Agapay v.

Palang
G.R. No. 116668, 28 July 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the Philippines for
good but did not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years
old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda Agapay.

In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Upon the death of Miguel in 1981,
Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in
Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void marriage
(Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel).

RULING:

Yes. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While
Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and
had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the
riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their
marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-
sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the
subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel
who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its
unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to
justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by
CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when
she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of respondent
Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated
in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property,
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a
Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to
their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.17

In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract of marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing
Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition
of the property that they owned in common, the provisions on coownership under the Civil Code
should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence
of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the
ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the former
spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that
without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public
document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately,
Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of
Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

The family 149 – 151

MAXIMO ALVAREZ,
Petitioner,

- versus -

SUSAN RAMIREZ,

Susan Ramirez filed a criminal case for arson against her brother-in-law Maximo Alvarez. The
prosecution called to the witness stand its first witness Esperanza Alvarez, sister of Susan and wife of
Maximo. Esperanza testified but when she showed uncontrolled emotions, the trial judge to
suspended the proceedings. Subsequently, Maximo, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification. The trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza, prompting
Susan to file a petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA nullified the order of the RTC.

Issue:

Can Esperanza testify against her husband in the arson case?

Held:

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.”

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.[11]

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law
aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home
Yes. The offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing
fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act
totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily
seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be
preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but
ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v.
Castaneda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification
Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so
that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct
testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the latter himself
who gave rise to its necessity (Alvarez vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005)

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner, v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his
capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO
MORENO, Respondent.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses
Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of
mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were
the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he
could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to
comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of
the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner
contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.5

[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to
compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a
stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not
always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less
relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often than
not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to
the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or
property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle
their differences among themselves.22 x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family
Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same
family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that
same family.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.