Brown v. Yambao years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part.

Even if it did not, his situation

G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957 would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
FACTS: The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain with them. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release
from internment and that they have lived separately thereafter.
Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children
issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff;
and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
The court subsequently declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due time,
despite service of summonsand directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate,
in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, if collusion exists between the parties.
During the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was found
out that after the liberation,Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had
begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal
separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had
incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of
the new Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted?

RULING:
No. The court below correctly held that the appellant’s action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife’s adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.Appellant’s brief does
not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by
either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.”
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned law, wherein
Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be granted.
Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that:“An action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.”
In the case at bar, Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years
after he learned of his wife’s adultery.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts
can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or
annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such
decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy
sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it
becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown’s inaction for ten
Pacete vs Carriaga

FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a
child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita
de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with
Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file
an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly
in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on
February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff on March 17,1980.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held
to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off”
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.”
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES
THE CASE husband disputes the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court
FACTS
•As member of diplomatic service assigned to different countries, petitioner Samson
Sabalones left to his wife (respondent), the administration of some of their conjugal
properties for 15 years.
•He retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines, but not to his wife and
children.
•4 years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot in
Greenhills, San Juan. He claimed that he was 68 years old, sick and living alone without any
income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his
hospitalization and medical treatment.
•In her answer, wife opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the house in Greenhills was occupied by her and their 6 kids, and that they
were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property (building
and lot in Forbes Park). She also informed the court that despite her husband’s retirement,
he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate
residence with another woman and their 3 kids.
•Wife asked the court to grant legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s share because of his adultery.
RTC RULING RTC found that petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage. Court
thus decreed the legal separation and forfeiture of petitioner’s share in the conjugal
properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his wife.
CA RULING (wife filed motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
petitioner from interfering with administration of their properties. She alleged that he had
harassed the tenant in Forbes Park that his lease would not be renewed) =granted by CA
(petitioner now assails this decision, arguing that since the law provides for joint
administration of conjugal properties, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. He also cited Art 124 and Art 61 of FC).
(and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect
approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the wife with the preliminary
injunction.
The primary purpose of injunction is to preserve status quo. The Court notes that the wife
has been administering the subject properties for 19 years now, without complaint on the
part of petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused
prejudice to the conjugal partnership. In her motion for issuance of preliminary injunction,
the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner’s harassment of their tenant in Forbes Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom. She
also complained that petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in USA in
favor of Thelma Cumareng (the other woman) to improve her lifestyle, to the prejudice of his
legitimate family. These allegations show that injunction is necessary to protect the interests
of wife and kids.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are: existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as
the petitioner’s legitimate wife, she has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal
estate. There is also enough evidence to raise apprehension that entrusting said estate to
petitioner may result in its disposition to the detriment of the wife and kids.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as
the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner,
pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Art 61.
Art 124: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

ISSUE
W/N a preliminary injunction can be issued by the Court (despite joint administration of
conjugal properties)

YES
SC RULING We agree with CA that pending the appointment of an administrator over the
whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence
adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife’s
administration pending resolution of the appeal.

The law does indeed grant joint administration over the conjugal properties, as clearly
provided in Art 124. However, Art 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been
filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement, appoint either one of the
spouse or a 3rd person to act as administrator.

While no formal designation of administrator has been made, such designation was implicit
in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties
Azcueta v. Republic
G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They
separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no child.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of
husband
Petitioner also complained of physical violence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

RULING:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with the guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’
marriage under Article 36.
The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169 Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best
Facts: left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. In 1942, he married Erlinda Kalaw. They lived together for a period of
thirty (30) years until they separated from bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about
five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg
Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potenciano’s
health deteriorated.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that respondents Sylvia and Bildner
refused her demands to see and visit Potenciano. The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda
for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus.

Issue:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their
conjugal dwelling?

Held:
No. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify
the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.
Tenchavez vs Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry
got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army
officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the
love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita
Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.
Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by
Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed
for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she
left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought
for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo
Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

b:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would
be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich
citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.
In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce
between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of
the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation
from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
fees.