry Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2000 The Stationery Office (2000), p129. 8 Department of Trade and Industry Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2000 The Stationery Office (2000).

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Some of the assumptions underlying the results in Table 2 are as follows: • The World Markets scenario will only include slow growth in the deployment of the cheapest renewable technologies. However, it will give few incentives for rapid deployment or for the expansion of CHP beyond current levels. The range of contributions from renewable energy sources under Provincial Enterprise is large since it will depend on strength of lobbies for other options based on fossil fuels and nuclear technology. However, growth in nuclear will be restricted by poor UK-based skills in nuclear plant construction. It is assumed that the UK would be less likely to use international tendering for nuclear construction under this scenario, even though this may improve the economics of this option. It is assumed that the 10% renewables target will be met by 2010 under Global Sustainability. This scenario is often regarded as the most likely host for a nuclear revival. This is due to the presence of incentives for non-carbon energy sources under a strong climate policy regime. For this reason, renewables figures were estimated for both nuclear and non-nuclear versions of the scenario. The CHP growth under this scenario is assumed to be driven by an expanding market for district heating schemes. Under Local Stewardship, urban renewal is assumed to give rise to substantial amounts of district heating by 2020. The expectation that some regions will favour the development of local energy infrastructures will also lead to a relatively strong showing for micro generation technologies, some of which will operate in CHP mode.

3.3 Dominant Technologies To aid the analysis of the effect of each scenario on the distribution and transmission network, the workshop concluded with an assessment of dominant renewable energy technologies. A similar assessment for CHP technologies was not carried out due to lack of time9. Renewable technologies vary in the extent to which they are embedded in distribution grids. For example, solar photovoltaic installations are often connected at low voltages at individual households, onshore wind farms tend to be embedded in rural electricity grids and waste to energy plants are likely to be sited nearer urban areas. The workshop concluded that the technologies that would dominate the renewable energy mix would be different under each of the four scenarios (see Table 3).
Table 3 – Dominant Renewable Technologies Scenario World Markets Provincial Enterprise Local Stewardship Global Sustainability Dominant Renewables Wind, Waste Offshore Wind, Tidal Waste, Biofuels, Wind, PV Wind, Waste, Energy Crops

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Follow-up conversations with participants after the workshop covered this area to a limited extent. It was felt that the most likely technologies for micro-scale CHP are first the Stirling engine, then the microturbine, with the fuel cell being the most distant prospect.

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3.4 Centralised, Embedded or Micro Generation ? These results imply variations in the extent to which the UK electricity system will have to absorb both embedded generating units (connected to the distribution grid) and micro generation units (sited at individual households, small groups of homes or small businesses). These two types of connection will present different challenges for grid operators and regulators. At present, less than 10% of UK installed generating capacity is embedded in distribution networks10. It is likely that the balance of centralised, embedded and micro generation under each scenario will be as follows in 2020: • World Markets: The electricity system is likely to comprise 90% centralised, 10% embedded and negligible micro generation. The increase in embedded generation will stem from marginal increases in renewable energy generation from the cheapest sources. Provincial Enterprise: The approximate breakdown under this scenario will be 85% centralised, 15% embedded and negligible micro generation. The increase in embedded generation will stem from some new CHP schemes, particularly in industry, and the probability that some new renewables projects such as offshore wind farms will be connected to distribution networks. Local Stewardship: A breakdown of 65% centralised, 25% embedded and 10% micro generation. This assumes that there will be significant growth in community CHP schemes for district heating and the use of local renewable energy resources such as biomass and wind. It also assumes that some regions will have strong policies to subsidise domestic solar roof programmes, and possibly non-renewable micro generation technologies such as fuel cells. Global Sustainability: Assuming that nuclear power does not experience a revival, the breakdown is likely to be 65% centralised plant, 30% embedded generation and 5% micro generation. Since energy crops and wind are two of the dominant renewable technologies, a significant amount of renewable energy generation will be connected to distribution grids in rural areas.

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N Jenkins et al Embedded Generation Institution of Electrical Engineers (2000), p5.

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4. Contrasts with the PIU Scenarios for 2020
4.1 Policy Drivers Not surprisingly, the PIU scenarios start from a very similar position to the Tyndall project workshop scenarios since they are derived from the same basic set. However, there are some notable differences in the elaboration of the scenarios and the policy drivers they imply: • World Markets. The PIU arrived at a more optimistic interpretation of this scenario than the Tyndall workshop. In particular, the PIU assumes that the 10% target for renewable electricity will remain whilst the Tyndall workshop concluded that it would be abandoned. In addition, the PIU anticipates that a focus on liberalisation and low prices will encourage embedded generation. Interestingly, this conclusion was also shared by the Foresight Fuelling the Future scenario exercise11. This alternative interpretation makes sense if liberalisation means the imposition of more cost reflective distribution pricing (with differing locational use of system charges). However, it is far from certain that this would be the case – such an imposition might be seen as unwarranted intervention in the market. Provincial Enterprise. For this scenario, the PIU assumes a significantly lower growth rate than that agreed by the Tyndall workshop - 1.5% annual GDP growth instead of 2.5%. This disparity inevitably leads to differences in the empirical results from the two scenario exercises (see below). In addition, the PIU does not see a case for assuming a further renewable electricity target beyond the 10% target for 2010. Local Stewardship. As with provincial enterprise, the PIU assumes a lower growth rate for this scenario than that agreed by the Tyndall workshop - 1% annual GDP growth instead of 1.5%. Despite this difference, the PIU’s storyline and policy implications for this scenario are very similar to those established by the Tyndall workshop. Global Sustainability. For this scenario, the PIU and the Tyndall workshop came to a very similar conclusion about its general shape and its policy implications.

4.2 Deployment of Renewables and CHP to 2020 The PIU scenarios include figures for the expected contribution of renewable energy sources and CHP to the UK electricity system in 2020. In some cases, these figures differ significantly from the equivalent figures from the Tyndall workshop. One important reason for these differences is a lack of agreement about the rate of growth in electricity supply (see Table 4):
Table 4 - Electricity Generated in 2020 Tyndall Workshop Scenarios World Markets Provincial Enterprise Local Stewardship Global Sustainability 625TWh (growth of 2.4% p.a.) 556TWh (growth of 1.8% p.a.) 475TWh (growth of 1.0% p.a.) 494TWh (growth of 1.2% p.a.) PIU Scenarios 525TWh 440TWh 342TWh 390TWh

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Energy Futures Task Force, op. cit., p11.

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On the whole, the PIU scenarios assume significantly lower electricity supply growth rates than the Tyndall workshop scenarios. For the case of Local Stewardship, the PIU has assumed a fall in the amount of electricity supplied from 380TWh to 342TWh. Whilst a reasons for using either set of growth rate figures can be argued, the PIU scenarios have an advantage in that they help to explore a future in which electricity growth is negative. The different approaches to this basic assumption has important implications for the expected contribution of renewables and CHP to electricity supply in 2020 under each set of scenarios (see Table 5).
Table 5 – The Contribution of Renewables and CHP to Electricity Supply in 2020 Renewables Tyndall World Markets Prov. Enterprise Local Stewardship Global Sust. (no new nuclear) 5% (31TWh) 5-15% (28-83TWh) 15% (71TWh) 20-25% (88-124TWh) PIU 10% (53TWh) 11% (48TWh) 21% (72TWh) 31% (121TWh) CHP Tyndall 5% (31TWh) Up to 15% (83TWh) 25% (119TWh) 15-20% (74-99TWh) PIU 71TWh 57TWh 85TWh 112TWh

The two sets of figures that emerged from the PIU and Tyndall exercises are relatively close for most scenarios, though perhaps there is a tendency for the PIU results to be more optimistic about the contribution of renewables and CHP. The main exceptions to this pattern are the results for World Markets. The expectation that embedded generation would do well under this scenario by the PIU has already been noted since it contrasts with the results from the Tyndall workshop. This expectation leads the PIU to predict much higher contributions from renewables and CHP to UK electricity supply in 2020 – approximately double the equivalent figures from the Tyndall workshop. As mentioned earlier, a World Markets future could encourage either outcome.

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5. Conclusions
Having analysed the results of the Tyndall scenario workshop and contrasted them with those from the PIU, it is possible to summarise some key implications for renewable energy and CHP deployment in the UK: • The range of outcomes under the four scenarios is wide. The fortunes of CHP and renewables depend strongly on the policy framework for the UK energy system. Despite current expectations by many within and outside the electricity industry, the scenarios show that a rapid move to a distributed energy system with large numbers of embedded generators is not inevitable. However, under most scenarios embedded generation will play a greater role in 20 years’ time than it does at present. Under some scenarios, it is highly unlikely that the 2010 targets for renewables and CHP will be met without positive policy action. For example, under a World Markets scenario, it is probable that deployment would fall short of the targets. Under Global Sustainability and Provincial Enterprise, the attainment of the targets depends on the strength of lobbies for other energy supply options. If nuclear power were considered a sustainable energy source under Global Sustainability, the growth of renewables could fall short of the target. Under Local Stewardship, it is likely that the target would be met and exceeded. Renewable energy technologies and CHP are not necessarily encouraged to the same degree under each scenario. For example, a Provincial Enterprise scenario might provide strong incentives for CHP as part of an energy efficiency strategy but weak incentives for renewables if other energy sources (gas, coal etc.) are favoured. Different policy approaches will tend to favour different combinations of renewable energy technologies. Whereas Provincial Enterprise might tend to favour larger more centralised renewables (e.g. offshore wind farms and tidal barrages), Local Stewardship includes incentives for the use of biomass, wind and PV technologies on a small scale.

The outcomes under the four scenarios considered here have a range of different implications for the regulation and operation of electricity distribution networks in the UK. A detailed analysis of these implications, and ways to address them will be undertaken in subsequent phases of the Tyndall Centre project. In carrying out this analysis, it will be important to bear in mind some of the main lessons from the scenario exercise. These include: • There is a large degree of uncertainty about the amount of new embedded generation that the UK electricity will have to absorb in the next 10-20 years. This depends on the extent to which measures to encourage renewable energy and CHP are successful, and the precise mix of technologies that are eventually deployed. Under some scenarios, it has been shown that there may be significant growth in micro generation at individual household level. Micro generation presents its own technical and regulatory challenges, some of which are similar to those for embedded generation (e.g. the growth generator numbers on the system) and others which are more complex (e.g. the need for new charging structures to deal with households that buy and sell power). Different sets of incentives will tend to produce different geographical spreads of embedded generation. Under some scenarios, it has been shown that the growth in embedded generation could be mostly urban. In others, it would be necessary to connect many additional small generators within rural grids.

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The inter-disciplinary Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research undertakes integrated research into the long-term consequences of climate change for society and into the development of sustainable responses that governments, business-leaders and decisionmakers can evaluate and implement. Achieving these objectives brings together UK climate scientists, social scientists, engineers and economists in a unique collaborative research effort. Research at the Tyndall Centre is organised into four research themes that collectively contribute to all aspects of the climate change issue: Integrating Frameworks; Decarbonising Modern Societies; Adapting to Climate Change; and Sustaining the Coastal Zone. All thematic fields address a clear problem posed to society by climate change, and will generate results to guide the strategic development of climate change mitigation and adaptation policies at local, national and global scales. The Tyndall Centre is named after the 19th century UK scientist John Tyndall, who was the first to prove the Earth’s natural greenhouse effect and suggested that slight changes in atmospheric composition could bring about climate variations. In addition, he was committed to improving the quality of science education and knowledge. The Tyndall Centre is a partnership of the following institutions: University of East Anglia UMIST Southampton Oceanography Centre University of Southampton University of Cambridge Centre for Ecology and Hydrology SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research (University of Sussex) Institute for Transport Studies (University of Leeds) Complex Systems Management Centre (Cranfield University) Energy Research Unit (CLRC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) The Centre is core funded by the following organisations: Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) UK Government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) For more information, visit the Tyndall Centre Web site (www.tyndall.ac.uk) or contact: External Communications Manager Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK Phone: +44 (0) 1603 59 3906; Fax: +44 (0) 1603 59 3901 Email: tyndall@uea.ac.uk

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