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Political Theory
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A SYMPOSIUM ON INTEREST
IN POLITICAL THEORY
THEODORE M. BENDITT
University of Southern California
[2451
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[2461 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975
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Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [247]
A. Interpretations of "x is in
N's interest"
(A) x will produce some benefit for N (although it may produce some
harmful results as well).
(C) x will produce a more favorable ratio of benefit to harm for N than some
other alternative-say, z.
(D) x will produce a more favorable ratio of beneflt to harm for N than any
other available alternative.
Since (C) and (D) are comparative in two ways (i.e., amount of benefit is
compared with amount of harm and the benefit/harm ratio of one policy
is compared with that of another or of others), it might be well to call (C)
and (D) "compound-comparative" interpretations, and to call (B)-since it
is comparative along only one dimension-the "simple-comparative"
interpretation.
For the most part these interpretations are logically distinct. (B) entails
(A), but not vice versa. Neither (C) nor (D), however, entails (A), for (C)
and (D) could be true even though the policies in question produced no
benefit at all; nor does (A) entail either (C) or (D). Neither (C) nor (D)
entails (B), for the former could be true even though none of the policies
in question produced more benefit than harm to N; nor does (B) entail
either (C) or (D).
It is necessary to select one of these four interpretations, so that the
discussion of what is in a person's interest can proceed without ambiguity.
In an effort to decide which would be the best to adopt, I will try to
determine whether some ordinary interest locutions can be given more
natural interpretations on the basis of (A), (B), (C), or (D). I will consider
the locutions "x is against N's interest," "x is more in N's interest than y,"
and "N has mistaken his interests." Interpretation (D) can be eliminated
immediately, however, for the following reason: it makes "x is in N's
interest" mean the same as what we would normally take "x is in N's best
interest" to mean, and hence it provides no meaning for "x is more in N's
interest than y."
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12481 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975
(1) x is against N's = x has harmful results for N (although it may have
interest beneficial results as well).
(1) x is against N's = x produces results that are more harmful than
interest beneficial for N.
(2) x is more in N's = Both x and y produce more benefit than harm, but
interest than y x produces a more favorable ratio of benefit to
harm than y.
(1) x is against N's = This is not clear. It might come out as: There is
interest some other alternative which produces a better
ratio of benefit to harm than x; or: x produces
results that have a more favorable ratio of benefit
to harm than the results that y would produce.
(2) x is more in N's = This is not clear. Literally it would be: x produces
interest than y a better ratio of benefit to harm than z, and y
either does not produce a better ratio than does z,
or else it does produce a better ratio than z, but
not as favorable as the ratio that x produces. How-
ever, this comes to saying that z produces a better
ratio of benefit to harm than y; this is similar to
the (B) interpretation of "x is more .n N's interest
than y."
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Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [2491
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[2501 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975
(C') x will produce a more favorable ratio of benefit to hann for N than some
other alternative-say, z, where x and z would both produce more benefit
than harm for N.
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Benditt /THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [251]
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[2521 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975
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Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [2531
life, to find something less destructive that will give him satisfaction1
(assuming, of course, that such an alternative is available).1 4
Barry suggests three possible replies to the above. First, while he
concedes the example, he treats it merely as an exceptional case which
calls for some sort of qualification in his view of interest. He says (pp.
177-178):
if someone isn't hinself able to make the rational calculation others can try to
think their way into the man's value system, or impute what seem reasonable
values to him (based largely on the value systems of more rational people) and
prevent him from doing things he will regret later or make him do things he
will be pleased later to have done.... Here we have a genuine qualification of
the assertion which I put forward as a flrst approximation, that an increase in
one's assets is always something which is in one's interest ...
It seems to me, however, that the exception is more serious than Barry
admits, and that he has emphasized the wrong thing with regard to what is
in a person's interest. I will indicate later what I take the proper emphasis
to be.
Second, Barry suggests (p. 189) that what I am calling the gambler's
interest is really a matter of his good. Now Barry is correct in holding that
what is in one's interest can be distinguished from what is for one's good
in that the former is at one remove from the latter (that is, one's interest
has to do with increased opportunities for something, not with the
something itself). However, he also thinks that they differ in their
objects-the object of the former being want fulfillment and of the latter
pleasure and happiness. This seems to me to be mistaken; it too will be
pursued further on.
Third, Barry might argue that, contrary to what has been said above,
getting rid of his compulsion will increase the gambler's opportunities for
want fulfillment, and thus is in his interest even on Barry's account of
interest. For, Barry might argue, kicking one's habit will increase one's
opportunities for fulfilling wants that one does not now have, but may
come to have. The gambler does not now want a life that does not involve
gambling, but he may come to want such a life, and it is in his interest to
be in a position to fulfill these wants.
Now it is generally the case that it is in a person's interest to maintain
himself in a position which will permit him some latitude should his wants
change. Philippa Foot argues,' 5although not in so many words, that it is
always in a person's interest not to lose a hand, and, less extremely, it may
be in my interest to avoid offending certain individuals although I
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[254] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975
presently have no use for them, or to keep my old address book when I
take up with a new lady friend. It is a matter, if not of diversifying, at least
of keeping one's options available. However, there are limits to this
principle, and these limits are most evident when it comes to choosing the
most important things in one's life-a life style, career, mate, and so on.
These kinds of things require a commitment; at some time we may have to
give up our options and take the plunge, or else the venture may not be
successful, or not as successful as we would like. In addition, whether a
person should burn his bridges is in part a matter of the likelihood that his
wants will change. So, when a person-such as our gambler or Grice's
actor-presently wants, more than anything else, a certain kind of life, it
may be in his interest to change, but not merely because he may come to
want something else. For on the one hand it is not always likely that he
will come to want something else, and on the other hand it is in his
interest to come to want something else. It is this that Barry's notion of
interest does not capture: it may be in a person's interest to want what he
does not want. Barry's account works only for what a person presently
wants.
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Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [2551
tion of wants; they are in one's interest only if and to the extent that the
promote or will promote one's good. They may fail to do so.
The good of a person, according to the suggestion we are now
considering, is a life that makes him happy. However, the possibility of
being happy can depend upon one's well-being. A person cannot be happy
if his physical or mental condition is such that he cannot feel satisfied with
the things that he gets in life-even when the things he gets are the things
he wants. It is not unreasonable to suppose that there are many aspects of
a person's physical and mental well-being which are relevant to his
happiness. Obviously if some of a person's wants involve his doing some
physical activity his body is not capable of, there are going to be areas of
his life with which he will not feel satisfied. We can generalize from this
and say that maintaining mental and emotional well-being is necessary for
happiness. Indeed, a person's well-being can be defined in terms of states
and/or conditions which enable him to feel satisfied with what life brings.
In this context we can see how the ascetic ideal of life works. If one's
position in life is such that he has little hope of fulfilling certain wants, he
is best advised to lower his sights and to train himself, if he can, to feel
satisfied with and take pleasure in other things. Good mental health is
often a matter of being able to feel satisfied with what life brings.
I suggest, then, that the concept of a person's interest is very much like
the concept of a person's good, and thus concerns a person's position in
life with respect to being happy. Thus, it concerns one's position with
respect to the fulfillment of expectations and with respect to well-being.
Something that improves one's position with respect to either of these is in
his interest. Note that having one's position improved (e.g., getting more
assets) is not necessarily a matter of actually fulfilling wants or
improvement in health; it may merely be a matter of being in a better
position to do these things.
This can be stated more precisely in the following way: x is in N's
interest if and only if x is an action or policy which would either (i)
improve more than it detracts from N's opportunities for getting out of
life what he requires for his happiness, or (ii) improve more than it
detracts from N's opportunities for protecting and improving his well-
being. Definitions of "x is against N's interest," "x is more in N's interest
than y," "N has mistaken his interests," and other locutions can be derived
in obvious ways from the definition of "x is in N's interest."
The definition which has just been given may need one further
modification ("may" because I am not certain whether it does or not).
The following might be offered as a counterexample to the definition.
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[2561 POLITICAL THEORY 1 AUGUST 1975
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Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [257]
NOTES
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[258] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975
short (in the scale-dividing use of "short") can be, in some ways, long-x feet long, as
long as y, or longer than z (p. 154). The expression "being in a person's interest," I
have suggested, has a scale-dividing, but not a toti-scalar, use.
12. Filling Barry's account of the substance of the concept of interest into the
definitional schema given earlier, we get "x is in N's interest if x will increase N's
opportunities for fulfilling his wants more than it decreases his opportunities for
fulfilling his wants."
13. I distinguish between the fulfillment of wants and the satisfaction (gratifica-
tion, pleasure, or whatever) that one may get when a want is fulfiled. There is
possibility of confusion here because the word "satisfy" and its cognates are often
used to mean either of these. If N wants to do x, and does x, then his want has been
fulfilled ("satisfied" is often used here-as by Barry, although I do not suggest that
Barry is at all confused about this), but whether N gets satisfaction from fulfilling his
want is another matter and is not entailed by the fulfillment of the want
14. This example is similar to one used by G. R Grice in The Grounds of Moral
Judgement (Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 16.
15. Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.
59 (1958-1959).
16. The topic of happiness is taken up in greater detail in my article "Happiness,"
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 25 (1974), pp. 1-20.
17. G. H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1963), p. 86.
18. I wish to thank the editors of Political Theory for the many editorial
suggestions which have improved the readability of this article.
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