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THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

A.K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

EDITORS

L.M.Joshi Ernst Steinkellner


Punjabi University University of Vienna
PatiaUi, India Wien, Austria

Alexander W. Macdonald Jikido Takasaki


Universitede Paris X University of Tokyo
Nanterre, France Tokyo,Japan

Hardwell Smith Robert Thurman


Carleton College Amherst College
Northjield, Minnesota, USA Amherst, Massachusetts, USA

A S S I S T A N T EDITOR
Roger Jackson
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA

Volume 8 1985 Number I


CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

J. Nagarjuna's Arguments Against Motion, by Kamaleswar


Bhattacharya 7
2. Dharani and Pratibhdna: Memory and Eloquence of the
Bodhisattvas, byJens Braarvig 17
3. The Concept of a "Creator God" in Tantric Buddhism,
by Eva K. Dargyay 31
4. Direct Perception (Pratyakja) in dGe-iugs-pa Interpre-
tations of Sautrantika,^/lnw^C. Klein 49
5. A Text-Historical Note on Hevajratantra II: v: 1-2, by
lj>onard W.J. van der Kuijp 83
6. Simultaneous Relation (Sahabhu-hetu): A Study in Bud-
dhist Theory of Causation, by Kenneth K. Tanaka 91

II. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Reviews:
1. The Books o/Kiu- Te or the Tibetan Buddhist Tantras: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, by David Reigle
Dzog Chen and Zen, by Namkhai Norbu
(Roger Jackson) 113
2. Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of
Ndgdrjuna, by Chr. Lindtner
(Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti) 115
3. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Bud-
dhism, by Steven Collins
(Vijitha Rajapakse) 117
4. Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, by Joaquin Perez-
Remon
(VijithaRajapkse) 122
5. The World of Buddhism, edited by Heinz Bechert and
Richard Gombrich
(Roger Jackson) 126

Notices:
1. Tibetan Blockprints in the Department of Rare Books
and Special Collections, compiled by Leonard
Zwilling
(Rena Haggarty) 134
OBITUARY 135
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 138
122 JIABSVOL.8NO. J

Yet would it not be somewhat naive to say baldly that Christians


are united into a single cultural world by this imagery, forgetting
the underlying ideas? Moreover, Collins' contentions regarding
the "specificity" of Theravada imagery might be considerably
undermined by a wider review of Gospel imagery. It is well to
remember that Christianity also refers to houses and homes, and
in particular to fields, plants, seeds and fruits in order to clarify
its doctrinal points.
T o sum up, Selfless Persons is an interesting book incorporat-
ing several strands of argument, many of which are unusually
thought provoking and sometimes controversial as well. Its find-
ings on Theravada positions on selfhood and personality might
be sociologically illuminating, but doubts can be entertained as
regards their philosophical, and in particular religious, accepta-
bility. Collins' attempt to link the thoughts and images relating
to these positions to their contextual social factors is a noteworthy
effort. Still, it is possible to detect some shortcomings in the way
he addresses himself to this very complex task. But even those
who object to some of the book's conclusions will no doubt rec-
ognize that the investigation pursued here has many innovative
features. The focus on Theravada imagery is especially worthy
of recall in this connection. This, to be sure, is something that
could be extended and viewed on the basis of other, less "reduc-
tionist" perspectives. It must be reiterated that Selfless Persons,
finally, is not likely to prove very attractive to admirers of
Theravada thought. But even this category of readers might be
instructed in some ways by paying heed to the critical vistas it
opens.

Vijitha Rajapakse

Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, by Joaquin Pe>ez-Remon. T h e


Hague, Paris and New York: Mouton Publishers, 1980. xii + 421
pp.
Buddhism dispenses with the traditional notion of an abiding
self, a position which appears to be somewhat paradoxical for a
religious system. Still, certain Buddhist schools (like the
Theravada) did place great emphasis on this position, sometimes
treating it as the focal point of Buddhist thinking as a whole.
REVIEWS 123

Many modern exponents of early Buddhism have sought to fol-


low their example, dwelling in turn on the negative implications
of the Buddhist teachings on the self—the anatta doctrine—with
a rigour which is almost scholastic. Pali literature reveals, how-
ever, that even in ancient times new entrants to the Buddhist
fold were not infrequently puzzled by these teachings. In any
event, the latter do pose certain problems and difficulties. The
discussions in this book tend to take into account two of them
in particular, and they are, to be sure, noteworthy. For one thing,
it might be asked whether the anatta doctrine can be strictly
maintained within Buddhism's spiritually oriented framework
where, among other things, the quest for salvation (and by impli-
cation a life beyond death) is seen as a reality. Then, on the other
hand, the present-day inquirer has to contend with the fact that
Pali literary sources which proclaim anatta (non-self) are them-
selves not entirely free from occasional references to attd (self).
Perez-Remon endeavours in this study to go some way towards
providing a reasoned solution to the former problem, and also
account for the latter difficulty. Though his conclusions, as will
be shown shortly, are not beyond challenge, Self and Non-Self in
Early Buddhism is a well researched study, and hence merits serious
notice. It addresses itself to a set of issues that have a great
significance not only to Buddhist thought, but also to Pali textual
exegesis.
Perez-Remon's book is analytical in nature, and its im-
mediate aim is to provide an interpretative study of the anatta
doctrine as it appears in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, namely
the Nikaya literature. He describes the religious views elaborated
in these contexts as a soteriology, that is to say a system of moral
training which considers salvation to be its prime goal. Buddhist
writings on the self, he argues, are not as clear and unambiguous
as is often supposed. He does not, in particular, believe that one
could regard them in a purely negative light, after the manner
of certain Theravada exponents. The use and the import of "self'
(attd) and "non-self (anatta) are of course central to this study.
In order to facilitate his inquiry into these key terms, he intro-
duces some important distinctions which appear for the most
part to be philosophical in nature. First, there is the distinction
between the self in its existential and metaphysical signification;
and second, between two senses of the term non-self, one qual-
ified and the other absolute. Previous interpretations of the anatta
doctrine have not revolved around distinctions of this kind. Perez-
Remon, however, is of the view that it is necessary to focus on
124 JIABSVOL.8NO. 1

them in order to gain a true insight into early Buddhist thinking


on the nature and existence of the self.
Since it provides the framework for the book's core discus-
sions, the first of the above distinctions is especially noteworthy.
Indeed, the discussions in question are arranged in two parts,
under two heads, "The Existential Self (Part I) and "The
Metaphysical Self (Part II). Perez-Remon considers this division
to be reflective of a pivotal fact gathered from textual analysis,
namely, the existence of different usages (and hence different
meanings) for the term "self in early Buddhist writings. He
insists, to be sure, that "whatever relations there may be between
these two kinds of self, the existence of the texts that speak of
them is a fact that no one can deny" (p. 7).
Part I of this book (which focuses on what Perez-Remon
calls the "existential self) serves in the main to draw attention
to the Nikaya sources where the self is represented in action,
especially in the moral and soteriological spheres. Not "one-sided
insistence on cessation" but rather, the "positive dwelling on
inner development" are the motifs that are held to dominate the
exposition in these contexts (p. 119). It is also emphasized that
the self as referred to here often stands for nothing less than
man's "existential core" as distinguished from the "peripheral
samsaric adjuncts" (p. 150). T h e drift of these findings tends to
be complemented or reinforced in the course of the examination
of texts that the author considers to highlight Buddhist positions
on the self s very nature in Part II (presented under the caption,
"The Metaphysical Self). He argues here that a higher, undefin-
able reality is always posited even amidst the reductive analyses
that one encounters in classic accounts of the anatta doctrine.
What tends to be denied, he maintains, is the existence of a self
identifiable with the human psycho-physical complex, (the khan -
dhas). Accordingly, anatta as taught in early Buddhism is held to
be relative, not absolute. He also expresses the opinion that the
texts that allude to the liberated sage "implicitly accept that there
is someone who is beyond description or beyond our present
categories of thought" (p. 285). Further, we are reminded that
the middle point between the extremes of eternalism and an-
nihilationism (which Buddhism always avoided) can hardly be
anatta as interpreted in an absolute sense. This middle point, in
the view of the author, has to be the absolute metaphysical trans-
cendence of the self. But in keeping with its soteriological orien-
tation, Nikaya literature, he adds, never sought to deliniate its
final character or basis, for in these writings, "the true self is the
REVIEWS 125

subject of emancipation, never the object of speculation or


philosophical discussion" (p. 299).
It should be remembered that these conclusions (and for
that matter much of the argumentation behind the book as a
whole) tend to counter what is designated as the "persistent
negativism" of extreme interpretations which "anattavadins" are
said to uphold on the question of the self. Perez-Remon's efforts
in Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism are interesting, and some
might even contend that they have a definite relevance in that
they throw some new light on a vexed question in Buddhist
thought. Indeed, he might not be entirely wrong when he ob-
serves that the absolutist positions taken on the self s non-exis-
tence in certain Theravada circles can assume the form of an
obsessive view (di(fki) which is at odds with the true spirit of
Buddhism. On the other hand, there is also room to ask whether
the author himself does not veer towards indulging in discursive
thinking and speculation on an ultimate issue in a way that is
not quite consonant with the outlook of the Nikaya literature.
Anyone pursuing this line of criticism might even say that he
eschews one extreme position (namely absolute anattd ) only fi-
nally to embrace another, (though at a different level), for some-
what paradoxically, relative anattd eventually comes to be equated
with the absolute metaphysical transcendence of the self (p. 286).
And, what is more, this poses a problem to the historian of
religion: if a reality over and above the khandhas is admitted,
then early Buddhism would to all intents and purposes lose its
distinctiveness vis a vis the dtman doctrine of Upanishadic Hin-
duism.
On the other hand, those who adopt classic Theravada ap-
proaches might not only insist that there are no explicit contexts
in Nikaya literature where a reality of the above kind is admitted,
but also maintain that many of Perez-Remon's affirmations on
this score are more often than not questionable inferences. In
this connection, it is possible to argue that the statements concern-
ing the indescribability of the liberated sage's destiny, for exam-
ple, hardly afford sufficient ground for reaching conclusions
about the selfs transcendence (cf. p. 280 ff.). In any event, it
would be well to point out that since Buddhism frowns upon
intellectualizing, even designations with positive connotations
(like "transcendent") can in the last analysis acquire a speculative
significance, and hence prove to be soteriologically stultifying in
the eyes of the believer. The preferred position of the Nikayas
on ultimate matters is no more than silence; this is a mode esoteric
126 JIABSVOL.8NO. 1

systems typically employ in order to point to what might be taken


as a dimension of inner meaning that stands beyond conceptual
thought altogether. Besides, it would be somewhat unwise to
read too much into the use of the term "self (attd) in moral
contexts and make this latter fact one of the grounds for arguing
that early Buddhism accepts the existence of a self in a higher
sense. It should be remembered that systems that reject the notion
of a self at the epistemological and metaphysical levels are often
forced to retain it in moral discussion. The writings of the British
philosopher David Hume sometimes bear witness to this cir-
cumstance in a notable way. What it highlights, however, is a
logical feature about language structure and discourse: in talking
about the facts of individual existence one is necessarily led to
use terms such as "self and "person" because in the last analysis
grammar demands it. In view of these considerations in particu-
lar, it appears that the quality of Perez-Remon's exposition would
have been notably enhanced if some of the categories and ideas
found in Western philosophical inquiries relating to the self had
been brought to bear upon his discussions. The subjects he deals
with are complex, and the interpretation of their finer points
indeed requires considerable conceptual sophistication. Still, the
book as it is has some undeniable merits. The connected view it
presents of the thinking in the Nikaya tradition on "self and
"non-self is both interesting and illuminating from the
standpoint of textual analysis; it can be also said to provide a
good basis for a more consciously philosophical study of these
key terms.

Vijitha Rajapakse

The World of Buddhism, edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard


Gombrich. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1984. 308 p.,
297 illustrations (82 color), 215 photographs, drawings and maps.
Glossary, Select Bibliography, Index. $49.95.

This may be the most beautiful book on Buddhism ever


produced, but it is devoutly to be wished that it will serve more
than just to accumulate onion-dip and wine-glass stains on sub-
urban coffee tables, for its text, to which have contributed the
likes of Etienne Lamotte, Lai Mani Joshi and Erik Ziircher, is as
fine a social history of Buddhism as we have.

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