The Concept of Interest in Political Theory

Author(s): Theodore M. Benditt

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Aug., 1975), pp. 245-258
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/191108
Accessed: 09-10-2019 02:15 UTC

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A SYMPOSIUM ON INTEREST

1. THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST

IN POLITICAL THEORY

THEODORE M. BENDITT
University of Southern California

hN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, and generally in political

discussion, the notion of interest is widely used. It is sometimes said, for
example, that politics can be characterized as the arena wherein diverse
interests compete for recognition. Some political writers take the notion
of interest to be the very central notion in politics.
There are several accounts of interest that can be found in the literature
of political theory, only one of which will be the concern of this article. It
may be worthwhile, though, to indicate briefly the variety of ways in
which the notion of interest has been understood and used. This will
enable us to have a sense of the difference between some of these ways of
understanding interests and the way that will be presented in this article.
There are at least seven accounts of interest in the literature. The first
four fall roughly into a group which can in a sense be called subjective'
accounts of interest, in that they give a central place to people's feelings,
attitudes, desires, or demands. Thus, interests have been held to be feelings
or attitudes;2 attitudes shared by groups of people;3 claims or demands;4
and wants.5 The remaining three notions might be called objective
notions. What distinguishes this group from the former is that a person's
interest is not dependent (or as dependent) on his having certain feelings,
attitudes, desires, or whatever, or on his making demands. This characteri-

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 3 No. 3, August 1975

? 1975 Sage Publications, Inc.

[2451

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[2461 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975

zation of the next three notions is not intended to be very precise; it is

only intended to indicate a rough classification. In this group we find
interests thought of as changes that affect one advantageously or
disadvantageously;6 as means to satisfying wants;7 and as what is
conducive to happiness.8 As the discussion that follows will show, I am
most in sympathy with the last of these as an account of something's being
in a person's interest.

I. SOME LOGICAL FEA TURES OF THE

CONCEPT OF INTEREST

In his book Political Argument9 Brian Barry gives a comprehensive

account of the concept of a person's interest, in which he elucidates what
he takes to be both the logical and the substantive dimensions of the
concept. I propose to argue against Barry with respect to both of these in
the course of presenting my own account of these dimensions.
The question "What are the things that are in N's interests?" can be
interpreted in either of the following ways: (a) it can be an inquiry into
what sorts of things are in N's interest; or (b) it can be an inquiry into
what is in N's interest at a particular time. To (a) we might answer that N's
interests include such things as his wealth, his career, the well-being and
welfare of his family, and his financial and social position. If N is, say, a
steelworker, we might include the interests of steelworkers among N's
interests. An answer to (b), on the other hand, would mention some
specific action or policy which, at a particular time, would promote or
protect some of the interests that could be mentioned in answer to (a). We
can distinguish answers to (a) from answers to (b) by means of the
following formulations: those things that can be given as answers to (a) are
N's interests; those things given as answers to (b) are in N's interests at t.
The distinction just made is needed if we are to be able to account for
the fact that it is sometimes not in a person's interest to pursue one of his
interests. For example, health and wealth may both be interests of N's, but
if an action which would produce more wealth for N would be detrimental
to his health, then it is (probably) in N's interest at t to do what is
necessary to protect his health, and it is not in his interest at t (indeed, it
is-probably-against N's interest at t) to do that act which would produce
the added wealth. For the present I will be concerned with features of the
concept of interest as it occurs in the formula "x is in N's interest at t."

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 Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [247]

A. Interpretations of "x is in
N's interest"

I want now to examine certain aspects of "x is in N's interest at t." (I

will omit the time designation hereafter except where needed.) The
question at issue is whether the concept of interest is comparative or
noncomparative. I can discern one noncomparative and three comparative
interpretations of "x is in N's interest." (A), below, is noncomparative;
(B), (C), and (D) are comparative.

(A) x will produce some benefit for N (although it may produce some
harmful results as well).

(B) x will produce more benefit than harm for N.

(C) x will produce a more favorable ratio of benefit to harm for N than some
other alternative-say, z.

(D) x will produce a more favorable ratio of beneflt to harm for N than any
other available alternative.

Since (C) and (D) are comparative in two ways (i.e., amount of benefit is
compared with amount of harm and the benefit/harm ratio of one policy
is compared with that of another or of others), it might be well to call (C)
and (D) "compound-comparative" interpretations, and to call (B)-since it
is comparative along only one dimension-the "simple-comparative"
interpretation.
For the most part these interpretations are logically distinct. (B) entails
(A), but not vice versa. Neither (C) nor (D), however, entails (A), for (C)
and (D) could be true even though the policies in question produced no
benefit at all; nor does (A) entail either (C) or (D). Neither (C) nor (D)
entails (B), for the former could be true even though none of the policies
in question produced more benefit than harm to N; nor does (B) entail
either (C) or (D).
It is necessary to select one of these four interpretations, so that the
discussion of what is in a person's interest can proceed without ambiguity.
In an effort to decide which would be the best to adopt, I will try to
determine whether some ordinary interest locutions can be given more
natural interpretations on the basis of (A), (B), (C), or (D). I will consider
the locutions "x is against N's interest," "x is more in N's interest than y,"
and "N has mistaken his interests." Interpretation (D) can be eliminated
immediately, however, for the following reason: it makes "x is in N's
interest" mean the same as what we would normally take "x is in N's best
interest" to mean, and hence it provides no meaning for "x is more in N's
interest than y."

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12481 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975

a. Application of the (A) interpretation

(1) x is against N's = x has harmful results for N (although it may have
interest beneficial results as well).

(2) x is more in N's = x produces more benefit than some alternative y.

interest than y

(3) N has mistaken = N is mistaken in believing (i) that x will produce a

his interest benefit for him, or (ii) that x will be more bene-
ficial than y.

b. Application of the (B) interpretation

(1) x is against N's = x produces results that are more harmful than
interest beneficial for N.

(2) x is more in N's = Both x and y produce more benefit than harm, but
interest than y x produces a more favorable ratio of benefit to
harm than y.

(3) N has mistaken = N is mistaken about whether (i) x will produce

his interests more benefit than harm; or (ii) x is more in his in-
terest than y.

c. Application of the (C) interpretation

(1) x is against N's = This is not clear. It might come out as: There is
interest some other alternative which produces a better
ratio of benefit to harm than x; or: x produces
results that have a more favorable ratio of benefit
to harm than the results that y would produce.

(2) x is more in N's = This is not clear. Literally it would be: x produces
interest than y a better ratio of benefit to harm than z, and y
either does not produce a better ratio than does z,
or else it does produce a better ratio than z, but
not as favorable as the ratio that x produces. How-
ever, this comes to saying that z produces a better
ratio of benefit to harm than y; this is similar to
the (B) interpretation of "x is more .n N's interest
than y."

(3) N has mistaken = N is mistaken about whether x will produce a

his interests better ratio of benefit to harm than z, or about
whether the ratio of x to z is better than that of
some y to z.

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 Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [2491

B. Reasons for Preferring the (B) Interpretation

to the (C) Interpretation

Barry claims that the concept of interest is a comparative concept on

the model of (C). He says: " 'being in A's interest' is at least a triadic
relationship (between A and at least two policies)" (p. 195). All
statements about interests, he says, carry "a 'secret comparison' between
one policy and another" (p. 194). For example, suppose that x and y are
policies affecting laborers. According to x each laborer individually
negotiates a contract with an employer, and y is a policy of collective
bargaining. To say that x is in N's interest, according to (C), is to say that
x will result in a better balance of benefits over harm for N than some
other policy-say, y.
There are, however, several difficulties with packing a comparison
between policies into the formula "x is in N's interest." For one thing, it
will turn out that almost everything is in a person's interest, for it will
almost always be possible to find some policy y that is less beneficial
and/or more harmful than x. Barry acknowledges this in his paper "The
Public Interest" :I 0

The selection of alternatives for comparison thus assumes a position of crucial

importance. Any policy can be made "preferable" by arbitrarily contrasting it
with one sufficiently unpleasant

Another difficulty with (C) is that it leaves us without a natural way of

expressing what is said by (B)-that a given policy x will produce more
benefit than harm for N-in terms of interests. (On the other hand, the
(B}version of "x is more in N's interest than y" captures in a natural way
what is packed into the (C)version of "x is in N's interest.") Now that a
policy x will produce more benefit than harm for N does seem to be
something that we want to be able to express in terms of interests. This
can be brought out with force by considering a related difficulty.
If (C) were what was meant by "x is in N's interest," then it could be
the case that a policy that was harmful to N on balance might be in N's
interest. This would happen when the policy with which x is being
compared is more harmful on balance than x. For example, suppose x is a
policy of individually negotiated labor contracts, and y is a policy of
employers unilaterally establishing the terms of employment. Suppose
further that both x and y would produce more harm than benefit for N,
but that x is not as bad as y. Then according to (C), x is in N's interest.
This is not, however, a natural way to describe the situation. It would be
more perspicuous to say that both x and y are against N's interest (this is

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[2501 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975

what is expressed by the (B)-version of "x is against N's interest"), but

that x is less against N's interest than y. When we make use of (B)based
locutions, comparisons between or among policies are mentioned explicit-
ly, not implicitly. There are "secret comparisons" in (B)locutions, but
they are not comparisons with alternative actions or policies.
One might try to avoid the foregoing results by revising the (C)
interpretation as follows: x is in N's interest =

(C') x will produce a more favorable ratio of benefit to hann for N than some
other alternative-say, z, where x and z would both produce more benefit
than harm for N.

This interpretation is unsatisfactory, for if there should be no alternative z

which would produce more benefit than harm, then x, although it would
produce more benefit than harm, would not be in N's interest. But, to the
contrary, it would seem that x certainly is in N's interest, and that it is so
for the reason that it produces more benefit than harm for him.
We see, then, that the (B) family of locutions is a more natural way to
capture some important features of the concept of interest; and I take this
to be a reason for preferring (B) to (C). Adopting (B) locutions, does,
however, require us to accept somewhat awkward results-namely, that a
policy may be against one's interest even though in the circumstances it
protects one's interests better than any other policy open to one; and that
a policy that is least against one's interest, although it might be the best
policy to adopt, is not in one's interest. These results sound anomalous
because of the failure to distinguish carefully between what is in a person's
interest and what the best thing to do is. These are often run together
because in decision-making that concerns only oneself, matters of interest
are usually (and perhaps always) the weightiest considerations. But
suppose, for the sake of argument, that personal ideals are relevant
considerations in personal decision-making, and that these are different
from considerations of interest. This makes it clear that one's interest and
the best thing to do are different notions.

(C). Reasons for Preferring the (B) Interpretation

to the (A) Interpretation

The question now arises as to which of (A) and (B) is to be

preferred-that is, whether the concept of interest is noncomparative or
comparative (i.e., simple-comparative). A feature of (A) is that almost
anything can have some beneficial results; thus, almost anything would be

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 Benditt /THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [251]

in a person's interest. For example, a policy of avoiding inoculations

would benefit N in that it would result in his experiencing less pain; or if
the survivors of a game of Russian roulette were to get $1.00 each it would
be in N's interest, according to (A), to play because it would provide him
with an opportunity to get $1.00.
(B) is preferable to (A), however, for the following reason. To say that
an action or policy is in a person's interest is to evaluate, in terms of
interests, the entire policy, not merely an aspect of it. If every policy were
in some way beneficial to N, then, according to (A), every policy would be
in N's interest. Further, to say that a policy was in a person's interest
would not go very far in distinguishing one policy from another. We would
have to resort to the comparative locutions "x is more in N's interest
overall (i.e., produces more benefit than harm)' or "x is more in N's
interest than y overall (i.e., produces a greater balance of benefit over
harm than y)" in order to rank policies, for "x is in N's interest" would
not aid in performing this task.
The job of the concept of interest thus seems to be to make partial
evaluations of alternative policies with an eye toward ranking the
alternatives. But to say of a policy that it is in one's interest is not yet to
rank it against other policies that are in one's interest; it only indicates
that it falls in the top part of the ranking order (i.e., that it is not against
one's interest).1 1 Of course we can and sometimes do rank policies all of
which are more harmful than beneficial, but that some policy is the best
one to adopt at a given time does not mean that it is in one's interest at
that time; it may mean only that it is the policy which is least against one's
interest at that time.
We are now in a position to give a schema for a definition of "x is in N's
interest," as follows: x is in N's interest if and only if x will produce more
[ .] than [ ] for N, where x is an action or policy. The blanks
in the schema represent the substantive concept of the concept of intere
What should be filled in will be discussed next.

II. SUBSTANTIVE FEA TURES OF THE

CONCEPT OF INTEREST

Barry holds that "an action or policy is in a man's interests if it

increases his opportunities to get what he wants" (p. 176). Now on the
face of it, it would seem that there could be some things that people want
which it would not be in their interest to have increased opportunities to
get, and if this is so, then Barry's definition is mistaken. For example, if
someone wants to get some kicks from playing Russian roulette, then,

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[2521 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975

according to Barry's definition, making a loaded gun available to him, or

having a law which makes it easy to get a gun, is in his interest.1 2 In a case
like this it seems natural to say that the action or policy in question is not
in this person's interest, and that if he thinks it is, he has mistaken his
interests. Barry, however, reserves the expression "mistaken one's in-
terests" for another kind of error concerning interest, and has a way of
trying to meet the difficulty just outlined.
Barry points out that the person involved here (N) is very likely to want
other things besides getting kicks from playing Russian roulette. If N
fulfills his present want, however, he runs a great risk of not being able to
fulfill other wants in the future. Barry (pp. 184-185) says:

The kind of example we are thinking of when we speak of limiting a man's

opportunities to get what he wants "in his own (best) interests" is surely one
where by doing what he wants now he will produce results that he doesn't
want in the future (including very commonly, a lack of opportunity to satisfy
whatever wants he may have in the future). The contrast is not between
want-satisfaction and sometiing other than want-satisfaction, but rather
between want-satisfaction now and want-satisfaction later.

On these grounds Barry can argue convincingly that on his account of a

person's interest, it may sometimes not be in one's interest to have
increased opportunities for want fulfillment-namely, in cases where the
opportunities for frustrating wants which are more important are thereby
increased. For the same reason, Barry argues, it will probably be in the
interest of a drug-addict or a compulsive gambler "to reduce either his
assets or at least his opportunities for committing them" (p. 177).
It seems to me, however, that something might be in a person's interest
even if it doesn't increase his opportunities for want fulfillment-indeed,
perhaps because it does not-where this is not merely a matter of a
preference for the fulfillment of other and more important wants in the
future. If there are such cases, then this suggests that it is something other
than opportunity for want fulfillment that we are concerned with.
While a drug addict or a compulsive gambler may, in a lucid moment,
want to reduce his assets or his opportunities for committing them, let us
suppose that he does not. Indeed, let us suppose that the gambler,
although his preoccupation is ruining him, wants nothing more than to
gamble. In his lucid moments he recognizes what is happening to him, but
he does not want it to be any different. He does not want a life that is
without the thrills of the turn of a card and the roll of dice. Now if it is
the case that a risky life will ultimately lead to misery for this gambler, it
would seem appropriate to say that it is in his interest to change his way of

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 Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [2531

life, to find something less destructive that will give him satisfaction1
(assuming, of course, that such an alternative is available).1 4
Barry suggests three possible replies to the above. First, while he
concedes the example, he treats it merely as an exceptional case which
calls for some sort of qualification in his view of interest. He says (pp.
177-178):

if someone isn't hinself able to make the rational calculation others can try to
think their way into the man's value system, or impute what seem reasonable
values to him (based largely on the value systems of more rational people) and
prevent him from doing things he will regret later or make him do things he
will be pleased later to have done.... Here we have a genuine qualification of
the assertion which I put forward as a flrst approximation, that an increase in
one's assets is always something which is in one's interest ...

It seems to me, however, that the exception is more serious than Barry
admits, and that he has emphasized the wrong thing with regard to what is
in a person's interest. I will indicate later what I take the proper emphasis
to be.
Second, Barry suggests (p. 189) that what I am calling the gambler's
interest is really a matter of his good. Now Barry is correct in holding that
what is in one's interest can be distinguished from what is for one's good
in that the former is at one remove from the latter (that is, one's interest
has to do with increased opportunities for something, not with the
something itself). However, he also thinks that they differ in their
objects-the object of the former being want fulfillment and of the latter
pleasure and happiness. This seems to me to be mistaken; it too will be
pursued further on.
Third, Barry might argue that, contrary to what has been said above,
getting rid of his compulsion will increase the gambler's opportunities for
want fulfillment, and thus is in his interest even on Barry's account of
interest. For, Barry might argue, kicking one's habit will increase one's
opportunities for fulfilling wants that one does not now have, but may
come to have. The gambler does not now want a life that does not involve
gambling, but he may come to want such a life, and it is in his interest to
be in a position to fulfill these wants.
Now it is generally the case that it is in a person's interest to maintain
himself in a position which will permit him some latitude should his wants
change. Philippa Foot argues,' 5although not in so many words, that it is
always in a person's interest not to lose a hand, and, less extremely, it may
be in my interest to avoid offending certain individuals although I

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[254] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975

presently have no use for them, or to keep my old address book when I
take up with a new lady friend. It is a matter, if not of diversifying, at least
of keeping one's options available. However, there are limits to this
principle, and these limits are most evident when it comes to choosing the
most important things in one's life-a life style, career, mate, and so on.
These kinds of things require a commitment; at some time we may have to
give up our options and take the plunge, or else the venture may not be
successful, or not as successful as we would like. In addition, whether a
person should burn his bridges is in part a matter of the likelihood that his
wants will change. So, when a person-such as our gambler or Grice's
actor-presently wants, more than anything else, a certain kind of life, it
may be in his interest to change, but not merely because he may come to
want something else. For on the one hand it is not always likely that he
will come to want something else, and on the other hand it is in his
interest to come to want something else. It is this that Barry's notion of
interest does not capture: it may be in a person's interest to want what he
does not want. Barry's account works only for what a person presently
wants.

IHI. A SUGGES TED CONCEPTION OF THE

INTEREST OF MAN

The good of a person may plausibly be taken to consist in his being

sufficiently satisfied in as many departments of his life as are necessary to
make him happy.1 6 People have various expectations in the different areas
of their lives (which, for the sake of convenience, we can call wants), the
fulfillment of which they will find worthwhile, and the good of a person
may be taken to consist, roughly speaking, in fulfilling these wants. Most
people have quite similar wants and expect much the same out of life as
other people. Obviously, if there are limited resources available for the
fulfillment of people's wants, it may be difficult for some to get out of life
what they require for their happiness. A person's chances for fulfilling his
wants are likely to depend largely upon how he is placed in life, especially
with regard to such things as wealth, power, and prestige. It is thus not
surprising that items such as these are most often cited as being a person's
interests. For increases in some or all of these usually improve the chances
for getting what is required for happiness. But what should not be lost
sight of is that increases in wealth, power, and prestige are not in one's
interest just because they are usually instrumental in producing satisfac-

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 Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [2551

tion of wants; they are in one's interest only if and to the extent that the
promote or will promote one's good. They may fail to do so.
The good of a person, according to the suggestion we are now
considering, is a life that makes him happy. However, the possibility of
being happy can depend upon one's well-being. A person cannot be happy
if his physical or mental condition is such that he cannot feel satisfied with
the things that he gets in life-even when the things he gets are the things
he wants. It is not unreasonable to suppose that there are many aspects of
a person's physical and mental well-being which are relevant to his
happiness. Obviously if some of a person's wants involve his doing some
physical activity his body is not capable of, there are going to be areas of
his life with which he will not feel satisfied. We can generalize from this
and say that maintaining mental and emotional well-being is necessary for
happiness. Indeed, a person's well-being can be defined in terms of states
and/or conditions which enable him to feel satisfied with what life brings.
In this context we can see how the ascetic ideal of life works. If one's
position in life is such that he has little hope of fulfilling certain wants, he
is best advised to lower his sights and to train himself, if he can, to feel
satisfied with and take pleasure in other things. Good mental health is
often a matter of being able to feel satisfied with what life brings.
I suggest, then, that the concept of a person's interest is very much like
the concept of a person's good, and thus concerns a person's position in
life with respect to being happy. Thus, it concerns one's position with
respect to the fulfillment of expectations and with respect to well-being.
Something that improves one's position with respect to either of these is in
his interest. Note that having one's position improved (e.g., getting more
assets) is not necessarily a matter of actually fulfilling wants or
improvement in health; it may merely be a matter of being in a better
position to do these things.
This can be stated more precisely in the following way: x is in N's
interest if and only if x is an action or policy which would either (i)
improve more than it detracts from N's opportunities for getting out of
life what he requires for his happiness, or (ii) improve more than it
detracts from N's opportunities for protecting and improving his well-
being. Definitions of "x is against N's interest," "x is more in N's interest
than y," "N has mistaken his interests," and other locutions can be derived
in obvious ways from the definition of "x is in N's interest."
The definition which has just been given may need one further
modification ("may" because I am not certain whether it does or not).
The following might be offered as a counterexample to the definition.

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[2561 POLITICAL THEORY 1 AUGUST 1975

Suppose that smoking cigarettes will shorten my life considerably.

can, for the sake of argument, ignore any other deleterious effects that
smoking may have on my health and focus just on the shortening of my
life.) The suggestion is that if smoking will shorten my life, then it is in my
interest to stop smoking. But, the argument continues, it is not in my
interest to stop smoking for either of the reasons contained in the
definition. Smoking is not against my interest because it will detract from
my opportunities for realizing my hopes, aspiration, and so on, for if I am
dead none of these matter. And likewise, detraction from my well-being i
not a consideration if I am dead. Nevertheless, it is said, it is in my intere
to stop smoking; hence the definition is inadequate.
It cannot be denied that there is force to this objection, and if it is
correct, then the definition would have to be modified so as to take
account of it. It does seem to be the case that the fact that smoking will
shorten my life is a reason for me to stop. What is not clear, however, is
whether it is proper to call this a reason of interest. It seems far too weak
to identify doing something that will preserve one's life merely as one's
interest. Self-preservation seems to be a presupposition of, not merely a
part of, the promotion of one's interest.
"A being, of whose good it is meaningful to talk, is one who can
meaningfully be said to be well or ill, to thrive, to flourish, be happy or
miserable."' " Only a being that has a life can have a good. But it would
seem, further, that the notion of one's good pertains only to the duration
of one's life. There is nothing that counts as a person's good when he is
dead, unless we believe that persons "persist" after death. And, likewise, it
does not seem to make sense to suggest that it is for a person's good that
he be alive at some time when he is not. Similarly, being alive at a time
when one is not or will not be does not seem to be in his interest. The
notion of a person's interest seems to apply only to lives which are
on-going; it is not a consideration that is relevant to questions concerning
keeping one's life going. Thus, although there is sorm-e force to the
objection to the proposed definition of "x is in N's interest," there are
more compelling considerations which argue in favor of the view that
although there is a reason to do that which will preserve one's life (namely,
the fact that doing x will preserve one's life), this reason does not seem to
be a reason of interest. Nevertheless, since reasons of interest and reasons
of life-preservation will usually favor the same results, there is no harm in
treating the latter as a case of the former as a matter of convenience.
Barry does not deny that the concept of a person's interest is connected
with happiness (he actually connects it with pleasure, but there is no

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 Benditt / THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST [257]

indication that he excludes happiness). He says that "the connection

between 'interest' and 'pleasure' is indirect rather than non-existent" (p.
176), for having increased opportunities for want fulfillment is a way of
increasing pleasure. I have argued, however, that Barry has got the
emphasis wrong-interest is directly connected with happiness, and
indirectly connected with opportunities for want fulfillment.' 8

NOTES

1. This subjective-objective distinction is drawn by Richard E. Flathma

Public Interest (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 16-17.
2. See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Modem Political Analysis (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hafl, 1963), p. 57.
3. See A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1908), p. 211; David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New
York: Knopf, 1951), p. 24; and J.D.B. Miller, The Nature of Politics (London:
Duckworth, 1962), p. 39.
4. See, for example, H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 23.
5. See John Plamenatz, "Interests," Political Studies, v. 2 (1954), pp. 1-2. In
later writings Plamenatz has expressed different views as to what interests are,
particularly in his Man and Society. See also C. B. Hagan, "The Group in Political
Science," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. R. Young (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestem University Press, 1958), discussed by Brian Barry, Political Argument
(New York: Humanities Press, 1967), p. 175.
6. See Flathman, op. cit., p. 17; and Vernon van Dyke, Political Science: A
Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 124.
7. See Barry, op. cit, p. 176; and van Dyke, op. cit, p. 148.
8. See John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. F.
A. Hayek (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 132; Joseph Butler, The Works of
Joseph Butler, ed. W. E. Gladstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), II, p. 50, and
XI, p. 189; and Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press,
1968), pp. 27-28.
9. Op. cit. Subsequent references to this book will be given in parentheses in the
text
10. Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(Supp.), Vol. 38 (1964), pp. 7-8.
11. Neil Cooper, in an article entitled "Scale-words," Analysis, Vol. 27
(1966-1967), makes the following distinction among words (called "scale-words")
whose function is "to place things in an order of comparison": scale-words have
"scale-dividing use," and some of them have in addition a "toti-scalar use." Words o
the former sort are used primarily "to assign things to parts of scales, for examp
'long' and 'short,' 'good' and 'bad'" (p. 153). Words of the latter sort not only divid
scales, but also can be used anywhere on the scale; for example, something that is

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[258] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1975

short (in the scale-dividing use of "short") can be, in some ways, long-x feet long, as
long as y, or longer than z (p. 154). The expression "being in a person's interest," I
have suggested, has a scale-dividing, but not a toti-scalar, use.
12. Filling Barry's account of the substance of the concept of interest into the
definitional schema given earlier, we get "x is in N's interest if x will increase N's
opportunities for fulfilling his wants more than it decreases his opportunities for
fulfilling his wants."
13. I distinguish between the fulfillment of wants and the satisfaction (gratifica-
tion, pleasure, or whatever) that one may get when a want is fulfiled. There is
possibility of confusion here because the word "satisfy" and its cognates are often
used to mean either of these. If N wants to do x, and does x, then his want has been
fulfilled ("satisfied" is often used here-as by Barry, although I do not suggest that
Barry is at all confused about this), but whether N gets satisfaction from fulfilling his
want is another matter and is not entailed by the fulfillment of the want
14. This example is similar to one used by G. R Grice in The Grounds of Moral
Judgement (Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 16.
15. Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.
59 (1958-1959).
16. The topic of happiness is taken up in greater detail in my article "Happiness,"
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 25 (1974), pp. 1-20.
17. G. H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1963), p. 86.
18. I wish to thank the editors of Political Theory for the many editorial
suggestions which have improved the readability of this article.

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