GEMINI

PROGRAM

MISSION

REPORT

.
ATTACHED

GEMINI
WHEN NOT IN STORAGE

VI-A..
T

ORM _-N 66)

843

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS 1 CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794t the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

!

JANUARY

1966
x./
SPACECRAFT CENTER

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION/MANNED

Mission GT-1

Description Unmanned 64 orbits

GEMINI SPACEC_ Launch date Apr. 8, 1964 Jan. 19, 1965 Mar_ 1965 June 1965 23,

FLIGHT

HISTORY accomplishments integrity. I
i

Major

Demonstrated

structural

GT-2

Unmanned suborbital Manned 3 orbits Manned 4 days Manned 8 days Manned 2 days rendezvous (canceled after failure of GATV)

Demonstrated performance.

heat protection

and systems

GT-3

Demonstrated manned Gemini spacecraft.

qualifications

of the

Gemini IV Gemini V Gemini VI

3,

Demonstrated EVA and systems for 4 days in space.

performance

Aug. 21, 1965 Oct. 25, 1965

Demonstrated long-duration flight_ rendezvous radar capability, and rendezvous maneuvers. Demonstrated dual countdown procedures (GAATV and GLV-spacecraft), flight performance of TLV and flight readiness of the GATV secondary propulsion system. Mission canceled after GATVfailed to achieve orbit.

_

Gemini VII

Manned 14 days rendezvous

Dee. 1965

4,

Demonstrated 2-week duration flight and station keeping with GLV stage II, evaluated "shirt sleeve" environment, acted as the rendezvous target for spacecraft 6_ and demonstrated a controlled reentry to within 7 miles of planned landing point. Demonstrated on-time launch procedures, closed-loop rendezvous capability, and station keeping techniques with spacecraft 7.

Gemini VI-A

Manned i day

Dec. 1965

15,

m

UNCLASSIFIED
MSC-G-R-66-2

i

GEMINI

PROGRAM GEMINI

MISSION VI-A

REPORT

Prepared

by:

Gemini

Mission

Evaluation

Team

Approved

by:

7

,9 Charles

4 W. Mathews Gemini Program

Manager,

Deputy

Director

NATIONAL
:z

AERONAUTICS MANNED

AND

SPACE ADMINISTRATION CENTER

SPACECRAFT

HOUSTON, JANUARY

TEXAS 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

NASA-S-66-241 JAN

_.

Spacecraft 7 as viewed from spacecraft 6 during station keeping.

UNCLASSIFIED

iii

Section TABLES FIGURES I. 0 2.0 3.0 MISSION ............ ............... SUMMARY ........... .....

Page xii xv i-i 2-i • • • 3-1 3-1 .... 3-1 3-1 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-4 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-25 ....... 3-27

INTRODUCTION GEMINI 3.1 VI-A

............. VEHICLE DESCRIPTION ........ Structure

GEMINI 3.1.1

SPACECRAFT Spacecraft 3.1.1.1 3.1.1.2

Reentry Adapter

assembly assembly ..........

........

3.1.2

Major

Systems

Communications system . . Instrumentation and recording system ....... 3.1.2.3 Environmental control system .......... 3.1.2.4 Guidance and control system 3.1.2.5 Time reference system .... 3.1.2.6 Electrical system ........ 3.1.2.7 Propulsion system ....... 3.1.2.8 Pyrotechnic ........... 3.1.2. 9 Crew station furnishings and equipment ......... 3.1.2.10 Landing system ......... 3.1.2. ll Postlanding and recovery system ............ 3.2 3.3 GEMINI GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE ............ DATA

3.1.2.1 3.1.2.2

. .

VI-A WEIGHT

AND BALANCE

f

UNCLASSIFIED

iv
Section 4.0 MISSION 4.1 4.2 4.3

UNCLASSIFIED
Page DESCRIPTION MISSION ...... ..... . . . . . 4-1 4-1 4-5 4-9 4-9 4- 9 4-i0 4-13 Stage . . 4-13 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-3

-

ACTUAL

SEQUENCE FLIGHT 4.3.1

OF EVENTS

TRAJECTORIES Gemini 4.3.1.1 4.3.1.2 4.3.1.3

Spacecraft Launch . Orbit .......... Reentry ....... Launch Vehicle Second

4.3.2 5 •0 VEHICLE 5 •1

Gemini

PERFORMANCE

............. ........... ........ .......

SPACECRAFT 5.1.1 5-1.2

PERFORMANCE

Spacecraft

Structure Systems

-.

Communications 5.1.2.1 5. i. 2.2 5 •i. 2.3 5.1.2.4 5. i. 2.5 5.1.2.6 5.1.2. 7

Ultrahigh frequency voice communications ..... High frequency voice communications ........ Radar transponders ...... Digital command system ..... Telemetry transmitters .... Antenna systems ........ Recovery aids ........ and Recording System • • • •

5-3 5-4 5-4 5-4 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-7 5-7 5-8 5-9 5-9 5-9 5-13

5.1.3

Instrumentation 5.1.3.1 5.1.3.2 5.1.3.3 5 •i. 3 •4 5.1.3.5

PCM tape recorder failure .__ Low-level multiplexer (reentry vehicle) failure . . . Delayed-time data quality Real-time data quality . . Overall system performance . Control System ......

5.1.4

Environmental

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Section 5.1.5 Guidance 5.1.5.1 _.1.5.2 5.1.6 5.l.7 and Control System ........ Page

v

5-15

Inertial guidance system performance evaluation ..... Control system evaluation .... System ...........

5-15 5-24 5-53 5-55 5-55 5-55 5-57

Time Reference Electrical 5.1.7.1 5 •1.7.2

System

.............

Power system ........... Sequential system ........ Propulsion System .......

5.1.8

Spacecraft 5.1.8.1 5.1.8.2 5.1.8.3

Orbital attitude and maneuver system ............ Reentry control system .... Retrograde rocket system . . System ........

5-57 5-58 5-59 5-65

5.1.9 5.1.10

Pyrotechnics

Crew Station Furnishings and Equipment ............. 5.1.10.1 5.1.10.2 5.1.10.3 5.1.10.4 5.1.10.5 5.1.10.6 Crew station design and layout ....... Controls and displays ...... Pressure suit and accessories .... Flight crew operatlonal equipment ......... Flight crew personal equipment ......... Bioinstrumentation ....... System ............

5-67

5 -67 5-68 5-69 5-70 5-70 5-72 5-73 5-75

5.1. ll Landing 5.1.12 5.2 GEMINI 5.2.1

Postlanding LAUNCH

............... PERFORMANCE ............... ........

VEHICLE

5-77 5-77

Airframe

UNCLASSIFIED

vi
Section

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 5.2.1.1 5.2.1.2 5.2.1.3 5.2.2 Propulsion 5.2.2.1 5.2.2.2 5.2.2.3 5.2.2.4 5.2.3 Flight 5.2.3.1 5.2.3.2 5.2.3.3 5.2.3.4 Longitudinal oscillation 5-77 5-77 5-78 5-79 5-79 5-81 5-81 5-82 5-82 5-83 5-83 5-84 5-84 5-84 5-84 5-84 5-85 5-86 5-87 5-87 5-87 ..... 5-87

-

(POG0) ............. Structural loads ........ Post-SECO disturbance .... ...........

Launch attempt analysis ..... Flight performance ........ Propellant loading and autogenous system performance ....... Performance margin ........ Control ..............

Stage I ............ Stage II separation Response to radio guiLnce cc_mands ...... Post-SECO and separation phase ......... System System ......... .........

5.2.4 5.2.5

Hydraulic Guidance 5.2.5.1 _.2._.2

Programed guidance . . . Radio guidance ......... System ............ ........

5.2.6 5.2.7

Electrical

Instrumentation 5.2.7.1 5.2.7.2

System

Ground ............. Airborne ............. Detection System

5.2.8

Malfunction 5.2.8.1 5.2.8.2

MDS operation during launch attempt ............ Gemini VI-A launch ....... .............

5-88 5-88 5-90 5-90 _-90

_.2. 9

Range

Safety

5.2.9.1 5.2.9.2

Flight termination system .... Range safety tracking system . . .

UNCLASSIFIED

r
Section

UNCLASSIFIED
5.2.9.3 5.2.10 Prelaunch 5.2.10.1 5.2.10.2 5.2.10.3 5.3 Ordnance ........ ....... ......

vii
Page 5-90 5-91 5-91 5-92 5-92

Operations

Launch attempt Recycle ........... Launch ...........

SPACECRAFT-LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE PERFORMANCE ................. SUPPORT PERFORMANCE .............

5 -103 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-2 6-2 6-2 6-2 6-4 6-7

6.0

MISSION 6.1

FLIGHT 6.1.1

CONTROL

.................. Operations ...........

Premission 6.1.1.1 6.1.1.2 6.1.1.3 6.1.1.4

Premission activities ...... Documentation ......... MCC/network flight control operations .......... Countdown .......... Operations Powered Orbital Reentry Stumnary ........

6.1.2

Mission 6.1.2.1 6.1.2.2 6.1.2.3

flight ........... ........... ............ .............

6.2

NETWORK 6.2.1

PERFORMANCE

Mission Control Center, Houston and Remote Facilities ............ Network 6.2.2.1 6.2.2.2 6.2.2.3 Facilities ............

6-7 6-7 6-7 6-7 6-8 6-ii 6-ii 6-12

6.2.2

Remote sites ........... Computing ............ Communications .......... ............... Deployment ........ ..........

6.3

RECOVERY 6.3.1 6.3.2

OPERATIONS Force

Recovery Location

and Retrieval

f-

UNCLASSIFIED

viii
Section 6.3.3

UNCLASSIFIED
Page Recovery 6.3.3.1 6.3.3.2 6.3.3.3 6.3.3.4 6.3.3.5 6.5.3.6 6.3.4 6.3.5 Aids ............ 6-13 6-13 6-13 6-15 6-15 6-15 6-15 6-15 . 6-17 7-1 .......... ........... 7-1 7-1 7-1 7-2 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 7-15 7-15 7-16 7-18 7-25 7-27 7-29 7-30 7-33 7-33 7-33 7-33

UHF recovery beacon ...... HF transmitter ....... UKF transmitter ...... UHF survival radio ....... Flashing light ........ Fluorescent sea marker .... Procedures System ...... Deactivation

Postretrieval Reentry

Control

7.0

FLIGHT 7.1

CREW

................... CREW PERFORMANCE Crew Activities 7.1.1.1 7.1.1.2 7.1.1.3 7.1.1.4 7.1.1.5 7.1.1.6 7.1.1.7 7.1.1.8 7.1.1. 9

FLIGHT 7.1.1

Prelaunch ......... Powered flight and insertion Rendezvous ......... Station keeping ...... Operational checks ...... Experiments ....... Crew housekeeping ...... Retrofire and reentry • • • Mission training and training evaluation ........... VI-A Pilots' Report ........

7.1.2

Gemini 7.1.2.1 7.1.2.2 7.1.2.3 7.1.2.4 7.1.2.5 7.1.2.6 7.1.2.7

Powered flight .......... Prerendezvous phase ....... Rendezvous phase ......... Station keeping Separation maneuver ....... Reentry ............. Landing and recovery ..... ................. ............... Clinical background data ..... Tilt-table tests .........

7.2

AEROMEDICAL 7.2.1

Preflight 7.2.1.1 7.2.1.2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Section 7.2.1.3 7.2.1.4 7.2.1.5 7.2.2 Inflight 7.2.2.1 7.2.2.2 7.2.3 Physical fitness and diet .... Medical examinations and crew status ......... Launch preparations ....... ................ Physiological data monitoring Medical observations ...... ............ Recovery activities ....... Examinations ........... Tilt-table studies ....... Laboratory studies ....... . .

ix
Page 7-33 7-34 7-35 7-35 7-35 7-36 7-39 7-39 7-39 7-40 7-41 8- I . . . 8-3 8-3 8-3 8-3 8-4 8-4 PHOTOGRAPHY . 8-5 8-5 8- 5 8-5 8-5 8-6

Postflight 7.2.3.1 7.2.3.2 7.2.3.3 7.2.3.4

8.0

EXPERIMENT S 8.1

..................... D-8, RADIATION IN SPACECRAFT

EXPERIMENT 8.1.i 8.1.2 8.1.3 8.1.4 8.1.5

Objective Equipment Procedure Results Conclusion

............ .............. ................ ............. ........... TERRAIN

8.2

EXPERIMENT 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.3 8.2.4 8.2.5

S-5, SYNOPTIC

Objective Equipment Procedure Results

........... ........... ............ ............. ............

Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED

x
Section 8.3 EXPERIMENT 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.3.3 8.3.4 8.3.5 9 •0 lO. 0 ll. 0 12.0 CONCLUSIONS

UNCLASSIFIED
Page S-6_ SYNOPTIC . .... . . . • • WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY 8-9 8-9 8-9 8-9 8-9 8-10 9-1 10-1 ll-1 12-1 12-1 Histories Vehicle Histories 12-1 12-1 12-11 12-21 12-21 Review 12-21

Objective Equipment Procedure Results

Conclusions ..... . . .

RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES APPENDIX 12.1

...... .......... HISTORIES Spacecraft Gemini

VEHICLE 12.1.1 12.1.2

Launch

12.2 12.3

WEATHER FLIGHT 12.3.1 12.3.2 12.3.3

CONDITIONS SAFETY REVIEWS

........ ....... ...... Readiness

Mission

Briefing Flight

Spacecraft

Launch Vehicle Flight Safety Review Board ............... REPORTS ...........

12-21 12-23 12_25 12-31 12-32

12.4 12.5 12.6

SUPPLEMENTAL

DATA AVAILABILITY POSTFLIGHT 12.6.1

............ ............ .........

INSPECTION

Spacecraft

Systems

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Section 12.6 .i.i 12.6.1.2 12.6.1.3 12.6.1.4 12.6.1.5 12.6.1.6 12.6.1.7 12.6.1.8 12.6.1.9 12.6.1.10 12.6.1.11 12.6.1.12 12.6.2 13.0 DI STRIBUT!ON Continuing ............ Structure ....... Environmental control system ...... Cormuumication s system Guidance and control

xi
Page 12-32 12-32 12-33 12-33 12-33 12-34 12-34 12-35 12-36 12-36 12-36 12-36 12-37 13-1

....

system .... Pyrotechnics" system ..... Instrumentation and recording system ..... Electrical system ...... Crew station furnishings and equipment ....... Propulsion system ...... Landing system ...... Postlanding recovery aids ......... Experiments ........ Evaluation ...... .......

if

UNCLASSIFIED

xii

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLES

Table 3.1-1 3.1-II 3.2-I 4.2-I 4.3-I SPACECRAFT 6 MODIFICATIONS STCWAGE LIST ......... ..........

Page 3-7 3-9 3-26 4-6

CREW STATION

GLV-6 MODIFICATIONS SEQUENCE COMPARISON OF EVENTS OF PLANNED

............ ............ AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY

PARAMETERS ...............
4.3-II COMPARISON OF ORBITAL AND AFTER MANEUVER COMPARISON RENDEZVOUS DElaYED-TIME REAL-TIME SUMMARY IVAR OF ORBITAL MANEUVERS DATA FROM ELEMENTS PRIOR ............... ELEMENTS TO

4-i4
4-16 4-17 4-18 .... 5-10 5-11 5-26 5-31 SECO ..... 5-32 5-34 AT _-34

4.3-111 4.3-IV 5.1.3-I 5.1.3-II 5.1._-I 5.1._-II 5.1.D-III 5.1.5-IV 5.1.5-V

..........

........... SELECTED FROM STATIONS

DATA RECEIVED OF GUIDANCE

SELECTED EVENTS

STATIONS .....

AND CONTROL .............

COMPARISONS

ASCENT

AND IGS TRACKING ERRGRS AT S%CO

ERRORS AT

GUIDANCE

...........

PRELIMINARY ORBIT INJECTION PARAMETERS SECO + 20 SECONDS ...........

5.l.5-vl
5.L.5-VII 5.1.5-VIII

GEKn_IVI-A PLATEO_I ALIGNMENT ACCORACY......
TRANSLATION RENDEZVOUS MAHEUVER S ............ VELOCITY COMPARISONS WITH STATIC

_-35
_-37

SInULATION (wt : 130 °)
5.1.5-IX

..........

5-38

COMPARISON OF COMI_JTER TELFC4ETRY REENIRY PARAMETERS WITH POSTFLIGIIT RECONSTRUCTED TELEMETRY DATA ............. 5- 39

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Table 5.1.8-1 5.1.8-II 0AMS AND RCS SERVICING DATA ...........

xiii
Page 5-60

OAMS MANEUVER TRANSLATION PERFORMANCE SUMMARY ................ RETROGRADE PRELIMINARY PRELIMINARY TRANSIENTS ROCKET STAGE STAGE DURING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE I ENGINE II ENGINE STAGE PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE ...... ..... ..... ....

5-61 5-62 5-93 5-94 5-95

5.i.8-III 5.2-1 5.2-11 5.2-111 5.2-IV

I HOLDDOWN

PERIOD

VEHICLE RATES SEPARATION

BETWEEN

SECO AND SPACECRAFT ............

5-96

5.2-V

COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS ............. GEMINI VI-A MALFUNCTION SWITCHOVER PARAMETERS GEMINI VI-A NE_ORK SUPPORT SUMMARY - COMMAND PILOT ...... PILOT ..... .... DETECTION SYSTEM ............ ..... .....

5-97

5.2-VI

5-98 6-9 6-19 7-10 7-42 7-44 7-46

6.2-I 6.3-1 7.1.1-I 7.2-I 7.2-II 7.2-III 7.2-IV 7.2-V 8.0-I 12.2-I

COI_FIGURATION

RECOVERY

CREW TRAINING BLOOD BLOOD STUDIES STUDIES-

URINALYSIS CLINICAL

...... EVALUATION .....

7-47 7-48

CREW RADIATION EXPER!MIYfS

...... VI-A CONDITIONS 15_ 1965 ...... ....

ON GEMINI

8-2

LAUNCH AREA ATMOSPHERIC AT 12:39 G.m.t._

DECEMBER

12-13

12.2-II

REENTRY

AREA ATMOSPHERIC

CONDITIONS 16, 1965 ...... 12-15

AT 15:30 G.m.t.,
f

DECEMBER

UNCLASSIFIED

xi_
Table 12.4-1 12.5- I 12.5-11 12.5-III GEMINI

UNCLASSIFIED
Page VI-A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS ........ ........ .... 12-24 12-26 12-27

INSTRUMENTATION SUMMARY

DATA AVAILABILITY

OF PHOTOGRAPHIC

DATA AVAILABILITY CAMERA

LAUNCH PHASE ENGINEERING SEQUENTIAL DATA AVAILABILITY ............

12-28

UNCLASSIFIED

r

UNCLASSIFIED
FIGURES

xv

Figure 3.1-1 GLV(a) (b) 3.1-2 3.1-3 3.1-4 spacecraft relationships

Page

Launch configuration .............. Dimensional axes and guidance coordinates arrangement and recovery and nomenclature section .......

3-12 • • • 3-13 3-14 3-1_

Spacecraft Rendezvous

...........

Water management and battery module installation ............. Water management Electrical Orbital Docking power schematic system ......... ..... .....

3-16 3-17 3-18 3-19 3-20 ..... ..... 3-21 3-22

3.1-5 3.1-6 3.1-7 3.1-8 3.1-9 3.1-10 3.1-11

installation system

attitude

and maneuver

bar assembly docking

.......... system

Emergency Spacecraft Spacecraft (a) (b)

release

controls interior

and displays stowage areas

View looking View looking

into command into pilot's

pilot's side ..... side ........

3-23 3-24

4.1-1

Planned and actual mission with planned alternates included ............ Ground (a) (b) track for the Gemini VI-A orbital mission

4-4

4.3-1

Revolutions 1 through 4 .......... Reentry ................... for the Gemini VI-A mission

4-21 4-22

4.3-2

Trajectory parameters launch phase (a) (b) (c)

Altitude and range ............... Space-fixed velocity and flight-path Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path

angle angle

4-23 . . . 4-24 . . . 4-25

f

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4.3-2 (Concluded) (d) (e) 4.3-3 Dynamic pressure and mach Longitudinal acceleration nt_nber ........ ........... VI-A 4-28 4-26 4-27 Page

-

Apogee and perigee altitude for the Gemini mission ...................... Rendezvous (a) (b) during the Gemini

4.3-4

VII -- VI-A mission

Range, yaw and pitch from Gemini VI-A to Gemini VII ............. Relative trajectory profile, measured from G_uini VII to Gemini VI-A in curvilinear coordinate system .............. VI-A mission

4-29

4-30

4.3-5

Trajectory parameters reentry phase (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

for the Gemini

Latitude, longitude, and altitude ....... Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle Dynamic pressure and Mach number ........ Longitudinal deceleration ........... parameters during ............ error

. . . . . .

4-31 4-32 4-33 4-34 4-35

4.3-6

Time history of relative terminal phase

4-36

5.1.5-1

launch vehicle -- spacecraft steering comparisons ...............

5-40 tracking 5-41 5-42 5-43 5-44 5-45 5-46

5.1.5-2

Comparison of spacecraft IGS and radar velocities ................. IMU error Braking Radar Radar Radar coefficient history

5.1.5-3 5.1.5-4 5.1.5-5 5.1.5-6 5.1.5-7 5.1.5-8

............

sequence

.............. sequence range ............. comparison ........ .........

acquisition to trajectory azimuth

and e[levation angles

Radar elevation angle versus computed mean value ................

5-47

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.1.5-9 5.1.5-10 5.1.5-11 5.1.5-12 Analog Radar range and range temperature rate ............. ........... Page 5-48 5-49 5-50

and pressure

Touchdown Comparison position Separation

comparisons

.............

of IGS position track with radar track at approximately 300_000 feet sequence ................. ............. overlap (autofire)

• • •

5-51 5-52 5-63

5.1.5-13 5.1.8-1 5.1.8-2 5.1.11-1 5.2-1

0AMS propellant Retro-rocket Landing Selected launch

consumption duration

firing

. . .

5-64 5-74

system

performance

............. VI-A

subassembly2 attempt

parameters Gemini ............... of

5-99

5.2-2

Stage I gas generator showing location dust tap ................... Umbilical 3D17 installation time line for final

5-100 launch .... 5-101 5-102

5.2-3 5.2-4 6.3-1

MSC parameter

...............

Gemini VI-A launch force deployment Landing Details zones

abort areas and recovery ................. staging area basis ......

6-20 6-21 6-22 6_23

6.3-2 6.3-3 6.3-4 6.3-5

and aircraft landing landing

of primary 6 after

Spacecraft

HF-DF network station bearings to the spacecraft after landing ................... Summary (a) (b) (c) flight plan

6-24

7.1.1-1

0 to i0 hours g.e.t ............... i0 to 20 hours g.e.t .............. 20 to 26 hours g.e.t ..............

7-ii 7-12 7_13

/

UNCLASSIFIED

iii
Figure 7.1.2-1

UNCLASSIFIED
Page Onboard target-centered coordinate rendezvous .................... Tilt (a) (b) table studies, command pilot ........... ........... 7-50 7-51 plot of 7-32

7.2-1

Preflight tilt studies Postflight tilt studies table studies, pilot

7.2-2

Tilt (a) (b)

Preflight tilt studies ............. Postflight tilt studies ............ measurements

7-52 7-53

7.2- 3

Physiological (a) (b)

Command pilot ................. Pilot ..................... synoptic terrain

7-55 7-56

8.2-1

Experiment S-5, typical photography (a) (b)

Sudan, showing Cenozoic volcanics in the Jebel Marra West coast of Somalia, in eastern Africa showing drainage patterns in Oenozoic marine sediments ...............

8-7

8-8

8.3-1

Experiment S-6_ two typical synoptic weather photographs taken on successive orbital revolutions 14 and 15 (a) View taken at approximately 10:44 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965 during Revolution 14 over the Canary Islands in the eastern Atlantic Ocean. _he cloud eddy at the center formed about 50 miles downwind (southwest) of Tenerife Island which appears in the corner of the photograph. _he open center of the vortex is about 15 miles in diameter .............

8-11

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 8.3-i (Concluded) (b) View taken at approximately 12:23 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965 during Revolution 15 looking west over the eastern Atlantic Ocean about 400 miles west of Cape Blanc_ Spanish West Africa. The small lines of cumulus clouds have formed open cellular _ patterns in the southern section of a high pressure region. Surface winds were easterly while the upper-air winds at the 500 millibar level were northerly. Subsidence of the air aloft suppressed the vertical development of the clouds ...... 6 test history at contractor facility at

xix
Page

8-12 . 12-2

12.1-1 12.1-2

Spacecraft

Spacecraft 6 significant problem areas contractor facility ................ Spacecraft (a) (b) 6 test history

12- 3

12.1- 3

at Cape Kennedy 12-4 12- 5 . . 12-6 12- 7

Prior to October 25, 1965 ........... Subsequent to October 25, 1965 ......... 6 significant at Denver problems at Cape Kennedy ........

12.1-4 12.1-5 12.1-6

Spacecraft

GLV-6 history GLV-6 history (a) (b)

and Baltimore

at Cape Kennedy 12-8 12- 9

Prior to October 25, 1965 ........... Subsequent to October 25, 1965 .........

12.2-1

Variation of wind direction and velocity with altitude for the launch area at 12:39 G.m.t._ December 15, 1965 ................. Variation of wind direction and velocity with altitude for the reentry area on December 16_ 1965 (a) (b) Rawinsonde and Rocketsonde data between sea level and 182K ft at 14:20 G.m.t ....... Rocketsonde data between 190K and 230K ft at 19:22 G.m.t ................

12-18

12.2-2

12-19 12-20

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:_

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

IN_TIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

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1.0 MISSION SUMMARY

1-1

The fifth manned

mission

and first

rendezvous

mission

of the Gemini

Program, designated Gemini VI-A, was launched from Complex 19, Cape Kennedy, Florida, at 8:37 a.m. e.s.t., on December 15, 1965. The flight was successfully concluded with the recovery of the spacecraft and the flight crew at 23°22.5 ' N. latitude 67°52.5 ' W. longitude by the prime recovery ship (U.S.S. Wasp), approximately i hour and 6 minutes after landing. This rendezvous mission was launched from Complex 19 within Ii days after the launch of the Gemini VII space vehicle. The spacecraft was manned by Astronaut Walter M. Schirra, command pilot, and Astronaut Thomas P. Stafford, pilot. The crew completed the flight in excellent physical condition and demonstrated excellent control of the rendezvous and competent management of all aspects of the mission. The primary objective of the Gemini VI-A mission was to rendezvous with spacecraft 7. The secondary objectives of the Gemini VI-A mission were to perform a closed loop rendezvous at M=4 (fourth darkness of the mission), conduct station keeping with spacecraft 7, evaluate the reentry guidance capability of the spacecraft, conduct visibility tests of spacecraft 7 as a rendezvous target vehicle, conduct 3 experiments, and conduct systems tests. The primary objective and all secondary objectives of the mission were successfully accomplished except for one of the three experiments for which valid data were not received. The Gemini launch vehicle performed satisfactorily in all respects. The countdown was nominal, resulting in a launch within one-half second of the scheduled time. First-stage flight was normal with all planned events occurring within allowable limits. The first stage offset yaw steering technique was used for the first time on this flight in an attempt to place spacecraft 6 in the same orbital plane as spacecraft 7. The technique results in a "dog-leg" trajectory_ and it was used successfully. Staging was nominal; however_ the crew reported that the flame front caused by staging enveloped the spacecraft in such a manner that it deposited a thin burned residue on the windows which affected the visibility through them. The pilot was able to verify this phenomenon as he had been observing a string of cumulus clouds prior to staging and also observed them after staging. He reported that the clearness and whiteness of these clouds was diminished after staging. The second stage flight was normal and all but 7 ft/sec of the -660 ft/sec out-of-plane velocity achieved during first stage operation was steered out during second stage flight. The spacecraft was inserted into an orbit having an 87.2 nautical mile perigee and an
f

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140 nautical mile apogee. The apogee was about 7 r_utical miles below the planned altitude. The slant range to spacecraft 7 from spacecraft at its insertion into orbit was a nominal 1067 nautical miles. Nine maneuvers were performed by spacecraft 6 during the following 5 hours 50 minutes to effect the rendezvous with spacecraft 7. These maneuvers were all performed using the spacecraft guidance system for attitude reference. Initial radar lock-on with spacecraft 7 occurred at a range of 248 nautical miles. Continuous lock-on started at a range of 235 nautical miles and no losses of lock occurred until the system was turned off at a range of 50 feet from spacecraft 7. The rendezvous phase of the mission was completed at 5:56:00 ground elapsed time when spacecraft 6 was 120 feet from spacecraft 7 and all relative motion between the two vehicles had been stopped. Station keeping was performed at distances between 1 foot and 300 feet for about 3 1/2 orbits after which a 9 ft/sec separation maneuver was performed. The relative motion of spacecraft 6 from the separation maneuver was stopped at a range of about 30 miles. The spacecraft and its systems performed very satisfactorily throughout the mission, except for the delayed-time telemetry tape recorder which failed at 20 hours 55 minutes ground elapsed time because of a bearing seizure. This recorder malfunction resulted in the loss of all delayed-time telemetry data for the remainder of the mission. The flight progressed nominally to its full duration. All checklists and stowage were completed in preparation for retrofire and reentry and the reentry control system was activated. Retrofire occurred exactly on time at 25:15:58 ground elapsed time for a landing in the West Atlantic landing area (primary). The reentry and landing were nominal_ and the landing point achieved was less than 7 nautical miles from the planned landing point. The crew remained in the spacecraft until the spacecraft had been secured on the deck of the recovery ship. 6

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

2_1

A description of the Gemini VI-A mission, as well as a discussion of the evaluation of the results, is contained in this report. The evaluation covers the time from start of the launch-attempt countdown to the date of publication of this report. Detailed discussions are found in the major sections related to each major area of effort. Some redundancy is found in various sections where it is required for a logical presentation of the subject matter. Data were reduced only in areas of importance from telemetry, on-

board records, and ground-based radar tracking. In evaluating the launch vehicle performance, all available data were processed. The evaluation of the spacecraft and launch vehicle consisted of analyzing the flight results and comparing them with the results from ground tests and from previous missions. Section 6-1, FLIGHT CONTROL, is based on observations and evaluations made in real time, and, therefore, may not coincide with the results obtained from the detailed postflight analysis. Brief descriptions of the experiments flown on this mission are presented in section 8.0 with preliminary results and any conclusions that could be drawn at the time of publication of this report. The mission objectives, as set forth in the Mission Directive, formed the basis for evaluation of the flight and were of paramount consideration during preparation of this report. The primary objective was to rendezvous with the Gemini VII spacecraft. The secondary objectives (a) (b) (c) were as follows: closed-loop station rendezvous with at M=4 (fourth darkness).

Perform Conduct Evaluate

keeping

the Gemini capability

VII spacecraft. of the spacecraft. VII spacecraft as a

the reentry visibility vehicle. assigned

guidance

(d) Conduct rendezvous target (e) (f) Conduct Conduct

tests

of the Gemini

experiments. systems tests.

spacecraft

At the time of publication of this report, more detailed analyses of data on the performance of the launch vehicle and the radio guidance

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2_2

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system were continuing. Analyses of thespacecraft and the inertial guidance system were also continuing. Supplemental reports, listed in section 12.4_ will be issued to provide documented results of these analyses. The results of previous 1 through 7. Gemini missions are reported in refer-

ences

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3.0 G_MINI VI-A VEHICLE DESCRIPTION

3-1

The space vehicle for the Gemini VI-A mission consisted of Gemini spacecraft 6 and Gemini launch vehicle 6 (GLV-6). Section 3.1 of this report describes the spacecraft configuration, section 3.2 describes the GLV configuration, and section 3.3 provides space-vehicle weight and balance data. The major reference coordinates for the space vehicle are shown in figure 3.1-1.

3. I

G_MINI

SPACECRAFT

The structure and major systems of spacecraft 6 were basically the same as those of spacecraft 5, except for replacing the fuel cell power system with an adapter battery module, deletion of the rendezvous evaluation pod and the addition of rendezvous and docking hardware, (see fig. 3.1-2). The detailed descriptions of spacecraft 5 and 6 are contained in references 5 and 8, respectively; therefore, only the significant differences are described in this report (refer to table 3. l-I).

3.1. I

Spacecraft

Structure

The primary load-bearing structure of spacecraft 6was essentially the same as that of spacecraft 5. The major changes are described in the following paragraphs. 3. i.i.i Reentry assembly.- A docking bar assembly was added to the rendezvous and recovery (R and R) section. It is extended in orbit and used for spacecraft alignment during docking operations and is jettisoned at retroadapter separation (see fig. 3.1-3). Three mooring latch receptacles were equally spaced around the forward perimeter of the R and R section (see fig. 3.1-3). For docking exercises the receptables are exposed (after the nose fairing is jettisoned) and mate with the mooring latch hooks on the target docking adapter (TDA). After use, the latch receptacles are jettisoned before reentry, and the remaining cavities are covered by spring-loaded, pyrotechnically-released covers. An umbilical receptacle was added to the forward end of the R and R section. The receptacle mates with the TDA umbilical plug (as the docking system is rigidized) to form a "hardline" connection.

f

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3-2

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as a result of

Redesigned hatch-latching mechanisms were included the difficulty in closing the hatch on spacecraft 4.

3.1.1.2 Adapter assembly.- Adapter equipment and associated supports for spacecraft 6 were the same as those for spacecraft 5, except for the following: (a) The rendezvous blast shield access door craft 6. evaluation podand mountings installed on the of spacecraft 5 were not installed on space-

(b) The spacecraft 5 fuel cells were replaced by batteries associated mounts, similar to those used on spacecraft 3 and 4. (c) A primary oxygen 106 pounds at 14.7 psia. container was installed with

and

a capacity

of

(d) Four propellant tanks were installed oxidizer for the orbital attitude and maneuver graph 3.1.2.7.1. )

to contain fuel and system. (See para-

3.1.2

Major

Systems

3.1.2.1 Communications system.- The communication equipment was the same as that installed in spacecraft 5, including the silence and record switches. However, the record (RCD) position was removed from the mode switches by removing the labeling and installing a stop to prevent switching to the RCD position. Also, the voice control center (VCC) had 3 dB less attenuation between microphone amplifiers and the voice recorder than on spacecraft 5. The telemetry transmitter used on spacecraft experiment data was deleted from spacecraft 6. 5 for transmitting

3.1.2.2 Instrumentation and recordin5 system.- The instrt_nentation and recording system was essentially the same as the spacecraft 5 system, except for the PCM tape recorder which was modified to insure proper head alignment. 3.1.2.3 Environmental control system.- The environmental control system was functionally the same as that used on spacecraft 5. The water storage tank that used a combination of oxygen and fuel cell water as a pressurant on spacecraft 5 was deleted from spacecraft 6, and an aluminum tank with a capacity of 42 pounds was used in its place (see fig. 3.1-4). This tank was serviced with 22 pounds of water prior to flight.

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3-3

The _ter management system was changed to a "blowdown" system by removing the gas regulator_ adding a pressurant tank, and servicing the entire system to 20 psia (see fig. 3.1-5). During manufacture of the spacecraft, both the water management and the urine systems were relocated to provide space for an extravehicular life support system (ELSS). Subsequently, extravehicular activities were cancelled from the mission and the space for ELSS was used for stowage. A new design water-metering device replaced the water dispenser used on spacecraft 5. (See ref. 7 for a description of the device.) Also, one coolant pump was removed from each coolant loop in the temperature control system. 3.1.2.4 Guidance and control system.- The guidance and control systems were similar to those used on spacecraft 5. The rendezvous evaluation pod, used on the Gemini V mission to simulate the Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV), was not installed on spacecraft 6. 3.1.2.5 Time reference system.- The space used for the flightplan roller installed in spacecraft 5 Ms utilized for a groundelapsed-time digital clock with reset capability. 3.1.2.6 Electrical system.- Power for spacecraft 6 was supplied by three silver-zinc batteries installed in the battery module mounted in the adapter section (see figs. 3.1-4 and 3. l-d). The power system was identical to that flown on the Gemini Ill mission (see ref. 3). 3.1.2.7 Propulsion system.- The propulsion system was basically the same as the spacecraft 5 system. Mission-oriented and improvement modifications to the subsystems were incorporated and are described in the following paragraphs. 3.1.2.7.1 Orbit attitude and maneuver system (0AMS): The configuration of the thrust chamber assemblies (TCA's) was such that their life could not be effected in using the quantity of propellant loaded. Two 22-inch diameter fuel tanks and two 20-inch diameter oxidizer tanks were installed, and 332 pounds of fuel and 381 pounds of oxidizer were loaded in the tanks (see fig. 3.1-7). This allowed 3-percent propellant ullage at 80 ° F in all tanks. 3.1.2.7.2 Reentry control system (RCS): New TCA's with 6 ° fiberglass lay-up of the chamber were included. Propellants loaded consisted of 16 pounds of fuel and 20 pounds of oxidizer in each ring. 3.1.2.7.3 Retrograde rocket system: systems used on prior Gemini spacecraft.
f

This

system was

identical

to

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3.1.2.8 Pyrotechnic the pyrotechnic system: (a) The rendezvous housings were deleted. system.The following changes were made to

evaluation

pod release

assembly

and cartridge

(b) A docking bar assembly_ extension cartridge, and jettison fig. 3. I-8).

composed of a docking bar actuator, cartridge, was installed (see

(c) An emergency docking release was installed. This assembly included a pyrotechnic body, cartridge, and latch assembly (see fig. 3.1-9). The cartridge was the same type as that used for cutting the cable and releasing the recovery hoist loop. (d) Pyrotechnic components in the hatch-actuation fuse system, replaced to improve reliability, included and four mild-detonating fuse interconnects. 3.1.2.9 Crew station furnishin6s and equipment.mild-detonatingtwo crossovers

3.1.2.9.1 Instrument panels and controls: The basic configuration of the instrument panels and controls (see fig. 3.1-10) was the same as that used for spacecraft 5 except for the following changes: (a) An ammeter and a voltmeter similar and 4 were installed on the right instrument cell power-system monitor instrument. to those on spacecraft 3 panel instead of the fuel-

(b) A digital clock displaying ground elapsed time was added to the center instrument panel in pJ_ce of the flight-plan display. The clock, synchronized with the time reference system, was started at lift-off and had a maximum elapsed time readout of 999 hours, 59 minutes, and 59 seconds. (c) A digital command of the pilot's seat. encoder control was installed to the right

was

(d) The out-of-tape indicator light for the voice relocated to the center instrument panel. The manual computer to a location under The flight-plan

tape

recorder

(e) side-wall (f)

switch was moved from the right-hand the right-hand instrument panel.

roller was deleted.

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(g) Other minor changes were made These are included in figure 3.1-10. in switches and nomenclature.

3.1.2.9.2 Space suits: The command pilot wore a G3C pressure suit and the pilot wore a G4C pressure suit. These suits were the same as those used on previous Gemini missions. Both crew members wore the lightweight coverlayers. Extravehicular overvisors were not
worn.

3.1.2.9.3 Flight crew equipment: The flight crew equipment was basically the same as that flown on the previous mission except as follows: (a) A water-metering dispenser was incorporated in place of the previously used water dispenser. The metering dispenser used the same pistol configuration as before; however, a valving system to deliver one-half ounce increments of water and a mechanical counter were added. The counter was designed to count each half ounce of water dispensed.

(b) A light meter was provided for determining lens and shutter settings for photography in orbit. This light meter had a very limited field of view to provide accurate readings on a selected target. A detailed list of the equipment in table 3.1-11. carried on the mission is listed

3.1.2.9.4 Spacecraft stowage facilities: Stowage facilities (see fig. 3.1-11) were similar to spacecraft 5 with the following exceptions: (a) The center stowage area was redesigned to accommodate the extravehicular life support system (ELSS). The ELSS, not carried on this mission s was replaced with a stowage box of the same overall size. (b) The aft food boxes were slightly narrower than those flown on spacecraft 5 because of the added volume required for the ELSS stowage provisions. (c) The pressure sealing door on the left-hand aft food box was omitted and a fabric door was provided to retain the contents of the box. The pressure sealing characteristics of the right-hand aft box were the same as spacecraft 5. 3.1.2.10 Landing used on spacecraft 5. system.The landing system was the same as that

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3-6

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3.1.2. Ii Postlandin5 and recovery system.- The postlanding and recovery system was the same as that used on spacecraft 5 except that flotation material was added to the R and R section similar to that used on spacecraft 2. the R and R section. This material was added to aid in recovery of

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-

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TABLE 3. i-I.SPACECRAFT 6 MODIFICATIONS

3-7

System

Significant changes incorporated in spacecraft from spacecraft 5 configuration

6

iReentry assembly structure

(a)

Flotation section.

material

was added

to the R and R

(b) (c)

A new design used.

of hatch-latching

mechanism

was

A docking bar assembly, three mooring latch receptacles, and a TDA umbilical receptacle were added to the R and R section. Batteries were used for main bus power instead of the fuel cells used in spacecraft 5. The rendezvous deleted. The experiment leted. evaluation pod mountings were

Adapter assembly structure

(a) (b)

Communications

(a)

telemetry

transmitter

was de-

(b) Instrumentation (a)

The VCC was modified. The PCM tape recorder prove head alignment. A water storage was modified to im-

Environmental control

(a) (b)

tank was installed. system was modified by and adding a pressurant

The water management removing a regulator tank. The water management relocated.

(c)

and urine

systems

were

(d)

One coolant pump was removed from each coolant loop in the temperature control subsyste_ A water-metering dispenser. The rendezvous device evaluation replaced the water

(e) Guidance control and (a)

pod was deleted.

iTime reference

(a)

A ground-elapsed-time digital clock replaced the flight-plan roller used on spacecraft 5. Silver-zinc batteries on spacecraft 5. replaced the fuel cell_

Electrical

(a)

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3-8

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TABLE 3.1--1.--SPACECRAFT 6 MODIFICATIONS -- Concluded

System

Significant from

changes incorporated in spacecraft spacecraft 5 configuration

6

Propulsion

(a)

0AMS: The thrust chamber assemblies (TCA) were modified to include 6° fiberglass lay-up of the chamber. Two 22-inch diameter fuel tanks and two 20-inch diameter oxidizer tanks were in stalled for 332 ib of fuel and 381 Ib of oxidizer. The rendezvous leted. pod ejection system was de-

(b)

Pyrotechnics

(a)

(b)

Pyrotechnics for the docking were installed. An emergency docking release

bar assembly

(c) (d)

was installed. were

Pyrotechnic components in the hatchactuation mild-detonating-fuse system modified. An ammeter cell power

Crew station

(a)

and voltmeter replaced the fuel system monitor instruments. and

(b) (c)

Minor variations in switch functions nomenclature were incorporated. The center stowage

area was redesigned.

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TABLE 3.1--11.-- CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST

3-9

Stowage area (see fig. 3.1-11) Centerline container stowage 16-mm 25-mm lens)

Item camera (with film magazines, lens, 18-mmlens_ and 75-mm 2

Quantity i

70-rmm camera Photo event

(with film magazines) indicator

1 1

Spot meter 250-mmlens

(with exposure

dial)

1 1 1 1

Tissue dispenser (on top of centerline stowage container) Sextant 16-mm sequence magazine) Interference Penlight Film Left-hand aft stowWaste Urine Pack (with film) camera (with film

i

filters

5 2 2 4 i i i 3 4 4 man days

containers receiver and hose system

age container

Lightweight Humidity Defecation Voice Food 16-mm

headset

sensor device bag tape cartridge

recorder

film magazine window pouch dispenser assembly sight glare shield shade

9 1 ll 1 1 1

Auxiliary Stowage Tissue Lanyard Optical

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3-1o

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TABLE 3.1--I!.-- CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST -- Continued

Stowage area (see fig. 3.1-11) Left-hand sidewall stowage containers Orbital path cludes three Tape Pilot preference Postlanding Passive !nflight Optical Right-hand aft stowage containers kit

Item display assembly overlays) (in-

Quantity i i0 feet

kit

i i 2

dosimeter medical sight water bag kit

i i 2

Auxiliary drinking (3-pound capacity) Auxiliary Reticle Lanyard window assembly assembly display,

shade

i i i

Right-hand sidewall stowage containers

Celestial Radiation

Mercator

i i i

pocket-dosimeter reprogramming

Blood pressure adapter Manual blood assembly Voice

pressure

inflator

i

recorder

tape

cartridges kit with

4 1 6 inches i

Pilot's Male with Dose

preference

Velcro, backing rate

2 in. wide,

indicator 2 in. wide, with

Female Velcro, backing Passive

6 inches i

dosimeter

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"
TABLE

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3.1--11.--CREW STATION STOWAGE LIST -- Concluded

3-_

Stowage area (see fig. 3.1-11) Plot board area Foot wells stowage Flight

Item data books

Quantity 2

Helmet

stowage

bag

i i

Plot board Dry stowage Passive bag

4 i

dosimeter

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NASA-S-66-I00JAN Spacecraft tations s Z239.28 ,_, Z233.91-/] Spacecraft/ "-_" _ _ _ F_\ Launch-vehiclestations "_X X 50.985 56.295

Reentry assembly Adapter assembly Oxidizer_ Fuel

Zlm._

ZD. 44 "

[

/

..... , " ;_ / n • , tl--_' ,, "-'-'-'-'-'--h "-:_"""-'--_ "J-/ _-_: i -_ . _--X *,

d:

X 276.825 X 299.151 X 319.522 384.522 X 430.000

{ Compartment1

Compartment 2

Engine
gimbal station_

N].;;l__i.I_,_-------- X 424.522 ____
--4,,_.., U./ _.U:! I ...,.. . _X 499.130 X 500.000 Compartment 3 X 583.200 X 621.727
II II II

/ _[_ Stage 1-2 , separation---/ _ -- L_ rl-1]_[]

"-_-['j'-' _
Launch vehicle ,, Oxidizer I ;i

x 649.727 ---

',,
-- -\

_ll.i.
j,"
I i I I

X 887.826

T

:..= , ---h--I., I I
! I

X 982.326

J_

Compartment 4

I I
'

J

i_
II

i,
"I I

Fuel,, ; i I',
--

I I -- __l.I

gimbal station_ Engine .-4

l.....,J / .:" _/f _,_ -...

X 1224.311 X 1274. 1 2 X 1342.31 -- L

Compartment 5

(a) Launch configuration. Figure 3. 1-1. - GLV- spacecraftrelationships.

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NASA-S-65-5998

3-z3

Launch vehicle pitch axis --"_'1 Spacecraftyawaxis Spacecraft Tr_

I

/

_,

Launch vehicle quadrant system

coordinatesystem-_ /f_T_,,_ Launch vehicle \/ // coordinatesystem--_ /_// +Z I-)( I _ [[

I [ "_'_

_\ \\

\ _ L+X Z r Launch vehicle yaw axis I Spacecraftpitch axis

Spacecraft -axis Z x_TT;S I _-J/ --]-]--/ _X_.._X plane of figure at ='/-=i-I-_"_\_xx_l // _u. On. perpendicular to \ \ _,_k,_--_."_.__./("-_2 /// j i!!ep_i_i "g !e to pl this point --_" __

"

I_!__..J

_

point

'rCeU_rth's

Spacecraft coordinate system Dimensional axes True North

+Y

j--Launch vehicle coordinate system

Theseaxes perpendicular to page vehicle centerline at Isign indicated is toward viewer)

SIC \ -_ t"- 5° °

///_ XLV, XS/C, -Y, Z,_]

O-Programmed rollangle Xp, X \_e_

_ __J

I_

/

1 • YLV

ZLV, YS/C XLV, YLV, ZLV - launch vehicle roll, pitch, yawbodyaxes, respectively XS/C, YS/C, ZS/C - spacecraft roll, yaw, pitch axes, respectively Xp, Ye' Zo - IGSplatform inertial codrdiffatesreferencedto launch stand X, Y, Z - IGScomputer computationalcoordinates

Guidancecoordinates

(b) Dimensionalaxesand guidancecoordinates. Figure3. 1-1.- Concluded.
,f

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NASA-S-66-59

JAN _mentsection Electronicodule m OAMS ECS coolant module ECS primary 02 module Silver zinc batteries Water tanks Oxygen pressurant tank section Instrumentation system Communication system Environmental control system Guidance and control system Electrical power system

! pJ -_-

o

section Retrograde rocket system C_ Z _} OAMS Rendezvous and docking light

C_ Z

Time reterence system _ontrols and displays

"11

•__

N
Adapter . assembly

•Rendezvous and recovery section Parachute landing system Rendezvous radar Docking bar

"'rl

m

x_.__
Reentry assembly Nose fairing

Figure 3.1-2.

- Spacecraft arrangement and nomenclature.

NASA-S-66-224 JAN

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3-_._

\

g bar and R section parachute storage

©C
,."
//

".
, i

chute ,g latch .tuna radar

'I i r--Slot I Rod assemblY-7/ and latch

II I

/_Lockwire

Close

_-----_? _

-"_

Mooring Nose fairing ---.-/

/"

-_-Cable

assembly

__ Mooring latch covet

L

Cable cutter (pyrotechnic) V Cover Slot. 1 Rod assembly_l -,, _:: "_ .... [ .... _ _ _ . _l Close _ I_ _Tube ,....-["_f "_T _ receptacle I ; ,,,: t_'--R and R section _,_..._ j i_ Mooring latch

_L-- Spring

Section A-A

See figure 3.1-9 for details of mooring latch receptacle.

Figure 3 .I-3.-

Rendezvous and recovery section,

F

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3-_6
NASA-S-66-156 JAN

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Battery module

_

structure tank

Silver zinc batteries

Oxygen fill and shutoff valve Oxygen pressurant tank

Figure 3.1-4.

- Water management and battery module installation.

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JNASA-S-b6-83 JAN

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I__]

3-_-7
Cap

valve

Adapter

water

Drinking dispenser

................................................................................. _ Cap Check valve
Outlet Inlet

Metabolic Water selector _/ valve
,--ii,-

moisture

from suit heat exchanger

Disconnect

Water Shutoff valve I Disconnect Relief tube Steam dump Legend Nomenclature Drinking water evaporatol

Selector dump valve

Unit

02
Waste water

Figure 3.1-5.

- Water management schematic.

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3-_+
NASA-S-b6-232 JAN

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Figure 3.1-6.

- Electrical power system installation.

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NASA-S-66-242 JAN regulator E" package S t_>_,£_" A" package /"Pressure transduce, Q Q Q Q OAMS thrusters Pitch up Pitchdown Yaw right Yaw left

3-Z9

_..f-Pressure _ ,_,."-_ 7_'_ "B" package_,/

0×_dizer /_"__"/ s"otoffvla_e_V \'_
shutoff valve "C" package_._/ Fuel (:ank

ac_a e "-"'_"P g

G Ro'clockw,se
Q Q Q G G Translate forward Translate aft Translate right Translate left Translate up Translate down

.i

Oxidizer tank,,

_ sealers Pressurant
I

I

/

Z

EqUiprnen(:

,

//
_

,

Retro sectio f-

--_ 'Cabin

secti°n _'_-..._.,.j Figure ..3.1-7. - Orbital attitude and maneuversystem.

/ _..

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NASA-S-66-20& JAN Locking mechanism

ttieon manifold ison 'ndexing

L,N I I'9 0

pin

Cartridge • Indexing i bar Docking assembly C_ xtend cartridges Extend manifold Shear pin engaged piston Shear C_ i _x'X--Endexing bar jettisoned

oin
('3
_,_

Z
('_
mechanism-_ Locking \

j-¢y.nder
,linder ,g_ mechanism

piston
• -n
I

"1"I
piston
1

ilrl

)rfice hear pin piston Inner piston extension

piston extension _fice

Ilrl _:_

piston piston extension Indexing bar extended Before activation Figure 3.1-8. - Docking bar assembly. CyIinder Indexing bar jettison (Re-entry)

"
NASA-S-66-71 JAN

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3-23

stowage box (right)

stowage box extension

Biomedical recorder no. i. _rline stowage box Left sidewall stowage box 16mm camera mounting bracket stowage iwizzle stick stowage area sage pouch

Pilot ejection seat_ removed for clarity '_ Inflight medical kitLeft side dry stowage bags t]]]]]] Ve[cro patches ]ptical sight stowage i

Right pedestal poubh PCM recorder

(a) View looking into command pilot_ side

Figure 3.1-11.

- Spacecraft interior stowage areas.

r_

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3- 4
NASA-S-66-60 JAN

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Centerline Right stowag, Blood pressure bulb stowage areaRigltt sidewall stowage box -n Voice tape recorder. Right stowage Utility stowage pouch-

stowage box-

• Aft stowage box (left) Biomedical recorder
no.

.....

pilot ejection seat removed for clarity side dry stowage bags pedestal pouch

[_]]

Velcro patches

Plotting

board stowage area

(b) View looking into pilot's side.

Figure 3.1-11.

- Concluded.

.UNCLASSIFIED

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3.2 G_!NI LAUNCH VEHICLE

3-25

The configuration of the Gemini launch vehicle 6 (GLV-6) was basically the same as the launch vehicles used on previous Gemini missions. A description of the GLV structure and major systems is contained in reference 2. Modifications to subsequent launch vehicles for the Gemini III_ Gemini IV_ and Gemini V missions are described in references _ 4_ and 5_ respectively. The only significant changes between GLV-5 and GLV-6 (see table 3.2-1) are as follows: (a) Flight control system - A 0.5-second to lO-second timer was added to change the time of autopilot gain change 104.96 to ii0.0 seconds after lift-off. (b) Hydraulic system port of the electric motor - A check pump. valve was added delay no. i from

to the discharge

(c) Propulsion system - The back pressure orifice was reduced from 0.5 inch to 0.46 inch to reduce the possibility of an inadvertent hold-kill because of late actuation of the oxidizer pressurant pressure switch. (d) Electrical system - Breakwire was added to the two umbilical connectors (pad disconnect tail plugs 3DIM and 3D2M) to prevent premature dropout before lift-off. No other significant systems. changes were made to the GLV-6 structure or

major

UNCLASSIFIED

k_ !

TABLE 3.2-1.-

GLV-6 MODIFICATIONS

O_

System

Significant

changes

incorporated

in GLV-6

from GLV-5 configuration

Structure Propulsion C 7 Flight controls

No significant

changes orifice was reduced from 0.5 inch to 0.46 imch. to include a C Z r-to the discharge part of the electric (2_ OO _-_

The back pressure

The autopilot gain change no. i was modified 0.5-second to lO-second delay timer No significant A check valve motor pump. Breakwire change was added

N
F(2_ OO m-11 Guidance Hydraulics

Electrical Malfunction detection

was added

to the two pad disconnect

tail plugs.

No significant No significant No significant

change change change

Instrumentation Range safety and ordnance

CONFIDENTIAL
3.3 GI_INI VI-A WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA

3-27

Weight

data

for the Gemini

VI-A

space vehicle

are as follows:

Condition

Weight (including spacecraft), lh (a)

Center-of-gravity location, in. (b) x 776.20 776.49 441.41 Y -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 z 59.94 59.94 59.73

Ignition Lift-off Stage I burnout

346 089 342 472 84 928

(mo)
Stage II start of steady-state combustion Stage II engine shutdown (SECO) 72 962 344.40 -0.14

59.90

14 188

290.00

-0.66

59.53

aWeights and center-of-gravity Aerospace Corporation.

data were

obtained

from

bRefer to figure 3.1-1 for GLV coordinate system. Along the X-axis, the center of gravity is referenced to GLV station 0.00. Along the Y-axis, the center-of-gravity location is referenced to buttock line 0.00 (vertical centerline of horizontal vehicle. Along the Z-axis, the center-of-gravity location is referenced to waterline 0.00 (60 inches below the horizontal centerline of the horizontal vehicle).

.....

CONFIDENTIAL

3- 8
Spacecraft

CONFIDENTIAL
6 weight and balance data are as follows:

Condition

Weight,

Center of gravity location, in.

lh
X

(a)
Y Z

Launch, weight

gross

7817.00

-0.46

1.31

107.41

Retrograde Reentry (O.05g)

5475.29 4781.12 4333.55

0.13 0.08 0.07

-1.47 -1.49 -1.64

131.21 136.89 129.49

Main parachute deployment Touchdown (no

4222.74

0.07

-1.70

127.39

parachute)

aThe X-axis and Y-axis are referenced to the center!ine of the vehicle. The Z-axis reference is located 13.44 inches aft of the launch vehicle-spacecraft mating plane (GLV station 290.265).

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
4.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION

4-1

4. i

ACTUAL

MISSION

Lift-off of the Gemini VI-A launch vehicle occurred at 13:37:26.471 G.m.t., December l_ 1965, on a biased launch azimuth of 81.4 ° (as determined from preflight targeting data). Altitude and flight-path angle were slightly depressed at completion of stage I; also_ a larger than expected northerly deviation in the lateral ground track was observed. Mission Control Center plotboards recorded a lateral velocity to the left (North) of approximately 200 ft/sec at BEC0_ a magnitude four times greater than experienced on earlier flights. Radio-guidance steering was good during second stage flight, ing out approximately -660 ft/sec of out-of-plane yaw velocity. steer-

The spacecraft separation sequence was completely nominal with no excessive rates or other anomalies. The insertion check list was completed about 9 minutes after lift-off and all systems were operating normally. At insertion_ an underspeed of about 12 ft/sec and an out-ofplane condition of about 7 ft/sec existed, coupled with a lateral displacement of approximately 25K feet north of the desired plane. The following maneuvers were performed prior to radar lock-on:

_

(a) A height-adjust maneuver (_)was performed at 1:34:03 g.e.t. (perigee point) to correct for the insertion underspeed. The platform mode of control was used with the spacecraft in a blunt-end-forward (BEF) attitude. apogee and

(b)

The phase-adjust

maneuver

_NcL ) was performed

at second

(2:18:01 g.e.t. ). This maneuver was performed in the small-end-forward (SEF) attitude.

in the platform

mode

(c) At 2:42:08 g.e.t., a plane change maneuver was performed to place the spacecraft into the same orbital plane as the target vehicle. The rate command attitude control mode was used for this maneuver and thrust was applied in a yaw attitude of 90.6 °.

(d) A second height adjustment was made at second perigee to compensate for a slightly low _V on the previous height adjustment and permit a more nominal terminal-phase initiation. The onboard radar was turned on at 3 hours 7 minutes g.e.t. After warm-up, the first radar lock-on indicated 246.22 nautical miles between

UNCLASSIFIED

4_2
spacecraft rendezvous

UNCLASSIFIED
6 and 7. A radar test was performed with the computer mode to check the radar-computer interface. in the

The coelliptic maneuver apogee (3:47:37 g.e.t.).

(NsR)

of 42.4 ft/sec

was performed

at third

_he terminal phase initiation maneuver was performed at 5 hours 19 minutes g.e.t., at a pitch angle of approximately 28 °. The _V was applied using the aft and lateral (up) thrusters. of 81.8 ° and 33.6 ° and The braking maneuvers

Midcourse corrections were applied at _t required about 16 and 12 ft/sec, respectively. were applied at 5:50:35 g.e.t.

Station keeping began at 5:56:00 g.e.t, when the two spacecraft were approximately 120 feet apart, which was the point at which all relative motion was brought to zero. Starting from this point, the distance was reduced to approximately l0 feet and spacecraft 7 was observed and photographed. Spacecraft 6 then closed to within 1 foot of spacecraft 7. During the first night cycle, the separation distance was varied from about 20 to 60 feet. During the next day cycle, the command pilot performed an in-plane fly-around maintaining about 150 to 250 feet from spacecraft 7. At approximately 07:42 g.e.t., the distance between spacecraft was monitored by observing the size of spacecraft 7 through the optical sight. The in-plane maneuver was followed by a pilot-controlled out-of-plane fly-around and other station keeping maneuvers. All of these maneuvers were performed in the pulse mode with the radar and computer turned off. Spacecraft 6 attitude was controlled to keep the X-axis pointed toward the spacecraft 7 center of mass. A separation maneuver of 9 ft/sec was performed at 11:14:29 g.e.t. Forward-firing thrusters were used in a retrograde attitude controlled by the platform mode. Apollo sextant sightings, using spacecraft 7 and the star Sirius_ were made during the ensuing separation. Spacecraft 7 was viewed continuously throughout the night period and through most of the following daylight period. Spacecraft 7 was in drifting flight to conserve fuel and at times the flashing light would disappear from view. However, the radar maintained lock-on almost continuously despite the target's changing attitude. At 13:25:52 g.e.t, a posigrade translation of 9 ft/sec was performed. This maneuver placed spacecraft 6 in an equal period orbit with spacecraft 7 about 30 miles ahead.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4-3

Preparations for a sleep period were begun after spacecraft 7 was no longer visible. _he actual sleep period occurred from 15 to 19 hours g.e.t, with spacecraft 6 in the horizon scan mode. During revolutions 13 and 14 dim-light Phenomena photography and S-5/S-6 experiment photographs were taken. _he majority of the photographs were taken of weather phenomena because a large portion of the land masses along the orbital track were obscured by clouds. Stowage for reentry required about one orbit to accomplish, and the preretrofire checklist was completed as scheduled. Retrofire occurred at 25:15:58 g.e.t., in a 20 ° pitch-down attitude; orbit rate command was used during this sequence. Following the retrofire sequence_ the spacecraft was rolled to the heads-down attitude and control was switched to pulse mode, ring A. Full lift was flown 55 ° left bank angle was assumed and held approximately 280K feet. to 400K feet at which time a until guidance initiate at

The pulse mode, ring A, was used until time for bank reversal (25:38:22 g.e.t.); at this time, the control mode was switched to orbit rate command. After guidance initiate, the downrange and crossrange needles were monitored and bank angle corrections applied as necessary. Shortly after peak acceleration was reached, the response to roll commands decreased, indicating the depletion of the RCS ring A propellants. Ring B was switched on and the bank angle was reestablished and held until time for drogue parachute deployment, which occurred at 25:45:49 g.e.t. (See section 5.1.5 for a detailed description of the reentry phase ). The parachute sequence was nominal and postlanding operations were accomplished without incident. The spacecraft landed within 7 miles of the planned landing point at 25:51:24 g.e.t. The crew remained in the spacecraft, which was hoisted aboard the carrier at 26:54:34 g.e.t.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-212 JAN Mode1 abort (erector lowering to 15,000 ft) (Ejection seats)

Mode ]I abort (Retrograde rockets salvo-fired (15,000 ft Lo522,000 ft)

posigrade) _1

Mode 111 abort (above 522,000 ft)

Normal retrograde sequence) Open loop reentry

r---_,

---_i

Orbitaloperations includingexperiments andsystems tests

',

Launch vehicle first stage ignition to _ spacecraft separation

_

Apogee height adjust maneuver (NH)

_

Phase adjust maneuver (Nc1)

_

Coelliptic maneuver (NSR)

_

Terminal phase initiation (TPI)

_

Braking maneuver (TPF)

_

Rendezvous and station keepingwith spacecraft 7

_

Separation maneuvers

_

_ '

Retrograde sequence

_

Closed loop reentry

_

Recovery

" ti
Plane change maneuver (Npc) '%'=:':_'"-_

Ii
Height adjust maneuver (NH) Planned mission --*Planned alternates .... Actual mission ........ _-

Figure 4.1-i.

- Planned and actual mission with planned alternates included

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
4.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

_-_

The times at which major events were planned and executed sented in table 4.2-I. All events were completed as scheduled the expected tolerances, indicating a satisfactory flight.

are preor within

F

UNCLASSIFIED

4-6

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 4.2-1 - SEQUENCE OF _S

Event

Planned

time,_ I'
i

g. e.t. Launch phase, sec Stage I engine ignition Stage I MDTCPS makes Stage I MDTCPS makes TOPS subassembly lockout signal (87FS1) 1 2 2 make -3.40 -2.30 -2.30 -2.20 -0.l0 13:37:26 17.68 20.48 23.04 88.32 105.00 109.96 119.04 144.64 145. O0 156.19 (87FS2)) 156.27 156.27 to 156.27 156.27 156.27 156.27 signal (91FSI) 156.27 156.27 156.97 157.17 162.56 162.36

Actual time, g.e.t,

Difference, sec

-3.28 -2.38 -2.36 -2.30 -0.09 13:37:26:471 17.66 20.46 22.99 88.20 105. O0 109.81 118.83 144.41 145. O0 157.12 157.16 157.16 157.16 157.16 157.16 157.16 157.16 157-16 157.84 157.90 161.70 161.64

0.]2. -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 0.01 0.471 -0.02 -0.02 _0.05 -0.12 0.O0 -0.15 -0.21 -0.23 O. O0 0.93 0.89 0.89 O.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.73 -0.86 -0.92

subassembly subassembly

1 and subassembly (back-up)

IShutdown

Lift-off (pad disconnect (13:_7:26.471 G.m.t. ) Roll program Roll program start end

separation)

Pitch program rate no. i start Pitch program rate no. i end_ no. 2 start

First IGS update sent Control system gain change no. i rate no. 2 end, no. 3 start circuitry armed

Pitch program

Stage I engine shutdown Second IGS update sent

Stage l MDTCPS BECO

unmake

(stage I engine shutdown switches actuate

Staging

Signals from stage I rate gyro package flight control system discontinued Hydraulic Telemetry switchover ceases, lockout

stage I

Staging nuts

detonate

Stage II engine ignition Control

system gain change begin

Stage separation

Stage II engine MDFJPS make Pitch program Radio guidance rate no. 3"ends enable

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE

UNCLASSIFIED
4.2-1 - SEQLrH_CE OF EVENTS - Concluded

4-7

I Event g.e.t, Planned time, Launch phase_ sec First guidance by TARS command signal received circuitry armed 169.00 317.44 336.70 336.70 337.00 356.70 356.70 368.20 168.53 316.28 338,74 338.75 338.88 361.03 359.22 372.61 -0.47 -1.16 2.04 2.05 1.88 4.33 2.52 4.41 g.e.t, Actual time, sec l Difference_ !

Stage II engine shutdown SECO

(stage II engine shutdown stage II shutdown

(glFS2))

Redundant

Stage II MDFJPS break Spacecraft OANS on OAMS off separation

Orbit phase_ Height adjust maneuver Phase adjust maneuver " Plane change maneuver Height adjust Coelliptic Terminal (vernier) maneuver

hr:min:sec 01:34:03 02:18:03 02:43:10 01:34:03 02:18:01 02:42:08 03:03:20 03:47:33 03:47:37 05:18:56 05:31:31 05:43:34 05:49:44 05:50:31 05:56:00 0 - 2 -62 4 13 47 0 0

maneuver initiate

phase maneuver

05:17:03

First correction Second correction Braking maneuver Rendezvous Retrograde Posigrade

maneuver maneuver

complete separation maneuver maneuver ll:14:31 13:25:52

ll:14:31 13:25:52

Reentry phase_ hr:min:sec Retrorocket initiation 25:15:58 25:38:45 25:43:49 25:45:39 initiate 25:47:18 25:51:36 25:15:58 25:38:28 25:43:54 25:45:49 25:47:21 25:51:24 0 -17 5 i0 3 -12

Begin blackout _ad blackout Drogue deployment Pilot deployment/main Landing

r

UNCLASSIFIED

4-8

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT

BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
4.3 FLIGHT TRAJECTORIES

4-9

The launch and orbital trajectories referred to as planned are either preflight calculated nominal trajectories from references 9 and i0 or trajectories based on nominal outputs from the real-time computer complex (RTCC) and planned attitudes and sequences as determined in real time in the auxiliary computer room (ACR). The actual trajectories are based on the Manned Space Flight Network tracking data and actual attitude and sequences, as determined by airborne instrumentation. The Patrick Air Force Base atmosphere was used for altitudes below 25 nautical miles, and the 19_9 ARDC model atmosphere was used for altitudes above 25 nautical miles for all trajectories except the actual launch phase. For the launch phase, the current atmosphere as measured up to 2_ nautical miles altitude at the time of launch was used. The earth model for all trajectories contained geodetic and gravitational constants representing the Fischer ellipsoid. A ground track of the first four revolutions, and from retrofire to landing is shown in figure 4.3-1. Launch_ orbit, rendezvous_ and reentry trajectory curves are presented in figures 4.3-2 to 4.3- _.

4.3.1 j

Gemini

Spacecraft

4.3.1.1 Launch.- The launch trajectory data shown in figure 4.3-2 are based on the real-time output of the range-safety impact prediction computer (IP 3600) and the Guided Missile Computer Facility (GMCF). _he IP 3600 used data from the missile trajectory measurement system (MISTRAM), FPQ-6, and TPQ-18 radars. The GMCF used data from the GE Mod III radar. Data from these tracking facilities were used during the time periods listed in the following table:

Facility

Time

from lift-off, see 0 to 52

IP 3600

(FPQ-6 and TPQ-18)

_CF (GEMod Ill)

52 to 403

The actual launch trajectory, as compared with the planned launch trajectory in figure 4.3-2 , was slightly low in altitude, velocity, and flight-path angle during stage I powered flight. After BECO, the radio guidance system (RGS) corrected what little error existed and guided stage II to a near nominal insertion. At BEC0_ the altitude_ velocity and flight-path angle were low by 3299 feet, 26 ft/sec, and 0.39 °,

CONFIDENTIAL

4-1o

CONFIDENTIAL

respectively. At SECO, the altitude was high by 318 feet, the velocity was low by 9 ft/sec and the flight-path angle was high by 0.01 °. Actual SECO conditions are based on corrected GE Mod III, MISTRAM, and telemetry data. At spacecraft separation, the altitude was high by 477 feet, the velocity was low by 12 ft/sec, the flight-path angle was high by 0.04 °, and the spacecraft was approximately 25K feet north of the desired plane. Table 4.3-I contains a comparison of planned and actual conditions at BECO_ SECO_ and spacecraft separation. The preliminary conditions at spacecraft separation were obtained by integrating the Bermuda vector after insertion back to the time of separation as determined during the mission, through the planned velocity changes (_V) and attitudes in reference i0. The final conditions were obtained by integrating the first orbit Best Estimate Trajectory (BET) back through the actual _V's and attitudes to spacecraft separation as determined by telemetry. (NOTE: The BET used tracking data from Bermuda, Grand Turk Island, Carnarvon, White Sands, and Eglin Air Force Base.) It can be seen, however, that except for _he time of separation, the preliminary solution agrees with the final solution. The GE Mod !II and MISTRAM radar tracking data, after SEC0, are used to compute a go-no-go for spacecraft insertion by averaging i0 seconds of data starting at SECO + 5 seconds. The go-no-go condition obtained from GE Mod III showed that velocity was high by 6 ft/sec and flight-path angle was low by 0.12 ° when compared to the more accurate orbital ephemeris data. The conditions obtained from MISTRAM showed that velocity was high by 2 ft/sec, and flight-path angle was low by 0.08 ° when compared to the ephemeris data. 4.3.1.2 Orbit.- The main objective of the Gemini VI-A mission was to rendezvous with spacecraft 7; therefore, the orbit phase is described in more detail in paragraph 4.3.1.2.1. Table 4.3-11 shows the planned and actual orbital elements after each maneuver and table 4.3-111 shows the orbital elements from insertion to retrofire. A comparison of planned and actual apogees and perigees is shown in figure 4.3- 3 . These planned and actual elements were obtained from orbital ephemerides generated, respectively, by using the sequences in reference i0 and by integrating the Gemini tracking network vectors after each of the midcourse and terminal phase rendezvous maneuvers. The planned trajectory as presented in table 4.3-IV and figure 4.3-4 was taken from the real-time solution obtained using the Gemini VII White Sands vector in revolution 161 and the Gemini VI-A Canary Island vector after insertion. This was the first plan obtained after the Gemini VI-A lift-off_ and comparison with later actual maneuver values illustrates a lack of significant change as the rendezvous progressed, indicating near nominal performance. The groumd-requested maneuvers were based on various Gemini VI-A vectors updated after each maneuver and the Gemini VII Hawaii vector in revolution 162.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

4-11

The actual trajectory duringthe rendezvous phase was reconstructed utilizing BET vectors (see ref. 9). The Gemini VI-A vector used was obtained prior to the first maneuver (group A in ref. 9). Maneuvers as derived from the inertial guidance system (IGS) postflight analysis were applied sequentially up to rendezvous. The first Gemini VII vector computed was used throughout, because that vehicle was not maneuvered except in attitude. The early ground computations of the Gemini VI-A trajectory, based on the Canary Island vector after insertion_ indicated nearly nominal conditions for effecting a fourth-orbit rendezvous. Because lift-off was on time, the only anomalies indicated were an underspeed at insertion of about 12 ft/sec and an out-of-plane condition requiring a plane change of about 32 ft/sec. The range between the vehicles at Gemini VI-A insertion was a nominal 1067 nautical miles_ but due to dispersions in the powered flight_ spacecraft 6 was approximately 4 nautical miles north of the target plane. The orbit planes were almost exactly parallel as planned and the plane change could be scheduled at the nominal point. These two major dispersions account for almost all of the small abovenominal translational cost encountered prior to the terminal phase. At 1:34:03 g.e.t., a height adjustment (_) to correct for the spacecraft 6 insertion underspeed was performed. This posigrade maneuver with the forward-firing thrusters was planned to raise the spacecraft 6 apogee from 140 nautical miles to 147 nautical miles (15 nautical miles below the spacecraft 7 orbit). Because of a slight accelerometer bias error, the ground-commanded value of 14.0 ft/sec was not fully applied. The actual value based on IGS readouts was approximately 13.8 ft/ sec. This error, coupled with an update on the vectors_ necessitated a small corrective height maneuver to be scheduled for the following perigee. Prior to this, however, the phase and plane adjustment maneuvers were made.

,_

The nomina&ly

scheduled

phase

maneuver

(NcL) was performed

at sec-

ond apogee at 2:18:01 g.e.t. The horizontal_ posigrade &V of 60.8 ft/ sec was applied accurately with the aft-firing thrusters. The resultant Gemini VI-A perigee was 121 nautical miles. Thus the catchup rate was reduced to 4.1 deg/orbit. The plane change ,(-.N_c_ to send spacecraft 6 into the target plane

was performed at 2:42:08 g.e.t. A thrust of 31.7 (yaw = 90.6 ° ) was applied with the aft thrusters. of-plane displacement was 0.5 mile.

ft/sec to the southeast The resulting out-

UNCLASSIFIED

4_12

UNCLASSIFIED
g.e.t., a small corrective height maneuapplied with the aft-firing thrusters, to 147 nautical miles. This maneuver, in an attempt to keep the terminal phase facilitate the crew's onboard backup cal-

At second perigee, 3:03:20 ver of 0.6 ft/sec posigrade was raising the spacecraft 6 apogee though not essential, was done as near nominal as possible to culations.

At third

apogee,

3:47:37

g.e.t,

the coelliptic

(NsR) maneuver I
\

was

performed. This slightly pitched-down posigrade maneuver of 42.4 ft/sec was accomplished with the aft-firing thrusters. The resulting spacecraft 6 orbit was 147 by 144 nautical miles. The height difference between the orbits at this point was 14. 7 nautical miles and varied up to 15.8 nautical miles until terminal-phase initiation. Thus, the coellipticity was well within tolerance but would have been better if the pitch angle during the NSR maneuver had been approximately i ° greater.

The range at this time was 172 nautical miles, which was approximately i nautical mile greater than previously calculated, and accounts for a slightly later terminal-phase initiation time. The crew proximately switched the onboard i0 seconds computer to the rendezvous mode ap-

4 minutes

after

the beginning

of the NSR maneuver.

Because of the existing relative position and catchup rate between the vehicles, this switch time came about a minute too late to produce the desired line-of-sight terminal phase initiation at 27 ° pitch. Due to the fixed internal solutions fro_ the onboard computer, set when the computer goes to rendezvous mode, the pitch of the terminal-phase maneuver at 5:18:56 g.e.t, was computed to be about 35 ° (which would produce the same results as a pitch of 28 ° line-of-sight). The terminal-phase-initiation maneuver was performed at a pitch angle of approximately 28 ° because the command pilot held line-of-sight radar lock-on during the maneuver. Thus the AV solution on the IVl's was primarily in the _D-AFT window but also contained about 4 ft/sec in the UP-DN window. The _V applied was 31.5 ft/sec using the aft and the lateral (up) thrusters. 'Eae _t = 81.8 ° and 33.6 ° midcourse corrections were applied 12 and 24 minutes laterj respectively, and required about 16 and 12 ft/sec. All were well within the expected (la) deviation. The braking maneuvers were started at 5:50:35 g.e.t, and were terminated at 5:56:00 g.e.t., when the two spacecraft were approximately 120 feet apart and relative motion was stopped. The total AV applied was approximately 65 ft/sec_ close to that predicted.

UNCLASSIFIED

-

UNCLASSIFIED

4- .3

_e translational cost for the terminal phase was approximately 125 ft/see, about 25 ft/sec greater than the minimum. The total translational cost of the rendezvous maneuvers (including terminal phase) was 276 ft/sec, approximately 70 ft/sec greater than the minimum but less than the lo deviation of about i00 ft/sec. 4.3.1. 3 Reentry.- The planned and actual reentry phase of the trajectory is shown in figure 4.3- 5. The planned trajectory was determined by integrating the Woomera vector in revolution 15 through planned retrofire sequences determined by the RTCC, and flying a 56 ° bank-angle lifting reentry according to Math Flow 6 described in reference ii. The Woomera vector was selected one revolution before retrofire because the retrofire setting in the spacecraft was based on that solution. The reentry trajectory in figure 4.3- 5 is only a simulated reentry required to hit the actual landing point. It was obtained by integrating the White Sands vector after retrofire back to the end of retrofire_ then forward to landing through a bank and reverse bank angle of 50.8 °. An actual reentry trajectory could not be run because the real-time telemetry data containing reentry attitudes were lost during the blackout region_ and the onboard tape recorder failed before reentry. The crew stated that they flew according to the Flight Director Indicator commands after guidance initiate_ and reversed bank at what they believed to be approximately 55 ° to 65 ° , four or five times as required to null out cross-range dispersions. The crew reported a maximum acceleration of 4.3g, as compared to 4.8g obtained with the simulated reentry trajectory and 4.9g with the real-time telemetry which was obtained after blackout. It is believed that the simulated reentry trajectory is reasonable because the blackout times agree within 12.0 seconds of the actual blackout_ maximum acceleration loads compare with telemetry within O.ig at the analogous times_ and parachute deployment altitudes at recorded sequence times are in accord with those reported in section 5.1.11. Table 4.3-1 contains a comparison of reentry dynamic parameters and landing points. The final landing point, as determined by extrapolated radar and IGS data, was within 7.0 nautical miles of the planned landing point. See section 5.1.5 for a more detailed description of this landing.

4.3.2

Gemini

Launch Vehicle

Second

Stage

_he second stage of the Gemini launch vehicle was inserted into an orbit with apogee and perigee altitudes of 134.8 and 86.9 nautical miles, respectively. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) network tracking sensors were able to skin-track the second stage during the ensuing 31-hour orbit lifetime. NORAD tracked the second stage prior to reentry in revolution 21 and predicted an impact point of latitude 28.9 ° N and longitude 179 ° W in the north Pacific.

UNCLASSIFIED

4_ 4
TABLE Condition

CONFIDENTIAL
4.3-1.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMET_S Actual Preliminary BECO I Final Planned

Time from lift-off, Geodetic latitude, deg Nest feet

sac ............. deg North ..........

156.33 28.63 79.59 205 449 33.8 51.4 9 998 18.32 83.21

Not computed

157.16 28.65 79.57 202 150 33.3 52.8 9 972 17.93 82.14

Longitude, Altitude, Altitude,

...............

................. miles ............

nautical

Range, nautical miles Space-fixed Space-fixed Space-fixed velocity,

.............. ft/sec .......... .......

flight-path

angle, deg

heading angle,

deg E of N ...... SECO

Time

from lift-off, latitude, deg West feet

sec ............. deg North ..........

336.63 29.06 71.91 529 252 ...... 87.1 456.4 25 646 02 90.14 Separation 356.63 29.05 70.43 529 218 87.1 534.6 25 750 O.O 90.91

Not computed

338. 74 29.12 71.84 529 570 87.2 460.8 25 637 .03 90.17

Geodetic

Longitude, Altitude, Altitude,

...............

................. ......

nautical miles miles

Range, nautical Space-fixed Space-fixed Space-fixed

.............. ft/sec angle, .......... deg ........

velocity,

flight-path

heading angle, deg E of N ...... Spacecraft

Time from lift-off_ Geodetic latitude, deg West feet

sec ............. deg North ..........

358.98 29.11 70.37 529 695 87.2 537-i 25 718 .05 9O. 94

361. Ol 29.11 70.20 529 695 87.2 546.0 25 718 .04 91.02

Longitude, Altitude, Altitude,

...............

................. ............

nautical miles miles

Range, nautical Space-fixed Space-fixed Space-fixed

.............. ft/sec .......... .......

velocity,

flight-path heading

angle, deg

angle, deg E of N ......

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 4.3-1.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMET_qS - Concluded

Condition

Planned

Actual Preliminary Final

Maximum Altitude_ Altitude, statute miles nautical miles velocity, velocity, g ............. ............ .......... ..........

Conditions 167.6 146.2 25 740 2_ 371 7.4 75X 4.9 N/A 326 Point 23:35 67:50 23:24a 67:53 a 23:35 _ 67:50b 161.5 140.4 25 728 2h 360 7.4 732 4.8 4.9 314 160.6 139.7 25 727 24 359 7.4 732 4.8 4.9 314

Space-fixed Earth-fixed

f_/sec ft/sec

Exit acceleration,

.............. lb/sq ft ......... g (tracking g (telemetry ib/sq ft data) data) ..... ....

Exit dynamic pressure, Reentry deceleration,

Reentry deceleration, Reentry

dynamic pressure,

....... Landing

Latitude, Longitude,

deg:min North deg:min West

............. ............

abased on preliminary

radar fix of helicopter

over the spacecraft. of these coordinates as the

bLanding within 7.0 n. mi. circle with the intersection center. See section 5.1.5.2.3.

f-

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE 4.3-II.-

COMPARISON

OF ORBITAL ELEMENTS PRIOR

TO AND AFTER MANEUVER After Maneuver Planned Actual Preliminary a 146.4 86.7 28.87 88.77 146.3 116.6 28.87 89.39 146.3 116.6 28.87 89.32 146.3 116.6 28.87 89.32 146.3 143.8 28.87 9O.17 161.0 158.7 28.87 90.56 161.0 155.4 28.87 90.47 168.4 154.2 28.90 163. 4 158.6 28.93 148.6 146.9 28.90 147.2 120.6 28.90 146.7 120.6 28.90 147.1 120.6 29.00 146.7 86.9 28.98 Final 146.8 86.9 28.97 88.82 146.9 120.6 28.97 89.45 146.9 120.6 28.89 89.45 147.3 120.6 28.89 89.46 147.6 145.5 28.89 89-99 161.9 156.3 28.89 90.55 168.1 153.0 28.89 90.54 > Z

4r ! Oh

Before Maneuver Maneuver Condition Planned Actual Preliminary a NH Apogee, n. mi .... Perigee, n. mi .... Inclination, Period, min NCI deg . . . ..... 146.2 86.7 28.87 88.77 146.4 86.7 28.87 88.77 146.3 116.6 28.87 89.32 146.3 116.6 28.87 89.32 146. 3 116.6 28.87 89.32 146.3 143.8 28.87 89.87 161.0 158.7 28.87 90.56 163.4 158.6 28.95 148.6 146.9 28.90 147.2 120.6 28.90 146.7 120.6 28.90 147.1 120.6 29.00 146.7 86.9 28.98 140.3 86.8 29. O0 Final 140.0 86.9 28.97 87.92 146.8 86.9 28.97 88.82 146.9 120.6 28.97 89.45 146.9 120.6 28.89 89.45 147.3 120.6 28.89 89. 46 147.6 145.5 28.89 89.99 161. 9 156. 3 28.89 90.55

Apogee, n. mi .... Perigee? n. mi .... Inclination, deg . . . .....

C Z Npc

Period, min Apogee,

n. mi ....

Perigee, n. mi .... Inclination, deg . . . > NH Period, min .....

Apogee, n. mi .... Perigee, n. mi .....

"_ _1 NSR

Inclination, Period, min

deg . . . .....

"11 _11

Apogee, n. mi .... Perigee, n. mi .... Inclination, Period, mln deg . . . .....

Te_ninal

Apogee, n. mi .... Perigee, n. mi .... deg . . . .....

Inclination, Period, min Separatlon

Apogee, n. mi .... Perigee, n. mi .... deg . . . .....

Inclination, Period, min apreliminary

elements are RTCC values obtained during the mission.

Period not available.

TABLE

4.3-III.-

COMPARISON

OF ORBITAL

ELEMENTS Actual Preliminary a Final 140.0 86.9 28.97 87.92 146.7 86.9 28.98 146.8 86.9 28.97 88.82 163.4 158.6 28.93 161.9 156.3 28.89 90.55 168.4 154.2 28.90 168.1 153.0 28.89 90.54 168.6 153.9 28.90 168.2 153.0 28.89 90.54 _-,
-4

Revolution

Condition

Planned

Insertion

Apogee, Perigee,

n. mi ..... n. mi ..... deg ...... . • .

146.2 86.8 28.87 88.77 146.2 . . 86.8 28.87 88.77 161.0 . . • . 158.7 28.87 90.56 . . 161.0 155.4 • . 28.87 90.47 160.0 154.2 28.87 90.46

140.3 86.8 29.00

Inclination, (I) Pre-rendezvous C Z F" > (i) Rendezvous Period, Apogee, Perigee, min

n. mi ..... n. mi. deg

C

Inclination, Period, min .

N
f--

Apogee,'n. Perigee,

mi. n. mi. deg .....

cn
(j) "11 rT1 (4) Post-rendezvous (2_ -_ rT1 Inclination, Period, Apogee, Perigee, min

n. mi. n. mi .... deg

Inclination, (12) Retrofire Period, Apogee, Perigee, min

n. mi ..... n. mi ..... deg ...... • • •

Inclination, (16) Period, min

apreliminary

elements

are RTCC values

obtained

during

the mission.

Period

not available.

4- .8

UN C LASSIFIED
TABLE 4.3-IV.RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS

Condition

Planned

Ground commanded

Actual

Height

maneuver

NH hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 1"34:03 1:34:02 1:34:02.5

Maneuver

initiate_

Av, ft/see ................
Pitch, Yaw, deg ................ .................

13.4
0.0 180. 00:22

14. o
0.0 180.0 00:24

13.8
-1.4 -179.2 00:23

deg

tB min: sec ................ Phase maneuver NCL hr:min:sec, g.e.t ....

Maneuver

initiate_

2:18:03

2:18:00

2:18:01

AV, ft/sec ................
Pitch, deg ................ ................. :

59.4
O. 0 0.0 01:14

60.8
0.0 0.0 01:17

60.8
O. 3 -0. i 01:16.5

Yaw, deg

tB rain: sec ................ Plane change _C hr:min:sec, g.e.t ....

Maneuver

initiate,

2:43:10 31.5 0.0 90.0 00:39

2:42:07 31.7 O. 0 90.0 00:40

2:42:08 31.7 0.4 90.6 00:39.4

AV, ft/sec Pitch, deg

................ ................ .................

Yaw, deg

tB min: sec ................ Height maneuver Maneuver NH hr:min: sec, g.e. t ....

initiate_

Not scheduled

3:03:19

3:03:20

AV, ft/sec ................
Pitch, deg ................ .................

0.8
0.0 0.0 00: Ol

0.6
-4.6 -12.6 00:00.8

Yaw, deg

t_ rain:see .................

UNCLASSIFIED

UN C LASSIFIED
TABLE 4.3-IV.RENDEZVOUS MANEUV_S - Continued

4- .9

Condition

Planned

Ground commanded

Actual

Co-elliptical Maneuver _V,

maneuver

NSR g.e.t . . . 3:47:33 44.4 2.8 0.0 00:55 3:47:37 42.5 -i. 5 0.0 00:53 3:47:37 42.4 -i. i -0. 3 00:53

initiate,

hr:min:sec,

ft/sec deg

................ ................. ................. ................ TPI g.e.t ....

Pitch,

Yaw, deg tB min/sec Terminal

phase maneuver initiate,

Maneuver

hr:min:sec,

5:16:51 32.5 27.3 0.0 00:40

5:18:39 33.7 26.5 -2.8 00:42

5:18:56 31.5 35.0 -1.5 00:39

Z_V, ft/sec Pitch, Yaw, deg

................ ................ .................

deg

tB min: see ................ 82 ° correction Maneuver _V, initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t ....

Not applicable

(a)

5:31:31 c16.54 (c) (c) (e)

ft/sec deg

................ ................ .................

Pitch, Yaw,

deg

tB min: sec ................

aThese maneuvers commanded.

are a function

of the onboard

radar and not ground

bThis ZkV is a summation of all translation for resultant Z_V and attitudes).

maneuvers

(see section

5.1.5

eThese were not single thrust onboard radar commanded attitude.

maneuvers

and were

a function

of the

UNCLASSIFIED

4_2o
TABLE

UNC LASSIFIED
4.3-IV.REND_ZVOUSMANEUVHRS - Conclu&ed

Condition

Planned

Ground commanded

Actual

34° correction Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... Not applicable (a) 5:43:34

Iseo ................
Pitch, Yaw, deg ................ .................. ................ deg

(b)
(c) (c) (c)

t B min:sec Braking

maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 5:49:18 41.8 54.4 179.9 01:09 5:50:47 42.3 58.0 179.6 01:i0 5:50:31 d65. (c) (c) eo4:jO

Maneuver aV,

ft/sec deg

................ ................ .................. ................

Pitch,

Yaw, deg tB min:sec

aThese commanded.

maneuvers

are a function

of the onbGard

radar and not ground

bThis AV is a sunmation of all translation for resultant _V and attitudes). CThese were not single thrust commanded attitude. maneuvers

maneuvers

(see section

5.1.5

and were a function

of the onboard

radar

_ncludes range.

approximately

20 fps for semi-optical

approach

to within

120 ft

eBurn time includes semi-opticaL approach. (If the 65 fps had been burned in one pulse, the duration of the b_rn would have been 1:47.)

UNCLASSIFIED

NASA-S-66-165 JAN

800

700

I00

0

0 0 20 40 60 80 I00 120 140 160 180 200 Timefrom lift-off, sec (a)Altitudeandrange. Figure4.3-2. - Trajectoryparametersor the Gemini_57]-A issionlaunchphase, f m .{::I I'o 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360

NASA-S-66-183-JAN

-I:I ro

4×_I
38 36 34 28 26 32 30

I 1 I 1'lit

T_

] [ I 1_

_ -- ----

Planned _]

22

_

26

p
{,#"i
m

18

"_ 22

p
{,#'}

12
6

l_

-..n_,o
2 0

,,
i0

20

40

60

80

i00

120

140

160 180 200 Timefrom lift-off, sec

220

240

260

280

300

320

340

360

(b)Space-fixedelocityandflight-path angle. v Figure4,3-2, - Continued,

/

NASA- -66-180 S JAN

44×

42 4O 38 36 34 100

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160 180 200 Timefrom lift-off, sec

220

240

260

280

300

320

340

360

(c)Earth-fixed velocityandflight-path angle. Figure4.3-2. - Continued. .#I

Ix.) kJ1

NASA-S-66-181 JAN

4=ro ox
I

44

........

38

1000[ 800i-

34 36 32

=

i 200_-

22 =_ 20

L _i8 =11 14
10

"1"1

0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Time from lift-off, sec 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360

(d) Dynamic pressure and mach number. Figure 4.3-2. - Continued.

NASA-S-66-182 JAN

0 0 20 40 60 80 lO0 120 140 160 180 200 Timefrom lift-off, sec 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360

(e)Longitudinalacceleration. Figure4.3-2. - Concluded. 4=I IX) -4

NASA-S-66-64 JAN 180

4=. I rO CO

170

160

150

('_
r"-

-_ _ _3o
c

._

Z F'_
-O0 O0 _ m

O0 O0 m

12o

--n
rn

_o
100

__

I I II I
90 _

_oellipt_c h_tude

T_

maneuver Terminal phase

80 O0:O0 02:00

hp - Per',_ 04:00 06:00

altitude 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 Groundelapsed time, hr:min

" 22:00 24:00 26:00 28:00

Figure 4. 3-3.-

Apogee and perigee altitude for the Gemini _2]-A mission.

--

UNCLASSIFIED

4-29

I

= o

._._ _: _ _ _ _ .-., _::, _

..

:i2 it " " _

.

ii

\

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/
. E x=

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mr

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(

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+ '_
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_ o ,_

._

--

z

L\ +
/
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I

'fi

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,b

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I
5_p '_eA

I

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i

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i

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I

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flap 'q:)l!d

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i

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_-

UNCLASSIFIED

i NASA-S-66-226 JAN -Actual __ --Planned 0

3

r

_-1
E __/./_ 0 C_ _ _-2 _

/--

-01:20:00

o,,0o:oo. _ ,//
_ !41/,///

_ _ __ _

_/ NC1 Phaseadjustment _'_ NH: :Heightadjustment Npc: Plane change TPI : Coellipticmaneuver NSR=Terminal phaseinitiation CORI: 82 corrective maneuver ° COR : 34 correctivemaneuver 2 ° TPF: Braking maneuver

'-'-<

_

i _

--

_

- -- _

'_'.-... _i_ -'_ -)i C_ ---

05:00:00-- / / 05:5100-- /

Z _'_

r-

-3 -4

_,,

_.

F

__

/,--" _ "

!
/

i_:,

,,r

....

r !

!

[

I-"
0'}

'--]'I m

-._ ,.=

lO-o
i 10minute time intervals

NCI : 02:1801-- _ A?%_b ,

J

o, ooo-\osooop-_ o _t
___ x_ __NsR = 03:47:3(

I Io5:51:ooI coR1 : o5:3t:53_ -__

_

--n
--

//

E_

.._,_ -40

02:00:00-/

4'_

i

"_

_------_" _-_-_-_-"_ --03:00:0_ _-_ I __ NH° 03:03:19--

/

pl .;05:18158__ COR2.05:43:32__ _X _ _ TPF= 05:50:35-

"_ -60

/_

N 0134 3 H

-8o

_----=---Z_ _ C
-700 -650 -600 -550 -500 -450 -400 -350 -300 Horizontaldisplacement,n. mi. -250 -200 -150 -100 (b)Relativetrajectory profile, measured from Gemini_3 to Gemini_-A in curvilinear coordinatesystem.

A.----I ----,_d I
-50" 0 50

-750

3O

NASA-S-66-78AN J

lO0(_lO 3

26

160

100

8

180

0

6 25:14

:16

:18

:20

:22

:24

:26

:28

:30

:32

:34

:36

:38

:40

:42

:44

:_

:48

:50

25:52

Groundelapsed time, hr:min

(a) Latitude,longitude,andaltitude, Figure4. 3-5. - Trajectoryparameters the Geminill]-A missionreentryphase. for .J;I ko4 F-'

_-_2

UNCLASSIFIED

o

UNCLASSIFIED

(]::II:IISSVIDNn

_-_

(]=II=IISSV1DNn

...

4-34

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

12 NASA-S-66T157 JAN

0 25:14

:16

:18

:20

:22

:24

:26

:28

:30

:32

:34

:36

:38

:zl0

:42

:_A

:46

:_

:50

25:52

Groundelapsed time, hr:min

(e) Longitudinal eceleration. d Figure4.3-5. - Concluded.
I

k_
kJ]

NASA-S-66-250 JAN

._

T_ "mina 10 , , )hase fitiate 140120 o` _ < -I0 " ---TIAzimuth angle_ _--E_ " ,,,

I
First Mid-course Correct on --T-_ _"_ .3- --Et 4-434 _ " • I

I
Second | I iMid_course_ I Co_/

22
i _raking ,_-M,--!a ' n euv-T_r" /'_

kN

'

....

o_

:.so_

40

_ ,_

_r "---Elevationangle

_._ _orrl 40_ ._

_o
• o. 20

_

--...
"xA ".

_Platform:_1 _ _
_

.- //

Oe )

/

_

E2 I"!"1

--

O(_:OL8 05:12.

05:16

05:20

05:24

05:28 05:32 05:36 Timefrom lift-off, hr:min

_"'J_ 05140

05144

_'_ 05:48

. 05:52

Figure 4. 3-6. - Time history of relativeparametersduring terminal phase.

UNCLASSIFIED
5.0 VEHICLE PERFORMANCE

5-1

5.1

SPACECRAFT

PERFORMANCE

5.1.1

Spacecraft

Structure

The Gemini V!-A spacecraft structure performed as expected in sustaining all loads, vibration, and heating in a satisfactory manner. However, some minor anomalies were reported, including docking fitting covers that did not function properly, residue that collected on the windows_ insulation around the reentry control system (RCS) thrusters that was partially pushed out during launch_ and nose-fairing tabs that vibrated. The rendezvous and recovery section (R and R) of the spacecraft was recovered. The recovery crew reported that the lower docking fitting cover had failed to slide forward to cover the cavity exposed by the jettisoned docking fitting. Postflight inspection of the burn pattern in the cavity confirmed this anomaly, and the inspection revealed that a fiberglass channel in which the cover slides had been improperly repaired. A notch in the channel prevented the cover from sliding forward. A thorough analysis of heating data from spacecraft 2 has shown that these covers are not required, and inspection of spacecraft 6 confirms this. Action will be taken to examine repairs in this area more closely. In addition to the door failure, the upper-right docking fitting retainer pin, which is pulled out of the fitting when it is jettisoned, moved back into the cavity left by the fitting. Investigation revealed that this pin is withdrawn by a piston driven by a pyrotechnic charge. It is held in by the charge for a sufficient time to assure the release of the fitting. In this instance, the pin moved back after the pressure of the charge had bled off and this is not considered a problem. The crew reported residue on the windows, as has been reported previously by other crews. "As a result, the contractor has been requested to propose an engineering change for transparent covers that will be ejected in orbit. A backup mode of removal by the pilot will be provided during the extravehicular activities scheduled for all remaining Gemini flights. The insulation around the RCS thrusters was partially pushed out during launch, and subsequently burned off during reentry. It is believed that this condition was caused by a differential pressure resulting from launch-venting lag of the compartment during the powered phase of flight. The condition is being analyzed for possible detrimental effects requiring correction. However, the fiberglass cloth blanket,

....

UNCLASSIFIED

5-2

UNCLASSIFIED

which is being exposed_ is backed up by a rigid fiberglass channel to prevent direct impingement of thermal radiation on structure and equipment within the compartment. If pressure relief from around the thrusters is prevented_ a more detrimental effect than exposed insulation might result. Therefore_ caution is being exercised in considering any design change. The crew reported that the docking fitting tabs on the nose fairing vibrated and distracted them. Vibration was also reported by the Gemini III crew. After the Gemini III mission, the docking fitting tabs were analyzed and found to be structurally sound. However_ inasmuch as the vibration distracted the crew while performing required functions within the cabin, corrective designs are being studied. The difficulty with the centerline stowage box described in sections 7.1.2 and 5.1.10 will be corrected on subsequent spacecraft by increasing the flexibility of the box attachment to structure. This will permit proper closure of the door despite the effects of pressure.

No reentry aerodynamic data with respect to trim angle of attack and lift-to-drag ratio were obtained because of the failure of the onboard pulse code modulation (PCM) tape recorder. Also, because of telemetry blackout during reentry_ real-time data were only recorded from Maeh 8 to landing. (The major lifting portion of the reentry is between Mach 22 and Mach i0.) The apparent stagnation point, as measured on the heat shieldj was 13.7 inches indicating that the spacecraft trimmed to approximately the planned nominal 12 ° angle of attack.

_

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.2 Communications Systems

The Gemini VI-A communications equipment provided the support necessary for successful accomplishment of mission objectives. The limited data available at this time indicate only one equipment failurej the voice tape recorder. Air-to-ground voice communications were of generally poorer quality when compared to transmissions received from other Gemini spacecraft. The flight crew reported that voice communications received from the ground were satisfactory. Communications reentry blackout occurred from 25:38:28 g.e.t, to 25:43:54 g.e.t, as determined from the real-time telemetry signal strength records taken at the Texas and Grand Turk Island stations. The flight crew reported that communications between spacecraft 7 and spacecraft 6 were satisfactory_ however_ they were uncertain of the distance between the two spacecraft when voice contact was first established. It is known that the distance was in excess of 235 nautical miles because rendezvous radar lock-on occurred at this distance and voice contact occurred prior to radar contact. The distance for readable ultrahigh frequency (UHF) voice contact between the two spacecraft had been previously estimated to be from 200 to 400 nautical miles, depending upon antenna orientation. The voice tape recorder failed during the final portion of the second tape. Postflight tests revealed that the motorto-reduction-wheel drive belt had broken. 5.1.2.1 Ultrahigh frequency voice communications.Voice communications from the spacecraft were substandard during the entire mission. The quality was poor when compared with previous missions. When spacecraft 6 and 7 were in close proximity and both talking to the same ground station_ the voice transmissions from both spacecraft 6 crew members were distorted_ and the background noise level was much higher than from spacecraft 7. The noise was caused by air circulation within the pressure suits contacting the helmet microphones. The flight crew was aware of this and reported that they gave particular attention to proper microphone location. This situation made it necessary for the crew to repeat many transmissions but did not seriously interfere with proper conduct of the mission. Because of substandard operation_ postflight tests were conducted and the preliminary conclusions reached by the spacecraft contractor are as follows: (a) Air noise was excessive when using the helmet microphones was more severe for the command pilot than for the pilot. (b) The helmet formerly used. microphones were more sensitive to noise than and

those

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(c) These microphones are also more sensitive to phasing than those used previously. This will cause distortion when the crewman's head is turned from side to side_ bringing the mouth closer to one microphone than the other. (d) When comparing the voice communications from both during station keeping, it should be noted that the crew of was using the lightweight headset with a single microphone_ attached to the head_ thus eliminating most of the problems preceding paragraphs. spacecraft spacecraft 7 essentially cited in the

5.1.2.2 High frequency voice communications.The high frequency (HF) voice communication system is an emergency system and was not required during the Gemini VI-A mission. The flight crew reported that the system operated normally during a routine test over the Canary Island station_ and that HFwas not used during the remainder of the mission until after landing. Post-landing use is described in section 5.1.2.7. _.1.2.3 Radar transponders.Performance of the adapter-mounted C-band radar transponder was normal throughout the mission. Signal fading occurred as expectedj and this was attributed to an unfavorable radiation pattern presented to the ground radar as a result of the spacecraft attitude. This type of fading can be as great as 30 dB_ but generally does not cause degraded data or loss of track. The reentry assembly transponder operated normally during launch and reentry. This transponder was also used several times in orbit. The antenna phase shifter was suspected of being inoperative at times, but investigation revealed that either it was turned off or the spacecraft attitude was such that phase-shifter operation was not present in the radiation lobe oriented toward the ground radar. An evaluation by tracking stations during the period when the phase shifter was turned off indicated that there were no serious adverse effects, but that antenna pattern nulls were much deeper. Because of the higher orbit, communications blackout during reentry occurred over White Sands, much farther west than on previous missions. All Eastern Test Range radars elected to skin-track because of heavy blackout attentuation. Beacon returns were received intermittently, but usually were weaker than skin-track returns. 5.1.2.4 Digital command system.- The telemetered parameters of the digital command system (DCS) performance were normal throughout the mission, and commands were transmitted on 27 occasions. All individual commands were validated except one command from the Canary Islands station. The tape-dump off-command was not validated on revolution ll_ although three other commands transmitted during the same pass did result

--_

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
in the receipt of a message acceptance pulse (MAP) at the ground station. A postflight analysis revealed the presence of a MAP in the downlinked telemetry for the off-con_nand, therefore, the nonvalidationwas attributed to a malfunction in the ground station. A problem occurred during the Gemini V mission in which a series of real-time stored program commands were sent from Mission Control CenterHouston (MCC-H), through the Texas station, in too rapid a succession to be properly received by the spacecraft. This problem did not occur duringthe Gemini VI-A mission because the DCS at MCC-H was modified to repeat a command word unless both a valid MAP and an indication of proper telemetry ground station synchronization are received. Effective with the Gemini VIII mission, spacecraft 8 will code a MAP as eight ones rather than eight zeros. This will further avoid a recurrence of the problem. 5.1.2.5 Telemetry transmitters.An examination of the data available at this time indicates that all telemetry transmitters operated normally throughout the mission. 5.1.2.6 Antenna systems.- An examination of the performance of the communications systems indicates that the adapter and reentry UNF antennas deployed properly and operated normally. The performance of the HI • orbit and postlanding antennas was satisfactory as evidenced by the transmission and reception of NF signals. The radar transponder antennas operated normally as evidenced by radar tracking data from the ground stations. 5.1.2.7 Recovery aids.- The communications recovery aids for the Gemini VI-A mission operated normally. The UHF recovery beacon was turned on after the spacecraft was on two-point suspension on the main parachute. The recovery aircraft received continuous wave (CW) and pulse transmissions from the _ recovery beacon at a reported distance of 200 nautical miles. The recovery aircraft also established voice communications with the spacecraft while the spacecraft was on the main parachute. The flashing light extended normally but was not necessary and was not turned on by the crew. The external intercommunications jack provided for communications between the crew and rescue personnel before the hatches were opened. The I_ postlanding antenna was deployed after landing. Excellent HF voice and direction-finding signals were received at Cape Kennedy and at St. Louis_ Missouri. The flight crew reported that they were in direct voice contact with Cape Kennedy. In order to prevent damage, the HF antenna was retracted by the crew just before the spacecraft was hoisted aboard the recovery ship. Operation of the spacecraft recovery aids is further described in section 6.3 of this report.

UNCLASSIFIED

5-6

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
_.i.3 Instrumentation and Recording System perDuring the mission the instrumentation and recording system formed satisfactorily except for the anomalies listed below: (a) The pulse code modulation the revolution 13 dump. (PCM) tape recorder failed

during

(b) Five parameters in the reentry vehicle low-level multiplexer failed at 24 minutes 53.4 second g.e.t, then resumed proper operation at approximately25 hours 17 minutes g.e.t. 5.1.3.1 PCM tape recorder failure.- The PCM tape recorder failed while in the playback mode for the revolution 13 data dump over Cape Kennedy. The dump was commanded on at 20:51:06 g.e.t, and a successful playback of the revolution 13 data was obtained. At the next station pass over the Canary Islands (CYI), it was noted from resl-time data that there was no tape motion indication. Monitoring of the real-time data at the Carnarvon (CR0), Texas (TEX)_ and Mission Control Center, Cape Kennedy (MCC-C) ground stations during revolution 14 verified the lack of this indication. Several attempts to restart the recorder manually by the crew and by ground digital command system (DCS) commands were unsuccessful. The MCC-C ground station noted that at the end of the revolution 13 data dump the tape motion monitor remained on for approximately 30 seconds after the modulation on the radio frequency (RF) carrier went off. Postflight examination of the recorder established the cause of the

_

failure. In normal ope_tion, the recorder motor operates continuously and motion is transferred either to the fast playback reel or to the record reel by means of electromagnetic clutches, either of which can be commanded to engage the rotating drive shaft. During the revolution 13 tape playback (dump), a ball bearing between the playback clutch and the drive shaft seized and caused the clutch, in effect_ to be continuously engaged. Thus_ the magnetic tape was driven in the playback direction past the point of start-of-tape microswitch operation which removes power from the playback clutch. This is, evidently_ the point at which PCM data modulation of the RF carrier stopped. The tape continued to drive in the playback direction until the takeup reel became so full of magnetic tape that the microswitch reached maximum deflection and motion of the takeup reel was mechanically jammed. However, the feed reel continued to move_ causing tape to leave the normal path. The resultant slack in the tape looped several times around the record/ playback and pinch belt paths, strayed across the top of the playback reel_ and became entangled in the reel gears_ stopping all motion. Failure analysis of the speed converter assemblies from both spacecraft 6 and spacecraft 7 revealed that the same playback clutch ball

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bearing failed in both tape recorders. Further investigations conducted at the vendor's plant and at the ball-bearing producer's laboratories revealed that the bearing failure was due to foreign particles inside the bearing. These particles were generated by the cutting action of the bearing dust shield on an adjacent aluminum shoulder. A design deficiency resulted in this shoulder being higher than the inner race of the ball bearing causing the shield to cut into it. The following corrective action has been instigated: (a) Cut down bearing shield. the shoulder to eliminate interference with the ball

(b) Add a hardened surface to the shoulder to prevent brinelling due to the rubbing action of the bearing's inner shoulder. These modifications recorders. are being incorporated into all flight

galling or race on the

PCM tape

5.1.3.2 Low-level multiplexer (reentry vehicle) failure.- At 24 minutes 53.4 seconds g.e.t., the following group of parameters in the reentry vehicle low-level multiplexer were affected: (a) (b) (c) (d) (d) Reentry vehicle low-level CB02, full scale, was lost. CC03, CC04, was lost. was lost. MA21, increased 8 counts.

Cabin temperature, Left Right Radar suit suit

inlet air temperature, inlet air temperature, was lost.

range rate, JA04,

These parameters were observed to be working properly again after retrofire at approximately 25 hours 17 minutes g.e.t, on the reentry pass over the Hawaii ground station, but they were not working properly during the Carnarvon station pass in_nediately preceding retrofire. It can only be concluded that these parameters started functioning properly between the Carnarvon and Hawaii ground station passes. These parameters comprise only the active 1.25 saddle-per-second channels in the low-level multiplexer_ therefore, the inte_nittent problem was isolated to these channels. The low-level multiplexer was returned to the vendor's plant for failure analysis. Vibration, low temperature, and high temperature tests have been conducted and thus far the vendor has been unable to repeat this failure. Dissection of the suspected first tier switch module transistors revealed the presence of foreign materials in a transistor. Tests are continuing to determine effects of the contamination on the failure.

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5.1.3.3 Delayed-time data quality.- The delayed-time data received by Cape Kennedy (Telemetry Station II)_ Hawaii, and MCC-C are summarized in table 5.1.3-I. This table represents 8 computer-processed data dumps out of the 13 dumps actually made prior to failure of the PCM tape recorder. For all the ground stations listed_ the usable data exceed 94.91 percent. 5.1.3.4 Real-time data quality.- The real-time data received by the MCC-C_ Guaymas, Texas_ Hawaii_ Carnarvon_ and Grand Turk Island ground stations and the real-time data received by aircraft 497 on reentry are summarized in table 5.1.3-11. For all ground stations and aircraft 497, the usable data recovered exceeded 97.89 percent. All percentages were derived from computer-processed data edits. 5.1.3.5 Overall system performance.There were a total of 259 parameters monitored in this mission and only the five parameters discussed in paragraph 5.1.3.2 failed to operate properly.

1

r-

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k_q ! O

TABLE 5.1.3-1.- DELAYED-TIME DATA FROM SELECTED STATIONS

Total data received Station Revolution Duration, hr:min:sec Prime subframes

Total losses Prime subframes percent

Usable data, percent

C
7 r" (2_ -T1 (Tel II) Hawaii MCC-C SUMMATION Launchl2,13and i_ 4,5_6 2,3, 3:55:58 4:10:20 2:29:41 i0:35:59 141 577 150 197 89 806 381 580 699 3 720 15 017 19 436 0.49 2.48 16.72 5.09 99-51 97.52 83.28 94.91

C
7 r-(2_ -11

TABLE 5.1.3-11-- REAL-TIME DATA RECEIVED FROM SELECTED STATIONS

Total data received Station Revolutions Duration, min:sec Total master frames

Total losses Usable data_ Master frames Percent percent

C
Z ('_ r"

MCC-C Guaymas Texas Hawaii

Ascent 15, 16 16 16 !6 16, 17 Reentry

07:18 15:10 05:02 08:20 10:25 14:31 06:59 67:45

17 515 36 385 12 081 20 010 25 001 34 839 16 744 162 575

212 584 16 716 956 561 384 3429

1.21 1.61 0.13 3.58 3.82 1.61 2.29 2.11

98.79 98.39 99.87 96.42 96.18 98.39 97.71 97.89

C
Z r"

(Jgm Carnarvon "11 Grand Turk Island Aircraft 497 SUMMATION

_m "11

kJ] !

___2

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PAGE

INTEntIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

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5.1.4 Environmental Control System

5-13

A review of all available telemetered data shows that the environmental control system (ECS) did not exhibit a malfunction throughout the flight. All parameters received were within expected values_ however_ telemetered suit inlet and cabin temperatures were lost early in the flight because of a failure in the low-level multiplexer. (See section 5.1.3.) The crew reported being warm at all times except late in the sleep period, even though both coolant loops and both suit compressors were used during most of the flight. The suit inlet temperature was 52o F at approximately 25 minutes g.e.t._ when telemetry was lost. When telemetry was restored at retrofire, suit inlet temperature was 54o F. The crew reported that suit inlet temperatures gradually rose to above 60° F during t_e powered-up portion of the mission, then declined to approximately 55 F during the sleep period. The temperature started increasing again after poweringup for reentry. Telemetered coolant temperatures to the suit heat exchanger indicated 40° F and 45 ° F throughout the flight except at approximately 2 hours g.e.t, when a rmaximum of 47 ° F was indicated. The inflight cabin temperature survey taken by the crew at 19 hours 25 minutes g.e.t, indicated dry bulb temperatures of 76 ° F to 80 ° F and relative humidities of 65 percent to 72 percent. These values are normal and agree with previous flight data. Extensive postflight tests were made on the ECS to determine if any failures had occurred. Checks were made of suit compressor flow rates, coolant flow and pressure drop, suit heat exchanger thermal performance, and onboard suit temperature instrumentation. All data agreed with preflight measurements. A review of all flight and postflight data shows all conditions to be normal_ therefore_ the conclusion must be made that the discomfort was a result of increased crew metabolic heat loads caused by the heavy workload throughout the mission. The total heat load apparently exceeded the capability of the suit heat exchanger which is about 1700 Btu per hour. The heat load of the cabin instruments is calculated as 680 Btu per hour. Some of this heat is absorbed by the structure and some is transferred to the cabin gas. Relative values are not known. The crew had their face plates open throughout most of the flight. The open faceplates caused a flow of gas from the suits_ through the cabin, across the instrument panel, and back into the system through the cabin recirculation valve. The cabin heat exchanger was not used; therefore, cabin heat was absorbed by the suit heat exchanger. The absence of the insulating characteristics of the water absorbent wallpaper, deleted from spacecraft 6, could also have caused additional heat in the cabin. The two suit compressors add approximately 239 Btu per hour to the gas stream and the heat generated about 195 Btu per hour. by absorption The addition of C02 by the lithium of these heat loads hydroxide to the suit adds

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circuit gas could reduce the capability of the suit heat exchanger for crew cooling to 500 Btu per hour or less per man. The hea_yworkload on this flight could easily have caused the crew output to exceed this value. Postflight inspection revealed two leaks in the right-hand secondary oxygen subsystem. A review of preflight (serviced on Sept. 16, 1965) and flight data indicates that no leaks of a measurable size occurred prior to initiation of flow from this system during reentry. Therefore_ the assumption must be made that the audible leaks occurred during landing or subsequent handling of the spacecraft.

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_.i.3 Guidance and Control System

5-15

Performance of the guidance and control system was excellent throughout the mission. The ascent, rendezvous, and reentry phases proceeded according to plan with no anomalies or abnormal occurrences. The rendezvous radar was thoroughly exercised for the first time and demonstrated excellent performance. Table 5.1.5-I contains a summary of events pertinent to the guidance and control systems. 3.1.3.1 Inertial guidance system performance evaluation.-

3.1.3.1.1 Ascent phase: The pitch_ yaw_ and roll steering signals are shown in figure 5.1.5-1. Superimposed on the inertial guidance system (IGS) quantities are the steering signals from the primary guidance system along with the upper and lower IGS attitude-error limit lines generated for a nominal Gemini VI-A trajectory. The predicted pitch and yaw attitude errors_ simulated for LO - 7 hour prelaunch winds_ are presented for the first 90 seconds of flight. The following is a brief discussion of the steering signals with respect to the ascent guidance phase. IGS performance during the first and second stages of powered flight was excellent. The difference in roll steering commands between the primary and secondary guidance systems_ just prior to first stage engine cutoff (BECO) was about 1.4° . Roll misalignment between the two systems contributed 0.04 ° of the difference_ and gimbal cross-coupling contributed at least 1.0 ° . The remaining difference of 0.36 ° was probably a Gemini launch vehicle (GLV) three-a_is reference system (TARS2 roll gyro drift. Engine misalignment was indicated at lift-off by a 0.7 offset in the roll steering signals. This deviation from null and the 195 ft/sec deviation at BECO between the actual and predicted out-of-plane velocity components indicated a GLV pitch-plane misalignment. The actual velocity components were in a direction that was north of the predicted values. The stage !I roll attitude errors for both systems indicated normal behavior. The pitch steering o signals for the primary and secondary guidance systems differed by 0.5_ at BEC0. This variation included a 0.23 ° deviation resultin_ from initial misalignment between the two systems. The remaining 0.32 v is attributed to pitch programmer deviations_ a TARS pitch gyro drift_ or a combination of the two. A shift of about O.1° in pitch attitude occurred at BEC0_ indicating only a slight center-ofgravity offset along the pitch axis. The behavior of the IGS pitch steering signals following guidance initiation indicated a normal response to the stage II steering commands of the primary system.

....

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5-16

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The first-stage offset-yaw-steering technique was exercised for the first time on this vehicle. This technique is used to place the spacecraft into the orbital plane of the target at insertion. The difference in the yaw steering commands between the two guidance systems was 0.5° at BECO. Initial misalignment contributed 0.3° and the remaining difference is attributed to the combined effects of gimbal cross-coupling and TARS gyro drift. The steering required to compensate for a center-ofgravity offset in yaw was greater in Gemini VI-A than in any of the previous missions, as indicated by a 2.3 ° shift in error signals at staging. Following guidance initiation, the IGS attitude error shifted from 1.3° to -4.9 ° . This shift in the ICS yaw steering signal is a normal response by the backup guidance system to the biased launch azimuth. The amount of shift is dependent upon the _gnitude of the out-of-plane velocity components, with respect to the target plane, which build up during the O . • first stage. The 6.2 shlft mn IGS yaw attitude error signal corresponds to an out-of-plane velocity of 675 ft/sec at guidance initiation. The primary guidance system indicated a yaw rate command of 0.25 deg/sec following guidance initiation, thus producing a gradual return of the attitude error to the null condition. The IGS indicated a normal response to the primary guidance commands during out-of-plane steering and throughout the remainder of the ascent guidance phase and shows excellent performance of the offset steering technique. If guidance switchover had occurred early in the stage II operation, the second stage engine cutoff (SECO) conditions would have deviated from those obtained by the following: 1.5 ft/sec in velocity, 260 feet in altitude, and 0.02 ° in flight-path angle. These deviations would have resulted in an apogee of 140.5 nautical miles and a perigee of 87 nautical miles. These values compare favorably with the actual Gemini VI-A trajectory in the presence of small inertial measurement unit (IMU) errors, and the comparison is substantiated by the delivery of the IGS SECO signal within i0 milliseconds of the primary SECO signal. Both azimuth updates were received by the IGS. The misalignments at launch and following the updates were reconstructed after the flight and were as follows: Platform After After release, deg ........ ....... . . . -0.52 -0.i0 0

first update, second update,

deg deg

The incremental puted by the onboard constructed by using reported readings of

velocity indicator (IVI) display, as actually comincremental velocity adjust routine (IVAR), was reIGS navigational and gimbal-angle data. The crew ii ft/sec forward, 2 ft/sec right, and 2 ft/sec

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5-17

down. These were the approximate readings calculated throughout the 60 seconds following the separation and roll maneuvers. Table 5.1.5-II shows the values of the reconstructed IVAR parameters in their final computation cycle as compared with the actual final values obtained from the data acquisition system (DAS). The crew readings and the comparison in the table validate the orbit insertion equations and the computer-IVI interface. If the IVAR had been used on this flight following the separation maneuver_ the IVI's would have displayed ii.i ft/sec forward and 6.5 ft/sec out-of-plane velocity corrections in component form. With the flight director indicator (FDI) needles hulled, the spacecraft would have been yawed left 25 ° and the resultant correction of 12.2 ft/sec fo_ard would have appeared on the fore and aft window. After thrusting until the IVl's had zeroed_ the in-plane velocity would have changed about ii ft/sec resulting in an apogee about 6 nautical miles higher than actually achieved and very close to the desired nominal of 146 nautical miles. The out-of-plane velocity would have been corrected by 6O ft/sec • so that the descending mode would have occurred approxmmately 90 from insertion. Less than i ft/sec velocity have been required to reach the desired change at apogee (Vgp) would perigee of 87 nautical miles.

An error was discovered in defini,ng the prelaunch digital command system (DCS) load for the parameter A9 _, used in the V equation. This gP 4 error resulted in the coefficient being defined as -3.8423 × i0instead of the intended ft. The effect -2.9268 × 10 -4 , or a difference of -.9155 × 10 -4 ft/sec/ of this error would be to change V by i ft/sec for gP every ll O00-foot difference between the actual radius from the earth center and the desired radius. For this mission_ have contributed at the time V a negligible would gP 0.i ft/sec.

have been used_

the error would

The onboard computer and inertial measurement unit performance was evaluated by comparing telemetered velocity data with that computed from ground tracking data. G.E. Mod IIl and Missile Trajectory Measurement (MISTRAM) tracking systems were utilized. Although final data fr_n these systems were adequate_ the MISTRAM 10OK (i00 000 ft base leg) velocity residual showed a divergence in the vertical channel (see fig. 5.1.5-2). A preliminary regression analysis indicates that a p-bias error was present. No significant errors have been found in the G.E. Mod Ill final data. IGS telemetry data were excellent during ascent with no significant drop outs. A preliminary engineering estimate of the !MU component errors the total velocity error induced by each error source are given in table 5.1.5-I1. The curve fit resulting from these errors is shown and

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superimposed on the velocity residuals in figure 9.1.5-2. The down range (X) difference is made up of timing errors (evident at BECO and SECO) and a small x accelero_ter misalignment toward z of -15 arc p P seconds. The major portion of the vertical (y) difference was caused by a z aceelerometer misalignment toward x of approximately i00 arc P P seconds. A preflight determined z accelerometer scale factor of P 400 parts per million (ppm) also contributed. The scale factor propagating in a negative direction accounts for the negative y residuals seen early in the flight. The primary contributors to the crossrange (z) error were a -40 arc second azimuth misalignment and a yp accelerometer bias of -160 ppm. Although many of the g-sensitive drift errors propagate along z, the residuals did not cross zero as they normally would with these errors present. The preflight values of these terms were stable as seen in figure 5.1.5-3, therefore it is concluded that they were present but compensated for each other. The component and radar tracking errors obtained from a preliminary error coefficient recovery program (ECRP) run (table 5.1.5-111) agree well with the engineering estimates_ however the large uncertainties, particularly in y_ indicate that the error model was inadequate. A continuing effort to improve this model is underway. The IGS position and velocity errors at SECO are presented in table 5.1.5-IV. These quantities were obtained from comparisons with the present best estimate of the trajectory. An estimate of injection parameters at SEC0 + 20 seconds determined from the IGS and other sources is given in table 5.1.5-V. 5.1.5.1.2 Orbital phase: Approximately 20 hours of operation were accrued on the IGS during the mission with proper operation indicated throughout. A summary of platform aligz_ents is presented in table 5.1.5-VI, where significant performances of the platform as controlled by the crew, are shown. The secondary horizon sensor was used for about 6 minutes during the first alignment_ however, this alignment started and ended using the primary sensor. All other alignments used the primary sensor with no difficulty, with either the alignments or the sensors, being reported by the crew. Only one alignment (for 4 minutes after the terminal phase initiate maneuver) was performed entirely in the pulse control mode. The results presented in table 5.1.5-VI indicate_ where data were available_ that the platform was accurately aligned at the termination of each alignment. The last a_ailable data (about 16 minutes prior to retrofire) show that the crew was still aligning at this time with O accuracies of 0.06 ° in pitch and yaw and 0.19 in roll, indieatlng a good alignment for retrofire was in process.

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A check of the accelerometer and indicated that the correction

-19

bias was made shortly after insertion inserted in the computer for the X P accelerometer was in error by approximately 0.07 counts/sec. The bias correction was updated by this amount after the first height-adjustment maneuver. Subsequent checks throughout the flight indicated stable operation in all axes. A summary of translation thrusting activity is included as table 5.1.5-VII. The applied velocity changes were calculated from IGS accelerometer data with the exception of the retrograde maneuver, for which the IVI readings reported by the crew were compared to tracking data. The planned quantities are the velocity adjustments sent to the spacecraft from the ground with the exception of the two terminal phase corrections for which no quantities were sent. Very close agreement between the reconstructed applied velocity changes and the planned quantities tends to substantiate the crew reported procedure of applying small corrections until a residual of less than 0.7 ft/sec remained in the manual data readout unit (MDRU). An analysis of the rendezvous maneuver is not complete_ however, the results to date indicate nominal system performance throughout. A rendezvous mode test was performed at 3:35:55 g.e.t., shortly after radar lock-on. The crew reported incorrect total velocity change required to o rendezvous (_Vm) readings and indicated that an erroneous value (180) of angle to rendezvous (wt) was in computer address 83. Static simulations had been performed using values of wt of 130°_ 180°, and 270° (the last being the value which should have been in address 83 at this time). The results are shown below together with the corresponding data acquisition system (DAS) quantity.

Time from lift-off_
hr:min: sec 3:35:55 3:37:35 3:39:15 3:40:55

AVT,

et/sec ave, _lsec
(_t = 180 °) 999 999 999 999 995 944 999 966

av_, ft/sec AvT, _lsec
(o_c = 270 °) 274 248 303 301 (DAS) 272 253 308 308

(rot = 130°)

The close agreement of the 270 ° run with the DAS readings gives evidence that the correct value was in the computer. Attempts have been made_ including a c_puter memory dump_ to find a source for the reported 180 ° value_ but with no success to date.

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5-2o
A static simulation

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was also run for the remainder of the rendezagreeing as table 5.1.5-VIII)

vous operation with the results (included closely with the actual quantities.

Using state vectors of the two spacecraft for 4:54:46 dynamic simulation was run in which radar errors, platform form alignment errors, and thrusting errors were ignored. of this run compare vernier midcourse is shown below. favorably with the values of _VT, The

g.e.t., a errors, platThe results

and of the two _VT, comparison

maneuvers

recorded

in flight.

Time

from

Radar range, n. mi. 48.58

2_VT, ft/sec (simulated)

AVT,

ft/sec data)

lift-off, hr:min: sec 5: 07:O0

(DAS flight

ll2

109

5:o8: 4o
5: lO: 20 5: 12:00 5: 13:40 5: 15:20

46.00
43.52 41.06 38.62 36.20

96
87 78 72 70

96
85 77 72 69 -

The terminal

phase

initiate

(TPI) maneuver

comparison

shows:

Simulated,

ft/sec

DAS

flight

data,

ft/sec

36 forward 0 right/left 0 up/down

31 forward I right 4 down

The simulation is mechanized so that the TPI maneuver is performed along the X-axis, whereas, in the actual flight, radar boresight attitudes were utilized. This accounts for the difference.

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r
The vernier thrust

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comparison shows:

5-21

Simulated, Vernier no. I 3 aft

ft/sec

DAS

flight

data,

ft/sec

7 forward 5 left 7 down 4 forward 6 right 2 do_rn

0 right/left 3 up Vernier no. 2 2 aft 0 right/left i up

The "fly-by" miss distance resulting from the simulated mission run indicated a minimum radar range of 96.6 feet. The actual radar range time history was examined to obtain a preliminary assessment of the accuracy of the on-board guidance system in guiding to intercept. Figure 5.1.5-4 shows that prior to the first braking maneuver, starting at 5:50:31 g.e.t., the range was 2500 feet and closing linearly at approximately 40 ft/sec. Extrapolating to the nominal time of impact without braking shows that a "fly-by" miss of less than 300 feet would have occurred. This indicates that the second vernier mideourse calculation was aorrect and accurate to within the expected limit of i000 feet. The analysis to date indicates that general system operation was excellent throughout the rendezvous maneuvers. The rendezvous radar was utilized extensively on this mission, and the analysis to date indicates proper operation throughout the mission. The radar was turned to "standby" at 3 hours 6 minutes g.e.t, with normal instrument indications_ and to "search" between 3 hours 7 minutes and 3 hours i0 minutes g.e.t. Figure 5.1.5-5 shows the sequence of radar/transponder aperations leading to acquisition (target verification) as a function of time. The transponder receiver gave the first indication of being interrogated at 3 hours i0 minutes g.e.t. (range approximately 272 n. mi.) when the automatic frequency control (AFC) locked-on. Replies to the radar (shown by the RF power monitor) began at 3 hours 13 minutes g.e.t, with intermittent radar lock-on (target verification) being achieved at 3 hours 14 minutes g.e.t. Solid lock-on began at 3 hours 19 minutes g.e.t, at a range of approximately 235 nautical miles and continued throughout the rendezvous operation except for the alignment period at approximately 5 hours 25 minutes g.e.t. Figure 5.1.5-6 shows the telemetered rendezvous radar range with the range computed from trajectory data superimposed. Although the
p

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trajectory data are not sufficiently accurate to assess radar performance, the _V's calculated by the IGS which uses radar data as inputs were close to nominal for the trajectory flown. The excellent agreement reflects nominal radar performance. Figure rendezvous_ • O within 1 . 5.1.5-7 plots the azimuth and elevation outputs during the and the figure shows that the radar boresight was maintained

The crew reported an FDI needle fluctuation of ±l ° at ranges beyond 90 nautical miles. The analog angle outputs of the radar are not telemetered_ however_ a detailed examination of the digital angle outputs was performed at a range of approximately 177 nautical miles in an attempt to analyze the phenomenon. Although the data rate is too low (1 sample per 2.4 seconds) to trace out variations occurring at intervals of 4 to 5 seconds_ the fluctuation should have been sampled at or near its maximum excursion several times during the 50 samples examined. The plot in figure 5.1.5-8 shows a peak excursion of approximately 0.20 ° for about l0 percent of the time° The calculated root/mean square (rms) angle noise is 2.08 milliradians or 0.12°_ corresponding to a peak excursion of ±0.36 ° . Because angle noise is inversely proportional to range, the corresponding value at lock-on would have been 0.16 ° rms or 0.48 ° peak. It should be noted that the resolution of the telemetry data is only 0.1 ° . Considering this, it is concluded that the angle tracking noise on the digital output was normal. Because both the digital encoder and analog induction potentiometer are geared to the same shaft, the angle noise present on the digital output should be equal to the analog angle noise. The larger amplitude of ±l ° noted by the pilot may be because of some amplification of the radar system noise by the display circuitry. Because the fluctuation is not present on the digital output_ it is not considered to be an operational problem. Figure 5.1.5-9 shows the analog range and range rate plotted to the same relative scale as that seen by the crew on the instrument panel indicator. The range scale is quasi-logarithmic with three linear scales_ and the range rate scale is equal to the square root of range. The figure indicates that the crew was able to keep the range rate well below the range value_ thereby insuring that a margin of braking acceleration was available. This criterion is established to prevent the possibility of an uncontrolled "fly-by". No evidence of the radar pressure drop_ which occurred on spacecraft 5_ was seen on this mission. Figure 5.1.5-10 contains a history of radar pressure and temperature as a function of time. When the pressure is corrected for the changes in temperature_ an essentially zero leak rate is indicated.

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5-23

5.1.5.1.3 Reentry phase: The IGS operated properly through the retrofire phase. Retrofire velocity was approximately 0.42 percent high as indicated in table 5.1.5-VII. Based on the IVI readings the average pitch angle was 20.5 ° . The footprint shift resulting from retrofire dispersions was 22 nautical miles uprange as shown in figure 5.1.5-11. From retrofire to an altitude of 400 000 feet_ a 0° bank angle trajectory was flown as planned. At 25:56:12.93 g.e.t, the computer commanded a 60° right bank angle which indicates proper computer logic to the 400 000 foot level. A comparison of IGS position with radar position from 25:37:56 to 25:38:18 g.e.t, is shown in figure 5.1.5-12 and indicates that the spacecraft was navigating approximately 2 nautical miles south of the radar track. As a result of the failure of the onboard tape recorder_ all computer telemetry data were blackout, between 25:38:21 and 25:43:59 g.e.t. lost during

At 25:45:15.30 g.e.t._ the computer properly terminated guidance at a density altitude factor of 4.58 which indicates the proper functioning of the reentry equations at this time in the reentry. Table S.l.5-IX contains a cGmparison of the actual telemetry data with those reconstructed after the flight using the DCS update_ gimbal angles_ spacecraft body rates_ and accelerometer outputs. This table indicates close agreement between the sets of data and demonstrates the proper functioning of the reentry mode of the computer. The IGS computed position at guidance termination (80 000 ft) was 7.3 nautical miles northeast of the planned target as shown in figure 5.1.5-11. The reported recovery pickup point was 14 nautical miles southwest of the planned target. Because no radar data are available below 180 000 feet_ no exact landing point can be fixed by radar tracking data. However_ since 80 percent of the spacecraft's lifting capability is complete by 180 000 feet_ a good estimate can be made of the spacecraft's touchdown area by projecting the radar data from 180 000 feet to touchdown and by taking into account the flight crew's report of their roll attitudes during this period of the reentry. Figure 5.1.5-11 also shows that using radar data obtained at 200 000 feet, the centerline of the footprint had shifted only approxinately 2 nautical miles south of the planned target. At this point the total cross-range capability remaining to the spacecraft was approximately ±12 nautical miles. Therefore_ in order to reach the reported pickup point_ the crew would have had to fly a lift vector consistently to thesouth from about 200 000 feet altitude to drogue d@ployment. However_ the flight crew reported that they flew approximately the same amount of time with the lift vector to the north as to the south and probably to the north first_ such that at 130 000 feet, the lift vector

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UNCLASSIFIED

was returning to full lift and did not return to the south until below 100 000 feet. This indicates that the spacecraft should have been close to the centerline of the footprint and probably north. The insert in figure 5.1.5-11 shows the probable area of landing. At 25:43:59 g.e.t., IGS telemetry again became available after the spacecraft exited from blackout. At 25:45:00 g.e.t, the spacecraft's heading and latitude showed a distinct shift toward the north despite gimbal-angle data which indicate a lift vector to the south. This occurrence late in flight probably did not significantly affect guidance accuracy_ however, with the loss of the onboard recorder and no tracking data below 180 000 feet, it is impossible to obtain an exact comparison. Studies are being conducted to determine the effect of initial platform misalignment, drifts, et cetera, which could give results that have the same characteristics as described above. From the analysis and the data on the figures, a malfunctioning accelerometer appears unlikely. A preliminary hardware test program was conducted and no out-of-specification conditions occurred in the inertial measurement unit. _.i.5.2 Control system evaluation.-

5.1.5.2.1 Attitude control and maneuvering equipment (ACME): The ACMEwas powered-up for approximately 25 hours and performed properly throughout the flight. The separation maneuver (shown in fig. 5.1.5-13) was normal with the maximum transient (2 deg/sec 2) observed about the pitch axis. The control modes using the orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) thrusters were checked immediately after separation and proper responses were noted in each case. A second mode check was made prior to reentry with the reentry control system (RCS) thrusters. Data are not available for this period_ however_ the crew reported proper operation. Both "rate command" and "platform" modes were utilized for translation maneuvers. Satisfactory control was obtained from both modes. Control capability during station keeping was adequate although the crew indicated that a pulse translation control mode would have been useful and desirable. Reentry data became available at 2_:17:25 g.e.t., i minute 27 seconds after retrofire. The control system was in pulse mode from this time until 25:38:21 g.e.t., 7 seconds prior to blackout, at which time the orbit rate command mode was utilized. The control system remained in this mode thereafter. RCS ring-A was used from the time that data became available until power down, with RCS ring-B also being utilized from 25:44:21 g.e.t._ about 14 seconds after maximum g, until power down approximately125 seconds late_ The maximum rates observed prior to drogue deployment (in the data available) were 5 deg/sec in pitch and yaw.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5-25

5.1.5.2.2 Horizon sensor: The horizon sensors were utilized throughout the flight and all except 16 minutes of the time was on the primary unit. No evidence of abnormal operation has been found in the available data. The crew reported instances of loss-of-track during sunrise and sunset periods_ a phenomenum experienced on previous flights. The horizon scan mode was utilized for approximately 5 hours during the sleep period. The data have not been reduced for this period; however, the crew reported that upon awakening, spacecraft attitude was correct in pitch and roll, and within a few degrees in yaw, an axis not controlled by the scanner.

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE

5.i.5-1.- SUNNARY OF GUIDANCE AND CONTROL EVENTS

kDu i DD OA

Ground ela?sed time, sec Planned Actual RGS Oi00 Actual IGS O.O0 Event Lift_off ACME Rate
C oNl_la_Id

Component Computer Ascent IMU Free

status Horizon sensor Radar Off Remarks 13: 37:26.471 G.m. t

0.00

Pr_nary

17- 68

17.66

17. 7_

Start roll program Complete roll

Rate command Rate

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

20.48

20.46

20.59

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

(_
Z 23.04 22.99 23.13

program
Start no. i pitch program 88. 52 88.20 88.06 End no. i pitch Start no. 2 pitch 105.00 105.25 104.98 to 107.50 No. 1 IC_ update

eom_nd
Rate command Rate command Rate command Ascent Free Primary Off (2_ Ascent Free Primary Off "_ Ascent Free Primary Off Ascent Free Primary Off "7 J..

N
p->

>

_#_ "I_ ll0. O0 109.81 109.80 No. 1 gain change

Rate
e oNir_nd

m
i19- 04 145.00 118.83 145-25 118. 75 _143.19 to 145.68 End no. 2 pitch Start no. 3 pitch No. 2 IGS update Rate command Rate command Rate command Rate command Rate command Rate conm_nd then direct Ascent Ascent Free Free Primary Primary Off Off

r'n

i_6.27

157.16

--

BEC0

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

162.56

161.70

162.56

End no. 3 pitch program Guidance initiate SECO

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

168.25

168.21

169.19

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

336.70

338.74

338.74

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

TABLE 5.i.5-1.-- SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE AND CONTROL EVENTS - Continued

Ground elapsed tim% hr:min:sec Planned )0:00:05.56 Actual 00:06:01. O1

Event ACME Separation (spacecraft - GLV Direct then Rate Co_uand

Component Computer Ascent

status Horizon Sensor Primary Radar Off

Remarks

IMU Free

TCA 9 and lO on 05:59 g.e.t. Shaped charge fire 06:01 g.e.t. Select rate command mode 06:02 g.e.t. Start roll to heads-up 06:02 g.e.t. TCA 9 and i0 off 06:13 g.e.t.

00:06:25

Control Mode Check Platform

PuAse Mode Check Platform

Ascent

Free

Primary

Off

C

L.

00:12:00

00:07:25

Prelaunch

SEF

Primary

Off

Pitch error = +0.25 _ Roll error = +0.75 ° Time of alignment = 49:19 g.e.t. Used secondary sensor from 18:09 until 34:12 g.e.t.

C

J..

00:24:40

00:16:00 (approx.)

Sensor check

Horscan

Prelaunch

Orbital Primary rate Secondary

Off

01:20:25

01:25:06

alignmentPlatf°rm (if needed)

Platform

Prelauneh

B_

iPrimary

Off

PitchStill erroraligni_g'= available -o.last340 Roll error = _3.18 ° _V planned = 14.0 fps,

data:

"_ _I 01:34:54 01:54:03 Height adjustment Rate command Catchup Orbital Primary rate Off

_V actual = 13.76 fps _t planned = 24.0 sec,

r_

_r_slation
01:47:51 Platform alignment Platform Prelaunch SEF Primary 0ff

Atactual 24.50sec =
Pitch error = +0.24 ° Roll error = +0.ii ° Time of alignment = 19:09 g.e.t. _V _V _t _t planned = 60.8 fps, actual = 60.84 fps planned = 77 sec, actual = 75.68 sec

D2:18:45

02:18:01

Phase adjust maneuver

Platform

Catchup

Orbital Primary rate

Off

Pitch error = -0.21 ° 32:30.30 02:34:24 Platform alignment Platform Catchup SEF Primary Off Roll error = 0.40 ° Time of alignment = 02:57 g.e.t. k_ I _0

TABLE

5.i._-I.- SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE

AND CONTROL EVENTS - Continued

k_ ! _O CO Remarks

Ground elapsed time, hr:rain: sec Planned Actual

Event ACME

Component Computer

status IMU Horizon Sensor Radar AV AV At At

02:42:07

02:42:08

Plane adjust maneuver

Rate cormnand

Catchup

Orbital Primary rate

Off

planned = 31.7 fps, actual = 51.71 fps planned = 40 sec, actual = 59.30 see

02:50:00

02:46:02

Platform alignment

Platform

Prelaunch

SEF

Primary

Off

Pitch error = -0.56 ° Roll error = -0. ll° Time of alignment = 17:38 g.e.t.

C
Z 03:03:19 03:03:20 Vernier height adjustment Platform Prelaunch Orbital Primary rate Stand by

Avplanned fps, =0.8
AV actual = 0.64 fps At planned = 1.0 sec, At actual = O.80 sec

C
"7

f-03:01:00 03:06:00 Radar on I IIORSCA2_ Prelaui%ch rateOl%italPri_rY iSyand Pitch error = --0.05 ° Roll error = +0.49 ° Time of alignment = 12:31 g.e.t. -_ _11 >

03:28:O0 ._ _1

03: 27:O0

Platform alignment

Platform

Rendezvous

SEF

Primary

On

03:41:01

Platform alignment

Platform

Rendezvous

SEF

Pitch error = +0.02 ° Roll error = +0.03Time of alignment = 9:ll g.e.t. !AV &V At ;At planned = 42.5 fps, actual = 42.42 fps planned = 53 se% actual = 51.35 sec forward 6/60 sec down 2.30 sec right planned = 35.7 fps, actual = 31.54 fps planned = 41 sec, actual = 36.80 sec forward 4.60 sec right 4.0 sec up

D3:47:37

3:47:37

Circularination maneuver

Platform

Catchup

Orbital Primary rate

On

D5:16:54

05:18:56

130 ° transfer maneuver

Rate command

Rendezvous

Orbital Primary rate

On

AV AV At At

TABLE 5.i.5-I-- SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE

AND CONTROL EVENTS - Continued

Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec Planned Actual Event ACME

Component Computer

status IMU Horizon sensor Remarks Radar AV actual = 10.88 fps

05:31:31

82 ° correction maneuver

Rate conm_and

Rendezvous

Orbital rate

Primary

On

At actual =

1.6 sec forward 13.4 sec left 18.4 sec up

05:43:34

34° correction maneuver

Rate command

Rendezvous

Orbital rate

Primary

0n

AV actual = 7.21 fps _t actual = 14.90 sec right 5.40 sec up

C
05:50:31 06:00:00 Terminal phase final Station Rate command Platform and pulse Catchup Rendezvous Catchup Orbital rate Orbital rate Orbital rate Primary Off _V planned = 9 fps, _V actual = 9.518 fps At planned = 15 sec_ At actual = 14.2 sec AV planned = 9.0 fps 13:25:52 13:25:52 Separation (posigrade) Platform and pulse Catchup Orbital rate Primary Off _V actual = 9.52 fps At planned = ii see _t actual = 11.40 sec Pitch error = +0.06 ° 24:59:59 iPlatform ialign_nent Platform Prelaunch BEF Primary Off Roll error = +0.19 ° Time of alignment = (Still aligning at end of data, 40 min later) Fo_ard/Aft IVI = 310 aft Right/Left IVI i right Up/Down IVI 116 down _V (actual) = 329.914 fps (tracking data) Primary Pri_Tary On Off AV actual = 40.08 fps At actual = 46.48 sec

C
Z

(approx.) keeping 11:14:39 11:14:31 Separation (retrograde)

(n
i " i_ _11

£n
i'll

_1

25:15:58

!Retrofire

Rate eon_nand

Reentry

Free

Primary

Off

25:36:11

25:36:08

400K

Direct

Reentry

Free

Off

Off I Po kO

(T + 20:13) R
25:38:58 (TR + 23:00 ) Guidance initiate Direct Reentry Free Off Off

k3] TABLE 5.i._-I.- SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE AND CONTROL EVENTS - Concluded O Ground elapsed time_ hr:min: see Planned Actual Drogue parachute deploy Main parachute deploy Touchdown Event ACME Rate command Component Computer Reentry status INU Free Horizon Sensor Off Radar Off Remarks

25:45:29 2_: 4_:_0 (TR + 29:21)

2_:46:29 2_:47:21 (T + 30:21) R

Rate command

Reentry

Free

Off

Off

C

25:51:29

25:51:21

Off

Off

Off

Off

Off

Z

<% +3_:21>

>
_n
"WI rll

>
oo
"11 r11

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 5- 1.5-II. - IVAR COMPARISONS

5-3

Calculated

Telemetry

Velocity

to be applied

at apogee,

Vgp,

ft/sec

. .

-2.70

-2.75

Velocity

to be applied

at perigee,

Vga,

ft/sec

+7.50

+7.41

Radial

velocity,

%,

ft/sec V, ft/sec

............ ........... ............

89.86 25 713.61 +5.78

90.06 25 713.37 +5.69

Inertial

velocity,

IVI fore-aft,

aVxb , ft/sec

IVI right-left, M up-down,

aVyb,

ft/sec

............

20.36 +3.97

-21.59 +3-90

AVzb , ft/sec

.............

Time

to apogee,

TAp , sec

.............

3 014.67

3 014.67

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 5.i.5-111.- ASCENT AND IGS TRACKING ERRORS AT SEC0

k_ h) Recovery program estimates and uncertainties Velocity error, ft/sec X Y Z

Engineering Error source Specification value Error coefficient

estimates

Velocity e_ror_ It/see X Y Z

Error coefficient

Misalignments Azimuth

I00 see -40 4.8 -48 _ 83 -5.7

Xp accelerometer Zp accelerometer 7 Constant drift

toward Y toward X 0.3 deg/hr

-15 +I00

-0.2 12.0 O

"_

x

o.i2

-

N

-i,oi

"_

FTI

X

z
g-sensitive drift 0.5 deglhrlg

-o.5 o

_

-0.7

P11

Z

_-g_opin xis balauoo s a _
Y-gyro spin axis unbalance Z--gyro spin axis unbalance X-gyro input axis unbalance Y-gyro input axis unbalance Z-gyro input axis unbalance Accelerometer X y Z bias 300 plmn

-0.0_
-0.14 -0.35 N

_

0._
I.i

]>

N

4.3 -0.38 ± 0.81 -1.3 -i0.41

-0.Ii

N

-3.8

N -160 _96.6 0.6 2.3

-200 • 665 364 ± 678 3.7 +2.8

P /

\

TABLE

5.1,5-111.- ASCENT AND IGS TRACKING

_0RS

AT SEC0 - Concluded

Engineering Specification value

estimates

Recovery program estimates and uncertainties Velocity error, ft/sec X Y Z

Error

source

Error coefficient

Velocity error, ft/sec X Y Z

Error coefficient

Accelerometer X

scale factor

360 ppm N N

g%

Y

-

-

g%

O
X

z
Timing errors, sec IGS time scale factor 50 ppm Time correlation Total velocity error -

moo
-80 -60 6.7 2.1 -5.1

2.7
-1.2 -62 _ 167 ppm -4.8 -1.O +0.5 9.2 -2.5 0.011 • 0.028 2.3 -3.8 0.6 -7.1 -2.9

O
" Z

"11

-11

U
_11 X _11 L

External

tracker errors Azimuth, radians Elevation, radians Refraction, n units

>

F"
System Range bias, ft P bias, ft Q bias, ft

F" _s_ lOOK _ 1.8 • 6. _ _ _/A _/A

data)

N = negligible N/A = not applicable k.n I k_ k_

TABLE

5. i. 5-IV.- GUIDANCE

ERRORS

AT SEC0
!

Position, X Y

ft Z X

Velocity, Y

ft/sec Z

IMU error Navigation error error

-400 • i00 970 ± 50 570 ± 150

220 • 50 i_ ± 5 235 • 50

-450 ± 50 50 ± !0 -400 ± 30

-i.0 _ 1.5 1.8

!O • 3.0 1.0

-2.5 ± 0.5 .2 -2.3 • 0.5 C_

Total guidance

0.8 ± 1.5 ii. 0 _ 3.0

0
Z TABLE 5. i. 5-V.- PRELIMINARY ORBIT INJECTION PARAMETERS AT SEC0 + 20 SECONDS rT1 Z _.4 Nominal IGS Preliminary best estimate trajectory MISTRAMI00K GE Mod III System Inertial velocity, ft/sec 25 729 25 720 Inertial flight-path angle, deg 0.037 0.015 Inertial (computer X 25 328 25 307 velocity components ft/sec Z -1.98 -227

0
Z

coordinates), Y 4_83 4584

r11 --4

r"

r-

25 718 25 719 25 719

O. 031 0.021 0.029

25 307 25 307 25 307

4573 4581 4578

-225 -225 -225

TABLE 5.i.5-VI. - GEMINI VI-A PLATFORM ALIGNMENT

ACCURACY

Time, g.e.t., hr:min:sec 00:07:25.50 00:56:45.18 01:25:06.58

Mode ACME Pulse_ platform Platform SEF

Pitch error (sensor minus gimbal angle), deg 2.00 .25

Roll error (sensor minus gimbal angle), deg 2.00 .75 .84

Remarks

Start of alignment End of alignment Start of alignment

_alse_ pl_tform

BEF

-2.00

C

01:34:59'33 01: 47:51:23 02:17:00.39 platform SEF

-.34 •27 .24 Pulse_ platform SEF -.lO

-.18 •33 .ll -.33

Still aligning, Aligning,

last available data

data 7

first available

End of alignment Start of alignment

_'_

02:34:24.52

02:37:21-29 02:46:02.84 "_ 03:03:40.32 Pulse, platform SEF

-.21 .66 -.56

-.40 -.43 -.ll

End of alignment Start of alignment End of _lignment "I_

rl_
_3:27:00.15 03:39:31.28 03:41:00.85 03:50:11.24 05:25:31.35 05:29:55.33 23:56:12.04 24:06:20.79 Pulse Unknown Unknown Unknown SEF SEF BEF Platform SEF .24 -.05 -.41 -.05 .42 -.05 -2.O0 .18 .52 .49 1.38 .05 i. 74 -.45 -2.00 -.40 Aligning, first available End of alignment Start of alignment End of alignment Start of alignment End of alignment Start of alignment End of alignment _n
!

data

Platform

SEF

k_

k_ ! TABLE 5.i. 5-VI. - GEMINI VI-A PLATFORM ALIGNMENT ACCURACY - Concluded k_ Oh

Mode Time_ g.e.t._ hr:min:sec Platform

Pitch error (sensor minus gimbal angle), deg

Roll error (sensor minus gimbal angle), deg

Remarks

24:20:34.28 24:22:26.97 24: _i: 13-47 C 24: 59: 59-61

Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown

BEF

-.31 -.08

.22 -.21 .05 •19

Start of alignment Still aligning, Aligning, last a_ailable data dat_ dats

BEF

.14 .06

first available

Still aligning,

last available

t'3

Z >
m

>
m

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 5.i.5-VII. - TRANSLATION M_-NEUVERS

-37

Event

Time_ g.e.t._ hr:min:sec

Components; ft/sec _VX AVy AV Z

Total AV, Planned AV_ Error, ft/sec ft/sec percent

Tailoff GLV separation 0:05:59.2

86.29 9.45 a(9.55)

26.76 2.04

-4.90 -1.82

90.48 9.84 a(9.93 ) 13.76

84.0 i0.0

7.7 1.6

a(2.04) a(-1.82)i -.33 -0.20

Height adjust

1:34:02.5

13.75 a(15.92)

14.0

1.7

a(-.33) a(-o. 20) ia(13.93) -0.37 -0.24 0.05 0.80 -18.09 -9.42 -2.85 24.68 0.09 -31.70 0.14 0.20 0.55 5.08 -5.45 4.20 60.84 31.71 0.64 42.42 31.54 10.88 7.21 40.08 60.8 31.7 0.8 42.5 33.7 NA_ NA 42-3 2.9 .06 .03 20.0 0.19 0.47

Phase adjust Plane adjust Vernier height adjust

2:18:01 2:42:08.2 3:09:20 3:47:37.5 initiate 5:18:56.1 5:51:30.7 5:43:54 5:50:31

60.84 -0.33 0.62 42.41 25.82 -i. 96 -3.78 31.30

Coelliptic Terminal
f

phase

First

correction

Second correction Braking Spacecraft 6 and spacecraft 7 separation Posigrade Retro (Reported M readings) (Based on tracking data)

11:14:31 17:25:52.0 25:15:58

-8.76 9.49

-0.52 -0.28

-0.04 -0.67

9.518 9.52

9.0 9.0

5.8 5.7

310 aft

116 down

i right

391

329

0.61

330

0.30

acalculated using preflight accelerometer bias. All other values calculated updated accelerometer bias. Error in bias insignificant after correction.

using

r

UNCLASSIFIED

5-38
TABLE

UNCLASSIFIED
5. i. 5-VIII.STATIC RENDEZVOUS SIMULATION VELOCITY COMPARISONS WITH

(wt = 130o )

Ground elapsed time, hr: min: sec

Radar range, n. mi.

VT, ft/sec simulated

Data acquisition system (DAS), ft/sec 712 701 672 652 644 622 614 591 581 _ 214 199 181 160 151 136 124 109 96 ....

4: 03:40 4: 05:20 4: 07:00 4: 08:40 4: lO: 20 4: 12:O0 4: 13:40 4: 15:20 4: 17:O0 (No data available) 4: 55:20 4: 57:O0 4: _8:40 5: 00:20 5: 02:00 5: 03:40 5: 05:20 5: 07:O0 5: 08:40 _: lO: 20 5: 12:O0 5:13:40 5: 15:20

146.8 144.2 141. 6 139.0 136.4 133.8 131.2 128.6 126.0 66.3 63.8 61. q 58.6 56.1 53.6 51.0 48.6 46.0 43.5 41.1 38.6 36.2

711 709 675 657 642 621 628 593 582 _ 213 200 181 166 151 139 115 i12 96

87

85
77 72 69

78
72 70

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE

5.I.5-IX. - COMPARISON WITH POSTFLIGHT

OF COMPUTER TELEMETRY RECONSTRUCTED

REENTRY PARAMETERS DATA

TELEMETRY

Time = 25:36:10.192 g.e.t. Altitude = 400K ft Parameters Telemetry Time in mode, see ..... Radius vector, ft ...... Velocity, O ft/sec ..... i 453.427 21 307 932 24 389.881 1.422 MAC i 453.427 21 307 633 24 387.7]-I -1.428 IBM i 453.427 21 307 532 24 389. 459 -1.422

Time = 25:45:12.732 g.e.t. Guidance Termination Telemetry 1 995.776 20 979 740 1 971. 031 -31.679 MAC i 995.776 20 979 720 1 573.909 -31.587 0 IBM

7"
"_

Flight-path-angle, deg ............ Spacecraft heading, deg ........... Longitude, Latitude, deg ......

Z
_'11

92.281 260. 593 28.81939 1.069

92. 221 360.443 28.82384 -0.940

92.276 260.544 28.820

76.644 292. 235 23.99 -4.924

76.713 292.235 23.951 -4.500

deg .......

-_

Cross range, n. mi...... Range to target, n. mi. Bank command_ deg ..... Density factor Predicted range Heading altitude ......... half-lift _

"_ #_

1 726.505 -60.0

1 732.492 -60.0 -60.0

6.757 0.0

6.534 0.0 0.0

HA

HA

NA

4.61328

4.61432

.......... to target,

NA

NA

NA

5.970

5.715

deg ...........

93.311

93.249

-

214.517

213.164

I aBecause of data dropout_ program was reinitialized after blackout.

_-4o
NASA-S-6b-74 JAN

CONFIDENTIAL

-6 on T- 7 hr launchdaywinds ,deg 0 20 40 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 Timefrom lift-oft, sec Figure5.I. 5-1. - Launchvehicle--spacecraft steeringerror comparisons. 60

CONFIDENTIAL

"
NASA-S-66-1121 FEB

CONFIDENTIAL

8
6 I

--+---+ -- __i
Down range velocity I

I

I

__

4

_" x

-g

-2

----

-

_--.

-4
-8 -IO I0

_ '
Vertical velocity a o [o _ _'''" _ I O Velocity difference between Nod m tracking and IMU [] _ I Velocity difference between MISTRAM tracking and IMU .... Hand fit values l-

4

.__ N _> >_

-2 -4 -6 -8

to
8 6 4 c __ 0 _.%_

_ _
I ' I I I i I I I Crossrange velocity

i

i
i

[
E

I__ i I t I I I I I -Ii

i

_g
N N

-4 -6 -8
-10

,

I I I
I

I

I I I t I I,
li

_ _ _
,

I I I ! '

O

20

40

611

80

100 120 140 160 180 200 22(1 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 Time from lift-off, sec

Figure 5. i. 5-2. - Comparison of spacecraft IGS and radar tracking velocities.

CONFIDENTIAL

x,.n i z _. Shift of gyro mass unbalance along input axis, deg/hr/g Shift of gyro constant drift, deg/hr Shift of accelerometer scale factor, gig Shift of accelerometer bias, g ' ha

Shift of gyro mass unbalance along spin axis, deg/hr/g

'

=

'

"

"

" =

_

x_"_:

_

_

_ _

'l
1
] , ] I •

I

_

__
m

"T1

=

_
,

_ _

r"

_

-

z

Rendezvous radardigitalrange,ft

8

a

5

--_

D.

Po

,,¢ o, 0

_ o
_ O0

Z
N

_

_

_
I

-n _
o

_

_

-n
_

_o
o

g

_.

_

o_
_ o

___ _a

_
3

d_o_

_

_

k.n I _7

NASA-S-06-227 JAN

4:O",

i0 8 (_ 6 , NO radardataobtained whilealigning platform C

n Z

_

_

_1

::::::::::::::::::::::

i ]

n Z

"!"1

-4 _
16

I (3 Azimuth 0 Elevation : i}i::::ii]:::::: : _:_:::_:f................... ................... _ _: ::[:::: i_:_ -;:s_ l:iii::
i ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

"_ m
1

_8

-lg 3:30

3:40

3:50

4:00

4:10

4:20

4:30 4:40 4:50 Groundelapsed time, hr: min.

5:00

5:10

5:20

5:30

5:40

5:50

Figure5.1.5-7. - Radar zimuthandelevationangles. a

'I

NASA-S-66-218 -2.0

JAN

0 0

-2.5

0

_-0 -0,0_

)_...

o
-3.0 "i >"_''""" "

o_

.-_"d "''_r__

o

_

o'°'_,,o

..
\
N

C 7-3.5
O_ _ > o -4.0

<,.60-0 o

\\ o \\
o o,,

CI

t"3
\ 0 0'_ O_

m

-4.5

q

_'0

2.4

second sample time angle

Data points radar elevation Computed mean value

-5.0

-5.5 3:41:24 :36 :48 3:42:00 :12 :24 :36 Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec :48 3:43:00 :12 3:43:24 v._ 4:--4

Figure 5.1.5-8. - Radar elevation angle versus computed mean value.

NASA-S-66-240 JAN

I Co

3o0xiO 3

200 40C 100

30C

C

30
_

2°°
0 ....... Rangerate 0 "'- ,,.,,

C
_,,

>
O_ Or)
-rl
rrl

-.
_ lO-- __ Ioo
3 --

>
o"\\
®

o
Note:Scales correspond tothoseonthe rangeandrange-rate indicator

O_ (,/,}
o.. o
\ _ \ \ O\ O \ \ ?

_

75

-rl
tll

2-_ 40 0 Calculated rangerate

\

O_ 1_

i0 3020 0 5:05

I 5:10

0

Range I 5:15

I 5:20

I 5:25

I 5:30

I 5:35

I 5:40

I 5:45

70 O_Z_. I I 5:50 5:55

6:00

Ground elapsed time, hr: rain Figure 5.1.5-9. - Analog rangeand rangerate.

NASA-S-66-221 JAN

:::::::!:::

( 8. 0

I

...................................
lie : :i:ii :i

C:

_-

'b" x

_

_

(_

7. 6 ._ 7.4 _ o_
40

_

:i_; ::: :_:_ ::._ "-. :.::: :::ii;: _

Z

22
.... --_ 0 Tern,erature Pressure ,_ _ o : ........ _

.............
',_ :_ i!i_i! ::.: :.::
::::::::::: :

0

0

2

4

6

8

10

12 14 Groundelapsed time, hr

16

18

20

22

24

26 ',,_n i .p',,0

Figure5.1.5-10.- Radar temperature andpressure.

NASA-S-66-245 AN J

23.9

-

I

I I I

I I I I

I I I I

I I I I

I

I I I

I I I I

i k_q O

IGS at drogue deploy.-_. 23.8 _--I IGS tlack--_ _k_ /-- Extrap°lati°n °f radar - IOSat80Kft >_--__ _ x_ p/ datafrom180Kft __ ./ (conterline of footprint)

"_.

I

23.7 __._j__j! ,_ _,, r-r_ _i.._nterline _

FExtrapolationofrada /data from 400Kft

r

of footprint)

_._,_--....___ .___
_

. '-"---...'_-.. large[ _. C
_.._
--Extrapolation of radar_ from 205Kft (centerline of footprint)

C
I! II'' I _1_ I' / _ _ _ _-,#:3 _ m,........--............,..

23.5 -__._ __
__
23.4 - _. ? - " I_. _

1"'_

_'_& _
_ 5.43 n.mLPick up by

o_
_J_ 24

_z_
/

_-

__

/7
_

'--_0 _.g - -_._ -_._ -_._ -,_., -_._
2331' i ' ' ',_,l'_,'i,,llll,,lll,,1 Longitude, deg

% 23 - Footprint retrofire aRer - Footprint before retrofire ----_.,_ 22 -71 Footprint at200, 000ft Spacecraft landing area I -70 I -69 I -68 I -67 Longitude, deg west Figure 5. 1. 5-11. - Touchdown comparisons. I -66 I -65 I -64

NASA-S-66-237 JAN

29

I
i I I I I

i-_-----25:37:56 I

G.e.t.

25:38:18

G0e.t.--'t _

!

_ _

Radartrack IGS track

= _d

i

N

=o
"_ _= _4
°_ o

N
28 I I I I I 12I I 6- n. mi. 0

0
-n --

°

0
_ "11 --

I'1"1

o

_,

i

I

I"1"1

Z
r=-

c_

Oo

, I
i I I I

'

Z
_

27 -92

-91
Longitude, deg west

i -90

-89

Figure 5.1.5-12.

- Comparisonof IGS position track with radar position track at approximately 300,000

feet.

kal I k.n F_

___2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.6 Time Reference System

5-53

The Gemini VI-A time reference system performed satisfactorily during the mission. The electronic timer was 181 milliseconds slow with respect to ground time during the flight. This difference is 2.0 parts per million which is well within the specification of if0 parts per million over a temperature range of 15° to 35 ° C. The electronic timer initiated the automatic retrofire sequence; however, the retrofire time could not be positively established because of the loss of the delayedtime data. The event timer_ the ground-elapsed-time digital clock, and the mechanical G.m.t. clock operated satisfactorily. The flight crew reported that the battery operated G.m.t. clock accumulated an error of 40 seconds during powered flight. The spacecraft contractor has stated that this may happen at any time that the launch vehicle vibrations contain sufficient energy at the resonant frequency of the clock. The clock lost approximately i i/2 seconds during the remainder of the mission. The time correlation buffer operated satisfactorily according to a preliminary examination of the onboard voice tape transcriptions.

f

/--

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_-54

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THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

I_

BIANK

----

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-

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5.1.7 Electrical System

5-55

The electrical system performed nominally throughout the mission. Details of this performance are presented in the following paragraphs. 5.1.7.1 Power system.- Nominal electrical power was supplied throughout the flight. It is estimated that 90 percent of the rated capacity of the main bus adapter batteries was used, but only 14. 3 and 17.1 percent of the reentry and squib batteries, respectively, were used. Postflight inspection revealed two blown fusistors: the equipmentadapter shaped charge (XF-C, 4-5), and the nose-fairing jettison (XF-K, 3-18). These blown fusistors resulted from slag formation in the associated pyrotechnic device. Fusistors have blo_-n in previous Gemini flights and this action is considered normal. 5.1.7.2 Sequential system.- Postflight inspection revealed that one group of a redundant pair of pyrotechnic initiators had not fired: latch release covers i, 2_ and 3, the index bar extend, and the index bar jettison. These functions are initiated by manual depression of the jettison retro-adapter s_itch, if a latching relay has operated at nose-fairing jettison. Postflight inspection has revealed that the nosefairing jettison switch malfunctioned. This switch is so constructed that two pressure-sealed limit switches are mounted side by side in a common housing. Each switch operates one of the two redundant circuits used to jettison the nose fairing and to actuate a latching relay which interlocks this action with the later jettisoning of the docking fittings and docking bar. A single push button normally actuates the two switches simultaneously through a cross head which pushes on two spring-supported levers, in the tests of the spacecraft 6 assembly, the suspected switch of the two actuated at sea level but failed at 5 psia. The differential pressure at altitude increases the actuation force of this ty_e of switch. The combination of limited push-button travel, deflection of the spring-supported lever, and the higher force was sufficient to prevent switch actuation in this particular instance. This type of switch assembly is used in eight places in the spacecraft. Action is being taken to prevent a similar occurrence on subsequent spacecraft. This action includes rigid inspection and tests of spacecraft 8 components and design changes to later units. Major electrical sequential occurrence may be found in table spacecraft 4.2-1. events and the time of their

UNCLASSIFIED

5-56

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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

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5.1.8 The performance ing this mission. 5.1.8.1 Orbital Spacecraft Propulsion System satisfactory

-57

of the propulsion

system was very

dur-

attitude

and maneuver

system.-

5.1.8.1.1 Preflight: Fuel and oxidizer servicing of the orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) was performed 47 and 46 days prior to lift-off_ respectively. Final servicing of the helium source pressurant tank was accomplished 8 days before launch. Table 5.1.8-I compares the planned and actual quantities of pressurant ana propellant. These loadings constitute an available overall system oxidizer-to-fuel mixture ratio of 1.12 by weight. A revised propellant-loading procedure was incorporated permitting a 4.9-pound fuel and a 2.1-pound oxidizer increase over the planned quantities. This was accomplished by filling the tanks to capacity and subsequently withdrawing 13.2 pounds of fuel and 55.5 pounds of oxidizer to provide the proper tank ullages. The static firing of all eight attitude thrust chamber assemblies (TCA's) provided a final end-to-end verification of system operation and the expulsion of gas entrapped in the propellant manifolds. In order to obtain satisfactory visual indications of engine operation_ attitude engines were fired three times for an approximate pulse duration of 0.5 second each time. 5.1.8.1.2 Flight: The flight data presented in table 5.1.8-11, a summary of maneuver engine performance during major orbit changes, show nominal engine performance. The technique employed by the crew to obtain a required velocity change (AV) consisted of a continuous firing until nearly the end of the specified time_ followed by several pulses for final trim-out of velocity residuals. Precise resolution of maneuver engine firing duration including these pulses was not possible because of very noisy data on these channels. During the flight all maneuver engines were fired_ and both modes of operation, continuous and pulse, were used. Regulator performance was nominal and stayed within the 293 to 300 psia range. The computed usable propellant remaining over the duration of the mission is presented in figure 5.1.8-1. Included in the figure are the quantities read by the crew from the onboard propellant quantity indicator (PQI) which have been corrected for mixture ratio variations from the fixed gage reference of 1.06 and the ground computed values using a more precise gaging equation. A comparison of the two sources of propellant quantity data shows a maximum variation of 20 pounds (3 percent), which compares well with the estimated preflight PQI accuracy of ±5 percent and the estimated ±3 percent accuracy of the gaging equation. The
r

UNCLASSIFIED

5-58

UNCLASSIFIED

1.04 mixture ratio determined for the overall mission compares closely with the preflight planned value of 1.00. The total quantity of usable propellant loaded was calculated to be 664 pounds when referenced to the 1.04 mixture ratio. Thus, at the end of the mission the crew had expended 62 percent or 412 pounds of the usable quantity of propellant. Approximately 73 percent of the propellant consumed was expended through the maneuver engines. This corresponds to a total maneuver thrust time of about 920 seconds which indicates a total attitude thrust time of approximately 1300 seconds. 5.1.8.2 Reentry control system.-

5.1.8.2.1 Preflight: Fuel loadings of the A-ring and B-ring of the reentry control system (RCS) were completed 47 days prior to liftoff. The oxidizer was serviced in each of the two rings 46 days before lift-off. The nitrogen source pressurant tanks of both rings were pressurized 46 days before launch. Planned loadings are compared with actual quantities in table 5.1.8-1. 5.1.8.2.2 Flight performance: RCS heater circuit energization occurred at 5 hours 49 minutes g.e.t, after one of the heater lights came on. The heaters were energized essentially throughout the remainder of the mission. RCS A-ring and B-ring measured temperatures were nominal during the orbital and reentry phases of the mission as shown in the following table:

Orbit Minimum Maximum

Reentry Minimum Maximum

A-ring

source

pressurant °F •

tank 73 88 37 66

temperat1_e,

A-ring oxidizer feed line temperature, °F ..... B-ring source pressurant °F ..... tank

67

78

66

87

temperature,

67

81

25

71

Rapid expansion of the nitrogen source pressurant gases during reentry_ reflecting a high rate of RCS usage_ cooled the pressurant tanks to the minimum values noted.

UNCLASSIFIED

--

UNCLASSIFIED

-59

After system activation (between 24 hours 13 minutes and 24 hours and 17 minutes g.e.t.), regulated pressure of the A-ring and B-ring stabilized at 302 and 300 psia, respectively. Pressure v_riations throughout the reentry phase were within nominal limits. Leakage of the nitrogen pressurizatio n gas was below measurable limits. No system data were available at system activation because of the delayed-time telemetry tape recorder failure. Hence, corrections to the propellant quantity computations which use system data immediately after activation were not possible. This decreased the accuracy of the propellant consumption computations, and in addition, prevented an analysis of spacecraft rate data during system checkout. However, the crew reported that they experienced no difficulty with any engines during the checkout_ and the available rate data during reentry showed no apparent problems. Single-ring reentry (A-ring) was used after completion of retrorocket firing and until expenditure of A-ring propellant was indicated by loss of control authority during roll near peak deceleration. At this time the B-ring was switched on and used until depletion of propellant during rate stabilization on the drogue parachute. Postflight deservicing revealed that essentially no propellant remained in either ring. The consumption of the entire RCS propellant load is attributed to the tight control dead-band of the orbit rate command mode which was used during the intervals of greatest demand on the RCS. The engines were fired in the pulse mode after retrofire until 25:38:21 g.e.t., then orbit rate command was used. 5.1.8.2.3 Postflight: The systems are receiving extensive testing for possible reuse on the Augmented Target Docking Adapter. No anomalies have been reported to date. 5.1.8.3 Retrograde rocket system.- According to available information, the retrorocket firing was initiated at 25:15:58 g.e.t. The performance of the system was nominal as indicated in table 5.1.8-111. The crew reported an appreciable time delay between each rocket firing. This can be analyzed by considering the tolerances on the time-delay relay and on the motor's web burn time. The latter corresponds to the time during motor burning when final thrust decay begins and would be noticed by the crew. The web burn time_ a function of propellant grain temperature_ decreased with higher retrorocket temperatures experienced on shorter duration missions. The net effect of these variances is shown in figure 5.1.8-2. Because retrorocket temperature data were not obtained on Gemini VI-A_ data from Gemini VII were used to obtain a value of 52o F for the motor temperature of Gemini VI-A at ignition. Figure 5.1.8-2 shows a possible time delay between rocket firings as long as 0.8 second at this temperature.

UNCLASSIFIED

kT]

TABLE

5. i.8. I. - OAMS AND RCS SERVICING

DATA

O_ O

System

Pressurant at reference temperature of 70° F_ psia Preactivation Postactivation

Propellant temperature Oxidizer

at reference of 70° F_ lb Fuel

Propellant quantity indicator_ percent

0AMS

C

Planned Actual

2706 2764

2700 2710

Maximum possible 381.2

Maximum possible 331.8

93 93.5

C Z r--

r--

Rcs
A-ring "T1 r_1 Planned Actual 3015 3040 2785 (a) 20.2 20.2 15.8 15.8 "11 Frl

B-ring Planned Actual 3015 2040 2785 (a) 20.2 20.2 15.8 15.8 -

aNo data due to loss of delayed-time

telemetry

TABLE 5.1.8-11.-

OAMS MANEUVER

TRANSLATION

PERFORMANCE

SUMMARY

Maneuver

Ground elapsed time, hr:mim:sec

Thrust chamber assembly number

Maneuver Planned

time_ see Actual

Velocity Planned

changes_

ft/sec

Actual

(a)
Separation Height C (_ F" adjust 00:05:59.2 01:34:02.} 02:18:01 02:42:08.0 9,10 11,12 9,10 9,10 12 24.0 77.0 40 13.4 24. 5 75.7 39.3 i0.0 14.0 60.8 31.7 9.84 13.76 60.84 31.71 FHeight adjust 03:03:20 03:47:37.5 05:18:56 9,10 9,10 9,10,11,12,13,15 i 53 48 0.8 56.7 54.9 0.8 42.5 33-7 0.64

Phase adjust Plane change

Z
om

om
(2_ --11 I'I'I Coelliptical Terminal initiate phase 42.42 31.54

-11 I'_

First correction wt = 82° Second correction wt = 34° Braking Separation maneuver

05:31:30.7

9,10,14,15

-

33.4

-

10.88

05:43:34

13,15

20.0

_

7.21

05:50:31 11:14:31

11,12,13,14,16 11,12

70 15

b122.3 14.2

42.3 9.0

40.08 9.518

Posigrade maneuver

13:25:52

9,10

ii

11.4

9.0

9.52
I Oh

aReal-time bTotal

planning time from start of breaking maneuver to completion of rendezvous

thrust

-62
Table 5.1.8-I!I.-

UNCLASSIFIED
RETROGRADE ROCKET SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

Parameter

Predicted

Actual

Deviation_ percent

AV_ ft/sec

. . .

Aft

.......

308

310

+0.6

Right

.....

000

001

--

Down

........

i17

i!6

-0.8

Total _V,

ft/sec

. . .

a329. 5

b331. 0

+0.4

-

Vehicle

pre-retrofire ib ..... 5475.3 5477.D +0.04

weight,

aMotor

performance

is based

on specification

values.

bMagnitude should ture_ have been

of IVI vector realized

readout

by crew.

A value test

of 330.2 flight

ft/sec tempera-

based

on retrorocket and spacecraft

data,

installation

cant angle_

estimated

weight

at the time above the

of retrofire. nominal

This value

represents below

a 0.21-percent

deviation

and 0.21 percent

the actual.

UNCLASSIFIED

ii0 i00

8O C _
D-

70

C

Z >
co O_
-rl I"1-1

Z
6o ( N

_

_
_ _
.o

50
40
3o
0 20 -10 --

_
"6"" b_'c
Correctedpropellant quantity indicator readings Groundcomputedvalues

> Go
r_ C_
-rl I-!1

o
0

2

4

1

6

8

I0

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

Groundelapsed time, hr

k_ !

Figure 5.1.8-1. - OAMS propellant consumption,

o_

_-_

UNCLASSIFIED

O O,J

!
J

0J O LL o

-_

-o

=

.o o
O rv"

_ o
.o
rv"

LL

N
I I I I I I

o

_ cxl

Q

.o
,.0 I I (./')

i

oas 'd_paAo uo!l!u61

<

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.9 Pyrotechnics System

5-65

Sequentially, the pyrotechnics system on the Gemini VI-A mission performed all functions required. However_ postflight inspection of the rendezvous and recovery section revealed that seven cartridges failed to fire as follows: (a) (b) (c) One of two docking Three Three bar jettison latch cartridges cartridges cartridges are identi-

of six docking of six docking

release

door cable

cutter

The part numbers and serial numbers of each of the cartridges fied in the postflight section of this report.

All of the above-mentioned cartridges are normally ignited at retrograde section separation. However_ electrical interlock circuitry exists in the fairing jettison circuit_ and investigation revealed that one of the redundant latching relays in this circuitry had not actuated. Thus_ those cartridges in one circuit did not receive a firing impulse at retrograde section jettison. The other circuit was fully operative, and the redundant cartridges satisfactorily accomplished the functions of jettisoning the docking bar_ releasing the docking latehes_ and releasing the docking doors. During failure analysis_ the fairing jettison switch_ was found to be intermittent at i0 psia and open at 5 psia_ thus showing a tendency to be pressure sensitive. For additional details see section 5.1.7. One of the tips of the flex line was found to be broken when removed from the breech assembly of the command pilot's hatch actuator. This condition was similar to previously reported broken tips on the MDF lines in the ejection seat backboard/egress kit jettison system. The anomaly has been investigated and is not considered detrimental in that tips which are properly installed would still be in a position to operate even though broken. Postflight inspection of pyroswitch G_ the pyroswitch which opens all circuits in the wire bundle from the spacecraft to the launch vehicle subsequent to separation_ indicated a closed circuit. Investigation of this anomaly is being conducted. Preliminary information indicates that a glass seal was broken as a result of excessive piston travel permitting adjacent wires to touch_ thus giving the closed circuit indications. The condition of the ZI3 launch vehicle/spacecraft separation plane on the Gemini VI-A spacecraft was similar to that of the Gemini VII i that is_ portions of the flexible linear shaped charge holders and the blast

UNCLASSIFIED

5-66

UNCLASSIFIED
of this of this is

absorber were trailing the spacecraft in orbit. A discussion contained in the Gemini VII mission report. An investigation matter has been initiated.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.10 Crew Station Furnishings and Equipment

-67

5.1.10.1 Crew station design and layout.- The basic design of the crew station was satisfactory for the Gemini VI-A mission. No major difficulties were encountered in the crew station; however, there were a few minor anomalies which are discussed in the following paragraphs. 5.1.10.1.1 Equipment stowage: By comparison with the previous two missions, there was a relatively small amount of equipment to be stowed for this mission. There were no difficulties of any significance in equipment handling or stowage. The crew reported a substantial amount of lint and dust escaping from the various stowage pouches when they were opened in orbit. Action has been initiated to vacuum the insides and outsides of all stowage pouches before they are packed for flight. The crew opened the center line stowage frame door soon after insertion into orbit. When this door was opened, the lower shelf of the frame deflected downward approximately 3/4 inch. The crew had great difficulty lifting the lower shelf enough to close the stowage door for the reentry phase. Postflight inspection showed no discrepancy in the installation. Because of similar difficulties encountered in spacecraft 7 and the spacecraft 8 altitude chamber test, the deflection of the lower shelf was attributed to structural deflection of the large pressure bulkhead when subjected to the normal cabin differential pressure. Corrective action for subsequent spacecraft is described in section 5.1.1 of reference 7 and 5.1.i of this report. 5.1.10.1.2 Habitability: The only habitability problem encountered in this mission was that the crew was uncomfortably warm for the first 17 to 18 hours after lift-off. This condition was related to suit inlet temperatures of up to 70° F during the first part of the mission, and is discussed in section 5.1.4. No difficulty was noted in sleeping on this mission, although the crew slept only a few hours because of mission activities. 5.1.10.1.3 Crew station furnishings: The command pilot cracked the visor of his pressure suit helmet at the time of release from the parachute single-point suspension to the two-point suspension just before landing. He reported having his left arm in front of his head to avoid hitting the window frame but indicated that his helmet visor probably hit his wrist ring at single-point release. The pilot had no damage to his helmet. The electrical connector on the cable from the left seat to the command pilot's suit failed to lock at the time of crew ingress prior to launch. The ground crew and the flight crew elected to launch in this condition because communications and bioinstrumentation were not affected. The connector came loose momentarily in flight but was replaced immediately by the command pilot without further incident. This

f

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>68

UNCLASSIFIED

connector had been replaced three days before launch because of a similar problem; however, the replacement connector had not been fit checked with the command pilot's bioinstrtumentation harness after the rework. Steps have been initiated to insture that a fit check with the flight crew's flight hardware will be made if the connectors on the cables from the seat to the suit are changed. Also a search has been started to find replacement connectors which will be more suitable. 5.1.10.1.4 Cabin lighting: The cabin lighting was adequate for the mission except for the center instrument panel. As reported by previous flight crews, the lighting for this panel was poor for dark side operation. In order to illuminate this panel adequately, it was necessary to turn the center cabin light so bright that it interfered with visibility outside the spacecraft. This problem was particularly noticeable because of the need for frequent reference to the digital clock on the center panel. The clock displayed mission elapsed time which was the primary time reference for the mission. Action has been initiated to provide additional lighting for the digital clock on future spacecraft. The docking light illuminated the docking bar, and du_ing dark side operation the reflection from the bright metal bar was objectionable to the crew. This bright reflection interfered with their dark adaptation. Review of this condition after t_he flight led to the decision not to paint the docking bar to change its reflective characteristics. Dark adaptation will not be required when the docking light is in use on future missions, and therefore, no action is required. The COMPUTE light on the center pedestal was covered with a polaroid dimmer cover. This dimming feat_re adequately corrected the problem reported in the Gemini V mission concerning the inability to dim or estinguish this warning light. Overheating of the cabin lights, reported after the Gemini V mission, was not a problem in this mission. The modified light fixtures with improved heat conduction characteristics were satisfactory. 5.1.10.2 5.1.10.2.1 Controls and displays.The basic attitude and maneuver controls were

--

Controls:

satisfactory for the rendezvous mission. The command pilot expressed concern over the proximity of the landing attitude switch to the parachute jettison switch on the center pedestal. The location of these two switches had not been adversely reported by any other crews. The need for an added guard on the parachute jettison switch in future spacecraft was reviewed but the decision reached was to retain the present design. 5.1.10.2.2 Displays: The flight crew described the displays as excellent for the rendezvous mission in all respects except for the markings on the attitude indicator. The lack of any pitch markings on the

UNCLASSIFIED

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5-69

altitude ball at pitch angles between 60 ° and 9_ was described as a serious deficiency for the back-up rendezvous procedures with a failed radar. Without these pitch markings it is impossible to determine the target elevation accurately during the final i0 miles of a nominal rendezvous approach. The crew also rgported that they could control the attitude of the spacecraft to ±i.0 in plteh, although the attmtude sphere is only marked every i0 ° . For future spacecraft the attitude indicators will be marked with i° pitch markings from 0° to ±60 ° and 5° pitch markings from ±60 ° to &9 O° . The digital clock was used for the first time in both spacecraft and 7. The flight crew reported that the onboard display of ground elapsed time was a major improvement in Gemini time displays. The correct action of the crew during the Gemini on December 12, 1965_ _as indicative of the adequacy the launch vehicle malfunction detection system. The rectly determined that the launch vehicle engines had lift-off on the basis of the following indications: (a) came back f (b) (c) One Engine on. The second I thrust chamber pressure light 6

VI-A launch attempt of the displays for command pilot corshut down prior to

flickered

off, then

Engine

I light

remained

on. early. were indicating

The event timer

started

2 to 3 seconds

(d) The rate needles zero rates. (e) lift-off. The flight crew

on the attitude

indicator

communicator

in the block

house

did not call

The crew was able to use the displayed information to analyze an unprecedented situation quickly and to arrive at the correct course of action under time-critical conditions. 5.1.10.9 Pressure suit and accessories.The pressure suits were satisfactory for the mission. The crew experienced some discomfort because of minor pressure points which developed on their backs while they waited in the lift-off position for approximately 90 minutes. The pilot spent much of the first six hours of the mission writing data in the rendezvous data book. Subsequently, he complained of a raw place on his forehead where he was pushing against his pressure suit helmet. He also had a backache later in the mission. In the absence of gravity to help lower the head, extra effort is required to bend the body. In this mission the pilot had a potential pressure point in the

....

UNCLASSIFIED

-zo

UNCLASSIFIED

helmet against which he had to push when he bent over. The muscular effort to overcome the pressure suit restriction as well as to substitute for gravity to bend the body would explain the backache. 5.1.10.4 Fli_ht crew o_erational equipment.-

5.1.10.4.1 Still camera (70-nm_): The 70-mm still camera with an 80-mm focal length lens and four 70-mm film magazines with color film was used successfully to take a large number of excellent photographs. By use of a light meter with a very limited field of view, the crew was able to obtain the correct lens settings for numerous high-quality photographs of spacecraft 7. 5.1.10.4.2 Sequence camera (16-mm): A new 16-mm sequence camera was used for the first time on this mission. The quality of the sequence shots, particularly those of spacecraft 7_ were excellent. This camera failed after _ of the i0 film magazines had been used during the mis-

sion. The cause of the failure was a jam or near-jam in the magazine which caused an overload current to burn out the motor. A detailed failure analysis of the camera and the magazine is being performed by the camera manufacturer. The proper value circuit breaker will be placed in series with this camera to prevent a jammed magazine from burning out the motor on subsequent missions. 5.1.10.4. 3 Optical sight: The optical sight operated satisfacto-

rily throughout the flightj however, the command pilot reported that the bore sight shifted up to 2- depending on the tightness of the mounting screw. Postflight investigation has not revealed the cause of the anomaly. A check of the spacecraft 6 sight and a similar sight at the contractor's plant revealed no basic design discrepancy. Future sights will be checked to insure that no mounting or misalignment error exists when the sight is mounted in the spacecraft. 5.1.10.4.4 D-8 Radiation sensor failure: The portable radiation sensor for the D-8 experiment came loose from its mount when the spacecraft was released from single-point to two-point parachute suspension. Postflight examination of the sensor mounting indicated no defect in the bayonet-type joint used to hold the sensor in its holder. During the flight crew debriefing it was established that the pilot may not have installed and locked the sensor properly in its holder prior to reentry. 5.1.10.5 Fli_ht crew personal equipment.-

5.1.10.5.1 Food: A total of 12 man-meals were provided for use by the Gemini VI-A crew. These meals included rehydratable and bite-size foods similar to those utilized in all previous missions. Because of the extremely heavy work load required for rendezvous and station

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
keeping, the flight crew ate only partial meals at approximately and 7:30 g.e.t. At approximately 12:30 g.e.t., each crew member sumed a normal meal utilizing rehydratables as well as bite-size No problems with rehydration or eating were experienced by the Gemini VI-A flight crew.

-71
3:30 conitems.

Water metering device: A water dispenser which provided the capability for metering water intake was installed on spacecraft 6. This pistol-configured device was utilized for drinking and food rehydration. Operation of this device was satisfactory throughout the flight with no problems noted. 5.1.10.5.3 launch day urine collection device (UCD): Neither pilot removed his UCD until late in the first day (approximately 12:00 g.e.t.). The pilot had not used his UCD during this 12-hour period, because it had come loose during the seventh or eight hour of flight. 5.1.10.5.4 Urine disposal system: The crew reported that excessive force was required to mate the quick disconnect coupler on the urine hose to the spacecraft quick disconnect nipple. As described by the flight crew, an estimated force of 30 to 70 pounds was required to make the connection. It was noted that quick-disconnect mating in the Gemini mission simulator was somewhat easier _han that in spacecraft 6. The spacecraft contractor has initiated a review of the present urine system quick disconnects to determine the necessary corrective action. It was further noted by the flight crew that some urine tended to remain in the urine system receiver area; however, this was absorbed by use of the personal hygiene towels onboard the spacecraft. There was no mention of free urine in the cabin area at any time. 5.1.10.5.5 Personal hygiene: Wet pads provided with each food pack were utilized infrequently by both crew members. The large personal hygiene towels and the tissues were utilized more often with no apparent problems. None of the oral hygiene items (gum, toothbrush) were utilized during the flight. 5.1.10.5.6 Humidity sensor: The hand-held humidity sensor was utilized for one complete cabin survey at approximately 19:25 g.e.t. Temperatures derived from this survey indicated that the cabin atmosphere was a nominal 80 ° F, wall temperatures were 76o F, and cabin relative ht_niditywas approximately 71 percent. Postflight calibration check of of this unit indicated that both dry and wet bulb temperature readings were within 2° of actual. See section 5.1.4 for additional details on this subject. 5.1.10.5.7 Miscellaneous: kits_ Additional items carried on spacecraft water bags, and 6

f

such as the survival

CO2 tapes,

auxiliary

drinking

UNCLASSIFIED

5-72

UNCLASSIFIED

defecation devices, were not utilized by the flight crew because they were not needed. The small pen lights were utilized frequently by both crewmen, particularly to check camera magazine footage and for reading instrument panel gages during the sleep period. Operation of the units was satisfactory throughout the flight. _.i.i0.6 Bioinstrumentation.Both pilots wore the standard bioinstrumentation which functioned normally throughout the mission except for the pilot's oral temperature probe. This probe was inoperative prior to crew ingress, however, the problem was discovered after the crew had completed suiting and there was insufficient time for repair. After the mission_ no discrepancy was found in any of the pressure suit leads and the failure was attributed to a loose connection inside the helmet. During the mission the pilot was able to obtain oral temperature readings with the probe on the light-weight headset. Both crewmen attempted to take blood pressure readings after landing; however, the reading on the command pilot was not obtained because of failure of the left hand biomedical tape recorder. Postflight investigation revealed that the recorder tape had come off the reel during the launch phase, thereby stopping the recorder. The cause of this failure is being investigated.

UNCLASSIFIED

J

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.11 landing System

5-73

The parachute landing system of providing a safe water landing

satisfactorily for the Gemini

performed its function VI-A crew. When com-

manded, all systems events occurred within established tolerances. Figure 5.1.11-1 illustrates the occurrence of the major sequences as related to altitude and ground elapsed time. By comparison, the oscillations of the Gemini VI-A spacecraft during the drogue descent were of higher amplitude than those of the Gemini VII spacecraft, although the Gemini VI-A remained well within the 124 ° performance requirement of the drogue parachute. The greater amplitude of spacecraft 6 could be attributed to a cross-coupling between the drogue parachute damping force and the reentry control system (RCS). (Such a condition could not exist on spacecraft 7 because the RCS propellants on that spacecraft were expended prior to drogue deployment.) A study to determine the magnitude of the cross-coupling, if it exists, has been requested of the contractor. During the repositioning maneuver to the landing attitude, the command pilot's faceplate was cracked when there was contact with the pressure suit wrist ring. The relatively poor positioning of the head with respect to the wrist ring was attributed to a last-second check by the command pilot to be certain that he was actuating the landing-attitude switch and not the parachute-jettison switch. The drogue, pilot, and main parachutes were recovered. This was the first mission in which the drogue parachute was recovered and the second time the pilot parachute has been recovered. All three parachutes were damage-charted and found to be in excellent condition. There were no apparent deleterious effects resulting from exposure to orbital flight conditions. It is planned to conduct laboratory tests of the parachute materials to confirm these conclusions.

f

UNCLASSIFIED

-74
NASA-S-66-205 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED

• Actual times [] Nominal times shown

55XI03 50

_

because of data loss

parachute deploy

40

@

_:

25 20

_

\_R

"R section separation ___ _d: z_?!: _ parachutedeploy

_

10 15

_ _

_F-/_l_ii'_.'a3_C hute [u' ' ° pen M_!z_pa_chuLe line stretch _? _ Touchdown

0 25:45 25:46 25:47 25:48

I

I 25:49

I

_ 25:50

I 25:51

-,

Ground elapsed time, hr:min

Figure 5.1.11-1.

- Landing system performance.

UNCLASSIFIED

-

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12 Postlanding

Proper deployment of the ultrahigh frequency (UNF) descent and recovery antennas following repositioning of the spacecraft was indicated by communications between the crew and recovery forces prior to spacecraft landing. The sea dye marker was automatically dispensed upon landing and could be seen easily by the recovery forces. The recovery flashing light and recovery hoist loop extended as the main parachute was jettisoned after touchdown. Satisfactory deployment of all recovery aids is evidenced in many recovery photographs. In particular, the HI _ antenna was photographed in both the extended and retracted positions. The operation and effectiveness of these aids are covered in the section on communications and recovery operations of this report.

-

UNCLASSIFIED

5-76

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED

-_.2

UNCLASSIFIED
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE

-77

The Gemini launch vehicle (GLV) was automatically shut down on the launch attempt of December 12, 1965, by the Master Operations Control Set as a result of a premature separation of an electrical umbilical. During the recycle operations for the actual launch of Gemini VI-A, examination of the data showed another anomaly, the drop-off of thrust chamber pressure on the number 2 engine subassembly prior to the shutdown signal. It was hypothesized that this could have been caused by a blocked propellant line to the gas generator. Disassembly and inspection of the gas generator revealed that a plastic dust cover had been inadvertently left in the oxidizer inlet port. This cover caused oxidizer blockage to the gas generator. After correction of these two anomalies, the launch of Gemini VI-A occurred 3 days later on December 15, with no problems. All GLV systems performed satisfactorily_ and a satisfacotry orbital insertion of the spacecraft was achieved.

5.2.1

Airframe

Flight loads on the launch vehicle were well within its capability. Vibration and acceleration environment was less than on previous flights, particularly longitudinal oscillations, the magnitude of which was the lowest experienced to date. 5.2.1.1 Longitudinal oscillation (POG0).- Filtered telemetry data show that the maximum longitudinal oscillaticn at the spacecraft-launch vehicle interface occurred at L0 + 146.8 seconds and again at IX) + 153.9 seconds. The amplitude of these oscillations was ±0.115g with corresponding response frequencies of 13.7 cps and 16.8 cps, respectively, lasting approximately i to 2 seconds in each instance. This is the lowest POG0 level to date and compares with the previous low of _0.125g on Gemini III and Gemini VII. 5.2.1.2 Structural loads.Calculated loads on the launch vehicle

for the Gemini VI-A flight are shown in the following table. These data indicate that critical loading occurred at station 320 during the preBECO region of flight and reached a value of 83 percent of design ultimate load (IXIL).

-

UNCLASSIFIED

-78
Launch-vehicle station, in. Load, ib

UNCLASSIFIED
Maximtnm qa Design ultimate, percent 25 40 61 72 Load, ib 66 845 287 090 461 375 451 935 Pre-BECO Design ultimate, percent 67 83 64 67

276 320 935 1188

25 250 138 390 439 260 486 410

A comparison of Gemini shown in the following

VI-A flight table.

loads with

previous

flight

loads are

Launch vehicle load, percent of design ultimate Flight Station 935 Station

load 320

(max
Gemini Gemini Gemini Gemini Gemini Gemini Gemini I II III IV V VII VI-A 66 64 63 68 59 58 61

(pre-BECO)
76 80 78 81 79 79 83

Lateral oscillations associated with the third structural mode of the launch vehicle were approximately three times greater than those experienced on any previous flight. The cause of this high level of oscillation may have been due to modal cross-coupling of the 16.7 cps lateral vibration and the inherent longitudinal oscillations (16.8 cps) occurring 3 seconds prior to BECO. Analysis of the oscillations indicates that the resultant dynamic load is only 5 percent of the vehicle design ultimate load and consequently is not of great concern. 5.2.1.3 Post-SECO disturbance.There were four indications of postSEC0 disturbances on the low-range axial accelerometer. The times of occurrence and the acceleration levels are shown in the following table. The last of the four was also noted on the actuator and rate gyro traces.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Time, sec Magnitude, 0.02 0.02 0. i0 0. I0 g

-79

SEC0 + 5.1 $EC0 + 6.6 SEC0 + 17.5 SEC0 + 28.0 a

aspacecraft

separation

was at SECO + 22.2 sec.

5.2.2

Propulsion

5.2.2.1 Launch attempt analysis.- Following the launch attempt_ a review of propulsion system performance revealed that all major propulsion system parameters on subassembly 2 were decaying prior to the engine shutdown signal (87FS2). A detailed review of all available data showed that the start transients of both subassemblies were nominal until approximately this time,
f-

1.0 second

after

the engine

ignition

signal

(87FSI).

At

chamber

pressure

(Pc) , fuel and oxidizer speed (Nt) on subassembly

discharge 2 started

pressures to decay,

(Pfd and Pod), and turbine

while the corresponding parameters on subassembly i were still showing normal trends. It was also noted that the slope of the chamber pressure decay on subassembly 2 was not perceptibly affected by the closure of the thrust chamber valves, indicating that the decay resulted from a loss of power or power absorption within the gas generator or turbopump assemblies. Figure 5.2-1 compares the principal subassembly 2 parameters with a normal transition from step pressure to steady state. Also noted in figure 5.2-1 are the engine ignition and shutdown tinles, and the subassembly 2malfunction detection thrust chamber pressure switch (MDTCPS) times of break and_ake. It should be noted that the MDTCPS break occurred before the thrust chamber valve motion could affect chamber pressure, indicating that the switch break was due to the anomalous Pc

decay rather than the engine shutdown transient. No thrust chamber pressure switch actuation signal was received as the subassembly 2 chamber pressure never exceeded the tested actuation pressure. A detailed engine system review for causes indicated three principal possibilities: (a) (b) assembly. Fuel or oxidizer leak most probably or drag within of the loss in thrust

in the bootstrap

system.

Mechanical

failure

the turbine

kit or gearbox

UNCLASSIFIED

5-8o
(c) Contaminated

UNCLASSIFIED
or partially blocked gas generator system.

A careful review of all films of engine compartment showed no fires_ vapor clouds, or spillages that would indicate the presence of a leak_ while a gearbox torque check_ conducted through the turbine_ showed normal torque values. The elimination of the first two possibilities caused the investigation to be concentrated on the gas generator system. The subassembly .2 gas generator system was then disassembled and inspected. During the inspection of the gas generator oxidizer injector/check-valve area_ a plastic dust cover was found partially blocking the oxidizer injector. Figure 5.2-2 is a sketch of the _ist cover in the injector. This dust cover was sufficient to block oxidizer flow to the gas generator. The stage I engine on this vehicle as well as the stage I engines on GLV-5 and GLV-7 were the subjects of an Engineering Test Directive (ETD) that called for inspection of the gas generator oxidizer system for possible contamination by thread lubricants. This ETD was performed at Cape Kennedy on GLV-5 and at the contractor's plant on GLV-6 and GLV-7. It was during the performance of this ETD that the dust cover_ used to protect the gas generator oxidizer injector during check valve cleaning_ was inadvertently left in the system. Dust ca_.- A standard practice instruction and an ETD, "Use and selection of caps_ plugs_ or other protective devices"_ has been issued to all contractor personnel eliminating the use of closures that can be inadvertently left in place during assembly. Further_ an accounting system has been incorporated to record all foreign objects intentionally placed in any system and provide a means to account for the removal of each object. Additional motivation and training of contractor personnel at Saeramento_ Baltimore, and Eastern Test Range was instituted in January 1966 to familiarize personnel with the dust cap incident and related human error problems. Other than the special tests and inspections subassembly 2 anomaly_ only normal work necessary was conducted as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) Drain and water-flush seal cavity torque flush, checks and refill gearbox with lubricating oil ermine drain and purge resulting from the after a launch attempt

Turbopump Gearbox Drain_

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(e) Engine leak checks

-81

Replacements after the launch attempt were limited to the hot gas cooler and superheater_ these parts were replaced because of the special posttest cleaning procedures and not because Of component malfunction. 5.2.2.2 Flight performance.Performance of the propulsion system during flight was satisfactory. A comparison of preflight predicted with postflight reconstructed engine perfor_ance_ shown in tables 5.2-I and 5.2-II_ indicates good agreement between predicted and actual performance. 5.2.2.2.1 Stage I performance: Start transients of both subassemblies displayed no anomalies and were in the range of OLV and Titan II experience. Engine performance during steady-state thrust was normal and close to predicted as shown in table 5.2-1. Engine shutdown was initiated by oxidizer exhaustion with approximately 866 pounds of usable fuel remaining. 5.2.2.2.2 Stage II performance: Performance of the stage II propulsion system was close to that predicted. No anomalies were noted during ignition_ steady-state thrust_ or shutdown. Shutdown was initiated by radio guidance system command and had a transient total impulse of 35 770 pound-seconds compared to a total impulse of 37 i00 ± 7000 pound-seconds. 5.2.2.3 Propellant loading and autogenous system performance.The following tables provide data on loaded propellant weight and average propellant temperature during flight. Both tables show good agreement between preflight and postflight values.

Propellant

Loading

Component

Stage I loading, ib Requested Actual 90 374 172 789 90 543 172 907

Stage II loading_ Ib Requested Actual 21 992 38 _i 21 993 38 227

Fuel Oxidizer

.....

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Average Propellant Temperature

Stage Component

I temperature s oF Actual

Stage

II temperature s oF Actual

Predicted

Predicted

Fuel Oxidizer

40.1 41.1

41.1 42.0

38.5 43. 3

41.8 44.1

5.2.2.4 Performance margin.- Real-time calculations performed during the countdown predicted that the vehicle - 3o payload capability would exceed the spacecraft weight by 275 pounds. Postflight reconstructed vehicle performance showed that the payload capability achieved was 8642 pounds which is 66 pounds less than the preflight predicted nominal capability of 8708 pounds.

5.2.3

Flight

Control

_

During the Gemini VI-A launch attempt_ a premature release of one electrical umbilical connector at 1.079 seconds after ignition (T-0 + 1.079 sec) led to an automatic shutdown. The flight-controls programmer normally receives a start signal at release of either of two lift-off connectors which de-energizes two initiate relays. The Flight Control System Test Set monitors four programmer-reSet-monitor outputs and combines them into one hold-fire/shut-down circuit in the Master Operation Control Set (MOCS). The programmer includes a series of single-shot multivibrator circuits which must be in the "reset" position until shutdown lockout occurs. The triggering of any of these multivibrator circuits will send a signal to the flight control system test set indicating a not-reset condition. The premature release of the liftoff connector started the programmer which triggered a not-reset signal to the MOCS_ automatically shutting the engine down. Further details are included in section _.2.6. A thorough review of all flight-control data taken during this launch-attempt countdown_ ignition_ and ensuing shutdown revealed normal responses to all events and the system was declared ready for a second attempt. The analysis of the Gemini VI-A flight-control performance shows satisfactory primary and secondary system operation from lift-off to spacecraft separation. The flight was accomplished with primary guidance_ however_ the spacecraft inertial guidance compared favorably with

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5-83

the primary launch vehicle guidance during both stage I and stage II and switchover could have been successfully accomplished at any time during powered flight. 5.2.3.1 Stage I.- Ignition and lift-off transients were normal. The peak actuator travel and rate gyro disturbances recorded during the ignition and holddown period are listed in table 5.2-111. The combination of thrust misa!igmment and engine misalignment at full thrust initiated a small roll transient at lift-off. The flight control system responded satisfactorily to correct the roll transient_ limiting the roll rate to a maximum of 1.8 deg/sec clockwise at 0.14 second after lift-off. The roll and pitch programs were performed as planned and were nominal in rate and duration. Stage I flight experienced the normal aerodynamic disturbances. The flight control system responded satisfactorily to these disturbances and to the roll and pitch programs. The dispersions during stage I between the primary and secondary guidance steering commands are discussed in section 5.1-5. The magnitudes of these dispersions were well within the primary flight control system accuracies. 5.2.3.2 Stage II separation.Separation at staging was accomplished satisfactorily. Thrust vector control was attained as soon as the stage II hydraulic system pressurized. The maximum attitude errors recorded during staging were as follows:

.

Axis Pitch Yaw

Attitude

errors_

deg

Time from

lift-off_

sec

- 0.21 + 2.76

158.5 159.7

Roll
The maximum

- 1.57
vehicle rates recorded were

158.4
as follows:

Axis Pitch

Rates_

deg/sec

Time

from lift-off_ 157.9 157.91 158.76 157.89 158.67 157.90

sec

+ 2.36 - 2.25 + 2.62 1.52 + 0.70 - 3.67

Yaw

Roll

UNCLASSIFIED

-84

CONFIDENTIAL

5.2.3.3 Response to radio guidance commands.- Radio guidance was initiated at L0 + 161.64 seconds. Response to the first pitch command was at L0 + 168.33 seconds and consisted of a small pitch com_nd followed by 0.55 deg/sec pitch down for 1.05 second. After the first 24.2 seconds of pitch guidance, the subsequent pitch commands were less than 0.25 deg/sec. The response to the first yaw command was at 169.23 seconds and consisted of a yaw right command of 0.25 deg/sec. After the first 31.5 seconds of yaw guidance, the yaw commands transmitted were less than 0.06 deg/sec. The rate gyro signals substantiated the correct response to the guidance commands. 5.2.3.4 Post-SECO and separation phase.- Vehicle rates between SEC0 and separation were normal. The maximum rates for the period between SEC0 and separation are listed in table 5.2-IV. Successful spacecraft separation was accomplished at SEC0 + 22.27 seconds.

5.2.4

Hydraulic

System

Performance of the hydraulic system was satisfactory. Prior to lift-off, an apparent anomaly occurred in the hydraulic system, but the situation was correctly diagnosed and the launch proceeded on schedule. The anomaly was a false indication from the actuator position transducer that the no. 4 pitch, stage I (41) actuator had drifted to +i.0 °

20.8 seconds before lift-off. However, the holdfire circuit which monitors the actuator position switch to within ±0.25 ° did not indicate an off-null condition. Also, the shutdown circuit which monitors both position transducer and position switches in series did not receive an off-null indication. The launch personnel assessed the indications and were certain that the actuator was operating normally and proceeded with the launch.

Preliminary investigation indicates a failure position transducer and further investigation will the specific mode of failure.

of the 41 actuator attempt to determine

5.2.5

@_idance

System

Performance of the stage I and stage II guidance systems was satisfactory throughout powered flight and resulted in placing the spacecraft 6 in an acceptable orbit for rendezvous with spacecraft 7. 5.2._.i Programed guidance.- The programed guidance acceptable limits, as shown in table 5.2-V. As discussed was within in section

4,

CONFIDENTIAL

/

CONFIDENTIAL

5-82

a nominal trajectory was flown. The errors at BEC0 were 26 ft/sec low in velocity, 3299.0 feet low in altitude, and 0.39 ° low in flight-path angle. 5.2.5.2 Radio guidance.- The guidance system acquired the pulse beacon of the launch vehicle, tracked in the monopulse automatic mode, and was locked-on continuously from lift-off to 43.5 seconds after SECO. At this time, there was a 27.5-second period of intermittent lock until final loss of signal at 71.0 seconds after SEC0. Track was maintained to an elevation angle of 1.5 ° above the horizon. The average received signal strength at the central station during stage II operation was satisfactory. Rate lock was continuous, from LO + 42.6 seconds to L0 + 383.1 seconds (44.4 seconds after SEC0). Rate lock was maintained to an elevation angle of 2.0 ° above the horizon. Pitch steering commands were issued, as planned, by the airborne decoder at L0 + 168.21 seconds. At this time, an initial i0 percent pitch-down steering command (0.2 deg/sec) was given for 0.5 second, followed by a 28 percent pitch-down steering command (0.55 deg/sec) for 1.05 seconds. The small pitch steering at guidance initiate was indicative of a very nominal first stage trajectory. The steering gradually returned 1.05 seconds later to relatively small and slow varying pitch commands of 0.2 to 0.3 deg/sec. This produced negative pitch rates until L0 + 250 seconds. At this time_ because of noisy tracking data, the rates became oscillatory. This particular phenomenon is characteristic of atmospheric conditions for this time of year. As a result, the commands varied between 0.09 to 0.24 deg/sec (pitch down) until 2.5 seconds before SEC0. Yaw steering started at L0 + 169.23 seconds. The commands, because of the dog-leg trajectory flown during the second stage powered flight_ were of larger magnitude than those experienced on previous Gemini flights. The purpose of the dog-leg trajectory, executed on this flight for the first time, is to remove the out-ofplane position error (wedge angle) that exists between the orbiting target vehicle and the GLV at lift-off. This was accomplished by use of a prelaunch targeting procedure which used the target vehicle's realtime ephemeris data to compute the proper biased launch azimuth. The targeting procedure will correct out-of-plane errors up to a wedge angle of 0.55°_ beyond which the GLV performance is a constraint. As a result of these procedures, yaw right commands of 12.5 percent (0.25 deg/sec) were sent for a duration of approximately i0 seconds. The steering gradually returned, 31.5 seconds later, to yaw right commands of less than 0.06 deg/sec for the duration of the flight (SECO - 2.5 seconds). SEC0 occurred at L0 + 338.737 seconds at an elevation angle of 6.89 ° above the horizon. The SECO + 20 second conditions were well within 3a limits. Table 5.2-V shows a comparison of the actual values with the planned values. Because the shutdown thrust transient was

f-

CONFIDENTIAL

5-86

UNCLASSIFIED

nominal, the SECO + 20 second errors were attributable to shutdown timing at SECO. TARS gyro drifts, wind_ b roll engine misalignment_ and noise and biases in the guidance data. The y_w position and velocity errors resulted in a 32 ft/sec out-of-plane maneuver during the second orbit (see section 4.0). Although the errors were within tolerance, studies were initiated to minimize the errors in future flights. At the end of tailoff (SECO + 20 sec), vehicle rates were 0.i0 deg/sec pitch down, 0.49 deg/sec yaw right, and 0.39 deg/sec roll clockwise. The computing system, in conjunction with the RGS ground and airborne systems_ completed all prelaunch and launch operations in a normal and satisfactory manner. The prelaunch transmission and verification of the targeting ephemeris data, between the real-time computing complex at Houston and the RGS computing system_ were also satisfactory. The spacecraft inertial guidance system ascent updates from the ground-based guidance computer were transmitted to the spacecraft digital command receiver and verified by the buffer (see section 5.1.5).

5.2.6

Electrical

System

The scheduled launch of Gemini VI-A on December 12, was terminated at 87FSI + 1.165 seconds by a engine shutdown command generated by the Master Operations Control Set (MOCS). The command was the result of the premature separation of electrical umbilical connector 3DIM (see section 5.2.3 for details of this anomaly). In a normal launch sequence_ the shutdown capabilities are timecontrolled by the actuation of the stage I engine thrust chamber pressure switches (TCPS). The allotted time is programmed to be TCPS "make" plus 1.8 second and in a normal launch this connector is the first umbilical to separate. Upon separation of this umbilical, the spacecraft event timer starts which is the flight crew's indication of lift-off. The resultant impact of the shutdown on other launch vehicle subsystems is discussed in their respective sections. As an added measure of confidence the mechanical connection of both electrical plugs, 3DiM and 3D2M, was augmented by the use of break-a-way wire. This increased the pull away (separation) load from a minimum value of 6 pounds tension to a minimum value of 25 pounds. In addition_ the connectors were marked with a paint stripe to provide a visual reference of the mated and locked condition, and the aerodynamic fairing which covers the connectors was modified to facilitate visual inspection of the mated connectors. This remedial action will also be applied to all subsequent vehicles. Figure 5.2-3 shows the safety-wired umbilical installation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-87

The operation of the Gemini VI-A electrical system was satisfactory throughout the powered flight. Voltage and current levels were nominal on both the instrumentation power supply (IPS) and the auxiliary power

supply (APs).

5.2.7

Instrumentation

System

5.2.7.1 Ground.- All measurements programmed for use on the launch attempt performed satisfactorily throughout the countdown as well as the shutdown phase. On the actual launch, on the ground system. At T - 20.8 (pitch, stage I) engine gimbal of ignition when it function is under there were 133 measurements programmed for use

seconds, the travel (measurement 0153) of actuator no. 4 displayed a sharp positive offset equivalent to an 1.8 ° . This anomaly remained in existence until engine returned to a position equivalent to null. This malinvestigation. release sequence was

Data recovery was lO0 percent. The umbilical as planned and was complete in 0.13 second.

5.2.7.2 Airborne.- For both the launch attempt and launch, 191 measurements were scheduled for use. During flight, there were no data anomalies or unexpected data loss. The expected data loss at staging lasted 300 miliseconds. Review of signal strength records revealed a signal attenuation of the telemetry frequency (244.3 mc) at LO + 289.3 seconds for a period of 2.5 seconds. It is important to note that no loss of data was experienced during this period. This same anomaly occurred on Gemini VII, earlier in stage II flight, and is under investigation.

5.2.8

Malfunction

Detection

System

Performance of the malfunction detection system (MDS) during preflight checkout, launch attempt, and flight was satisfactory. MDS operation during the attempted launch is discussed in section 5.2.8.1, and during the actual launch in section 5.2.8.2. MDS parameters are shown in table 5.2-VI.

F

UNCLASSIFIED

5-88
5.2.8.1 5.2.8.1.1 Engine as follows:

UNCLASSIFIED
MDS operation RIDS: during launch attempt.times and pressures The _DTCPS actuation

were

Actuation Switch Condition engine

time

from signal, Pressure, psia

ignition seo

Subassembly MDTCPS

i Make Break 2 Make Break +1.020 +1.180 580 550 +.930 +1.483 600 545

Subassembly MDTCPS

All switches operated within an acceptable range of pressures. It is interesting to note that the subassembly 2 switch made late and dropped out early when compared to the s_assembly i switch. Operation of the switches with respect to other events is shown in figure 5.2-4. 5.2.8.1.2 Tank pressure indication: Tank pressure indications correct for the launch attempt and were close to nominal.

were

5.2.8.1.3 Spacecraft MDS displays: The spacecraft MDS display panel is shown in figure 3.1-i0. The left hand "Engine I" telelite did not flicker noticeably during the launch attempt. This was because the incandescent lamp filament did not respond to the 0.16-second power interruption provided by the subassembly number 2 MDTCPS's. The right hand "Engine I" telelite did extinguish and relight in response to the 0.55-second power interruption provided by the subassembly number i MDTCPS's. The event timer start coincided with the flicker of the subassembly number i "Engine I" telelite.

The "secondary guidance" telelite came on about 41 seconds after the engine start as a result of a switchover (SWO) command. The switchover command was generated by the hardover contact on the subassembly i pitch actuator. Hydraulic pressure was zero at that time; the engine bells normally drift to hardover position with no hydraulic pressure. All other MDS displays remained static during the launch attempt. 5.2.8.2 torily during Gemini VI-A launch°- All MDS hardware functioned the prelaunch and launch of Gemini VI-A. satisfac-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
were 5.2.8.2.1 Engine as follows: MDS: The MDTCPS and MDFJPS switch actuations

-89

Actuation Switch Condition

time Pressure_ psia

from lift-off_ sec

Subassembly MDTCPS

i Make Break 2 Make Break 3 Make Break +157.899 +338.877 N/A N/A -2.359 +157.117 575 530 -2.379 +157.115 585 550

Subassembly MDTCPS

Subassembly MDJFPS

F

5.2.8.2.2 Prelaunch malfunction detection system: Review of the GLV-7 data indicate that a potential problem in time-to-make of the 0PPS (oxidizer pressurant pressure switch) existed which could result in an unnecessary engine shutdown during the holddown monitoring period. In an effort to decrease the time-to-make of this switch on GLV-6, the oxidizer pressurant back pressure orifice was reduced in size from 0.50 in. to 0.46 in. diameter. The results of this change are included in the following table:

Average Gemini (GLV 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7)

GLV-6

0PPS actuation 0PPS actuation

time pressure

87FS I + 1.76 sec 410 442

87FS I + 1.58 sec 424 520

PoP0i a at 87FS I + 2.2 sec

(a)

Oxidizer

pressurant

orifice

inlet pressure

UNCLASSIFIED

5-9o

UNCLASSIFIED
switch package performed over-rates occurred from

5.2.8.2.3 Airframe MDS: The MDS rate properly throughout the flight. No vehicle lift-off through spacecraft separation.

5.2.8.2.4 Tank pressure indicators: All tank pressure indicators performed properly. A and B sensors agreed within specification values throughout powered flight.

5.2. 9

[Range Safety

The performance of all range safety and ordnance items was satisfactory during both the launch attempt on December 12_ and the launch on December 15. 5.2.9.1 Flight termination system.- Both command receivers displayed adequate received signal strength for proper operation throughout powered flight and beyond spacecraft separation. The following flight. Time_ table shows the command facilities used during the

sec Cape 600-W antenna Cape lO-kW

Facility transmitter

used and single-helix

L0 to L0 + 66

LO + 66 to LO + i19 LO + 119 to L0 + 162

transmitter

and quad-helix transmitter

antenna and

Grand Bahama Island steerable antenna Grand Turk Island steerable antenna

10-kW

L0 + 162 to L0 + 364

lO-kW

transmitter

and

L0 + 364 to L0 + 380

Grand [Bahama Island steerable antenna Grand Turk Island steerable antenna

lO-kW

transmitter

and

LO + 380 to LO + 640

10-kW

transmitter

and

5.2.9.2 Range safety tracking system.- Missile trajectory measurement (MISTRAM) system I was used as the primary source for impact prediction and provided accurate information through insertion. Several short unlocks occurred at 62 and 83 seconds after lift-off_ but did not interfere with use of the data. 5.2.9. 3 Ordnance.- The performance of all ordnance items was satisfactory. Following the launch attempt_ the test conductor immediately

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5-91

returned the airborne ordnance safety switch (0SS) to safe. Vehicle inspection revealed that no ordnance devices had fired subsequent to the OSS safe. Range safety gave permission to safe destruct initiators 33 seconds after engine shutdown and all destruct initiators safed properly. Ordnance operation during the Gemini VI-A launch was normal.

5.2.10

Prelaunch

Operations

5.2.10.1 Launch attempt.- Propellant loading was accomplished in 3 hours i0 minutes_ the best loading time of any Gemini countdown. There were no problems encountered throughout the countdown and the preplanned "hold" at T - 3 minutes was reached without incident. The launch was terminated at 9:54 a.m.e.s.t. (engine ignition 87FS I + 1.165 sec)

because of the premature separation of electrical umbilical connector 3DIM. After engine shutdown_ response to the test conductor was as follows:

Reaction Function
.f

Requested_

sec

Verified_

sec

time_

sec

Reset ordnance switch

safety 3 8 5

Reset staging command lockout switch Vent all tanks to blanket pressure Safe destruct initiators power

5

8

3

9 33 75

12 33 75

3 negligible negligible

Return

to ground

The TARS programmer could not be reset with the 3DiMumbilical plug disconnected. Because the vehicle was safed_ the programmer was permitted to run until photographic evidence of the plug disconnection had been obtained. The plug was then reconnected and the programmer reset. Erector raising was delayed to allow sufficient time to extinguish incipient fuel fires and to execute Test Conductor's Training Procedure for Emergency Conditions 183/ETR (TP-183). The erector was raised at 11:28 a.m.e.s.t, and the crew was removed at 11:33 a.m.e.s.t. Required activity of TP-183 is being investigated to determine whether similar time delays can be reduced in the event of future shutdowns.

UNCLASSIFIED

-92

UNCLASSIFIED

5.2.10.2 Recycle.- The recycle of the launch vehicle consisted of purging the propellant tanks_ replacement of stage I subassembly engine number two gas generator s and engine ordnance devices. Also included was the installation of break-wire on the two umbilical connectors (3DIM and 3D2M). The gas generator replacement incident described in section 5.2.2. 5.2.10.3 Launch.- The and 21 minutes. Because of position during the recycle to the propellant loaded on was the result of the

propellant loading was complete in 3 hours the engine prevalve remaining in an open time_ a weight correction had to be applied board at the "high-light" verification.

The split count (T - 240 minutes) was initiated at 0912 G.m.t. on December 15, 1965. During the fuel tank pressurization of stage I_ it was discovered that a _alve in the propellant pressurization system was in the wrong position (closed). The opening of this valve corrected the problem and did not in any way impair the scheduled countdown. At 1309 G.m.t._ the programmed hold (T - 3 min) was reached. The hold lasted for the predicted 25 minutes and at 1337_ the launch was successfully accomplished.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-93

TABLE

5.2-1.-

PRELIMINARY

STAGE

I ENGINE

PERFORMANCE

Parameter a Thrust , ib ........

Preflight prediction 431 317

Postflight reconstruction 433 3L7

Difference, percent +0.50

Thrust (flight average), ib ........... Specific impulse a, ib-sec/ib ........ Specific impulse (flight average), ib-sec/ib . . . Engine Engine mixture mixture ratio a ratio .... • • -

457 616

454 539

-0.66

259.74

260.28

+0.23

277.15 1.9377

277.53 1.9596

+0.15 +1.34

(flight average) Burn time 87FS2),

1.9282

1.9414

+0.94

(87FSI to sec .......

159.699

160.433

+0.46

asampled conditions.

at DO + 55 seconds

and corrected

to standard

inlet

f

CONFIDENTIAL

5-9

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 5.2-II.-

PRELIMINARY

STAGE

II ENGINE

PERFORMANCE

Parameter

Preflight prediction 102 098

Postflight reconstruction I01 842

Difference, percent -0.25

Thrust a'b,

ib

.......

Thrust (flight average# Ib ............ Specific impulse a'b, ib-sec/ib ........ Specific impulse (flight . . . .

102 801

i01 929

-0.85

313.44

312.64

-0.26

average) b, ib-sec/ib Engine mixture ratio a

313.85 1.7736

313.03 1.7833

-0.26 +0.55

Engine mixture ratio flight average ...... Thrust time, (91FS1 to 91FS2), sec .......

1.7470

1.7584

+0.65

180.30

181.58

+0.71

asampled at staging inlet conditions.

plus

55 seconds

and corrected

to standard

bIncludes

roll

control

nozzle

thrust.

CONFIDENTIAL

-

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE 5.2-111.-

TRANSIENTS

DURING

STAGE

I HOLDDOWN

PERIOD

Maximum Actuator designation Travel,

d_ring

ignition Time from lift-off, sec Maximum during holddown null check, in.

in.

Pitch,

II 21

-0.122 +0.209

-2.26 -2.25

-0.03 +0.01

Yaw/roll,

Yaw/roll,

31

+0.169

-2.28

-0.01

.f

Pitch,

41

(a)

-

-

Maximum Axis

rate

stage

I gyro,

deg/sec Secondary +0.21 +0.20 -0.31

Primary Pitch Yaw Roll +0.19 -0.21 -0.30

a41 actuator transient data are not available; is found in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.10.

detail

information

UNCLASSIFIED

-96

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE

5.2-IV.-

VEHICLE

RATES

BETWEI_

SECO AND SPACE_

SEPARATION

Pitch axis

Rate,

deg/sec

Maximum Maximum Rate

positive negative

rate at SECO rate at SECO

+ 2.4 sec + 0.09 sec

0.59 -0.29 -0.i0

at SECO + 20 sec separation Yaw axis (SECO + 22.27 sec)

Rate at spacecraft

0.0

Maximum Maximum

positive negative

rate rate

at SECO at SECO

+ 12.7 sec + 8.7 sec

0.59 -i.ii 0.49

-

Rate at SECO + 20 sec Rate at spacecraft separation Roll (SECO + 22.27 sec)

0.49

axis

Maximum Maxim_n

positive negative

rate at SECO rate

+ 2.3 see

0.49 -0.39 0.39

at SECO + 5.4 sec

Rate at SECO + 20 see Rate at spacecraft separation (SECO + 22.27 sec)

0.19

UNCLASSIFIED

f

UNCLASSIFIED

5-97

TABLE

5.2-V.-

COMPARISON

OF PLANNED

AND ACTUAL

TRAJECTORY

PARAMETI_RS

Condition

at SEC0 + 20 seconds

Planned

Actual

Difference

Time

from lift-off, ft

sec .......

356.63 529 218

358.74 529 695 25 718

+2.11 +477 -12

Altitude, Space-fixed Space-fixed angle,

............ velocity, flight-path ............ ft/sec ft ........ ft/sec ....

25 730

deg

0.00 a.3. I a-i 613

0.05 -7.0 -26 454

+0.05 -3.9 -25 843

Yaw velocity, Yaw position,

..........

aprelaunch

targeting

errors

included.

UNCLASSIFIED

k_ I

TABLE 5.2-VI.-

G_INI

VI-A MALFUNCTION

DETECTION

SYSTEM

SWITCHOVER

PARAMETERS

Parameter

Switchover setting

Maximum or positive

Time from lift-off_ sec

Minimum or negative

Time from lift-off, sec

Stage I primary

hydraulics

Shuttle spring (1500 psia equivalent) None

3280 psi

-2.12

2520 psi

-2.40

Stage C Stage

I secondary

hydraulics

3400 psi

-2.64

2320 psi

BECO C

I tandem actuators 2 pitch 2 yaw/roll i yaw/roll i pitch ±4.0 deg ±4.0 deg _4.0 deg _4.0 deg +2.5 deg/sec -3.0 deg/sec J_-5 deg/sec +0.70 deg +i.00 deg +0.45 deg +0.85 deg +0.30 deg/sec +0.30 deg/sec 53-5 80.0 87.5 91.0 0.3 78-5 -0.70 deg -0.75 deg -1.30 deg -i.00 deg -1.40 deg/sec -1.38 deg/sec 86.5 87.5 80.0 53.0 88.0 82.5

No. I subassembly

Z

F-"

No. 2 subassembly No. 3 subassembly No. 4 subassembly

f'-

"M
_1_

Stage I pitch rate Stage I yaw rate

(_

"11
_1

Stage ton rate I
Stage II pitch rate Stage II yaw rate Stage II roll rate

.2odeg/seo +1.80eg/sec d
_10 deg/sec _lO deg/sec _20 deg/sec +O.lO deg/sec +2.50 deg/sec +0.50 deg/sec

O.2
165.0 158.8 158.8

-1.30eg/sec d
-0.55 deg/sec -0.60 deg/sec -0.10 deg/sec

157.1
170.0 160.9 338.0

Note:

+ indicates

up right clockwise

- indicates

down left counterclockwise

(laI=IISSV1DNA
z

Thrust chamber valve position, percent

> _,
i

I Turbine speed, rpm x O.05 • Chamber pressure, fuel and oxidizer pumpdischarge pressure, psia

I

I

I

I

I

,_ z

_.E

E

• Z
i

_

/
I//

X

_. =-. E

-_ ,_ '_

i/ /i

_ N o

"
_

/ - . /: /
/

4 i I

/
66-Y (]31-11££VIDNrl --

5-__oo
NASA-S-66-76 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED

Plastic dust ca

(_

Omniseal groove

Exhaust injector instrumentation pressure tap

Combustion chamber

_ Injector

Turbulence

ring

Oxidizer inlet -Fuel inlet

Figure 5.2 .-2. - Stage I gas generator showing location of dust cap.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-210 JAN

_-_-o_-

Y

ii

Figure 5.2-3.

- Umbilical 3D17 installation

for final launch.

....

UNCLASSIFIED

NASA-S-66-154 JAN ; ! SA-1 engineI-telelite Off o ro

I i
i SA-2 enginel"-telelite

i.._.
i i _

,r

7

I I

I I Off

Ii
i Event timer SA-1 MDTCPS make+0.962 SA-2 MDTCPS make+1.027 False lift-off + 1. 079 87FS2 engine shutdown+1.165 SA2 MDTCPS break +1.197 SA1 MDTCPS break +1.482 Actual .................. Planned 87FS1 engine start ' I I Off Running (_

t
C I
i

'
,t

i."..... t
I

,
', ,I

'l
'I
', _1 ! I : I I t I

Z
r-"

Z
r'l C.f}

I ,
i I

I I
i JI

i

I
I

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i
I
i I,

, r

_I

r13 I_

'1
-0.2 0

I
.2

I
.4

I
.6

I
.8 1.0 Time from ignition, sec

, _

[I
1.2

I
1.4

i
1.6 1.8

Figure 5.2-4.

- MDS parametertimeline.

UNCLASSIFIED
5.3 SPACECRAFT-LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE PERFORMANCE

-1o3

The various aspects of the spacecraft-launch vehicle interface, as defined in Interface Specification and Control Document No. i, performed within specification limits. The performance of the electrical and mechanical interfacing systems was derived from the overall performance of the launch vehicle and the spacecraft as determined from instrumentation and crew observation. The electrical circuitry performed as expected in all respects. The malfunction detection system and the spacecraft inertial guidance system steering signals to the launch vehicle remained passive.

UNCLASSIFIED

5-__o4

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK
r--

UNCLASSIFIED

....
6.0

UNCLASSIFIED
MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE

6-1

6.1 The Gemini VI-A mission

FLIGHT

CONTROL from the Mission Control

was controlled

Center in Houston (MCC-H) using three shifts of flight controllers each day. This section of the report is based on real-time observations, and may disagree with some of the detailed evaluations in other report sections that were made from analyses of the postflight data.

6.1.1

Premission

Operations

/

6.1.1.1 Premission activities.The premission activities for Gemini VI-A differed from previous missions in that spacecraft 7 was flying during the launch pad test for Gemini VI-A and, therefore, not all activities were supported by the MCC-H. The MCC-H supported approximately 4 hours of the simulated flight, the midcount, and the terminal count. Two days of network simulations and i day of launch abort and reentry simulations were conducted. Also 2 days of network simulations were conducted assuming that Gemini VII was in orbit and Gemini VI-A was on the launch pad and the countdown was in progress. The network simulations are carried to rendezvous, 6.1.1.2 Documentation.The documentation and very few changes were necessary. for the mission was good

6.1.1. 3 MCC/network flight control operations.- The normal operations of checking out the network were not performed because the network was in continuous operation supporting Gemini VII. It was necessary to reconfigure the remote sites and the MCC-H, however, when changing from Gemini VII support to Gemini VI-A support. The remote sites had to change remote site data processor (RSDP) programs and telemetry station patch boards. The MCC-H had to change computer programs. When in the Gemini VI-A configuration, the remote sites could look at data from Gemini VI-A and Gemini VII_ but only the Gemini VI-A data entered in the RSDP. The Gemini VI-A data cov_d be called out of the RSDP and automatically sent to the MCC-H to update the computer-generated displays. The Gemini VII data were recorded during real time and played into the RSDP after the Gemini VII RSDP program had been loaded. The systems monitors at the remote sites could then call the data from the RSDP in the form of teletype printouts in engineering units. A teletype punch tape was obtained with the printout, and the data were then sent to the MCC-H. Conversely, when in the Gemini VII configuration, that data were handled automatically and the Gemini VI-A data were handled manually.

r

UNCLASSIFIED

6_2
6. i. 1.4

UNCLASSIFIED
Countdown.The countdown was completely nominal.

6.1.2

Mission

Operations

Summary

6.1.2.1 Powered flight.- At approximately 22 seconds prior to lift-off, measurement 0153 (pitch actuator, engine number i) drifted off null. This was traced to a telemetry sensor on the Gemini launch vehicle (GLV). It apparently corrected itself at engine start because of the shock or for some other reason, and it functioned normally through staging. The powered flight trajectory was very near nominal. The velocity at second stage engine cutoff (SECO) +20 seconds was approximately 14 ft/ sec low, and there was a slight northerly deviation of the ground track. At insertion, the flight-path angle was +0.08 ° and the wedge angle was 0.08 ° north. 6.1.2.2 Orbital.- Following insertion and the Bermuda low-speed radar differential correction, a docking initiate plan (DKI) for M=4 was generated. This mission plan was then transferred to the summary maneuver table (SMT). The SMT yielded the following set of maneuvers for rendezvous:

Maneuver

Ground elapsed time hr:min: sec adjust) adjust) change) 1:34:04 2:18:03 2:41:11 3:47:35 5:16:28

AV, ft/sec

Direction

NH (Height NCL (Phase Npc (Plane SR

13.0 58.0 31.4 46.0 33.7

In-plane, In-plane,

posigrade posigrade right

Cross-plane, In-plane,

(coelliptic) phase

posigrade

TPI (Terminal initiate) TPF (Terminal final)

Pitch up 35 °, posigrade Pitch down 58°_ posigrade

phase

5:48:36

42.6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Subsequent tracking data confirmed the Bermuda the following set of maneuvers for rendezvous: solution.

6-3
The SMT yielded

Maneuver NH (Height adjust)

Ground elapsed hr:min:sec 1:34:02 2:18:00 2:42:07 3:03:19 3:47:37 5:18:39

time

AV, ft/sec

Direction

14.0 60.8 31.7 0.8 42.9 33.7

In-plane, In-plane,

posigrade posigrade right

NCL (Phase adjust) NpC (Plane adjust) NH (Height NSR _PI adjust)

Cross-plane, In-plane, In-plane,

posigrade posigrade

Yaw left 2.8 °, pitch up 26.5 °, posigrade Yaw right 179.6 °, pitch up 58 °, posigrade

I_F f

5:50:47

42.3

The additional height adjust was scheduled by the rendezvous as a result of tracking data following the phasing maneuver.

logic

The only anomaly noted during the midcourse phase of the rendezvous concerned terminal phase initiation time. Tracking data subsequent to the coelliptic (NsR) maneuver indicated that the terminal phase initiate

(TPI) would be delayed approximately 2 minutes. The rendezvous solution was converging and very close to the pre-lift-off time of the TPI prior to and immediately execution after the NSR maneuver. establishes Phasing is insensitive orbit. to

of the NSR which

a coelliptic

The reason

for the 2-minute change is not known at this time_ but the anomaly is currently being investigated. It should be noted that this anomaly caused no concern during the mission, because the dispersion of TPI was we!lwithin the desired tolerance of 18 minutes. Spacecraft 6 stayed in formation with spacecraft 7 for one revolution longer than planned, and therefore, the separation maneuver and the posigrade maneuver were performed later than planned. Thus, the retrorocket firing times required updating for revolutions 7 through 12. At this time, the real-time computer complex (RTCC) was configured for support.

UNCLASSIFIED

64

UNCLASSIFIED

of spacecraft 7which made it impossible to have the correct times run to update as planned. This resULted in flying revolutions 7 and 8 without an updated retrofire time. The times were run in an off-line computer in the RTCC and passed to the crew over Canton during the latter portion of revolution 8. In order for the ground to gage orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) propellant remaining accurately, it is necessary to determine the duration of maneuver thrusts. This has been done in the past by manually evaluating the dump data at the remote sites. For this mission, a change was made to the RSDP program to evaluate the dump data automatically and print out the total thrust time. This evaluation was also made manually and in some instances did not agree with the RSDP data. The problem is thought to be in the method used to disregard thrust indications during periods of telemetry loss-of-sync and should be corrected prior to the Gemini VIII mission. For a more detailed explanation of this problem refer to reference ]-3. At 25 minutes g.e.t._ between Kano and Tananarive on revolution i, there was a malfunction in the reentry vehicle low-level multiplexer. The reference voltage on group LR-I (parameter MA21) went to full scale. The following telemetry parameters were affected: cabin air temperature (CB02), left suit temperature (CC03), right suit temperature (CC04), and radar range rate (JA04). After retrofire, the Hawaii data indicated that the problem with group LR-I had resolved itself because all the affected parameters were giving a nominal indication as far as could be determined. The telemetry tape recorder failed at the end of the tape dump performed over Cape Kennedy at the end of revolution 13. The dump was normal in all respects_ but the tape recorder would not start recording following the dump. The dump ended at 20:_5:30 g.e.t. The failure was confirmed by the absence of the tape-motion indication and no modulation on subsequent dump attempts. All attempts to restart the record cycle including use of real-time commands_ time-of-retrorocket firing con_uands and onboard crew actions were unsuccessful. 6.1.2.3 Reentry.- From a guidance and trajectory standpoint, reentry was nominal. Retrofire occurred on time at 25:15:58 g.e.t. The crew flew a manual closed-loop reentry with an indicated landing point approximately 12 nautical miles from the prime recovery ship. A solution for backup guidance parameters was obtained from the incremental velocity indicator (IVI) readouts_ Hawaii_ California, and White Sands tracking data. The White Sands solution was passed to the crew. The command pilot redefined the electrical null on the downrange error needle by marking the downrange needle null position with a pen on the face of his display. He did this between retrofire and guidance

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
initiate_ and then flew do_m-range error with respect to the new null which was approximately 2 !/2 needle widths from the original null. The crew reported umusually long delays between the first, second,

and third retroroeket firings. The manual time-to-retrofire (TR) button was held in at about the time of the third retrorocket firing and the fourth rocket fired with what the crew t_ought was a correct delay. Analysis of this problem was incomplete because the onboard tape recorder had failed and retrofire was not over a remote site.

....

UNCLASSIFIED

6-6

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

_

BLANK

_

UNCLASSIFIED

J

UNCLASSIFIED
6.2 NETWORK PERFORMANCE

6-7

The network

was placed

on mission

status

for the Gemini

VII and the

Gemini VI-A missions on November 22, 1965, and was ready mission at lift-off on December 15, 1966.

to support

6.2.1

Mission

Control

Center,

Houston

and Remote

Facilities

The network configuration and the general support required at each station are indicated in table 6.2-I. Figure 4.3-i(a) shows the worldwide network stations. In addition, approximately 15 aircraft provided supplementary photographic, weather, telemetry, and voice relay support in the launch and reentry areas. North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Space Acquisition Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) radars provided tracking of the Gemini launch vehicle and the spacecraft.

6.2.2

Network

Facilities

Performance of the network is reported on a negative basis by system. All performance not detailed in this report was satisfactory. 6.2.2.1 Remote sites.The performance of the network telemetry

6.2.2.1.1 Telemetry: system was very good. 6.2.2.1.2 Radar:

A majority

of the network

radars

were

scheduled

to track spacecraft 6 while in orbit. During revolution 4, the Ascension (ASC) station and the Range Tracker (RTK) were assigned to spacecraft 7; all other sites were assigned to spacecraft 6. Radar tracking was excellent during the entire portion of the dual mission. 6.2.2. i. 3 Acquisition aids and timing: Timing was good for the entire Gemini VI-Amission. The tracking quality of ship board acquisition aids was satisfactory throughout the entire mission. 6.2.2.1.4 6.2.2.2 Command: Computing.In general, the without inciNo significant problems occurred.

6.2.2.2.1 Real-Time Control Center (RTCC) Houston: RTCC support of the Gemini VI-A mission was accomplished dent.

UNCLASSIFIED

6-8

UNCLASSIFIED

During the Gemini VI-A mission, the RTCC was able to accomplish 15 reconfigurations and each was within the anticipated lO-minute to 15-minute time period. Coordination and interface with the network during reconfiguration were very good. These reconfigurations were necessary to receive and display information from a particular spacecraft at a particular time, and in some cases from both spacecraft simultaneously during the mission. 6.2.2.2.2 Remote site data processors (RSDP): The RSDP's performed without any significant problems during the Gemini VI-A mission. 6.2.2. 3 Communications.-

6.2.2.3.1 Ground co_aunications: Ground communications were generally good for the Gemini VI-A mission. The communications to Canary Island were interrupted by more outages than expected, but contact with Tananarive was much improved over past missions. 6.2.2.3.2 Frequency interference: One case of interference was reported. It occurred during the first Gemini VI-A launch attempt and caused interference on 15.016 Mc/sec. All stations with direction finder (DF) capability were contacted, and DF information indicated the interfering signal was originating in the Cape Kennedy vicinity. The signal disappeared shortly after the launch attempt was postponed. Cause of the interference was undetermined.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 6.2-I.- GEMINI VI-A NET_0EK CONFIGURATION

6-9

4o 4o @

_

_

_

+_

.,_

,_

_o

o
o (_ X

.,-_¢

,_

o
o o _ _
X X X X X X

o
_ X

o

c o

o

_a_
MCC-H MCC-C MLA CNV PAT GBI GTK BDA CYI KNO _._ TAN PRE CRO CTN HAW GYM CAL TEX WHS EGL ANT ASC CSQ RIGI RffK W0M A/C WLP X - Master DCS Ship positions: X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X i X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

_o_
X X X X

_o
X

_ _
X X X X

X

X

X

X X X X

X

X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X

X

X X

X X

X

X X

X

X

X

X X

X X X X X X X X X

X

X X

X X X X X []

X X

X

X

X X X

X X

X X X

X

[]

X

X

X X X

X

X X X X X X X

X

X

X

X X X X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X X

X

X X

X

X

X

_TEX will supply backup capability to MCC-H remoting CSQ - LTS°E 20°N; RKV - 39°W 19°S; R_ - 175°W 25°N

UNCLASSIFIED

6-_o

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLaAVK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
6.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS

6- _1

6.3.1

Recovery

Force Deployment landing areas designated for the

The four categories of planned Gemini VI-A mission were:

(a) Primary landing area (supported located in the West Atlantic zone)

by an aircraft

carrier

and

(b) Secondary landing areas (East Atlantic, West Pacific, MidPacific and areas within the West Atlantic zone not supported by the aircraft carrier) (c) (d) Launch Launch site landing abort landing area areas

f

Data concerning the deployment of ships and aircraft in planned landing areas are provided in table 6.3-I. Figure 6.3-1 shows the deployment of ships and aircraft in the launch abort landing areas. The four worldwide landing zones are illustrated in figure 6.3-2 , and the ship support provided for each of the numbered landing areas is listed in table 6.3-I. The recovery forces were assigned positions in these areas so that any point in a particular area could be reached within a specified access time. The ship and aircraft access times, which varied for the different areas, were based upon the probability of the spacecraft landing within a given area and the amount of recovery support in that area. Ten ships (including'l mine sweeper), 31 fixed-wing aircraft, six helicopters, and various special vehicles weTe positioned for support of the four categories of planned landing areas. _¢enty-six of the aircraft_ with y_rarescue teams aboard, were deployed around the world on strip alert. These aircraft were at the locations shown in figure 6.3-2 to provide contingency recovery support and support in the zones described in the preceding paragraphs. The normal contingent of Department of Defense (DOD) ships and aircraft were used for recovery support. Special equipment, such as retrieval cranes, airborne ultrahigh frequency (UHF) electronic receivers (homing systems), spacecraft flotation collars, and swimmer interphones, were furnished to the DOD by NASA. All aircraft providing

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
contingency and secondary landing-area support carried pararescue teams ready to drop to the spacecraft_ install a spacecraft flotation collar, and provide assistance to the flight crew. Twin-turbine helicopters (type SH-3A)_ launched from the carrier, provided location support and were used to transport swin_ner teams, flotation collars_ and photographers to the landing point. Fixed-wing aircraft from the carrier were utilized to relay con_munications and to transport the on-scene commander to the landing point.

6.3.2

Location

and Retrieval

The MCC-Recovery Control Center informed all recovery forces of flight progress throughout the mission. As the orbital ground tracks shifted during the mission, possible landing points were passed to all forces, and the positions of the recovery ships and aircraft were altered accordingly. On December 16, 1965, at 25:16 g.e.t., a nominal retrofire at 25:15:58 g.e.t, was reported, and deployed forces were notified accordingly. The spacecraft landed at 25:51:24 g.e.t, and was located by one of the search helicopters (Search 2) which vectored the airborne on-scene commander to the landing point (reported as latitude 23°24.5 ' N longitude 67°53 ' W). (See fig. 6.3-3.) A visual sighting report was immediately transmitted to the primary recovery ship U.S.S. Wasp_ and a helicopterborne swimmer team was immediately dispatched to the landing point. Swimmers were deployed at 26:14:34 g.e.t, and the flotation collar was attached to the spacecraft (see fig. 6.3-4) and inflated by 26:21:34 g.e.t. Radio and interphone communication with the flight crew indicated that they were in good physical condition and desired to be brought aboard the recovery ship in the spacecraft. The left hatch was opened at 26:33:34 g.e.t. The spacecraft and the flight crew were on the carrier at 26:54:34 g.e.t. The carrier had the spacecraft secured in the dolly at 26:57:34 g.e.t. The U.S.S. Wasp reported the position of the spacecraft at pickup was 23°22.5 N., 67°52.5 W., approximately 1.8 miles from where it had landed. The main parachute remained attached to the spacecraft after landing and was recovered by a swimmer from the "Swim i team". The rendezvous and recovery (R and R) section was recovered by the swim team from "Search 3" approximately 300 to 400 yards upwind of the spacecraft.

.4

UNCLASSIFIED

r

UNCLASSIFIED
6.3.3 Recovery Aids

6-13

6.3.3.1 UHF recovery beacon.- Signals from the spacecraft beacon were received by the following aircraft:

recovery

Aircraft

Initial time of contact, hr:min_ g.e.t, I 25:47

Range, n. mi. 28

Mode

Search

Pulse

(S_-3A)
Search 2 (SH-3A) Search 3 12

CW
Pulse CW CW

25:50

12

(S_-3A)
Kindley Rescue i_ (HC-97) 25:45 200 Pulse CW

6.3.3.2 HF transmitter.Fifteen stations of the DOD high frequency-direction finder (_FF-DF) network received signals from the spacecraft. Fourteen of the stations obtained bearing information on the spacecraft. Signal strength_ bearing accuracy, and signal quality were as shown in the following table and in figure 6.3-5.

'

UNCLASSIFIED

6-14
Station Signal strength

UNCLASSIFIED
Bearing accuracy Signal quality Time_ hr:min_ G.m.t. (December 16, 1965)

i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15

i 3 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 3 3 2

Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Poor

Good Fair Fair Fair Fair Poor Good Excellent Good Fair Good Good Fair Good Good

15:33 15:50 15:49 15:49 15:33 15:33 15:33 15:33 15:33 15:50 15:33 15:33 15:33 15:33 15:39

to 15:_0

to 15:50 to 15:50 to 15:50 to 15:50 to 15:50

to 15:50 to 15:50 to 15:50 to 15:50 to 15:50

No recovery

force units

reported

_

reception.

UNCLASSIFIED

F

UNCLASSIFIED
6.3.3.3 DT{F transmitter.Signals from the spacecraft transmitter were received by aircraft as follows:

6-15
UHF voice

Aircraft

Time of contact_ hr:min_ g.e.t,

Range_ n. mi.

Receiver

Swim I (SH-3A) Swim 2

25:53

20

ARC-27

-

ARC-27

(SH-3)
Photo i (SH-3A) Air Boss (S-2E) I ARC-27

26:04

5

ARC-52

Air Boss 2

(s-2s)

25:37

3

ARC-52

6.3.3.4

UT{F survival

radio.-

This radio

was not used. _ras erected properly

6.3.3.5 Flashin_ but was not activiated

light.- The flashing by the crew.

light

6.3.3.6 Fluorescent sea marker.- The sea dye marker diffusion appeared normal_ and was observed by all aircraft in the landing area at ranges from 2 to lO nautical miles. The recovery sh_p reported a range of 5 nautical miles.

6.3.4

Postretrieval

Proced'_les

Spacecraft postretrieval procedures were performed as specified in the references 12 and 13. All onboard film and other specified equipment, such as experiment equipment, PCM tape recorder_ flight logs, voi< tapes, and biomedical recorders, were expedited to Cape Kennedy and Houston by special flights from the carrier. Observations (Photographs were of the spacecraft after retrieval taken of all these observations.) were as follows:

(a) The }IF antenna had been deployed but would not fuily retract when the HF ANT switch was placed in the retract position. The crew manually retracted the antenna while they were outside the spacecraft.

-

UNCLASSIFIED

6-16
were

UNCLASSIFIED
and _F voice antennas had deployed and

(b) Both the recovery in good condition.

(c) The recovery hoist loop and recovery light were erected; however, the light was not flashing. (The crew did not actuate the light because it was not needed.) (d) Both windows were fogged; the left window had a light film on the surface. Swimmers' reports indicated that the right window was smeared during recovery operations. (e) A 2 ft. by i/2 in. by i/4 in. gouge was noted in the heat shield in the lower right quadrant. The stagnation point appeared to be in the lower center portion. No unusual ablative effects were observed. (f) Several scorched being removed. insulation pads were found while RCS shingles

were

(g) The interior of the spacecraft appeared to be clean, neat, and dry. Both egress hatch seals were in excellent condition. "D" rings and drogue parachutes had been safetied by the flight crew and the spacecraft had been powered down. Both of the hatchlock position indicators were on neutral. (h) the right The left aft stowage box hatch seal was in good stowage box hatch seal was broken. the recovery operations the following actions shingle condition;

Durimg (a)

took place: removal.

A scratch

was placed

on the RCS during removed

(b) Drogue mortar slugs were sidewall extension boxes. (c) A 3/8-inch and was not removed. (d) open-end

and stowed

in the respective

wrench

was dropped

behind

the right

seat

_he hot gas catapult

initiator

line was separated.

The R and R section was recovered as well as the pilot, drogue and main parachutes. _he R and R section appeared in good condition, with the following notations: (a) A dent was noted in the periphery of the R and R section. It was apparently caused by impact with the hoisting hood during retrieval.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(b) One radar is unknown. dome appeared to be dented. The cause

6-17
of the dent

(c) The main parachute was not washed or handled excessively, but was placed in a plastic bag for shipment in its "as retrieved" cor_ dition. On December 16, 1965, the flight crew left the carrier, U.S.S. Wasp and flew to Cape Kennedy. Following completion of spacecraft postretrieval pYocedures, the spacecraft was unloaded at Mayport Naval Station, Florida on December 20, 1965.

6.3.5

Reentry

Control

System Deactivation

f

After the spacecraft was unloaded from the carrier U.S.S. Wasp at Mayport Naval Station, Florida_ it was transported by dolly to a previously selected, well-isolated area where deactivation was begun at i0:00 a.m.e.s.t, on December 20, 1965. Deactivation was completed at 2:00 a.m. e.s.t, on December 21, 1965. Upon receipt of the spacecraft, there was no visual indication of toxic vapors from any of the 16 RCS thrust chamber assemblies (TCA). The RCS shingles had been previously removed on board the carrier. Before the pressurant in each ring was relieved to atmospheric pressure, the landing and safing team (LST) obtained pressure readings of source pressure from test point I (A package) of both rings and regulated lock-up pressure from test point 6 (B package) of both rings. Source pressure readings of 1050 psig and 1070 psig (ambient dry bulb temperature of 54° F) were obtained from A and B rings, respectively. Regulator lock-up pressure readings of 300 psig were obtained from both the A and B rings. The pressures in both rings were then relieved to atmospheric pressure. Immediately following the source pressurant draining operation, the pressurant upstream of the propellant bladders and downstream of the B package check valves was relieved through test points TP-4 and TP-6 by venting through separate propellant scrubber units. Following the above operations_ nitrogen pressure of 50 psig was utilized to force the remaining usable propellants of both rings into the proper propellant holding containers. When these steps were accomplished, the propellant motorized valves were left in the closed position so that propellant loss would be minimized. The propellant solenoid valves did not leak vapors or flush-fluids at any time. All the RCS valves appeared to function normally. Approximately I tablespoon

....

UNCLASSIFIED

6-18

UNCLASSIFIED

of fuel was removed from each of rings A and B but there was insufficient quantity for analysis. Neither ring A nor ring B contained liquid oxidizer material_ there were only fumes. No sample was available for analysis.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 6.3-1.- RECOVERY SUPPORT

6- .9

Access Landing area

time_ hr:min Support Ship

Aircraft Launch site area: Pad

4 LARC (amphibious vehicle) i LCU (large landing craft with trieval capabilities) 00:i0 00:02 00:15 2 LVTR (amphibious vehicle with trieval capabilities) 3 M-II3 (tracked land vehicles)

spacecraft spacecraft

rere-

Land Water (if flight crew ejects) Water (if flight crew is in spacecraft)

4 CH-3C (helicopters) (3 with rescue teams) i M_0 (mine sweepers) with salvage capabilities i boat (50 ft) with water salvage team

Launch abort A B C D

area: 4:00 3:00 3:00 3:00 12:00 3:00 14:00 14:00 i CVS (aircraft carrier) with onboard aircraft capabilities, 3 DD (destroyers), i AO (oiler), i ATF, (fleet tug) and 5 aircraft on station (5HC-_7) (See fig. 6.3-1)

Primary landing area: West Atlantic (end-ofmission area 17-1) i:00 4:00 i CVS (aircraft carrier) from area A, station 3 2 HC-97 (search and rescue) 6 SH-3A helicopters (3 location, 2 swinmler, and i photo ) 2 S-2E (on-scene commander and backup) 2 EA-IF (Navy communications relay - i primary, i backup) i EA-IE (radar search)

Secondary

landing areas: 30 min strip alert 6:00 i CVS (carrier) from station 3

West Atlantic (Zone i) East Atlantic (Zone 2 ) West Pacific

6:00 6:00 6:00

i DD (destroyer) 2 DD's

from station 6 a (rotating on station)

(destroyers)

(Zone 3)
Mid-Pacific (Zone 4) Contingency 1 DD (destroyer) b

26 aircraft basis MS0's)

on strip alert at worldwide

staging

Total (including

i0 ships, 6 helicopters,

31 aircraft

aln addition

an oiler

(A0) was assigned

to this area by CTF 140 for logistic purposes. purposes and an additional

bin addition an oiler (A0) was assigned to the area for logistic destroyer (DD) was assigned to cover the launch of Gemini VI-A.

UNCLASSIFIED

NASA-S-66-151 JAN 80 40 r_./._ 75 _ 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 i Legend: 20 t 15 10 40

G'x
I

o

A/C- Aircraft AO - Oiler CVS-Aircraft carrier -35 _//_/J_-Cape Kennedy _ _ 30 f Bermuda l ,. DD - Destroyer I CanaryIslands-x / Sta}'_S AreaA .......... _ 'au .... I Zone2 I EastAtlantc AreeB AreaD Africa_, X _ o_ "a .-rY/_. , .,,X ,_ _

35

Y/_l_Sta z/_ 1, _//__

--_

.A_/C .....

30

C "= -_ =

_

??-

................... ] ............ .......

C Z

,_: ,West Atlantic Zon

p

:: '_,..,'814 bias_ :: .._ :::::::::::: 4 :::::::::::: :: _ta DD :::: :::::::A/c ....... .......... ......... .... ,..

o_ _

-,1

"271:: ............ ..... "

_

::::::!! :

_

/;::

: :

,

t, 3 J

o_

_z

//

A_c_Y_'_

-,1

N
80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 i0 Longitude,deg Figure6.3-1. - Gemini3EI-A launchabortareas and recovery forcedeployment.

_-

UNCLASSIFIED NASA-S-66-231 JAN

6-_

f

Figure 6.3-4.

- Spacecraft 6 after landing.

r

UNCLASSIFIED

0

20

Figure 6..3-5.

- HF-DF network station bearings to the spacecraft after landing.

F-

UNCLASSIFIED
7.0 FLIGHT CREW

7-1

7- i

FLIGHT

CREW PI_FORMANCE

7.1.1

Crew Activities

Crew performance during the Gemini VI-A mission resulted in a smoothly executed closed-loop rendezvous with sufficient fuel savings to permit extension of station keeping. The crew completed all of the mission objectives_ and in addition they obtained valuable information directly applicable to the future rendezvous missions. Figure 7.1.1-1 represents the actual summary flight plan for this mission. The orbit-adjust maneuvers as well as the rendezvous maneuvers were very well performed. Station keeping with spacecraft 7 was considered a fairly simple task after a brief period of practice. The retrofire and reentry were accomplished nominally with a resultant landing miss-distance of less than 7 miles. No significant crew training inadequacies were evidenced. Because of the relatively short duration of this mlssion_ routine housekeeping was not the demanding task that it was for the Gemini V and VII missions.
f

7.1.1.1 Prelaunch.The December !2_ 1965, prelaunch was nominal except that the crew thought that the 25-minute programmed "hold" was unnecessary. Engine ignition occurred exactly on time and Gemini launch vehicle (GLV) instrumentation as well as sound cues provided proper indications of thrust buildup. Engine shutdown occurred approximately 1 1/2 seconds after ignition. The crew realized that a "holdkill" had occurred; however, the fact that the clock was operating caused crew concern because they had been briefed that this situation would not occur and had not trained for it. Post-shutdown events (other than clock operation) proceeded as expected. "Shutdown" and "programmer reset" communications were called out and there was no flight director indicator (FDI) needle deviations noted by the crew. The crew was concerned about the slowness in bringing up the erector, and they thought that the exact procedures subsequent to shutdown and prior to bringing up the erector had not been clearly established. The prelaunch for the Gemini VI-A countdown (December 15, 1965) was again nominal with the crew resting during the 25-minute programmed hold. At times, communication between the crew members was difficult because their intercom system was not operational when the Spacecraft Test Conductor was communicating by using the push-to-talk mode.

UNCLASSIFIED

7-2

UNCLASSIFIED

7.1.1.2 Powered flisht and insertion.- Lift-off and powered flight were nominal, and the crew impressions were very similar to those reported by previous crews. The Gemini_VI-A crew further verified previous crew reports concerning the staging operation and resultant deposits on the spacecraft windows. Second stage engine cutoff (SECO) was nominal with no noticeable post-separation oscillations. The crew received an insertion "go" from tlhe ground prior to SECO + 20 seconds, and they promptly accomplished the post-insertion activities. Although their attention was primarily focused inside the cockpit, the crew noted that the out-the-window view was almost identical to that displayed by the Gemini mission simulator (GMS) at Cape Kennedy. 7.1.1.3 Rendezvous.Five orbit-adjust maneuvers were performed prior to rendezvous, as outlined in-section 4. 3. The platform was aligned prior to each maneuver and the residual velocity components were nulled by the crew after eaclh orbit-adjust maneuver. 7.1.1.3.1 Rendezvous mode test: A check of the onboard-computer rendezvous mode was made at 3 hours, 15 minutes g.e.t. The values of total velocity required to rendezvous, which were displayed on the incremental velocity indicators (IVI's), were noted by the crew as being approximately one-half the anticipated values. This was later determined to be caused by failure to update the computer with the correct values of _t and A_t prior to the test. 7.1.1.3.2 Rendezvous terminal phase: The rendezvous was accomplished as planned with the crew using procedures and techniques developed during their preflight training period. Th_ total fuel usage from terminal-phase initiation to completion of rendezvous was approximately ll3 pounds. Lower than predicted attitude-control fuel-usage is attributed to pilot technique as well as the excellent control capability in the pulse attitude control mode. The crew used onbo_rd computer solutions for translation maneuvers; however, the pilot was able to back up the computer for terminal-phase initiation and the second midcourse correction with manu_l calculations based on platformpitch and radar range obtained from computer readouts.

The n_nual calculations for terminal-phase initiation differed from the onboard computer solution by 8 ft/sec in forward velocity. This _as partially because the terminal-phase initiation was delayed from nominal to optimize lighting conditions during the final phase of rendezvous (insure that the sun would be behind spacecraft 6). Also, the charts used for manual calculations are accurate only when terminal phase initiation is to occur at a pitch angle of 27.6 ° and longitudinal thrusting is along the line of sight. The manual calculations for the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
second midcourse correction agreed with the computer solution the limits of the predetermined accuracies of the two methods putation.

7-3
within of com-

The pilot also used computer readouts of platform pitch attitude and radar range to plot the relative trajectory of spacecraft 6 with respect to spacecraft 7 throughout the terminal phase of rendezvous. This trajectory plot together with analog meter readouts of radar range and range rate proved to be an extremely useful device for real-time monitoring of the trajeetoryand for evaluating computer and manual thrust calculations. The con_mand pilot hulled angular rate motion of the target vehicle with respect to the stars from the second midcourse maneuver until stars were no longer visible. 7.1.1.3.3 Braking: The braking maneuver was performed during the time when spacecraft 6 was 0.48 to 0.24 nautical miles from the target. Braking was done with a continuous application of thrust while holding the correct attitude. Thrust was terminated when relative range rate, as read on the analog meter_ decreased to l0 ft/sec. Afterward, the command pilot nulled angular rate motion using platform and radar data. 7.1.1.4 Station keeping.- The crew performed station keeping with spacecraft 7 from the end of rendezvous at 5 hours, 56 minutes g.e.t. until separation of the two spacecraft at ll hours, 14 minutes g.e.t. Closest approach of the two spacecraft was estimated by the crew as approximately 1 foot, with a maximum range of 275 to 300 feet during the in-plane fly-around. 7.1.1.4.1 Attitude control: The platform and pulse attitude control modes were used for attitude control during station keeping. Pulse mode was used for all of the fly-around maneuvers. In all cases, translation inputs were made with minute blips of the maneuver controller. Motion pictures taken from both spacecraft verify crew reports that adequate control was available in pulse mode as well as platform mode to maintain a stable station-keeping position, once relative rates were reduced to near zero. Based on this experience_ the crew stated that it should be completely safe to hold station with a crewman on the end of an umbilical. 0ut-of-plane fly-arounds were performed by both crewmen and were reported to be easier than the in-plane flyaround because of the position cues provided by the horizon during the out-of-plane maneuver. During the in-plane fly-around when the horizon was not in view, the task of maintaining a stable relative position became much more difficult, particularly as the range between the spacecraft increased to 300 feet. Radar was not used during station keeping.

r

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Ranges were estimated using the reticle and known dimensions of spacecraft 7. The platform was aligned immediately after rendezvous and maintained in the orbit rate mode. 7.1.1.4.2 Translations: Translations to 20 feet were performed by both crew members during daylight and darkness in order to simulate docking maneuvers. The crew reported that the translations were quite easy as long as short duration pulses were used. At times during station keeping, the sun would impinge on a spacecraft window at such an angle as to make it impossible for one crewman to see through the coating of foreign material deposited on the window. This often required a transfer of control to the other crevman because the orientation of the windows is such that only one window at a time was obscured. The combined effects of the bright horizon and the sunlight on the very bright equipme_ adapter section of spacecraft 7 was annoying to the crew during station keeping_ and this made it difficult to adapt to the comparatively dark spacecraft interior when crosschecking instrumentation. At night, the crew of spacecraft 7 maintained their interior lights at full bright to give the crew of spacecraft 6 a target for station keeping. The crew of spacecraft 6maintained station with and without their docking light being on, and at one time used their hand-held penlight to illuminate spacecraft 7. The crew found that the spacecraft 7 windows illuminated by interior lighting, although dimmer than the Agena cone lights, were satisfactory night targets for station keeping off the nose of spacecraft 7. The crew was continuously busy from the start of rendezvous until separation from spacecraft 7, and they were very tired at the end of this activity. The crew reported that if extravehicular activity (EVA) had been scheduled on the same day as the rendezvous it would have been a most difficult task to accomplish. 7.1.1.5 Operational checks.- Several operational checks were performed at the completion of rendezvous and continued through the separation. The operational checks of importance from the standpoint of crew performance are discussed in the following paragraphs. 7. I. I.5. I Platform alignment: The first operational check performed after rendezvous and during station keeping was platform alignment in the close vicinity of another spacecraft. The alignment was nominal and no difficulties were caused by the close proximity of spacecraft 7. Data obtained indicate all platform alignments during the period of operational checks were within I ° accuracy in the pitch and roll axes.

UNCLASSIFIED

F

UNCLASSIFIED

7-5

7.1.1.5.2 Separation and sextant sightings: The separation maneuver from spacecraft 7 (at Ii hours, 14 minutes, 31 seconds g.e.t.) was initiated approximately one revolutionlater than planned. This delay was possible because all previously required operational checks were accomplished with surplus fuel remaining, and an additional revolution of station keeping was performed. The separation was a 9 ft/sec retrograde maneuver using the forward-firing thrusters, and it was performed using the platform attitude control mode. Following separation, the pilot made 19 sextant sightings using the acquisition lights on spacecraft 7 and the star Sirius. The acquisition lights of spacecraft 7 were visible throughout the first night period following separation. The crew noted that target visibility was better when looking through the lower portion of the windows because of the heavier concentration of foreign substance on the upper area of the windows. The technique used by the crew was to adjust the sextant so that the line-of-sight to spacecraft 7 was below the line-of-sight to Sirius and moving upward. As the two lines-of-sight became superimposed, the pilot called out a time "mark" and pushed the readout button to display radar range on the manual data insertion unit (MDU). The command pilot read time from the event timer on the pilot's "mark" and recorded all data in the flight log. The fade-in and fade-out of the flashing lights, caused by the tumbling of spacecraft 7, did not allow sufficient acquisition time for sextant measurements during the second night period following the separation maneuver. (This was also a problem during the first night period.) The crew reported that they could not have accomplished the sextant sightings without the radar and computer pointing data. The flashing lights were reported as being approximately onetenth of the intensity of reflected sunlight from the adapter and therefore inadequate. The acquisition lights were observed at the maximum distance of 24 miles, whereas, the sunlight on spacecraft 7 was reported to be as bright as Venus at approximately 50 miles. The spacecraft 7 acquisition lights were considered to be too bright during station keeping. Therefore, the acquisition lights were turned off and the cockpit lights of spacecraft 7 were turned up for optimum station keeping during the night side of orbit. It was also reported that the bulk of the sextant was about twice that desired and that a mounted, rather than a hand-held, sextant would be more desirable. The crew stated that the use of only optics under the conditions as previously for rendezvous noted. would not be possible

7.1.1.6 Experiments.Excellent results were obtained with most of the scheduled experiments. The D-8 experiment was to measure the radiation level and the total radiation flux inside the spacecraft during 2 passes through the South Atlantic anomaly. Data were obtained by the pilot during the first scheduled period using the portable

r

UNCLASSIFIED

7-6

UNCLASSIFIED

sensor head in all six required positions. No further D-8 measurements were attempted. At single-point release on the main parachute, the D-8 portable sensor came loose lh'om its mounting, hit the instrument panel, and dropped to the floor. It was determined during the crew debriefing that the crew may not have properly secured the sensor. The S-5 synoptic terrain photography experiments were completed and nearly all film was used. The S-5 photography was hampered and the S-6 photography was enhanced because of the extensive cloud coverage. All photography was performed by the crew without updating from the ground. The dim-light photography was accomplished by using one complete film pack of the black and white film and approximately 15 exposures on the second of the two film packs carried. 7.1. i. 7 Crew housekeeping.The crew ate when they could, and a total of three meals were eaten during the mission. The crew had no problems with the water system. The extra water bags were left stowed. The total water consumed was 129 half-ounces for the command pilot and 163 half-ounces for the pilot. The crew decided to leave the urine nozzle stawed and wear their urine collection devices until after rendezvous. The urine adapter hose was very difficult to install. It took 20 to 30 minutes, with both men working hard, in order to couple the hose fitting to the spacecraft quick-disconnect on the water management panel. This condition was discovered prior to flight but there was not sufficient time to correct the problem. The use of a low-residue preflight diet eliminated the need for defecation. At the start of the sleep period, the crew powered dawn only nonrequired systems and did not use the silence switches. The sleep period was in reasonable accordance with the flight-plan schedule. The cockpit was cluttered uz_til termination of the rendezvous maneuver. The crew generally utilized the same stowage techniques developed by the Gemini V crew. The aft stowage containers were not utilized until after the rendezvous maneuver was completed. The bags stowed in the left aft box released a material similar to lint in large amounts when opened. In these while the debris settled out. instances, visors had to be closed

--.

The camera box A-frame bent as a result of cabin pressurization and the crew was forced to use the water gun lan_rd and pin to keep it closed. Prior to reentry, 20 minutes of intense effort was required by both crew members to close this container. Other than this anomaly, stowage was generally as anticipated. All equipment except the water

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7-7

bags was stowed in the retro-stowage areas. Extensive use of tape aided stowage as well as holding down extraneous debris in the cabin. 7.1.1.8 Retrofire and reentry.- Stowage was initiated approximately 3 hours prior to retrofire, and the spacecraft was powered up at 19 hours, 12 minutes g.e.t. The platform was aligned during approximately a one-orbit period, and the crew was prepared for retrofire at least 1 hour preceding this event. Preretrofire events were nominal, and the crew's d@scription of the events was similar to that of previous crews. Firing of the retrorockets occurred automatically with the pilot providing manual backup after the first retrorocket ignition. The crew noted that there was a distinct pause between ignition of each retrorocket, such that this maneuver seemed like four individual retrorocket maneuvers. The command pilot controlled the spacecraft within 1 ° of the nominal retroattitude utilizing the rate command control mode and both RCS rings. Attitude and rates were controlled by reference to the FDI displayed rates and the attitude indicator, with the lighting conditions in the cabin on full bright. The horizon was not visible during the night retrofire. Shortly after a nominal jettisoning of the retropackage and docking bar, the crew checked the computer for FDI needle bias, and marked the FDI display with the proper null position. The spacecraft was rolled to the full-lift position and this position was maintained until 400K feet at which time the spacecraft was banked left to 55 °. At guidance initiate, the rate command mode was selected utilizing ring-A, and the command pilot initially controlled the spacecraft based on the reentry displays. The command pilot commented that the oscillations were not so severe during this period as to require the rate command mode, and that a less-fuel-expending control mode could have been used. Prior to 100K feet, ring-A fuel was depleted and the spacecraft rotated back to the full-lift position. The pilot immediately turned on ring-B and the propgr bank angle was reestablished. At this time, the cross-range needle deflected full right and remained in this position in spite of crew attempts to get it back to the center position. At 80K feet the reentry solution terminated and the rate position was selected to continue to damp the oscillations. The oscillations were very close to zero at drogue parachute deployment. The drogue parachute was deployed as 50K feet was registering _on the altimeter and the 40.6K-foot light illuminated almost immediately thereafter. Prior to drogue parachute disreefing, the oscillations increased, however, they decreased very rapidly subsequent to drogue parachute disreefing, and the spacecraft was very stable upon reaching 30K feet.

f

F

UNCLASSIFIED

7-8

UNCLASSIFIED

The main parachute was deployed at 10.6K feet on the altimeter, with good correlation between the altimeter and the 10.6K barostat light. The crow braced themselves for two-point suspension in a manner very similar to that used successfully by previous flight crews; however, the co_nand pilot's visor was cracked as a result of contacting the _rist ring. Because of slight oscillations on the main parachute, the crew could see the ocean intermittently. The spacecraft contacted the water with a reading of approximately 100 feet on the altimeter which had been set to the local atmospheric pressure. The spacecraft, upon landing, tilted forward, rolled left approximately 90 ° submerging the left window, and immediately stabilized to the proper flotation position. The crew did not observe any water leaks, and they proceeded with the postlanding checklists. Good communications with recovery forces were maintained throughout the recovery period and the high frequency (HF) communication test _as accomplished with excellent results. Initially the crew was informed that they were 33 miles from the recovery ship. This caused them to contemplate removing their suits until they were told shortly thereafter that the recovery ship was 12 miles from their position. The flotation collar was attached to the spacecraft very shortly after landing, and the crew opened their hatches to obtain fresh air. Prior to recovery by the prime recovery ship, the crew closed the hatches, and before egressing they completely powered down the spacecraft. 7.1.1.9 Mission trainin_ and trainin_ evaluation.Crew training was accomplished generally as planned and outlined in the Gemini VI Training Plan. The crew's familiarity with the spacecraft and proficiency in systems operation were obtained over a long period of time as a result of their extensive training as the backup crew for Gemini III. Table 7.1-I contains a sun_nary of the Gemini VI-A crew training for this mission. Because Gemini V!-A was the first rendezvous mission and because of the extensive training received as a backup crew for the Gemini III mission, training was focused on the develolmment of crew procedures and techniques as well as development of crew proficiency in accomplishing rendezvous under both nominal and contingency conditions. The contractor's rendezvous and reentry simulators were used for initial crew rendezvous training before the Gemini mission simulator became suitably operational for this purpose. The rendezvous training accomplished at the contractor site was also useful because it provided the crew an excellent means for making inputs into the Gemini VI-A rendezvous mission planning and procedures development.

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7-9

Overall, training in the Gemini-mission-simulator was adequate. The visual display system of the Cape Kennedy simulator was very valuable in crew preparation for the rendezvous _ask. There were problems throughout the training period in aligning the system so that correct star patterns were synchronized with the orbit and the position of the simulated target flashing light agreed with radar boresight. The launch-reentry and simulated-network simulations were valuable crew training programs; however, the network simulations were of little value to the cre_ because crew participation in them Ms limited to the launch phase.

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! TABLE 7.1.1-1.CREW TRAINING SDMMARY O

Training

activity

Prime command pilot hr:rain runs

Prime pilot hr: min runs

Backup command pilot hr: min runs

Backup pilot hr: min runs

Spacecraft

tests simulator simulator

41:27 102:30 32 25 22:30 107 4:00 2:00

44:30 112:15 32 17 28:30 79 4:00 2:00 1 60

40:07 56:00 22

41:37 96:15 22 33 Z

Gemini mission C Contractor Contractor r--

rendezvous reentry

simulator

Translation and docking simulator Lattuch abort and reentry simulator Water egress

8:00 80

25:00 127 r--

Pad egress Parachute _.'_ Zero-g Planetarium Sextant Gemini Gemini and Agena mockups and Agena systems briefings

2:00 i

2:00 i 40 _--11

8:00 13:00 50:30 23:00 30:00 8:00

8:00 34:30 13:00 50:30 23:00 30:00 8:00

8:00 13:00 50:30 21:30 30:00 ll:O0

8:00 15:O0 13:00 50:30 21:30 30:00 ll:00

Experiments Flight Mission

briefings

plan reviews rules reviews

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NASA-S-66-2741 MAR Revolution count _, ;round
--O0

Revolution count Ground elapsed time Night Day _ ,
-OS

e,apsed time
CNV TLaunc h Align platform Voice recorder -off Reentry update BDA _lnsertion checklist check (HF only) Communications

Day Night

I

TAN

130 ° Transfer

translation

i l

ASC

Scanne_ check Radiator in flow posiUon d CSQ

TAlign 1
81,8

p_atform ° Correction translation

TAN

-CRO Radiator Go--no-go
m Ol

-check 06 HAW

33.b ° Correction translation Brake to 40> R >25 Brake to 4 R/see Null Rat 20 feet _Align -platfonn Delayed-time tape playback

--

m

--

HAW

Translation

update

mm

GYMTAlign_ TEX CNV BDA

platform Belayed-Ume tape playback

i

-RKV -Command pilot staLion keep at 100 D-8 experilnent feet

m

Height adjust translation TranslaUon update

ASC -02 TAN -/CRO M=2 Phase adjust translation update CSQ Align platform - 07

Spacecraft

7 tbruster

plun/e photos

ilot station

keep at 100

feet

Translation

Cornnland pilot station keeg at>lOO Delayed-time tape playback HAW In-plane flyaround ft7:

ft

lign platform Plane adjust translation

Eat

-l _ l

03

HAWT_,lignplatform Spacecraft 7: I Trailspender - on I GYM Minor beiqht adjust translation Delayed-time Spacecraft 7 a'cquisition update TEX Acquire spacecraft 7 tape CNV

- ,IA

- 08
I l

I;
D-8 Pilot

p......

I Power downplatforlnlPer;°d

T _L

0ut-of-plane

flyaxeund

A -i SC

Translation

update T playback| -TAN RKV I

station keep at i00

feet and

lign platform endezvous test check

anslate to 20 feet

TAN i_lign CircularizaUon platform Acquire 1 --HAW i GYM TEX I l 04 CSQ spacecraft

translation 7

period Eat

ISgacecraft : 7

I Station 6:

keep at 300>R>20 TIirlJster phnne

ftI

CompuLer - rendezvous

CSQ/
= 09 HAW 1

_-Spacecraft

First AV T displayed _'Range readouts and check _ iamld adapter pbotograpby

Update separationburn Flyaround to snlall end forward position Delayed-time tape playback

Range readouts and checks l
1 1

Delayed-Ume tape playback

--

-RKV

T I Station keeping

l

05

l

1

0

(a) Oto 10 hours g.e.t. Figure 1. 1. 1-1. - Summary flight plan.

F

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NASA-S-66-2742 MAR Revolution count Ground elapsed time Revolution count

Night _l, _I' Day -- Ground
--15 1

elapsed time

Night Day

--10

1 StaUon keeping

CTN CSQ _

--

__
1 _

ANT

9 ft/sectrallslation RKV Delayed-time tape playback -CYI Delayed-time playback extant sigbtings

IS

KNO

tape

--17

CRO

CSQ

Both CTN Planned _allding area updates T -1 -- -__ ANT BDA Delayed-time

I
RKV Delayed-timetape playback period

sleep period

--18

CYI

playback

I
KNC Sextant siQIitings

1
translation

1

9 ft/sec F __ CSQ -I S-6

Posigrade

_L
Eat

-1

CRO

tape

Crew statusreport(command pilotand pilot) Platform - off IGS power - off

--I4

--19 Pilot awake -_-II

1

1

I

_

--

1

TEX CNV BDA T

Secondary coolant pump - off IGS power - on Platform - on Delayed-time tape playback

1

1

RKV

Delayed-time tape playback

--

CYI

1"
T

umi_ity sensor check

10

- i5 1

KNO (b) 10to Figure 20 hours .e.t..

--20
7. 1. 1-1. - Continued.

Comand

pilot

awakel--_

1

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UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-2743 AR M Revolution count Ground elapsedtime
_--20 -CRO S-5 and S-6 experirrent --_ 16 -13 ---1 -GYM TEX CNV BDA CYI --21 T KNO S-5 and S-6 experiment Dim light sequel_ce 2 Delayed-time tape playback CTN --' __N ig ht Eat period | _'1 Retrofire (25:15:58) _ _' -HAW TR- 00:04:16 Area- 17-1 GYM CNV 8DA End blackout Droguedeployment Main chute deployed Touchdownblackout TEX Begin Checklist Night

Revolutioncount Day | Groundelapsedtime
--25

Day

1

--

TAN

I

14

--

CRO

--22 CTN Delayed-time __ -_ -- -GYM TEX CNV Crew status report BDA tape playback --

CYI ---23 _ 15 -CRO

T S-5 and S-6 experiment 1 1

CTN __ __ ---l --CRO 16 --25 Align platform (C) 201o 26 hours fg.e,t.
l

HAW l 24 GYMTAIign platform

__

T X± s-sa,, S-Ooxge.,.,o,.t - ,me Be, yo BDA tape
TR-Ot:O0:O0 Start prerettochecklist ASC Align platfoml playback

--

TAN l

Figure 7. 1. 1-1. - Concluded.

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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLAIk_

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7.1.2 Gemini VI-A Pilots' Report

7-1

7.1.2.1 Powered flight.- The noise of the turbines and the engines coming up to full thrust gave the crew a positive indication of ignition, and a noticeable decrease in noise and vibration provided a good indication of lift-off. At lift-off, the crew noticed a physiological cue, which was later explained as a small roll transient. The programmed roll started at about lift-off (DO) plus 17 seconds, and was completed a little after 20 seconds from lift-off. Pitch programming started on time, and cabin pressure relieved and sealed at 5.5 psi. The noise during maximum dynamic pressure was not objectionable. The onboard tapes recorded the noise as well as voice, and the crew thought that they could have transmitted through this noise level. The primary and secondary guidance were in excellent agreement and a slight yaw correction was noted at L0 plus i minute 24 seconds. Voice transmissions from the ground were received with no trouble. The transition times for the various modes of abort were received and noted onboard; and both the L0 plus i minute 45 second and LO plus 2 minute 25 second digital command system (DCS) updates to the spacecraft inertial guidance system (IGS) were received and accepted. Staging occurred at approximately LO plus 2 minutes 38 seconds. During staging, a large orange flame enveloped the spacecraft in such a way that the spacecraft appeared to fly through the burned residue of the staging event. Prior to staging, the pilot noted a string of cumulus clouds which were very white and very distinct but, subsequent to staging, the clouds appeared less white and less distinct, indicating that this residue caused a window obscuration. Radio guidance system (RGS) guidance-initiate occurred at approximately DO plus 2 minutes 50 seconds and apparently no major corrections were made (very minor flight director indications of less than 1/2 deg/sec in rate, and less than 1/2 deg in attitude error). The attitude errors were indicated by the inertial guidance system (IGS) to be nearly zero throughout the stage II flight. At LO plus 4 minutes, the spacecraft attitude display indicated that the vehicle had achieved a horizontal attitude. The acceleration increased to approximately 2g at IX) plus 4 minutes 15 seconds, and the final acceleration was 6.8g at second stage engine cutoff (SECO). A countdown to SECO was conducted by the command pilot, observing the event timer, and the pilot noted that SEC0 from IGS occurred at the same time as SEC0 from RGS. This event and all other IGS indications during the launch IGS in the ascent mode. proved the excellent performance of the

F

Immediately after a nominal separation sequence, the computer was interrogated again for velocity. At this time the total inertial velocity read 25729, and the orbital radius rate (vertical velocity) read 00025. These two values indicated that the flight path angle was zero or slightly positive and that the total insertion conditions were

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nominal. The onboard-computed maneuvers necessary to achieve the planned orbit, as well as the time from lift-off to first apogee, were read and transmitted to the flight controllers. The IVI readings after separation were ii ft/sec forward, 2 right, and 2 down. The insertion was nominal and the spacecraft was very stable prior to, during, and subsequent to spacecraft separation. The fairings were jettisoned on time and some debris was noticed. However, the crew was mainly occupied with onboard readings. The command pilot was stabilizing the spacecraft using platform indications, and the pilot was logging the insertion conditions; therefore, few out-the-window observations were made at that time. 7.1.2.2 Prerendezvous phase.- Subsequent to caging the platform small-end-forward (SEF), the platform was switched to the SEF align mode and the attitude control was changed from the manual pulse mode to the automatic platform mode to permit both crew members to complete the insertion checklist. The insertion checklist was completed at 8 minutes 58 seconds g.e.t., and the retrofire time for landing in the prime recovery area at the end of the first revolution (i alpha) was recorded. The platform alignment was completed rapidly and the primary horizon scanner appeared to operate very satisfactorily. The secondary scanner was selected and checked with attitude control in pulse mode for alignment. Checking against the horizon and the flight director indicator indicated that the secondary horizon scanner was operating with the same degree of accuracy as the primary scanner. The primary scanner was again selected at 34 minutes g.e.t., and remained on for the duration of the mission. After the first orbit was completed, the crew commented that a first-apogee rendezvous would have been difficult because of the large number of tasks involved immediately after insertion. High suit temperatures were noted at this point and steps were taken to eliminate the problem. Both crew members, subsequent to the Carnarvon pass, removed their pressure suit gloves and interliners. These items were stowed until just prior to the start of the retrofire Checklist. This procedure was used in training because it was found to be difficult to wear gloves throughout the rendezvous runs that were conducted at St. Louis, Houston, and on the Gemini mission simulator (GMS) at Cape Kennedy; therefore, the crew elected to fly with gloves off, as they had trained. All ground-computed orbit-adjustment data were received in ample time to insert the proper addresses into the onboard computer, validate the readout on the incremental velocity indicator (IVl), zero the IV!, and allow the display to be generated 30 seconds prior to the maneuver. All maneuvers were performed to an accuracy of better than _0.2 ft/see in all three body axes by reducing the computed desired-velocity-change

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7-17

displays to zero. The initial thrusts, made in either the small-endforward (SEF) or blunt-end-forward (_EF) attitude, were performed in the platform mode. The residuals, after thrusting until the IVI read i ft/sec in all axes, were typically less than 0.7 ft/sec, usually less than 0.2 to 0.3 ft/sec; The out-of-plane maneuver was conducted in rate command, with the spacecraft yawed 90o to the southeast. Two stars, Alpha and Beta Centauri, were noted while in this attitude. At this point, it would ha_e been convenient to have received star positions to use for the out-of-plane thrust. Star information would have been excellent neuver. backup data to validate the spacecraft would attitude during The coelliptic (NsR) maneuvers have required this maa 2° pitch-

down attitude from the normal SEF position. This maneuver was also conducted while in the platform mode, and the vertical component was inserted by using the down thrusters. There were no problems associated with reducing the residual velocity components from any of the maneuvers. The reporting technique was to wait until the residual velocities had been reduced to less than 0.2 ft/sec and report the final velocity change and the percentage of propellant quantity remaining. The crew was impressed with the final height-adjust maneuver of 0.8 ft/sec, and they become aware that the range tracking data were outstanding when the solution provided by these data permitted this very small correction. This continual updating and the effect of these appropriate maneuvers made the crew also aware that the network systems performance was outstanding. A recommendation to subsequent crews should be made at this point. Because of the slight cant of the lateral maneuver thrusters, it is quite difficult to apply the final thrusts and remove the residual desired changes in velocity indicated in the manual data readout unit (_DRU). The pilot devoted considerable training time, in the GMS, checking the various methods to reduce the residual velocities to acceptable levels. Both the command pilot and the pilot remember the strong impression that there was no need to know their exact position over the surface of the earth. The appropriate maneuvers were executed with time as a reference and the crew was working with ground elapsed time and radar range throughout the rendezvous until the start of station keeping. The first definitive look at the earth's surface occurred during the in-plane flyaround maneuver when spacecraft 6 was above spacecraft 7. It was difficult for the crew to effect utilization of the world orbit chart; therefore, it is reeon_nended that each range station notify the flight crew

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7-18

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of signal acquisition and of approaching loss of signal. This information would enable the flight crew to transmit all of the data that they accumulate during any previous critical time period. During the short slack periods between maneuvers, equipment was removed from its stowage position and was mounted for the rendezvous phase. This equipment included two 16mm sequence cameras and associated brackets, two 25mm lenses and lens mirrors, the spot meter, the 70mm camera with the 80mm lens, and as much film for these cameras as could be stowed in the cockpit. The world-orbit chart, the star chart, the flight plan, and the rendezvous chart were placed in their appropriate positions for in_nediate use. The period prior to the first orbit-adjust maneuver provided very little time to eat, but one meal was removed from a side stowage box and both crew members quickly ate the bite-size food. The reconstituted food was stowed on Velcro surfaces and was not eaten until the stationkeeping period. The command pilot used a chart for recording the computer outputs during the period between radar acquisition and initiation of the transfer maneuver. This chart was placed over the first-stage and second-stage propellant gages, and an abbreviated rendezvous mode checklist was attached to the instrument panel over the altimeter and rate-of-descent indicator. The time for each thrust was logged by the command pilot on the rendezvous procedure sheet. The preflight planning was directed at avoiding the requirement to use equipment that was difficult to unstow. To further simplify proce_ dures, the launch-day urine bags were worn until after the rendezvous. The crew recognized that it was important to drink enough water to maintain their total water volume. When taking the first drink from the water gun, the crew noted a number of approximately 63 000 on the counter, which required unnecessary writing in the crew log. At approximately 2 hours 45 minutes g.e.t., the command pilot installed the optical sight and checked the alignment by sighting on a star. It was noted at this time that the torque to tighten the lower attach knob affected the alignment. During rendezvous, when the knob was fully tightened, the error in the sight was 0.5° to the right for target location in relation to the radar null. 7.1.2.3 Rendezvous phase.of spacecraft 7: At approximately for acquisition of spacecraft 7 was and 5.5 ° pitch up. The ground coninitial computer readout of range at 3 hours 15 minutes g.e.t. The

7.1.2.3.1 Radar acquisition 3 hours g.e.t., the ground update received as an attitude of 0° yaw trollers also indicated that the (248 nautical miles) would occur

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F

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7-19

radar was turned on in the standby position at approximately 3 hours 5 minutes g.e.t. The analog meter indication cycled exactly as predicted, and the range and range rate indications oscillated until the set warmed up. The radar was then placed on "ON". The first radar-range readout on the MDRU was 248.66 nautical miles, which is the maximum range readable. At this time, the radar lock-on light was flickering. The radar lock-on became steady at 246.22 nautical miles. At that time, a radar test was performed with the rendezvous mode of the computer to verify the interface and sequenceing of the computer and the radar. This radar-computer test was not conclusive in that the specified 130o angle of orbit travel to rendezvous (_t) was not inserted and the last wt that was loaded was 180 °, which had been used for a prelaunch test. Subsequent to the NSR maneuver and the final switching to the rendezvous mode, the correct value of wt (130 ° ) was loaded. The computer cycled properly, holding the range in the register for i00 seconds, and the IVl's corresponded to the computer readout of total-velocity-change for rendezvous. The initial-velocity-change for target intercept was also noted, and the values were found to be decreasing as range decreased. The event timer was synchronized f utes after with the initiation of the NSR of the NSR maneuver. Four minwas switched

initiation

maneuver,

the computer

to the rendezvous mode and continuously monitored by the pilot. A time synchronization revealed that the event timer was approximately 7 seconds ahead of the computer time sequence (for 100-second intervals). The event timer was resynchronized with the computer-time and counted correctly throughout the remainder of the run. After the NSR maneuver,

the range was approximately 169 nautical miles. The pilot did not record anything on the data sheet until the values began to match the nominal values at approximately 136 nautical miles range. After that, the values were recorded and data points were frequently called to the ground. The computer solution for the total-velocity-change for rendezvous was very close to nominal. The target-centered coordinate plot (see fig. 7.1.2-1) showed that the trajectory NSR maneuver had placed spacewas craft 6 into the nominal and that the maximum deviation

approximately 0.25 mile high with no ellipticity. During this time, the elevation and azimuth pointers were oscillating approximately 11.5 ° from the electrical null. The period of the oscillation was approximately 4 seconds. As the range decreased to 97 miles, there was a noticeable reduction in the amplitude of the oscillation; however, the period remained constant. It should be noted that both the azimuth and elevation readings crossed the null point simultaneously during these oscillations. At a range of 79 miles, all pointer oscillations ceased and remained steady throughout the remainder of the rendezvous operations

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7-2o

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and down to a range of 20 feet. The radar data were continually being plotted and computations made as spacecraft 6 approached the point of terminal phase initiation. 7.1.2.3.2 Visual acquisition: Visual acquisition of spacecraft 7 occurred at 5 hours 4 minutes g.e.t., 54 miles slant-range from spacecraft 6 to spacecraft 7. The target vehicle appeared as a bright star, 0.5° to the right of the boresig_ line on the optical sight. The target appeared brighter than the star Sirius, and during postflight comparisons, the flight crew beliew_d it was probably brighter than the planet Venus. The target stayed in sight because of reflected sunlight until 05:15:56 g.e.t., or for approximately 12 minutes. Spacecraft 7 was lost in darkness about 3 minutes prior to the transfer thrust, at a range of approximately 30 miles. The crew, however, could have determined a backup solution during tl_ programmed tracking period prior to transfer, and would have been able to perform the maneuver without visual contact. 7.1.2.3.3 Terminal phase: During the terminal phase_ the crew used the data provided by the !GS (closed-loop) to perform all maneuvers. However, the pilot did make all backup computations for each maneuver in order to compare them with the results of the closed-loop solution. The target-centered coordinate plot revealed very quickly that the relative trajectory was near nominal and that the transfer thrust would be very close to the planned value of 32 ft/sec along the line of sight. For the backup procedure, the component normal to the line of sight was determined from the time changeof the total pitch angle. The ground solution, transmitted from Guaymas, indicated that the value was 31.5 ft/sec. The initial time transmitted to the flight crew for the initiation of the terminal phase was 05:16:54 g.e.t. A short time later this was refined to 05:18:54 g.e.t. The onboard computer solution gave a thrust time of 05:18:58 computed on the ground. g.e.t., 4 seconds later than that

As the point of terminal phase initiate approached, it became evident that the exact" time to initiate the maneuver would be near the halfway point between two of the computer solutions that are i00 seconds apart. At this point the crew discussed the situation'and decided to take the second of these solutions, if it still met the basic criteria. This decision was made to insure that transfer would occur from a position that would place spacecraft 6 forward and below spacecraft 7 at final rendezvous, and that brakir_ would occur slightly later than nominal rather than earlier. This was the crew's approach to being conservative with respect to the lighting conditions during the braking maneuver in that, being slightly later, it would insure that the target would be in daylight during the final approach. A pitch angle to spacecraft 7 of 20.8 deg was selected for terminal phase initiate at a range of 41.06 nautical miles. At this time the START COMPbutton was pressed,

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7-2

and the initial computer solution produced a value of 31 ft/sec fo_¢ard, 7 ft/see up (this value later decreased to 4 ft/sec up at the time of thrust), and i ft/sec right. The backup solution was computed to be 23 ft/sec forward and 2 ft/sec up, and a notation was made of this anomaly. The crew discussed the problem and decided that if a backup maneuver had been necessary they would have applied the nominal thrust of 32 ft/see. This decision was reached because of the nominal trajectories that were indicated, up to that point, on the onboard targetcentered coordinate plot. In case the radar or computer had failed, the thrusts that would have been applied were those necessary to achieve changes in velocity of 2 ft/sec up and 32 ft/see forward. After completion of the transfer thrust, the fuel remaining was 62 percent. At this point, the time system was reset to zero based on the beginning of the first computer time cycle that occurred 270 seconds after depressing the START COMP button (nominally, this time coincides with the end of the transfer maneuver). The crew used this phase elapsed time (p.e.t.) as a time reference through final rendezvous. The target was not in sight during the tight-tracking period from 3 to 5 minutes after the transfer maneuver. During the 3-to-5 minute tighttracking period, the analog range rate was 160 ft/sec at 3 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t. Computations from the onboard computer showed 156 ft/sec. At 4 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t., range rate from the analog meter was 155 ft/sec, and the computer value was 152 ft/sec. These comparisons show the close agreement between the analog meter readout and the computer solution and provided the crew with high confidence in the radar-computer _nterface. At 5 hours 23 minutes g.e.t., during the 3-to-5 minute tighttracking period, spacecraft 7 lights were barely visible and not sufficient for tracking. This time corresponds to a range of approximately 24 miles. Subsequent to _ minutes p.e.t., the spacecraft was pitched do_n to horizontal, using the direct attitude-control mode, to align the platform. It was decided that alignment would be conducted during the planned optional alignment period, from 5 minutes to i0 minutes p.e.t. This decision was based on the fact that 1.5 hours had elapsed since the last alignment. During this alignment period (with the platform in SEF, the control mode in pulse, and the flight director indicator displaying platform and attitude), very little motion was detected in the pointers, indicating that the platform had been in good alignment. In addition, the optical sight and the visible horizon also indicated good alignment before starting the align period. This excellent performance of the platform provided the crew with further confidence in the spacecraft IGS system. At i0 minutes 20 seconds p.e.t., direct control was selected and the spacecraft was pitched back up in order to track spacecraft 7. The radar lock-on light had not extinguished; therefore, lockon was continuous during the alignment period. The radar was hulled on

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_22

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the target, and the target lights appeared very dim in the sight at this time. The target lighting was evaluated as sufficient for subsequent tracking and angular measurements. At this time, an estimation was made, using the data entered on the target-centered coordinate plot, that the first mideourse correction would require slight forward and up velocities. The IVl's indicated 7 ft/sec forward, 7 ft/sec up, and 5 ft/sec left at a p.e.t, of ii minutes 40 seconds. This p.e.t, corresponds to 5:31:31 g.e.t. After the midcourse correction t_ust was applied, the IVI read zero in all axes. A second tight tracking of the target was required again between 15 minutes and 17 minutes p.e.t. It was not difficult to observe the docking light on the target spacecraft at this time. The acquisition lights did not show clearly, but they could have been tracked for backup solutions frora approximately 12 minutes after the transfer maneuver through final rendezvous. During the second period of tight tracking, the range rate was noted from the analog meter at 15 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t, and indicated 90 ft/sec. The computer data gave a range rate at this time of 91 ft/sec. At 16 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t., the analog meter indicated a range rate of 85 ft/sec and the onboard computed range rate was also 85 ft/sec. At 17 minutes p.e.t, the range to the target was 7.7 nauti_ cal miles. After this data point was obtained, the desired velocity changes in guidance axes were zeroed in the computer, and tight tracking was maintained for a period of 3 minutes to determine the backup solution for a normal-to-the-line-of-sight correction. The command pilot remarked that the spacecraft 7 docking light was as bright as the Agena. At 16 minutes p.e.t. (5:]55:51 g.e.t.) the pilot remarked that he could see the docking light even though he had a brightly lighted area in the cockpit. The docking light on spacecraft 7 was displaced 0.5° to the right of the zero position in the optical sight, while using the radar null as the pointing command. Farther to the left, approximately i0° , two bright stars, Castor and Pollux, were in sight. These stars provided excellent pitch, roll, and yaw reference. In addition, there were sufficient stars near and around the target to permit good tracking. It was also noted that the docking light obscured the acquisition lights because of its relatively greater brilliance. However, the spacecraft 6 crew requested that the spacecraft 7 docking light be left on. The target-centered coordinate plot indicated that small up and forward corrections would be required for the second mid-course correction. The backup solution indicated 6 ft/sec up. No backup velocity correction along the line of sig_ could be obtain@d because the computer math flow locked out ranges at this time. At 23 minutes 40 seconds p.e.t., the computer solution gave a correction of 4 ft/sec forward, 3 ft/see up,

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7-23

and 6 ft/sec right. When this maneuver was completed, the IVI was zeroed and the computer switched to the catchup mode. The pilot then cleared b{DRU addresses 25, 26, and 27 (X, Y, and Z, desired velocity changes in guidance axes) and the IV! displayed all zeros. From this point_ the pilot continually called out the pitch angle to spacecraft 7 as it increased and the range decreased. The command pilot, at this point_ acquired a very good star pattern to maintain a celestial line of sight. Very little motion was discerned during this period. The target-centered coordinate plot indicated a flight path that was forward of and nearly parallel to the nominal trajectory. At one point, the pilot stated that it appeared as if the target were going up; however, the command pilot decided not to make any changes at that time. At a range of 2 miles it again appeared from the pilot's plot that the target was going up a small amount, but there was no apparent motion in relation to the star background. At 5 hours 46 minutes g.e.t., no relative motion was observable. The range rate was approximately 42 ft/sec, and at 05:48:11 g.e.t., the target appeared to start moving down a small amountbut this relative motion was stopped. At this point, the START COMP button was pressed. This caused all subsequent changes in velocity to be displayed in cumulative totals. At 05:49:06 g.e.t., both the colmmand pilot and the pilot noted that the reentry control system (RCS) heater light came on at the telelight panel. This was at a range of i mile. This indicates that the panel was observable to the crew during this critical period. The total pitch angle_ from 1.30 nautical miles into station keeping at 120 feet, was approximately 125 ° . 7.1.2.3.4 Braking maneuver: During the terminal phase a combination of radar display and optical tracking was utilized by the command pilot with the platform continually in orbital rate. The target held steady on the indicator throughout the terminal phase maneuver. At 05:49:41 g.e.t., the command pilot remarked that the docking quite bright, and the pilot noted the same thing. light was

At 0.74 mile range (05:49:58 g.e.t. ), the pilot noted that the target appeared to be moving down. This comment was prompted as a result of seeing sunlight reflected off frost particles leaving spacecraft 6 and confusing them with stars. Spacecraft 6 was approaching the BEF attitude (spacecraft 6 was 30 ° beyond the local vertical). The ballistic number of these particles was such that they trailed the spacecraft, tending to move upward toward the nose of the spacecraft. As the crew observed the frost particles, they appeared to go up in relation to this apparent star field. There were stars still visible beyond these bright particles and these stars confirmed that the target was not moving in relation to the stars. This illusion for the pilot developed from the lighting conditions in the right crew station. This side of the cockpit was lighted sufficiently to permit the pilot to record data and work with the computer throughout this period. As a result, when

"-

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he made an out-the-window observation, he could not see the stars, and the particles appeared as stars to him. (This could have resulted in additional fuel expenditures if both the command pilot and the pilot had reacted identically. ) At 0.48 mile range, the crew started decelerating spacecraft 6 from a closing range rate of approximately 42 ft/sec. During this period, there appeared to be no out-of-pl_ne motion. As the braking continued, the velocity was reduced in a continuous thrust. The command pilot peered behind the black shield on the vernier scale until the pointer for range rate just appeared, having determined in the training simulator that this represented approximately 7 ft/sec. At this point, thrust was terminated and the range was approximately 1200 feet. The target had dropped slightly ar,d a downward thrust was also added. At 800 feet range, 32 minutes after the translation maneuver, the closing velocity was approximately 6 ft/sec and the IVl's were cleared. The cumulative velocity changes at this point read 27 ft/sec aft, 14 ft/see left, and 7 ft/see down. The total distance encompassed during the braking maneuver was 0.24 nautical miles (from 0.48 to 0.24 n. mi. from the target). When the range was 0.20 nautical miles, the pilot called the range to spacecraft 7 in feet to the ground and to the command pilot. At a range of approximately 700 feet, the sunlight illuminated spacecraft 7 and the target was so bright that no stars were visible. The total impact of the brightness was as if a carbon arc lamp had been turned on immediately in front of spacecraft 6. The range decreased nominally, during which time both the pilot and command pilot continually commented on the brightness of the target. Because of the brightness, the radar display and the flight director attitude indicator (FDAI) were then used for tracking. As spacecraft 6 approached a range of 300 feet from spacecraft 7, the pitch angle decreased to 90o and held that value. Spacecraft 6 then continued to approach from directly below spacecraft 7. At 240 feet, all rates in translation, except the closing velocity, had been reduced to zero. The closing velocity was being reduced by a series of small thrusts to approximately 2 ft/sec. Finally, at a range of ]20 feet, all relative motion between the two spacecraft was stopped at approximately 36 minutes after the translation maneuver. The final braking maneuver was difficult because of (1) the brightness of the reflected sunlight from the target at a range of approximately 700 feet, and (2) the fact that the crew could no longer use stars as a reference. Also, the target spacecraft was changing pitch attitude in order to track spacecraft 6 and, as a visible object, could

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not be used for attitude reference maneuver of spacecraft 6. A very low, relative with relation to motion

7-25
in a pitch

translation

rate

remained

near

the end of the

braking maneuver. Spacecraft 6 had moved from a pitch angle of 90 ° to a pitch angle of 60° by the time the forward relative velocity was reduced to zero. The crew elected to continue this motion at a 120-foot radius, pitching down to the SEF attitude, and holding this position. At this point, spacecraft 6 was in the SEF position, with spacecraft 7 facing it in BEF_ and all relative motion was stopped. The attitude control system was placed in SEFplatform control mode, and all maneuvers were then performed with the maneuver controller. The performance of the guidance and control system and radar system during all phases of rendezvous was excellent and the use of radar for rendezvous was shown to be extremely valuable. Throughout the rendezvous phase, the radar maintained positive lock-on and an accurate indication of range was available through the minimum readable value of 60 feet. The attitude indications were steady throughout the entire maneuver. 7.1.2.4 Station keeping.- From the crew's analysis of the timing, spacecraft 6 arrived in formation with spacecraft 7 about 23 seconds earlier than predicted prior to lift-off. In the SEF attitude, the distance between the spacecraft was closed to approximately 6 to lO feet in order to observe spacecraft 7 in detail. Still photographs and motion pictures were taken and all exposure values were determined with the spot meter. The results of this photography indicate that a spot meter is a valuable aid in photographing objects in space. Initially, station keeping was accomplished in platform mode with minute thrust motions made with the maneuver controller. Shortly after the start of station keeping, the sun striking the command pilot's window completely obscured his view of spacecraft 7. The pilot gave voice positions of the target, and finally_ control was passed to the pilot for approximately 1 minute until the spacecraft moved out of this sun angle. (This effect will continue to be a problem for station keeping.) The crew did not elect to do the in-plane fly-around at this point because they wanted to determine the composition of the strap observed hanging from the adapter of spacecraft 7. Shortly thereafter, the Gemini VII crew informed the Gemini VI-A crew that they also had a strap hanging from their adapter. This subsequently was determined to be part of the shaped charge holders. (See section 5.1.9.) During the final portion of the first daylight period, station keeping was conducted in platform mode and finally in pulse mode when it was determined to be an easy task. Spacecraft 6 closed to about i foot, nose to nose with spacecraft 7, and it was concluded that

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docking would not present any problems. It was also noted during this period that one spacecraft could influence the horizon scanners of the other spacecraft. During the first night period, station keeping was maintained at ranges varying from 20 to 60 feet and the spacecraft were nose to nose. During the transition from daylight to night, the blurred horizon caused the scanner to lose track; therefore, orbit rate was selected prior to entering this period to avoid any transients that might occur during the period of scanner loss. Station was maintained by first using the docking light and platform mode, then with the docking light and pulse mode, then without the docking light and using the illuminated windows of spacecraft 7 as a reference. D_ing a subsequent night pass, an outof-plane position was encountered where the crew could not see the window of spacecraft 7. The hand-held penlights were then utilized to illuminate spacecraft 7 at a range of approximately 30 or 40 feet. The crew determined that they had sufficient lighting for station keeping. The most efficient way to conduct station keeping was to maintain station in horizon scan mode, letti_ the spacecraft drift in yaw. The recommended position for maintaining station is in the out-of-plane position, rather than trying to maintain station above or below the spacecraft. This provides a visual aid in that the horizon relative to the target permits holding pitch and roll relatively steady in the horizon scan mode. During the second daylight period, spacecraft 7 was scheduled to perform an experiment and conduct a small amount of station keeping. To provide a fixed target for the D-4/D-7 experiment, spacecraft 6 was moved to a nose-to-nose position, 20 feet from spacecraft 7. The amount of fuel remaining in spacecraft 7 did not permit more than about 2 to 3 minutes of station keeping, and both the co,and pilot and pilot maneuvered off the nose of spacecraft 6 for this period. Subsequent to the station keeping performed by spacecraft 7, spacecraft 6 again picked up the nose position and the co_nd pilot initiated an in-plane flyaround. The in-plane fly-aroumd was conducted for 20 minutes starting at 7 hours 42 minutes g.e.t. The pilot conducted an out-of-plane flyaround for ii minutes starting at 8 hours i0 minutes g.e.t. The command pilot, during the in-plane fly-around, allowed the range between the two spacecraft to increase to an estimated 300 feet. The relative position of spacecraft 6 at that time was above spacecraft 7, and slightly to the rear. This distance appeared to be excessive for proper station keeping and the range was quickly reduced to less than i00 feet. The radar system was not used during the station-keeping period. These ranges were determined both by visual observation in relation to the 10-foot diameter of the spacecraft as viewed through the

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optical sight during the flight and by measurements photographs taken with known optical systems. after

7- 7
the flight of

It is recommended that station keeping not be conducted in-plane above or below the target. The ideal condition for station keeping is SEF or BEF in platform mode; however, station keeping can easily be conducted out-of-plane at ranges up to 60 or 80 feet without losing the perceptive cues that pilots have learned to recognize in formation flying with aircraft. The smallest distance between spacecraft 6 and spacecraft 7 during station keeping was approximately i foot, and both the command pilot and pilot flew at this distance with great ease. This, of course, greatly enhanced the crew's confidence in the control system for subsequent station-keeping operations. The control-system response can be described as perfect. The torque-to-inertia ratios of the attitude control system using the pulse mode, and thrust-to-inertia ratios of the translation system using minute inputs, were excellent for the station keeping performed during this mission. Docking with a target vehicle could have been easily executed by applying a small burst of forward thrust from the 1-foot range. 7.1.2.5 Separation maneuver.- The next event was the separation maneuver and the Apollo sextant sightings. The separation thrust was initiated at ll:14:31 g.e.t, with spacecraft 6 in the SEF position, 15 to 20 feet from spacecraft 7 in the BEF position. All rates and translation velocities were nulled in order to achieve zero relative velocity with respect to spacecraft 7. The separation thrust was conducted with the crew using the displays from the inertial guidance system to provide a retrograde separation of 9 ft/sec. The Apollo sextant sightings were conducted with Sirius as the basic reference star. Data were collected by the pilot and recorded by the command pilot. During preflight planning, the crew decided to have the platform, computer, and radar in operation for correlation with the sextant sightings and this was done. The time of the sightings was logged by the photo event indicator on the telemetry channel. The event timer was observed continually during these sightings, but its accuracy was about 0.2 sec at best. Therefore, the data should be considered to be only as accurate as the timing system. The spacecraft 7 docking light was used initially during the separation maneuver but was later turned off because the target vehicle was not being held to a fixed attitude. The flashing lights were observed for short periods, between which they would disappear completely because of the changing attitude of spacecraft 7. The last visual contact with the lights on spacecraft 7 was at 9.70 miles, and, subsequent to that point, they were no longer visible.

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After spacecraft 7 moved into the daylight, a visibility test was conducted to determine the amount of sunlight reflected from spacecraft 7 while spacecraft 6 changed attitude with respect to the sun. The inverted position and sideways positions were noted, and no appreciable change could be observed in the reflected light from spacecraft 7. Also, at this time, no stars could be observed in the inverted position even though the sun was being blocked from the windows of spacecraft 6. The last observable object, other than spacecraft 7, was the planet Jupiter, which was visible for a very short period after sunrise occurred. Spacecraft 6 was predominately BEF at this point, and the attitudes were adjusted from BEF to c_timize visual observation of stars and spacecraft 7. Spacecraft 7 was visible when spacecraft 6 was in the true BEF attitude (0° roll, 180 ° yaw, and 0° pitch) throughout most of the daylight period after the initial night period following separation. In the second night period, the spacecraft 7 acquisition lights were visible intermittently to the pilot who was using the 4-power magnification of the sextant. The brightness of the star Sirius, when brought together with the image of spacecraft 7 to get the angular displacement, blanked out the small apparent light from spacecraft 7. The intervals of time that spacecraft 7 acquisition lights could be observed were a maximum of 5 to l0 seconds long, and the total motion of the sextant to bring the star and the spacecraft 7 together could not be achieved in these short periods of time. The acquisition lights were spotted very faintly for only a few seconds at a range of 16.33 nautical miles. During this time, spacecraft 7 was in a tumbling or drifting mode, and the radar continued to maintain lock-on and range readout to the last sighting attempt which was approximately 20 miles from spacecraft 7. Subsequent to this last attempt for a sextant sighting, the crew prepared for their sleep period. The posigrade thrust maneuver of 9 ft/sec was initiated at 13:25:52 g.e.t. This thrust put spacecraft 6 in an equal-period orbit with spacecraft 7 and leading by approximately 30 miles. The sleep perio_ started at approximately 15 hours g.e.t.; the command pilot stated that he slept for approximately 5 hours, and the pilot stated that he slept for approximately 4 hours. The crew was awakened by a call from spacecraft 7 to the ground requesting the retro-time of spacecraft 6. This call noted the time would be 14 hours 53 minutes G.m.t. and indicated that spacecraft 6 had approximately 4 orbits left. The crew performed minor housekeeping duties, powered up the spacecraft, and obtained dim-light-phenomena photographs during revolutions 13 and 14. Experiments S-5 and S-6 were also conducted during revolutions 13 and 14, and part of revolution 15. The majority of the photographs were of

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weather phenomena observed. because only very small areas of land masses

7-29
could be

The flight controller at the Mission Control Center requested that the radar be turned on during revolution 14 to perform range measurements. The radar locked on and performed as well as it had during the rendezvous. During the radar test, the spacecraft 7 acquisition lights were observed for ond data point at 22:12:00 g.e.t. At 25:15:58 g.e.t., all of the items required for retrofire had been checked and the cockpit was in the proper configuration. The RCS had performed satisfactorily, and spacecraft 6 was in rate command, pitched dowu20 ° for the retrofire maneuver. Retrofire was initiated exactly on time at 25:15:58 g.e.t. The disturbance torques indicated that the first retrorocket was slightly misaligned and there was a pause between each of the retrorocket firings, long enough to permit the IVI's to stop counting up between each rocket firing. The final readout of the IVI's was 309 ft/sec aft, 1 ft/sec right, and ll6 ft/sec down. This number changed to 310 ft/sec subsequent to jettisoning the retrosections, indicating a slight change in velocity during retroadapter jettison. 7.1.2.6 Reentry.- At the time of retro-adapter jettison, the docking bar, which had been deployed, was jettisoned and a large number of sparks appeared which can be described as similar to a Roman candle. The spacecraft was then put in the heads-down (inverted) attitude and was flown in pulse mode with one ring of the reentry control system activated. Because of the night retrofire, the horizon did not come into view until shortly before an altitude of 400K feet was reached. Prior to this, the reentry logic was checked. For this check, the computer outputs were selected for display on the flight director indicator and there appeared to be a shift in the electrical null of the command pilot's indicator of approximately2 1/2 pointer-widths down. The pilot's indicator was reading approximately 2 pointer-widths down. The command pilot and the pilot both marked their instrument faces for these new electrical nulls, and decided to fly to that point for landing. The pointer displacement that had been noted throughout the flight had been approximately one-half pointer-width down for the command pilot; therefore, after retrofire the system appeared to have shifted an additional 2 pointer-widths down, representing a 12-mile overshoot for landing. A bank angle of 55 ° left was attained in pulse mode, ring A, and held until guidance initiate at approximately 280K feet. The first error indication on the display was cross range to the right, indicating that spacecraft 6 was left, or north, of the desired path. The value of cross range indicated was approximately 1.5° to 2° right, and the value of down range, indicated from the center point of the horizon, was approximately 2.5_ do_m, or an indicated 55-to-60 mile overshoot.

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The control configurations used during reentry started with ring A in the pulse mode which provided sufficient authority to maintain the bank angle. When guidance initiate occurred the bank angle was increased to approximately 55 ° to effect correction of the down-range needle. This increased bank angle provided decreased lift and brought the down-range needle up toward the reference marking on the instrument face. As the needles started moving, the bank angle was decreased to approximately 45 ° which was very close to the updated bank angles of 47° right and left. When the down-range needle reached the reference marking, the cross range became zero and crossed to the opposite side. The pointers were allowed to move slightly above the reference marking to permit a roll to the right which in turn produced a small increment of lift and brought the pointer back to the zero point. A right bank angle was selected to bring the cross-range pointer back to the center or null position. This particular reentry condition_ where the initial errors were small, had not been practiced on the simulator. As a result, to reverse the bank angle rapid_y, to reduce transients, and to keep the pointer exactly on the mark, the rate command control mode was selected for the reverse bank maneuver. This control mode provided the authority to reverse bank immediately and keep the rates damped. The reverse bank was held at approximately 47 °. When the cross-range pointer came back to the center, the control was reversed to a left bank angle of approximately 45° . The cross range held null, but, after the time of peak acceleration, the pointer started moving to the right, indicating a landing north of the desired landing point. The bank angle was increased slightly to between 500 and 55°; however, the cross range error continued increasing to the rigkb, but did not go beyond the full deflection position on the low scale. As the reentry accelerations were decreasing from the peak of 4.3g, the fuel in ring A of the reentry control system was exhausted. (This was noted because there was no apparent response to the roll command from the attitude control stick.) The redundant ring 9 was selected and the desired bank angle was re-established. As the reentry continued, the down-range pointer held at the reference mark, and the bank angle was increased to favor the cross-range error which was off to the right and holding steady. This was the final error indication as the spacecraft passed through 80K feet, at which time the cross-range pointer was displaced to the right and the downrange error indication was locked on the reference line. This bank angle was maintained to drogue parachute deployment. 7.1.2.7 Landing and recove_.The postlanding condition was nomiExcellent }{F communications were established with the Mission Con-

nal.

trol Center at Cape Kennedy. The spacecraft was in excellent condition and the crew elected to open the hatches to provide cooling after the flotation collar had been installed and inflated. The hatches were secured prior to the spacecraft being hoisted aboard the carrier

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7-3_

U.S.S. Wasp. After the spacecraft was secured in the recovery transportation dolly, the power-down sequence was accomplished and the crew egressed to the deck of the ship.

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(fine scale)

Elevation ngle, deg. a Figure7.1.2-1. - Onboard target-centeredoordinateplotof rendezvous. c

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7.2 AEROM_D!CAL

7-33

_he Gemini VI-A mission presented two new major aspects of the manned spaceflight program to medical support personnel. First, this was the initialflight in a planned series of rendezvous missions. In these missions there are essentially no new or novel environmental conditions imposed upon the crew. Major emphasis shifted from attempting to detect and record all biomedical changes in the crew members_ which might result from the space-flight experience, to attempting to provide optimum operational medical support and monitoring for mission safety. Second, the fact that Gemini VI-A was launched approximately i week after Gemini VII afforded medical personnel an early opportunity to evaluate the adequacy of plans for simultaneous medical assessment and support of up to six crewmen in the available facilities at the Kennedy Space Flight Center. In responding to these new mission support requirements, medical operations personnel gained understanding which will permit realistic_ detailed planning for medical support of future space missions.

7.2.1 f •

Preflight

7.2.1.1 Clinical background data.- Pertinent medical records were reviewed and summarized for the prime and backup crews. Because the command pilot of the flight crew and both members of the backup crew had previous space-flight experience, clinical and physiological data characterizing the individual responses of these men to actual flight were available for direct comparison with data obtained during the Gemini VI-A mission. Testing for drug sensitivity and skin reaction to the biosensor materials was finished in early October, 1965, in preparation for the first attempted launch of Gemini VI. It was not necessary to repeat these procedures. 7.2.1.2 Tilt-table tests.- Since significant changes in the reflex responses of the cardiovascular system have been measured in all Gemini missions, similar changes were expected to occur during the Gemini VI-A flight. _hree preflight tilt-table tests were conducted on each of the flight crew members, and the results were tabulated and plotted for comparison with postflight measurements. Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2 present these tilt responses. 7.2.1. 3 Physical fitness and diet.- _he command pilot thought that the best physical preparation for the mission would consist of physical activity commensurate with the amount of exercise he anticipated would be required in the conduct of the flight. _his approach was based on the assumption that the probability of an emergency landing, which would place high demands on the crew for feats of physical strength and

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endurance, was so low as to be negligible. The pilot had adopted a routine to achieve and maintain a high level of physical stamina at the time he entered into crew training. It was his practice to exercise vigorously for approximately i hour a day, using a program designed to maintain a high level of strength and endurance. He continued on this program until the morning of the flight. _he crew wished to avoid the necessity for defecation during the flight in order not to be distracted from their progress toward the accomplishment of rendezvous. _hey scheduled a preflight trial on a lowresidue diet with administration of a mild laxative planned at the conclusion of the low-residue dietary period. The crew determined, to their satisfaction_ that use of the low-residue diet and laxative regime would increase the probability that they could fly up to 48 hours, if necessary, without discomfort or inconvenience because of a requirement for bowel evacuation. The low-residue diet and laxative regime were employed during the final 4 days prior to the scheduled launch on October 25, 1965, and on December 9, 1965, in anticipation of launch on December 12. When this second launch attempt was postponed, the crew remained on the low-residue diet in preparation for the rescheduled launch date of December 15_ 1965. 7.2.1.4 Medical examinations and crew status.- Both members of the flight crew developed mild upper respiratory infections during the last 2 weeks prior to their scheduled launch date of December 12_ 1965. Each reported the symptoms immediately_ the condition was treated_ and was followed closely by the crew flight surgeons. The illness was diagnosed as a localized viral upper respiratory infection and was treated without antibiotics. The flight crew was examined on December i, December 9, December 12, and December 15, 1965. They were found medically qualified for flight on each occasion. Results of blood and urine analyses performed in conjunction with the first two examinations are shown in Tables 7.2-1 through 7.2-11!. During the for Gemini VI-A flight crew for cal examination examination was December i, 1965, ex_nination, the flight and backup crews were examined by the crew flight surgeons while the Gemini VII was undergoing a comprehensive F-3 day mediby the team of specialist consultants. This overlapping scheduled to avoid conflicts which otherwise would have

occurred in the training plans of the crews for the two spacecraft. The examinations were accomplished without difficulty and with a minimum of delay. The activity demonstrated that the medical examining facility at Cape Kennedy is capable of being used for medical examinations planned in support of Apollo flights.

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7-3

7.2.1.5 Launch preparations.Application of biomedical sensors, instrumentation checkout_ and suiting were accomplished on schedule on December 12_ 1965, and again on December 15, 1965. All bioinstrumentation functioned properly during the attempted launch on December 12, 1965. _he reaction of both flight crew members to the engine shutdown was completely professional and appropriate to the situation. Changes in heart rate and respiratory pattern were barely perceptible in either crew member throughout the emergency sequence. On the morning of December 15, 1965, the oral temperature probe in the pilot's helmet was found to be inoperative during bioinstrumentation checkout. A replacement unit was not available and a decision was made to proceed with crew ingress on schedule since the measurement was not mandatory for launch.

7.2.2

Inflight

This section of the report includes analysis of events from lift-off to spacecraft landing, an elapsed time of approximately 25 hours 52 minutes. 7.2.2.1 Physiological data monitoring.Physiological information acquired by the Gemini bioinstrumentation system, as well as certain physiologically important environmental conditions measured in the spacecraft, was transmitted from the spacecraft and monitored in real time by physicians at the Mission Control Center - Houston (MCC-H), and by aeromedical flight controllers at remote network tracking sites. Additional physiological data were stored on the biomedical tape recorders located in the spacecraft. Physiological phenomena telemetered to the ground included two leads of electrocardiogram, a pneumogram (respiration), oral temperature, and blood pressure from each crew member. Because spacecraft 7 was also in orbit at the same time, physiological data telemetered to the remote tracking stations were not transmitted to MCC-H during station passes. Post-pass replay of these data was possible upon request. The quality of the analog data recorded at the MCC-H was satisfactory for analysis and assessment of the crew's physiological condition. Electrocardiograms and respiration traces from each crew member were also recorded on the onboard biomedical tape recorders during the entire flight. Portions of these records will be replayed in analog form for review at a later date. 7.2.2.1.1 Electrocardiograms and heart rate: Electrocardiographic patterns and heart rate remained within normal limits throughout the flight. At the MCC-H_ heart rate information was displayed graphically on trend plots prepared manually in the Life Systems Staff Support Room. (See fig. 7.2-3(a) and (b).)

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7.2.2. i. 2 Respiration: Respiration rates_ as determined from telemetered impedence pneumograms_ were well within expected normal ranges. 7.2.2. i. 3 Blood pressure: Two blood pressure measurements were obtained from each crew member during the flight. _hese values were consistent with preflight determinations and are shown in figures 7.2-3(a) and (b). Blood pressure determinations from both crewmen were obtained during crew status reports. The pilot reported that a sensation of increased pressure under the blood pressure cuff existed throughout the mission. There were no other problems with the blood pressure measuring system on this flight. 7.2.2. I. 4 0ral temperature: The flight plan called for oral temperature from each crew member during the crew status reports. However_ because the pilot's oral temperature probe was inoperative_ readings were obtained from the command pilot only and were normal. 7.2.2.2 Medical observations. -

7.2.2.2.1 Lift-off and powered flight: _he crew_ because of having experienced an engine shutdown on December 12, 1965, was exceptionally well qualified to comment on the sensations of actual lift-off. _hey confirmed that the physical sensation of lift-off is unmistakable. [he visual cues inside the spacecraft, such as the clock starting_ needles moving, et cetera, are of less significance than the sensations of the buildup of thrust perceived from the sound and vibration. They also described a slight_ but definite "eyeballs-in" acceleration and a brief_ but definite period of slight lateral oscillation. The crew experienced a maximum acceleration of slightly greater than 7g without difficulty. There was no difficulty experienced from the vibration associated with powered flight and no POlO was noted. Neither crew member experienced vertigo or disorientation during powered flight_ and there were no unusual sensations described upon insertion into orbit with transition to weightless flight. 7.2.2.2.2 Food: _hree meals per crew member of Gemini flight food were stowed aboard the spacecraft. _he crew found_ however, that they were too busy during the first 12 hours of flight to prepare the reconstituted foods. During this time, they shared one meal, eating only the bite-sized foods, leter, they prepared and ate the remaining food items. The crew stated that they were not especially hungry during the busy portion of the flight, but that they became quite hungry later, eating and enjoying the food. The juices were especially recommended for their palatability and thirst-quenching quality.

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7- 7

7.2.2.2. 3 Water: An ample quantity of potable water was available to the crew in the spacecraft drinking-water system. A modified water dispensing nozzle discharged a measured amount of approximately 1/2 ounce of water each time the release mechanism was actuated. _he total number of discharges was displayed on a cumulative digital counter. This system of recording drinks was satisfactory and presented no problems other than the fact that the counter was not set on zero at lift-off_ but rather on a five-digit number. This complicated the calculations necessary for recording the volume of each drink. The command pilot consumed 64 i/2 ounces of water, the pilot 81 I/2 ounces. 7.2.2.2.4 Waste management and personal hygiene: Neither crew member used the defecation bag during this flight. _he crew experienced difficulty with the assembly of the urine disposal system. _he quickdisconnect attaching the urine receiver hose to the water management panel required excessive force to make the connection. Both crew members had to release their restraining strapsj turn around in the seat_ and work together to attach this connection. This operation required excessive time_ and both crew members were aware of an uncomfortable amount of body heat generated during this activity. Otherwise_ the operation of the urine system was acceptable with very little spillage of urine when minimal precautionary measures, such as a towel or tissue to prevent spillage, were used. Personal hygiene presented no problem. For oral hygiene purposes, the command pilot used the chewing gum only. The sealed premoistened sanitary wipes were satisfactory for cleansing purposes. 7.2.2.2.5 Sleep: Both crew members were very tired following completion of the station-keeping activities and slept soundly. _he command pilot slept 5 hours and the pilot slept 4 hours i0 minutes. During sleep the crew had their visors open and their gloves off. The filters on the spacecraft windows provided sufficient light attenuation for sleep. Each crew member awoke spontaneously at a different time during the sleep periods. Both crew members emphasized the importance of scheduling sleep periods at the end of a period of concentrated effort, such as rendezvous, rather than trying to carry out some other demanding task such as extravehicular activity at that time. 7.2.2.2.6 Physical status and comfort: The crew thought that the environmental control system was not adequate to maintain comfort during powered-up periods of flight. Each recalled that any amount of physical activity generated a heat load leading to a buildup of sweating. It was necessary to relax and remain relatively inactive to become comfortable.

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and several spacewell and the suit

During sleep_ however_ when activity was at a minimum craft systems were powered down_ the system responded flow had to be reduced to prevent over-cooling.

After insertion into orbit; both crew members removed and later felt that their helmets should have been removed

their gloves at that time

also. The spacecraft 6 crew actllally wore their helmets during the entire flight. Both crew members experienced discomfort in the upper back_ shoulder_ and neck muscles. They attributed this to the fact that they had to lean forward with their helmets on during the active portions of the flight in order to perform their activities. _he pilot_ who frequently had to bend forward to perform calculations and monitor the instruments, also developed a superficial abrasion on his forehead which persisted during the immediate postflight period. The extremes of contrast and suddenness of change when transi%ioning from light to dark phases of flight bothered the crew considerably. The command pilot described the situation as analogous to mild snowblindness and recommended that some sort of visual protection be provided for this phenomenon. The command pilot experienced some nasal stuffiness and discharge during the latter phases of the flight. He requested_ and later took, one actifed tablet approximately 3 1/2 hours prior to retrofire to preclude earblock on reentry. He experienced effective relief. The crew was not aware of unusual odors at any time during the

flight. They did, however, notice an acrid odor upon opening the snorkel; shortly after landing on the water. Because of this; they remained on the suit ventilation circuit for the period of time necessary for the odor to dissipate. _his odor was described as being similar to that near the heat shield of a spacecraft that has recently reentered. The crew experienced no other medical problems on this flight. 7.2.2.2.7 Retrofire and reentry: Both crew members agreed that the 4.8g peak experienced on reentry was much more noticeable than the 7g peak experienced during powered flight. They experienced moderately severe oscillations when the spacecraft was suspended from the parachute. At single-point release_ there was a particularly abrupt translation during which both crew members experienced the normal jolt forward. The landing sequence was uneventful and the crew experienced no unusual symptoms during descent.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
7.2.3 Postflight

7-39

This portion of the report includes medical information gathered after the time of spacecraft landing_ _hese data were obtained during several clinical examinations, a medical debriefing_ and by laboratory examinations of blood and urine. Postflight deviations from normal were limited to the following: (a) Mild transient reduction in pulse pressure and elevation of heart rate during the postflight tilt procedures as compared to the preflight tilt studies. (b) (c) Very mild crew fatigue

Hemoconcentration

7.2.3.1 Recovery activities.- Medical recovery activities were planned in advance of the mission and were modified only as dictated by the observed medical responses of the crew. Because these medical responses were normal, there was essentially no modification to preflight medical planning for the recovery phase of the flight. f 7.2.3.1.1 Planned recovery procedures: Following recovery of the crew and suit removal_ a detailed examination by the medical evaluation team who examined the crew preflight was planned. This team consisted of the NASA recovery physician, an opthalmologist, and otorhinolaryngologist_ a neuropsychiatrist_ a specialist in internal medicine_ and a laboratory pathologist. Tilt procedures were planned twice on the day of recovery and daily thereafter until the responses had returned to preflight values. 7.2.3.1.2 Narrative: After landing_ the crew reported that they were con_fortable in the spacecraft. They elected to remain in their pressure suits and in the spacecraft until recovery aboard the U.S.S. Wasp. _he seas were unusually calm on the day of recovery, no drugs were taken_ and no symptoms of seasickness were reported by the crew. Following a normal spacecraft retrieval_ the crew egressed without difficulty. _hey had no adverse symptoms upon standing and being welcomed aboard the ship. Immediately thereafter, they walked unassisted to the ship's sick bay where the initial postflight medical examinations were performed. At no time during the recovery or postflight phase of the mission did the crew report any subjective symptoms of low blood pressure. y. 2.3.2 Examinations.A detailed medical examination was conducted by the medical evaluation team as soon as the crew had arrived in sick bay. Medical observations began with the doffing of the crew's space

UNCLASSIFIED

7-4o

UNCLASSIFIED

suits. Of the slightly more than 4 hours that both crew members spent in sick bay, 3 hours iO minutes were used to examine the command pilot and 2 hours 50 minutes were required for the pilot. With the exception of the relatively minimal orthostatic hypotensive tilt response and mild hemoconcentration, no significant abnormalities were noted during this examination. The findings are summarized in table 7.2-IV. Both crew members exhibited a mild reaction to the tape used to fasten the body sensors on the thoracic wall. The skin was in excellent condition with good turgor and there was no desquamation. The underwear was only moderately saturated with perspiration and appeared to be quite clean. Body odor was nearly absent. _here was no skin eruption other than that mentioned where the biosensors had been attached. Specifically, there was no maceration in the axillae or perineal areas. Scalp scaling was not present. _he pilot had a very superficial abrasion across his forehead because of helmet pressure. The crew was only minireally fatigued and appeared well rested following recovery. The internist examined the command pilot early on arrival in sick bay and noted some narrowing and slight irregularity of the retinal arterioles. Later, the opthalmologist observed these same findings, mainly in the inferior temporal area of the left eye. This arteriolar narrowing had diminished within 3 hours following landing and was absent that evening shortly before the con_nand pilot retired. _hese funduscopic findings were absent in the pilot. Such arteriolar narrowing had not been observed in prior Gemini crews and was not observed in the Gemini VII crew. Although one might implicate the lO0-percent oxygen atmosphere, fatigue, and stress as possible explanations for this phenomenon, the etiology of such an isolated finding cannot be explained with certainty. No other significant changes from the crew's preflight medical conditions were noted during the postflight medical examinations. The crew reported no symptoms nor did they demonstrate any medical sequelae during the postflight phase of the mission. 7.2.3.3 Tilt-table studies.- The same tilt-table procedure as used on the Gemini V mission was employed on Gemini VI-A. Three preflight and three postflight tilt studies were performed on each crewman. The postflight tilt procedures revealed only a minimal elevation of heart rate and decrease in pulse pressure in both crewmen. No adverse symptoms were noted at any time. This tilt response returned to normal in 2 days as shown in figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2. This minimal physiological alteration did not in any way compromise the crew's ability to function during the inflight or postflight phases of the mission. As on previous missions, these cardiovascular responses are believed to have occurred because of true physiologic alteration, although the individual crewman's tilt responses were influenced by other individual_ operational_ and environmental variables.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7-4 _

7.2.3.4 Laboratory studies. - Evidence of hemoconcentration was present during postflight examination and returned to normal 2 days following landing. On the day of recovery_ from the time of arrival in sick bay until retiring for the night_ the command pilot drank i190 ec fluid and the pilot drank 1760 ce. Only routine urinalyses were accomplished amd_ other than a high specific gravity_ no significant changes were noted. Crew radiation was minimal and is tabulated in table 7.2-V.

f

UNCLASSIFIED

7-42
TABLE

UNCI.ASSIFIED
7.2-I.(a) BLOOD STUDIES - COMMAND PILOT

Chemistries

Determination Date, 196_ Time, e.s.t.

Preflight December 9 $:00 a.m.

Post flight December 16 i:O0 p.m.

Sodium,

m Eq/l m Eq/l m Eq/l m Eq/l mg percent m Eq/l mg percent

144 4.7 102 4.6 9.2 2.2 5.0 98 2,5 7.3 4.4 5.8 O. 5

137 4.4 i01 5.5 ii.0 i. 7 3.8 102 20.4 7.5 4.3 5. QNSa a --

Potassium, Chloride, Calcium, Calcium, Magnesium, Phosphate, Glucose, Urea,

mg percent

N mg percent gm percent

Total protein, Albumin,

gm percent

Uric acid, mg percent Total bilirubin, mg percent

Alkaline phosphatase, BL units

i. 6

QNS

aQuantity

not sufficient

(to be measured).

UNCLASSIFIED

_
TABLE 7.2-1.-

UNC LASSIFIED
BLOOD STUDIES (b) - COMMAND PILOT - Concluded

7-43

Hematology

Determination Date, 1965 Time, e_s.t.

Preflight December i 8:00 a.m. December 9 8:00 a.m.

Postflight December 16 12:30 p.m. December 18 i0:i0 a.m.

White

blood cells/mm percent percent percent percent percent cells,

3

9 350 45 47 4 4 0 4.455 45.3

ii 800 59 27 8

9 600 63 29 7 i 0

i0 450 50 37 5 7 i 45 16.4 Normal

Neutrophiles, Lymphoeytes, Monocytes,

Eosinophiles, Basophiles, Red blood f Hematocrit, Reticulocyte Hemoglobin,

millions/mm 3

5.070 46.5

4.625 54 0.95

percent count, gm/100 percent ml

14.6 Normal 15.0 Normal

16 Normal

Cell morphology

UN C LASSIFIED

7-44
TABLE

UNCLASSIFIED
7.2-II.]BLOOD STUDIES - PILOT

(a) Chemistries

Determination Date, 1965 Time, e.s.t.

Preflight December 9 8:00 a.m.

Postflight December 16 i:00 p.m.

Sodium,

m Eq/l m Eq/l m Eq/l m Eq/l mg percent m Eq/l mg percent

154 4.7 103 4.9 9.8 2.4 4.2 108 17 7.5 4.6 7. i O. 5

139 4.3 107 5.6 ii.2 2.2 4. i 112 16.5 8. i 5.0 6. i QNS a

Potassium, Chloride, Calcium, Calcium, Magnesium, Phosphate, Glucose,

mg percent

Urea, N, mg percent Total protein, Albumin, gm percent

gm percent mg percent mg percent

Uric acid,

Total bilirubin,

Alkaline phosphatase, BL units

i.0

QNS a

aQuantity

not sufficient

(to be measured)

UNCLASSIFIED

UN C LASSIFIED
TABLE 7.2-11.(b) BLOOD STUDIES Hematology - PILOT - Concluded

7-4_

Determination Date, 1965 Time, e.s.t.

Preflight December i 8:15 a.m. December 9 7:30 a.m.

Postflight December 16 12:00 a.m. December 18 i0:00 a.m.

jWhite blood Neutrophiles, Lymphocytes, Monocytes,

cells/ram3 percent percent percent percent percent millions/mm 3

7 163 50 32 8 2 0 5.425 47.6

7 038 54 34 ii i 0 5.470 48.0

9 025 56 32 ii i 0 5.1365 55 i

6 350 56 32 5 5 2

Eosinophiles_ Basophiles,

Red blood cells, Hematocrit, Reticulocyte Hemoglobin,

percent count, percent gm/lO0 ml

45 16.4 Normal

16.2 Normal

16.2 Normal

17.0 Normal

Cell morphology

UN C LASSIFIED

TABLE 7.2-111.(a)

URINALYSIS Oh

Con_nand Pilot

Preflight Date, 1965 Time, e.s.t. Color/appearance Specific pH Albumen, sugar acetone, bile C Z Microscopic gravity December 7:15 i December 9 December 16 0800 Straw, clear 1.025 5.0 Negative Infrequent

Postflight December 0645 17

Amber_ clear 1.025 5.0 Negative 3 to 4 white blood

Straw_ clear 1.027 5.0 Negative 2 to 3 red blood cells/hpf, i to 2 whlte blood cells/ hpf. No casts No bacterial 450

Straw, clear i.030 5.0 Negative

white blood

7 to i0 white blood cells, infrequent red blood cells one cylindroid

C Z

cells/hpf Frequent mucus threads

cells and red blood cells, no casts, numerous mucus threads

_ --

Volume,

cc

360

340

267

>

0'_ O_
-n
Preflight r1_ Date, 1965 December 6:45 a.m. Amber, clear i.015 5.0 Negative Infrequent white blood cells i December 7:35 a.m. 9

(b)Pilot
Postflight December 9:00 a.m. Straw, clear i.028 6.0 Trace albumen Others negative Occasional white blood cells, 2 to 3 red blood cells, no casts frequent oxalate crystals 310 16 December 6:45 a.m. Straw, clear i.024 5.5 Negative I to 2 white blood cells, no red blood cells_ no casts_ occassional mucus threads 260 17

Om £n
"11
r1_

Time, e.s.t. Color/appearance Specific pH Albumen_ sugar acetone, bile Microscopic gravity

Straw, clear i.015 5.0 Negative No cells, No casts

Volume, cc

220

400

i

/

TABLE

7.2-IV.- CLINICAL (a)

EVALUATION

Command Pilot

Preflight (launch site) December 15, 1965 Body weight, ib ......... Temperat_e, oral, OF ..... 176 98.0 (Shipboard) December 16, 1965 11:50 a.m.e.s.t. 174.65 98.6

Postflight (Shipboard) December 16, 1965 8:05 p.m.e.s.t. 177.2_ 99.0 (launch site) December 18, 1965 10:05 a.m.e.s.t. 177-5 98.6

C Z

Heart rate, beats/minute Skin .............

. . .

62 Clear

74 Minimal erythema at sensor sites, good turgor

76 No change, facial skin clear Partial

64 clearing of erythema J.--

Comments >

...........

Fit for flight

Alert, cooperative, oriented

Shaven_ slightly "tired"

Rested, fit >

O_ O_
"11
_I Preflight

(b)Pilot
Postflight

tn £n
-R
rlI

(_eh sitel
December 15, 1965

(Shipboard)
December 16, 1965 11:4.8 a.m.e.s.t.

(Sbiphoard)
December 16, 1965 7:00 p.m.e.s.t,

(_uneblte) s
December 18, 1965 a.m.e.s.t.

Body weight, Temperature,

ib ........ oral, oF ..... . . .

171 98.0 60 Clear

163.D 98.6 68 Minimal erythema at sensor sites, slightly dry Mildly fatigued, alert, cooperative, oriented

170.2 98.6 70 No change, facial skin clear

168 97.7 53 Partial clearing of erythema -q ! __

Heart rate, beats/minute Skin .............

Con_nents

...........

Fit for flight

Shaven, no other change

Rested,

fit

7-48

UNCI.ASSIFIED
TABLE 7.2-V... CREW RADIATION

Colmmand Pilot Film badge Right location Dose_ mr

chest pocket

26 ± 1.5 25 ± 2.1 24 ± 1.7 25 _ 2.8

Left chest pocket Left thigh Helmet pocket

Pilot Film badge location Dose, mr

Right chest pocket Left chest pocket Right thigh Helmet pocket

20 • 1.5 24 H 1.4 22 _ O. 2 31 ± 7.4

The Gemini using radiation film badgesdetector. VI-A a thermoluminescent were read

out 2

J

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7-49

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED

7-5o
...... --Blood

UNCLASSIFIED NASA-S-66-87 JAN
Heart-rate pressure

Darkened area represents pulse pressure

160 150

Pre-tilt -

October i0,

1965 Post-tilt Pre-tilt

October 15, 1965 Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt Pre-tilt

October 22,

1965 Post-tilt

Tilt to 70 °

Tilt to 70 °

i

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-95 .... _. JAN Heart rate Blood pressure

7-5

Darkenedarea represents pulse pressure December 16, 1965 Started at landing + 2 hr Pre-tilt 150 160 .-= 140
E

December 16, 1965 Started at landing +9.5 hr Post t.ilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt Pre-tilt

December 18, 1965 Started at landing + 49 hr Tilt to 70 ° I Post-tilt

Tilt to 70 °

-

,_ 130

II0 ' i00

:i:i:i!i!!i!i!iiiii!
..........

::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

!i!::i]i[i]i::iii[i::i]i::i !:!:!:i:_:_:i:i:i:i:i:{:i:i:i:i:i i:{:!:_:_:_:_:i:i:i:i:i: :' :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

.:.:,:-:-:.>:.'..:.:<.>:.:.:.:

_n

80

:::::::::::::::_ :_$:':::"'" ":!$i_

............................ ":':':'''":':':':'"

s %

_"

_o rm

_ 7o _ 9o
O

60 5040I I I I i I

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::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
%

_i

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I

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i

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I

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i

lllJl

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I

IIII

llilll

IIII

I

llill

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il

llll

III

lllill

III

III

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

300

5 0

5

i0

I

0

5

0

5 0

5 i0 15 0 Elapsed time, rain

5

0

5 0

5

i0

15 0

5

(b) Postflight tilt studies. Figure 7.2-1. - Concluded.

UNCLASSIFIED

7-_2
NASA-S-66-92 JAN .... Heart rate Blood pressure Darkenedarearepesents pulse pressure

UNCLASSIFIED

4O

3o
0 5 0 5 i0 15 0 5

l]ttll lllillilllllnlll I,,,,II,,,, llnlil,nnnl,llnl I,,,,I
0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 Elapsed time, rain (a) Preflight tilt studies. Figure 7.2.-2. - Tilt table studies, pilot.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-63-JAN ...... -Heart rate Blood pressure

7-53

Darkenedarea presents pulse pressure December16, 1965 Started at landing + 1 hr December16, 1965 Started at landing + 8.5 hr December18, 1965 ;tarred at landing + 47.5

hr

15o
140
t-,-

re-tilt

I

Tilt to 70 °

Post-tilt

Pre-tilt

Tilt to 70 °

!

Post-tilt

Pre-tilt

Tilt to 70 ° I

I

Post-tilt

E

130 120 I %,* :.q L It I

"_

_7 -_ii0 _ ".'rI

100

-1- 90
E

_; 8O
1/3

_ o
rn

70 60 50 4O 3O 0 5 0 5 10 0 5 0 5 0 5 10 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 10 15 0 5 ,t

%

Elapsed time, min (b) Postflight tilt studies. Figure 7.2-2. - Concluded.

UNCLASSIFIED

7-_4

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7-_

I I I

Highheart ate r / Peak heart rate _ _l.___l,_-_ Mean heart rate / ,-- Florida night I

Sleep period, actual

;

I I I

'
I
F I I Liftoff

"L_-"
_ _OW heart rate

J
B Iood pressure m

i

i

,
I
, Blood pressure- -_ II Preretrofire-_ ' \

,
I I
I Post blackout ,

IIL
I Pre blackout-_ T i rate _ T_

-

,

r

T i /

:.

.

I

--

_'x

.t-

T

.'_

_
#1

.'r_
' " " "

t q"

6 ,,_,'ll

: ,

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I

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)iration rate, breaths/rain

..

• -

".J.x

q-

-

'--

_.s. J

"_LJ
-

r_

""

/

I

,

t
I I I
I

t

I

I
-2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 20 11 12 13 24 25 Ground elapsedtime, hr

_
1'6

I
27 18 29 20 21 22 23 24 25

I

m

J
26

(a) Commandpilot. FLgure7.2-3. - Physiological measurements.

UNCLASSIFIED

CO

UNCLASSIFIED
8.0 EXPERIMENTS

8-1

Three scientific experiments were conducted on the Gemini VI-A mission to extend man's knowledge of space and to further develop the ability to sustain life in the space environment. These experiments are listed in table 8.0-I. One originally scheduled experiment (D-3_ Mass Determination) was deleted from this mission because of the major emphasis necessary for rendezvous with spacecraft 7, a fully passive target vehicle. Only a preliminary evaluation of the experiment results is presented in this report_ because of the nature of these experiments. In most cases_ detailed evaluations and conclusions will be published after all data for each experiment have been analyzed.

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE 8.0-1.-

EXPERIMENTS

ON GEMINI

VI-A

_o _D

Experiment number

Experiment

title

Principal

experimenter

Sponsor

D-8

Radiation

in spacecraft

Research

and Technology

Division,

Department

of Defense

Air Force Weapons C Kirtland

Laboratory,

Air Force Base, Z

New Mexico

N
S-5 (_ Synoptio terrain Theoretical Space Flight Division, Center, NASA Goddard Greenbelt, Office of Space Sciences photograph

(]
_Zand
s-6 synoptic weather National Weather Satellite Center, Office of Space Sciences

OO
"11
rl_ photography

O_
"11
r_

U.S. Weather _ryland

Bureau_

Suitland,

i

UNCLASSIFIED
8.1 EXPERIMENT D-8, RADIATION IN SPACECRAFT

8-3

8.1.1

Objective the intensity and particular emphasis

The purpose of the D-8 experiment is to measure distribution of radiation inside the spacecraft with on measurements in the vicinity of the crew.

8.1.2

Equipment

The D-8 experiment on Gemini VI-A differed from that on Gemini IV in the location of two of the passive dosimeters and in the addition of a removable brass shield on the tissue equivalent ionization chamber (TEIC) of the command pilot's hatch. This shield was designed to provide shielding equivalent to that which the crew members' muscles and abdomen would provide for the interior regions. During one of the passes through the South Atlantic radiation anomaly, the shield was to be removed while the radiation survey was being performed with the hand-held dosimeter.

8.1.3
f

Procedure

The experiment on Gemini VI-A was designed to provide information in addition to that obtained on Gemini IV. Information provided by the experiment on Gemini VI-A was as follows: (a) An additional quantity of portable dosimeter survey data from the South Atlantic anomaly to provide missing information not obtained on Gemini IV. (b) A comparison of internal (shielded) versus external human dosage during passage through the anomaly_ and a correlation of this dosage with that received at the various other locations of the survey. (c) Passive dosimetry data correlation shielded active dosimeter readings. with the shielded and un-

The D-8 experiment was programmed for the anomaly passes occurring on revolutions 5 and 6 with a possible inclusion of surveys during revolutions 19_ 20_ and 21. As it became apparent that Gemini VI-A would be a l-day mission_ a review of the anomaly passes was made and revolutions 7 and 8 were considered in lieu of 19, 20, and 21.

UNCLASSIFIED

8-4

UNCLASSIFIED
8.1.4 Results on revolutions 5

-

The D-8 experiment was scheduled to be performed and 6 at 06:35 and 08:10 g.e.t., respectively.

At 06:35 g.e.t, the survey was performed by the pilot as scheduled_ however_ the command pilot was occupied with station keeping and did not remove the shield from the sensor. The O8:10 g.e.t, run was not performed because of crew activities during station keeping operations. Because no report was received from the crew to indicate deviations from the scheduled experiment performance, it was not rescheduled for later revolutions. As a result, no data were obtained with the brass shield removed from the chamber and only one survey of the anomaly was made. Analysis of the data from the one survey and the contents of the passive dosimeters is still in progress. Quick-look data indicate that the dose rate level stayed below i00 millirads/hour. The crew reported that the its holder during the spacecraft Testing of the flight item on a retrieval after landing, failed It is possible that the unit was
use.

hand-held survey instrument came out of pitch-down to the two-point suspension. centrifuge to 40g, subsequent to its to loosen the instrument from its holder. not properly locked into place after
_

8.1.5

Conclusion

In conclusion, valuable additional data were attained concerning radiation in space but the primal7 objectives of this experiment on this mission were not attained.

UNCLASSIFIED

8.2

UNCLASSIFIED
EXPERIMENT S-5_ SYNOPTIC TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY

8.2.1

Objective

The objective of experiment S-5 was to obtain high-quality, smallscale color photographs of terrain features for geological and geographical research. Pictures were especially desired ofsouthern Mexico, Africa_ and Australia to increase the coverage of these areas which are relatively poorly mapped.

8.2.2

Equipment

Four 70-mm camera film magazines containing color film were onboard the spacecraft_ each magazine having a 60-frame capacity. These magazines_ used with a 70-mm still camera, were also used for the S-6 experiment. A haze filter and an exposure meter were available to be used at the discretion of the crew.

8.2.3
f

Procedure

The crew was instructed to take_ subject to fuel and power restrictionsj vertically oriented_ systematic overlapping pictures of Mexico_ Africa_ and Australia_ or any other area showing cloud-free terrain. As in previous Gemini missions_ it was stressed that any picture of the earth's surface was valuable_ even if the planned procedure could not be followed exactly.

8.2.4

Results

Despite the pressure of rendezvous operations_ a substantial number of terrain photographs were taken. The quality of the pictures range from poor (caused chiefly by cloud cover) to excellent. A number of the pictures appear to have color rendition and clarity equal to or better than the best pictures taken on previous flights. Twenty-eight pictures of fair to excellent quality were taken over Africa. Of these, ii were taken in sequence over Mauritania and Upper Volta, and show extensive areas of stabilized sand dunes as well as areas of currently active self dunes. One picture taken over Ethiopia shows a portion of the Rift Valley. Another_ showing a part of the Hamada du Dra in southern Algeria, includes a number of structural lineaments. Other pictures taken over North Africa appear to be of great potential value in the study of Pre-Cambrian structure, Cenozoic vulcanism, aeolian landforms, and soil mapping (see fig. 8.2-i(a)). An

UNCLASSIFIED

8-6

UNCLASSIFIED

especially interesting series of four pictures taken over Somalia shows the drainage pattern and major structures of Cenozoic marine sediments in an area not previously photographed from manned spacecraft. (See fig. 8.2-i(b)). Other photographs include portions of northwest Australia_ showing near-shore topography in the Shark Bay area_ and the front of the Himalayas in Nepal.

8.2.5

Conclusions

The S-5 experiment can be classified as very successful_ especially in view of the demands of the rendezvous operations. The pictures provide coverage of areas not previosly photographed_ and the pictures should be extremely useful for geological mapping. Of particular interest are the photographs of the southern Sahara_ which is the transition zone between desert and equatorial jungle.

UNCLASSIFIED

_NASA-S-66-143 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED

8-7

(a) Sudan, showing Cenozoic volcanics in the Jebel Marra. Figure 8.2-1. - Experiment S-5, typical synoptic terrain photography.

_-

UNCLASSIFIED

8-8
NASA-S-66-2 09 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) West coast of Somalia, in eastern Africa, patterns in Cenozoic marine sediments.

showing drainage

Figure 8.2.-1.

- Concluded.

UNCLASSIFIED

-

UNCLASSIFIED
8.3 EXPERIMENT S-6, SYNOPTIC WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY

8-9

8.3.1

Objective

The objective of experiment S-6 was to obtain high-resolution color photographs of clouds and weather systems in equatorial regions for meteorological studies.

8.3.2

Equipment

Four 70-mm camera film magazines containing color film were onboard the spacecraft, each magazine having a 60-frame capacity. These magazines, used with a 70-mm still camera, were also available for the S-5 experiment and for the general photography requirements during rendezvous. A haze filter and an exposure meter were available to be used when needed.

8.3.3
/

Procedure

Prior to the flight, the crew was briefed on the types of clouds and weather systems of interest for the experiment. During the mission, meteorologists from the _vironmental Science Services Administration selected specific areas likely to contain cloud patterns of interest, based on TIROS weather satellite pictures and worldwide weather maps. These areas were included in the flight plan when possible. Additional photographs were made at the crew's discretion.

8.3.4

Results clouds were taken over the eastern North

About I00 high-quality photographs containing during the flight. Nearly all of these were taken

Atlantic Ocean, Africa, the _ southern Indian Ocean, western Australia, and the Gulf of Mexico during revolutions 13, 14 and 15. An area of cloudiness associated with a cold front in the mid-Atlantic Ocean showing cloud shadows on a lower cloud layer was photographed. Pictures of several cloud eddies near the Canary Islands (fig. 8.3-i(a)) are among the most interesting photographed to date from space. Open_ cellular patterns of cumulus clouds west of Cape Blanc, Spanish West Africa, appear in a series of seven pictures. One of the photographs in this series is shown in figure 8.3-i(b)). Another series taken over central and east Africa show elongated bands of cirrus clouds over Nigeria. Thin, cellular patterns of cumuloform clouds appear over Cameroon and the Central African Republic, and many convective-type clouds cover an area between Lake Victoria and Mauritius. Several pictures show sun reflection patterns

r

UNCLASSIFIED

8-1o

UNCLASSIFIED

-

from the sea surface and from a swampy region near the White Nile River. A series of eight pictures over the southern Indian Ocean show interesting cellular clouds, cirrus cloud bands, and cumulus cloud streets.

8.3.5

Conclusions

A detailed study of the photographs will require extensive analysis and evaluation. However, the S-6 experiment can be classified as a success. The photographs will be compared with available TIROS pictures and conventional weather data will be used in analyzing the cloud patterns. Pictures that were taken in an overlapping series will be especially helpful because they depict larger scale weather patterns than can be shown in a single picture.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-208 JAN

(a) View taken at approximately 10:44 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965 during Revolution 14 over the Canary Islands in the eastern Atlantic Ocean. The cloud eddy at the center formed about 50 miles downwind (southwest) of Tenerife Island which appears in the corner of the photograph. The open center of the vortex is about 15 miles in diameter. Figure 8.,3-1. -Experiment S-6, two typical synoptic weather photographs taken on successive orbital revolutions 14 and 15.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-207 JAN

-

(b) View taken at approximately 12:23 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965 during Revolution 15 looking west over the eastern Atlantic Ocean about 400 miles west of Cape Blanc, Spanish West Africa. The small lines of cumulus clouds have formed open cellular patterns in the southern section of a high pressure region. Surface winds were easterly while the upper-air winds at the 500 millibar level were northerly. Subsidence of the air aloft suppressed the vertical development of the clouds. Figure 8..3-1. - Concluded.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
9.0 CONCLUSIONS

9-1

The performance of the spacecraft, launch vehicle, flight crew, and mission support was very satisfactory for the Gemini VI-A mission, and all objectives of the mission were accomplished. The flight contributed significantly to the knowledg_ of manned space flight_ especially in the area of man's ability to perform the necessary functions to accomplish rendezvous and station keeping. The following conclusions were obtained from data crew observations of the Gemini VI-A mission. evaluation and

I. The rendezvous procedures and associated equipment were satisfactory for a eoelliptic parking orbit rendezvous technique. Backup calculations, using onboard spacecraft data, were adequate to monitor and evaluate the progress of the rendezvous maneuvers. 2. Station keeping can be performed within i foot to 200 feet of a target and with a minimum fuel and power usage in the horizon scan mode. The out-of-plane positions from the target are the most acceptable and the in-plane positions above or below the target are the most difficult. 3. The malfunction detection system performed perfectly during the Gemini VI-A launch attempt by shutting down the engine prior to lift-off, when the tail plug dropped out prematurely. By combining all data inputs, the crew did correctly assess the situation and did not initiate an uncessary ejection which would have precluded the accomplishment of this rendezvous mission. 4. The Mission Control Center in Houston and the associated Space Flight Network successfully supported two manned spacecraft orbit simultaneously. Manned in

5. The GLV-6 performance was near nominal, and the spacecraft was placed in an acceptable orbit for rendezvous with Gemini VII. As a result of the premature release of the tail plug which caused the abort of the first Gemini VI-A launch attempt, modifications were made to the tail-plug installation. These modifications proved to be satisfactory in the subsequent launch of Gemini VI-A. 6. A film was deposited on the spacecraft windows during the launch phase similar to that experienced on previous flights. This film interfered with visibility, particularly when direct impingement of the sunlight occurred on the spacecraft windows.

UNCLASSIFIED

9-2

UNCI.ASSIFIED

7. Air-to-ground radio transmissions from the command pilot were marginal at various times during the mission. The major cause of the problem was the unusually high air noise in the command pilot's pressure suit; however, there were other contributing factors which are still being investigated. 8. The flight crew was somewhat warm during periods of high activity throughout the rendezvous phase of the flight because of higher than expected metabolic heat loads. 9. The overall operation of the rendezvous radar system was excellent_ with the system maintaining continuous lock from a range of 235 nautical miles until the radar was turned off at a distance of 20 feet. i0. Overall operations. cabin lighting was satisfactory for both day and night

Ii. The acquisition lights [_ilized on spacecraft 7 were not visible beyond 15 to 16 miles. It is desired to provide lights which can be acquired at ranges up to 30 miles to assure that optical backup rendezvous techniques may be used. 12. The voice tape recorder failed after the second cartridge had been used. The failure was determined to have been caused by a broken belt between the motor and the reduction wheel. 13 . The delayed-time telemetry tape recorder failed at approximately 22 hours ground elapsed time because of a bearing seizure. (This same failure occurred during the Gemini VII mission.) Corrective action has been determined and implemented in spacecraft 8 and up. 14. The difficulty encountered when closing the centerline stowage box is attributed to a deformation of the structure which was caused by the effects of cabin differential pressure.

15. One set of pyrotechnics in the docking system_ all armed by one electrical circuit, failed to fire. However_ the redundant set of pyrotechnic devices did operate properly and all functions were performed as required. The failure was found to be caused by a crew-operated arming switch which was sensitive to ambient pressure changes.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
i0.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

lo-1

The following recommendations are made as a result ation and crew observations of the Gemini VI-A mission.

of data

evalu-

I. Extravehicular activity should not be scheduled on the same day as rendezvous because of the excessive workload on the crew to prepare for and accomplish both tasks. 2. Corrective action should be taken to prevent film deposit the spacecraft windows during the launch phase of the flight. 3. The centerline stowage that no door opening or closing is pressurized. on

structure should be modified to assure problems are encountered when the cabin

4. A study should be conducted to determine proper drive-belt tension and operating conditions in order to modify the voice tape recorder and preclude belt failures during flight. 5. Capsule communicators should relay voice data slowly enough that it can be correctly recorded by the crew_ and on lengthy data relays, the communicators should break transmission periodically to determine if the crew is receiving and recording the data. 6. _he remote sites should inform the crew when inflight acquisition position and during

"-

loss of signal occur to provide the busy rendezvous maneuver.

the crew with

7- The optical sight mounting and checkout procedures should be modified to assure that accurate boresight alignment is attained when the sight is installed in orbit. 8. The effective intensity of the target acquisition lights be increased to make them "visible at ranges up to 30 miles. 9. Star charts of star angles should be improved to permit from orbital track. more accurate should

measure-

ments

i0. A light meter similar to the spot meter used on Gemini VI-A should be utilized for all photography of objects in space during manned missions. ii. The Apollo hand-held sextant is too bulky for use as flight gear. The sextant should be smaller and mounted to the spacecraft.

UNCLASSIFIED

1o_2

UNCLASSIFIED

-

12. The sequential switches should be modified to preclude the possibility of a malfunction caused by pressure changes. Also, a study should be performed to evaluate the need for the interlock of the dockingbar and latch-jettison sequence circuit with the fairing jettison circuit. 13. _he presently utilized reentry control procedures should be modified to assure that adequate reentry control system propellants remain for spacecraft stabilization below 50 000 feet in case the drogue parachute should not function properly. 14. Medical tests that are not necessary to complete immediately after recovery should be postponed until critical debriefing of the crew has been accomplished.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ii. 0 REF]_I_ENCES

11_1

I.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report for Gemini - Titan I (GT-I). MSC-R-G-64-1, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, May 1964. Gemini Mission Evaluation Gemini 2. MSC-R-G-65-1, Gemini Mission Evaluation Gemini 3. MSC-C-R-65-2, Team: Gemini Program Mission Report GT-2, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Feb. 1965. Team: Gemini Program Mission Report GT-3, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, April 1965. Program Mission Report, Spacecraft Center, June

2.

3.

4.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Gemini IV. MSC-G-R-65-3, NASA Manned Gemini Mission Evaluation Gemini V. MSC-G-R-65-4, August 1965.

1965.

5.

Team: Gemini Program Mission Report, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,

6.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Gemini V!. MSC-G-R-65-5, NASA Manned Gemini Mission Gemini VII. Jan. 1966.

Program Mission Report, Spacecraft Center, Oct.

1965.

7.

Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report, MSC-G-R-66-1, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,

8.

McDonnell Aircraft Corp. : Gemini Spacecraft Number 6 Performance/ Configuration Specification. Rept. A900-6, Feb. 1965. Aerospace Corp. : Systems Test Objective for Gemini Launch Vehicle NASA Mission Gemini VI. TOR-669(6126-8).3. Dec. 1965. NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Project Gemini Preflight Orbital and Reentry Trajectory Data for Gemini VI. MSC Internal Note 65-FM-125, Sept. 1965. International Business Machines Corp. : Description. II_ No. 64-528-00021. NASA Manned McDonnell ation. Spacecraft Center: Recovery Gemini Reentry Math Flow 6

9.

I0.

ii.

12. 13.

Operations

Manual. RCS Deactiv-

Aircraft Corp. : Gemini SEDR F-399, March 1965.

Spacecraft

Postflight

UNCLASSIFIED

1___2
14.

UNCLASSIFIED
Procedures for

McDonnell Aircraft Corp. : Postflight Evaluation Spacecraft 6. SEDR F499-6, Nov. 1965. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.: Corrosion Recovered Spacecraft, PS 186, Aug. Control 1965.

15.

Procedures

for

UNCLASSIFIED

.-

UNCLASSIFIED
12.0 APPENDIX

12-1

12. I

VEHICLE

HISTORIES

12.1.1

Spacecraft

Histories

Spacecraft histories at the contractor's facilities in St. Louis, Missouri, are shown in figures 12.1-1 and 12. i-2, and at Cape Kennedy, Florida, in figures 12.1- 3 and 12.1-4. Figures 12.1-I and 12.1-3 are summaries of activities with emphasis on spacecraft systems testing and prelaunch preparation. Figures 12.1-2 and 12.1-4 are summaries of significant, concurrent problem areas.

12.1.2 Gemini

Gemini

Launch Vehicle

Histories facilities

launch vehicle

(CLV) histories

at the contractor's

_

at Denver, Colorado, and Baltimore, Maryland, are shown in figure 12.1-5_ and at Cape Kennedy, Florida, in figure 12.1-6. Figure 12.1-5 is a summary of significant manufacturing and factory-test activities, including concurrent problem areas. Figure 12.1-6 summarizes the GLV test and prelaunch preparation activities and also presents a summary of the significant, concurrent problem areas.

UNCLASSIFIED

12_2
g_

UNCLASSIFIED

i

g

_

!

UNCLASSIFIED

NA SA-S-05:11,252A f::il Troubleshoot xygenhigh rate, RCSheaters, waterpressure, and inadvertentmalfunction lights. o _ak fix _lace and R umbilical in R and Rsection R eRePlace RCSTCA's3 and 4 _lace heaterson D-package B-ring in RCS and

E::it
• Replace OAMSfuel tank C_ _> Oe) (,2')m I1 l _ 1 • Correct leak in secondarycoolant dacecabinrelief valve Demate RCSand reworkwire bundle Replace OAMSTCA's5 and 8 _ Replace IMU static powersupply • Install newsuit loopheat exchanger-_.. • Replace oxygendemandregulators (m_

C3 (_
_>. (f)

-rl

I"11

1

_

>

"-i1
I-I'1

OTroubleshootphasingtest • Replace scratched RHhatch window

,Fi,ilrl

• Replace twodamaged segments coolant systemlines of • Repairdamaged wire bundle 4 11 18 25 2 9 16 May 65 23 6 13 20 27 4 ii 18 July 65 25

Apr 65

June 65

Figure 12_. 1-2.- Spacecraft6 significant problemareasat contractor facility.

NASA-S-65-1i, 258A Spacecraftarrival Modificationsand pyrotechnic build up Integratedtest with GAIV(Plan X1 Preparefor pad Hoist spacecraftand connectcables Hurricane Betsy C: Z t"" (F) ._ I"rl _:_ Pre-mateverification test , and mate Electrical interface integratedvalidation and joint Gand C Joint combinedsystems tests Testprepa ration Launch vehicle tanking Flight configu ration modetest wet mocksimulatedlaunch preparation Wetmocksimulatedlaunch Simultaneouslaunch demonstration Demate,battery replacement,and remate Systems test Clean-up and simulatedflight Service and pre-count Final count Mission canceled 8 15 22 Aug 65 29 5 12 19 Sept65 17 24 7 Oct 65 (a) Prior to October25, 1965. Figure 12.1-3. - Spacecraft6 test history at CapeKennedy. 26 3 10 14 21 Nov65 28

I

(_

_'_ t"" _f) _._ m _:_

NASA-S-66-136 JAN Gemini]ZE final count De;se _i,ceF:spacec r,_t

missioncancelled

Filrijl
,
L::_II I_:_111 Jill:i:] III II

l

De-e c,t, n,d,,[no,veto, re, a KennedySpace Center

Ba!!i_ tIIjJtI!ijt r+_°va!l IIIII[ I/I I
II I _-'.'l I I I t I I I::3 I I I I I I I I I I!:.'1 III

X-ray OAMSfuel and oxidizer tanks PurgeOAMSand RCS regulators ]dder permeabilitychecks _.'.'1 I I I E:!I ] I I I I _::l I I I I I I I SimultaneityI and engine leakchecks I I I t::i ] I I I }:;1 I I I I I I Moveto cryogenicsbuilding Purgeand functionally checkOAMSand RCS regulators

C_

1:':4 I I I _ i-;-] i I I I I I i De-servicedrinking water

(_

Suit circuit leakchecks Trial-fit a,d,apter batteries _p; O_ --I'1 !"1'3 GeminiE]E launch Servicehypergolics II1 . Servicedrinking water ii Install flight batteries Final padpreparations and cable Final systems test Replace test computer and Simulatedflight Replace and test voicetaperecorder Serviceand precount Launch attempt validation Launch 7 24 Oct65 31 7 14 Nov65 2t 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 Jan 66 23 30 6 13 Feb60 20 r_ ,,m
I I _::1I I I I I I

('_

_f) C/') "I"1 I-I"1

Dec65 (b) Subsequento October25, 1965. t Figure 12.1-3. - Concluded.

NASA-S-65-11,265A Install new radome gasket I / / / / / ' Install emergency manualcomputer control Install seal in PCMprogrammer Changedisconnectsin cryogenic system Emergency dockingreleasemodification II II I Install digital ClOCk Voicecontrol center modification l_stall flotation blocksin R and R section 7 ilil' I Move"out of tape" light Replace UHFwhipantenna

!

o'_

I
I

Ii

C Z

"_"

I I / I / I

IIi]I._ m I
I { fii]

IIEi_ Programmer modification I wiring
I- Ii_I[Rep lacemultiplexers C:

I

lllilill IIi!llI I Replaceno. 2 suit fan (noiseproblem) IIFiil/ l_il II Re boresightradarpackage rate g llllIiil l_ill II I Reinstall yro II

'""_II "_:' 1 I Rep,ace _ PCM taperecorder
I , I I l _

'

(=_

cn
--I1 rn E2

_

_odify TDAumbilical in Rand R section )emateR and R for TDA recheck Radarto St Louis for specialtest I Replace C02 partial pressure transducer Replace dc-dc converter

I

(,C) --I"1 I-n

II

Radarremovaland pressure check il_ Cleanleft and right windows !ili ll Install gassealedtelemetry transmitter [,ill lii IF I IMU replaced II I Replace secondaryhorizon sensor andelectronicpackage Install newdockingbar Install modifiedhardline umbilicalin Rand R section

II ii_ I iil]/

:

ii I

ill/ H Ill III
i:: I E::illllliil I
I::i / I::il II

ii I _llilllI liil I
I

I
8 15 22 Aug 6.5

/I
29

,t, I
5

_::i ::i .i ::; Install modified b,om,ed, ca,!aperecorders 12 19 26 [ 3 I0 17 24 Sept Figure 12.1-4. - Spacecraft significant problemsat CapeKennedy. 6

f;!, _i1111 ill]Ill.......................... / Ill 65 I oct 65

_;_ [_!IIIi!l I l [iil

I ii Changewater problem gun flighttest measurement I Computer insimulated

NASA-S-65-11,261A __._r_a_o_ _. _ _ _ _/.z_ Tank fabrication and test Ba,timore,Maryland 25

3°131
Manufacturing requirements: 16 • Visual ins)ection • Dyepenetrant tests • Radiographic ins)ection • Weldeddycurrent checks • Hydrostatic .Chemical cleaning • Helium checks • Nitrogenpurge • Dewpoint checks Jul 30 -Tank roll-out inspection Aug 13- Customercertification Aug 16-Tanksair-lifted to Baltimore Feb5 !Feb23 Feb25 Mar 30Apr 3 -

I II
Tankscleanedand I I I purged 5 23 Tank splice complete Engine installations complete Stage13 horizontal tests complete StageI horizontal tests complete

IIHo.zonta, test assemb,y and
3o3,_
Stages and II erectedin VTF I [] _ : IA Power-on Post erection inspection Vertical tests C Z

C Z (_ _. ¢../.1 ¢J3

ICSAT I I I
I i I Vat review I I I • De-erectstages1 and I-I |

n
> (J3

m

t

I

I

.

¢._

Tank leak checksA

I

I I
I

I == I

"-n
1"31

rl-I

U

Weightand balancechecks A

I
I

Rollout inspection A

I I

Preparationto ship I

J
I

Stage[shipped ,_ Stage£I shipped,_. Apr May June July Aug 1964 Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May 1965 June July Aug

Figure 12.I-5.- GLV-6history at Denverand Baltimore.

--,1

PO I

_.2-8

UNCLASSIFIED

_:,:`:`:`_;_._;1;:;_;_;_;.;.;.;`;`;`;`;`:.:`:_;-;-:.:-:_:`:`:_:_:.:`:`:`:;:;:.1;t;:;:;_;_;.;.;-:`;`;':.:_:.:-:-:-:`:.:.:':.:-:_:_:.:_1._:;:;::_;_;.;`;.;`;.;.;_;.:_:.:.:.:_:`:`:`:.t`:`:::._:;t;_;_;.;.;.;.:.:`;-;.:_:_:_:.:':_:.:.:-:_:`:_:`:.`..-_;`;-:_:.;-;-:.:`:`:`:`:-:`:-:`:.:`:_:`:.:.:;_;_;_:_;.;.;`;`;` •

UNCLASSIFIED

NASA-S-66-160 JAN

Erect stages I and 1I

(_

GuJdancecanmstersand mlstrar to la borator for reverification

Iiiiiiiiiiii,lii ili:iiii;m.*.
:_ 'i! _i . _i

(_ Z

Z
r = O_

Iriil rIIIIlil llrllIRil I
Engineharnessand )ressure Iil Changed stageI thrust chambervalve bolts

Sub systemsreverification tests

> "-I"1
m

IIIIIIiillllllllIil lliilld llill Simulated*light ":' [il !ill IllllllilJll/liiJtlllJ[illlllJIiitlllllliJI Final preparationsand precount
Changeden, ine-driven hydraulic pumpson stagesI and

(,f)

:> Or') --I"1
i-i"1

rrl

u

lil IlIi]lll Iiilllllllitll[lllil[llllliilll/llIiill Ii!lllll ,auncha*tempt
Orifice size chant ed in oxidizer pressurant pressure switch I!il Critical systemsre-test It Iiil 17 Oct 65 " n, t Padd,,,scon, c, plug, ropped pri,or !o I,if!.off e d o!! Removed ust capfrom I::_ II Ill I::_ I I[ no. 2 gasgenerator d subassemblyItf:il II I[1_::_ I III I_!: Paddisconnect plug safetywired 24 3] 7 14 Nov65 21 28 5 12 19 26 Dec65 (b) Subsequentto October25, 1965. Figure 12.1-6. - Concluded. Launch

'.o

ro i

__2-__o

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE

IK_ENTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED

....

UNCLASSIFIED
12.2 _YEATH_ CONDITIONS

The weather conditions in the launch area at Cape Kennedy, Florida, were satisfactory for all operations.on the day of the launch, December 15, 1965. Surface weather observations in the launch area taken at $:37 a.m.e.s.t. (13:37 G.m.t.) were as follows: Cloud coverage ..... deg knots 2/10 covered, .............. ................ scattered at ii 000 feet 200 4 7 29.93 65 . . 67 97

Wind direction, Wind velocity, Visibility, Pressure,

miles in. Hg °F °F

............... ................. ...................

Temperature, Dew point, Relative

.................. percent .........

humidity,

Weather observations taken onboard the U.S.S. Wasp located were as follows: Cloud Wind Wind coverage direction, velocity, ...... deg knots ......

at 15:29 G.m.t., December 16_ 1965, at latitude 23°22 ' N., longitude 67053 ' W.

4/10

covered,

scattered

at 2500

feet 40 6 I0 76 66

........... ...... .........

Visibility, Temperature, Dew point, Relative

miles _F °F

............ percent °F ..... ...... calm,

humidity,

62 76 I to 3 foot swells

Sea temperature, Sea state ......

UNCLASSIFIED

12___2

UNCLASSIFIED

-

Table 12.2-1 presents the l_unch area atmospheric conditions at the time of lift-off (12:39 G.m.t.). Table 12.2-!I provides weather data in the vicinity of Cape Kennedy at 15:30 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965. Figures 12.2-1 and 12.2-2 present the launch area and reentry area wind direction and velocity plotted against altitude.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 12.2-1.AT 12:39 LAUNCH AREA ATMOSPH_qlC G,m.t., DECEMB_ CONDITIONS 15, 1965

Altitude s ft a 0 x 103 5 i0 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Temperature s °Fa 64.4 57.4 46.9 31,6 15.3 -5.6 -24.7 -45.2 -74.4 -81.6 -94,4

Pressure s ib/sq fta

Density, slugs/cu 2336.3 1986.7 1693.1 1453.1 1239,9 1060.8 897.4 755,9 635.8 515.2 414. 3 ft a

2116.7 1773,6 1478.9 1226.4 1010.6 826,6 670.0 537,6 426,5 334,2 2_9,8

× 10 -6

55
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 i00 105 ii0 115

-101.2
-99.6 -89.3 -82.7 -78.2 -76.9 -77.3 -72.4 -66.2 -49.9 -47.2 -40,2 -33,4

200.5
154,6 119.7 93.4 73.1 57,2 44.9 35.3 27, 8 22. i 17.8 14.2 11.3

325.8
250,1 188.4 144,4 111.6 87.1 68.5 53,2 41, i 31.4 24.8 19.6 15,5

asee note a at end of table.

UNCLASSIFIED

12- _4
TABLE

UNCLASSIFIED
12.2-1.LAUNCH AREA ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS - Concluded

AT 13:39 G.m.t.,

DECT_MBER 15, 1965

Altitude_ ft a

Temperature ,_ °Fa

Pressure, ib/sq ft a

Density, slugs/cu ft a

120 × 103 125 130 135

-22.9 -12.0 -i 19.8

9.1 7.4 6.0 5.0

12.2 × 10 -6 9.7 7.7 6.0

14o
145 150 155 160 165 17o 175 180

20.6
24.7 24.8 36.9 41.20 49. 4 57.7 49.4 46.1

4.1
3.4 2.8 2.3 i.9 io6 i. 3 i. i 0°9

5.o
4. i 3.4 2,7 2,2 i° 8 i. 5 i. 3 i.i -

aAccuracy

of readings

is as follows :

Altitude_ ft

Temperature error_ °F

Pressure rms error_ percent

Density rms error_ percent

0 to 60 X 103 60 to 120 120 to 180

i i 4

i i 1.5

0.5 .8 1.0

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 12.2-II.- REENTRY AREA ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS AT 15:30 G.m.t., DECnMBER 16_ 1965

Altitude_ fta'b 0 X 103 5 i0 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60

Temperature, °Fa 73.8 58.3 46.9 30.6 13.5 -2.7 -23.3 -44.7 -66.8 -87.3 -95.4 -103.0 -98.0

Pressure_ ib/sq fta 2119.2 1775.8 1481.i 1228.8 1012.6 828.5 672.5 540.3 428.7 335.7 260.9 201.4 155.4

Density_ slugs/cu fta 2296 × 10-6 1990.9 1701.6 1461.1 1248.2 1058.i 899.i 759.6 637.2 562.4 417.9 329.5 250.5

65
70 75 80 85 90 95 iO0 105

-90.2
-84.5 -79.6 -75.1 -73.3 -71.0 -63.0 -56.9 -51.0

120.5
94.0 73.4 57.6 45.3 35.7 28.2 22.3 17.7

19o. 2
146.i 112.7 87.3 68.3 53.4 41.3 32.2 25.2

asee note a at end of table. bsee note b at end of table.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE AT 12.2-II.REENTRY AREA ATMOSPHERIC 16, 1965 CONDITIONS - Continued

-

15:30 G.m.t. _ DECEMBE_

Altitude, ft a'b llO X 103 115

Temperature, °Fa -38._ -35.7

Pressure _ Ib/sq ft a

Dens ity, slugs/cu ft a

14.2 ii. 7

19.6 X 10 -6 15.5

220
125

-23.1
-ii. 6

9.4
7.7

12.2
9.5

130 135
140 145 150 155

15.1 14.6
14.9 14.5 20.2 28.7

6.3 5.2
4.4 3.5 2.9 2.5

7.8 6.4
5.2 4.3 3.5 2.9 --

i6o
165 170 175 180 190

40.4
42.6 40.7 32.0 27.8 30. 2

2.o
i. 7 i. 4 i. 2 i. 0 -

2.3
I. 9 i. 6 i. 4 i. I .7472

200
210 220 230 240

-13. o
-67.2 -85.0 -95.8 -88.6 -

.5561
.4162 .2747 .1742 •0993

250
260

-86.8
-113. 8

.o612
.0379

asee note a at end of table.

bsee

note b at end of table.

UNCLASSIFIED

-TABLE 12.2-11.-

UNCLASSIFIED
REENTRY AREA ATMOSI_HER!C CONDITIONS

l -17

AT 15:30 G.m.t.,

DECEMBER

16, 1965 - Concluded

Altitude_ ft a_b 270 × 103 280 290 300

Temperature_ °Fa -113.8 -125.2 -135.4 -135.4

l°ressure_ lb/sq ft a

Density_ slugs/cu ft a

.0379 x 10 -6 .0241 .0079 .0044

aAccuracy

of readings

is as follows:

f

Altitude, ft

Temperature error, °F

Pressure rms error, percent i i 1.5

Density rms error_ percent i 8 1.0

0 to 60 x 103 60 to 120 120 to 180

i i 4

bAbove 180 000 feet, the data are from a special high sounding rocket launched from Eglin AFB at 19:22:02 C.m.t.

altitude

F

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NASA-S-66-155 JAN 190x 180

I10

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

<

90

_

80

70

60

50

30 2O

10 0 120

_

360 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 0 60 120 Winddirection, degfrom north Windvelocity,knots Figure 12. -L -Variation of winddirectionandvelocitywith altitudefor the launcharea at 12:39 2 G.m.t., December 1965. 15,

180

240

300

UNCLASSIFIED

F
NASA-S-66-145 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED
18o
160

_-_9

150 140

1 _

130

12o

2
_ Y f

_

11o

_- I00

so

_

30

!"
_
,_ _

_o
o
60

S

120 180 240 300 360 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 Winddirection, degfrom north Windvelocity,knots (a)Rawinsondend Rocketsonde a databetween sealeveland 182K at 14:20 ft G.m.t. Figure 12. -2. - Variationof winddirectionandvelocitywith altitudefor the reentryareaon December 1965. 2 16,

"-

UNCLASSIFIED

1__2o
NASA-S-66-235 JAN

UNCLASSIFIED

-

230 X 10 3

226 224 222

°
\

;
_/_
9

218

22o
216 _ d 212 210 208

G/ k_

.__
<

206 202 2OO 204 196

C_

)

180

240

300

360 0

0 60

40

80

120

160

Wind direction, deg from north

Wind velocity, knots

(b) Rocketsonde data between 190K and 230K ft at 19:22 G.m.t. Figure 12.2-2. - Concluded.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
12.3 FLIGHT SAFETY REVIEWS

2_21

After the Gemini VI launch attempt on October 25, 1965, the flight readiness of the Gemini VI-A space vehicle was determined at the review meetings noted below.

12.3.1

Mission

Briefing

The Mission Briefing was conducted by the Mission Director on December 2_ 1965_ at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida. All elements reviewed their status and were found in readiness to support the mission.

12.3.2

Spacecraft

Flight

Readiness

Review

The Flight Readiness Review_ covering the Gemini VI-A operations and activities after the vehicle was taken down on October 25, 1965, was held on December 9 and i0, 1965. All systems were found ready for flight.

12.3.3

Launch

Vehicle

Flight

Safety Review

Board

The Air Force Space Systems Division Flight Safety Review Board met on December ii, 1965, at Cape Kennedy and recommended to the Mission Director that the launch vehicle be committed to flight. Following the launch attempt on December 12, 1965, a second Flight Safety Review Board meeting for Gemini VI-A was held on December 14_ 1965, and the Board assured the Mission Director that all systems were acceptable. It recommended that the launch vehicle be committed to flight.

UNCLASSIFIED

__2_22

UNCLASSIFIED

-

THIS PAGE

INTenTIONALLY

LEFT BLANK

--.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
12.4 SUPPLI_V_ENTAL REPORTS

table

Supplemental reports for the Gemini VI-A mission are listed in 12.4-I. The format will conform to the external distribution

format of the NASA or external organization preparing the report. Each report will be identified on the title page, as being a Gemini VI-A supplemental report. The same distribution will be made on the supplemental reports as that made on the Mission Report.

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE 12.4-1.-

GEMINI

V!-A SUPPLEMENTAL

REPORTS

59 ! _o 4_

Number

Report

title

Responsible organization

Completion date

i.

Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation NASA Mission Gemini/Titan GT-6A Launch Vehicle No. 6A Flight

Report-

Aerospace

Corporation

Feb 14, 1966 Standing requirement Jan 30, 1966 Standing requirement

2.

Evaluation

Martin

Company

C
Z 3. MBFN Performance GT-6A/7 Mission Analysis for GT-6 and Goddard Space Flight Center Feb 16, 1966 Standing requirement

C N
p--

4o 5. (_

Reconstruction Gemini GT-6A IGS Evaluation GT-6A Inertial Guidance Computer Analysis

Trajectory and

TRW Systems International Business Machines Corporation

Standing requirement Jan 30, 1966 Jan 30, 1966 Standing requirement

System

"11 Pll

"11 rll

U

J

--

UNCLASSIFIED
12.5 DATA AVAILABILITY

__2_2_

Tables 12.5-1, 12.5-II, and 12.5-111 list the mission data which were available for evaluation. The trajectory and telemetry data will be on file at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Computation and Analysis Division, Central Metric Data File. The photographic data will be on file at the MSC Photographic Technology Laboratory.

"

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE 12.5-I.INSTRUMENTATION DATA AVAILABILITY

Data description

Paper recordin6s Spacecraft telemetry measurements (revolutions 3-6 and ll-16) GLV telemetry Telemetry measurements (launch) recordings

Reentry phase Plots and tabulations of all system parameters for the following approximate times (g.e.t.): 25:17:25 25:19:22 25:30:03 25:43:58 25:47:49 Event 25:17:27 25:25:44 25:38:22 25:47:23 25:52:06

si_aal-strength

MCC-H plotboards _gnetic tape

tabulations

Experiment D-8 parameters (revolutions 3-6) Radar data IP-5600 trajectory C-band data (Confidential) - Confidential) system

Sequence of event tabulations versus time (including thruster firing) for ascent; revolutions i-6, 12 and 13; and selected real-time passes for revolution 16 and reentry Special computations (Confidential)

(launch phase coordinate

Natural

Ascent phase

Final reduced Trajectory data processed at M_C and GSFC

IGS computer word flow tag correction Special aerodynamic calculations Steering deviation and guidance

Voice transcripts

(Confidential) calculation and onboard recorder Mod III RGS versus IGS velocity comparison (Confidential) Orbital phase computations

Merged air-to-ground Technical GLV reduced debriefings telemetry

data

Engineering Spacecraft

units versus time plots data

OAMB propellant remaining for revolutions 1-6 OANB thruster revolutions activity 1-6

reduced telemetry

computations

for

Ascent phase Selected Orbital time history tabulations

Experiment D-8 tabulations tions 3-6 Reentry phase

for revolu-

phase

Parameter tabulations and plots (statistical) for revolutions 1-6, 12, and 13 Time history tabulations of selected parameters for selected times for revolutions 2-6, 15, and l6 Band pass tabulations 1-6, 12_ and 13 for revolutions

RCS propellant remaining activity computation Attempted Paper Launch

and thruster

recording measurements

GLV telemetry

UNCLASSIFIED

/

TABLE 12.5-11.-

SUMMARY

OF PHOTOGRAPHIC Gemini VI-A

DATA AVAILABILITY

Category

of photographic

data

Number

of

still photographs Launch and prelaunch i0

Motion picture film, footage 7478

Recovery

C

Swimmer Aircraft

deployment

and installation

of collar

99

900 900

_.. 7 _'_

carrier of spacecraft and arrival of flight crew 77 130

_-_

Loading

r-Inspection _ ._ m Mayport, Florida activities 32 21 78 of spacecraft 300

p--

>
_

General

"11

RCS deactivation Postflight Onboard inspection

spacecraft camera 194 terrain 102 1300

16-mm sequential

70-mm still camera Experiments and weather S-5 and S-6, synoptic photography

Pictures of spacecraft laneous pictures aEngineering sequential

7 and other miseel-

92

film only.

_o
!

Oo TABLE 12.5-III.LAUNCH PHASE ENGINEERING Gemini SEQUENTIAL CAMERA DATA AVAILABILITY

VI-A Launch Attempt

Sequential film coverage item 1.2-14 C Z 1.2-15 1.2-16

Size, _ 16

Location

Presentation

Total length, feet 224

Stage II umbilical second level

tower_

GLV, explosive action

bolt

16 16

50-foot

tower,

19-7A

GLV, launch GLV, possible ± ue± leakage GLV, possible fuel leakage GLV, engine observation

215 216

Z

East launcher

1.2-17

16

West

launcher

216

"11 p_

1.2-18

16

North launcher

216 m 216

1.2-19

16

South launcher

GLV, engine observation GLV, umbilical disconnect

1.2-20

16

Umbilical tower, first level

216

TABLE 12.5-III.-

I_UNCH

PHASE ENGINEERING

SEQUENTIAL

CAMERA

DATA AVAILABILITY

- Continued

Gemini

VI-A Launch

Sequential coverage, 1.2- 9 1.2-11 C 1.2-12 1.2-13 1.2-i_ 1.2-16 1.2-17 1.2-18 1.2-19 "_ 1.2-20 i.2-21 1.2-22 1.2-23 1.2-24 1.2-25 1.2-26 1.2-27 1.2-28 1.2-29 1.2-30 1.2-31

film item

Size, mm

Location

Presentation

Potal length of film, feet 180 180

16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 70 70 16

50-foot 50-foot 50-foot 50-foot

tower, tower, tower, tower,

19-1 19-7A 19-7A 19-2 19-7A

GLV launch GLV launch Spacecraft Spacecraft launch launch

81 80 ii0 170 130 200 155 140 146 200 i_0 140 210 80 140 217 ID 30 337

C Z r--

50-foot tower, East launcher West launcher North launcher South launcher Umbilical Umbilical Umbilical Umbilical Umbilical Umbilical Umbilical Umbilical 50-foot

GLV, launch GLV, possible

fuel leakage

GLV, possible fuel leakage GLV, engine observation GLV, engine first level second fourth level level observation disconnect disconnect disconnect disconnect disconnect disconnect disconnect

tower, tower, tower_ tower, tower, tower,

GLV, umbilical GLV_ umbilical GLV_ umbilical GLV_ umbilical GLV, umbilical GLV, umbilical

"I_

fifth level sixth level sixth level

tower, top level, tower, top level,

no. i GLV, upper umbilical no. 2 J-bars and lanyard

observation disconnect

tower,

70o50 '

Spacecraft

umbilical

South of Pad 19 West of Pad 19

GLV and spacecraft GLV and spacecraft Tracking

launch launch

, _o

Complex 34

_O
!

TABLE 12.5-111.-

I_UNCH PHASE ENGINEERING

SEQUENTIAL

CAMERA

DATA AVAILABILITY

- Concluded

Gemini

VI-A Launch

Total Bequential coverage, 1.2-32 C 1.2-33 1.2-34 _._ 1.2-35 -.-I __xT_, 1.2-38 1.2-39 1.2-40 "11 1.2-41 None film item Size, m Location Presentation

length

of film, feet 401 385 310 375 360 Z

16 16 16 16 35 35 35 70 70 35

West of Pad !9 South of Pad 19 South of Pad 19 South of Pad 19 Northwest of Pad 19 South of Pad !9 Patrick Air Force Base

Tracking Tracking Tracking Tracking Tracking Tracking, Tracking, Tracking, Tracking, Tracking IGOR IGOR ROTI ROTI

_'_

377 180 125 130 _'_

North of Pad 19 Cocoa Beach Aircraft no. L-4011

r1'1

225

I'rl

UNCLASSIFIED
12.6 POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION

12-3 _

The postflight inspection of the spacecraft 6 reentrY assembly was conducted in accordance with reference 14 at the contractor's facility in St. Louis, Missouri, from December 21, 1965, to January 14_ 1966. The rendezvous and recovery (R and R) section was returned to St. Louis for postflight inspection, and the recovery parachutes were returned to Cape Kennedy for damage charting. Certain items of equipment were removed from the spacecraft onboard the prime recovery ship and disposed of in accordance with Spacecraft Test Requests (STR) 600OD, 6002 through 6007, 6012 and 6013. The reentry assembly was received at St. Louis in good condition, and the external appearance was similar to spacecraft 3, 4, and 5. The following is a list of the discrepancies noted during the detailed inspection of the reentry assembly: (a) A residue was on the exterior would surface of both hatch windows. in the

(b) The voice tape recorder cartridge.
I

not advance

the tape

(c) The upper right-hand tion was extended.

docking

fitting

pin on the R and R sec-

(d) Reentry heating marks on the R and R section docking fitting doors indicated that they had not completely closed after the docking latches were jettisoned. (e) The left-hand hatch was broken off in the breech. actuator breech pressure line end tip

(f) Leaks were detected in the right-hand secondary oxygen bottle at the inlet to the bottle and at the outlet shutoff valve "B" nuts. (g) Two fuses in the electrical cartridges fuse blocks were blown. had not

been

(h) Seven pyrotechnic detonated. Insulation around was protruding.

in the R and R section

(i) thrusters

some of the reentry

control

system

(RCS)

UNCLASSIFIED

12-32

UNCLASSIFIED
continuity checks indicated the

(j) Pyro switch "G" electrical switch had not opened. (k) ture. The TB!2 terminal

strip was found

to have reversed

nomencla-

12.6.1

Spacecraft

Systems

12.6.1.1 Structure.The overall appearance of the spacecraft structure was good. The appearance of the heat shield was normal, and the stagr_tion point was located 13.7 inches below the horizontal centerline and 0.4 inch to the left of the vertical centerline. The heat shield was removed and dried. The dry weight of the heat shield was 316.98 pounds without the insulation blankets. Two plugs were removed from the heat shield for analysis in accordance with STR 6010. Residue similar to that on the windows of previous spacecraft noted, and STR 6008 was written to determine the constituents. was

The upper right-hand docking fitting pin on the R and R section was extended. The other two docking fitting pins were retracted. Reentry heating marks on the docking fitting doors indicated that they had not completely closed although all three of the release cables had been cut by the pyrotechnic cutters. The lower docking fitting door was found in the retracted position when recovered by the prime recovery ship, and it released were removed. when the R and R section shingles and insulation

well

Examination of the environmental control system (ECS) door and interior indicated no leakage of water into the spacecraft. A radiation check of the spacecraft sensor which indicated no radioactivity

except

at the C02

had a reading

of 1.3 milliroentgens. samples refer-

12.6.1.2 Environmental control system.- Drinking water were taken and dispositioned for analysis in accordance with ence 14. The total water removed was 14.0 pounds.

The lithium hydroxide cartridge was removed from the ECS package and weighed. The cartridge weighed 103.0 pounds with a center-ofgravity 8.066 inches from the bottom of the cartridge. Leaks were detected in the right-hand secondary oxygen bottle at the inlet to the bottle (small leak at "B" nut) and outlet shutoff valve (heavy leak at "B" nut -- possibly 20-30 cc/min). The torque-paint

UNCLASSIFIED

-

UNCLASSIFIED

12- 3

seal on the outlet shutoff valve "B" nut had been broken, and marks indicated that the nut had been tightened after the torquing paint seal had been applied. Residual pressures remaining in the left-hand and right-hand secondary oxygen bottles were 4164 psig and i14 psig, respectively. STR 6033 was written to investigate the anomaly. The coolant and ventilation systems were investigated because the crew complained of being too warm. per STR 6510

12.6.1.3 Communications system.- The external appearance of all the communications equipment bays was good. A small amount of corrosion was evident on the coaxial switches and connectors. The command pilot's pressure suit, biomedical harness and helmet, and the pilot's helmet and biomedical harness, and the light-weight headset were returned to St. Louis to conduct the test outlined in

STR 6023A.
The voice per STR 6028. tape recorder was removed, tested, and dispositioned The capstans would not turn when the motor was running.

12.6.1.4 Guidance and control system.- The inertial measurement unit (IMU) system, attitude control maneuver electronics (ACME) system, computer, auxiliary control power unit (ACPU), horizon sensor electronics, and the rendezvous radar were removed, rinsed, dried, and packaged aboard the prime recovery ship in accordance with reference 15. The equipment was dispositioned at Mayport, Florida to the vendor representatives per STR's 6002A through 6007A. 12.6.1.5 pyrotechnics system.- Pyrotechnic resistance checks were performed on all actuated pyrotechnic devices per reference 14. The postflight visual inspection of the wire bundle guillotines, parachutebridle release mechanisms, drogue parachute mortar, docking-bar release mechanism, and other pyrotechnics disclosed that all appeared to have functioned normally. The hatch actuator breeches, rocket catapults, devices, and other unfired pyrotechnic devices were and subsequent disposition per reference 14. seat pyrotechnic removed for storage

The electrical connector to the mild detonating fuse (MDF) detonator on the right-hand side of the Z192 bulkhead had the bayonet pins sheared off and was hanging loose from the cartridge. This condition has been noted on previous missions and is considered acceptable. Both MDF detonators had high order detonation.

UNCLASSIFIED

12-3

UNCLASSIFIED

Pyrotechnic resistance checks of the R and R section revealed that the seven pyrotechnics had not detonated. Subsequent electrical continuity checks of the retro-squib bus no. 1 circuitry revealed that a relay in the docking relay panel had not latched. STR 6507 was written to investigate the anomaly. One of the left-hand hatch actuator had the tip broken off in the breech. breech flexible pressure lines

12.6.1.6 Instrumentation and recording system.- The pulse code modulation (PCM) tape recorder was removed aboard the prime recovery ship and dispositioned to St. Louis for failure analysis per STR 6020. The PCM programmer, instrumentation package no. 2_ high-level multiplexer, and low-level multiplexer were removed, rinsed, dried, and packaged aboard the prime recovery ship in accordance with reference 15. The biomedical tape recorders were removed onboard the recovery ship and returned to the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Houston. A failure analysis of serial number 006 was conducted per STR 6034. 12.6.1.7 Electrical system.- The main and squib batteries were removed and discharged in accordance with reference 14. The following table lists the ampere-hours remaining in the battery after flight when discharged to the level of 20 volts with the battery still delivering the currents specified in reference 14.

Main

Serial number

Discharge, Amp-hr

Squib

Serial number

Discharge, Amp-hr

1 2 3 4

163 170 172 190

42.5 33.8 36.7 41.3

l 2 3

132 131 120

12.0 12.7 12.6

The main and squib batteries were storage for ground test use.

recharged

and placed

in bonded

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
The current leakage caused by salt water immersion was and the resistances below 5 ohms were recorded in reference The fuse block performed, (a) (b) status check in accordance with reference checked 14. 14 was

and the following Fuse

fuses were blown: XF-C XF-K

no. 4-5, pin 2, fuse block

Fuse no. 3-18, pin 4, fuse block

The aerospace ground equipment (AGE) test point inspection was performed per reference 14, and residue and rust were found in AGE test point no. 21 behind access door no. 39. During the pyro switch electrical continuity check per reference pyro switch "G" indicated a continuous circuit. The pyro switch was removed for failure analysis per STR 6511. Inspection of the TBI2 terminal strip on the terminal studs was reversed. revealed that the nomencla14,

ture

12.6.1.8 Crew station furnishinss and e_uipment.- The appearance of the cabin interior was good. The flight crew equipment removed on the prime recovery ship was dispositioned in accordance with STR 6000D. Functional checks of the mechanical linkages were performed in accordance with reference 14 and no anomalies were noted. The ejection seats were removed and deactivated per reference 14. The residual pressures in the left-hand and right-hand egress kits recorded during deservicing were 1650 psig and 2050 psig, respectively. The latching of the centerline stowage compartment door was checked without the stowage boxes. The door operated normally. The urine system quick-disconnect assembly anomaly reported by the crew will be investigated per STR 6016. 12.6.1.9 Propulsion system.- The reentry control system (RCS) thrust chamber assemblies (TCA's) appeared normal. Peripheral cracks were noted in some thrusters. A residue was noted in the throat of some thrusters some TCA's. and the thermal insulation was protruding from around

The RCS section was deactivated at Mayport, Florida, and purge gas samples were sent to Patrick AFB, Florida, for analysis prior to moving the spacecraft into the contractor's industrial area. No propellants were obtained from either the '_" or "B" systems for analysis. The RCS section was removed, vented, and vacuum dried for disposition per STR 6503.

--

UNCLASSIFIED

12-36

UNCLASSIFIED

12.6.1.10 Landin_ system.- The single-point bridle release mechanism and the main parachute forward and aft bridle release mechanisms appeared to have functioned normally. The main parachute_ drogue parachute, and pilot returned to Cape Kennedy for waslhing_ drying_ damage further analysis per STR 6001. parachute charting, were and

Visual examination of the R and R section revealed that the apex line cutter and pilot parachute mortar had not been actuated. This is normal for a nominal parachute recovery. 12.6.1.11 Postlandin_ recovery aids.- The flashing recovery light and the hoist loop doors appeared to have functioned normally but the doors were not recovered_ which was normal. A block of styrofoam flotation material from the right-hand side of the RCS section was returned as a loose piece. This flotation material was removed on the prime recovery ship for access to the sea dye marker container. 12.6.1.12 Experiments.The experiment equipment was removed the prime recovery ship and dispositioned per STR 6000D. on -

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
12.6.2 Continuing Evaluation

2-37

_he following is a list of the spacecraft test requests (STR's) that have been approved for the postflight evaluation of reported spacecraft anomalies:

STR number

System

Purpose

6006B

Guidance control Structure

and

To determine the cause of the apparent bias error in the computer. To determine the composition and origins of the residue on the windows. To determine the cause of the difficulty in connecting the urine system quick disconnect. To determine the cause recorder malfunction. To perform failure the 16-mm sequence of the PCM tape

6008

6016

Crew station

6020

Instrumentation and recording Crew station

6022

analysis camera.

and repair

6023A

Communications

To evaluate the voice quality of the UHF voice transmission system including helmets_ microphones_ VCC_ and UHF transmitters. To determine the cause of the malfunction during flight.

6026

Instrumentation and recording

of the low-level

multiplexer

6028

Communications

To determine if the voice tape recorder malfunctioned during flight, and to compare ground test performance with mission performance. To determine the pilot's the cause oral of the failure probe. of

6029

Instrumentation and recording

temperature

6030

Crew station

To determine the cause of the reported boresight shift in the optical sight.

f

UNCLASSIFIED

1 -38
6031 Crew station

UNCLASSIFIED
To determine the cause of the deformation of the center stowage frame experienced in flight. To determine the cause of the leakage at the "B" nuts on the right-hand secondary oxygen bottle. To determine the cause of the malfunction of the biomedical recorder. To investigate anomaly associated with seven unfired pyros in the R and R section. To investigate anomaly associated with pyro switch "G" continuity tests. and To investigate the anomaly associated with the Flight Director Indicator needle displacement.

-

6033

Environmental control system

6034

Instrumentation and recording Pyrotechnics

6507A

6511

Electrical

6519

Guidance control

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
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National Aeronautics and Space George C. Marshall Space Fli_t Liaison Representative, RL c/o Manned Spacecraft Center Houston, Texas 77058

National Aeronautics and Space Administration John F. Kennedy Space Center Western Test Range Operations Division Attention: Director Post Office Box 425 Lompoc, California 93438 National Aeronautics Wallops Station Attention: Director Wallops Island, and Space Administration

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Virginia

23337 i

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Western Operations Office Attention: Director 150 Pico Boulevard Santa Monica, California 90406 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SAF-SL

Executive Officer, MOLProgram Office, Attention: Col. Richard L. Dennen Headquarters, USAF The Pentagon Room 5E417 Washington, D.C. 20301 Office Office of the Secretary of Defense of the Director of Defense

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Attention: Col. Robert A. Duffy Research and Engineering The Pentagon Room 3D-I085 Washington, D.C. 20301 Department of Defense Manager Marmed Space Flight Support Operations, Attention: Col. R. G. 01son Air Force Eastern Test Range Patrick Air Force Base, Florida 32922 3 DDMS

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Addressee Department of Defense Representative Liaison Officer, ZR2 c/o Manned Spacecraft Center Houston, Texas 77058 U.S. AIR FORCE Commander_ Headquarters UBAF Systems Command Attention: Andrews (SCGR) 1 Number 1

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Department of Defense Manager for Space Flight Support Operations AFB_ Maryland 21605 3

Commander _ RIRGV National Range Division (Patrick) USAF Systems Command Patrick AFB_ Florida 32922 Commander _ ETG Air Force Eastern Test Range USAF Systems Command Patrick AFB, Florida 32922 _SC (_) Andrews AFB Washington_ D.C. 20331

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Chief, Patrick Test Site 0ffice_ RETPQC Quality Assurance Division_ Gemini Program USAF Systems Command P. 0. Box 4507 Patrick AFB_ Florida 32922 Commander, SSG Headquarters, Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045

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Colonel Russel M. Herrington_ Jr. _ SSB Assistant for Programs 623A and 624A Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045

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Addressee Deputy for Launch Vehicles, SSV Headquarters, Space Systems Division UBAF Systems Co_nand Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045 i Number of copies 2

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Chief, Agena Directorate, SSVA Headquarters, Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045

Chief, Gemini Agena Division, SSVAT Agena Directorate Headquarters, Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045

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Director, Gemini Launch Vehicles, SSVL Headquarters, Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045

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Advanced Development Directorate Attention: Lt. Col. _heodore D. Little, Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command E1 Segundo, California 90245 Research and Technology Directorate, Attention: Col. N. J. Keefer Headquarters, Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command Los Angeles Air Force Station Air Force Unit Post Office Los Angeles, California 90045 SSTR

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1

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Addressee Commander s Detachment 2_ ZR1 Headquarterss Space Systems Division USAF Systems Command Field Office c/o Manned Spacecraft Center Houston; Texas 77058 Commander 6555th Aerospace Test Wing s DWG Space Systems Division USAFSystems Command PatrickAFB, Florida 32922 Chief, Gemini Launch Vehicle 6555th Aerospace Test Wing Space Systems Division USAFSystems Command Patrick AFB, Florida 32922 Chief, SLV-III Division_ DWC 6555th Aerospace Test Wing Space Systems Division USAF Systems Con_nand Patrick AFB, Florida 32922 Co_ander, Headquarters_ Air Rescue Military Air Transport Service USAF Orlando AFB_ Florida 32813 1 Service Division s DWD Number 10

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Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory Research and Technology Division Air Force Systems Command, USAF AFPRL (RPRPP/Mr. Martinkovic) Edwards_ California 93523 Office of Director for Research Aerospace Medical Division Attention: Lt. Col. S. C. White s USAF s MC Brooks AFB, Texas 78235 USAFSystems Command/Air Training Liaison Representative_ ZR 3 c/o Manned Spacecraft Center Houston, Texas 77058 Command Office

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Number of copies 1

Department of the Air Force USAFHospitalAndrews (Hq. Comd. USAF) Attention: Medical Library Andrews AFB, Washington, D. C. 20331 U.S. NAVY

Chief of Naval Operations _he Pentagon Room 4E636 Washington, D.C. 20301 Commander-in-Chief, Norfolk Naval Base Norfolk, Virginia Atlantic 23500 Flotilla 4 Fleet

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Connnander, Cruiser-Destroyer Norfolk Naval Base Norfolk, Virginia 33500

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Co_muander, Hawaiian Code 34 Box llO Fleet Post Office San Francisco, U.S. GENERAL

Sea Frontier

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California OFFICE

94100

ACCOUNTING

U.S. General Accounting Office Liaison Representative, ZS1 c/o Manned Spacecraft Center Houston, Texas 77058 U.S. WEA_IER BUREAU Group

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Chief, Spaceflight Meteorological U.S. Weather Bureau Washington, D. C. 20234 Group Center

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Spaceflight Meteorology U.S. Weather Bureau c/o Manned Spacecraft Houston, Texas 77058

1

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Addressee Spaceflight Meteorology U. S. Weather Bureau Group, WO Number

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c/o John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899 National Weather Satellite Attention: K. Nagler U. S. Weather Bureau Suitland, Maryland 21668 Center i

AEROJET-GENERAL

CORPORATION I

Mr. R. C. Stiff, Jr. Vice President and Manager of the Liquid Rocket Operations Aerojet-General Corporation P. O. Box 1947 Sacramento, California 95801 Mr. L. D. Wilson Gemini Program Manager Liquid Rocket Operations Aerojet-General Corporation P. O. Box 1947 Sacramento, California 95801 Mr. R. M. Groo Aerojet-General Corporation Eastern Test Range Office Hangar U P. 0. Box 4425 Patrick AFB, Florida 32922 AEROSPACE CORPORATION

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Dr. Walter C. Williams, Vice President and General Manager of Manned Systems Division AErospace Corporation P. O. Box 95085 Los Angeles, California 90045 Mr. Bernhard A. Hohmana, Group Director Gemini Launch Systems Directorate Aerospace Corporation P. 0. Box 95085 Los Angeles, California 90045

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Number M0L of copies 1

Mr. L. M. Weeks, Group Director, Systems Engineering Office Aerospace Corporation P. 0. Box 95085 Los Angeles, California 90045

Mr. Richard E. Day, Director, Systems Systems Engineering Office Aerospace Corporation P. 0. Box 95085 Los Angeles, California 90045 Dr. Leon R. Bush

Operations _ M0L

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Director, Systems and Guidance Analysis Gemini Launch Systems Directorate Aerospace Corporation P. 0. Box 95085 Los Angeles, California 90045 Mr. Newton A. Mas 6

Manager, Gemini Program Aerospace Corporation P. 0. Box 4007 Patrick AFB_ Florida 32922 GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION i

Mr. G. C. Sebold Vice President, Convair Division General Dynamics Corporation P. O. Box i128 San Diego, California 92112

Mr. R. W. Keehn Manager, Gemini Target Convair Division General Dynamics P. 0. Box I128 San Diego, Vehicle Project Office

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Corporation 92112 2

California

Mr. B. G. McNabb Manager, Base Operations Convair Operations General Dynamics Corporation P. 0. Box 999 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

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Addressee Mr. J. M. Fitzpatrick Manager, Houston Office General Dynamics Corporation 1730 NASA Road i Suite 204 Houston, Texas 77058 AND SPACE COMPANY i Number

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LOCKHEED MISSILES

Mr. R. R. Kearton Vice President and General Manager Space Systems Division Lockheed Missiles and Space Company P. 0. Box 504 Sunnyvale, California 94088 Mr. G. H. Putt Vice President and Assistant

i General Manager

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Space Systems Division Lockheed Missiles and Space Company P. O. Box 504 Sunnyvale, California 94088 Mr. J. O. Shoenhair Assistant General Manager, NASA Programs Space Systems Division Lockheed Missiles and Space Company P. O. Box 504 Sunnyvale, California 94088 Mr. L. A. Smith Manager, Gemini Program Space Systems Division Lockheed Missiles and Space Company P. O. Box 504 Sunnyvale, California 94088 Mr. B. E. Steadman Manager, Houston Area Office Lockheed Aircraft Corporation 16811 E1 Camino Real Houston, Texas 77058 1 i

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Addressee MARTIN COMPANY

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Number of copies

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Mr. V. R. Rawlings, Mail No. 14

Vice President

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Martin-Marietta Corporation Baltimore, Maryland 21203' Mr. Bastian Hello i

Director_ Lifting Body Progra_ Mail No. 3070 Martin-Marietta Corporation Ba!timore_ Maryland 21203 Mr. W. D. Smith Director, Gemini Program Mail No. 3134 Martin-Marietta Corporation Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Mr. O. E. Tibbs, Vice President Mail No. A-I Canaveral Division Martin-Marietta Corporation Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mr. J. M. Verlander Gemini Program Director Mail No. B-1605 Canaveral Division Martin-Marietta Corporation Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mr. J. Donald Rauth _, Vice Mail No. A-I-I Denver Division Martin-Marietta Corporation P. O. Box 179 Denver, Colorado 80200 Mr. John J. Laurinec Gemini Program Manager Mail No. C-222-I03 Denver Division Martin-Marietta Corporation P. O. Box 179 Denver, Colorado 80200 i President i 4 i 8

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Addressee Mr. Colin A. Harrison Number i

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Martin Company 1720 NASA Road i Suite 106 Houston, Texas 77058 CORPORATION 25

MCDONNELLAIRCRAFT

Mr. Walter F. Burke Vice President and General Manager Spacecraft and Missiles McDonnell Aircraft Corporation Lambert-St. Louis Municipal Airport P. O. Box 516 St. Louis, Missouri 63166 Mr. R. D. Hill, Jr. Base Manager McDonnell Aircraft Corporation P. O. Box M
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Cocoa Beach,

Florida

32931 i

Mr. Frank G. Morgan McDonnell Aircraft Corporation 1730 NASA Road 1 Suite 101 Houston, Texas 77058

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