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ORM 843
_-N 66)


1 CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT This material contains

! information
the meaning
affecting the National
of the espionage laws,
Defense of the United States within
Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and
794t the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Mission Description date Major accomplishments

GT-1 Unmanned Apr. 8, Demonstrated structural integrity.

64 orbits 1964 I

GT-2 Unmanned Jan. 19, Demonstrated heat protection and systems

suborbital 1965 performance.

GT-3 Manned Mar_ 23, Demonstrated manned qualifications of the

3 orbits 1965 Gemini spacecraft.

Gemini Manned June 3, Demonstrated EVA and systems performance

IV 4 days 1965 for 4 days in space.

Gemini Manned Aug. 21, Demonstrated long-duration flight_ rendez-

V 8 days 1965 vous radar capability, and rendezvous

Gemini Manned Oct. 25, Demonstrated dual countdown procedures

VI 2 days 1965 (GAATV and GLV-spacecraft), flight per-
rendezvous formance of TLV and flight readiness of
(canceled the GATV secondary propulsion system. _
after fail- Mission canceled after GATVfailed to
ure of GATV) achieve orbit.

Gemini Manned Dee. 4, Demonstrated 2-week duration flight and

VII 14 days 1965 station keeping with GLV stage II, eval-
rendezvous uated "shirt sleeve" environment, acted
as the rendezvous target for spacecraft 6_
and demonstrated a controlled reentry to
within 7 miles of planned landing point.

Gemini Manned Dec. 15, Demonstrated on-time launch procedures,

VI-A i day 1965 closed-loop rendezvous capability, and
station keeping techniques with space-
craft 7.




Prepared by: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team

Approved by:

7 ,9 4

Charles W. Mathews
Manager, Gemini Program

Deputy Director






NASA-S-66-241 JAN _.

Spacecraft 7 as viewed from spacecraft 6 during station keeping.


Section Page

TABLES ............ ..... xii

FIGURES ............... xv

I. 0 MISSION SUMMARY ........... i-i

2.0 INTRODUCTION ............. 2-i


3.1 GEMINI SPACECRAFT ........ 3-1

3.1.1 Spacecraft Structure .... 3-1 Reentry assembly 3-1 Adapter assembly ........ 3-2

3.1.2 Major Systems .......... 3-2 Communications system . . 3-2 Instrumentation and
recording system ....... 3-2 Environmental control
system .......... 3-2 Guidance and control system . . 3-3 Time reference system .... 3-3 Electrical system ........ 3-3 Propulsion system ....... 3-3 Pyrotechnic ........... 3-4
3.1.2. 9 Crew station furnishings
and equipment ......... 3-4 Landing system ......... 3-5
3.1.2. ll Postlanding and recovery
system ............ 3-6

3.2 GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE ............ 3-25


Section Page


4.1 ACTUAL MISSION ..... 4-1

4.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS . . . 4-5


4.3.1 Gemini Spacecraft 4-9 Launch . 4- 9 Orbit .......... 4-i0 Reentry ....... 4-13

4.3.2 Gemini Launch Vehicle Second Stage . . 4-13

5 •0 VEHICLE PERFORMANCE ............. 5-1

5 •1 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE ........... 5-1

5.1.1 Spacecraft Structure ........ 5-1 -.

5-1.2 Communications Systems ....... 5-3 Ultrahigh frequency voice

communications ..... 5-3
5. i. 2.2 High frequency voice
communications ........ 5-4
5 •i. 2.3 Radar transponders ...... 5-4 Digital command system ..... 5-4
5. i. 2.5 Telemetry transmitters .... 5-5 Antenna systems ........ 5-5
5.1.2. 7 Recovery aids ........ 5-5

5.1.3 Instrumentation and Recording System • • 5-7 PCM tape recorder failure

.__ • • 5-7 Low-level multiplexer (reentry
vehicle) failure . . . 5-8 Delayed-time data quality 5-9
5 •i. 3 •4 Real-time data quality . . • 5-9 Overall system performance . 5-9

5.1.4 Environmental Control System ...... 5-13

Section Page

5.1.5 Guidance and Control System ........ 5-15 Inertial guidance system

performance evaluation ..... 5-15
_.1.5.2 Control system evaluation .... 5-24

5.1.6 Time Reference System ........... 5-53

5.l.7 Electrical System ............. 5-55 Power system ........... 5-55

5 •1.7.2 Sequential system ........ 5-55

5.1.8 Spacecraft Propulsion System ....... 5-57 Orbital attitude and maneuver

system ............ 5-57 Reentry control system .... 5-58 Retrograde rocket system . . 5-59

5.1.9 Pyrotechnics System ........ 5-65

5.1.10 Crew Station Furnishings and

Equipment ............. 5-67 Crew station design and

layout ....... 5 -67 Controls and displays ...... 5-68 Pressure suit and
accessories .... 5-69 Flight crew operatlonal
equipment ......... 5-70 Flight crew personal
equipment ......... 5-70 Bioinstrumentation ....... 5-72

5.1. ll Landing System ............ 5-73

5.1.12 Postlanding ............... 5-75


5.2.1 Airframe ............... 5-77

Section Page Longitudinal oscillation

(POG0) ............. 5-77 Structural loads ........ 5-77 Post-SECO disturbance .... 5-78

5.2.2 Propulsion ........... 5-79 Launch attempt analysis ..... 5-79 Flight performance ........ 5-81 Propellant loading and autogenous
system performance ....... 5-81 Performance margin ........ 5-82

5.2.3 Flight Control .............. 5-82 Stage I ............ 5-83 Stage II separation 5-83 Response to radio guiLnce
cc_mands ...... 5-84 Post-SECO and separation
phase ......... 5-84

5.2.4 Hydraulic System ......... 5-84

5.2.5 Guidance System ......... 5-84 Programed guidance . . . 5-84

_.2._.2 Radio guidance ......... 5-85

5.2.6 Electrical System ............ 5-86

5.2.7 Instrumentation System ........ 5-87 Ground ............. 5-87 Airborne ............. 5-87

5.2.8 Malfunction Detection System ..... 5-87 MDS operation during launch

attempt ............ 5-88 Gemini VI-A launch ....... 5-88

_.2. 9 Range Safety ............. 5-90 Flight termination system .... 5-90 Range safety tracking system . . . _-90

Section Page Ordnance ........ 5-90

5.2.10 Prelaunch Operations ....... 5-91 Launch attempt ...... 5-91 Recycle ........... 5-92 Launch ........... 5-92


PERFORMANCE ................. 5 -103


6.1 FLIGHT CONTROL .................. 6-1

6.1.1 Premission Operations ........... 6-1 Premission activities ...... 6-1 Documentation ......... 6-1 MCC/network flight control
operations .......... 6-1 Countdown .......... 6-2

6.1.2 Mission Operations Stumnary ........ 6-2 Powered flight ........... 6-2 Orbital ........... 6-2 Reentry ............ 6-4

6.2 NETWORK PERFORMANCE ............. 6-7

6.2.1 Mission Control Center, Houston and

Remote Facilities ............ 6-7

6.2.2 Network Facilities ............ 6-7 Remote sites ........... 6-7 Computing ............ 6-7 Communications .......... 6-8

6.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS ............... 6-ii

6.3.1 Recovery Force Deployment ........ 6-ii

6.3.2 Location and Retrieval .......... 6-12

Section Page

6.3.3 Recovery Aids ............ 6-13 UHF recovery beacon ...... 6-13 HF transmitter ....... 6-13 UKF transmitter ...... 6-15 UHF survival radio ....... 6-15 Flashing light ........ 6-15 Fluorescent sea marker .... 6-15

6.3.4 Postretrieval Procedures ...... 6-15

6.3.5 Reentry Control System Deactivation . 6-17

7.0 FLIGHT CREW ................... 7-1

7.1 FLIGHT CREW PERFORMANCE .......... 7-1

7.1.1 Crew Activities ........... 7-1 Prelaunch ......... 7-1 Powered flight and insertion 7-2 Rendezvous ......... 7-2 Station keeping ...... 7-3 Operational checks ...... 7-4 Experiments ....... 7-5 Crew housekeeping ...... 7-6 Retrofire and reentry • • • 7-7
7.1.1. 9 Mission training and training
evaluation ........... 7-8

7.1.2 Gemini VI-A Pilots' Report ........ 7-15 Powered flight .......... 7-15 Prerendezvous phase ....... 7-16 Rendezvous phase ......... 7-18 Station keeping 7-25 Separation maneuver ....... 7-27 Reentry ............. 7-29 Landing and recovery ..... 7-30

7.2 AEROMEDICAL ................. 7-33

7.2.1 Preflight ............... 7-33 Clinical background data ..... 7-33 Tilt-table tests ......... 7-33

Section Page Physical fitness and diet .... 7-33 Medical examinations and
crew status ......... 7-34 Launch preparations ....... 7-35

7.2.2 Inflight ................ 7-35 Physiological data monitoring . . 7-35 Medical observations ...... 7-36

7.2.3 Postflight ............ 7-39 Recovery activities ....... 7-39 Examinations ........... 7-39 Tilt-table studies ....... 7-40 Laboratory studies ....... 7-41

8.0 EXPERIMENT S ..................... 8- I


8.1.i Objective ............ 8-3

8.1.2 Equipment .............. 8-3

8.1.3 Procedure ................ 8-3

8.1.4 Results ............. 8-4

8.1.5 Conclusion ........... 8-4


8.2.1 Objective ........... 8-5

8.2.2 Equipment ........... 8- 5

8.2.3 Procedure ............ 8-5

8.2.4 Results ............. 8-5

8.2.5 Conclusions ............ 8-6

Section Page


8.3.1 Objective . 8-9

8.3.2 Equipment .... 8-9

8.3.3 Procedure . • • 8-9

8.3.4 Results . . 8-9

8.3.5 Conclusions 8-10

9 •0 CONCLUSIONS ..... 9-1

lO. 0 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . 10-1

ll. 0 REFERENCES ...... ll-1

12.0 APPENDIX .......... 12-1


12.1.1 Spacecraft Histories 12-1

12.1.2 Gemini Launch Vehicle Histories 12-1

12.2 WEATHER CONDITIONS ........ 12-11

12.3 FLIGHT SAFETY REVIEWS ....... 12-21

12.3.1 Mission Briefing ...... 12-21

12.3.2 Spacecraft Flight Readiness Review 12-21

12.3.3 Launch Vehicle Flight Safety Review

Board ............... 12-21

12.4 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS ........... 12-23

12.5 DATA AVAILABILITY ............ 12_25

12.6 POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION ............ 12-31

12.6.1 Spacecraft Systems ......... 12-32

Section Page

12.6 .i.i Structure ....... 12-32 Environmental control
system ...... 12-32 Cormuumication s system .... 12-33 Guidance and control
system .... 12-33 Pyrotechnics" system ..... 12-33 Instrumentation and
recording system ..... 12-34 Electrical system ...... 12-34 Crew station furnishings
and equipment ....... 12-35 Propulsion system ...... 12-36 Landing system ...... 12-36 Postlanding recovery
aids ......... 12-36 Experiments ........ 12-36

12.6.2 Continuing Evaluation ...... 12-37

13.0 DI STRIBUT!ON ............ ....... 13-1



Table Page

3.1-1 SPACECRAFT 6 MODIFICATIONS ......... 3-7


3.2-I GLV-6 MODIFICATIONS ............ 3-26

4.2-I SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ............ 4-6


PARAMETERS ............... 4-i4


AND AFTER MANEUVER ............... 4-16

4.3-111 COMPARISON OF ORBITAL ELEMENTS .......... 4-17

4.3-IV RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS ........... 4-18




5.1._-II IVAR COMPARISONS ............. 5-31


5.1.5-IV GUIDANCE ERRGRS AT S%CO ........... 5-34


SECO + 20 SECONDS ........... _-34


5.L.5-VII TRANSLATION MAHEUVER S ............ _-37


SInULATION(wt : 130°) .......... 5-38
TELEMETRY DATA ............. 5- 39

Table Page

5.1.8-1 0AMS AND RCS SERVICING DATA ........... 5-60


SUMMARY ................ 5-61






SEPARATION ............ 5-96


PARAMETERS ............. 5-97




6.3-1 RECOVERY SUPPORT ..... 6-19

7.1.1-I CREW TRAINING SUMMARY ...... 7-10


7.2-II BLOOD STUDIES- PILOT ..... 7-44

7.2-III URINALYSIS ...... 7-46


7.2-V CREW RADIATION ...... 7-48



AT 12:39 G.m.t._ DECEMBER 15_ 1965 ...... 12-13


AT 15:30 G.m.t., DECEMBER 16, 1965 ...... 12-15

Table Page





DATA AVAILABILITY ............ 12-28


Figure Page

3.1-1 GLV- spacecraft relationships

(a) Launch configuration .............. 3-12

(b) Dimensional axes and guidance coordinates • • • 3-13

3.1-2 Spacecraft arrangement and nomenclature ....... 3-14

3.1-3 Rendezvous and recovery section ........... 3-1_

3.1-4 Water management and battery module

installation ............. 3-16

3.1-5 Water management schematic ......... 3-17

3.1-6 Electrical power system installation ..... 3-18

3.1-7 Orbital attitude and maneuver system ..... 3-19

3.1-8 Docking bar assembly .......... 3-20

3.1-9 Emergency docking release system ..... 3-21

3.1-10 Spacecraft controls and displays ..... 3-22

3.1-11 Spacecraft interior stowage areas

(a) View looking into command pilot's side ..... 3-23

(b) View looking into pilot's side ........ 3-24

4.1-1 Planned and actual mission with planned

alternates included ............ 4-4

4.3-1 Ground track for the Gemini VI-A orbital mission

(a) Revolutions 1 through 4 .......... 4-21

(b) Reentry ................... 4-22

4.3-2 Trajectory parameters for the Gemini VI-A mission

launch phase

(a) Altitude and range ............... 4-23

(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle . . . 4-24
(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle . . . 4-25

Figure Page

4.3-2 (Concluded)

(d) Dynamic pressure and mach nt_nber ........ 4-26

(e) Longitudinal acceleration ........... 4-27

4.3-3 Apogee and perigee altitude for the Gemini VI-A

mission ...................... 4-28

4.3-4 Rendezvous during the Gemini VII -- VI-A mission

(a) Range, yaw and pitch from Gemini VI-A

to Gemini VII ............. 4-29
(b) Relative trajectory profile, measured from
G_uini VII to Gemini VI-A in curvilinear
coordinate system .............. 4-30

4.3-5 Trajectory parameters for the Gemini VI-A mission

reentry phase

(a) Latitude, longitude, and altitude ....... 4-31

(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle . . . 4-32
(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle . . . 4-33
(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number ........ 4-34
(e) Longitudinal deceleration ........... 4-35

4.3-6 Time history of relative parameters during

terminal phase ............ 4-36

5.1.5-1 launch vehicle -- spacecraft steering error

comparisons ............... 5-40

5.1.5-2 Comparison of spacecraft IGS and radar tracking

velocities ................. 5-41

5.1.5-3 IMU error coefficient history ............ 5-42

5.1.5-4 Braking sequence .............. 5-43

5.1.5-5 Radar acquisition sequence ............. 5-44

5.1.5-6 Radar to trajectory range comparison ........ 5-45

5.1.5-7 Radar azimuth and e[levation angles ......... 5-46

5.1.5-8 Radar elevation angle versus computed

mean value ................ 5-47

Figure Page

5.1.5-9 Analog range and range rate ............. 5-48

5.1.5-10 Radar temperature and pressure ........... 5-49

5.1.5-11 Touchdown comparisons ............. 5-50

5.1.5-12 Comparison of IGS position track with radar

position track at approximately 300_000 feet • • • 5-51

5.1.5-13 Separation sequence ................. 5-52

5.1.8-1 0AMS propellant consumption ............. 5-63

5.1.8-2 Retro-rocket firing duration overlap (autofire) . . . 5-64

5.1.11-1 Landing system performance ............. 5-74

5.2-1 Selected subassembly2 parameters Gemini VI-A

launch attempt ............... 5-99

5.2-2 Stage I gas generator showing location of

dust tap ................... 5-100

5.2-3 Umbilical 3D17 installation for final launch .... 5-101

5.2-4 MSC parameter time line ............... 5-102

6.3-1 Gemini VI-A launch abort areas and recovery

force deployment ................. 6-20

6.3-2 Landing zones and aircraft staging basis ...... 6-21

6.3-3 Details of primary landing area 6-22

6.3-4 Spacecraft 6 after landing 6_23

6.3-5 HF-DF network station bearings to the spacecraft

after landing ................... 6-24

7.1.1-1 Summary flight plan

(a) 0 to i0 hours g.e.t ............... 7-ii

(b) i0 to 20 hours g.e.t .............. 7-12
(c) 20 to 26 hours g.e.t .............. 7_13

Figure Page

7.1.2-1 Onboard target-centered coordinate plot of

rendezvous .................... 7-32

7.2-1 Tilt table studies, command pilot

(a) Preflight tilt studies ........... 7-50

(b) Postflight tilt studies ........... 7-51

7.2-2 Tilt table studies, pilot

(a) Preflight tilt studies ............. 7-52

(b) Postflight tilt studies ............ 7-53

7.2- 3 Physiological measurements

(a) Command pilot ................. 7-55

(b) Pilot ..................... 7-56

8.2-1 Experiment S-5, typical synoptic terrain


(a) Sudan, showing Cenozoic volcanics in

the Jebel Marra 8-7
(b) West coast of Somalia, in eastern Africa
showing drainage patterns in Oenozoic
marine sediments ............... 8-8

8.3-1 Experiment S-6_ two typical synoptic weather

photographs taken on successive orbital
revolutions 14 and 15

(a) View taken at approximately 10:44 G.m.t.

on December 16, 1965 during Revolution 14
over the Canary Islands in the eastern
Atlantic Ocean. _he cloud eddy at the
center formed about 50 miles downwind
(southwest) of Tenerife Island which
appears in the corner of the photograph.
_he open center of the vortex is about
15 miles in diameter ............. 8-11

Figure Page

8.3-i (Concluded)

(b) View taken at approximately 12:23 G.m.t.

on December 16, 1965 during Revolution 15
looking west over the eastern Atlantic
Ocean about 400 miles west of Cape Blanc_
Spanish West Africa. The small lines of
cumulus clouds have formed open cellular _
patterns in the southern section of a high
pressure region. Surface winds were
easterly while the upper-air winds at the
500 millibar level were northerly. Sub-
sidence of the air aloft suppressed the
vertical development of the clouds ...... 8-12

12.1-1 Spacecraft 6 test history at contractor facility . 12-2

12.1-2 Spacecraft 6 significant problem areas at

contractor facility ................ 12- 3

12.1- 3 Spacecraft 6 test history at Cape Kennedy

(a) Prior to October 25, 1965 ........... 12-4

(b) Subsequent to October 25, 1965 ......... 12- 5

12.1-4 Spacecraft 6 significant problems at Cape Kennedy . . 12-6

12.1-5 GLV-6 history at Denver and Baltimore ........ 12- 7

12.1-6 GLV-6 history at Cape Kennedy

(a) Prior to October 25, 1965 ........... 12-8

(b) Subsequent to October 25, 1965 ......... 12- 9

12.2-1 Variation of wind direction and velocity with

altitude for the launch area at 12:39 G.m.t._
December 15, 1965 ................. 12-18

12.2-2 Variation of wind direction and velocity with

altitude for the reentry area on December 16_

(a) Rawinsonde and Rocketsonde data between sea

level and 182K ft at 14:20 G.m.t ....... 12-19
(b) Rocketsonde data between 190K and 230K ft
at 19:22 G.m.t ................ 12-20




The fifth manned mission and first rendezvous mission of the Gemini
Program, designated Gemini VI-A, was launched from Complex 19, Cape
Kennedy, Florida, at 8:37 a.m. e.s.t., on December 15, 1965. The flight
was successfully concluded with the recovery of the spacecraft and the
flight crew at 23°22.5 ' N. latitude 67°52.5 ' W. longitude by the prime
recovery ship (U.S.S. Wasp), approximately i hour and 6 minutes after
landing. This rendezvous mission was launched from Complex 19 within
Ii days after the launch of the Gemini VII space vehicle. The space-
craft was manned by Astronaut Walter M. Schirra, command pilot, and
Astronaut Thomas P. Stafford, pilot. The crew completed the flight
in excellent physical condition and demonstrated excellent control of
the rendezvous and competent management of all aspects of the mission.

The primary objective of the Gemini VI-A mission was to rendezvous

with spacecraft 7. The secondary objectives of the Gemini VI-A mission
were to perform a closed loop rendezvous at M=4 (fourth darkness of the
mission), conduct station keeping with spacecraft 7, evaluate the re-
entry guidance capability of the spacecraft, conduct visibility tests
of spacecraft 7 as a rendezvous target vehicle, conduct 3 experiments,
and conduct systems tests. The primary objective and all secondary
objectives of the mission were successfully accomplished except for one
of the three experiments for which valid data were not received.

The Gemini launch vehicle performed satisfactorily in all respects.

The countdown was nominal, resulting in a launch within one-half second
of the scheduled time. First-stage flight was normal with all planned
events occurring within allowable limits. The first stage offset yaw
steering technique was used for the first time on this flight in an
attempt to place spacecraft 6 in the same orbital plane as spacecraft 7.
The technique results in a "dog-leg" trajectory_ and it was used suc-

Staging was nominal; however_ the crew reported that the flame
front caused by staging enveloped the spacecraft in such a manner that
it deposited a thin burned residue on the windows which affected the
visibility through them. The pilot was able to verify this phenomenon
as he had been observing a string of cumulus clouds prior to staging
and also observed them after staging. He reported that the clearness
and whiteness of these clouds was diminished after staging.

The second stage flight was normal and all but 7 ft/sec of the
-660 ft/sec out-of-plane velocity achieved during first stage operation
was steered out during second stage flight. The spacecraft was in-
serted into an orbit having an 87.2 nautical mile perigee and an


140 nautical mile apogee. The apogee was about 7 r_utical miles below
the planned altitude. The slant range to spacecraft 7 from spacecraft 6
at its insertion into orbit was a nominal 1067 nautical miles.

Nine maneuvers were performed by spacecraft 6 during the following

5 hours 50 minutes to effect the rendezvous with spacecraft 7. These
maneuvers were all performed using the spacecraft guidance system for
attitude reference. Initial radar lock-on with spacecraft 7 occurred
at a range of 248 nautical miles. Continuous lock-on started at a
range of 235 nautical miles and no losses of lock occurred until the
system was turned off at a range of 50 feet from spacecraft 7. The
rendezvous phase of the mission was completed at 5:56:00 ground elapsed
time when spacecraft 6 was 120 feet from spacecraft 7 and all relative
motion between the two vehicles had been stopped.

Station keeping was performed at distances between 1 foot and

300 feet for about 3 1/2 orbits after which a 9 ft/sec separation man-
euver was performed. The relative motion of spacecraft 6 from the
separation maneuver was stopped at a range of about 30 miles.

The spacecraft and its systems performed very satisfactorily

throughout the mission, except for the delayed-time telemetry tape
recorder which failed at 20 hours 55 minutes ground elapsed time be-
cause of a bearing seizure. This recorder malfunction resulted in
the loss of all delayed-time telemetry data for the remainder of the

The flight progressed nominally to its full duration. All check-

lists and stowage were completed in preparation for retrofire and re-
entry and the reentry control system was activated. Retrofire occurred
exactly on time at 25:15:58 ground elapsed time for a landing in the
West Atlantic landing area (primary). The reentry and landing were
nominal_ and the landing point achieved was less than 7 nautical miles
from the planned landing point. The crew remained in the spacecraft
until the spacecraft had been secured on the deck of the recovery ship.


A description of the Gemini VI-A mission, as well as a discussion

of the evaluation of the results, is contained in this report. The
evaluation covers the time from start of the launch-attempt countdown
to the date of publication of this report.

Detailed discussions are found in the major sections related to

each major area of effort. Some redundancy is found in various sections
where it is required for a logical presentation of the subject matter.

Data were reduced only in areas of importance from telemetry, on-

board records, and ground-based radar tracking. In evaluating the launch
vehicle performance, all available data were processed. The evaluation
of the spacecraft and launch vehicle consisted of analyzing the flight
results and comparing them with the results from ground tests and from
previous missions.

Section 6-1, FLIGHT CONTROL, is based on observations and evalua-

tions made in real time, and, therefore, may not coincide with the re-
sults obtained from the detailed postflight analysis. Brief descriptions
of the experiments flown on this mission are presented in section 8.0
with preliminary results and any conclusions that could be drawn at the
time of publication of this report.

The mission objectives, as set forth in the Mission Directive,

formed the basis for evaluation of the flight and were of paramount
consideration during preparation of this report. The primary objective
was to rendezvous with the Gemini VII spacecraft. The secondary ob-
jectives were as follows:

(a) Perform closed-loop rendezvous at M=4 (fourth darkness).

(b) Conduct station keeping with the Gemini VII spacecraft.

(c) Evaluate the reentry guidance capability of the spacecraft.

(d) Conduct visibility tests of the Gemini VII spacecraft as a

rendezvous target vehicle.

(e) Conduct assigned experiments.

(f) Conduct spacecraft systems tests.

At the time of publication of this report, more detailed analyses

of data on the performance of the launch vehicle and the radio guidance

system were continuing. Analyses of thespacecraft and the inertial
guidance system were also continuing. Supplemental reports, listed in
section 12.4_ will be issued to provide documented results of these

The results of previous Gemini missions are reported in refer-

ences 1 through 7.


The space vehicle for the Gemini VI-A mission consisted of Gemini
spacecraft 6 and Gemini launch vehicle 6 (GLV-6). Section 3.1 of this
report describes the spacecraft configuration, section 3.2 describes
the GLV configuration, and section 3.3 provides space-vehicle weight
and balance data. The major reference coordinates for the space
vehicle are shown in figure 3.1-1.


The structure and major systems of spacecraft 6 were basically the

same as those of spacecraft 5, except for replacing the fuel cell power
system with an adapter battery module, deletion of the rendezvous eval-
uation pod and the addition of rendezvous and docking hardware, (see
fig. 3.1-2). The detailed descriptions of spacecraft 5 and 6 are con-
tained in references 5 and 8, respectively; therefore, only the signif-
icant differences are described in this report (refer to table 3. l-I).

3.1. I Spacecraft Structure

The primary load-bearing structure of spacecraft 6was essentially

the same as that of spacecraft 5. The major changes are described in
the following paragraphs.

3. i.i.i Reentry assembly.- A docking bar assembly was added to

the rendezvous and recovery (R and R) section. It is extended in orbit
and used for spacecraft alignment during docking operations and is
jettisoned at retroadapter separation (see fig. 3.1-3).

Three mooring latch receptacles were equally spaced around the

forward perimeter of the R and R section (see fig. 3.1-3). For docking
exercises the receptables are exposed (after the nose fairing is jetti-
soned) and mate with the mooring latch hooks on the target docking
adapter (TDA). After use, the latch receptacles are jettisoned before
reentry, and the remaining cavities are covered by spring-loaded,
pyrotechnically-released covers.

An umbilical receptacle was added to the forward end of the R and R

section. The receptacle mates with the TDA umbilical plug (as the dock-
ing system is rigidized) to form a "hardline" connection.

Redesigned hatch-latching mechanisms were included as a result of
the difficulty in closing the hatch on spacecraft 4. Adapter assembly.- Adapter equipment and associated sup-

ports for spacecraft 6 were the same as those for spacecraft 5, except
for the following:

(a) The rendezvous evaluation podand mountings installed on the

blast shield access door of spacecraft 5 were not installed on space-
craft 6.

(b) The spacecraft 5 fuel cells were replaced by batteries and

associated mounts, similar to those used on spacecraft 3 and 4.

(c) A primary oxygen container was installed with a capacity of

106 pounds at 14.7 psia.

(d) Four propellant tanks were installed to contain fuel and

oxidizer for the orbital attitude and maneuver system. (See para-
graph )

3.1.2 Major Systems Communications system.- The communication equipment was

the same as that installed in spacecraft 5, including the silence and
record switches. However, the record (RCD) position was removed from
the mode switches by removing the labeling and installing a stop to
prevent switching to the RCD position. Also, the voice control center
(VCC) had 3 dB less attenuation between microphone amplifiers and the
voice recorder than on spacecraft 5.

The telemetry transmitter used on spacecraft 5 for transmitting

experiment data was deleted from spacecraft 6. Instrumentation and recordin5 system.- The instrt_nentation

and recording system was essentially the same as the spacecraft 5 system,
except for the PCM tape recorder which was modified to insure proper
head alignment. Environmental control system.- The environmental control

system was functionally the same as that used on spacecraft 5. The
water storage tank that used a combination of oxygen and fuel cell
water as a pressurant on spacecraft 5 was deleted from spacecraft 6, and
an aluminum tank with a capacity of 42 pounds was used in its place
(see fig. 3.1-4). This tank was serviced with 22 pounds of water prior
to flight.

The _ter management system was changed to a "blowdown" system by
removing the gas regulator_ adding a pressurant tank, and servicing the
entire system to 20 psia (see fig. 3.1-5). During manufacture of the
spacecraft, both the water management and the urine systems were re-
located to provide space for an extravehicular life support system
(ELSS). Subsequently, extravehicular activities were cancelled from
the mission and the space for ELSS was used for stowage.

A new design water-metering device replaced the water dispenser

used on spacecraft 5. (See ref. 7 for a description of the device.)
Also, one coolant pump was removed from each coolant loop in the tem-
perature control system. Guidance and control system.- The guidance and control

systems were similar to those used on spacecraft 5. The rendezvous
evaluation pod, used on the Gemini V mission to simulate the Gemini
Agena target vehicle (GATV), was not installed on spacecraft 6. Time reference system.- The space used for the flight-
plan roller installed in spacecraft 5 Ms utilized for a ground-
elapsed-time digital clock with reset capability. Electrical system.- Power for spacecraft 6 was supplied

by three silver-zinc batteries installed in the battery module mounted
in the adapter section (see figs. 3.1-4 and 3. l-d). The power system
was identical to that flown on the Gemini Ill mission (see ref. 3). Propulsion system.- The propulsion system was basically

the same as the spacecraft 5 system. Mission-oriented and improvement
modifications to the subsystems were incorporated and are described in
the following paragraphs. Orbit attitude and maneuver system (0AMS): The con-

figuration of the thrust chamber assemblies (TCA's) was such that their
life could not be effected in using the quantity of propellant loaded.
Two 22-inch diameter fuel tanks and two 20-inch diameter oxidizer tanks
were installed, and 332 pounds of fuel and 381 pounds of oxidizer were
loaded in the tanks (see fig. 3.1-7). This allowed 3-percent propellant
ullage at 80 ° F in all tanks. Reentry control system (RCS): New TCA's with 6 ° fiber-

glass lay-up of the chamber were included. Propellants loaded consisted
of 16 pounds of fuel and 20 pounds of oxidizer in each ring. Retrograde rocket system: This system was identical to

systems used on prior Gemini spacecraft.

UNCLASSIFIED Pyrotechnic system.- The following changes were made to
the pyrotechnic system:

(a) The rendezvous evaluation pod release assembly and cartridge

housings were deleted.

(b) A docking bar assembly_ composed of a docking bar actuator,

extension cartridge, and jettison cartridge, was installed (see
fig. 3. I-8).

(c) An emergency docking release was installed. This assembly

included a pyrotechnic body, cartridge, and latch assembly (see
fig. 3.1-9). The cartridge was the same type as that used for cutting
the cable and releasing the recovery hoist loop.

(d) Pyrotechnic components in the hatch-actuation mild-detonating-

fuse system, replaced to improve reliability, included two crossovers
and four mild-detonating fuse interconnects. Crew station furnishin6s and equipment.- Instrument panels and controls: The basic configura-

tion of the instrument panels and controls (see fig. 3.1-10) was the
same as that used for spacecraft 5 except for the following changes:

(a) An ammeter and a voltmeter similar to those on spacecraft 3

and 4 were installed on the right instrument panel instead of the fuel-
cell power-system monitor instrument.

(b) A digital clock displaying ground elapsed time was added to

the center instrument panel in pJ_ce of the flight-plan display. The
clock, synchronized with the time reference system, was started at
lift-off and had a maximum elapsed time readout of 999 hours, 59 min-
utes, and 59 seconds.

(c) A digital command encoder control was installed to the right

of the pilot's seat.

(d) The out-of-tape indicator light for the voice tape recorder
was relocated to the center instrument panel.

(e) The manual computer switch was moved from the right-hand
side-wall to a location under the right-hand instrument panel.

(f) The flight-plan roller was deleted.


(g) Other minor changes were made in switches and nomenclature.

These are included in figure 3.1-10. Space suits: The command pilot wore a G3C pressure

suit and the pilot wore a G4C pressure suit. These suits were the
same as those used on previous Gemini missions. Both crew members
wore the lightweight coverlayers. Extravehicular overvisors were not
worn. Flight crew equipment: The flight crew equipment was

basically the same as that flown on the previous mission except as

(a) A water-metering dispenser was incorporated in place of the

previously used water dispenser. The metering dispenser used the same
pistol configuration as before; however, a valving system to deliver
one-half ounce increments of water and a mechanical counter were added.
The counter was designed to count each half ounce of water dispensed.

(b) A light meter was provided for determining lens and shutter
settings for photography in orbit. This light meter had a very limited
field of view to provide accurate readings on a selected target.

A detailed list of the equipment carried on the mission is listed

in table 3.1-11. Spacecraft stowage facilities: Stowage facilities

(see fig. 3.1-11) were similar to spacecraft 5 with the following excep-

(a) The center stowage area was redesigned to accommodate the

extravehicular life support system (ELSS). The ELSS, not carried on
this mission s was replaced with a stowage box of the same overall size.

(b) The aft food boxes were slightly narrower than those flown
on spacecraft 5 because of the added volume required for the ELSS
stowage provisions.

(c) The pressure sealing door on the left-hand aft food box was
omitted and a fabric door was provided to retain the contents of the
box. The pressure sealing characteristics of the right-hand aft box
were the same as spacecraft 5. Landing system.- The landing system was the same as that
used on spacecraft 5.


3.1.2. Ii Postlandin5 and recovery system.- The postlanding and

recovery system was the same as that used on spacecraft 5 except that
flotation material was added to the R and R section similar to that
used on spacecraft 2. This material was added to aid in recovery of
the R and R section.


Significant changes incorporated in spacecraft 6

System from spacecraft 5 configuration

iReentry assembly (a) Flotation material was added to the R and R

structure section.

(b) A new design of hatch-latching mechanism was


(c) A docking bar assembly, three mooring latch

receptacles, and a TDA umbilical receptacle
were added to the R and R section.

Adapter assembly (a) Batteries were used for main bus power in-
structure stead of the fuel cells used in spacecraft 5.

(b) The rendezvous evaluation pod mountings were


Communications (a) The experiment telemetry transmitter was de-


(b) The VCC was modified.

Instrumentation (a) The PCM tape recorder was modified to im-

prove head alignment.

Environmental (a) A water storage tank was installed.

control (b) The water management system was modified by

removing a regulator and adding a pressurant

(c) The water management and urine systems were


(d) One coolant pump was removed from each cool-

ant loop in the temperature control subsyste_

(e) A water-metering device replaced the water


Guidance and (a) The rendezvous evaluation pod was deleted.


iTime reference (a) A ground-elapsed-time digital clock replaced

the flight-plan roller used on spacecraft 5.

Electrical (a) Silver-zinc batteries replaced the fuel cell_

on spacecraft 5.


System Significant changes incorporated in spacecraft 6

from spacecraft 5 configuration

Propulsion (a) 0AMS: The thrust chamber assemblies (TCA)

were modified to include 6° fiberglass
lay-up of the chamber.

(b) Two 22-inch diameter fuel tanks and two

20-inch diameter oxidizer tanks were in
stalled for 332 ib of fuel and 381 Ib of

Pyrotechnics (a) The rendezvous pod ejection system was de-


(b) Pyrotechnics for the docking bar assembly

were installed.

(c) An emergency docking release was installed.

(d) Pyrotechnic components in the hatch-

actuation mild-detonating-fuse system were

Crew station (a) An ammeter and voltmeter replaced the fuel

cell power system monitor instruments.

(b) Minor variations in switch functions and

nomenclature were incorporated.

(c) The center stowage area was redesigned.


Stowage area
(see fig. 3.1-11) Item Quantity

Centerline stowage 16-mm camera (with film magazines, 2 i

container 25-mm lens, 18-mmlens_ and 75-mm

70-rmm camera (with film magazines) 1

Photo event indicator 1

Spot meter (with exposure dial) 1

250-mmlens 1

Tissue dispenser (on top of center- 1

line stowage container)
Sextant 1

16-mm sequence camera (with film i


Interference filters 5

Penlight 2

Film Pack (with film) 2

Left-hand aft stow- Waste containers 4

age container
Urine receiver and hose system i

Lightweight headset i

Humidity sensor i

Defecation device bag 3

Voice recorder tape cartridge 4

Food 4 man days

16-mm film magazine 9

Auxiliary window shade 1

Stowage pouch ll

Tissue dispenser 1

Lanyard assembly 1

Optical sight glare shield 1


Stowage area
(see fig. 3.1-11) Item Quantity

Left-hand sidewall Orbital path display assembly (in- i

stowage containers cludes three overlays)
Tape i0 feet

Pilot preference kit i

Postlanding kit i

Passive dosimeter 2

!nflight medical kit i

Optical sight i

Right-hand aft Auxiliary drinking water bag 2

stowage containers (3-pound capacity)

Auxiliary window shade i

Reticle assembly i

Lanyard assembly i

Right-hand sidewall Celestial display, Mercator i

stowage containers
Radiation pocket-dosimeter i

Blood pressure reprogramming i


Manual blood pressure inflator i


Voice recorder tape cartridges 4

Pilot's preference kit 1

Male Velcro, 2 in. wide, with 6 inches

with backing
Dose rate indicator i

Female Velcro, 2 in. wide, with 6 inches


Passive dosimeter i


Stowage area
(see fig. 3.1-11) Item Quantity

Plot board stowage Flight data books 2


Foot wells Helmet stowage bag i

Plot board i

Dry stowage bag 4

Passive dosimeter i

Spacecraftstations Launch-vehiclestations

Z239.28 ,_,
Z233.91-/] "-_" "_X X 50.985
Reentry _ _
Spacecraft/ assembly _ F_\

ZD. 44 "
[ Adapter
assembly / ..... ,
;_" / tl--_'
n•, X 276.825
Oxidizer_ - d: ,, "-'-'-'-'-'---
h "-:_"""-'--_
X 299.151
X 319.522
Fuel "- J-/
_-_: i -_*, . _--X 384.522 Compartment 2
Engine N].;;l__i.I_,_-------- X 424.522 ____
gimbal --4,,_..,
_.U:! I U./ . X 430.000
station_ ...,.. _X 499.130
X 500.000
/ _[_ Compartment3
Stage1-2 ,
separation---/ _ -- L_ X 583.200
rl-1]_[] X 621.727
_ II
x 649.727-- --
Launch ,,
vehicle I ;i
-- -- _ll.i. X 887.826 T

\ j,"
:..= , Compartment4
I I i
X 982.326
! I I
I i_
I i,
' "I I
; i

-- -- __l.I

gimbal l.....,J
.:" / X 1224.311 Compartment5
station_ _/f X 1274.21

Engine .-4 _,_ -... X 1342.31 -- L

(a) Launch configuration.

Figure 3. 1-1. - GLV- spacecraftrelationships.


Launch vehicle pitch axis --"_'1

Spacecraftyawaxis / _, Launch vehicle
quadrant system
Spacecraft Tr_

coordinatesystem-_ /f_T_,,_
Launch vehicle \/ // I _\ \
coordinatesystem--_ /_// _ \\ _ r Launch vehicle yaw axis
+Z I-)( I [[ [ "_'_ L+X Z I Spacecraftpitch axis

plane Z-axis
of figure at ='/-=i-I-- x_TT;S I _-J/ --]-]--
_"_\_xx_l // / _X_.._X_u. On.
perpendicular to \ \ _,_k,_--_."_.__./("-_2 /// j to pli!!ep_i_i "g!e "
this point --_" __ _ point 'rCeU_rth's

Spacecraft coordinate system j--Launch vehicle

+Y coordinate system

Dimensional axes

Theseaxes perpendicular SIC

to pageat vehicle centerline \ -_ t"- 5°°
Isign indicated is toward viewer)

///_ O-Programmed
Xp, X rollangle
XLV, XS/C, -Y, Z,_] \_e_

_ I_ / XLV, YLV, ZLV - launch vehicle
__J roll, pitch, yawbodyaxes, respectively
XS/C, YS/C, ZS/C - spacecraft
1 roll, yaw, pitch axes, respectively
YLV Xp, Ye' Zo - IGSplatform inertial
• codrdiffatesreferencedto launch stand
Guidancecoordinates X, Y, Z - IGScomputer

(b) Dimensionalaxesand guidancecoordinates.

Figure3. 1-1.- Concluded.

NASA-S-66-59 JAN -_-
Electronic module
ECS coolant module
o ECS primary 02 module
Silver zinc batteries
Water tanks
Oxygen pressurant tank

section Instrumentation system
Retrograde rocket system Communication system
OAMS Environmental control system C_
C_ Rendezvous and docking light Guidance and control system
Z Electrical power system Z
_} Time reterence system
_ontrols and displays

•Rendezvous and recovery section

"11 •__ Parachute landing system "'rl
Rendezvous radar
N Docking bar m
Adapter .


Reentry assembly
Nose fairing

Figure 3.1-2. - Spacecraft arrangement and nomenclature.

NASA-S-66-224 JAN

\ g bar

and R section
parachute storage


,." ". chute

// , i
'I ,g latch

i .tuna
r--Slot and latch
Rod assemblY-7/ /_Lockwire

II I Close

_? -"_ Mooring /"
Nose fairing ---.-/

-_-Cable assembly __

Mooring latch covet

L Cable cutter (pyrotechnic)

V Cover i_ Mooring latch
Slot. 1

Rod _ _ . ,....--
assembly_l -,, _:: _l Close _ ["_f "_T I _ receptacle
"_ .... [ .... _ I_ ; ,,,: t_'--R and R section

_L-- Spring _Tube _,_..._ j

Section A-A See figure 3.1-9 for details

of mooring latch receptacle.

Figure 3 .I-3.- Rendezvous and recovery section,

NASA-S-66-156 JAN

Battery module

_ structure


Silver zinc

Oxygen fill and

shutoff valve

Oxygen pressurant

Figure 3.1-4. - Water management and battery module installation.

NASA-S-b6-83 JAN

I__] Cap


Adapter water

Check valve
dispenser Outlet Inlet

Metabolic moisture
Water from suit heat exchanger

_/ valve

,--ii,- Disconnect

Shutoff valve evaporatol
I Disconnect

Selector tube
valve Steam


Unit Nomenclature

Drinking water
Waste water

Figure 3.1-5. - Water management schematic.

NASA-S-b6-232 JAN

Figure 3.1-6. - Electrical power system installation.


NASA-S-66-242 JAN OAMS thrusters

_..f-Pressure regulator Q Pitch up

_ ,_,."-_ E" package Q Pitchdown

7_'_ S A" package Q Yaw right

"B" package_,/ t_>_,£_" /"Pressure transduce, Q Yaw left

0×_dizer /_"__"/
\'_ "-"'_"Pac_a
ge G Ro'clockw,se
shutoff valve

"C" package_._/ Q Translate forward

Fuel (:ank Q Translate aft

Q Translate right

G Translate left

G Translate up

Translate down

Oxidizer tank,, _ sealers



EqUiprnen(: ,
// ,

Retro --_ _
sectio 'Cabin

secti°n _'_-..._.,.j / _..

f- Figure ..3.1-7. - Orbital attitude and maneuversystem.

NASA-S-66-20& JAN L,N
Locking I'9
mechanism 0
pin ison


• i _x'X--Endexing bar
xtend pin
Docking cartridges engaged
assembly Extend piston

C_ manifold C_
Shear Shear

oin Z
('3 j-¢y.nder ('_
,linder ,g_ mechanism-_
Locking \
_,_ mechanism
•-n "1"I
I piston 1

ilrl )rfice piston Ilrl

hear extension _:_



extension CyIinder

Indexing bar extended Indexing bar jettison

Before activation (Re-entry)

Figure 3.1-8. - Docking bar assembly.

NASA-S-66-71 JAN

stowage box (right) stowage box extension

Biomedical recorder
no. i.
_rline stowage box
Left sidewall stowage box

16mm camera mounting bracket stowage

iwizzle stick
stowage area

Pilot ejection seat_

removed for clarity '_
Inflight medical kit-
]ptical sight
Left side dry stowage bags stowage i
t]]]]]] Ve[cro patches Right pedestal poubh

PCM recorder

(a) View looking into command pilot_ side

Figure 3.1-11. - Spacecraft interior stowage areas.

NASA-S-66-60 JAN

Centerline stowage box- • Aft stowage box (left)

Right stowag, Biomedical recorder

Blood pressure bulb stowage area-
Rigltt sidewall stowage box -n
Voice tape recorder.

Right stowage

Utility stowage pouch-

..... pilot ejection

seat removed for clarity
side dry stowage bags

pedestal pouch
[_]] Velcro patches
Plotting board stowage area

(b) View looking into pilot's side.

Figure 3.1-11. - Concluded.


The configuration of the Gemini launch vehicle 6 (GLV-6) was basi-

cally the same as the launch vehicles used on previous Gemini missions.
A description of the GLV structure and major systems is contained in
reference 2. Modifications to subsequent launch vehicles for the
Gemini III_ Gemini IV_ and Gemini V missions are described in refer-
ences _ 4_ and 5_ respectively. The only significant changes between
GLV-5 and GLV-6 (see table 3.2-1) are as follows:

(a) Flight control system - A 0.5-second to lO-second delay

timer was added to change the time of autopilot gain change no. i from
104.96 to ii0.0 seconds after lift-off.

(b) Hydraulic system - A check valve was added to the discharge

port of the electric motor pump.

(c) Propulsion system - The back pressure orifice was reduced

from 0.5 inch to 0.46 inch to reduce the possibility of an inadvert-
ent hold-kill because of late actuation of the oxidizer pressurant
pressure switch.

(d) Electrical system - Breakwire was added to the two umbilical

connectors (pad disconnect tail plugs 3DIM and 3D2M) to prevent pre-
mature dropout before lift-off.

No other significant changes were made to the GLV-6 structure or

major systems.


System Significant changes incorporated in GLV-6 from GLV-5 configuration

Structure No significant changes

Propulsion The back pressure orifice was reduced from 0.5 inch to 0.46 imch.

C Flight controls The autopilot gain change no. i was modified to include a C
7 0.5-second to lO-second delay timer Z
F- Guidance No significant change r--

(2_ Hydraulics A check valve was added to the discharge part of the electric (2_
OO motor pump. OO

m-11 Electrical Breakwire was added to the two pad disconnect tail plugs. _-_

Malfunction detection No significant change

Instrumentation No significant change

Range safety and ordnance No significant change


Weight data for the Gemini VI-A space vehicle are as follows:

Weight Center-of-gravity
(including location,
Condition spacecraft), in.
lh (b)
(a) x Y z

Ignition 346 089 776.20 -0.03 59.94

Lift-off 342 472 776.49 -0.03 59.94

Stage I burnout 84 928 441.41 -0.08 59.73

Stage II start of 72 962 344.40 -0.14 59.90
steady-state com-

Stage II engine 14 188 290.00 -0.66 59.53

shutdown (SECO)

aWeights and center-of-gravity data were obtained from

Aerospace Corporation.

bRefer to figure 3.1-1 for GLV coordinate system. Along the

X-axis, the center of gravity is referenced to GLV station 0.00.
Along the Y-axis, the center-of-gravity location is referenced to
buttock line 0.00 (vertical centerline of horizontal vehicle.
Along the Z-axis, the center-of-gravity location is referenced to
waterline 0.00 (60 inches below the horizontal centerline of the
horizontal vehicle).


Spacecraft 6 weight and balance data are as follows:

Center of gravity
Condition Weight, in.
lh (a)

Launch, gross 7817.00 -0.46 1.31 107.41


Retrograde 5475.29 0.13 -1.47 131.21

Reentry (O.05g) 4781.12 0.08 -1.49 136.89

Main parachute 4333.55 0.07 -1.64 129.49


Touchdown (no 4222.74 0.07 -1.70 127.39


aThe X-axis and Y-axis are referenced to the center!ine of the

vehicle. The Z-axis reference is located 13.44 inches aft of the
launch vehicle-spacecraft mating plane (GLV station 290.265).



Lift-off of the Gemini VI-A launch vehicle occurred at 13:37:26.471

G.m.t., December l_ 1965, on a biased launch azimuth of 81.4 ° (as deter-
mined from preflight targeting data). Altitude and flight-path angle
were slightly depressed at completion of stage I; also_ a larger than
expected northerly deviation in the lateral ground track was observed.
Mission Control Center plotboards recorded a lateral velocity to the left
(North) of approximately 200 ft/sec at BEC0_ a magnitude four times
greater than experienced on earlier flights.

Radio-guidance steering was good during second stage flight, steer-

ing out approximately -660 ft/sec of out-of-plane yaw velocity.

The spacecraft separation sequence was completely nominal with no

excessive rates or other anomalies. The insertion check list was com-
pleted about 9 minutes after lift-off and all systems were operating
normally. At insertion_ an underspeed of about 12 ft/sec and an out-of-
plane condition of about 7 ft/sec existed, coupled with a lateral dis-
_ placement of approximately 25K feet north of the desired plane.

The following maneuvers were performed prior to radar lock-on:

(a) A height-adjust maneuver (_)was performed at 1:34:03 g.e.t.

(perigee point) to correct for the insertion underspeed. The platform
mode of control was used with the spacecraft in a blunt-end-forward (BEF)

(b) The phase-adjust maneuver _NcL ) was performed at second apogee

(2:18:01 g.e.t. ). This maneuver was performed in the platform mode and
in the small-end-forward (SEF) attitude.

(c) At 2:42:08 g.e.t., a plane change maneuver was performed to

place the spacecraft into the same orbital plane as the target vehicle.
The rate command attitude control mode was used for this maneuver and
thrust was applied in a yaw attitude of 90.6 °.

(d) A second height adjustment was made at second perigee to com-

pensate for a slightly low _V on the previous height adjustment and
permit a more nominal terminal-phase initiation.

The onboard radar was turned on at 3 hours 7 minutes g.e.t. After

warm-up, the first radar lock-on indicated 246.22 nautical miles between

spacecraft 6 and 7. A radar test was performed with the computer in the
rendezvous mode to check the radar-computer interface.

The coelliptic maneuver (NsR) of 42.4 ft/sec was performed at third

apogee (3:47:37 g.e.t.).

_he terminal phase initiation maneuver was performed at 5 hours

19 minutes g.e.t., at a pitch angle of approximately 28 °. The _V was
applied using the aft and lateral (up) thrusters.

Midcourse corrections were applied at _t of 81.8 ° and 33.6 ° and

required about 16 and 12 ft/sec, respectively. The braking maneuvers
were applied at 5:50:35 g.e.t.

Station keeping began at 5:56:00 g.e.t, when the two spacecraft were
approximately 120 feet apart, which was the point at which all relative
motion was brought to zero. Starting from this point, the distance was
reduced to approximately l0 feet and spacecraft 7 was observed and photo-
graphed. Spacecraft 6 then closed to within 1 foot of spacecraft 7.
During the first night cycle, the separation distance was varied from
about 20 to 60 feet. During the next day cycle, the command pilot per-
formed an in-plane fly-around maintaining about 150 to 250 feet from
spacecraft 7. At approximately 07:42 g.e.t., the distance between space-
craft was monitored by observing the size of spacecraft 7 through the
optical sight. The in-plane maneuver was followed by a pilot-controlled
out-of-plane fly-around and other station keeping maneuvers. All of
these maneuvers were performed in the pulse mode with the radar and com-
puter turned off. Spacecraft 6 attitude was controlled to keep the
X-axis pointed toward the spacecraft 7 center of mass.

A separation maneuver of 9 ft/sec was performed at 11:14:29 g.e.t.

Forward-firing thrusters were used in a retrograde attitude controlled
by the platform mode. Apollo sextant sightings, using spacecraft 7 and
the star Sirius_ were made during the ensuing separation. Spacecraft 7
was viewed continuously throughout the night period and through most of
the following daylight period. Spacecraft 7 was in drifting flight to
conserve fuel and at times the flashing light would disappear from view.
However, the radar maintained lock-on almost continuously despite the
target's changing attitude.

At 13:25:52 g.e.t, a posigrade translation of 9 ft/sec was performed.

This maneuver placed spacecraft 6 in an equal period orbit with space-
craft 7 about 30 miles ahead.

Preparations for a sleep period were begun after spacecraft 7 was
no longer visible. _he actual sleep period occurred from 15 to 19 hours
g.e.t, with spacecraft 6 in the horizon scan mode.

During revolutions 13 and 14 dim-light Phenomena photography and

S-5/S-6 experiment photographs were taken. _he majority of the photo-
graphs were taken of weather phenomena because a large portion of the
land masses along the orbital track were obscured by clouds.

Stowage for reentry required about one orbit to accomplish, and the
preretrofire checklist was completed as scheduled. Retrofire occurred
at 25:15:58 g.e.t., in a 20 ° pitch-down attitude; orbit rate command was
used during this sequence. Following the retrofire sequence_ the space-
craft was rolled to the heads-down attitude and control was switched to
pulse mode, ring A. Full lift was flown to 400K feet at which time a
55 ° left bank angle was assumed and held until guidance initiate at
approximately 280K feet.

The pulse mode, ring A, was used until time for bank reversal
(25:38:22 g.e.t.); at this time, the control mode was switched to orbit
rate command. After guidance initiate, the downrange and crossrange
needles were monitored and bank angle corrections applied as necessary.
Shortly after peak acceleration was reached, the response to roll com-
mands decreased, indicating the depletion of the RCS ring A propellants.
Ring B was switched on and the bank angle was reestablished and held
until time for drogue parachute deployment, which occurred at 25:45:49
g.e.t. (See section 5.1.5 for a detailed description of the reentry
phase ).

The parachute sequence was nominal and postlanding operations were

accomplished without incident. The spacecraft landed within 7 miles of
the planned landing point at 25:51:24 g.e.t. The crew remained in the
spacecraft, which was hoisted aboard the carrier at 26:54:34 g.e.t.

NASA-S-66-212 JAN


abort (Ejection seats)

to 15,000 ft)

Mode ]I
abort (Retrograde rockets salvo-fired posigrade)
(15,000 ft _1
Lo522,000 ft)

Mode 111
abort Normal retrograde sequence)
522,000 ft) Open
r---_, loop ---_i

Orbitaloperationsincludingexperimentsandsystemstests ',

Launch vehicle Apogee Rendezvous Closed

first stage height Phase Coelliptic Terminal Braking and station Separation _ _ Retrograde _ loop _ Recovery
ignition to _ _ adjust _ adjust _ maneuver _ phase _ maneuver _ keepingwith _ maneuvers ' sequence
spacecraft maneuver maneuver (NSR) initiation (TPF) reentry
separation (NH) (Nc1) (TPI) spacecraft 7

ti Ii
Plane Height
change adjust Planned mission --*-
maneuver '%'=:':_'"-_ maneuver Planned alternates ....
(Npc) (NH) Actual mission ........ _-

Figure 4.1-i. - Planned and actual mission with planned alternates included


The times at which major events were planned and executed are pre-
sented in table 4.2-I. All events were completed as scheduled or within
the expected tolerances, indicating a satisfactory flight.


Event Planned time,_ Actual time, Difference,

g.e.t, sec
g. e.t. I'

Launch phase, sec

Stage I engine ignition signal (87FS1) -3.40 -3.28 0.]2.

Stage I MDTCPS makes subassembly 1 -2.30 -2.38 -0.08

Stage I MDTCPS makes subassembly 2 -2.30 -2.36 -0.06

TOPS subassembly 1 and subassembly 2 make -2.20 -2.30 -0.10

IShutdown lockout (back-up) -0.l0 -0.09 0.01

Lift-off (pad disconnect separation) 13:37:26 13:37:26:471 0.471

(13:_7:26.471 G.m.t. )
Roll program start 17.68 17.66 -0.02

Roll program end 20.48 20.46 -0.02

Pitch program rate no. i start 23.04 22.99 _0.05

Pitch program rate no. i end_ no. 2 start 88.32 88.20 -0.12
First IGS update sent 105.00 105. O0 0.O0
Control system gain change no. i 109.96 109.81 -0.15

Pitch program rate no. 2 end, no. 3 start 119.04 118.83 -0.21

Stage I engine shutdown circuitry armed 144.64 144.41 -0.23

Second IGS update sent 145. O0 145. O0 O. O0

Stage l MDTCPS unmake 156.19 157.12 0.93

BECO (stage I engine shutdown (87FS2)) 156.27 157.16 0.89

Staging switches actuate 156.27 157.16 0.89

Signals from stage I rate gyro package to 156.27 157.16 O.89
flight control system discontinued

Hydraulic switchover lockout 156.27 157.16 0.89

Telemetry ceases, stage I 156.27 157.16 0.89

Staging nuts detonate 156.27 157.16 0.89

Stage II engine ignition signal (91FSI) 156.27 157.16 0.89

Control system gain change 156.27 157-16 0.89

Stage separation begin 156.97 157.84 0.87

Stage II engine MDFJPS make 157.17 157.90 0.73
Pitch program rate no. 3"ends 162.56 161.70 -0.86

Radio guidance enable 162.36 161.64 -0.92

TABLE 4.2-1 - SEQLrH_CE OF EVENTS - Concluded

Event g.e.t,
Planned time, g.e.t,
Actual time, l sec

Launch phase_ sec

First guidance command signal received 169.00 168.53 -0.47

Stage II engine shutdown circuitry armed 317.44 316.28 -1.16

SECO (stage II engine shutdown (glFS2)) 336.70 338,74 2.04

Redundant stage II shutdown 336.70 338.75 2.05

Stage II MDFJPS break 337.00 338.88 1.88

Spacecraft separation 356.70 361.03 4.33
OANS on 356.70 359.22 2.52
OAMS off 368.20 372.61 4.41

Orbit phase_ hr:min:sec

Height adjust maneuver 01:34:03 01:34:03 0

Phase adjust maneuver 02:18:03 02:18:01 - 2

" Plane change maneuver 02:43:10 02:42:08 -62

Height adjust (vernier) maneuver 03:03:20 -

Coelliptic maneuver 03:47:33 03:47:37 4

Terminal phase maneuver initiate 05:17:03 05:18:56 13
First correction maneuver 05:31:31 -

Second correction maneuver 05:43:34 -

Braking maneuver 05:49:44 05:50:31 47

Rendezvous complete 05:56:00 -

Retrograde separation maneuver ll:14:31 ll:14:31 0
Posigrade maneuver 13:25:52 13:25:52 0

Reentry phase_ hr:min:sec

Retrorocket initiation 25:15:58 25:15:58 0

Begin blackout 25:38:45 25:38:28 -17

_ad blackout 25:43:49 25:43:54 5

Drogue deployment 25:45:39 25:45:49 i0

Pilot deployment/main initiate 25:47:18 25:47:21 3

Landing 25:51:36 25:51:24 -12




The launch and orbital trajectories referred to as planned are

either preflight calculated nominal trajectories from references 9 and i0
or trajectories based on nominal outputs from the real-time computer com-
plex (RTCC) and planned attitudes and sequences as determined in real
time in the auxiliary computer room (ACR). The actual trajectories are
based on the Manned Space Flight Network tracking data and actual at-
titude and sequences, as determined by airborne instrumentation. The
Patrick Air Force Base atmosphere was used for altitudes below 25 nauti-
cal miles, and the 19_9 ARDC model atmosphere was used for altitudes
above 25 nautical miles for all trajectories except the actual launch
phase. For the launch phase, the current atmosphere as measured up to
2_ nautical miles altitude at the time of launch was used. The earth
model for all trajectories contained geodetic and gravitational con-
stants representing the Fischer ellipsoid. A ground track of the first
four revolutions, and from retrofire to landing is shown in figure 4.3-1.
Launch_ orbit, rendezvous_ and reentry trajectory curves are presented
in figures 4.3-2 to 4.3- _.

4.3.1 Gemini Spacecraft

j Launch.- The launch trajectory data shown in figure 4.3-2
are based on the real-time output of the range-safety impact prediction
computer (IP 3600) and the Guided Missile Computer Facility (GMCF). _he
IP 3600 used data from the missile trajectory measurement system (MISTRAM),
FPQ-6, and TPQ-18 radars. The GMCF used data from the GE Mod III radar.
Data from these tracking facilities were used during the time periods
listed in the following table:

Facility Time fromseelift-off,

IP 3600 (FPQ-6 and TPQ-18) 0 to 52

_CF (GEMod Ill) 52 to 403

The actual launch trajectory, as compared with the planned launch

trajectory in figure 4.3-2 , was slightly low in altitude, velocity, and
flight-path angle during stage I powered flight. After BECO, the radio
guidance system (RGS) corrected what little error existed and guided
stage II to a near nominal insertion. At BEC0_ the altitude_ velocity
and flight-path angle were low by 3299 feet, 26 ft/sec, and 0.39 °,

respectively. At SECO, the altitude was high by 318 feet, the velocity
was low by 9 ft/sec and the flight-path angle was high by 0.01 °. Actual
SECO conditions are based on corrected GE Mod III, MISTRAM, and telem-
etry data. At spacecraft separation, the altitude was high by 477 feet,
the velocity was low by 12 ft/sec, the flight-path angle was high by
0.04 °, and the spacecraft was approximately 25K feet north of the de-
sired plane. Table 4.3-I contains a comparison of planned and actual
conditions at BECO_ SECO_ and spacecraft separation. The preliminary
conditions at spacecraft separation were obtained by integrating the
Bermuda vector after insertion back to the time of separation as deter-
mined during the mission, through the planned velocity changes (_V) and
attitudes in reference i0. The final conditions were obtained by inte-
grating the first orbit Best Estimate Trajectory (BET) back through the
actual _V's and attitudes to spacecraft separation as determined by te-
lemetry. (NOTE: The BET used tracking data from Bermuda, Grand Turk
Island, Carnarvon, White Sands, and Eglin Air Force Base.) It can be
seen, however, that except for _he time of separation, the preliminary
solution agrees with the final solution.

The GE Mod !II and MISTRAM radar tracking data, after SEC0, are
used to compute a go-no-go for spacecraft insertion by averaging i0 sec-
onds of data starting at SECO + 5 seconds. The go-no-go condition ob-
tained from GE Mod III showed that velocity was high by 6 ft/sec and
flight-path angle was low by 0.12 ° when compared to the more accurate
orbital ephemeris data. The conditions obtained from MISTRAM showed
that velocity was high by 2 ft/sec, and flight-path angle was low by
0.08 ° when compared to the ephemeris data. Orbit.- The main objective of the Gemini VI-A mission was
to rendezvous with spacecraft 7; therefore, the orbit phase is described
in more detail in paragraph Table 4.3-11 shows the planned
and actual orbital elements after each maneuver and table 4.3-111 shows
the orbital elements from insertion to retrofire. A comparison of plan-
ned and actual apogees and perigees is shown in figure 4.3- 3 . These
planned and actual elements were obtained from orbital ephemerides gen-
erated, respectively, by using the sequences in reference i0 and by inte-
grating the Gemini tracking network vectors after each of the midcourse
and terminal phase rendezvous maneuvers.

The planned trajectory as presented in table 4.3-IV and figure 4.3-4

was taken from the real-time solution obtained using the Gemini VII
White Sands vector in revolution 161 and the Gemini VI-A Canary Island
vector after insertion. This was the first plan obtained after the
Gemini VI-A lift-off_ and comparison with later actual maneuver values
illustrates a lack of significant change as the rendezvous progressed,
indicating near nominal performance. The groumd-requested maneuvers
were based on various Gemini VI-A vectors updated after each maneuver
and the Gemini VII Hawaii vector in revolution 162.

The actual trajectory duringthe rendezvous phase was reconstructed
utilizing BET vectors (see ref. 9). The Gemini VI-A vector used was ob-
tained prior to the first maneuver (group A in ref. 9). Maneuvers as
derived from the inertial guidance system (IGS) postflight analysis were
applied sequentially up to rendezvous. The first Gemini VII vector com-
puted was used throughout, because that vehicle was not maneuvered ex-
cept in attitude.

The early ground computations of the Gemini VI-A trajectory, based

on the Canary Island vector after insertion_ indicated nearly nominal
conditions for effecting a fourth-orbit rendezvous. Because lift-off
was on time, the only anomalies indicated were an underspeed at inser-
tion of about 12 ft/sec and an out-of-plane condition requiring a plane
change of about 32 ft/sec. The range between the vehicles at Gemini VI-A
insertion was a nominal 1067 nautical miles_ but due to dispersions in
the powered flight_ spacecraft 6 was approximately 4 nautical miles north
of the target plane. The orbit planes were almost exactly parallel as
planned and the plane change could be scheduled at the nominal point.
These two major dispersions account for almost all of the small above-
nominal translational cost encountered prior to the terminal phase.

At 1:34:03 g.e.t., a height adjustment (_) to correct for the

,_ spacecraft 6 insertion underspeed was performed. This posigrade maneu-
ver with the forward-firing thrusters was planned to raise the space-
craft 6 apogee from 140 nautical miles to 147 nautical miles (15 nautical
miles below the spacecraft 7 orbit). Because of a slight accelerometer
bias error, the ground-commanded value of 14.0 ft/sec was not fully ap-
plied. The actual value based on IGS readouts was approximately 13.8 ft/
sec. This error, coupled with an update on the vectors_ necessitated a
small corrective height maneuver to be scheduled for the following peri-
gee. Prior to this, however, the phase and plane adjustment maneuvers
were made.

The nomina&ly scheduled phase maneuver (NcL) was performed at sec-

ond apogee at 2:18:01 g.e.t. The horizontal_ posigrade &V of 60.8 ft/
sec was applied accurately with the aft-firing thrusters. The resultant
Gemini VI-A perigee was 121 nautical miles. Thus the catchup rate was
reduced to 4.1 deg/orbit.

target plane
The plane .N_c_ to send spacecraft
change ,(-- 6 into the
was performed at 2:42:08 g.e.t. A thrust of 31.7 ft/sec to the southeast
(yaw = 90.6 ° ) was applied with the aft thrusters. The resulting out-
of-plane displacement was 0.5 mile.

At second perigee, 3:03:20 g.e.t., a small corrective height maneu-
ver of 0.6 ft/sec posigrade was applied with the aft-firing thrusters,
raising the spacecraft 6 apogee to 147 nautical miles. This maneuver,
though not essential, was done in an attempt to keep the terminal phase
as near nominal as possible to facilitate the crew's onboard backup cal-

At third apogee, 3:47:37 g.e.t, the coelliptic (NsR)I maneuver

performed. This slightly pitched-down posigrade maneuver of 42.4 ft/sec
was accomplished with the aft-firing thrusters. The resulting space-
craft 6 orbit was 147 by 144 nautical miles. The height difference be-
tween the orbits at this point was 14. 7 nautical miles and varied up to
15.8 nautical miles until terminal-phase initiation. Thus, the coellip-
ticity was well within tolerance but would have been better if the pitch
angle during the NSR maneuver had been approximately i ° greater.

The range at this time was 172 nautical miles, which was approxi-
mately i nautical mile greater than previously calculated, and accounts
for a slightly later terminal-phase initiation time.

The crew switched the onboard computer to the rendezvous mode ap-
proximately 4 minutes i0 seconds after the beginning of the NSR maneuver.
Because of the existing relative position and catchup rate between the
vehicles, this switch time came about a minute too late to produce the
desired line-of-sight terminal phase initiation at 27 ° pitch. Due to
the fixed internal solutions fro_ the onboard computer, set when the
computer goes to rendezvous mode, the pitch of the terminal-phase ma-
neuver at 5:18:56 g.e.t, was computed to be about 35 ° (which would pro-
duce the same results as a pitch of 28 ° line-of-sight).

The terminal-phase-initiation maneuver was performed at a pitch

angle of approximately 28 ° because the command pilot held line-of-sight
radar lock-on during the maneuver. Thus the AV solution on the IVl's
was primarily in the _D-AFT window but also contained about 4 ft/sec
in the UP-DN window. The _V applied was 31.5 ft/sec using the aft
and the lateral (up) thrusters. 'Eae _t = 81.8 ° and 33.6 ° midcourse
corrections were applied 12 and 24 minutes laterj respectively, and re-
quired about 16 and 12 ft/sec. All were well within the expected (la)

The braking maneuvers were started at 5:50:35 g.e.t, and were ter-
minated at 5:56:00 g.e.t., when the two spacecraft were approximately
120 feet apart and relative motion was stopped. The total AV applied
was approximately 65 ft/sec_ close to that predicted.

_e translational cost for the terminal phase was approximately
125 ft/see, about 25 ft/sec greater than the minimum. The total trans-
lational cost of the rendezvous maneuvers (including terminal phase) was
276 ft/sec, approximately 70 ft/sec greater than the minimum but less
than the lo deviation of about i00 ft/sec.

4.3.1. 3 Reentry.- The planned and actual reentry phase of the tra-
jectory is shown in figure 4.3- 5. The planned trajectory was determined
by integrating the Woomera vector in revolution 15 through planned retro-
fire sequences determined by the RTCC, and flying a 56 ° bank-angle lift-
ing reentry according to Math Flow 6 described in reference ii. The
Woomera vector was selected one revolution before retrofire because the
retrofire setting in the spacecraft was based on that solution. The re-
entry trajectory in figure 4.3- 5 is only a simulated reentry required
to hit the actual landing point. It was obtained by integrating the
White Sands vector after retrofire back to the end of retrofire_ then
forward to landing through a bank and reverse bank angle of 50.8 °. An
actual reentry trajectory could not be run because the real-time telem-
etry data containing reentry attitudes were lost during the blackout re-
gion_ and the onboard tape recorder failed before reentry. The crew
stated that they flew according to the Flight Director Indicator commands
after guidance initiate_ and reversed bank at what they believed to be
approximately 55 ° to 65 ° , four or five times as required to null out
cross-range dispersions. The crew reported a maximum acceleration of
4.3g, as compared to 4.8g obtained with the simulated reentry trajectory
and 4.9g with the real-time telemetry which was obtained after blackout.

It is believed that the simulated reentry trajectory is reasonable

because the blackout times agree within 12.0 seconds of the actual
blackout_ maximum acceleration loads compare with telemetry within O.ig
at the analogous times_ and parachute deployment altitudes at recorded
sequence times are in accord with those reported in section 5.1.11.
Table 4.3-1 contains a comparison of reentry dynamic parameters and
landing points. The final landing point, as determined by extrapolated
radar and IGS data, was within 7.0 nautical miles of the planned landing
point. See section 5.1.5 for a more detailed description of this landing.

4.3.2 Gemini Launch Vehicle Second Stage

_he second stage of the Gemini launch vehicle was inserted into an
orbit with apogee and perigee altitudes of 134.8 and 86.9 nautical miles,
respectively. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) network
tracking sensors were able to skin-track the second stage during the en-
suing 31-hour orbit lifetime. NORAD tracked the second stage prior to
reentry in revolution 21 and predicted an impact point of latitude 28.9 ° N
and longitude 179 ° W in the north Pacific.


Condition Planned
Preliminary I Final

Time from lift-off, sac ............. 156.33 Not computed 157.16

Geodetic latitude, deg North .......... 28.63 28.65

Longitude, deg Nest ............... 79.59 79.57

Altitude, feet ................. 205 449 202 150

Altitude, nautical miles ............ 33.8 33.3

Range, nautical miles .............. 51.4 52.8

Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec .......... 9 998 9 972

Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ....... 18.32 17.93

Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N ...... 83.21 82.14


Time from lift-off, sec ............. 336.63 Not computed 338. 74

Geodetic latitude, deg North .......... 29.06 29.12

Longitude, deg West ............... 71.91 71.84

Altitude, feet ................. 529 252 529 570

Altitude, nautical miles ...... ...... 87.1 87.2

Range, nautical miles .............. 456.4 460.8

Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec .......... 25 646 25 637

Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ........ 02 .03

Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N ...... 90.14 90.17

Spacecraft Separation

Time from lift-off_ sec ............. 356.63 358.98 361. Ol

Geodetic latitude, deg North .......... 29.05 29.11 29.11

Longitude, deg West ............... 70.43 70.37 70.20

Altitude, feet ................. 529 218 529 695 529 695

Altitude, nautical miles ............ 87.1 87.2 87.2

Range, nautical miles .............. 534.6 537-i 546.0

Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec .......... 25 750 25 718 25 718

Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ....... O.O .05 .04

Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N ...... 90.91 9O. 94 91.02


Condition Planned
Preliminary Final

Maximum Conditions

Altitude_ statute miles ............. 167.6 161.5 160.6

Altitude, nautical miles ............ 146.2 140.4 139.7

Space-fixed velocity, f_/sec .......... 25 740 25 728 25 727

Earth-fixed velocity, ft/sec .......... 2_ 371 2h 360 24 359

Exit acceleration, g .............. 7.4 7.4 7.4

Exit dynamic pressure, lb/sq ft ......... 75X 732 732

Reentry deceleration, g (tracking data) ..... 4.9 4.8 4.8

Reentry deceleration, g (telemetry data) .... N/A 4.9 4.9

Reentry dynamic pressure, ib/sq ft ....... 326 314 314

Landing Point

Latitude, deg:min North ............. 23:35 23:24a 23:35 _

Longitude, deg:min West ............ 67:50 67:53 a 67:50b

abased on preliminary radar fix of helicopter over the spacecraft.

bLanding within 7.0 n. mi. circle with the intersection of these coordinates as the
center. See section


Before Maneuver After Maneuver
Maneuver Condition Actual Actual
Planned Planned
Preliminary a Final Preliminary a Final

NH Apogee, n. mi .... 146.2 140.3 140.0 146.4 146.7 146.8

Perigee, n. mi .... 86.7 86.8 86.9 86.7 86.9 86.9

Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 29. O0 28.97 28.87 28.98 28.97

Period, min ..... 88.77 87.92 88.77 88.82

NCI Apogee, n. mi .... 146.4 146.7 146.8 146.3 147.1 146.9

Perigee? n. mi .... 86.7 86.9 86.9 116.6 120.6 120.6
Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 28.98 28.97 28.87 29.00 28.97

C Period, min ..... 88.77 88.82 89.39 89.45

Z Npc Apogee, n. mi .... 146.3 147.1 146.9 146.3 146.7 146.9 Z

Perigee, n. mi .... 116.6 120.6 120.6 116.6 120.6 120.6

Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 29.00 28.97 28.87 28.90 28.89

> Period, min ..... 89.32 89.45 89.32 89.45 >

NH Apogee, n. mi .... 146.3 146.7 146.9 146.3 147.2 147.3
Perigee, n. mi ..... 116.6 120.6 120.6 116.6 120.6 120.6

"_ Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 28.90 28.89 28.87 28.90 28.89 "11

_1 Period, min ..... 89.32 89.45 89.32 89.46 _11

NSR Apogee, n. mi .... 146. 3 147.2 147.3 146.3 148.6 147.6

Perigee, n. mi .... 116.6 120.6 120.6 143.8 146.9 145.5
Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 28.90 28.89 28.87 28.90 28.89

Period, mln ..... 89.32 89. 46 9O.17 89-99

Te_ninal Apogee, n. mi .... 146.3 148.6 147.6 161.0 163. 4 161.9

Perigee, n. mi .... 143.8 146.9 145.5 158.7 158.6 156.3

Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 28.90 28.89 28.87 28.93 28.89

Period, min ..... 89.87 89.99 90.56 90.55
Separa- Apogee, n. mi .... 161.0 163.4 161. 9 161.0 168.4 168.1
Perigee, n. mi .... 158.7 158.6 156. 3 155.4 154.2 153.0

Inclination, deg . . . 28.87 28.95 28.89 28.87 28.90 28.89

Period, min ..... 90.56 90.55 90.47 90.54

apreliminary elements are RTCC values obtained during the mission. Period not available.

Revolution Condition Planned
Preliminary a Final

Insertion Apogee, n. mi ..... 146.2 140.3 140.0

Perigee, n. mi ..... 86.8 86.8 86.9

Inclination, deg . • . 28.87 29.00 28.97

(I) Period, min ...... 88.77 87.92

Pre-rendezvous Apogee, n. mi ..... 146.2 146.7 146.8

C Perigee, n. mi. . . 86.8 86.9 86.9 C

Z Inclination, deg 28.87 28.98 28.97

F" (i) Period, min . 88.77 88.82 f--
> Rendezvous Apogee,'n. mi. 161.0 163.4 161.9
(j) Perigee, n. mi. . . 158.7 158.6 156.3 (2_
"11 Inclination, deg • . 28.87 28.93 28.89 -_
rT1 (4) Period, min ..... 90.56 90.55 rT1
Post-rendezvous Apogee, n. mi. . . 161.0 168.4 168.1

Perigee, n. mi .... 155.4 154.2 153.0

Inclination, deg • . 28.87 28.90 28.89

(12) Period, min 90.47 90.54

Retrofire Apogee, n. mi ..... 160.0 168.6 168.2

Perigee, n. mi ..... 154.2 153.9 153.0

Inclination, deg • • • 28.87 28.90 28.89

(16) Period, min ...... 90.46 90.54 _-,


apreliminary elements are RTCC values obtained during the mission. Period not available.

Condition Planned Ground Actual


Height maneuver NH

Maneuver initiate_ hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 1"34:03 1:34:02 1:34:02.5

Av, ft/see ................ 13.4 14.o 13.8

Pitch, deg ................ 0.0 0.0 -1.4

Yaw, deg ................. 180. 180.0 -179.2

tB min: sec ................ 00:22 00:24 00:23

Phase maneuver NCL

Maneuver initiate_ hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 2:18:03 2:18:00 2:18:01

AV, ft/sec ................ 59.4 60.8 60.8

Pitch, deg ................ : O. 0 0.0 O. 3

Yaw, deg ................. 0.0 0.0 -0. i

tB rain:sec ................ 01:14 01:17 01:16.5

Plane change _C

Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 2:43:10 2:42:07 2:42:08

AV, ft/sec ................ 31.5 31.7 31.7

Pitch, deg ................ 0.0 O. 0 0.4

Yaw, deg ................. 90.0 90.0 90.6

tB min: sec ................ 00:39 00:40 00:39.4

Height maneuver NH

Maneuver initiate_ hr:min: sec, g.e. t .... Not 3:03:19 3:03:20


AV, ft/sec ................ 0.8 0.6

Pitch, deg ................ 0.0 -4.6

Yaw, deg ................. 0.0 -12.6

t_ rain:see ................. 00: Ol 00:00.8


Condition Planned Actual

Co-elliptical maneuver NSR

Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t . . . 3:47:33 3:47:37 3:47:37

_V, ft/sec ................ 44.4 42.5 42.4

Pitch, deg ................. 2.8 -i. 5 -i. i

Yaw, deg ................. 0.0 0.0 -0. 3

tB min/sec ................ 00:55 00:53 00:53

Terminal phase maneuver TPI

Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 5:16:51 5:18:39 5:18:56

Z_V, ft/sec ................ 32.5 33.7 31.5

Pitch, deg ................ 27.3 26.5 35.0

Yaw, deg ................. 0.0 -2.8 -1.5

tB min: see ................ 00:40 00:42 00:39

82 ° correction

Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... Not (a) 5:31:31

_V, ft/sec ................ c16.54

Pitch, deg ................ (c)

Yaw, deg ................. (c)

tB min: sec ................ (e)

aThese maneuvers are a function of the onboard radar and not ground

bThis ZkV is a summation of all translation maneuvers (see section 5.1.5

for resultant Z_V and attitudes).

eThese were not single thrust maneuvers and were a function of the
onboard radar commanded attitude.


Condition Planned Ground Actual


34° correction

Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... Not (a) 5:43:34

Iseo ................ (b)
Pitch, deg ................ (c)

Yaw, deg .................. (c)

t B min:sec ................ (c)

Braking maneuver

Maneuver initiate, hr:min:sec, g.e.t .... 5:49:18 5:50:47 5:50:31

aV, ft/sec ................ 41.8 42.3 d65.

Pitch, deg ................ 54.4 58.0 (c)

Yaw, deg .................. 179.9 179.6 (c)

tB min:sec ................ 01:09 01:i0 eo4:jO

aThese maneuvers are a function of the onbGard radar and not ground

bThis AV is a sunmation of all translation maneuvers (see section 5.1.5

for resultant _V and attitudes).

CThese were not single thrust maneuvers and were a function of the onboard
radar commanded attitude.

_ncludes approximately 20 fps for semi-optical approach to within 120 ft


eBurn time includes semi-opticaL approach. (If the 65 fps had been burned
in one pulse, the duration of the b_rn would have been 1:47.)




I00 0

0 20 40 60 80 I00 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Timefrom lift-off, sec


Figure4.3-2. - Trajectoryparametersfor the Gemini_57]-A

NASA-S-66-183-JAN -I:-

4×_I I 1 I 1'lit T_ ] [ I 1_ _ -- ---- Planned_]

28 - 32
26 30

22 _ 26

p 18 "_ 22 p
{,#"i 12 l_ {,#'}

-..n_,o ,,
m 6 i0


20 40 60 80 i00 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Timefrom lift-off, sec

velocityandflight-path angle.

Figure4,3-2, - Continued,




0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Timefrom lift-off, sec

(c)Earth-fixedvelocityandflight-path angle.

Figure4.3-2. - Continued. .#-

NASA-S-66-181 JAN 4=-
44 ........


1000[ 36
800i- 32

= i 22

200_- =_ 20

L _i8

=11 14 "1"1

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Time from lift-off, sec

(d) Dynamic pressure and mach number.

Figure 4.3-2. - Continued.


0 20 40 60 80 lO0 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Timefrom lift-off, sec


Figure4.3-2. - Concluded. 4=-

NASA-S-66-64 JAN 4=.
180 rO




('_ _ _3o F'_
r"- ._

O0 12o O0
-- O0

--n _o __
rn m

I I II I _oellipt_c maneuver
90 _ h_tude T_ Terminal phase

80 hp - Per',_ altitude "

O0:O0 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00 24:00 26:00 28:00
Groundelapsed time, hr:min

Figure 4. 3-3.- Apogee and perigee altitude for the Gemini _2]-A mission.
I =
._._ _: _ _ ..
_ _ .-., _::, _
:i2 . ii
it " " _
\ I
/ _
. E
x= ._
' mr %_
( 8 _
+ '_ ,'I: "E
-- z _ o ,_
/ I
L\ + 'fi
•!m "U 'aBue_
I I I I I I I I i I i
,b 5_p '_eA
_ I I I I I I I I I i I
flap 'q:)l!d

NASA-S-66-226JAN 0

-Actual __
3 r

E /-- -01:20:00
_ ,// _ _ __ _

0 _'_ NC1
_/ NH: :Heightadjustment
Phaseadjustment '-'-< _ i_ -- _ - -- _ '_'.-... _i_ -'_ -)i

C_ _
_-2 _ _ Npc: Plane change 05:00:00-- / / C_
!41/,/// TPI
NSR=: Terminal phaseinitiation
Coellipticmaneuver 05:5100-- / ---

Z -3 _,, _. /,--" _ CORI: 82° corrective maneuver

_'_ -4 " COR2 : 34° correctivemaneuver
TPF: Braking maneuver
r- F __ ! i_:, ,,r .... r ! ! [ I-"

lO-- / I Io5:51:oo- 0'}

o I coR1
: o5:3t:53_-__
'--]'I J
NCI : 02:1801-- _ o,oooo-\osooop-_
_t _ --n

m ._ i 10minute time intervals A?%_b , ___

,.= x_ __NsR = 03:47:3(
// E_
.._,_ 02:00:00-- 4'_ i "_ _------_"
_-"_ _-_-_--
_-_ / pl .;05:18158___ COR2.05:43:32__ _X_
-40 I __ TPF= 05:50:35-
/ NH° 03:03:19--

"_ -60 /_ NH 0134 3

-8o _----=---Z_ _ C A.----

I ----,_d
-750 -700 -650 -600 -550 -500 -450 -400 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50" 0 50
Horizontaldisplacement,n. mi.

(b)Relativetrajectory profile, measuredfrom Gemini_3 to Gemini_-A in curvilinear coordinatesystem.


lO0(_lO3 26

160 100 8

180 0 6
25:14 :16 :18 :20 :22 :24 :26 :28 :30 :32 :34 :36 :38 :40 :42 :44 :_ :48 :50 25:52
time, hr:min

(a) Latitude,longitude,andaltitude,

Figure4. 3-5. - Trajectoryparametersfor the Geminill]-A missionreentryphase.


_-_ (]=II=IISSV1DNn ...

12 NASA-S-66T157

25:14 :16 :18 :20 :22 :24 :26 :28 :30 :32 :34 :36 :38 :zl0 :42 :_A :46 :_ :50 25:52
Groundelapsedtime, hr:min

(e) Longitudinaldeceleration.

Figure4.3-5. - Concluded.
NASA-S-66-250JAN ._

10 ,
T_ "mina
, )hase
Second |

I iMid_course_
i _raking ,_--
fitiate Correct on I Co_/ M,--!a
' neuv-T_r"

140- o` " ---T- --T-- I

120 _ IAzimuth angle_ _--E_ " _ .3- --Et"4-434 _ /'_

< -I0 ,,, _"_ • ....

_ 40 _
,_ _r "---Elevationangle

_._ _ _Platform:_1
_ .- // Oe )

_o- _o --... _
rrl ._ "xA
• ". _ / _ E2
40_ o. 20

_"'J_ _'_ .
-- O(_:OL8 05:12. 05:16 05:20 05:24 05:28 05:32 05:36 05140 05144 05:48 05:52
Timefrom lift-off, hr:min

Figure 4. 3-6. - Time history of relativeparametersduring terminal phase.



5.1.1 Spacecraft Structure

The Gemini V!-A spacecraft structure performed as expected in sus-

taining all loads, vibration, and heating in a satisfactory manner.
However, some minor anomalies were reported, including docking fitting
covers that did not function properly, residue that collected on the
windows_ insulation around the reentry control system (RCS) thrusters
that was partially pushed out during launch_ and nose-fairing tabs that

The rendezvous and recovery section (R and R) of the spacecraft was

recovered. The recovery crew reported that the lower docking fitting
cover had failed to slide forward to cover the cavity exposed by the
jettisoned docking fitting. Postflight inspection of the burn pattern
in the cavity confirmed this anomaly, and the inspection revealed that
a fiberglass channel in which the cover slides had been improperly re-
paired. A notch in the channel prevented the cover from sliding forward.
A thorough analysis of heating data from spacecraft 2 has shown that
these covers are not required, and inspection of spacecraft 6 confirms
this. Action will be taken to examine repairs in this area more closely.
In addition to the door failure, the upper-right docking fitting retainer
pin, which is pulled out of the fitting when it is jettisoned, moved
back into the cavity left by the fitting. Investigation revealed that
this pin is withdrawn by a piston driven by a pyrotechnic charge. It is
held in by the charge for a sufficient time to assure the release of the
fitting. In this instance, the pin moved back after the pressure of the
charge had bled off and this is not considered a problem.

The crew reported residue on the windows, as has been reported pre-
viously by other crews. "As a result, the contractor has been requested
to propose an engineering change for transparent covers that will be
ejected in orbit. A backup mode of removal by the pilot will be provided
during the extravehicular activities scheduled for all remaining Gemini

The insulation around the RCS thrusters was partially pushed out
during launch, and subsequently burned off during reentry. It is be-
lieved that this condition was caused by a differential pressure result-
ing from launch-venting lag of the compartment during the powered phase
of flight. The condition is being analyzed for possible detrimental
effects requiring correction. However, the fiberglass cloth blanket,

which is being exposed_ is backed up by a rigid fiberglass channel to
prevent direct impingement of thermal radiation on structure and equip-
ment within the compartment. If pressure relief from around the thrust-
ers is prevented_ a more detrimental effect than exposed insulation might
result. Therefore_ caution is being exercised in considering any design

The crew reported that the docking fitting tabs on the nose fairing
vibrated and distracted them. Vibration was also reported by the
Gemini III crew. After the Gemini III mission, the docking fitting
tabs were analyzed and found to be structurally sound. However_ inas-
much as the vibration distracted the crew while performing required
functions within the cabin, corrective designs are being studied.

The difficulty with the centerline stowage box described in sec-

tions 7.1.2 and 5.1.10 will be corrected on subsequent spacecraft by
increasing the flexibility of the box attachment to structure. This
will permit proper closure of the door despite the effects of pressure.

No reentry aerodynamic data with respect to trim angle of attack

and lift-to-drag ratio were obtained because of the failure of the on-
board pulse code modulation (PCM) tape recorder. Also, because of telem-
etry blackout during reentry_ real-time data were only recorded from _
Maeh 8 to landing. (The major lifting portion of the reentry is between
Mach 22 and Mach i0.) The apparent stagnation point, as measured on the
heat shieldj was 13.7 inches indicating that the spacecraft trimmed to
approximately the planned nominal 12 ° angle of attack.


5.1.2 Communications Systems

The Gemini VI-A communications equipment provided the support nec-

essary for successful accomplishment of mission objectives. The limited
data available at this time indicate only one equipment failurej the
voice tape recorder. Air-to-ground voice communications were of gener-
ally poorer quality when compared to transmissions received from other
Gemini spacecraft. The flight crew reported that voice communications
received from the ground were satisfactory.

Communications reentry blackout occurred from 25:38:28 g.e.t, to

25:43:54 g.e.t, as determined from the real-time telemetry signal
strength records taken at the Texas and Grand Turk Island stations. The
flight crew reported that communications between spacecraft 7 and space-
craft 6 were satisfactory_ however_ they were uncertain of the distance
between the two spacecraft when voice contact was first established. It
is known that the distance was in excess of 235 nautical miles because
rendezvous radar lock-on occurred at this distance and voice contact
occurred prior to radar contact. The distance for readable ultrahigh
frequency (UHF) voice contact between the two spacecraft had been pre-
viously estimated to be from 200 to 400 nautical miles, depending upon
antenna orientation. The voice tape recorder failed during the final
portion of the second tape. Postflight tests revealed that the motor-
to-reduction-wheel drive belt had broken. Ultrahigh frequency voice communications.- Voice communi-

cations from the spacecraft were substandard during the entire mission.
The quality was poor when compared with previous missions. When space-
craft 6 and 7 were in close proximity and both talking to the same
ground station_ the voice transmissions from both spacecraft 6 crew
members were distorted_ and the background noise level was much higher
than from spacecraft 7. The noise was caused by air circulation within
the pressure suits contacting the helmet microphones. The flight crew
was aware of this and reported that they gave particular attention to
proper microphone location. This situation made it necessary for the
crew to repeat many transmissions but did not seriously interfere with
proper conduct of the mission. Because of substandard operation_ post-
flight tests were conducted and the preliminary conclusions reached by
the spacecraft contractor are as follows:

(a) Air noise was excessive when using the helmet microphones and
was more severe for the command pilot than for the pilot.

(b) The helmet microphones were more sensitive to noise than those
formerly used.


(c) These microphones are also more sensitive to phasing than

those used previously. This will cause distortion when the crewman's
head is turned from side to side_ bringing the mouth closer to one micro-
phone than the other.

(d) When comparing the voice communications from both spacecraft

during station keeping, it should be noted that the crew of spacecraft 7
was using the lightweight headset with a single microphone_ essentially
attached to the head_ thus eliminating most of the problems cited in the
preceding paragraphs. High frequency voice communications.- The high frequency

(HF) voice communication system is an emergency system and was not re-
quired during the Gemini VI-A mission. The flight crew reported that
the system operated normally during a routine test over the Canary Island
station_ and that HFwas not used during the remainder of the mission
until after landing. Post-landing use is described in section

_.1.2.3 Radar transponders.- Performance of the adapter-mounted

C-band radar transponder was normal throughout the mission. Signal fad-
ing occurred as expectedj and this was attributed to an unfavorable radi-
ation pattern presented to the ground radar as a result of the spacecraft
attitude. This type of fading can be as great as 30 dB_ but generally --_
does not cause degraded data or loss of track.

The reentry assembly transponder operated normally during launch

and reentry. This transponder was also used several times in orbit.
The antenna phase shifter was suspected of being inoperative at times,
but investigation revealed that either it was turned off or the space-
craft attitude was such that phase-shifter operation was not present in
the radiation lobe oriented toward the ground radar. An evaluation by
tracking stations during the period when the phase shifter was turned
off indicated that there were no serious adverse effects, but that
antenna pattern nulls were much deeper.

Because of the higher orbit, communications blackout during reentry

occurred over White Sands, much farther west than on previous missions.
All Eastern Test Range radars elected to skin-track because of heavy
blackout attentuation. Beacon returns were received intermittently, but
usually were weaker than skin-track returns. Digital command system.- The telemetered parameters of

the digital command system (DCS) performance were normal throughout the
mission, and commands were transmitted on 27 occasions. All individual
commands were validated except one command from the Canary Islands sta-
tion. The tape-dump off-command was not validated on revolution ll_
although three other commands transmitted during the same pass did result

in the receipt of a message acceptance pulse (MAP) at the ground sta-
tion. A postflight analysis revealed the presence of a MAP in the down-
linked telemetry for the off-con_nand, therefore, the nonvalidationwas
attributed to a malfunction in the ground station.

A problem occurred during the Gemini V mission in which a series of

real-time stored program commands were sent from Mission Control Center-
Houston (MCC-H), through the Texas station, in too rapid a succession to
be properly received by the spacecraft. This problem did not occur dur-
ingthe Gemini VI-A mission because the DCS at MCC-H was modified to
repeat a command word unless both a valid MAP and an indication of proper
telemetry ground station synchronization are received. Effective with
the Gemini VIII mission, spacecraft 8 will code a MAP as eight ones rath-
er than eight zeros. This will further avoid a recurrence of the prob-
lem. Telemetry transmitters.- An examination of the data avail-

able at this time indicates that all telemetry transmitters operated
normally throughout the mission. Antenna systems.- An examination of the performance of the

communications systems indicates that the adapter and reentry UNF anten-
nas deployed properly and operated normally. The performance of the HI•
orbit and postlanding antennas was satisfactory as evidenced by the
transmission and reception of NF signals. The radar transponder anten-
nas operated normally as evidenced by radar tracking data from the ground
stations. Recovery aids.- The communications recovery aids for the

Gemini VI-A mission operated normally. The UHF recovery beacon was
turned on after the spacecraft was on two-point suspension on the main
parachute. The recovery aircraft received continuous wave (CW) and pulse
transmissions from the _ recovery beacon at a reported distance of
200 nautical miles. The recovery aircraft also established voice com-
munications with the spacecraft while the spacecraft was on the main
parachute. The flashing light extended normally but was not necessary
and was not turned on by the crew. The external intercommunications jack
provided for communications between the crew and rescue personnel before
the hatches were opened.

The I_ postlanding antenna was deployed after landing. Excellent

HF voice and direction-finding signals were received at Cape Kennedy and
at St. Louis_ Missouri. The flight crew reported that they were in direct
voice contact with Cape Kennedy. In order to prevent damage, the HF
antenna was retracted by the crew just before the spacecraft was hoisted
aboard the recovery ship. Operation of the spacecraft recovery aids is
further described in section 6.3 of this report.



_.i.3 Instrumentation and Recording System

During the mission the instrumentation and recording system per-

formed satisfactorily except for the anomalies listed below:

(a) The pulse code modulation (PCM) tape recorder failed during
the revolution 13 dump.

(b) Five parameters in the reentry vehicle low-level multiplexer

failed at 24 minutes 53.4 second g.e.t, then resumed proper operation
at approximately25 hours 17 minutes g.e.t. PCM tape recorder failure.- The PCM tape recorder failed
while in the playback mode for the revolution 13 data dump over Cape
Kennedy. The dump was commanded on at 20:51:06 g.e.t, and a successful
playback of the revolution 13 data was obtained. At the next station
pass over the Canary Islands (CYI), it was noted from resl-time data that
there was no tape motion indication. Monitoring of the real-time data
at the Carnarvon (CR0), Texas (TEX)_ and Mission Control Center, Cape
Kennedy (MCC-C) ground stations during revolution 14 verified the lack
of this indication. Several attempts to restart the recorder manually
by the crew and by ground digital command system (DCS) commands were
_ unsuccessful. The MCC-C ground station noted that at the end of the
revolution 13 data dump the tape motion monitor remained on for approxi-
mately 30 seconds after the modulation on the radio frequency (RF) car-
rier went off.

Postflight examination of the recorder established the cause of the

failure. In normal ope_tion, the recorder motor operates continuously
and motion is transferred either to the fast playback reel or to the
record reel by means of electromagnetic clutches, either of which can
be commanded to engage the rotating drive shaft. During the revolu-
tion 13 tape playback (dump), a ball bearing between the playback clutch
and the drive shaft seized and caused the clutch, in effect_ to be
continuously engaged. Thus_ the magnetic tape was driven in the playback
direction past the point of start-of-tape microswitch operation which
removes power from the playback clutch. This is, evidently_ the point
at which PCM data modulation of the RF carrier stopped. The tape con-
tinued to drive in the playback direction until the takeup reel became
so full of magnetic tape that the microswitch reached maximum deflection
and motion of the takeup reel was mechanically jammed. However, the
feed reel continued to move_ causing tape to leave the normal path. The
resultant slack in the tape looped several times around the record/
playback and pinch belt paths, strayed across the top of the playback
reel_ and became entangled in the reel gears_ stopping all motion.

Failure analysis of the speed converter assemblies from both space-

craft 6 and spacecraft 7 revealed that the same playback clutch ball

bearing failed in both tape recorders. Further investigations conducted
at the vendor's plant and at the ball-bearing producer's laboratories
revealed that the bearing failure was due to foreign particles inside
the bearing. These particles were generated by the cutting action of
the bearing dust shield on an adjacent aluminum shoulder. A design
deficiency resulted in this shoulder being higher than the inner race
of the ball bearing causing the shield to cut into it. The following
corrective action has been instigated:

(a) Cut down the shoulder to eliminate interference with the ball
bearing shield.

(b) Add a hardened surface to the shoulder to prevent galling or

brinelling due to the rubbing action of the bearing's inner race on the

These modifications are being incorporated into all flight PCM tape
recorders. Low-level multiplexer (reentry vehicle) failure.- At

24 minutes 53.4 seconds g.e.t., the following group of parameters in the
reentry vehicle low-level multiplexer were affected:

(a) Reentry vehicle low-level full scale, MA21, increased 8 counts.

(b) Cabin temperature, CB02, was lost.

(c) Left suit inlet air temperature, CC03, was lost.

(d) Right suit inlet air temperature, CC04, was lost.

(d) Radar range rate, JA04, was lost.

These parameters were observed to be working properly again after

retrofire at approximately 25 hours 17 minutes g.e.t, on the reentry
pass over the Hawaii ground station, but they were not working properly
during the Carnarvon station pass in_nediately preceding retrofire. It
can only be concluded that these parameters started functioning properly
between the Carnarvon and Hawaii ground station passes. These parameters
comprise only the active 1.25 saddle-per-second channels in the low-level
multiplexer_ therefore, the inte_nittent problem was isolated to these
channels. The low-level multiplexer was returned to the vendor's plant
for failure analysis. Vibration, low temperature, and high temperature
tests have been conducted and thus far the vendor has been unable to
repeat this failure. Dissection of the suspected first tier switch
module transistors revealed the presence of foreign materials in a tran-
sistor. Tests are continuing to determine effects of the contamination
on the failure.

UNCLASSIFIED Delayed-time data quality.- The delayed-time data received
by Cape Kennedy (Telemetry Station II)_ Hawaii, and MCC-C are summarized
in table 5.1.3-I. This table represents 8 computer-processed data dumps
out of the 13 dumps actually made prior to failure of the PCM tape re-
corder. For all the ground stations listed_ the usable data exceed
94.91 percent. Real-time data quality.- The real-time data received by

the MCC-C_ Guaymas, Texas_ Hawaii_ Carnarvon_ and Grand Turk Island
ground stations and the real-time data received by aircraft 497 on re-
entry are summarized in table 5.1.3-11. For all ground stations and
aircraft 497, the usable data recovered exceeded 97.89 percent. All
percentages were derived from computer-processed data edits. Overall system performance.- There were a total of 259

parameters monitored in this mission and only the five parameters dis-
cussed in paragraph failed to operate properly.




Total data received Total losses

Usable data,
Station Revolution Duration, Prime Prime percent
hr:min:sec subframes subframes percent

7 (Tel II) Launchl2,13and
i_ 3:55:58 141 577 699 0.49 99-51 7

r" Hawaii 4,5_6 4:10:20 150 197 3 720 2.48 97.52 r--

(2_ MCC-C 2,3, 2:29:41 89 806 15 017 16.72 83.28 (2_

-T1 SUMMATION i0:35:59 381 580 19 436 5.09 94.91 -11


Total data received Total losses

Usable data_
Station Revolutions Duration, Total master Master Percent percent
min:sec frames frames

MCC-C Ascent 07:18 17 515 212 1.21 98.79

Z Guaymas 15, 16 15:10 36 385 584 1.61 98.39 Z

r" Texas 16 05:02 12 081 16 0.13 99.87 r"

Hawaii 16 08:20 20 010 716 3.58 96.42

(Jgm Carnarvon !6 10:25 25 001 956 3.82 96.18 _m

"11 "11
Grand Turk Island 16, 17 14:31 34 839 561 1.61 98.39

Aircraft 497 Reentry 06:59 16 744 384 2.29 97.71

SUMMATION 67:45 162 575 3429 2.11 97.89



5.1.4 Environmental Control System

A review of all available telemetered data shows that the environ-

mental control system (ECS) did not exhibit a malfunction throughout the
flight. All parameters received were within expected values_ however_
telemetered suit inlet and cabin temperatures were lost early in the
flight because of a failure in the low-level multiplexer. (See sec-
tion 5.1.3.) The crew reported being warm at all times except late in
the sleep period, even though both coolant loops and both suit compres-
sors were used during most of the flight.

The suit inlet temperature was 52o F at approximately 25 min-

utes g.e.t._ when telemetry was lost. When telemetry was restored at
retrofire, suit inlet temperature was 54o F. The crew reported that suit
inlet temperatures gradually rose to above 60° F during t_e powered-up
portion of the mission, then declined to approximately 55 F during the
sleep period. The temperature started increasing again after powering-
up for reentry. Telemetered coolant temperatures to the suit heat
exchanger indicated 40° F and 45 ° F throughout the flight except at ap-
proximately 2 hours g.e.t, when a rmaximum of 47 ° F was indicated. The
inflight cabin temperature survey taken by the crew at 19 hours 25 min-
utes g.e.t, indicated dry bulb temperatures of 76 ° F to 80 ° F and rela-
tive humidities of 65 percent to 72 percent. These values are normal
and agree with previous flight data. Extensive postflight tests were
made on the ECS to determine if any failures had occurred. Checks were
made of suit compressor flow rates, coolant flow and pressure drop, suit
heat exchanger thermal performance, and onboard suit temperature instru-
mentation. All data agreed with preflight measurements.

A review of all flight and postflight data shows all conditions to

be normal_ therefore_ the conclusion must be made that the discomfort
was a result of increased crew metabolic heat loads caused by the heavy
workload throughout the mission. The total heat load apparently exceeded
the capability of the suit heat exchanger which is about 1700 Btu per
hour. The heat load of the cabin instruments is calculated as 680 Btu
per hour. Some of this heat is absorbed by the structure and some is
transferred to the cabin gas. Relative values are not known. The crew
had their face plates open throughout most of the flight. The open face-
plates caused a flow of gas from the suits_ through the cabin, across the
instrument panel, and back into the system through the cabin recircula-
tion valve. The cabin heat exchanger was not used; therefore, cabin heat
was absorbed by the suit heat exchanger. The absence of the insulating
characteristics of the water absorbent wallpaper, deleted from space-
craft 6, could also have caused additional heat in the cabin. The two
suit compressors add approximately 239 Btu per hour to the gas stream
and the heat generated by absorption of C02 by the lithium hydroxide adds
about 195 Btu per hour. The addition of these heat loads to the suit

circuit gas could reduce the capability of the suit heat exchanger for
crew cooling to 500 Btu per hour or less per man. The hea_yworkload on
this flight could easily have caused the crew output to exceed this

Postflight inspection revealed two leaks in the right-hand secondary

oxygen subsystem. A review of preflight (serviced on Sept. 16, 1965) and
flight data indicates that no leaks of a measurable size occurred prior
to initiation of flow from this system during reentry. Therefore_ the
assumption must be made that the audible leaks occurred during landing
or subsequent handling of the spacecraft.

_.i.3 Guidance and Control System

Performance of the guidance and control system was excellent

throughout the mission. The ascent, rendezvous, and reentry phases pro-
ceeded according to plan with no anomalies or abnormal occurrences. The
rendezvous radar was thoroughly exercised for the first time and demon-
strated excellent performance. Table 5.1.5-I contains a summary of
events pertinent to the guidance and control systems. Inertial guidance system performance evaluation.- Ascent phase: The pitch_ yaw_ and roll steering signals
are shown in figure 5.1.5-1. Superimposed on the inertial guidance sys-
tem (IGS) quantities are the steering signals from the primary guidance
system along with the upper and lower IGS attitude-error limit lines
generated for a nominal Gemini VI-A trajectory. The predicted pitch and
yaw attitude errors_ simulated for LO - 7 hour prelaunch winds_ are pre-
sented for the first 90 seconds of flight. The following is a brief
discussion of the steering signals with respect to the ascent guidance
phase. IGS performance during the first and second stages of powered
flight was excellent.

The difference in roll steering commands between the primary and

secondary guidance systems_ just prior to first stage engine cutoff
(BECO) was about 1.4° . Roll misalignment between the two systems con-
tributed 0.04 ° of the difference_ and gimbal cross-coupling contributed
at least 1.0 ° . The remaining difference of 0.36 ° was probably a Gemini
launch vehicle (GLV) three-a_is reference system (TARS2 roll gyro drift.
Engine misalignment was indicated at lift-off by a 0.7 offset in the
roll steering signals. This deviation from null and the 195 ft/sec devi-
ation at BECO between the actual and predicted out-of-plane velocity com-
ponents indicated a GLV pitch-plane misalignment. The actual velocity
components were in a direction that was north of the predicted values.
The stage !I roll attitude errors for both systems indicated normal be-

The pitch steering osignals for the primary and secondary guidance
systems differed by 0.5_ at BEC0. This variation included a 0.23 ° devi-
ation resultin_ from initial misalignment between the two systems. The
remaining 0.32 v is attributed to pitch programmer deviations_ a TARS
pitch gyro drift_ or a combination of the two. A shift of about O.1° in
pitch attitude occurred at BEC0_ indicating only a slight center-of-
gravity offset along the pitch axis. The behavior of the IGS pitch
steering signals following guidance initiation indicated a normal re-
sponse to the stage II steering commands of the primary system.

The first-stage offset-yaw-steering technique was exercised for the
first time on this vehicle. This technique is used to place the space-
craft into the orbital plane of the target at insertion. The difference
in the yaw steering commands between the two guidance systems was 0.5°
at BECO. Initial misalignment contributed 0.3° and the remaining differ-
ence is attributed to the combined effects of gimbal cross-coupling and
TARS gyro drift. The steering required to compensate for a center-of-
gravity offset in yaw was greater in Gemini VI-A than in any of the pre-
vious missions, as indicated by a 2.3 ° shift in error signals at staging.
Following guidance initiation, the IGS attitude error shifted from 1.3°
to -4.9 ° . This shift in the ICS yaw steering signal is a normal response
by the backup guidance system to the biased launch azimuth. The amount
of shift is dependent upon the _gnitude of the out-of-plane velocity
components, with respectO

target plane, which build up during the
first stage. The 6.2 shlft mn IGS yaw attitude error signal corresponds
to an out-of-plane velocity of 675 ft/sec at guidance initiation. The
primary guidance system indicated a yaw rate command of 0.25 deg/sec
following guidance initiation, thus producing a gradual return of the
attitude error to the null condition. The IGS indicated a normal re-
sponse to the primary guidance commands during out-of-plane steering and
throughout the remainder of the ascent guidance phase and shows excellent
performance of the offset steering technique.

If guidance switchover had occurred early in the stage II operation,

the second stage engine cutoff (SECO) conditions would have deviated from
those obtained by the following: 1.5 ft/sec in velocity, 260 feet in
altitude, and 0.02 ° in flight-path angle. These deviations would have
resulted in an apogee of 140.5 nautical miles and a perigee of 87 nauti-
cal miles. These values compare favorably with the actual Gemini VI-A
trajectory in the presence of small inertial measurement unit (IMU)
errors, and the comparison is substantiated by the delivery of the IGS
SECO signal within i0 milliseconds of the primary SECO signal.

Both azimuth updates were received by the IGS. The misalignments

at launch and following the updates were reconstructed after the flight
and were as follows:

Platform release, deg ........ -0.52

After first update, deg ....... -0.i0

After second update, deg . . . 0

The incremental velocity indicator (IVI) display, as actually com-

puted by the onboard incremental velocity adjust routine (IVAR), was re-
constructed by using IGS navigational and gimbal-angle data. The crew
reported readings of ii ft/sec forward, 2 ft/sec right, and 2 ft/sec

down. These were the approximate readings calculated throughout the
60 seconds following the separation and roll maneuvers. Table 5.1.5-II
shows the values of the reconstructed IVAR parameters in their final
computation cycle as compared with the actual final values obtained from
the data acquisition system (DAS). The crew readings and the comparison
in the table validate the orbit insertion equations and the computer-IVI

If the IVAR had been used on this flight following the separation
maneuver_ the IVI's would have displayed ii.i ft/sec forward and
6.5 ft/sec out-of-plane velocity corrections in component form. With
the flight director indicator (FDI) needles hulled, the spacecraft would
have been yawed left 25 ° and the resultant correction of 12.2 ft/sec
fo_ard would have appeared on the fore and aft window. After thrusting
until the IVl's had zeroed_ the in-plane velocity would have changed
about ii ft/sec resulting in an apogee about 6 nautical miles higher than
actually achieved and very close to the desired nominal of 146 nautical
miles. The out-of-plane velocity would have been corrected

by 6O ft/sec
so that the descending mode would have occurred approxmmately 90 from

insertion. Less than i ft/sec velocity change at apogee (Vgp) would

have been required to reach the desired perigee of 87 nautical miles.

An error was discovered in defini,ng the prelaunch digital command

system (DCS) load for the parameter A9 _, used in the V equation. This
gP 4
error resulted in the coefficient being defined as -3.8423 × i0- instead

of the intended -2.9268 × 10 -4 , or a difference of -.9155 × 10 -4 ft/sec/

ft. The effect of this error would be to change V by i ft/sec for
every ll O00-foot difference between the actual radius from the earth
center and the desired radius. For this mission_ at the time V would
have been used_ the error would have contributed a negligible 0.i ft/sec.

The onboard computer and inertial measurement unit performance was

evaluated by comparing telemetered velocity data with that computed from
ground tracking data. G.E. Mod IIl and Missile Trajectory Measurement
(MISTRAM) tracking systems were utilized. Although final data fr_n these
systems were adequate_ the MISTRAM 10OK (i00 000 ft base leg) velocity
residual showed a divergence in the vertical channel (see fig. 5.1.5-2).
A preliminary regression analysis indicates that a p-bias error was pres-
ent. No significant errors have been found in the G.E. Mod Ill final
data. IGS telemetry data were excellent during ascent with no signifi-
cant drop outs.

A preliminary engineering estimate of the !MU component errors and

the total velocity error induced by each error source are given in
table 5.1.5-I1. The curve fit resulting from these errors is shown

superimposed on the velocity residuals in figure 9.1.5-2. The down
range (X) difference is made up of timing errors (evident at BECO and
SECO) and a small x accelero_ter misalignment toward z of -15 arc
p P
seconds. The major portion of the vertical (y) difference was caused
by a z aceelerometer misalignment toward x of approximately i00 arc
seconds. A preflight determined z accelerometer scale factor of
400 parts per million (ppm) also contributed. The scale factor propagat-
ing in a negative direction accounts for the negative y residuals seen
early in the flight. The primary contributors to the crossrange (z)
error were a -40 arc second azimuth misalignment and a yp accelerometer
bias of -160 ppm. Although many of the g-sensitive drift errors propa-
gate along z, the residuals did not cross zero as they normally would
with these errors present. The preflight values of these terms were
stable as seen in figure 5.1.5-3, therefore it is concluded that they
were present but compensated for each other.

The component and radar tracking errors obtained from a preliminary

error coefficient recovery program (ECRP) run (table 5.1.5-111) agree
well with the engineering estimates_ however the large uncertainties,
particularly in y_ indicate that the error model was inadequate. A con-
tinuing effort to improve this model is underway.

The IGS position and velocity errors at SECO are presented in

table 5.1.5-IV. These quantities were obtained from comparisons with
the present best estimate of the trajectory. An estimate of injection
parameters at SEC0 + 20 seconds determined from the IGS and other sources
is given in table 5.1.5-V. Orbital phase: Approximately 20 hours of operation were

accrued on the IGS during the mission with proper operation indicated

A summary of platform aligz_ents is presented in table 5.1.5-VI,

where significant performances of the platform as controlled by the crew,
are shown. The secondary horizon sensor was used for about 6 minutes
during the first alignment_ however, this alignment started and ended
using the primary sensor. All other alignments used the primary sensor
with no difficulty, with either the alignments or the sensors, being
reported by the crew. Only one alignment (for 4 minutes after the termi-
nal phase initiate maneuver) was performed entirely in the pulse control
mode. The results presented in table 5.1.5-VI indicate_ where data were
available_ that the platform was accurately aligned at the termination
of each alignment. The last a_ailable data (about 16 minutes prior to
retrofire) show that the crew was still aligning O at this time with
accuracies of 0.06 ° in pitch and yaw and 0.19 in roll, indieatlng a good
alignment for retrofire was in process.

A check of the accelerometer bias was made shortly after insertion
and indicated that the correction inserted in the computer for the X
accelerometer was in error by approximately 0.07 counts/sec. The bias
correction was updated by this amount after the first height-adjustment
maneuver. Subsequent checks throughout the flight indicated stable op-
eration in all axes.

A summary of translation thrusting activity is included as

table 5.1.5-VII. The applied velocity changes were calculated from IGS
accelerometer data with the exception of the retrograde maneuver, for
which the IVI readings reported by the crew were compared to tracking
data. The planned quantities are the velocity adjustments sent to the
spacecraft from the ground with the exception of the two terminal phase
corrections for which no quantities were sent. Very close agreement be-
tween the reconstructed applied velocity changes and the planned quan-
tities tends to substantiate the crew reported procedure of applying
small corrections until a residual of less than 0.7 ft/sec remained in
the manual data readout unit (MDRU).

An analysis of the rendezvous maneuver is not complete_ however,

the results to date indicate nominal system performance throughout. A
rendezvous mode test was performed at 3:35:55 g.e.t., shortly after
radar lock-on. The crew reported incorrect total velocity change re-
quired to orendezvous (_Vm) readings and indicated that an erroneous
value (180) of angle to rendezvous (wt) was in computer address 83.
Static simulations had been performed using values of wt of 130°_
180°, and 270° (the last being the value which should have been in
address 83 at this time). The results are shown below together with
the corresponding data acquisition system (DAS) quantity.

Time from
lift-off_ AVT, et/sec ave, _lsec av_, ft/sec AvT, _lsec
hr:min: sec (rot = 130°) (_t = 180 °) (o_c = 270 °) (DAS)

3:35:55 995 999 274 272

3:37:35 944 999 248 253

3:39:15 999 999 303 308

3:40:55 966 999 301 308

The close agreement of the 270 ° run with the DAS readings gives
evidence that the correct value was in the computer. Attempts have been
made_ including a c_puter memory dump_ to find a source for the reported
180 ° value_ but with no success to date.

A static simulation was also run for the remainder of the rendez-
vous operation with the results (included as table 5.1.5-VIII) agreeing
closely with the actual quantities.

Using state vectors of the two spacecraft for 4:54:46 g.e.t., a

dynamic simulation was run in which radar errors, platform errors, plat-
form alignment errors, and thrusting errors were ignored. The results
of this run compare favorably with the values of _VT, and of the two

vernier midcourse maneuvers recorded in flight. The _VT, comparison

is shown below.

Time from Radar 2_VT, ft/sec AVT, ft/sec

hr:min: sec range,
n. mi. (simulated) (DAS flight data)

5: 07:O0 48.58 ll2 109

5:o8:4o 46.00 96 96
5: lO: 20 43.52 87 85

5: 12:00 41.06 78 77

5: 13:40 38.62 72 72 -

5: 15:20 36.20 70 69

The terminal phase initiate (TPI) maneuver comparison shows:

Simulated, ft/sec DAS flight data, ft/sec

36 forward 31 forward

0 right/left I right

0 up/down 4 down

The simulation is mechanized so that the TPI maneuver is performed along

the X-axis, whereas, in the actual flight, radar boresight attitudes
were utilized. This accounts for the difference.

The vernier thrust comparison shows:

Simulated, ft/sec DAS flight data, ft/sec

Vernier no. I 3 aft 7 forward

0 right/left 5 left
3 up 7 down

Vernier no. 2 2 aft 4 forward

0 right/left 6 right
i up 2 do_rn

The "fly-by" miss distance resulting from the simulated mission

run indicated a minimum radar range of 96.6 feet. The actual radar
range time history was examined to obtain a preliminary assessment of
the accuracy of the on-board guidance system in guiding to intercept.
Figure 5.1.5-4 shows that prior to the first braking maneuver, starting
at 5:50:31 g.e.t., the range was 2500 feet and closing linearly at ap-
proximately 40 ft/sec. Extrapolating to the nominal time of impact
without braking shows that a "fly-by" miss of less than 300 feet would
have occurred. This indicates that the second vernier mideourse calcu-
lation was aorrect and accurate to within the expected limit of
i000 feet. The analysis to date indicates that general system operation
was excellent throughout the rendezvous maneuvers.

The rendezvous radar was utilized extensively on this mission, and

the analysis to date indicates proper operation throughout the mission.
The radar was turned to "standby" at 3 hours 6 minutes g.e.t, with
normal instrument indications_ and to "search" between 3 hours 7 min-
utes and 3 hours i0 minutes g.e.t. Figure 5.1.5-5 shows the sequence
of radar/transponder aperations leading to acquisition (target verifi-
cation) as a function of time. The transponder receiver gave the first
indication of being interrogated at 3 hours i0 minutes g.e.t. (range
approximately 272 n. mi.) when the automatic frequency control (AFC)
locked-on. Replies to the radar (shown by the RF power monitor) began
at 3 hours 13 minutes g.e.t, with intermittent radar lock-on (target
verification) being achieved at 3 hours 14 minutes g.e.t. Solid lock-on
began at 3 hours 19 minutes g.e.t, at a range of approximately 235 nau-
tical miles and continued throughout the rendezvous operation except for
the alignment period at approximately 5 hours 25 minutes g.e.t.

Figure 5.1.5-6 shows the telemetered rendezvous radar range with

the range computed from trajectory data superimposed. Although the

trajectory data are not sufficiently accurate to assess radar perform-
ance, the _V's calculated by the IGS which uses radar data as inputs
were close to nominal for the trajectory flown. The excellent agreement
reflects nominal radar performance.

Figure 5.1.5-7 plots the azimuth and elevation outputs during the
• O and the figure shows that the radar boresight was maintained
within 1 .

The crew reported an FDI needle fluctuation of ±l ° at ranges beyond

90 nautical miles. The analog angle outputs of the radar are not telem-
etered_ however_ a detailed examination of the digital angle outputs
was performed at a range of approximately 177 nautical miles in an at-
tempt to analyze the phenomenon. Although the data rate is too low
(1 sample per 2.4 seconds) to trace out variations occurring at inter-
vals of 4 to 5 seconds_ the fluctuation should have been sampled at or
near its maximum excursion several times during the 50 samples examined.
The plot in figure 5.1.5-8 shows a peak excursion of approximately 0.20 °
for about l0 percent of the time° The calculated root/mean square (rms)
angle noise is 2.08 milliradians or 0.12°_ corresponding to a peak ex-
cursion of ±0.36 ° . Because angle noise is inversely proportional to
range, the corresponding value at lock-on would have been 0.16 ° rms or
0.48 ° peak. It should be noted that the resolution of the telemetry
data is only 0.1 ° . Considering this, it is concluded that the angle
tracking noise on the digital output was normal. Because both the dig-
ital encoder and analog induction potentiometer are geared to the same
shaft, the angle noise present on the digital output should be equal
to the analog angle noise. The larger amplitude of ±l ° noted by the
pilot may be because of some amplification of the radar system noise
by the display circuitry. Because the fluctuation is not present on
the digital output_ it is not considered to be an operational problem.

Figure 5.1.5-9 shows the analog range and range rate plotted to
the same relative scale as that seen by the crew on the instrument panel
indicator. The range scale is quasi-logarithmic with three linear
scales_ and the range rate scale is equal to the square root of range.
The figure indicates that the crew was able to keep the range rate well
below the range value_ thereby insuring that a margin of braking acceler-
ation was available. This criterion is established to prevent the pos-
sibility of an uncontrolled "fly-by".

No evidence of the radar pressure drop_ which occurred on space-

craft 5_ was seen on this mission. Figure 5.1.5-10 contains a history
of radar pressure and temperature as a function of time. When the pres-
sure is corrected for the changes in temperature_ an essentially zero
leak rate is indicated.

UNCLASSIFIED 5-23 Reentry phase: The IGS operated properly through the
retrofire phase. Retrofire velocity was approximately 0.42 percent
high as indicated in table 5.1.5-VII. Based on the IVI readings the
average pitch angle was 20.5 ° . The footprint shift resulting from
retrofire dispersions was 22 nautical miles uprange as shown in fig-
ure 5.1.5-11.

From retrofire to an altitude of 400 000 feet_ a 0° bank angle

trajectory was flown as planned. At 25:56:12.93 g.e.t, the computer
commanded a 60° right bank angle which indicates proper computer logic
to the 400 000 foot level. A comparison of IGS position with radar
position from 25:37:56 to 25:38:18 g.e.t, is shown in figure 5.1.5-12
and indicates that the spacecraft was navigating approximately 2 nauti-
cal miles south of the radar track. As a result of the failure of the
onboard tape recorder_ all computer telemetry data were lost during
blackout, between 25:38:21 and 25:43:59 g.e.t.

At 25:45:15.30 g.e.t._ the computer properly terminated guidance

at a density altitude factor of 4.58 which indicates the proper func-
tioning of the reentry equations at this time in the reentry.

Table S.l.5-IX contains a cGmparison of the actual telemetry data

• with those reconstructed after the flight using the DCS update_ gimbal
angles_ spacecraft body rates_ and accelerometer outputs. This table
indicates close agreement between the sets of data and demonstrates the
proper functioning of the reentry mode of the computer.

The IGS computed position at guidance termination (80 000 ft) was
7.3 nautical miles northeast of the planned target as shown in fig-
ure 5.1.5-11. The reported recovery pickup point was 14 nautical miles
southwest of the planned target. Because no radar data are available
below 180 000 feet_ no exact landing point can be fixed by radar track-
ing data. However_ since 80 percent of the spacecraft's lifting capa-
bility is complete by 180 000 feet_ a good estimate can be made of the
spacecraft's touchdown area by projecting the radar data from
180 000 feet to touchdown and by taking into account the flight crew's
report of their roll attitudes during this period of the reentry.

Figure 5.1.5-11 also shows that using radar data obtained at

200 000 feet, the centerline of the footprint had shifted only approxi-
nately 2 nautical miles south of the planned target. At this point the
total cross-range capability remaining to the spacecraft was approxi-
mately ±12 nautical miles. Therefore_ in order to reach the reported
pickup point_ the crew would have had to fly a lift vector consistently
to thesouth from about 200 000 feet altitude to drogue d@ployment.
However_ the flight crew reported that they flew approximately the same
amount of time with the lift vector to the north as to the south and
probably to the north first_ such that at 130 000 feet, the lift vector

was returning to full lift and did not return to the south until below
100 000 feet. This indicates that the spacecraft should have been close
to the centerline of the footprint and probably north. The insert in
figure 5.1.5-11 shows the probable area of landing. At 25:43:59 g.e.t.,
IGS telemetry again became available after the spacecraft exited from
blackout. At 25:45:00 g.e.t, the spacecraft's heading and latitude
showed a distinct shift toward the north despite gimbal-angle data which
indicate a lift vector to the south. This occurrence late in flight
probably did not significantly affect guidance accuracy_ however, with
the loss of the onboard recorder and no tracking data below 180 000 feet,
it is impossible to obtain an exact comparison. Studies are being con-
ducted to determine the effect of initial platform misalignment, drifts,
et cetera, which could give results that have the same characteristics
as described above. From the analysis and the data on the figures, a
malfunctioning accelerometer appears unlikely. A preliminary hardware
test program was conducted and no out-of-specification conditions oc-
curred in the inertial measurement unit.

_.i.5.2 Control system evaluation.- Attitude control and maneuvering equipment (ACME): The

ACMEwas powered-up for approximately 25 hours and performed properly
throughout the flight. The separation maneuver (shown in fig. 5.1.5-13)
was normal with the maximum transient (2 deg/sec 2) observed about the
pitch axis. The control modes using the orbital attitude and maneuver
system (OAMS) thrusters were checked immediately after separation and
proper responses were noted in each case. A second mode check was made
prior to reentry with the reentry control system (RCS) thrusters. Data
are not available for this period_ however_ the crew reported proper
operation. Both "rate command" and "platform" modes were utilized for
translation maneuvers. Satisfactory control was obtained from both
modes. Control capability during station keeping was adequate although
the crew indicated that a pulse translation control mode would have been
useful and desirable.

Reentry data became available at 2_:17:25 g.e.t., i minute 27 sec-

onds after retrofire. The control system was in pulse mode from this
time until 25:38:21 g.e.t., 7 seconds prior to blackout, at which time
the orbit rate command mode was utilized. The control system remained
in this mode thereafter. RCS ring-A was used from the time that data
became available until power down, with RCS ring-B also being utilized
from 25:44:21 g.e.t._ about 14 seconds after maximum g, until power down
approximately125 seconds late_ The maximum rates observed prior to
drogue deployment (in the data available) were 5 deg/sec in pitch and

UNCLASSIFIED 5-25 Horizon sensor: The horizon sensors were utilized
throughout the flight and all except 16 minutes of the time was on the
primary unit. No evidence of abnormal operation has been found in the
available data. The crew reported instances of loss-of-track during
sunrise and sunset periods_ a phenomenum experienced on previous flights.
The horizon scan mode was utilized for approximately 5 hours during the
sleep period. The data have not been reduced for this period; however,
the crew reported that upon awakening, spacecraft attitude was correct
in pitch and roll, and within a few degrees in yaw, an axis not con-
trolled by the scanner.

Ground ela?sed time,
sec Component status

Planned Actual Actual

RGS IGS Event ACME Computer IMU Horizon sensor Radar Remarks

0.00 Oi00 O.O0 Lift_off Rate Ascent Free Pr_nary Off 13: 37:26.471 G.m. t
C oNl_la_Id

17- 68 17.66 17. 7_ Start roll Rate Ascent Free Primary Off
program command

20.48 20.46 20.59 Complete roll Rate Ascent Free Primary Off

(_ program eom_nd
Z 23.04 22.99 23.13 Start no. i Rate Ascent Free Primary Off "7
pitch program command N
88. 52 88.20 88.06 End no. i pitch Rate Ascent Free Primary Off p--

> Start no. 2 pitch command >

105.00 105.25 104.98 to 107.50 No. 1 IC_ update Rate Ascent Free Primary Off
_#_ command (2_

"I_ ll0. O0 109.81 109.80 No. 1 gain change Rate Ascent Free Primary Off "_
e oNir_nd

m r'n
i19- 04 118.83 118. 75 End no.
Start 2 3
no. pitch
pitch Rate
command Ascent Free Primary Off

145.00 145-25 _143.19 to 145.68 No. 2 IGS update Rate Ascent Free Primary Off

i_6.27 157.16 -- BEC0 Rate Ascent Free Primary Off


162.56 161.70 162.56 End no. 3 pitch Rate Ascent Free Primary Off
program command

168.25 168.21 169.19 Guidance Rate Ascent Free Primary Off

initiate command

336.70 338.74 338.74 SECO Rate Ascent Free Primary Off


Ground elapsed tim% Event Component status Remarks

Planned Actual ACME Computer IMU Sensor Radar

)0:00:05.56 00:06:01. O1 Separation Direct Ascent Free Primary Off TCA 9 and lO on 05:59 g.e.t.
(spacecraft - GLV then Shaped charge fire 06:01 g.e.t.
Rate Select rate command mode 06:02 g.e.t.
Co_uand Start roll to heads-up 06:02 g.e.t.
TCA 9 and i0 off 06:13 g.e.t.

00:06:25 Control PuAse Ascent Free Primary Off

Mode Mode
Check Check
C Pitch error = +0.25 _ C
00:12:00 00:07:25 Platform Platform Prelaunch SEF Primary Off Roll error = +0.75 °
L. Time of alignment = 49:19 g.e.t. J..
00:24:40 00:16:00 Sensor Horscan Prelaunch Orbital Primary Off Used secondary sensor from 18:09
(approx.) check rate Secondary until 34:12 g.e.t.

01:20:25 01:25:06 alignmentPlatf°rm Platform Prelauneh B_ iPrimary Off PitchStill

available data:
(if needed) Roll error = _3.18 °

"_ _V planned = 14.0 fps,

_I 01:34:54 01:54:03 Height Rate Catchup Orbital Primary Off _V actual = 13.76 fps r_
adjustment command rate _t planned = 24.0 sec,
_r_slation = 24.50sec
Pitch error = +0.24 °
01:47:51 Platform Platform Prelaunch SEF Primary 0ff Roll error = +0.ii °
alignment Time of alignment = 19:09 g.e.t.

_V planned = 60.8 fps,

D2:18:45 02:18:01 Phase Platform Catchup Orbital Primary Off _V actual = 60.84 fps
adjust rate _t planned = 77 sec,
maneuver _t actual = 75.68 sec

Pitch error = -0.21 °

32:30.30 02:34:24 Platform Platform Catchup SEF Primary Off Roll error = 0.40 °
alignment Time of alignment = 02:57 g.e.t.
sec time, Event Component status Remarks

Planned Actual ACME Computer IMU Horizon Radar


AV planned = 31.7 fps,

02:42:07 02:42:08 Plane Rate Catchup Orbital Primary Off AV actual = 51.71 fps
adjust cormnand rate At planned = 40 sec,
maneuver At actual = 59.30 see

Pitch error = -0.56 °

02:50:00 02:46:02 Platform Platform Prelaunch SEF Primary Off Roll error = -0. ll°
alignment Time of alignment = 17:38 g.e.t.

C Avplanned
=0.8fps, C
Z 03:03:19 03:03:20 Vernier Platform Prelaunch Orbital Primary Stand AV actual = 0.64 fps "7
height rate by At planned = 1.0 sec,
adjustment At actual = O.80 sec
03:01:00 03:06:00 Radar on I IIORSCA2_ Prelaui%ch rateOl%italPri_rY iSyand >

Pitch error = --0.05°

03:28:O0 03: 27:O0 Platform Platform Rendezvous SEF Primary On Roll error = +0.49 °
._ alignment Time of alignment = 12:31 g.e.t. -_

_1 Pitch error = +0.02 ° _11

03:41:01 Platform Platform Rendezvous SEF Roll error = +0.03-
alignment Time of alignment = 9:ll g.e.t.

!AV planned = 42.5 fps,

D3:47:37 3:47:37 Circulari- Platform Catchup Orbital Primary On &V actual = 42.42 fps
nation rate At planned = 53 se%
maneuver ;At actual = 51.35 sec forward
6/60 sec down
2.30 sec right

AV planned = 35.7 fps,

D5:16:54 05:18:56 130 ° Rate Rendezvous Orbital Primary On AV actual = 31.54 fps
transfer command rate At planned = 41 sec,
maneuver At actual = 36.80 sec forward
4.60 sec right
4.0 sec up

Ground elapsed time, Component status

hr:min:sec Event Horizon Remarks
Planned Actual ACME Computer IMU sensor Radar

AV actual = 10.88 fps

05:31:31 82 ° correction Rate Rendezvous Orbital Primary On At actual = 1.6 sec forward
maneuver conm_and rate 13.4 sec left
18.4 sec up

05:43:34 34° correction Rate Rendezvous Orbital Primary 0n AV actual = 7.21 fps
maneuver command rate _t actual = 14.90 sec right
5.40 sec up
05:50:31 Terminal
phase final Rate
command Rendezvous Orbital
rate Primary On AV actual
At actual =
= 46.48
40.08 sec
fps Z

06:00:00 Station Platform Catchup Orbital Pri_Tary Off

(approx.) keeping and pulse rate

11:14:39 11:14:31 Separation Catchup Orbital Primary Off _V planned = 9 fps, _V actual = 9.518 fps
(retrograde) rate At planned = 15 sec_ At actual = 14.2 sec
(n £n
i AV planned = 9.0 fps
i 13:25:52 13:25:52 Separation Platform Catchup Orbital Primary Off _V actual = 9.52 fps i'll
_11 (posigrade) and pulse rate At planned = ii see

_t actual = 11.40 sec _1

Pitch error = +0.06 °

24:59:59 iPlatform Platform Prelaunch BEF Primary Off Roll error = +0.19 °
ialign_nent Time of alignment = (Still aligning
at end of data, 40 min later)

Fo_ard/Aft IVI = 310 aft

Right/Left IVI i right
25:15:58 !Retrofire Rate Reentry Free Primary Off Up/Down IVI 116 down
eon_nand _V (actual) = 329.914 fps
(tracking data)

25:36:11 25:36:08 400K Direct Reentry Free Off Off

(TR + 20:13) I
25:38:58 Guidance Direct Reentry Free Off Off kO
(TR + 23:00 ) initiate

Ground elapsed time_

hr:min: see Event Component status Remarks

Planned Actual ACME Computer INU Horizon Radar


25:45:29 2_: 4_:_0 Drogue Rate Reentry Free Off Off

(TR + 29:21) parachute command

2_:46:29 2_:47:21 Main Rate Reentry Free Off Off

(TR + 30:21) parachute command

C 25:51:29 25:51:21 Touchdown Off Off Off Off Off

Z <% +3_:21>

> >
_n oo

"WI "11
rll r11

Calculated Telemetry

Velocity to be applied at apogee, Vgp, ft/sec . . -2.70 -2.75

Velocity to be applied at perigee, Vga, ft/sec +7.50 +7.41

Radial velocity, %, ft/sec ............ 89.86 90.06

Inertial velocity, V, ft/sec ........... 25 713.61 25 713.37

IVI fore-aft, aVxb , ft/sec ............ +5.78 +5.69

IVI right-left, aVyb, ft/sec ............ 20.36 -21.59

M up-down, AVzb , ft/sec ............. +3.97 +3-90

Time to apogee, TAp , sec ............. 3 014.67 3 014.67


Recovery program estimates

Engineering estimates and uncertainties

Error source Specification Velocity e_ror_ Velocity error,

value Error It/see Error ft/sec
coefficient coefficient

Misalignments I00 see

Azimuth -40 - - 4.8 -48 _ 83 -5.7

Xp accelerometer toward Y -15 -0.2

Zp accelerometer toward X +I00 - 12.0 O

7 Constant drift 0.3 deg/hr

"_ x o.i2 - N -i,oi "_

FTI -o.
o5 _ -0.7 P11
X z Z
g-sensitive drift 0.5 deglhrlg

spinaxis_balauoo -0.0_ _ 0._ ]>
Y-gyro spin axis unbalance

Z--gyro spin axis unbalance -0.14 N I.i

X-gyro input axis unbalance -0.35 N 4.3

Y-gyro input axis unbalance -0.38 ± 0.81 -1.3 -i0.41

Z-gyro input axis unbalance -0.Ii N -3.8

Accelerometer bias 300 plmn

X N -

y -160 2.3 -200 • 665 +2.8

Z _96.6 0.6 364 ± 678 3.7

P \

TABLE 5.1,5-111.- ASCENT AND IGS TRACKING _0RS AT SEC0 - Concluded

Recovery program estimates

Engineering estimates and uncertainties

Specification Velocity error, Velocity error,

Error source value Error ft/sec Error ft/sec
coefficient coefficient

Accelerometer scale factor 360 ppm


g% Y - - g%
O z moo 2.7 O
X Timing errors, sec " Z
"11 -11
IGS time scale factor 50 ppm -80 -60 -1.2 -62 _ 167 ppm -4.8 -1.O
_11 Time correlation - 6.7 2.1 +0.5 0.011 • 0.028 2.3 0.6 _11

X Total velocity error -5.1 9.2 -2.5 -3.8 -7.1 -2.9 L

External tracker errors >

F" F"
System Range bias, ft P bias, ft Q bias, ft Azimuth, radians Elevation, radians Refraction, n units

_s_ lOOK _ 1.8 • 6._ _ _/A _/A


N = negligible
N/A = not applicable


Position, ft Velocity, ft/sec


IMU error -400 • i00 220 • 50 -450 ± 50 -i.0 _ 1.5 !O • 3.0 -2.5 ± 0.5

Navigation error 970 ± 50 i_ ± 5 50 ± !0 1.8 1.0 .2

Total guidance error 570 ± 150 235 • 50 -400 ± 30 0.8 ± 1.5 ii. 0 _ 3.0 -2.3 • 0.5 C_

0 0

Inertial velocity components

rT1 Inertial Inertial
Z System velocity, flight-path (computer coordinates), ft/sec r11
_.4 ft/sec angle, deg X Y Z --4

Nominal 25 729 0.037 25 328 4_83 -1.98

r" r-

IGS 25 720 0.015 25 307 4584 -227

Preliminary best
estimate trajectory 25 718 O. 031 25 307 4573 -225

MISTRAMI00K 25 719 0.021 25 307 4581 -225

GE Mod III 25 719 0.029 25 307 4578 -225


Pitch error Roll error

Time, g.e.t., Mode (sensor minus (sensor minus
hr:min:sec ACME Platform gimbal angle), deg gimbal angle), deg

00:07:25.50 Pulse_ platform SEF 2.00 2.00 Start of alignment

00:56:45.18 .25 .75 End of alignment

01:25:06.58 _alse_ pl_tform BEF -2.00 .84 Start of alignment

C 01:34:59'33 -.34 -.18 Still aligning, last available data

01: 47:51:23 platform SEF •27 •33 Aligning, first available data 7

02:17:00.39 .24 .ll End of alignment

_'_ 02:34:24.52 Pulse_ platform SEF -.lO -.33 Start of alignment

02:37:21-29 -.21 -.40 End of alignment

02:46:02.84 Pulse, platform SEF .66 -.43 Start of alignment

"_ 03:03:40.32 -.56 -.ll End of _lignment "I_

_3:27:00.15 Platform SEF .24 .52 Aligning, first available data
03:39:31.28 -.05 .49 End of alignment

03:41:00.85 Platform SEF -.41 1.38 Start of alignment

03:50:11.24 -.05 .05 End of alignment

05:25:31.35 Pulse SEF .42 i. 74 Start of alignment

05:29:55.33 Unknown SEF -.05 -.45 End of alignment

23:56:12.04 Unknown BEF -2.O0 -2.00 Start of alignment

24:06:20.79 Unknown .18 -.40 End of alignment



Mode Pitch error Roll error

Time_ g.e.t._ (sensor minus (sensor minus Remarks
hr:min:sec Platform gimbal angle), deg gimbal angle), deg

24:20:34.28 Unknown BEF -.31 .22 Start of alignment

24:22:26.97 Unknown -.08 -.21 Still aligning, last a_ailable dats

24: _i: 13-47 Unknown BEF .14 .05 Aligning, first available data

C 24: 59: 59-61 Unknown .06 •19 Still aligning, last available dat_
> >

m m

Event Time_ g.e.t._ Components; ft/sec Total AV, Planned AV_ Error,
hr:min:sec _VX AVy AV Z ft/sec ft/sec percent

Tailoff 86.29 26.76 -4.90 90.48 84.0 7.7

GLV separation 0:05:59.2 9.45 2.04 -1.82 9.84 i0.0 1.6

a(9.55) a(2.04) a(-1.82)i a(9.93 )

Height adjust 1:34:02.5 13.75 -.33 -0.20 13.76 14.0 1.7

a(15.92) a(-.33) a(-o. 20) ia(13.93)

Phase adjust 2:18:01 60.84 -0.37 0.09 60.84 60.8 .06

Plane adjust 2:42:08.2 -0.33 -0.24 -31.70 31.71 31.7 .03

Vernier height adjust 3:09:20 0.62 0.05 0.14 0.64 0.8 20.0

Coelliptic 3:47:37.5 42.41 0.80 0.20 42.42 42.5 0.19

Terminal phase initiate 5:18:56.1 25.82 -18.09 0.55 31.54 33.7 0.47

f First correction 5:51:30.7 -i. 96 -9.42 5.08 10.88 NA_

Second correction 5:43:54 -3.78 -2.85 -5.45 7.21 NA

Braking 5:50:31 31.30 24.68 4.20 40.08 42-3 2.9

Spacecraft 6 and
spacecraft 7 sepa-
ration 11:14:31 -8.76 -0.52 -0.04 9.518 9.0 5.8

Posigrade 17:25:52.0 9.49 -0.28 -0.67 9.52 9.0 5.7

Retro 25:15:58
(Reported M
readings) 310 aft 116 down i right 391 329 0.61

(Based on tracking
data) 330 0.30

acalculated using preflight accelerometer bias. All other values calculated using
updated accelerometer bias. Error in bias insignificant after correction.




Ground elapsed time, Radar range, VT, ft/sec Data acquisition

hr: min: sec n. mi. simulated system (DAS),

4: 03:40 146.8 711 712

4: 05:20 144.2 709 701

4: 07:00 141. 6 675 672

4: 08:40 139.0 657 652

4: lO: 20 136.4 642 644

4: 12:O0 133.8 621 622

4: 13:40 131.2 628 614

4: 15:20 128.6 593 591

4: 17:O0 126.0 582 581 ....
(No data available) - _ _

4: 55:20 66.3 213 214

4: 57:O0 63.8 200 199

4: _8:40 61. q 181 181

5: 00:20 58.6 166 160

5: 02:00 56.1 151 151

5: 03:40 53.6 139 136

5: 05:20 51.0 115 124

5: 07:O0 48.6 i12 109

5: 08:40 46.0 96 96

_: lO: 20 43.5 87 85
5: 12:O0 41.1 78 77

5:13:40 38.6 72 72

5: 15:20 36.2 70 69



Time = 25:36:10.192 g.e.t. Time = 25:45:12.732 g.e.t.

Altitude = 400K ft Guidance Termination
Telemetry MAC IBM Telemetry MAC IBM

Time in mode, see ..... i 453.427 i 453.427 i 453.427 1 995.776 i 995.776

Radius vector, ft ...... 21 307 932 21 307 633 21 307 532 20 979 740 20 979 720

Velocity, ft/sec ..... 24 389.881 24 387.7]-I 24 389. 459 1 971. 031 1 573.909

O Flight-path-angle, 0
deg ............ 1.422 -1.428 -1.422 -31.679 -31.587
7" Spacecraft heading,
"_ deg ........... 92.281 92. 221 92.276 76.644 76.713 _'11

Longitude, deg ...... 260. 593 360.443 260.544 292. 235 292.235

Latitude, deg ....... 28.81939 28.82384 28.820 23.99 23.951

-_ Cross range, n. mi...... 1.069 -0.940 -4.924 -4.500 "_

Range to target, #_
n. mi. 1 726.505 1 732.492 6.757 6.534

Bank command_ deg ..... -60.0 -60.0 -60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Density altitude
factor ......... HA HA NA 4.61328 4.61432

Predicted half-lift
range .......... _ NA NA NA 5.970 5.715

Heading to target,
deg ........... 93.311 93.249 - 214.517 213.164

aBecause of data dropout_ program was reinitialized after blackout.
NASA-S-6b-74 JAN


on T- 7 hr launchdaywinds ,deg

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360
Timefrom lift-oft, sec
Figure5.I. 5-1. - Launchvehicle--spacecraftsteeringerror comparisons.

NASA-S-66-1121 FEB

8 --+---+ -- __i
6 I Down range velocity I I I

__ 4

_" -2 ---- - _--.


_ '



Vertical velocity a o [o _ _'''"

4 _

.__ -2 I
_> -4 O Velocity difference between Nod m
>_ tracking and IMU

-6 [] Velocity difference between MISTRAM

-8 _ tracking and IMU l-

I .... Hand fit values

to _ _ i
I I__
8 I I i
I Crossrange velocity I
6 ' i t
4 I
i [ I
c E I

__ 0 _.%_ i i --

_g , I
N -4 I I _ I
-6 I t _ !
I '
-8 I I, _

-10 I li ,
O 20 40 611 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 22(1 240 260 280 300 320 340 360

Time from lift-off, sec

Figure 5. i. 5-2. - Comparison of spacecraft IGS and radar tracking velocities.

_. ha
Shift of gyro mass unbalance Shift of gyro mass unbalance Shift of gyro constant Shift of accelerometer Shift of accelerometer
along spin axis, deg/hr/g along input axis, deg/hr/g drift, deg/hr scale factor, gig bias, g '

• ' = ' " " " = _ x_"_: _ _ _ _

'l I _ __
"T1 = 1 m
] , ] I •

_ _ -
, r"

_ _ -

8 a

--_ D.


_ 0 Z
_ _ o _

_ _ _ O0 I

-n _ -n
g o _ o_
_o _. o
_ o_

d_o_ _

_ k.n



(_ 6 C
, whilealigning platform

n __ _1 :::::::::::::::::::::: i ] Z

"!"1 -4 _ I "_
0 Azimuth :::[::::

Elevation _:_:::_:f
l:iii:: m

_8 i

3:30 3:40 3:50 4:00 4:10 4:20 4:30 4:40 4:50 5:00 5:10 5:20 5:30 5:40 5:50
Groundelapsedtime, hr: min.

Figure5.1.5-7. - Radarazimuthandelevationangles.

NASA-S-66-218 JAN

-2.5 0 _-0 -0,0_ )_...

o o_ .-_"d"''_r__ _ o'°'_,,o
-3.0 "i >""_''"""
o ..\
<,.60-0 o N
C \\ o CI
7-3.5 \\ t"3

O_ _ o o,, 0'_
> -4.0
o \ 0 O_

m -4.5 q _'- 2.4 second sample time

0 Data points radar elevation angle
Computed mean value



3:41:24 :36 :48 3:42:00 :12 :24 :36 :48 3:43:00 :12 3:43:24 v._
Ground elapsed time, hr:min:sec 4:--
Figure 5.1.5-8. - Radar elevation angle versus computed mean value. -4




100 30C

C 30 2°° C
0 ....... 0 _,,

_ Rangerate "'- ,,.,,

> -. >
O_ _ o o"- O_
Or) lO-- __ Ioo \\ (,/,}
-rl _ 75 o.. o -rl
3 -- Note:Scalescorrespondtothoseonthe ® \
rrl rangeandrange-rateindicator _ \ ? tll

\ O
2-- \
_ 40 \
0 Calculatedrangerate

O_ i0
1_ 3020
0 I 0 Range
I I I I I I I I O_Z_. I
5:05 5:10 5:15 5:20 5:25 5:30 5:35 5:40 5:45 5:50 5:55 6:00

Groundelapsedtime, hr: rain

Figure 5.1.5-9. - Analog rangeand rangerate.


( I

8. 0 ...................................

: :i:ii :i

C: _- 'b"x _ _ (_
7.6 _ :i_;
::: Z

._ 7.4 _o_ :_:

_ "-. :.:::
:::ii;: _


22 .............

.... 0 Tern,erature ,_ ........ ',_

--_ Pressure o_ _ :i!i_i!

: ::.:


0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
time, hr
Figure5.1.5-10.- Radartemperatureandpressure. ',,0
23.9 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
JAN - i

IGS at drogue deploy.-_.

23.8 _--- I IGS tlack--_ _k_ /-- Extrap°lati°n °f radar

- IOSat80Kft >_--__ _ x_ p/ datafrom180Kft
"_. __ I ./ (conterline of footprint)

23.7 __._j__j! FExtrapolationofrada

/data from 400Kft r

,_ r-r- _ _i.._nterline of footprint)

- .___ _ large[
. '-"---...'_-..
_. -

C __ -__._
23.5 1"'_ C
- _
_ _'_& _ _.._
- _. _ 5.43 n.mL- --Extrapolation of radar_
I! _1_ 23.4 ? from 205Kft
II'' I I' _ _ - " _. (centerline of footprint)
/ _ _-,#:3 I- _ Pick up by

o_ _z_ / _-
__ _
/7 _
2331' i ' '

_J_ 24 m,........--............,.. Longitude, deg


- Footprint
aRer retrofire
- Footprint
----- Footprint

_.,_ Spacecraft

22 I I I I I I I
-71 -70 -69 -68 -67 -66 -65 -64
Longitude, deg west

Figure 5. 1. 5-11. - Touchdown comparisons.

NASA-S-66-237 JAN

i-_-----25:37:56 G.e.t. 25:38:18 G0e.t.--'t _ Radartrack
I _ _ IGS track
I !
=_d I i
N =o N
0 °
"_ I
12- 0
°_ I I 6- n. mi. _
-n _4 28 I 0 "11
-- o I I --

I'1"1 _,
o i I I"1"1
Z Oo
c_ ,
I ' Z

r=- i _
27 i
-92 -91 -90 -89
Longitude, deg west

Figure 5.1.5-12. - Comparisonof IGS position track with radar position track at approximately 300,000 feet.

5.1.6 Time Reference System

The Gemini VI-A time reference system performed satisfactorily dur-

ing the mission. The electronic timer was 181 milliseconds slow with
respect to ground time during the flight. This difference is 2.0 parts
per million which is well within the specification of if0 parts per mil-
lion over a temperature range of 15° to 35 ° C. The electronic timer
initiated the automatic retrofire sequence; however, the retrofire time
could not be positively established because of the loss of the delayed-
time data.

The event timer_ the ground-elapsed-time digital clock, and the

mechanical G.m.t. clock operated satisfactorily. The flight crew re-
ported that the battery operated G.m.t. clock accumulated an error of
40 seconds during powered flight. The spacecraft contractor has stated
that this may happen at any time that the launch vehicle vibrations con-
tain sufficient energy at the resonant frequency of the clock. The clock
lost approximately i i/2 seconds during the remainder of the mission.
The time correlation buffer operated satisfactorily according to a pre-
liminary examination of the onboard voice tape transcriptions.



5.1.7 Electrical System

The electrical system performed nominally throughout the mission.

Details of this performance are presented in the following paragraphs. Power system.- Nominal electrical power was supplied

throughout the flight. It is estimated that 90 percent of the rated ca-
pacity of the main bus adapter batteries was used, but only 14. 3 and
17.1 percent of the reentry and squib batteries, respectively, were used.

Postflight inspection revealed two blown fusistors: the equipment-

adapter shaped charge (XF-C, 4-5), and the nose-fairing jettison (XF-K,
3-18). These blown fusistors resulted from slag formation in the asso-
ciated pyrotechnic device. Fusistors have blo_-n in previous Gemini
flights and this action is considered normal. Sequential system.- Postflight inspection revealed that one

group of a redundant pair of pyrotechnic initiators had not fired: latch
release covers i, 2_ and 3, the index bar extend, and the index bar jet-
tison. These functions are initiated by manual depression of the jetti-
son retro-adapter s_itch, if a latching relay has operated at
nose-fairing jettison. Postflight inspection has revealed that the nose-
fairing jettison switch malfunctioned. This switch is so constructed
that two pressure-sealed limit switches are mounted side by side in a
common housing. Each switch operates one of the two redundant circuits
used to jettison the nose fairing and to actuate a latching relay which
interlocks this action with the later jettisoning of the docking fittings
and docking bar. A single push button normally actuates the two switches
simultaneously through a cross head which pushes on two spring-supported
levers, in the tests of the spacecraft 6 assembly, the suspected switch
of the two actuated at sea level but failed at 5 psia. The differential
pressure at altitude increases the actuation force of this ty_e of
switch. The combination of limited push-button travel, deflection of the
spring-supported lever, and the higher force was sufficient to prevent
switch actuation in this particular instance. This type of switch as-
sembly is used in eight places in the spacecraft. Action is being taken
to prevent a similar occurrence on subsequent spacecraft. This action
includes rigid inspection and tests of spacecraft 8 components and de-
sign changes to later units.

Major electrical sequential spacecraft events and the time of their

occurrence may be found in table 4.2-1.



5.1.8 Spacecraft Propulsion System

The performance of the propulsion system was very satisfactory dur-

ing this mission. Orbital attitude and maneuver system.- Preflight: Fuel and oxidizer servicing of the orbital

attitude and maneuver system (OAMS) was performed 47 and 46 days prior
to lift-off_ respectively. Final servicing of the helium source pres-
surant tank was accomplished 8 days before launch. Table 5.1.8-I com-
pares the planned and actual quantities of pressurant ana propellant.
These loadings constitute an available overall system oxidizer-to-fuel
mixture ratio of 1.12 by weight. A revised propellant-loading procedure
was incorporated permitting a 4.9-pound fuel and a 2.1-pound oxidizer
increase over the planned quantities. This was accomplished by filling
the tanks to capacity and subsequently withdrawing 13.2 pounds of fuel
and 55.5 pounds of oxidizer to provide the proper tank ullages.

The static firing of all eight attitude thrust chamber assemblies

(TCA's) provided a final end-to-end verification of system operation
and the expulsion of gas entrapped in the propellant manifolds. In order
to obtain satisfactory visual indications of engine operation_ attitude
engines were fired three times for an approximate pulse duration of
0.5 second each time. Flight: The flight data presented in table 5.1.8-11,

a summary of maneuver engine performance during major orbit changes,
show nominal engine performance. The technique employed by the crew to
obtain a required velocity change (AV) consisted of a continuous firing
until nearly the end of the specified time_ followed by several pulses
for final trim-out of velocity residuals. Precise resolution of maneuver
engine firing duration including these pulses was not possible because
of very noisy data on these channels. During the flight all maneuver
engines were fired_ and both modes of operation, continuous and pulse,
were used. Regulator performance was nominal and stayed within the
293 to 300 psia range.

The computed usable propellant remaining over the duration of the

mission is presented in figure 5.1.8-1. Included in the figure are the
quantities read by the crew from the onboard propellant quantity indica-
tor (PQI) which have been corrected for mixture ratio variations from
the fixed gage reference of 1.06 and the ground computed values using a
more precise gaging equation. A comparison of the two sources of pro-
pellant quantity data shows a maximum variation of 20 pounds (3 percent),
which compares well with the estimated preflight PQI accuracy of ±5 per-
cent and the estimated ±3 percent accuracy of the gaging equation. The

1.04 mixture ratio determined for the overall mission compares closely
with the preflight planned value of 1.00. The total quantity of usable
propellant loaded was calculated to be 664 pounds when referenced to the
1.04 mixture ratio. Thus, at the end of the mission the crew had ex-
pended 62 percent or 412 pounds of the usable quantity of propellant.
Approximately 73 percent of the propellant consumed was expended through
the maneuver engines. This corresponds to a total maneuver thrust time
of about 920 seconds which indicates a total attitude thrust time of
approximately 1300 seconds. Reentry control system.- Preflight: Fuel loadings of the A-ring and B-ring of

the reentry control system (RCS) were completed 47 days prior to lift-
off. The oxidizer was serviced in each of the two rings 46 days before
lift-off. The nitrogen source pressurant tanks of both rings were pres-
surized 46 days before launch. Planned loadings are compared with actual
quantities in table 5.1.8-1. Flight performance: RCS heater circuit energization

occurred at 5 hours 49 minutes g.e.t, after one of the heater lights
came on. The heaters were energized essentially throughout the remainder
of the mission. RCS A-ring and B-ring measured temperatures were nominal
during the orbital and reentry phases of the mission as shown in the
following table:

Orbit Reentry

Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum

A-ring source pressurant tank

temperat1_e, °F • 73 88 37 66

A-ring oxidizer feed line

temperature, °F ..... 67 78 66 87

B-ring source pressurant tank

temperature, °F ..... 67 81 25 71

Rapid expansion of the nitrogen source pressurant gases during reentry_

reflecting a high rate of RCS usage_ cooled the pressurant tanks to the
minimum values noted.

After system activation (between 24 hours 13 minutes and 24 hours
and 17 minutes g.e.t.), regulated pressure of the A-ring and B-ring
stabilized at 302 and 300 psia, respectively. Pressure v_riations
throughout the reentry phase were within nominal limits. Leakage of the
nitrogen pressurizatio n gas was below measurable limits. No system data
were available at system activation because of the delayed-time teleme-
try tape recorder failure. Hence, corrections to the propellant quan-
tity computations which use system data immediately after activation
were not possible. This decreased the accuracy of the propellant con-
sumption computations, and in addition, prevented an analysis of space-
craft rate data during system checkout. However, the crew reported that
they experienced no difficulty with any engines during the checkout_ and
the available rate data during reentry showed no apparent problems.
Single-ring reentry (A-ring) was used after completion of retrorocket
firing and until expenditure of A-ring propellant was indicated by loss
of control authority during roll near peak deceleration. At this time
the B-ring was switched on and used until depletion of propellant during
rate stabilization on the drogue parachute. Postflight deservicing re-
vealed that essentially no propellant remained in either ring. The con-
sumption of the entire RCS propellant load is attributed to the tight
control dead-band of the orbit rate command mode which was used during
the intervals of greatest demand on the RCS. The engines were fired in
the pulse mode after retrofire until 25:38:21 g.e.t., then orbit rate
command was used. Postflight: The systems are receiving extensive testing

for possible reuse on the Augmented Target Docking Adapter. No anoma-
lies have been reported to date. Retrograde rocket system.- According to available informa-

tion, the retrorocket firing was initiated at 25:15:58 g.e.t. The per-
formance of the system was nominal as indicated in table 5.1.8-111.
The crew reported an appreciable time delay between each rocket firing.
This can be analyzed by considering the tolerances on the time-delay re-
lay and on the motor's web burn time. The latter corresponds to the
time during motor burning when final thrust decay begins and would be
noticed by the crew. The web burn time_ a function of propellant grain
temperature_ decreased with higher retrorocket temperatures experienced
on shorter duration missions. The net effect of these variances is
shown in figure 5.1.8-2. Because retrorocket temperature data were not
obtained on Gemini VI-A_ data from Gemini VII were used to obtain a
value of 52o F for the motor temperature of Gemini VI-A at ignition.
Figure 5.1.8-2 shows a possible time delay between rocket firings as
long as 0.8 second at this temperature.


Pressurant at reference Propellant at reference Propellant

System temperature of 70° F_ psia temperature of 70° F_ lb quantity
Preactivation Postactivation Oxidizer Fuel indicator_

C Planned 2706 2700 Maximum Maximum 93 C

possible possible
Actual 2764 2710 381.2 331.8 93.5 Z

r-- r--
"T1 "11

r_1 Planned 3015 2785 20.2 15.8 - Frl

Actual 3040 (a) 20.2 15.8 -


Planned 3015 2785 20.2 15.8 -

Actual 2040 (a) 20.2 15.8 -

aNo data due to loss of delayed-time telemetry


Ground elapsed time, Thrust chamber Maneuver time_ see Velocity changes_ ft/sec
hr:mim:sec assembly number
Planned Actual Planned Actual

Separation 00:05:59.2 9,10 12 13.4 i0.0 9.84

Height adjust 01:34:02.} 11,12 24.0 24. 5 14.0 13.76

C Phase adjust 02:18:01 9,10 77.0 75.7 60.8 60.84

(_ Plane change 02:42:08.0 9,10 40 39.3 31.7 31.71
F" F-
Height adjust 03:03:20 9,10 i 0.8 0.8 0.64
om om
(2_ Coelliptical 03:47:37.5 9,10 53 56.7 42.5 42.42

--11 Terminal phase 05:18:56 9,10,11,12,13,15 48 54.9 33-7 31.54 -11

I'I'I initiate I'_

First correction 05:31:30.7 9,10,14,15 - 33.4 - 10.88

wt = 82°

Second correction 05:43:34 13,15 20.0 _ 7.21

wt = 34°

Braking 05:50:31 11,12,13,14,16 70 b122.3 42.3 40.08

Separation maneuver 11:14:31 11,12 15 14.2 9.0 9.518

Posigrade maneuver 13:25:52 9,10 ii 11.4 9.0 9.52


aReal-time planning

bTotal thrust time from start of breaking maneuver to completion of rendezvous


Parameter Predicted Actual Deviation_


AV_ ft/sec . . .

Aft ....... 308 310 +0.6

Right ..... 000 001 --

Down ........ i17 i!6 -0.8

Total _V, ft/sec . . . a329. 5 b331. 0 +0.4 -

Vehicle pre-retrofire

weight, ib ..... 5475.3 5477.D +0.04

aMotor performance is based on specification values.

bMagnitude of IVI vector readout by crew. A value of 330.2 ft/sec

should have been realized based on retrorocket test data, flight tempera-

ture_ installation cant angle_ and spacecraft estimated weight at the time

of retrofire. This value represents a 0.21-percent deviation above the

nominal and 0.21 percent below the actual.




C _ 70 C
Z D-
_ 6o ( N
> _ 50 _ >
O_ __ 40 "6""
b_'c r_ C_
-rl .o -rl
I"1-1 3o I-!1
0 Correctedpropellant quantity
20 -- indicator readings

-- Groundcomputedvalues

o 0 2
4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26

Groundelapsed time, hr

Figure 5.1.8-1. - OAMS propellant consumption, o_
O LL o
-_ =
o .o
O rv" rv"
N o
_ Q
.o oas 'd_paAo uo!l!u61
5.1.9 Pyrotechnics System

Sequentially, the pyrotechnics system on the Gemini VI-A mission

performed all functions required. However_ postflight inspection of the
rendezvous and recovery section revealed that seven cartridges failed to
fire as follows:

(a) One of two docking bar jettison cartridges

(b) Three of six docking latch release cartridges

(c) Three of six docking door cable cutter cartridges

The part numbers and serial numbers of each of the cartridges are identi-
fied in the postflight section of this report.

All of the above-mentioned cartridges are normally ignited at retro-

grade section separation. However_ electrical interlock circuitry
exists in the fairing jettison circuit_ and investigation revealed that
one of the redundant latching relays in this circuitry had not actuated.
Thus_ those cartridges in one circuit did not receive a firing impulse
at retrograde section jettison. The other circuit was fully operative,
and the redundant cartridges satisfactorily accomplished the functions of
jettisoning the docking bar_ releasing the docking latehes_ and releasing
the docking doors. During failure analysis_ the fairing jettison switch_
was found to be intermittent at i0 psia and open at 5 psia_ thus showing
a tendency to be pressure sensitive. For additional details see sec-
tion 5.1.7.

One of the tips of the flex line was found to be broken when removed
from the breech assembly of the command pilot's hatch actuator. This
condition was similar to previously reported broken tips on the MDF lines
in the ejection seat backboard/egress kit jettison system. The anomaly
has been investigated and is not considered detrimental in that tips
which are properly installed would still be in a position to operate even
though broken.

Postflight inspection of pyroswitch G_ the pyroswitch which opens

all circuits in the wire bundle from the spacecraft to the launch vehicle
subsequent to separation_ indicated a closed circuit. Investigation of
this anomaly is being conducted. Preliminary information indicates that
a glass seal was broken as a result of excessive piston travel permitting
adjacent wires to touch_ thus giving the closed circuit indications.

The condition of the ZI3 launch vehicle/spacecraft separation plane

on the Gemini VI-A spacecraft was similar to that of the Gemini VII i that
is_ portions of the flexible linear shaped charge holders and the blast

absorber were trailing the spacecraft in orbit. A discussion of this is
contained in the Gemini VII mission report. An investigation of this
matter has been initiated.

5.1.10 Crew Station Furnishings and Equipment Crew station design and layout.- The basic design of the
crew station was satisfactory for the Gemini VI-A mission. No major
difficulties were encountered in the crew station; however, there were
a few minor anomalies which are discussed in the following paragraphs. Equipment stowage: By comparison with the previous two

missions, there was a relatively small amount of equipment to be stowed
for this mission. There were no difficulties of any significance in
equipment handling or stowage. The crew reported a substantial amount
of lint and dust escaping from the various stowage pouches when they were
opened in orbit. Action has been initiated to vacuum the insides and
outsides of all stowage pouches before they are packed for flight. The
crew opened the center line stowage frame door soon after insertion into
orbit. When this door was opened, the lower shelf of the frame deflected
downward approximately 3/4 inch. The crew had great difficulty lifting
the lower shelf enough to close the stowage door for the reentry phase.
Postflight inspection showed no discrepancy in the installation. Because
of similar difficulties encountered in spacecraft 7 and the spacecraft 8
altitude chamber test, the deflection of the lower shelf was attributed
to structural deflection of the large pressure bulkhead when subjected
f to the normal cabin differential pressure. Corrective action for subse-
quent spacecraft is described in section 5.1.1 of reference 7 and 5.1.i
of this report. Habitability: The only habitability problem encountered

in this mission was that the crew was uncomfortably warm for the first
17 to 18 hours after lift-off. This condition was related to suit inlet
temperatures of up to 70° F during the first part of the mission, and is
discussed in section 5.1.4. No difficulty was noted in sleeping on this
mission, although the crew slept only a few hours because of mission
activities. Crew station furnishings: The command pilot cracked the

visor of his pressure suit helmet at the time of release from the para-
chute single-point suspension to the two-point suspension just before
landing. He reported having his left arm in front of his head to avoid
hitting the window frame but indicated that his helmet visor probably hit
his wrist ring at single-point release. The pilot had no damage to his

The electrical connector on the cable from the left seat to the
command pilot's suit failed to lock at the time of crew ingress prior to
launch. The ground crew and the flight crew elected to launch in this
condition because communications and bioinstrumentation were not affect-
ed. The connector came loose momentarily in flight but was replaced
immediately by the command pilot without further incident. This

connector had been replaced three days before launch because of a sim-
ilar problem; however, the replacement connector had not been fit checked
with the command pilot's bioinstrtumentation harness after the rework.
Steps have been initiated to insture that a fit check with the flight
crew's flight hardware will be made if the connectors on the cables from
the seat to the suit are changed. Also a search has been started to find
replacement connectors which will be more suitable. Cabin lighting: The cabin lighting was adequate for

the mission except for the center instrument panel. As reported by pre-
vious flight crews, the lighting for this panel was poor for dark side
operation. In order to illuminate this panel adequately, it was neces-
sary to turn the center cabin light so bright that it interfered with
visibility outside the spacecraft. This problem was particularly notice-
able because of the need for frequent reference to the digital clock on
the center panel. The clock displayed mission elapsed time which was the
primary time reference for the mission. Action has been initiated to
provide additional lighting for the digital clock on future spacecraft.

The docking light illuminated the docking bar, and du_ing dark side
operation the reflection from the bright metal bar was objectionable to
the crew. This bright reflection interfered with their dark adaptation.
Review of this condition after t_he flight led to the decision not to --
paint the docking bar to change its reflective characteristics. Dark
adaptation will not be required when the docking light is in use on fu-
ture missions, and therefore, no action is required.

The COMPUTE light on the center pedestal was covered with a polaroid
dimmer cover. This dimming feat_re adequately corrected the problem re-
ported in the Gemini V mission concerning the inability to dim or estin-
guish this warning light. Overheating of the cabin lights, reported
after the Gemini V mission, was not a problem in this mission. The
modified light fixtures with improved heat conduction characteristics
were satisfactory. Controls and displays.- Controls: The basic attitude and maneuver controls were

satisfactory for the rendezvous mission. The command pilot expressed
concern over the proximity of the landing attitude switch to the para-
chute jettison switch on the center pedestal. The location of these two
switches had not been adversely reported by any other crews. The need
for an added guard on the parachute jettison switch in future spacecraft
was reviewed but the decision reached was to retain the present design. Displays: The flight crew described the displays as

excellent for the rendezvous mission in all respects except for the mark-
ings on the attitude indicator. The lack of any pitch markings on the

altitude ball at pitch angles between 60 ° and 9_ was described as a
serious deficiency for the back-up rendezvous procedures with a failed
radar. Without these pitch markings it is impossible to determine the
target elevation accurately during the final i0 miles of a nominal ren-
dezvous approach. The crew also rgported that they could control the
attitude of the spacecraft to ±i.0 in plteh, although the attmtude
sphere is only marked every i0 ° . For future spacecraft the attitude
indicators will be marked with i° pitch markings from 0° to ±60 ° and 5°
pitch markings from ±60 ° to &9 O° .

The digital clock was used for the first time in both spacecraft 6
and 7. The flight crew reported that the onboard display of ground
elapsed time was a major improvement in Gemini time displays.

The correct action of the crew during the Gemini VI-A launch attempt
on December 12, 1965_ _as indicative of the adequacy of the displays for
the launch vehicle malfunction detection system. The command pilot cor-
rectly determined that the launch vehicle engines had shut down prior to
lift-off on the basis of the following indications:

(a) One Engine I thrust chamber pressure light flickered off, then
came back on.

f (b) The second Engine I light remained on.

(c) The event timer started 2 to 3 seconds early.

(d) The rate needles on the attitude indicator were indicating

zero rates.

(e) The flight crew communicator in the block house did not call

The crew was able to use the displayed information to analyze an unpre-
cedented situation quickly and to arrive at the correct course of action
under time-critical conditions. Pressure suit and accessories.- The pressure suits were

satisfactory for the mission. The crew experienced some discomfort be-
cause of minor pressure points which developed on their backs while they
waited in the lift-off position for approximately 90 minutes.

The pilot spent much of the first six hours of the mission writing
data in the rendezvous data book. Subsequently, he complained of a raw
place on his forehead where he was pushing against his pressure suit
helmet. He also had a backache later in the mission. In the absence of
gravity to help lower the head, extra effort is required to bend the
body. In this mission the pilot had a potential pressure point in the

helmet against which he had to push when he bent over. The muscular
effort to overcome the pressure suit restriction as well as to substi-
tute for gravity to bend the body would explain the backache. Fli_ht crew o_erational equipment.- Still camera (70-nm_): The 70-mm still camera with an

80-mm focal length lens and four 70-mm film magazines with color film
was used successfully to take a large number of excellent photographs.
By use of a light meter with a very limited field of view, the crew was
able to obtain the correct lens settings for numerous high-quality pho-
tographs of spacecraft 7. Sequence camera (16-mm): A new 16-mm sequence camera

was used for the first time on this mission. The quality of the sequence
shots, particularly those of spacecraft 7_ were excellent. This camera

failed after _ of the i0 film magazines had been used during the mis-
sion. The cause of the failure was a jam or near-jam in the magazine
which caused an overload current to burn out the motor. A detailed
failure analysis of the camera and the magazine is being performed by
the camera manufacturer. The proper value circuit breaker will be placed
in series with this camera to prevent a jammed magazine from burning out
the motor on subsequent missions. 3 Optical sight: The optical sight operated satisfacto-

rily throughout the flightj however, the command pilot reported that the
bore sight shifted up to 2- depending on the tightness of the mounting
screw. Postflight investigation has not revealed the cause of the anom-
aly. A check of the spacecraft 6 sight and a similar sight at the con-
tractor's plant revealed no basic design discrepancy. Future sights will
be checked to insure that no mounting or misalignment error exists when
the sight is mounted in the spacecraft. D-8 Radiation sensor failure: The portable radiation

sensor for the D-8 experiment came loose from its mount when the space-
craft was released from single-point to two-point parachute suspension.
Postflight examination of the sensor mounting indicated no defect in the
bayonet-type joint used to hold the sensor in its holder. During the
flight crew debriefing it was established that the pilot may not have
installed and locked the sensor properly in its holder prior to reentry. Fli_ht crew personal equipment.- Food: A total of 12 man-meals were provided for use by

the Gemini VI-A crew. These meals included rehydratable and bite-size
foods similar to those utilized in all previous missions. Because of
the extremely heavy work load required for rendezvous and station

keeping, the flight crew ate only partial meals at approximately 3:30
and 7:30 g.e.t. At approximately 12:30 g.e.t., each crew member con-
sumed a normal meal utilizing rehydratables as well as bite-size items.
No problems with rehydration or eating were experienced by the
Gemini VI-A flight crew.

Water metering device: A water dispenser which provided the capa-

bility for metering water intake was installed on spacecraft 6. This
pistol-configured device was utilized for drinking and food rehydration.
Operation of this device was satisfactory throughout the flight with no
problems noted. launch day urine collection device (UCD): Neither pilot

removed his UCD until late in the first day (approximately 12:00 g.e.t.).
The pilot had not used his UCD during this 12-hour period, because it
had come loose during the seventh or eight hour of flight. Urine disposal system: The crew reported that exces-

sive force was required to mate the quick disconnect coupler on the urine
hose to the spacecraft quick disconnect nipple. As described by the
flight crew, an estimated force of 30 to 70 pounds was required to make
the connection. It was noted that quick-disconnect mating in the Gemini
f mission simulator was somewhat easier _han that in spacecraft 6. The
spacecraft contractor has initiated a review of the present urine system
quick disconnects to determine the necessary corrective action. It was
further noted by the flight crew that some urine tended to remain in the
urine system receiver area; however, this was absorbed by use of the
personal hygiene towels onboard the spacecraft. There was no mention
of free urine in the cabin area at any time. Personal hygiene: Wet pads provided with each food pack
were utilized infrequently by both crew members. The large personal
hygiene towels and the tissues were utilized more often with no apparent
problems. None of the oral hygiene items (gum, toothbrush) were utilized
during the flight. Humidity sensor: The hand-held humidity sensor was

utilized for one complete cabin survey at approximately 19:25 g.e.t.
Temperatures derived from this survey indicated that the cabin atmosphere
was a nominal 80 ° F, wall temperatures were 76o F, and cabin relative
ht_niditywas approximately 71 percent. Postflight calibration check of
of this unit indicated that both dry and wet bulb temperature readings
were within 2° of actual. See section 5.1.4 for additional details on
this subject. Miscellaneous: Additional items carried on spacecraft 6

such as the survival kits_ CO2 tapes, auxiliary drinking water bags, and


defecation devices, were not utilized by the flight crew because they
were not needed. The small pen lights were utilized frequently by both
crewmen, particularly to check camera magazine footage and for reading
instrument panel gages during the sleep period. Operation of the units
was satisfactory throughout the flight.

_.i.i0.6 Bioinstrumentation.- Both pilots wore the standard bio-

instrumentation which functioned normally throughout the mission except
for the pilot's oral temperature probe. This probe was inoperative prior
to crew ingress, however, the problem was discovered after the crew had
completed suiting and there was insufficient time for repair. After the
mission_ no discrepancy was found in any of the pressure suit leads and
the failure was attributed to a loose connection inside the helmet.
During the mission the pilot was able to obtain oral temperature readings
with the probe on the light-weight headset. Both crewmen attempted to
take blood pressure readings after landing; however, the reading on the
command pilot was not obtained because of failure of the left hand bio-
medical tape recorder. Postflight investigation revealed that the re-
corder tape had come off the reel during the launch phase, thereby stop-
ping the recorder. The cause of this failure is being investigated.

5.1.11 landing System

The parachute landing system satisfactorily performed its function

of providing a safe water landing for the Gemini VI-A crew. When com-
manded, all systems events occurred within established tolerances. Fig-
ure 5.1.11-1 illustrates the occurrence of the major sequences as related
to altitude and ground elapsed time.

By comparison, the oscillations of the Gemini VI-A spacecraft during

the drogue descent were of higher amplitude than those of the Gemini VII
spacecraft, although the Gemini VI-A remained well within the 124 ° per-
formance requirement of the drogue parachute. The greater amplitude of
spacecraft 6 could be attributed to a cross-coupling between the drogue
parachute damping force and the reentry control system (RCS). (Such a
condition could not exist on spacecraft 7 because the RCS propellants on
that spacecraft were expended prior to drogue deployment.) A study to
determine the magnitude of the cross-coupling, if it exists, has been
requested of the contractor.

During the repositioning maneuver to the landing attitude, the com-

mand pilot's faceplate was cracked when there was contact with the pres-
sure suit wrist ring. The relatively poor positioning of the head with
f respect to the wrist ring was attributed to a last-second check by the
command pilot to be certain that he was actuating the landing-attitude
switch and not the parachute-jettison switch.

The drogue, pilot, and main parachutes were recovered. This was
the first mission in which the drogue parachute was recovered and the
second time the pilot parachute has been recovered. All three para-
chutes were damage-charted and found to be in excellent condition.
There were no apparent deleterious effects resulting from exposure to
orbital flight conditions. It is planned to conduct laboratory tests
of the parachute materials to confirm these conclusions.

NASA-S-66-205 JAN

• Actual times
[] Nominal times shown

55XI03 _ because of data loss


40 @

_: 25 _ \_R "R section separation ___ _

20 _d: z_?!:
_ parachutedeploy

10 _ _F-/_l_ii'_.'a3_C hute [u' ' ° pen

15 _ M_!z_pa_chuLe line stretch _?

_ Touchdown

0 I I I _ I -,

25:45 25:46 25:47 25:48 25:49 25:50 25:51

Ground elapsed time, hr:min

Figure 5.1.11-1. - Landing system performance.

5.1.12 Postlanding

Proper deployment of the ultrahigh frequency (UNF) descent and re-

covery antennas following repositioning of the spacecraft was indicated
by communications between the crew and recovery forces prior to space-
craft landing. The sea dye marker was automatically dispensed upon land-
ing and could be seen easily by the recovery forces. The recovery
flashing light and recovery hoist loop extended as the main parachute
was jettisoned after touchdown. Satisfactory deployment of all recovery
aids is evidenced in many recovery photographs. In particular, the HI_
antenna was photographed in both the extended and retracted positions.
The operation and effectiveness of these aids are covered in the section
on communications and recovery operations of this report.




The Gemini launch vehicle (GLV) was automatically shut down on the
launch attempt of December 12, 1965, by the Master Operations Control Set
as a result of a premature separation of an electrical umbilical. During
the recycle operations for the actual launch of Gemini VI-A, examination
of the data showed another anomaly, the drop-off of thrust chamber pres-
sure on the number 2 engine subassembly prior to the shutdown signal.
It was hypothesized that this could have been caused by a blocked pro-
pellant line to the gas generator. Disassembly and inspection of the
gas generator revealed that a plastic dust cover had been inadvertently
left in the oxidizer inlet port. This cover caused oxidizer blockage to
the gas generator.

After correction of these two anomalies, the launch of Gemini VI-A

occurred 3 days later on December 15, with no problems. All GLV systems
performed satisfactorily_ and a satisfacotry orbital insertion of the
spacecraft was achieved.

5.2.1 Airframe

Flight loads on the launch vehicle were well within its capability.
Vibration and acceleration environment was less than on previous flights,
particularly longitudinal oscillations, the magnitude of which was the
lowest experienced to date. Longitudinal oscillation (POG0).- Filtered telemetry data

show that the maximum longitudinal oscillaticn at the spacecraft-launch
vehicle interface occurred at L0 + 146.8 seconds and again at
IX) + 153.9 seconds. The amplitude of these oscillations was ±0.115g
with corresponding response frequencies of 13.7 cps and 16.8 cps, respec-
tively, lasting approximately i to 2 seconds in each instance. This is
the lowest POG0 level to date and compares with the previous low of
_0.125g on Gemini III and Gemini VII. Structural loads.- Calculated loads on the launch vehicle

for the Gemini VI-A flight are shown in the following table. These data
indicate that critical loading occurred at station 320 during the pre-
BECO region of flight and reached a value of 83 percent of design ulti-
mate load (IXIL).

Maximtnm qa Pre-BECO
station, in. Load, Design ultimate, Load, Design ultimate,
ib percent ib percent

276 25 250 25 66 845 67

320 138 390 40 287 090 83

935 439 260 61 461 375 64

1188 486 410 72 451 935 67

A comparison of Gemini VI-A flight loads with previous flight loads are
shown in the following table.

Launch vehicle load,

percent of design ultimate load

Flight Station 935 Station 320

(max (pre-BECO)
Gemini I 66 76
Gemini II 64 80

Gemini III 63 78
Gemini IV 68 81

Gemini V 59 79

Gemini VII 58 79

Gemini VI-A 61 83

Lateral oscillations associated with the third structural mode of

the launch vehicle were approximately three times greater than those
experienced on any previous flight. The cause of this high level of os-
cillation may have been due to modal cross-coupling of the 16.7 cps
lateral vibration and the inherent longitudinal oscillations (16.8 cps)
occurring 3 seconds prior to BECO. Analysis of the oscillations indi-
cates that the resultant dynamic load is only 5 percent of the vehicle
design ultimate load and consequently is not of great concern. Post-SECO disturbance.- There were four indications of post-

SEC0 disturbances on the low-range axial accelerometer. The times of
occurrence and the acceleration levels are shown in the following table.
The last of the four was also noted on the actuator and rate gyro traces.

Time, sec Magnitude, g

SEC0 + 5.1 0.02

$EC0 + 6.6 0.02

SEC0 + 17.5 0. i0
SEC0 + 28.0 a 0. I0

aspacecraft separation was at SECO + 22.2 sec.

5.2.2 Propulsion Launch attempt analysis.- Following the launch attempt_

a review of propulsion system performance revealed that all major pro-
pulsion system parameters on subassembly 2 were decaying prior to the
engine shutdown signal (87FS2). A detailed review of all available data
showed that the start transients of both subassemblies were nominal until
approximately 1.0 second after the engine ignition signal (87FSI). At
this time, chamber pressure (Pc) , fuel and oxidizer discharge pressures

f- (Pfd and Pod), and turbine speed (Nt) on subassembly 2 started to decay,
while the corresponding parameters on subassembly i were still showing
normal trends. It was also noted that the slope of the chamber pressure
decay on subassembly 2 was not perceptibly affected by the closure of the
thrust chamber valves, indicating that the decay resulted from a loss of
power or power absorption within the gas generator or turbopump assem-
blies. Figure 5.2-1 compares the principal subassembly 2 parameters with
a normal transition from step pressure to steady state. Also noted in
figure 5.2-1 are the engine ignition and shutdown tinles, and the sub-
assembly 2malfunction detection thrust chamber pressure switch (MDTCPS)
times of break and_ake. It should be noted that the MDTCPS break
occurred before the thrust chamber valve motion could affect chamber
pressure, indicating that the switch break was due to the anomalous Pc

decay rather than the engine shutdown transient. No thrust chamber pres-
sure switch actuation signal was received as the subassembly 2 chamber
pressure never exceeded the tested actuation pressure.

A detailed engine system review for causes of the loss in thrust

indicated three principal possibilities:

(a) Fuel or oxidizer leak most probably in the bootstrap system.

(b) Mechanical failure or drag within the turbine kit or gearbox


(c) Contaminated or partially blocked gas generator system.

A careful review of all films of engine compartment showed no fires_

vapor clouds, or spillages that would indicate the presence of a leak_
while a gearbox torque check_ conducted through the turbine_ showed nor-
mal torque values.

The elimination of the first two possibilities caused the investiga-

tion to be concentrated on the gas generator system. The subassembly .2
gas generator system was then disassembled and inspected. During the
inspection of the gas generator oxidizer injector/check-valve area_ a
plastic dust cover was found partially blocking the oxidizer injector.
Figure 5.2-2 is a sketch of the _ist cover in the injector. This dust
cover was sufficient to block oxidizer flow to the gas generator. The
stage I engine on this vehicle as well as the stage I engines on GLV-5
and GLV-7 were the subjects of an Engineering Test Directive (ETD) that
called for inspection of the gas generator oxidizer system for possible
contamination by thread lubricants. This ETD was performed at Cape
Kennedy on GLV-5 and at the contractor's plant on GLV-6 and GLV-7. It
was during the performance of this ETD that the dust cover_ used to pro-
tect the gas generator oxidizer injector during check valve cleaning_
was inadvertently left in the system.

Dust ca_.- A standard practice instruction and an ETD, "Use and

selection of caps_ plugs_ or other protective devices"_ has been issued
to all contractor personnel eliminating the use of closures that can be
inadvertently left in place during assembly. Further_ an accounting
system has been incorporated to record all foreign objects intentionally
placed in any system and provide a means to account for the removal of
each object.

Additional motivation and training of contractor personnel at

Saeramento_ Baltimore, and Eastern Test Range was instituted in Janu-
ary 1966 to familiarize personnel with the dust cap incident and related
human error problems.

Other than the special tests and inspections resulting from the
subassembly 2 anomaly_ only normal work necessary after a launch attempt
was conducted as follows:

(a) Drain and water-flush ermine

(b) Turbopump seal cavity drain and purge

(c) Gearbox torque checks

(d) Drain_ flush, and refill gearbox with lubricating oil

(e) Engine leak checks

Replacements after the launch attempt were limited to the hot gas cooler
and superheater_ these parts were replaced because of the special post-
test cleaning procedures and not because Of component malfunction. Flight performance.- Performance of the propulsion system

during flight was satisfactory. A comparison of preflight predicted with
postflight reconstructed engine perfor_ance_ shown in tables 5.2-I and
5.2-II_ indicates good agreement between predicted and actual perform-
ance. Stage I performance: Start transients of both sub-

assemblies displayed no anomalies and were in the range of OLV and
Titan II experience. Engine performance during steady-state thrust was
normal and close to predicted as shown in table 5.2-1. Engine shutdown
was initiated by oxidizer exhaustion with approximately 866 pounds of
usable fuel remaining. Stage II performance: Performance of the stage II pro-

pulsion system was close to that predicted. No anomalies were noted
during ignition_ steady-state thrust_ or shutdown. Shutdown was initi-
ated by radio guidance system command and had a transient total impulse
of 35 770 pound-seconds compared to a total impulse of
37 i00 ± 7000 pound-seconds. Propellant loading and autogenous system performance.-

The following tables provide data on loaded propellant weight and average
propellant temperature during flight. Both tables show good agreement
between preflight and postflight values.

Propellant Loading

Component Stage I loading, ib Stage II loading_ Ib

Requested Actual Requested Actual

Fuel 90 374 90 543 21 992 21 993

Oxidizer 172 789 172 907 38 _i 38 227

Average Propellant Temperature

Stage I temperature s Stage II temperature s

oF oF
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual

Fuel 40.1 41.1 38.5 41.8

Oxidizer 41.1 42.0 43. 3 44.1 Performance margin.- Real-time calculations performed dur-

ing the countdown predicted that the vehicle - 3o payload capability
would exceed the spacecraft weight by 275 pounds. Postflight recon-
structed vehicle performance showed that the payload capability achieved
was 8642 pounds which is 66 pounds less than the preflight predicted
nominal capability of 8708 pounds.

5.2.3 Flight Control _

During the Gemini VI-A launch attempt_ a premature release of one

electrical umbilical connector at 1.079 seconds after ignition
(T-0 + 1.079 sec) led to an automatic shutdown. The flight-controls
programmer normally receives a start signal at release of either of two
lift-off connectors which de-energizes two initiate relays. The Flight
Control System Test Set monitors four programmer-reSet-monitor outputs
and combines them into one hold-fire/shut-down circuit in the Master
Operation Control Set (MOCS). The programmer includes a series of
single-shot multivibrator circuits which must be in the "reset" position
until shutdown lockout occurs. The triggering of any of these multi-
vibrator circuits will send a signal to the flight control system test
set indicating a not-reset condition. The premature release of the lift-
off connector started the programmer which triggered a not-reset signal
to the MOCS_ automatically shutting the engine down. Further details
are included in section _.2.6. A thorough review of all flight-control
data taken during this launch-attempt countdown_ ignition_ and ensuing
shutdown revealed normal responses to all events and the system was de-
clared ready for a second attempt.

The analysis of the Gemini VI-A flight-control performance shows

satisfactory primary and secondary system operation from lift-off to
spacecraft separation. The flight was accomplished with primary guid-
ance_ however_ the spacecraft inertial guidance compared favorably with

the primary launch vehicle guidance during both stage I and stage II and
switchover could have been successfully accomplished at any time during
powered flight. Stage I.- Ignition and lift-off transients were normal.

The peak actuator travel and rate gyro disturbances recorded during the
ignition and holddown period are listed in table 5.2-111. The combina-
tion of thrust misa!igmment and engine misalignment at full thrust ini-
tiated a small roll transient at lift-off. The flight control system
responded satisfactorily to correct the roll transient_ limiting the
roll rate to a maximum of 1.8 deg/sec clockwise at 0.14 second after
lift-off. The roll and pitch programs were performed as planned and were
nominal in rate and duration. Stage I flight experienced the normal
aerodynamic disturbances. The flight control system responded satis-
factorily to these disturbances and to the roll and pitch programs.

The dispersions during stage I between the primary and secondary

guidance steering commands are discussed in section 5.1-5. The magnitudes
of these dispersions were well within the primary flight control system
accuracies. Stage II separation.- Separation at staging was accom-

. plished satisfactorily. Thrust vector control was attained as soon as
the stage II hydraulic system pressurized. The maximum attitude errors
recorded during staging were as follows:

Axis Attitude errors_ deg Time from lift-off_ sec

Pitch - 0.21 158.5

Yaw + 2.76 159.7

Roll - 1.57 158.4

The maximum vehicle rates recorded were as follows:

Axis Rates_ deg/sec Time from lift-off_ sec

Pitch + 2.36 157.9

- 2.25 157.91

Yaw + 2.62 158.76

1.52 157.89

Roll + 0.70 158.67

- 3.67 157.90

-84 CONFIDENTIAL Response to radio guidance commands.- Radio guidance was
initiated at L0 + 161.64 seconds. Response to the first pitch command
was at L0 + 168.33 seconds and consisted of a small pitch com_nd fol-
lowed by 0.55 deg/sec pitch down for 1.05 second. After the first
24.2 seconds of pitch guidance, the subsequent pitch commands were less
than 0.25 deg/sec.

The response to the first yaw command was at 169.23 seconds and con-
sisted of a yaw right command of 0.25 deg/sec. After the first 31.5 sec-
onds of yaw guidance, the yaw commands transmitted were less than
0.06 deg/sec. The rate gyro signals substantiated the correct response
to the guidance commands. Post-SECO and separation phase.- Vehicle rates between

SEC0 and separation were normal. The maximum rates for the period be-
tween SEC0 and separation are listed in table 5.2-IV. Successful space-
craft separation was accomplished at SEC0 + 22.27 seconds.

5.2.4 Hydraulic System

Performance of the hydraulic system was satisfactory. Prior to

lift-off, an apparent anomaly occurred in the hydraulic system, but the
situation was correctly diagnosed and the launch proceeded on schedule.
The anomaly was a false indication from the actuator position transducer
that the no. 4 pitch, stage I (41) actuator had drifted to +i.0 °
20.8 seconds before lift-off. However, the holdfire circuit which moni-
tors the actuator position switch to within ±0.25 ° did not indicate an
off-null condition. Also, the shutdown circuit which monitors both
position transducer and position switches in series did not receive an
off-null indication. The launch personnel assessed the indications and
were certain that the actuator was operating normally and proceeded with
the launch.

Preliminary investigation indicates a failure of the 41 actuator

position transducer and further investigation will attempt to determine
the specific mode of failure.

5.2.5 @_idance System

Performance of the stage I and stage II guidance systems was satis-

factory throughout powered flight and resulted in placing the space-
craft 6 in an acceptable orbit for rendezvous with spacecraft 7.

5.2._.i Programed guidance.- The programed guidance was within

acceptable limits, as shown in table 5.2-V. As discussed in section 4,

a nominal trajectory was flown. The errors at BEC0 were 26 ft/sec low
in velocity, 3299.0 feet low in altitude, and 0.39 ° low in flight-path
angle. Radio guidance.- The guidance system acquired the pulse

beacon of the launch vehicle, tracked in the monopulse automatic mode,
and was locked-on continuously from lift-off to 43.5 seconds after SECO.
At this time, there was a 27.5-second period of intermittent lock until
final loss of signal at 71.0 seconds after SEC0. Track was maintained
to an elevation angle of 1.5 ° above the horizon. The average received
signal strength at the central station during stage II operation was
satisfactory. Rate lock was continuous, from LO + 42.6 seconds to
L0 + 383.1 seconds (44.4 seconds after SEC0). Rate lock was maintained
to an elevation angle of 2.0 ° above the horizon.

Pitch steering commands were issued, as planned, by the airborne

decoder at L0 + 168.21 seconds. At this time, an initial i0 percent
pitch-down steering command (0.2 deg/sec) was given for 0.5 second, fol-
lowed by a 28 percent pitch-down steering command (0.55 deg/sec) for
1.05 seconds. The small pitch steering at guidance initiate was indica-
tive of a very nominal first stage trajectory. The steering gradually
returned 1.05 seconds later to relatively small and slow varying pitch
f- commands of 0.2 to 0.3 deg/sec. This produced negative pitch rates
until L0 + 250 seconds. At this time_ because of noisy tracking data,
the rates became oscillatory. This particular phenomenon is character-
istic of atmospheric conditions for this time of year. As a result,
the commands varied between 0.09 to 0.24 deg/sec (pitch down) until
2.5 seconds before SEC0. Yaw steering started at L0 + 169.23 seconds.
The commands, because of the dog-leg trajectory flown during the second
stage powered flight_ were of larger magnitude than those experienced
on previous Gemini flights. The purpose of the dog-leg trajectory,
executed on this flight for the first time, is to remove the out-of-
plane position error (wedge angle) that exists between the orbiting
target vehicle and the GLV at lift-off. This was accomplished by use
of a prelaunch targeting procedure which used the target vehicle's real-
time ephemeris data to compute the proper biased launch azimuth. The
targeting procedure will correct out-of-plane errors up to a wedge angle
of 0.55°_ beyond which the GLV performance is a constraint. As a result
of these procedures, yaw right commands of 12.5 percent (0.25 deg/sec)
were sent for a duration of approximately i0 seconds. The steering
gradually returned, 31.5 seconds later, to yaw right commands of less
than 0.06 deg/sec for the duration of the flight (SECO - 2.5 seconds).

SEC0 occurred at L0 + 338.737 seconds at an elevation angle of

6.89 ° above the horizon. The SECO + 20 second conditions were well
within 3a limits. Table 5.2-V shows a comparison of the actual values
with the planned values. Because the shutdown thrust transient was


nominal, the SECO + 20 second errors were attributable to shutdown timing

at SECO. TARS gyro drifts, wind_ b roll engine misalignment_ and noise
and biases in the guidance data. The y_w position and velocity errors
resulted in a 32 ft/sec out-of-plane maneuver during the second orbit
(see section 4.0). Although the errors were within tolerance, studies
were initiated to minimize the errors in future flights. At the end of
tailoff (SECO + 20 sec), vehicle rates were 0.i0 deg/sec pitch down,
0.49 deg/sec yaw right, and 0.39 deg/sec roll clockwise.

The computing system, in conjunction with the RGS ground and air-
borne systems_ completed all prelaunch and launch operations in a normal
and satisfactory manner. The prelaunch transmission and verification
of the targeting ephemeris data, between the real-time computing complex
at Houston and the RGS computing system_ were also satisfactory. The
spacecraft inertial guidance system ascent updates from the ground-based
guidance computer were transmitted to the spacecraft digital command re-
ceiver and verified by the buffer (see section 5.1.5).

5.2.6 Electrical System

The scheduled launch of Gemini VI-A on December 12, was terminated

at 87FSI + 1.165 seconds by a engine shutdown command generated by the
Master Operations Control Set (MOCS). The command was the result of the
premature separation of electrical umbilical connector 3DIM (see sec-
tion 5.2.3 for details of this anomaly).

In a normal launch sequence_ the shutdown capabilities are time-

controlled by the actuation of the stage I engine thrust chamber pressure
switches (TCPS). The allotted time is programmed to be TCPS "make" plus
1.8 second and in a normal launch this connector is the first umbilical
to separate. Upon separation of this umbilical, the spacecraft event
timer starts which is the flight crew's indication of lift-off. The
resultant impact of the shutdown on other launch vehicle subsystems is
discussed in their respective sections. As an added measure of confi-
dence the mechanical connection of both electrical plugs, 3DiM and 3D2M,
was augmented by the use of break-a-way wire. This increased the pull
away (separation) load from a minimum value of 6 pounds tension to a
minimum value of 25 pounds. In addition_ the connectors were marked with
a paint stripe to provide a visual reference of the mated and locked con-
dition, and the aerodynamic fairing which covers the connectors was modi-
fied to facilitate visual inspection of the mated connectors. This
remedial action will also be applied to all subsequent vehicles.

Figure 5.2-3 shows the safety-wired umbilical installation.

The operation of the Gemini VI-A electrical system was satisfactory
throughout the powered flight. Voltage and current levels were nominal
on both the instrumentation power supply (IPS) and the auxiliary power

5.2.7 Instrumentation System Ground.- All measurements programmed for use on the launch

attempt performed satisfactorily throughout the countdown as well as the
shutdown phase.

On the actual launch, there were 133 measurements programmed for use
on the ground system.

At T - 20.8 seconds, the travel (measurement 0153) of actuator no. 4

(pitch, stage I) displayed a sharp positive offset equivalent to an
engine gimbal of 1.8 ° . This anomaly remained in existence until engine
ignition when it returned to a position equivalent to null. This mal-
function is under investigation.

Data recovery was lO0 percent. The umbilical release sequence was
as planned and was complete in 0.13 second. Airborne.- For both the launch attempt and launch, 191 meas-
urements were scheduled for use. During flight, there were no data
anomalies or unexpected data loss. The expected data loss at staging
lasted 300 miliseconds.

Review of signal strength records revealed a signal attenuation of

the telemetry frequency (244.3 mc) at LO + 289.3 seconds for a period of
2.5 seconds. It is important to note that no loss of data was experienced
during this period. This same anomaly occurred on Gemini VII, earlier
in stage II flight, and is under investigation.

5.2.8 Malfunction Detection System

Performance of the malfunction detection system (MDS) during pre-

flight checkout, launch attempt, and flight was satisfactory. MDS oper-
ation during the attempted launch is discussed in section, and
during the actual launch in section MDS parameters are shown in
table 5.2-VI.

5-88 UNCLASSIFIED MDS operation during launch attempt.- Engine RIDS: The _DTCPS actuation times and pressures

were as follows:

Actuation time from

Switch Condition engine ignition
signal, psia

Subassembly i
MDTCPS Make +.930 600
Break +1.483 545

Subassembly 2
MDTCPS Make +1.020 580
Break +1.180 550

All switches operated within an acceptable range of pressures. It is

interesting to note that the subassembly 2 switch made late and dropped
out early when compared to the s_assembly i switch. Operation of the
switches with respect to other events is shown in figure 5.2-4. Tank pressure indication: Tank pressure indications

were correct for the launch attempt and were close to nominal. Spacecraft MDS displays: The spacecraft MDS display

panel is shown in figure 3.1-i0. The left hand "Engine I" telelite did
not flicker noticeably during the launch attempt. This was because the
incandescent lamp filament did not respond to the 0.16-second power
interruption provided by the subassembly number 2 MDTCPS's. The right
hand "Engine I" telelite did extinguish and relight in response to the
0.55-second power interruption provided by the subassembly number i
MDTCPS's. The event timer start coincided with the flicker of the sub-
assembly number i "Engine I" telelite.

The "secondary guidance" telelite came on about 41 seconds after

the engine start as a result of a switchover (SWO) command. The switch-
over command was generated by the hardover contact on the subassembly i
pitch actuator. Hydraulic pressure was zero at that time; the engine
bells normally drift to hardover position with no hydraulic pressure.
All other MDS displays remained static during the launch attempt. Gemini VI-A launch°- All MDS hardware functioned satisfac-

torily during the prelaunch and launch of Gemini VI-A.

UNCLASSIFIED -89 Engine MDS: The MDTCPS and MDFJPS switch actuations
were as follows:

Actuation time
Switch Condition from lift-off_ Pressure_
sec psia

Subassembly i
MDTCPS Make -2.379 585
Break +157.115 550

Subassembly 2
MDTCPS Make -2.359 575
Break +157.117 530

Subassembly 3
MDJFPS Make +157.899 N/A
Break +338.877 N/A

F Prelaunch malfunction detection system: Review of the

GLV-7 data indicate that a potential problem in time-to-make of the
0PPS (oxidizer pressurant pressure switch) existed which could result
in an unnecessary engine shutdown during the holddown monitoring period.
In an effort to decrease the time-to-make of this switch on GLV-6, the
oxidizer pressurant back pressure orifice was reduced in size from
0.50 in. to 0.46 in. diameter. The results of this change are included
in the following table:

Average Gemini (GLV 2, GLV-6

3, 4, 5, and 7)

0PPS actuation time 87FS I + 1.76 sec 87FS I + 1.58 sec

0PPS actuation pressure 410 424

PoP0i a at 87FS I + 2.2 sec 442 520

(a) Oxidizer pressurant orifice inlet pressure

5-9o UNCLASSIFIED Airframe MDS: The MDS rate switch package performed
properly throughout the flight. No vehicle over-rates occurred from
lift-off through spacecraft separation. Tank pressure indicators: All tank pressure indicators

performed properly. A and B sensors agreed within specification values
throughout powered flight.

5.2. 9 [Range Safety

The performance of all range safety and ordnance items was satis-
factory during both the launch attempt on December 12_ and the launch
on December 15. Flight termination system.- Both command receivers dis-

played adequate received signal strength for proper operation throughout
powered flight and beyond spacecraft separation.

The following table shows the command facilities used during the

Time_ sec Facility used

L0 to L0 + 66 Cape 600-W transmitter and single-helix


LO + 66 to LO + i19 Cape lO-kW transmitter and quad-helix antenna

LO + 119 to L0 + 162 Grand Bahama Island 10-kW transmitter and

steerable antenna

L0 + 162 to L0 + 364 Grand Turk Island lO-kW transmitter and

steerable antenna

L0 + 364 to L0 + 380 Grand [Bahama Island lO-kW transmitter and

steerable antenna

LO + 380 to LO + 640 Grand Turk Island 10-kW transmitter and

steerable antenna Range safety tracking system.- Missile trajectory measure-

ment (MISTRAM) system I was used as the primary source for impact pre-
diction and provided accurate information through insertion. Several
short unlocks occurred at 62 and 83 seconds after lift-off_ but did not
interfere with use of the data.

5.2.9. 3 Ordnance.- The performance of all ordnance items was satis-

factory. Following the launch attempt_ the test conductor immediately

returned the airborne ordnance safety switch (0SS) to safe. Vehicle
inspection revealed that no ordnance devices had fired subsequent to the
OSS safe. Range safety gave permission to safe destruct initiators
33 seconds after engine shutdown and all destruct initiators safed prop-
erly. Ordnance operation during the Gemini VI-A launch was normal.

5.2.10 Prelaunch Operations Launch attempt.- Propellant loading was accomplished in

3 hours i0 minutes_ the best loading time of any Gemini countdown.
There were no problems encountered throughout the countdown and the pre-
planned "hold" at T - 3 minutes was reached without incident. The launch
was terminated at 9:54 a.m.e.s.t. (engine ignition 87FS I + 1.165 sec)
because of the premature separation of electrical umbilical connector
3DIM. After engine shutdown_ response to the test conductor was as

Function Requested_ sec Verified_ sec
time_ sec

Reset ordnance safety

switch 3 8 5

Reset staging command

lockout switch 5 8 3

Vent all tanks to blanket

pressure 9 12 3

Safe destruct initiators 33 33 negligible

Return to ground power 75 75 negligible

The TARS programmer could not be reset with the 3DiMumbilical plug
disconnected. Because the vehicle was safed_ the programmer was per-
mitted to run until photographic evidence of the plug disconnection had
been obtained. The plug was then reconnected and the programmer reset.

Erector raising was delayed to allow sufficient time to extinguish

incipient fuel fires and to execute Test Conductor's Training Procedure
for Emergency Conditions 183/ETR (TP-183). The erector was raised at
11:28 a.m.e.s.t, and the crew was removed at 11:33 a.m.e.s.t. Required
activity of TP-183 is being investigated to determine whether similar
time delays can be reduced in the event of future shutdowns.

-92 UNCLASSIFIED Recycle.- The recycle of the launch vehicle consisted of
purging the propellant tanks_ replacement of stage I subassembly engine
number two gas generator s and engine ordnance devices. Also included
was the installation of break-wire on the two umbilical connectors
(3DIM and 3D2M). The gas generator replacement was the result of the
incident described in section 5.2.2. Launch.- The propellant loading was complete in 3 hours

and 21 minutes. Because of the engine prevalve remaining in an open
position during the recycle time_ a weight correction had to be applied
to the propellant loaded on board at the "high-light" verification.

The split count (T - 240 minutes) was initiated at 0912 G.m.t. on

December 15, 1965. During the fuel tank pressurization of stage I_ it
was discovered that a _alve in the propellant pressurization system was
in the wrong position (closed). The opening of this valve corrected the
problem and did not in any way impair the scheduled countdown. At
1309 G.m.t._ the programmed hold (T - 3 min) was reached. The hold
lasted for the predicted 25 minutes and at 1337_ the launch was success-
fully accomplished.



Parameter Preflight Postflight Difference,

prediction reconstruction percent

Thrust , ib ........ 431 317 433 3L7 +0.50

Thrust (flight average),

ib ........... 457 616 454 539 -0.66

Specific impulse a,
ib-sec/ib ........ 259.74 260.28 +0.23

Specific impulse (flight

average), ib-sec/ib . . . 277.15 277.53 +0.15

Engine mixture ratio a • • - 1.9377 1.9596 +1.34

Engine mixture ratio

(flight average) .... 1.9282 1.9414 +0.94

Burn time (87FSI to

87FS2), sec ....... 159.699 160.433 +0.46

asampled at DO + 55 seconds and corrected to standard inlet




Parameter Preflight Postflight Difference,

prediction reconstruction percent

Thrust a'b, ib ....... 102 098 I01 842 -0.25

Thrust (flight average#

Ib ............ 102 801 i01 929 -0.85

Specific impulse a'b,

ib-sec/ib ........ 313.44 312.64 -0.26

Specific impulse (flight

average) b, ib-sec/ib . . 313.85 313.03 -0.26

Engine mixture ratio a . . 1.7736 1.7833 +0.55

Engine mixture ratio

flight average ...... 1.7470 1.7584 +0.65

Thrust time, (91FS1 to

91FS2), sec ....... 180.30 181.58 +0.71

asampled at staging plus 55 seconds and corrected to standard

inlet conditions.

bIncludes roll control nozzle thrust.



Maximum d_ring ignition

Actuator Maximum during holddown
Time from null check, in.
designation Travel, in. lift-off, sec

Pitch, II -0.122 -2.26 -0.03

Yaw/roll, 21 +0.209 -2.25 +0.01

Yaw/roll, 31 +0.169 -2.28 -0.01

.f Pitch, 41 (a) - -

Maximum rate stage I gyro, deg/sec

Primary Secondary

Pitch +0.19 +0.21

Yaw -0.21 +0.20

Roll -0.30 -0.31

a41 actuator transient data are not available; detail information

is found in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.10.



Pitch axis Rate, deg/sec

Maximum positive rate at SECO + 2.4 sec 0.59

Maximum negative rate at SECO + 0.09 sec -0.29

Rate at SECO + 20 sec -0.i0

Rate at spacecraft separation (SECO + 22.27 sec) 0.0

Yaw axis

Maximum positive rate at SECO + 12.7 sec 0.59 -

Maximum negative rate at SECO + 8.7 sec -i.ii

Rate at SECO + 20 sec 0.49

Rate at spacecraft separation (SECO + 22.27 sec) 0.49

Roll axis

Maximum positive rate at SECO + 2.3 see 0.49

Maxim_n negative rate at SECO + 5.4 sec -0.39

Rate at SECO + 20 see 0.39

Rate at spacecraft separation (SECO + 22.27 sec) 0.19



Condition at SEC0 + 20 seconds Planned Actual Difference

Time from lift-off, sec ....... 356.63 358.74 +2.11

Altitude, ft ............ 529 218 529 695 +477

Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec .... 25 730 25 718 -12

Space-fixed flight-path
angle, deg ............ 0.00 0.05 +0.05

Yaw velocity, ft/sec ........ a.3. I -7.0 -3.9

Yaw position, ft .......... a-i 613 -26 454 -25 843

aprelaunch targeting errors included.



Switchover Maximum or Time from Minimum or Time from

Parameter setting positive lift-off_ sec negative lift-off, sec

Stage I primary hydraulics Shuttle spring 3280 psi -2.12 2520 psi -2.40
(1500 psia

Stage I secondary hydraulics None 3400 psi -2.64 2320 psi BECO

C Stage I tandem actuators C

No. I subassembly 2 pitch ±4.0 deg +0.70 deg 53-5 -0.70 deg 86.5 Z

No. 2 subassembly 2 yaw/roll ±4.0 deg +i.00 deg 80.0 -0.75 deg 87.5
F-" f'-
No. 3 subassembly i yaw/roll _4.0 deg +0.45 deg 87.5 -1.30 deg 80.0
No. 4 subassembly i pitch _4.0 deg +0.85 deg 91.0 -i.00 deg 53.0

+2.5 deg/sec +0.30 deg/sec 0.3 -1.40 deg/sec 88.0 (_

Stage I pitch rate -3.0 deg/sec
"M "11
_1_ Stage I yaw rate J_-5 deg/sec +0.30 deg/sec 78-5 -1.38 deg/sec 82.5 _1

I ton rate .2odeg/seo +1.80
deg/sec O.2 -1.30
deg/sec 157.1
Stage II pitch rate _10 deg/sec +O.lO deg/sec 165.0 -0.55 deg/sec 170.0

Stage II yaw rate _lO deg/sec +2.50 deg/sec 158.8 -0.60 deg/sec 160.9

Stage II roll rate _20 deg/sec +0.50 deg/sec 158.8 -0.10 deg/sec 338.0

Note: + indicates up - indicates down

right left
clockwise counterclockwise
Thrust chamber >
valve position, percent _,

I I I I I I ,_
Turbine speed, rpm x O.05
•Chamber pressure, fuel and oxidizer pumpdischarge pressure, psia z

_.E E

•Z _ / I// X

_. -_ ,_ i/ _
=-. '_ /i N

E o

" / 4 i
_ /
- . /: / I

66-Y (]31-11££VIDNrl --
NASA-S-66-76 JAN

Plastic dust ca (_

Omniseal groove


pressure tap

Combustion chamber

_ Turbulence ring


Oxidizer inlet

-Fuel inlet

Figure 5.2 .-2. - Stage I gas generator showing location of dust cap.

NASA-S-66-210 JAN

• • ii

Figure 5.2-3. - Umbilical 3D17 installation for final launch.

NASA-S-66-154 JAN
; ro

! SA-1 engineI-telelite Off

I i.._. 7
i ,r
i SA-2 enginel"-telelite i I I
i _ Off

i Event timer ' I I Off
t ' i.".....t
I Running (_
C I SA-1 MDTCPS make+0.962 ,t
, 'l Z
Z i SA-2 MDTCPS make+1.027 ', ,I ',
I, False lift-off + 1. 079
'I _1
II r-"
i ! I i
C.f} I 87FS2 engine shutdown+1.165 :I I JI
i SA2 MDTCPS break +1.197 t I I
r13 i SA1 MDTCPS break +1.482 , r _I r13
I Actual I_
i .................. Planned
I, 87FS1 engine start

'1 I I I I
,_ [I I i
-0.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Time from ignition, sec

Figure 5.2-4. - MDS parametertimeline.


The various aspects of the spacecraft-launch vehicle interface, as

defined in Interface Specification and Control Document No. i, performed
within specification limits. The performance of the electrical and
mechanical interfacing systems was derived from the overall performance
of the launch vehicle and the spacecraft as determined from instrumenta-
tion and crew observation.

The electrical circuitry performed as expected in all respects.

The malfunction detection system and the spacecraft inertial guidance
system steering signals to the launch vehicle remained passive.






The Gemini VI-A mission was controlled from the Mission Control
Center in Houston (MCC-H) using three shifts of flight controllers each
day. This section of the report is based on real-time observations,
and may disagree with some of the detailed evaluations in other report
sections that were made from analyses of the postflight data.

6.1.1 Premission Operations Premission activities.- The premission activities for

Gemini VI-A differed from previous missions in that spacecraft 7 was
flying during the launch pad test for Gemini VI-A and, therefore, not
all activities were supported by the MCC-H. The MCC-H supported approx-
imately 4 hours of the simulated flight, the midcount, and the terminal
count. Two days of network simulations and i day of launch abort and
reentry simulations were conducted. Also 2 days of network simulations
were conducted assuming that Gemini VII was in orbit and Gemini VI-A
was on the launch pad and the countdown was in progress. The network
/ simulations are carried to rendezvous, Documentation.- The documentation for the mission was good

and very few changes were necessary.

6.1.1. 3 MCC/network flight control operations.- The normal oper-

ations of checking out the network were not performed because the net-
work was in continuous operation supporting Gemini VII. It was necessary
to reconfigure the remote sites and the MCC-H, however, when changing
from Gemini VII support to Gemini VI-A support. The remote sites had
to change remote site data processor (RSDP) programs and telemetry sta-
tion patch boards. The MCC-H had to change computer programs. When
in the Gemini VI-A configuration, the remote sites could look at data
from Gemini VI-A and Gemini VII_ but only the Gemini VI-A data entered
in the RSDP. The Gemini VI-A data cov_d be called out of the RSDP and
automatically sent to the MCC-H to update the computer-generated dis-
plays. The Gemini VII data were recorded during real time and played
into the RSDP after the Gemini VII RSDP program had been loaded. The
systems monitors at the remote sites could then call the data from the
RSDP in the form of teletype printouts in engineering units. A teletype
punch tape was obtained with the printout, and the data were then sent
to the MCC-H. Conversely, when in the Gemini VII configuration, that
data were handled automatically and the Gemini VI-A data were handled

6. i. 1.4 Countdown.- The countdown was completely nominal.

6.1.2 Mission Operations Summary Powered flight.- At approximately 22 seconds prior to

lift-off, measurement 0153 (pitch actuator, engine number i) drifted
off null. This was traced to a telemetry sensor on the Gemini launch
vehicle (GLV). It apparently corrected itself at engine start because
of the shock or for some other reason, and it functioned normally through

The powered flight trajectory was very near nominal. The velocity
at second stage engine cutoff (SECO) +20 seconds was approximately 14 ft/
sec low, and there was a slight northerly deviation of the ground track.
At insertion, the flight-path angle was +0.08 ° and the wedge angle was
0.08 ° north. Orbital.- Following insertion and the Bermuda low-speed

radar differential correction, a docking initiate plan (DKI) for M=4 was
generated. This mission plan was then transferred to the summary maneu-
ver table (SMT). The SMT yielded the following set of maneuvers for

Maneuver Ground elapsed

hr:min: sec time AV, ft/sec Direction

NH (Height adjust) 1:34:04 13.0 In-plane, posigrade

NCL (Phase adjust) 2:18:03 58.0 In-plane, posigrade

Npc (Plane change) 2:41:11 31.4 Cross-plane, right

SR (coelliptic) 3:47:35 46.0 In-plane, posigrade

TPI (Terminal phase 5:16:28 33.7 Pitch up 35 °,

initiate) posigrade

TPF (Terminal phase 5:48:36 42.6 Pitch down 58°_

final) posigrade

Subsequent tracking data confirmed the Bermuda solution. The SMT yielded
the following set of maneuvers for rendezvous:

Maneuver Ground elapsed

hr:min:sec time AV, ft/sec Direction

NH (Height adjust) 1:34:02 14.0 In-plane, posigrade

NCL (Phase adjust) 2:18:00 60.8 In-plane, posigrade

NpC (Plane adjust) 2:42:07 31.7 Cross-plane, right

NH (Height adjust) 3:03:19 0.8 In-plane, posigrade

NSR 3:47:37 42.9 In-plane, posigrade

_PI 5:18:39 33.7 Yaw left 2.8 °,

pitch up 26.5 °,

I_F 5:50:47 42.3 Yaw right 179.6 °,

f pitch up 58 °,

The additional height adjust was scheduled by the rendezvous logic

as a result of tracking data following the phasing maneuver.

The only anomaly noted during the midcourse phase of the rendezvous
concerned terminal phase initiation time. Tracking data subsequent to
the coelliptic (NsR) maneuver indicated that the terminal phase initiate
(TPI) would be delayed approximately 2 minutes. The rendezvous solution
was converging and very close to the pre-lift-off time of the TPI prior
to and immediately after the NSR maneuver. Phasing is insensitive to
execution of the NSR which establishes a coelliptic orbit. The reason
for the 2-minute change is not known at this time_ but the anomaly is
currently being investigated. It should be noted that this anomaly
caused no concern during the mission, because the dispersion of TPI was
we!lwithin the desired tolerance of 18 minutes.

Spacecraft 6 stayed in formation with spacecraft 7 for one revolution

longer than planned, and therefore, the separation maneuver and the posi-
grade maneuver were performed later than planned. Thus, the retrorocket
firing times required updating for revolutions 7 through 12. At this
time, the real-time computer complex (RTCC) was configured for support.


of spacecraft 7which made it impossible to have the correct times run

to update as planned. This resULted in flying revolutions 7 and 8
without an updated retrofire time. The times were run in an off-line
computer in the RTCC and passed to the crew over Canton during the
latter portion of revolution 8.

In order for the ground to gage orbital attitude and maneuver sys-
tem (OAMS) propellant remaining accurately, it is necessary to determine
the duration of maneuver thrusts. This has been done in the past by
manually evaluating the dump data at the remote sites. For this mission,
a change was made to the RSDP program to evaluate the dump data auto-
matically and print out the total thrust time. This evaluation was also
made manually and in some instances did not agree with the RSDP data.
The problem is thought to be in the method used to disregard thrust indi-
cations during periods of telemetry loss-of-sync and should be corrected
prior to the Gemini VIII mission. For a more detailed explanation of
this problem refer to reference ]-3.

At 25 minutes g.e.t._ between Kano and Tananarive on revolution i,

there was a malfunction in the reentry vehicle low-level multiplexer.
The reference voltage on group LR-I (parameter MA21) went to full scale.
The following telemetry parameters were affected: cabin air temperature
(CB02), left suit temperature (CC03), right suit temperature (CC04), and
radar range rate (JA04). After retrofire, the Hawaii data indicated that
the problem with group LR-I had resolved itself because all the affected
parameters were giving a nominal indication as far as could be determined.

The telemetry tape recorder failed at the end of the tape dump per-
formed over Cape Kennedy at the end of revolution 13. The dump was
normal in all respects_ but the tape recorder would not start recording
following the dump. The dump ended at 20:_5:30 g.e.t. The failure was
confirmed by the absence of the tape-motion indication and no modulation
on subsequent dump attempts. All attempts to restart the record cycle
including use of real-time commands_ time-of-retrorocket firing con_uands
and onboard crew actions were unsuccessful. Reentry.- From a guidance and trajectory standpoint, re-

entry was nominal. Retrofire occurred on time at 25:15:58 g.e.t. The
crew flew a manual closed-loop reentry with an indicated landing point
approximately 12 nautical miles from the prime recovery ship. A solution
for backup guidance parameters was obtained from the incremental velocity
indicator (IVI) readouts_ Hawaii_ California, and White Sands tracking
data. The White Sands solution was passed to the crew.

The command pilot redefined the electrical null on the downrange

error needle by marking the downrange needle null position with a pen on
the face of his display. He did this between retrofire and guidance

initiate_ and then flew do_m-range error with respect to the new null
which was approximately 2 !/2 needle widths from the original null.

The crew reported umusually long delays between the first, second,
and third retroroeket firings. The manual time-to-retrofire (TR) button
was held in at about the time of the third retrorocket firing and the
fourth rocket fired with what the crew t_ought was a correct delay.
Analysis of this problem was incomplete because the onboard tape re-
corder had failed and retrofire was not over a remote site.




The network was placed on mission status for the Gemini VII and
Gemini VI-A missions on November 22, 1965, and was ready to support the
mission at lift-off on December 15, 1966.

6.2.1 Mission Control Center, Houston and Remote Facilities

The network configuration and the general support required at each

station are indicated in table 6.2-I. Figure 4.3-i(a) shows the world-
wide network stations. In addition, approximately 15 aircraft provided
supplementary photographic, weather, telemetry, and voice relay support
in the launch and reentry areas. North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD) Space Acquisition Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) radars
provided tracking of the Gemini launch vehicle and the spacecraft.

6.2.2 Network Facilities

Performance of the network is reported on a negative basis by

system. All performance not detailed in this report was satisfactory. Remote sites.- Telemetry: The performance of the network telemetry

system was very good. Radar: A majority of the network radars were scheduled

to track spacecraft 6 while in orbit. During revolution 4, the Ascension
(ASC) station and the Range Tracker (RTK) were assigned to spacecraft 7;
all other sites were assigned to spacecraft 6. Radar tracking was ex-
cellent during the entire portion of the dual mission.

6.2.2. i. 3 Acquisition aids and timing: Timing was good for the
entire Gemini VI-Amission. The tracking quality of ship board acqui-
sition aids was satisfactory throughout the entire mission. Command: No significant problems occurred. Computing.- Real-Time Control Center (RTCC) Houston: In general, the

RTCC support of the Gemini VI-A mission was accomplished without inci-

During the Gemini VI-A mission, the RTCC was able to accomplish
15 reconfigurations and each was within the anticipated lO-minute to
15-minute time period. Coordination and interface with the network
during reconfiguration were very good. These reconfigurations were
necessary to receive and display information from a particular space-
craft at a particular time, and in some cases from both spacecraft si-
multaneously during the mission. Remote site data processors (RSDP): The RSDP's performed

without any significant problems during the Gemini VI-A mission.

6.2.2. 3 Communications.- Ground co_aunications: Ground communications were gen-

erally good for the Gemini VI-A mission. The communications to Canary
Island were interrupted by more outages than expected, but contact with
Tananarive was much improved over past missions. Frequency interference: One case of interference was

reported. It occurred during the first Gemini VI-A launch attempt and
caused interference on 15.016 Mc/sec. All stations with direction finder
(DF) capability were contacted, and DF information indicated the inter-
fering signal was originating in the Cape Kennedy vicinity. The signal
disappeared shortly after the launch attempt was postponed. Cause of
the interference was undetermined.


4o _ _ _

4o @

+_ .,_ ,_ _o
o .,-_¢
_ o c o o

_a_ _o_ _o o o _ _ _ _
MCC-H X X X (_ X X X X X X





_._ TAN X X X X X




TEX X X X X [] X X X X X X X []





RffK X X X X


- Master DCS _- TEX will supply backup capability to MCC-H remoting

Ship positions: CSQ - LTS°E 20°N; RKV - 39°W 19°S; R_ - 175°W 25°N




6.3.1 Recovery Force Deployment

The four categories of planned landing areas designated for the

Gemini VI-A mission were:

(a) Primary landing area (supported by an aircraft carrier and

located in the West Atlantic zone)

(b) Secondary landing areas (East Atlantic, West Pacific, Mid-

Pacific and areas within the West Atlantic zone not supported by the
aircraft carrier)

(c) Launch site landing area

(d) Launch abort landing areas

Data concerning the deployment of ships and aircraft in planned

landing areas are provided in table 6.3-I. Figure 6.3-1 shows the
deployment of ships and aircraft in the launch abort landing areas.
f The four worldwide landing zones are illustrated in figure 6.3-2 , and
the ship support provided for each of the numbered landing areas is
listed in table 6.3-I.

The recovery forces were assigned positions in these areas so

that any point in a particular area could be reached within a speci-
fied access time. The ship and aircraft access times, which varied
for the different areas, were based upon the probability of the space-
craft landing within a given area and the amount of recovery support
in that area.

Ten ships (including'l mine sweeper), 31 fixed-wing aircraft, six

helicopters, and various special vehicles weTe positioned for support
of the four categories of planned landing areas. _¢enty-six of the
aircraft_ with y_rarescue teams aboard, were deployed around the world
on strip alert. These aircraft were at the locations shown in fig-
ure 6.3-2 to provide contingency recovery support and support in the
zones described in the preceding paragraphs.

The normal contingent of Department of Defense (DOD) ships and

aircraft were used for recovery support. Special equipment, such as
retrieval cranes, airborne ultrahigh frequency (UHF) electronic re-
ceivers (homing systems), spacecraft flotation collars, and swimmer
interphones, were furnished to the DOD by NASA. All aircraft providing

contingency and secondary landing-area support carried pararescue teams
ready to drop to the spacecraft_ install a spacecraft flotation collar,
and provide assistance to the flight crew. Twin-turbine helicopters
(type SH-3A)_ launched from the carrier, provided location support and
were used to transport swin_ner teams, flotation collars_ and photogra-
phers to the landing point. Fixed-wing aircraft from the carrier were
utilized to relay con_munications and to transport the on-scene commander
to the landing point.

6.3.2 Location and Retrieval

The MCC-Recovery Control Center informed all recovery forces of

flight progress throughout the mission. As the orbital ground tracks
shifted during the mission, possible landing points were passed to all
forces, and the positions of the recovery ships and aircraft were
altered accordingly.

On December 16, 1965, at 25:16 g.e.t., a nominal retrofire at

25:15:58 g.e.t, was reported, and deployed forces were notified accord-
ingly. The spacecraft landed at 25:51:24 g.e.t, and was located by one
of the search helicopters (Search 2) which vectored the airborne on-scene
commander to the landing point (reported as latitude 23°24.5 ' N longitude .4
67°53 ' W). (See fig. 6.3-3.) A visual sighting report was immediately
transmitted to the primary recovery ship U.S.S. Wasp_ and a helicopter-
borne swimmer team was immediately dispatched to the landing point.
Swimmers were deployed at 26:14:34 g.e.t, and the flotation collar was
attached to the spacecraft (see fig. 6.3-4) and inflated by
26:21:34 g.e.t.

Radio and interphone communication with the flight crew indicated

that they were in good physical condition and desired to be brought
aboard the recovery ship in the spacecraft. The left hatch was opened
at 26:33:34 g.e.t. The spacecraft and the flight crew were on the car-
rier at 26:54:34 g.e.t. The carrier had the spacecraft secured in the
dolly at 26:57:34 g.e.t.

The U.S.S. Wasp reported the position of the spacecraft at pickup

was 23°22.5 N., 67°52.5 W., approximately 1.8 miles from where it had

The main parachute remained attached to the spacecraft after land-

ing and was recovered by a swimmer from the "Swim i team". The rendez-
vous and recovery (R and R) section was recovered by the swim team from
"Search 3" approximately 300 to 400 yards upwind of the spacecraft.


6.3.3 Recovery Aids UHF recovery beacon.- Signals from the spacecraft recovery

beacon were received by the following aircraft:

Aircraft Initial time of contact, Range, Mode

hr:min_ g.e.t, n. mi.

Search I 25:47 28 Pulse

(S_-3A) CW
Search 2 - 12 Pulse
(SH-3A) CW

Search 3 25:50 12 CW
Kindley 25:45 200 Pulse
Rescue i_ CW
(HC-97) HF transmitter.- Fifteen stations of the DOD high

frequency-direction finder (_FF-DF) network received signals from the
spacecraft. Fourteen of the stations obtained bearing information on
the spacecraft. Signal strength_ bearing accuracy, and signal quality
were as shown in the following table and in figure 6.3-5.

Station Signal Bearing Signal hr:min_ G.m.t.
strength accuracy quality (December 16, 1965)

i i - Good 15:33 to 15:_0

2 3 Good Fair 15:50

3 5 Good Fair 15:49

4 4 Good Fair 15:49

5 4 Good Fair 15:33 to 15:50

6 5 Good Poor 15:33 to 15:50

7 5 Good Good 15:33 to 15:50

8 5 Good Excellent 15:33 to 15:50

9 5 Good Good 15:33 to 15:50

i0 3 Good Fair 15:50

ii 4 Good Good 15:33 to 15:50

12 5 Good Good 15:33 to 15:50

13 3 Good Fair 15:33 to 15:50

14 3 Good Good 15:33 to 15:50

15 2 Poor Good 15:39 to 15:50

No recovery force units reported _ reception.

F UNCLASSIFIED 6-15 DT{F transmitter.- Signals from the spacecraft UHF voice
transmitter were received by aircraft as follows:

Aircraft Time of contact_ Range_ Receiver

hr:min_ g.e.t, n. mi.

Swim I 25:53 20 ARC-27


Swim 2 - ARC-27
Photo i - ARC-27

Air Boss I 26:04 5 ARC-52


Air Boss 2 25:37 3 ARC-52

(s-2s) UT{F survival radio.- This radio was not used. Flashin_ light.- The flashing light _ras erected properly

but was not activiated by the crew. Fluorescent sea marker.- The sea dye marker diffusion ap-
peared normal_ and was observed by all aircraft in the landing area at
ranges from 2 to lO nautical miles. The recovery sh_p reported a range
of 5 nautical miles.

6.3.4 Postretrieval Proced'_les

Spacecraft postretrieval procedures were performed as specified in

the references 12 and 13. All onboard film and other specified equip-
ment, such as experiment equipment, PCM tape recorder_ flight logs, voi<
tapes, and biomedical recorders, were expedited to Cape Kennedy and
Houston by special flights from the carrier.

Observations of the spacecraft after retrieval were as follows:

(Photographs were taken of all these observations.)

(a) The }IF antenna had been deployed but would not fuily retract
when the HF ANT switch was placed in the retract position. The crew
manually retracted the antenna while they were outside the spacecraft.

(b) Both the recovery and _F voice antennas had deployed and
were in good condition.

(c) The recovery hoist loop and recovery light were erected; how-
ever, the light was not flashing. (The crew did not actuate the light
because it was not needed.)

(d) Both windows were fogged; the left window had a light film
on the surface. Swimmers' reports indicated that the right window was
smeared during recovery operations.

(e) A 2 ft. by i/2 in. by i/4 in. gouge was noted in the heat
shield in the lower right quadrant. The stagnation point appeared to
be in the lower center portion. No unusual ablative effects were ob-

(f) Several scorched insulation pads were found while RCS shingles
were being removed.

(g) The interior of the spacecraft appeared to be clean, neat,

and dry. Both egress hatch seals were in excellent condition. "D" rings
and drogue parachutes had been safetied by the flight crew and the space-
craft had been powered down. Both of the hatchlock position indicators
were on neutral.

(h) The left aft stowage box hatch seal was in good condition;
the right stowage box hatch seal was broken.

Durimg the recovery operations the following actions took place:

(a) A scratch was placed on the RCS during shingle removal.

(b) Drogue mortar slugs were removed and stowed in the respective
sidewall extension boxes.

(c) A 3/8-inch open-end wrench was dropped behind the right seat
and was not removed.

(d) _he hot gas catapult initiator line was separated.

The R and R section was recovered as well as the pilot, drogue

and main parachutes. _he R and R section appeared in good condition,
with the following notations:

(a) A dent was noted in the periphery of the R and R section. It

was apparently caused by impact with the hoisting hood during retrieval.

(b) One radar dome appeared to be dented. The cause of the dent
is unknown.

(c) The main parachute was not washed or handled excessively,

but was placed in a plastic bag for shipment in its "as retrieved" cor_

On December 16, 1965, the flight crew left the carrier, U.S.S. Wasp
and flew to Cape Kennedy. Following completion of spacecraft postre-
trieval pYocedures, the spacecraft was unloaded at Mayport Naval Station,
Florida on December 20, 1965.

6.3.5 Reentry Control System Deactivation

After the spacecraft was unloaded from the carrier U.S.S. Wasp at
Mayport Naval Station, Florida_ it was transported by dolly to a prev-
iously selected, well-isolated area where deactivation was begun at
i0:00 a.m.e.s.t, on December 20, 1965. Deactivation was completed at
2:00 a.m. e.s.t, on December 21, 1965. Upon receipt of the spacecraft,
there was no visual indication of toxic vapors from any of the 16 RCS
thrust chamber assemblies (TCA). The RCS shingles had been previously
f removed on board the carrier.

Before the pressurant in each ring was relieved to atmospheric

pressure, the landing and safing team (LST) obtained pressure readings
of source pressure from test point I (A package) of both rings and reg-
ulated lock-up pressure from test point 6 (B package) of both rings.
Source pressure readings of 1050 psig and 1070 psig (ambient dry bulb
temperature of 54° F) were obtained from A and B rings, respectively.
Regulator lock-up pressure readings of 300 psig were obtained from both
the A and B rings. The pressures in both rings were then relieved to
atmospheric pressure. Immediately following the source pressurant
draining operation, the pressurant upstream of the propellant bladders
and downstream of the B package check valves was relieved through test
points TP-4 and TP-6 by venting through separate propellant scrubber

Following the above operations_ nitrogen pressure of 50 psig was

utilized to force the remaining usable propellants of both rings into
the proper propellant holding containers. When these steps were accom-
plished, the propellant motorized valves were left in the closed posi-
tion so that propellant loss would be minimized. The propellant
solenoid valves did not leak vapors or flush-fluids at any time. All
the RCS valves appeared to function normally. Approximately I tablespoon


of fuel was removed from each of rings A and B but there was insuffi-
cient quantity for analysis. Neither ring A nor ring B contained liquid
oxidizer material_ there were only fumes. No sample was available for


Access time_ hr:min

Landing area Support
Aircraft Ship

Launch site area:

Pad 4 LARC (amphibious vehicle)

i LCU (large landing craft with spacecraft re-
trieval capabilities)

Land 00:i0 2 LVTR (amphibious vehicle with spacecraft re-

trieval capabilities)
Water (if flight crew 00:02 3 M-II3 (tracked land vehicles)

Water (if flight crew 00:15 4 CH-3C (helicopters) (3 with rescue teams)
is in spacecraft) i M_0 (mine sweepers) with salvage capabilities
i boat (50 ft) with water salvage team

Launch abort area:

A 4:00 12:00 i CVS (aircraft carrier) with onboard aircraft

B 3:00 3:00 capabilities, 3 DD (destroyers), i AO
C 3:00 14:00 (oiler), i ATF, (fleet tug) and 5 aircraft
D 3:00 14:00 on station (5HC-_7) (See fig. 6.3-1)

Primary landing area:

West Atlantic (end-of- i:00 4:00 i CVS (aircraft carrier) from area A, station 3
mission area 17-1) 2 HC-97 (search and rescue)
6 SH-3A helicopters (3 location, 2 swinmler, and
i photo )
2 S-2E (on-scene commander and backup)
2 EA-IF (Navy communications relay - i primary,
i backup)
i EA-IE (radar search)

Secondary landing areas:

West Atlantic 30 min 6:00 i CVS (carrier) from station 3

(Zone i) strip

East Atlantic 6:00 i DD (destroyer) from station 6 a

(Zone 2 )

West Pacific 6:00 2 DD's (destroyers) (rotating on station)

Mid-Pacific 6:00 1 DD (destroyer) b
(Zone 4)

Contingency 26 aircraft on strip alert at worldwide staging


Total (including MS0's) i0 ships, 6 helicopters, 31 aircraft

aln addition an oiler (A0) was assigned to this area by CTF 140 for logistic purposes.

bin addition an oiler (A0) was assigned to the area for logistic purposes and an additional
destroyer (DD) was assigned to cover the launch of Gemini VI-A.


80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 o
40 r_./._ _ i t 40
A/C- Aircraft
AO - Oiler
CVS-Aircraft carrier -- 35

35 _//_/J_-Cape
_ _ Kennedy f Bermuda l
DD - Destroyer I ,.

30 30
z/_ 1, --_ .A_/C / AreaA X
.......... _ I Zone2 I _ o_ "a .-rY/_.
_//__ ..... Sta}'_S EastAtlantc , .,,X ,_
C _ ??- ...................
] ............
....... 'au .... AreeB _ C

"= :: :: :: '_,..,'814
.._ bias_ Z
_ta 4 ::::::::::::
:::: AreaD
,_: :::::::::::: DD:::::::A/c
p -_
= ,West Atlantic Zon ....... .......... ......... .... ,.. Africa_,

o_ _
-,1 "271::.....
" •

: : ,


80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 i0


Figure6.3-1. - Gemini3EI-Alaunchabortareasand recoveryforcedeployment.


Figure 6.3-4. - Spacecraft 6 after landing.

0 20

Figure 6..3-5. - HF-DF network station bearings to the spacecraft after landing.


7.1.1 Crew Activities

Crew performance during the Gemini VI-A mission resulted in a

smoothly executed closed-loop rendezvous with sufficient fuel savings
to permit extension of station keeping. The crew completed all of the
mission objectives_ and in addition they obtained valuable information
directly applicable to the future rendezvous missions. Figure 7.1.1-1
represents the actual summary flight plan for this mission.

The orbit-adjust maneuvers as well as the rendezvous maneuvers

were very well performed. Station keeping with spacecraft 7 was con-
sidered a fairly simple task after a brief period of practice. The
retrofire and reentry were accomplished nominally with a resultant
landing miss-distance of less than 7 miles. No significant crew train-
ing inadequacies were evidenced. Because of the relatively short dura-
tion of this mlssion_ routine housekeeping was not the demanding task
that it was for the Gemini V and VII missions.
f Prelaunch.- The December !2_ 1965, prelaunch was nominal

except that the crew thought that the 25-minute programmed "hold" was
unnecessary. Engine ignition occurred exactly on time and Gemini
launch vehicle (GLV) instrumentation as well as sound cues provided
proper indications of thrust buildup. Engine shutdown occurred approx-
imately 1 1/2 seconds after ignition. The crew realized that a "hold-
kill" had occurred; however, the fact that the clock was operating
caused crew concern because they had been briefed that this situation
would not occur and had not trained for it. Post-shutdown events (other
than clock operation) proceeded as expected. "Shutdown" and "programmer
reset" communications were called out and there was no flight director
indicator (FDI) needle deviations noted by the crew. The crew was con-
cerned about the slowness in bringing up the erector, and they thought
that the exact procedures subsequent to shutdown and prior to bringing
up the erector had not been clearly established.

The prelaunch for the Gemini VI-A countdown (December 15, 1965)
was again nominal with the crew resting during the 25-minute programmed
hold. At times, communication between the crew members was difficult
because their intercom system was not operational when the Spacecraft
Test Conductor was communicating by using the push-to-talk mode.

7-2 UNCLASSIFIED Powered flisht and insertion.- Lift-off and powered flight

were nominal, and the crew impressions were very similar to those re-
ported by previous crews. The Gemini_VI-A crew further verified pre-
vious crew reports concerning the staging operation and resultant
deposits on the spacecraft windows. Second stage engine cutoff (SECO)
was nominal with no noticeable post-separation oscillations. The crew
received an insertion "go" from tlhe ground prior to SECO + 20 seconds,
and they promptly accomplished the post-insertion activities. Although
their attention was primarily focused inside the cockpit, the crew
noted that the out-the-window view was almost identical to that displayed
by the Gemini mission simulator (GMS) at Cape Kennedy. Rendezvous.- Five orbit-adjust maneuvers were performed

prior to rendezvous, as outlined in-section 4. 3. The platform was
aligned prior to each maneuver and the residual velocity components
were nulled by the crew after eaclh orbit-adjust maneuver. Rendezvous mode test: A check of the onboard-computer

rendezvous mode was made at 3 hours, 15 minutes g.e.t. The values of
total velocity required to rendezvous, which were displayed on the in-
cremental velocity indicators (IVI's), were noted by the crew as being
approximately one-half the anticipated values. This was later deter-
mined to be caused by failure to update the computer with the correct
values of _t and A_t prior to the test. Rendezvous terminal phase: The rendezvous was accom-

plished as planned with the crew using procedures and techniques devel-
oped during their preflight training period. Th_ total fuel usage from
terminal-phase initiation to completion of rendezvous was approximately
ll3 pounds. Lower than predicted attitude-control fuel-usage is attrib-
uted to pilot technique as well as the excellent control capability in
the pulse attitude control mode.

The crew used onbo_rd computer solutions for translation maneuvers;

however, the pilot was able to back up the computer for terminal-phase
initiation and the second midcourse correction with manu_l calculations
based on platformpitch and radar range obtained from computer readouts.

The n_nual calculations for terminal-phase initiation differed

from the onboard computer solution by 8 ft/sec in forward velocity.
This _as partially because the terminal-phase initiation was delayed
from nominal to optimize lighting conditions during the final phase of
rendezvous (insure that the sun would be behind spacecraft 6). Also,
the charts used for manual calculations are accurate only when terminal
phase initiation is to occur at a pitch angle of 27.6 ° and longitudinal
thrusting is along the line of sight. The manual calculations for the

second midcourse correction agreed with the computer solution within
the limits of the predetermined accuracies of the two methods of com-

The pilot also used computer readouts of platform pitch attitude

and radar range to plot the relative trajectory of spacecraft 6 with
respect to spacecraft 7 throughout the terminal phase of rendezvous.
This trajectory plot together with analog meter readouts of radar range
and range rate proved to be an extremely useful device for real-time mon-
itoring of the trajeetoryand for evaluating computer and manual thrust

The con_mand pilot hulled angular rate motion of the target vehicle
with respect to the stars from the second midcourse maneuver until
stars were no longer visible. Braking: The braking maneuver was performed during the

time when spacecraft 6 was 0.48 to 0.24 nautical miles from the target.
Braking was done with a continuous application of thrust while holding
the correct attitude. Thrust was terminated when relative range rate,
as read on the analog meter_ decreased to l0 ft/sec. Afterward, the
command pilot nulled angular rate motion using platform and radar data. Station keeping.- The crew performed station keeping with

spacecraft 7 from the end of rendezvous at 5 hours, 56 minutes g.e.t.
until separation of the two spacecraft at ll hours, 14 minutes g.e.t.
Closest approach of the two spacecraft was estimated by the crew as
approximately 1 foot, with a maximum range of 275 to 300 feet during
the in-plane fly-around. Attitude control: The platform and pulse attitude

control modes were used for attitude control during station keeping.
Pulse mode was used for all of the fly-around maneuvers. In all cases,
translation inputs were made with minute blips of the maneuver control-
ler. Motion pictures taken from both spacecraft verify crew reports
that adequate control was available in pulse mode as well as platform
mode to maintain a stable station-keeping position, once relative
rates were reduced to near zero. Based on this experience_ the crew
stated that it should be completely safe to hold station with a crewman
on the end of an umbilical. 0ut-of-plane fly-arounds were performed by
both crewmen and were reported to be easier than the in-plane fly-
around because of the position cues provided by the horizon during the
out-of-plane maneuver. During the in-plane fly-around when the horizon
was not in view, the task of maintaining a stable relative position be-
came much more difficult, particularly as the range between the space-
craft increased to 300 feet. Radar was not used during station keeping.


Ranges were estimated using the reticle and known dimensions of space-
craft 7. The platform was aligned immediately after rendezvous and
maintained in the orbit rate mode. Translations: Translations to 20 feet were performed

by both crew members during daylight and darkness in order to simulate
docking maneuvers. The crew reported that the translations were quite
easy as long as short duration pulses were used.

At times during station keeping, the sun would impinge on a space-

craft window at such an angle as to make it impossible for one crewman
to see through the coating of foreign material deposited on the window.
This often required a transfer of control to the other crevman because
the orientation of the windows is such that only one window at a time
was obscured. The combined effects of the bright horizon and the sun-
light on the very bright equipme_ adapter section of spacecraft 7 was
annoying to the crew during station keeping_ and this made it difficult
to adapt to the comparatively dark spacecraft interior when cross-
checking instrumentation.

At night, the crew of spacecraft 7 maintained their interior lights

at full bright to give the crew of spacecraft 6 a target for station
keeping. The crew of spacecraft 6maintained station with and without
their docking light being on, and at one time used their hand-held pen-
light to illuminate spacecraft 7. The crew found that the spacecraft 7
windows illuminated by interior lighting, although dimmer than the Agena
cone lights, were satisfactory night targets for station keeping off the
nose of spacecraft 7.

The crew was continuously busy from the start of rendezvous until
separation from spacecraft 7, and they were very tired at the end of
this activity. The crew reported that if extravehicular activity (EVA)
had been scheduled on the same day as the rendezvous it would have been
a most difficult task to accomplish. Operational checks.- Several operational checks were per-

formed at the completion of rendezvous and continued through the sepa-
ration. The operational checks of importance from the standpoint of
crew performance are discussed in the following paragraphs.

7. I. I.5. I Platform alignment: The first operational check per-

formed after rendezvous and during station keeping was platform align-
ment in the close vicinity of another spacecraft. The alignment was
nominal and no difficulties were caused by the close proximity of
spacecraft 7. Data obtained indicate all platform alignments during
the period of operational checks were within I ° accuracy in the pitch
and roll axes.

F UNCLASSIFIED 7-5 Separation and sextant sightings: The separation maneu-

ver from spacecraft 7 (at Ii hours, 14 minutes, 31 seconds g.e.t.) was
initiated approximately one revolutionlater than planned. This delay
was possible because all previously required operational checks were
accomplished with surplus fuel remaining, and an additional revolution
of station keeping was performed. The separation was a 9 ft/sec retro-
grade maneuver using the forward-firing thrusters, and it was performed
using the platform attitude control mode. Following separation, the
pilot made 19 sextant sightings using the acquisition lights on space-
craft 7 and the star Sirius. The acquisition lights of spacecraft 7
were visible throughout the first night period following separation.
The crew noted that target visibility was better when looking through
the lower portion of the windows because of the heavier concentration
of foreign substance on the upper area of the windows.

The technique used by the crew was to adjust the sextant so that
the line-of-sight to spacecraft 7 was below the line-of-sight to Sirius
and moving upward. As the two lines-of-sight became superimposed, the
pilot called out a time "mark" and pushed the readout button to display
radar range on the manual data insertion unit (MDU). The command pilot
read time from the event timer on the pilot's "mark" and recorded all
data in the flight log. The fade-in and fade-out of the flashing
lights, caused by the tumbling of spacecraft 7, did not allow sufficient
acquisition time for sextant measurements during the second night period
following the separation maneuver. (This was also a problem during the
first night period.) The crew reported that they could not have accom-
plished the sextant sightings without the radar and computer pointing
data. The flashing lights were reported as being approximately one-
tenth of the intensity of reflected sunlight from the adapter and
therefore inadequate. The acquisition lights were observed at the max-
imum distance of 24 miles, whereas, the sunlight on spacecraft 7 was
reported to be as bright as Venus at approximately 50 miles. The space-
craft 7 acquisition lights were considered to be too bright during sta-
tion keeping. Therefore, the acquisition lights were turned off and
the cockpit lights of spacecraft 7 were turned up for optimum station
keeping during the night side of orbit. It was also reported that the
bulk of the sextant was about twice that desired and that a mounted,
rather than a hand-held, sextant would be more desirable. The crew
stated that the use of only optics for rendezvous would not be possible
under the conditions as previously noted. Experiments.- Excellent results were obtained with most

of the scheduled experiments. The D-8 experiment was to measure the
radiation level and the total radiation flux inside the spacecraft
during 2 passes through the South Atlantic anomaly. Data were obtained
by the pilot during the first scheduled period using the portable

sensor head in all six required positions. No further D-8 measurements
were attempted. At single-point release on the main parachute, the
D-8 portable sensor came loose lh'om its mounting, hit the instrument
panel, and dropped to the floor. It was determined during the crew
debriefing that the crew may not have properly secured the sensor.

The S-5 synoptic terrain photography experiments were completed

and nearly all film was used. The S-5 photography was hampered and
the S-6 photography was enhanced because of the extensive cloud coverage.
All photography was performed by the crew without updating from the
ground. The dim-light photography was accomplished by using one com-
plete film pack of the black and white film and approximately 15 ex-
posures on the second of the two film packs carried.

7.1. i. 7 Crew housekeeping.- The crew ate when they could, and a
total of three meals were eaten during the mission. The crew had no
problems with the water system. The extra water bags were left stowed.
The total water consumed was 129 half-ounces for the command pilot and
163 half-ounces for the pilot.

The crew decided to leave the urine nozzle stawed and wear their
urine collection devices until after rendezvous. The urine adapter
hose was very difficult to install. It took 20 to 30 minutes, with --.
both men working hard, in order to couple the hose fitting to the space-
craft quick-disconnect on the water management panel. This condition
was discovered prior to flight but there was not sufficient time to
correct the problem. The use of a low-residue preflight diet eliminated
the need for defecation.

At the start of the sleep period, the crew powered dawn only non-
required systems and did not use the silence switches. The sleep
period was in reasonable accordance with the flight-plan schedule.

The cockpit was cluttered uz_til termination of the rendezvous

maneuver. The crew generally utilized the same stowage techniques
developed by the Gemini V crew. The aft stowage containers were not
utilized until after the rendezvous maneuver was completed. The bags
stowed in the left aft box released a material similar to lint in
large amounts when opened. In these instances, visors had to be closed
while the debris settled out.

The camera box A-frame bent as a result of cabin pressurization and

the crew was forced to use the water gun lan_rd and pin to keep it
closed. Prior to reentry, 20 minutes of intense effort was required
by both crew members to close this container. Other than this anomaly,
stowage was generally as anticipated. All equipment except the water


bags was stowed in the retro-stowage areas. Extensive use of tape aided
stowage as well as holding down extraneous debris in the cabin. Retrofire and reentry.- Stowage was initiated approximately

3 hours prior to retrofire, and the spacecraft was powered up at 19 hours,
12 minutes g.e.t. The platform was aligned during approximately a
one-orbit period, and the crew was prepared for retrofire at least
1 hour preceding this event. Preretrofire events were nominal, and the
crew's d@scription of the events was similar to that of previous crews.

Firing of the retrorockets occurred automatically with the pilot

providing manual backup after the first retrorocket ignition. The
crew noted that there was a distinct pause between ignition of each
retrorocket, such that this maneuver seemed like four individual retro-
rocket maneuvers. The command pilot controlled the spacecraft within
1 ° of the nominal retroattitude utilizing the rate command control mode
and both RCS rings. Attitude and rates were controlled by reference
to the FDI displayed rates and the attitude indicator, with the light-
ing conditions in the cabin on full bright. The horizon was not vis-
ible during the night retrofire.

Shortly after a nominal jettisoning of the retropackage and dock-

f ing bar, the crew checked the computer for FDI needle bias, and marked
the FDI display with the proper null position.

The spacecraft was rolled to the full-lift position and this posi-
tion was maintained until 400K feet at which time the spacecraft was
banked left to 55 °. At guidance initiate, the rate command mode was
selected utilizing ring-A, and the command pilot initially controlled
the spacecraft based on the reentry displays. The command pilot com-
mented that the oscillations were not so severe during this period as
to require the rate command mode, and that a less-fuel-expending con-
trol mode could have been used. Prior to 100K feet, ring-A fuel was
depleted and the spacecraft rotated back to the full-lift position.
The pilot immediately turned on ring-B and the propgr bank angle was
reestablished. At this time, the cross-range needle deflected full
right and remained in this position in spite of crew attempts to get
it back to the center position. At 80K feet the reentry solution
terminated and the rate position was selected to continue to damp the

The oscillations were very close to zero at drogue parachute de-

ployment. The drogue parachute was deployed as 50K feet was registering
_on the altimeter and the 40.6K-foot light illuminated almost immedi-
ately thereafter. Prior to drogue parachute disreefing, the oscilla-
tions increased, however, they decreased very rapidly subsequent to
drogue parachute disreefing, and the spacecraft was very stable upon
reaching 30K feet.


The main parachute was deployed at 10.6K feet on the altimeter,

with good correlation between the altimeter and the 10.6K barostat
light. The crow braced themselves for two-point suspension in a
manner very similar to that used successfully by previous flight crews;
however, the co_nand pilot's visor was cracked as a result of contact-
ing the _rist ring.

Because of slight oscillations on the main parachute, the crew

could see the ocean intermittently. The spacecraft contacted the
water with a reading of approximately 100 feet on the altimeter which
had been set to the local atmospheric pressure. The spacecraft, upon
landing, tilted forward, rolled left approximately 90 ° submerging the
left window, and immediately stabilized to the proper flotation position.
The crew did not observe any water leaks, and they proceeded with the
postlanding checklists.

Good communications with recovery forces were maintained through-

out the recovery period and the high frequency (HF) communication test
_as accomplished with excellent results. Initially the crew was in-
formed that they were 33 miles from the recovery ship. This caused
them to contemplate removing their suits until they were told shortly
thereafter that the recovery ship was 12 miles from their position.
The flotation collar was attached to the spacecraft very shortly after
landing, and the crew opened their hatches to obtain fresh air. Prior
to recovery by the prime recovery ship, the crew closed the hatches,
and before egressing they completely powered down the spacecraft. Mission trainin_ and trainin_ evaluation.- Crew training

was accomplished generally as planned and outlined in the Gemini VI
Training Plan. The crew's familiarity with the spacecraft and profi-
ciency in systems operation were obtained over a long period of time
as a result of their extensive training as the backup crew for
Gemini III. Table 7.1-I contains a sun_nary of the Gemini VI-A crew
training for this mission.

Because Gemini V!-A was the first rendezvous mission and because
of the extensive training received as a backup crew for the Gemini III
mission, training was focused on the develolmment of crew procedures and
techniques as well as development of crew proficiency in accomplishing
rendezvous under both nominal and contingency conditions. The con-
tractor's rendezvous and reentry simulators were used for initial crew
rendezvous training before the Gemini mission simulator became suitably
operational for this purpose. The rendezvous training accomplished at
the contractor site was also useful because it provided the crew an ex-
cellent means for making inputs into the Gemini VI-A rendezvous mission
planning and procedures development.

Overall, training in the Gemini-mission-simulator was adequate.
The visual display system of the Cape Kennedy simulator was very val-
uable in crew preparation for the rendezvous _ask. There were prob-
lems throughout the training period in aligning the system so that
correct star patterns were synchronized with the orbit and the posi-
tion of the simulated target flashing light agreed with radar bore-
sight. The launch-reentry and simulated-network simulations were
valuable crew training programs; however, the network simulations were
of little value to the cre_ because crew participation in them Ms
limited to the launch phase.


Prime Prime Backup Backup

command pilot pilot command pilot pilot
Training activity
hr:rain runs hr: min runs hr: min runs hr: min runs

Spacecraft tests 41:27 44:30 40:07 41:37

Gemini mission simulator 102:30 112:15 56:00 96:15

C Contractor rendezvous simulator 32 32 22 22

Contractor reentry simulator 25 17 33 Z

Translation and docking simulator 22:30 28:30 8:00 25:00
r-- Lattuch abort and reentry simulator 107 79 80 127 r--
Water egress 4:00 4:00
Pad egress 2:00 2:00 2:00 2:00
Parachute 1 i i

_.'_ Zero-g 60 40 _--11

Planetarium 8:00 8:00 8:00 8:00

Sextant 34:30 15:O0

Gemini and Agena mockups 13:00 13:00 13:00 13:00

Gemini and Agena systems briefings 50:30 50:30 50:30 50:30

Experiments briefings 23:00 23:00 21:30 21:30

Flight plan reviews 30:00 30:00 30:00 30:00

Mission rules reviews 8:00 8:00 ll:O0 ll:00
NASA-S-66-2741 MAR

Revolution count Revolution count

Ground elapsed time Day
_, ;round e,apsed time Night
Day _ , Night
-- O0 CNV TLaunc h -- OS

-- Align platform Voice recorder -off

Reentry update
BDA _lnsertion checklist check (HF only)
Communications I TAN 130 ° Transfer translation

i ASC Scanne_ check TAlign p_atform

l 1
Radiator in flow posiUon 81,8 ° Correction translation
CSQ 33.b ° Correction translation
Brake to 40> R >25
-- -- Brake to 4 R/see
CRO Radiator check Null Rat 20 feet

Go--no-go _Align platfonn

m Ol -- 06 HAW -- Delayed-time
m -- playback

HAW Translation update

mm GYMTAlign_ platform i --
TEX RKV Command pilot staLion keep at 100 feet
CNV Height adjust translation Belayed-Ume D-8 experilnent
m BDA TranslaUon update tape --

ASC Spacecraft 7 tbruster plun/e photos

-- 02 Align platform - 07
ilot station keep at 100 feet


-- M=2 Phase adjust translation CSQ

/- CRO Translation update Cornnland pilot station keeg at>lOO ft

Delayed-time tape playback

lign platform HAW

Plane adjust translation In-plane flyaround Eat

- - ,IA
I; p...... ft7: I Power downplatforlnlPer;°d
Spacecraft 7: I Trailspender - on I - 08
03 GYM Minor beiqht adjust translation Delayed-time I l

Spacecraft 7 a'cquisition update D-8

TEX Acquire spacecraft 7 tape
-- l _ CNV
0ut-of-plane flyaxeund

A Translation update Pilot station keep at i00 feet and

-- SC lign platformtest check

endezvous T TAN anslate to 20 feet
playback| -- RKV I

TAN i_lign CircularizaUon

platform translation period
Eat ISgacecraft7: I Station keep at 300>R>20 ftI
Acquire spacecraft 7 CompuLer - rendezvous CSQ/ _-Spacecraft 6: TIirlJster phnne

1 04 First AV T displayed

-- CSQ _'Range readouts and check _ = 09 1 iamld adapter pbotograpby

HAW Update separationburn

-- Flyaround to snlall end forward position
HAW Range readouts and checks Delayed-time tape playback
i l

GYM 1 1

Delayed-Ume --
I l tape

playback -- T

l 05 l 1 0 RKV I Station keeping

(a) Oto 10 hours g.e.t.

Figure 1. 1. 1-1. - Summary flight plan.

NASA-S-66-2742 MAR

Revolution count Revolution count

Ground elapsed time Night

Day --
_l, _I'
Ground elapsed time Night

--10 1 --15
StaUon 1

CSQ _ --

__ ANT

1 _ 9 ft/sectrallslation

RKV Delayed-time tape playback -- CYI Delayed-time

extant sigbtings

IS KNO tape

--17 CRO


CTN Planned _allding area updates T -- sleep

-- -- ANT

__ BDA Delayed-time

RKV Delayed-timetape playback period --18 CYI playback


KNC Sextant siQIitings 1 1

F I S-6
9 ft/sec Posigrade translation _L Eat -- CRO tape

__ 1
CSQ Crew statusreport(command pilotand pilot)

-- Platform - off IGS power - off

--I4 --19
Pilot awake -_-II

1 1 Secondary coolant pump - off

CNV IGS power - on Platform - on
I _ -- 1 BDA Delayed-time
T playback
1 1


1" umi_ity sensor check

1 i5 KNO
T Comand pilot awakel--_ 1

(b) 10to 20 hours .e.t..

Figure 7. 1. 1-1. - Continued.


Revolutioncount Revolutioncount

Ground elapsedtime Day | Groundelapsedtime Day

_--20 S-5 and S-6 experirrent --25

-- CRO --_
16 Retrofire (25:15:58)
-- --' __N ig ht | _'1 _'_ HAW Area- 17-1
TR- 00:04:16 Checklist Night


Dim light sequel_ce2
1 -- GYM

8DA End blackout
-- TEX tape Droguedeployment
1 CNV playback Main chute deployed
-- BDA Touchdown
TEX Begin blackout

--21 T
KNO S-5 and S-6 experiment

-- TAN I

14 --


__ GYM tape --
TEX playback

-_ -- -- CNV Crew status report


-- S-5 and S-6 experiment

--23 1
_ 1
-- CRO

__ HAW

__ l

-- 24 GYMTAIign platform
__ --
X± s-sa,,
yo - ,me --
TR-Ot:O0:O0 Start playback
-- prerettochecklist
ASC Align platfoml

-- TAN

-- l

16 --25 Align platform l

(C) 201o 26 hours g.e,t.

Figure 7. 1. 1-1. - Concluded.



7.1.2 Gemini VI-A Pilots' Report Powered flight.- The noise of the turbines and the engines
coming up to full thrust gave the crew a positive indication of ignition,
and a noticeable decrease in noise and vibration provided a good indica-
tion of lift-off. At lift-off, the crew noticed a physiological cue,
which was later explained as a small roll transient. The programmed
roll started at about lift-off (DO) plus 17 seconds, and was completed
a little after 20 seconds from lift-off. Pitch programming started on
time, and cabin pressure relieved and sealed at 5.5 psi. The noise dur-
ing maximum dynamic pressure was not objectionable. The onboard tapes
recorded the noise as well as voice, and the crew thought that they
could have transmitted through this noise level. The primary and sec-
ondary guidance were in excellent agreement and a slight yaw correction
was noted at L0 plus i minute 24 seconds. Voice transmissions from the
ground were received with no trouble. The transition times for the
various modes of abort were received and noted onboard; and both the
L0 plus i minute 45 second and LO plus 2 minute 25 second digital com-
mand system (DCS) updates to the spacecraft inertial guidance system
(IGS) were received and accepted.

Staging occurred at approximately LO plus 2 minutes 38 seconds.

During staging, a large orange flame enveloped the spacecraft in such
F a way that the spacecraft appeared to fly through the burned residue of
the staging event. Prior to staging, the pilot noted a string of cumu-
lus clouds which were very white and very distinct but, subsequent to
staging, the clouds appeared less white and less distinct, indicating
that this residue caused a window obscuration. Radio guidance system
(RGS) guidance-initiate occurred at approximately DO plus 2 minutes
50 seconds and apparently no major corrections were made (very minor
flight director indications of less than 1/2 deg/sec in rate, and less
than 1/2 deg in attitude error). The attitude errors were indicated by
the inertial guidance system (IGS) to be nearly zero throughout the
stage II flight. At LO plus 4 minutes, the spacecraft attitude display
indicated that the vehicle had achieved a horizontal attitude. The
acceleration increased to approximately 2g at IX) plus 4 minutes 15 sec-
onds, and the final acceleration was 6.8g at second stage engine cut-
off (SECO). A countdown to SECO was conducted by the command pilot,
observing the event timer, and the pilot noted that SEC0 from IGS oc-
curred at the same time as SEC0 from RGS. This event and all other IGS
indications during the launch proved the excellent performance of the
IGS in the ascent mode.

Immediately after a nominal separation sequence, the computer was

interrogated again for velocity. At this time the total inertial ve-
locity read 25729, and the orbital radius rate (vertical velocity) read
00025. These two values indicated that the flight path angle was zero
or slightly positive and that the total insertion conditions were

nominal. The onboard-computed maneuvers necessary to achieve the
planned orbit, as well as the time from lift-off to first apogee, were
read and transmitted to the flight controllers.

The IVI readings after separation were ii ft/sec forward, 2 right,

and 2 down. The insertion was nominal and the spacecraft was very sta-
ble prior to, during, and subsequent to spacecraft separation. The
fairings were jettisoned on time and some debris was noticed. However,
the crew was mainly occupied with onboard readings. The command pilot
was stabilizing the spacecraft using platform indications, and the pi-
lot was logging the insertion conditions; therefore, few out-the-window
observations were made at that time. Prerendezvous phase.- Subsequent to caging the platform

small-end-forward (SEF), the platform was switched to the SEF align
mode and the attitude control was changed from the manual pulse mode to
the automatic platform mode to permit both crew members to complete the
insertion checklist. The insertion checklist was completed at 8 minutes
58 seconds g.e.t., and the retrofire time for landing in the prime re-
covery area at the end of the first revolution (i alpha) was recorded.
The platform alignment was completed rapidly and the primary horizon
scanner appeared to operate very satisfactorily. The secondary scanner
was selected and checked with attitude control in pulse mode for align-
ment. Checking against the horizon and the flight director indicator
indicated that the secondary horizon scanner was operating with the same
degree of accuracy as the primary scanner. The primary scanner was
again selected at 34 minutes g.e.t., and remained on for the duration
of the mission. After the first orbit was completed, the crew commented
that a first-apogee rendezvous would have been difficult because of the
large number of tasks involved immediately after insertion.

High suit temperatures were noted at this point and steps were
taken to eliminate the problem. Both crew members, subsequent to the
Carnarvon pass, removed their pressure suit gloves and interliners.
These items were stowed until just prior to the start of the retrofire
Checklist. This procedure was used in training because it was found to
be difficult to wear gloves throughout the rendezvous runs that were
conducted at St. Louis, Houston, and on the Gemini mission simulator
(GMS) at Cape Kennedy; therefore, the crew elected to fly with gloves
off, as they had trained.

All ground-computed orbit-adjustment data were received in ample

time to insert the proper addresses into the onboard computer, validate
the readout on the incremental velocity indicator (IVl), zero the IV!,
and allow the display to be generated 30 seconds prior to the maneuver.
All maneuvers were performed to an accuracy of better than _0.2 ft/see
in all three body axes by reducing the computed desired-velocity-change

displays to zero. The initial thrusts, made in either the small-end-
forward (SEF) or blunt-end-forward (_EF) attitude, were performed in
the platform mode. The residuals, after thrusting until the IVI read
i ft/sec in all axes, were typically less than 0.7 ft/sec, usually less
than 0.2 to 0.3 ft/sec; The out-of-plane maneuver was conducted in rate
command, with the spacecraft yawed 90o to the southeast. Two stars,
Alpha and Beta Centauri, were noted while in this attitude. At this
point, it would ha_e been convenient to have received star positions to
use for the out-of-plane thrust. Star information would have been ex-
cellent backup data to validate the spacecraft attitude during this ma-
neuver. The coelliptic (NsR) maneuvers would have required a 2° pitch-
down attitude from the normal SEF position. This maneuver was also
conducted while in the platform mode, and the vertical component was
inserted by using the down thrusters.

There were no problems associated with reducing the residual ve-

locity components from any of the maneuvers. The reporting technique
was to wait until the residual velocities had been reduced to less than
0.2 ft/sec and report the final velocity change and the percentage of
propellant quantity remaining. The crew was impressed with the final
height-adjust maneuver of 0.8 ft/sec, and they become aware that the
range tracking data were outstanding when the solution provided by these
data permitted this very small correction. This continual updating and
the effect of these appropriate maneuvers made the crew also aware that
the network systems performance was outstanding.

A recommendation to subsequent crews should be made at this point.

Because of the slight cant of the lateral maneuver thrusters, it is
quite difficult to apply the final thrusts and remove the residual
desired changes in velocity indicated in the manual data readout unit
(_DRU). The pilot devoted considerable training time, in the GMS,
checking the various methods to reduce the residual velocities to ac-
ceptable levels.

Both the command pilot and the pilot remember the strong impression
that there was no need to know their exact position over the surface of
the earth. The appropriate maneuvers were executed with time as a ref-
erence and the crew was working with ground elapsed time and radar range
throughout the rendezvous until the start of station keeping. The first
definitive look at the earth's surface occurred during the in-plane fly-
around maneuver when spacecraft 6 was above spacecraft 7. It was diffi-
cult for the crew to effect utilization of the world orbit chart; there-
fore, it is reeon_nended that each range station notify the flight crew

of signal acquisition and of approaching loss of signal. This informa-
tion would enable the flight crew to transmit all of the data that they
accumulate during any previous critical time period.

During the short slack periods between maneuvers, equipment was re-
moved from its stowage position and was mounted for the rendezvous phase.
This equipment included two 16mm sequence cameras and associated brack-
ets, two 25mm lenses and lens mirrors, the spot meter, the 70mm camera
with the 80mm lens, and as much film for these cameras as could be
stowed in the cockpit. The world-orbit chart, the star chart, the
flight plan, and the rendezvous chart were placed in their appropriate
positions for in_nediate use.

The period prior to the first orbit-adjust maneuver provided very

little time to eat, but one meal was removed from a side stowage box and
both crew members quickly ate the bite-size food. The reconstituted
food was stowed on Velcro surfaces and was not eaten until the station-
keeping period. The command pilot used a chart for recording the com-
puter outputs during the period between radar acquisition and initiation
of the transfer maneuver. This chart was placed over the first-stage
and second-stage propellant gages, and an abbreviated rendezvous mode
checklist was attached to the instrument panel over the altimeter and
rate-of-descent indicator. The time for each thrust was logged by the
command pilot on the rendezvous procedure sheet.

The preflight planning was directed at avoiding the requirement to

use equipment that was difficult to unstow. To further simplify proce_
dures, the launch-day urine bags were worn until after the rendezvous.
The crew recognized that it was important to drink enough water to main-
tain their total water volume. When taking the first drink from the
water gun, the crew noted a number of approximately 63 000 on the counter,
which required unnecessary writing in the crew log.

At approximately 2 hours 45 minutes g.e.t., the command pilot in-

stalled the optical sight and checked the alignment by sighting on a
star. It was noted at this time that the torque to tighten the lower
attach knob affected the alignment. During rendezvous, when the knob
was fully tightened, the error in the sight was 0.5° to the right for
target location in relation to the radar null. Rendezvous phase.- Radar acquisition of spacecraft 7: At approximately

3 hours g.e.t., the ground update for acquisition of spacecraft 7 was
received as an attitude of 0° yaw and 5.5 ° pitch up. The ground con-
trollers also indicated that the initial computer readout of range
(248 nautical miles) would occur at 3 hours 15 minutes g.e.t. The

radar was turned on in the standby position at approximately 3 hours
5 minutes g.e.t. The analog meter indication cycled exactly as pre-
dicted, and the range and range rate indications oscillated until the
set warmed up. The radar was then placed on "ON".

The first radar-range readout on the MDRU was 248.66 nautical

miles, which is the maximum range readable. At this time, the radar
lock-on light was flickering. The radar lock-on became steady at
246.22 nautical miles. At that time, a radar test was performed with
the rendezvous mode of the computer to verify the interface and sequence-
ing of the computer and the radar. This radar-computer test was not
conclusive in that the specified 130o angle of orbit travel to rendez-
vous (_t) was not inserted and the last wt that was loaded was 180 °,
which had been used for a prelaunch test. Subsequent to the NSR ma-
neuver and the final switching to the rendezvous mode, the correct value
of wt (130 ° ) was loaded. The computer cycled properly, holding the
range in the register for i00 seconds, and the IVl's corresponded to
the computer readout of total-velocity-change for rendezvous. The
initial-velocity-change for target intercept was also noted, and the
values were found to be decreasing as range decreased. The event timer
was synchronized with the initiation of the NSR maneuver. Four min-

f utes after initiation of the NSR maneuver, the computer was switched
to the rendezvous mode and continuously monitored by the pilot. A time
synchronization revealed that the event timer was approximately 7 sec-
onds ahead of the computer time sequence (for 100-second intervals).
The event timer was resynchronized with the computer-time and counted
correctly throughout the remainder of the run. After the NSR maneuver,
the range was approximately 169 nautical miles. The pilot did not re-
cord anything on the data sheet until the values began to match the
nominal values at approximately 136 nautical miles range. After that,
the values were recorded and data points were frequently called to the
ground. The computer solution for the total-velocity-change for rendez-
vous was very close to nominal. The target-centered coordinate plot
(see fig. 7.1.2-1) showed that the NSR maneuver had placed space-
craft 6 into the nominal trajectory and that the maximum deviation was
approximately 0.25 mile high with no ellipticity. During this time, the
elevation and azimuth pointers were oscillating approximately 11.5 ° from
the electrical null. The period of the oscillation was approximately
4 seconds. As the range decreased to 97 miles, there was a noticeable
reduction in the amplitude of the oscillation; however, the period re-
mained constant. It should be noted that both the azimuth and eleva-
tion readings crossed the null point simultaneously during these oscil-
lations. At a range of 79 miles, all pointer oscillations ceased and
remained steady throughout the remainder of the rendezvous operations

and down to a range of 20 feet. The radar data were continually being
plotted and computations made as spacecraft 6 approached the point of
terminal phase initiation. Visual acquisition: Visual acquisition of spacecraft 7

occurred at 5 hours 4 minutes g.e.t., 54 miles slant-range from space-
craft 6 to spacecraft 7. The target vehicle appeared as a bright star,
0.5° to the right of the boresig_ line on the optical sight. The tar-
get appeared brighter than the star Sirius, and during postflight com-
parisons, the flight crew beliew_d it was probably brighter than the
planet Venus. The target stayed in sight because of reflected sunlight
until 05:15:56 g.e.t., or for approximately 12 minutes. Spacecraft 7
was lost in darkness about 3 minutes prior to the transfer thrust, at a
range of approximately 30 miles. The crew, however, could have deter-
mined a backup solution during tl_ programmed tracking period prior to
transfer, and would have been able to perform the maneuver without vis-
ual contact. Terminal phase: During the terminal phase_ the crew

used the data provided by the !GS (closed-loop) to perform all maneuvers.
However, the pilot did make all backup computations for each maneuver in
order to compare them with the results of the closed-loop solution. The
target-centered coordinate plot revealed very quickly that the relative
trajectory was near nominal and that the transfer thrust would be very
close to the planned value of 32 ft/sec along the line of sight. For
the backup procedure, the component normal to the line of sight was de-
termined from the time changeof the total pitch angle. The ground
solution, transmitted from Guaymas, indicated that the value was
31.5 ft/sec. The initial time transmitted to the flight crew for the
initiation of the terminal phase was 05:16:54 g.e.t. A short time
later this was refined to 05:18:54 g.e.t. The onboard computer solu-
tion gave a thrust time of 05:18:58 g.e.t., 4 seconds later than that
computed on the ground.

As the point of terminal phase initiate approached, it became evi-

dent that the exact" time to initiate the maneuver would be near the half-
way point between two of the computer solutions that are i00 seconds
apart. At this point the crew discussed the situation'and decided to
take the second of these solutions, if it still met the basic criteria.
This decision was made to insure that transfer would occur from a posi-
tion that would place spacecraft 6 forward and below spacecraft 7 at
final rendezvous, and that brakir_ would occur slightly later than nom-
inal rather than earlier. This was the crew's approach to being con-
servative with respect to the lighting conditions during the braking
maneuver in that, being slightly later, it would insure that the target
would be in daylight during the final approach. A pitch angle to space-
craft 7 of 20.8 deg was selected for terminal phase initiate at a range
of 41.06 nautical miles. At this time the START COMPbutton was pressed,

and the initial computer solution produced a value of 31 ft/sec fo_¢ard,
7 ft/see up (this value later decreased to 4 ft/sec up at the time of
thrust), and i ft/sec right. The backup solution was computed to be
23 ft/sec forward and 2 ft/sec up, and a notation was made of this
anomaly. The crew discussed the problem and decided that if a backup
maneuver had been necessary they would have applied the nominal thrust
of 32 ft/see. This decision was reached because of the nominal tra-
jectories that were indicated, up to that point, on the onboard target-
centered coordinate plot. In case the radar or computer had failed,
the thrusts that would have been applied were those necessary to achieve
changes in velocity of 2 ft/sec up and 32 ft/see forward.

After completion of the transfer thrust, the fuel remaining was

62 percent. At this point, the time system was reset to zero based on
the beginning of the first computer time cycle that occurred 270 sec-
onds after depressing the START COMP button (nominally, this time co-
incides with the end of the transfer maneuver). The crew used this
phase elapsed time (p.e.t.) as a time reference through final rendezvous.
The target was not in sight during the tight-tracking period from 3 to
5 minutes after the transfer maneuver. During the 3-to-5 minute tight-
tracking period, the analog range rate was 160 ft/sec at 3 minutes
30 seconds p.e.t. Computations from the onboard computer showed
156 ft/sec. At 4 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t., range rate from the analog
f meter was 155 ft/sec, and the computer value was 152 ft/sec. These com-
parisons show the close agreement between the analog meter readout and
the computer solution and provided the crew with high confidence in the
radar-computer _nterface.

At 5 hours 23 minutes g.e.t., during the 3-to-5 minute tight-

tracking period, spacecraft 7 lights were barely visible and not suf-
ficient for tracking. This time corresponds to a range of approximately
24 miles.

Subsequent to _ minutes p.e.t., the spacecraft was pitched do_n

to horizontal, using the direct attitude-control mode, to align the
platform. It was decided that alignment would be conducted during the
planned optional alignment period, from 5 minutes to i0 minutes p.e.t.
This decision was based on the fact that 1.5 hours had elapsed since
the last alignment. During this alignment period (with the platform in
SEF, the control mode in pulse, and the flight director indicator dis-
playing platform and attitude), very little motion was detected in the
pointers, indicating that the platform had been in good alignment. In
addition, the optical sight and the visible horizon also indicated good
alignment before starting the align period. This excellent performance
of the platform provided the crew with further confidence in the space-
craft IGS system. At i0 minutes 20 seconds p.e.t., direct control was
selected and the spacecraft was pitched back up in order to track space-
craft 7. The radar lock-on light had not extinguished; therefore, lock-
on was continuous during the alignment period. The radar was hulled on

the target, and the target lights appeared very dim in the sight at this
time. The target lighting was evaluated as sufficient for subsequent
tracking and angular measurements.

At this time, an estimation was made, using the data entered on

the target-centered coordinate plot, that the first mideourse correc-
tion would require slight forward and up velocities. The IVl's indi-
cated 7 ft/sec forward, 7 ft/sec up, and 5 ft/sec left at a p.e.t, of
ii minutes 40 seconds. This p.e.t, corresponds to 5:31:31 g.e.t.
After the midcourse correction t_ust was applied, the IVI read zero
in all axes. A second tight tracking of the target was required again
between 15 minutes and 17 minutes p.e.t. It was not difficult to ob-
serve the docking light on the target spacecraft at this time. The
acquisition lights did not show clearly, but they could have been
tracked for backup solutions frora approximately 12 minutes after the
transfer maneuver through final rendezvous.

During the second period of tight tracking, the range rate was
noted from the analog meter at 15 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t, and indi-
cated 90 ft/sec. The computer data gave a range rate at this time of
91 ft/sec. At 16 minutes 30 seconds p.e.t., the analog meter indicated
a range rate of 85 ft/sec and the onboard computed range rate was also
85 ft/sec. At 17 minutes p.e.t, the range to the target was 7.7 nauti_
cal miles. After this data point was obtained, the desired velocity
changes in guidance axes were zeroed in the computer, and tight track-
ing was maintained for a period of 3 minutes to determine the backup
solution for a normal-to-the-line-of-sight correction. The command pi-
lot remarked that the spacecraft 7 docking light was as bright as the
Agena. At 16 minutes p.e.t. (5:]55:51 g.e.t.) the pilot remarked that he
could see the docking light even though he had a brightly lighted area
in the cockpit.

The docking light on spacecraft 7 was displaced 0.5° to the right

of the zero position in the optical sight, while using the radar null
as the pointing command. Farther to the left, approximately i0° , two
bright stars, Castor and Pollux, were in sight. These stars provided
excellent pitch, roll, and yaw reference. In addition, there were suf-
ficient stars near and around the target to permit good tracking. It
was also noted that the docking light obscured the acquisition lights
because of its relatively greater brilliance. However, the spacecraft 6
crew requested that the spacecraft 7 docking light be left on.

The target-centered coordinate plot indicated that small up and

forward corrections would be required for the second mid-course correc-
tion. The backup solution indicated 6 ft/sec up. No backup velocity
correction along the line of sig_ could be obtain@d because the computer
math flow locked out ranges at this time. At 23 minutes 40 seconds p.e.t.,
the computer solution gave a correction of 4 ft/sec forward, 3 ft/see up,

and 6 ft/sec right. When this maneuver was completed, the IVI was zeroed
and the computer switched to the catchup mode. The pilot then cleared
b{DRU addresses 25, 26, and 27 (X, Y, and Z, desired velocity changes in
guidance axes) and the IV! displayed all zeros.

From this point_ the pilot continually called out the pitch angle
to spacecraft 7 as it increased and the range decreased. The command
pilot, at this point_ acquired a very good star pattern to maintain a
celestial line of sight. Very little motion was discerned during this
period. The target-centered coordinate plot indicated a flight path
that was forward of and nearly parallel to the nominal trajectory. At
one point, the pilot stated that it appeared as if the target were go-
ing up; however, the command pilot decided not to make any changes at
that time. At a range of 2 miles it again appeared from the pilot's
plot that the target was going up a small amount, but there was no
apparent motion in relation to the star background. At 5 hours 46 min-
utes g.e.t., no relative motion was observable. The range rate was
approximately 42 ft/sec, and at 05:48:11 g.e.t., the target appeared
to start moving down a small amountbut this relative motion was
stopped. At this point, the START COMP button was pressed. This
caused all subsequent changes in velocity to be displayed in cumu-
lative totals. At 05:49:06 g.e.t., both the colmmand pilot and the
pilot noted that the reentry control system (RCS) heater light came
on at the telelight panel. This was at a range of i mile. This in-
dicates that the panel was observable to the crew during this crit-
ical period. The total pitch angle_ from 1.30 nautical miles into
station keeping at 120 feet, was approximately 125 ° . Braking maneuver: During the terminal phase a combina-

tion of radar display and optical tracking was utilized by the command
pilot with the platform continually in orbital rate. The target held
steady on the indicator throughout the terminal phase maneuver. At
05:49:41 g.e.t., the command pilot remarked that the docking light was
quite bright, and the pilot noted the same thing.

At 0.74 mile range (05:49:58 g.e.t. ), the pilot noted that the tar-
get appeared to be moving down. This comment was prompted as a result
of seeing sunlight reflected off frost particles leaving spacecraft 6
and confusing them with stars. Spacecraft 6 was approaching the BEF
attitude (spacecraft 6 was 30 ° beyond the local vertical). The bal-
listic number of these particles was such that they trailed the space-
craft, tending to move upward toward the nose of the spacecraft. As
the crew observed the frost particles, they appeared to go up in rela-
tion to this apparent star field. There were stars still visible beyond
these bright particles and these stars confirmed that the target was not
moving in relation to the stars. This illusion for the pilot developed
from the lighting conditions in the right crew station. This side of
the cockpit was lighted sufficiently to permit the pilot to record data
and work with the computer throughout this period. As a result, when

he made an out-the-window observation, he could not see the stars, and
the particles appeared as stars to him. (This could have resulted in
additional fuel expenditures if both the command pilot and the pilot had
reacted identically. ) At 0.48 mile range, the crew started decelerating
spacecraft 6 from a closing range rate of approximately 42 ft/sec. Dur-
ing this period, there appeared to be no out-of-pl_ne motion. As the
braking continued, the velocity was reduced in a continuous thrust. The
command pilot peered behind the black shield on the vernier scale until
the pointer for range rate just appeared, having determined in the train-
ing simulator that this represented approximately 7 ft/sec. At this
point, thrust was terminated and the range was approximately 1200 feet.
The target had dropped slightly ar,d a downward thrust was also added.
At 800 feet range, 32 minutes after the translation maneuver, the clos-
ing velocity was approximately 6 ft/sec and the IVl's were cleared. The
cumulative velocity changes at this point read 27 ft/sec aft, 14 ft/see
left, and 7 ft/see down.

The total distance encompassed during the braking maneuver was

0.24 nautical miles (from 0.48 to 0.24 n. mi. from the target). When
the range was 0.20 nautical miles, the pilot called the range to space-
craft 7 in feet to the ground and to the command pilot.

At a range of approximately 700 feet, the sunlight illuminated

spacecraft 7 and the target was so bright that no stars were visible.
The total impact of the brightness was as if a carbon arc lamp had been
turned on immediately in front of spacecraft 6. The range decreased
nominally, during which time both the pilot and command pilot contin-
ually commented on the brightness of the target. Because of the bright-
ness, the radar display and the flight director attitude indicator
(FDAI) were then used for tracking. As spacecraft 6 approached a range
of 300 feet from spacecraft 7, the pitch angle decreased to 90o and held
that value. Spacecraft 6 then continued to approach from directly be-
low spacecraft 7.

At 240 feet, all rates in translation, except the closing velocity,

had been reduced to zero. The closing velocity was being reduced by a
series of small thrusts to approximately 2 ft/sec. Finally, at a range
of ]20 feet, all relative motion between the two spacecraft was stopped
at approximately 36 minutes after the translation maneuver.

The final braking maneuver was difficult because of (1) the bright-
ness of the reflected sunlight from the target at a range of approxi-
mately 700 feet, and (2) the fact that the crew could no longer use
stars as a reference. Also, the target spacecraft was changing pitch
attitude in order to track spacecraft 6 and, as a visible object, could

not be used for attitude reference with relation to motion in a pitch
maneuver of spacecraft 6.

A very low, relative translation rate remained near the end of the
braking maneuver. Spacecraft 6 had moved from a pitch angle of 90 ° to
a pitch angle of 60° by the time the forward relative velocity was re-
duced to zero. The crew elected to continue this motion at a 120-foot
radius, pitching down to the SEF attitude, and holding this position.
At this point, spacecraft 6 was in the SEF position, with spacecraft 7
facing it in BEF_ and all relative motion was stopped. The attitude
control system was placed in SEFplatform control mode, and all maneu-
vers were then performed with the maneuver controller.

The performance of the guidance and control system and radar sys-
tem during all phases of rendezvous was excellent and the use of radar
for rendezvous was shown to be extremely valuable. Throughout the ren-
dezvous phase, the radar maintained positive lock-on and an accurate
indication of range was available through the minimum readable value of
60 feet. The attitude indications were steady throughout the entire
maneuver. Station keeping.- From the crew's analysis of the timing,

spacecraft 6 arrived in formation with spacecraft 7 about 23 seconds
_ earlier than predicted prior to lift-off. In the SEF attitude, the
distance between the spacecraft was closed to approximately 6 to lO feet
in order to observe spacecraft 7 in detail. Still photographs and mo-
tion pictures were taken and all exposure values were determined with
the spot meter. The results of this photography indicate that a spot
meter is a valuable aid in photographing objects in space. Initially,
station keeping was accomplished in platform mode with minute thrust
motions made with the maneuver controller. Shortly after the start of
station keeping, the sun striking the command pilot's window completely
obscured his view of spacecraft 7. The pilot gave voice positions of
the target, and finally_ control was passed to the pilot for approxi-
mately 1 minute until the spacecraft moved out of this sun angle. (This
effect will continue to be a problem for station keeping.) The crew did
not elect to do the in-plane fly-around at this point because they wanted
to determine the composition of the strap observed hanging from the
adapter of spacecraft 7. Shortly thereafter, the Gemini VII crew in-
formed the Gemini VI-A crew that they also had a strap hanging from
their adapter. This subsequently was determined to be part of the
shaped charge holders. (See section 5.1.9.)

During the final portion of the first daylight period, station

keeping was conducted in platform mode and finally in pulse mode when
it was determined to be an easy task. Spacecraft 6 closed to about
i foot, nose to nose with spacecraft 7, and it was concluded that

docking would not present any problems. It was also noted during this
period that one spacecraft could influence the horizon scanners of the
other spacecraft.

During the first night period, station keeping was maintained at

ranges varying from 20 to 60 feet and the spacecraft were nose to nose.
During the transition from daylight to night, the blurred horizon caused
the scanner to lose track; therefore, orbit rate was selected prior to
entering this period to avoid any transients that might occur during the
period of scanner loss. Station was maintained by first using the dock-
ing light and platform mode, then with the docking light and pulse mode,
then without the docking light and using the illuminated windows of
spacecraft 7 as a reference. D_ing a subsequent night pass, an out-
of-plane position was encountered where the crew could not see the win-
dow of spacecraft 7. The hand-held penlights were then utilized to
illuminate spacecraft 7 at a range of approximately 30 or 40 feet. The
crew determined that they had sufficient lighting for station keeping.
The most efficient way to conduct station keeping was to maintain sta-
tion in horizon scan mode, letti_ the spacecraft drift in yaw. The
recommended position for maintaining station is in the out-of-plane posi-
tion, rather than trying to maintain station above or below the space-
craft. This provides a visual aid in that the horizon relative to the
target permits holding pitch and roll relatively steady in the horizon
scan mode.

During the second daylight period, spacecraft 7 was scheduled to

perform an experiment and conduct a small amount of station keeping.
To provide a fixed target for the D-4/D-7 experiment, spacecraft 6 was
moved to a nose-to-nose position, 20 feet from spacecraft 7. The amount
of fuel remaining in spacecraft 7 did not permit more than about 2 to
3 minutes of station keeping, and both the co,and pilot and pilot ma-
neuvered off the nose of spacecraft 6 for this period. Subsequent to
the station keeping performed by spacecraft 7, spacecraft 6 again picked
up the nose position and the co_nd pilot initiated an in-plane fly-

The in-plane fly-aroumd was conducted for 20 minutes starting at

7 hours 42 minutes g.e.t. The pilot conducted an out-of-plane fly-
around for ii minutes starting at 8 hours i0 minutes g.e.t.

The command pilot, during the in-plane fly-around, allowed the range
between the two spacecraft to increase to an estimated 300 feet. The
relative position of spacecraft 6 at that time was above spacecraft 7,
and slightly to the rear. This distance appeared to be excessive for
proper station keeping and the range was quickly reduced to less than
i00 feet. The radar system was not used during the station-keeping per-
iod. These ranges were determined both by visual observation in rela-
tion to the 10-foot diameter of the spacecraft as viewed through the

optical sight during the flight and by measurements after the flight of
photographs taken with known optical systems.

It is recommended that station keeping not be conducted in-plane

above or below the target. The ideal condition for station keeping is
SEF or BEF in platform mode; however, station keeping can easily be
conducted out-of-plane at ranges up to 60 or 80 feet without losing the
perceptive cues that pilots have learned to recognize in formation fly-
ing with aircraft.

The smallest distance between spacecraft 6 and spacecraft 7 during

station keeping was approximately i foot, and both the command pilot and
pilot flew at this distance with great ease. This, of course, greatly
enhanced the crew's confidence in the control system for subsequent
station-keeping operations. The control-system response can be described
as perfect. The torque-to-inertia ratios of the attitude control system
using the pulse mode, and thrust-to-inertia ratios of the translation
system using minute inputs, were excellent for the station keeping per-
formed during this mission. Docking with a target vehicle could have
been easily executed by applying a small burst of forward thrust from
the 1-foot range. Separation maneuver.- The next event was the separation

maneuver and the Apollo sextant sightings. The separation thrust was
initiated at ll:14:31 g.e.t, with spacecraft 6 in the SEF position,
15 to 20 feet from spacecraft 7 in the BEF position. All rates and
translation velocities were nulled in order to achieve zero relative
velocity with respect to spacecraft 7. The separation thrust was con-
ducted with the crew using the displays from the inertial guidance sys-
tem to provide a retrograde separation of 9 ft/sec.

The Apollo sextant sightings were conducted with Sirius as the

basic reference star. Data were collected by the pilot and recorded by
the command pilot. During preflight planning, the crew decided to have
the platform, computer, and radar in operation for correlation with the
sextant sightings and this was done. The time of the sightings was
logged by the photo event indicator on the telemetry channel. The event
timer was observed continually during these sightings, but its accuracy
was about 0.2 sec at best. Therefore, the data should be considered to
be only as accurate as the timing system.

The spacecraft 7 docking light was used initially during the sep-
aration maneuver but was later turned off because the target vehicle was
not being held to a fixed attitude. The flashing lights were observed
for short periods, between which they would disappear completely because
of the changing attitude of spacecraft 7. The last visual contact with
the lights on spacecraft 7 was at 9.70 miles, and, subsequent to that
point, they were no longer visible.

After spacecraft 7 moved into the daylight, a visibility test was
conducted to determine the amount of sunlight reflected from spacecraft 7
while spacecraft 6 changed attitude with respect to the sun. The in-
verted position and sideways positions were noted, and no appreciable
change could be observed in the reflected light from spacecraft 7. Also,
at this time, no stars could be observed in the inverted position even
though the sun was being blocked from the windows of spacecraft 6.

The last observable object, other than spacecraft 7, was the planet
Jupiter, which was visible for a very short period after sunrise oc-
curred. Spacecraft 6 was predominately BEF at this point, and the atti-
tudes were adjusted from BEF to c_timize visual observation of stars and
spacecraft 7. Spacecraft 7 was visible when spacecraft 6 was in the true
BEF attitude (0° roll, 180 ° yaw, and 0° pitch) throughout most of the
daylight period after the initial night period following separation. In
the second night period, the spacecraft 7 acquisition lights were visible
intermittently to the pilot who was using the 4-power magnification of
the sextant. The brightness of the star Sirius, when brought together
with the image of spacecraft 7 to get the angular displacement, blanked
out the small apparent light from spacecraft 7.

The intervals of time that spacecraft 7 acquisition lights could be

observed were a maximum of 5 to l0 seconds long, and the total motion of
the sextant to bring the star and the spacecraft 7 together could not be
achieved in these short periods of time. The acquisition lights were
spotted very faintly for only a few seconds at a range of 16.33 nautical

During this time, spacecraft 7 was in a tumbling or drifting mode,

and the radar continued to maintain lock-on and range readout to the
last sighting attempt which was approximately 20 miles from spacecraft 7.
Subsequent to this last attempt for a sextant sighting, the crew pre-
pared for their sleep period.

The posigrade thrust maneuver of 9 ft/sec was initiated at

13:25:52 g.e.t. This thrust put spacecraft 6 in an equal-period orbit
with spacecraft 7 and leading by approximately 30 miles. The sleep per-
io_ started at approximately 15 hours g.e.t.; the command pilot stated
that he slept for approximately 5 hours, and the pilot stated that he
slept for approximately 4 hours. The crew was awakened by a call from
spacecraft 7 to the ground requesting the retro-time of spacecraft 6.
This call noted the time would be 14 hours 53 minutes G.m.t. and indi-
cated that spacecraft 6 had approximately 4 orbits left. The crew per-
formed minor housekeeping duties, powered up the spacecraft, and ob-
tained dim-light-phenomena photographs during revolutions 13 and 14.
Experiments S-5 and S-6 were also conducted during revolutions 13 and
14, and part of revolution 15. The majority of the photographs were of

weather phenomena because only very small areas of land masses could be

The flight controller at the Mission Control Center requested that

the radar be turned on during revolution 14 to perform range measure-
ments. The radar locked on and performed as well as it had during the
rendezvous. During the radar test, the spacecraft 7 acquisition lights
were observed for ond data point at 22:12:00 g.e.t.

At 25:15:58 g.e.t., all of the items required for retrofire had

been checked and the cockpit was in the proper configuration. The RCS
had performed satisfactorily, and spacecraft 6 was in rate command,
pitched dowu20 ° for the retrofire maneuver. Retrofire was initiated
exactly on time at 25:15:58 g.e.t. The disturbance torques indicated
that the first retrorocket was slightly misaligned and there was a
pause between each of the retrorocket firings, long enough to permit
the IVI's to stop counting up between each rocket firing. The final
readout of the IVI's was 309 ft/sec aft, 1 ft/sec right, and ll6 ft/sec
down. This number changed to 310 ft/sec subsequent to jettisoning the
retrosections, indicating a slight change in velocity during retro-
adapter jettison. Reentry.- At the time of retro-adapter jettison, the dock-

ing bar, which had been deployed, was jettisoned and a large number of
sparks appeared which can be described as similar to a Roman candle.
The spacecraft was then put in the heads-down (inverted) attitude and
was flown in pulse mode with one ring of the reentry control system
activated. Because of the night retrofire, the horizon did not come
into view until shortly before an altitude of 400K feet was reached.
Prior to this, the reentry logic was checked. For this check, the com-
puter outputs were selected for display on the flight director indicator
and there appeared to be a shift in the electrical null of the command
pilot's indicator of approximately2 1/2 pointer-widths down. The
pilot's indicator was reading approximately 2 pointer-widths down. The
command pilot and the pilot both marked their instrument faces for these
new electrical nulls, and decided to fly to that point for landing. The
pointer displacement that had been noted throughout the flight had been
approximately one-half pointer-width down for the command pilot; there-
fore, after retrofire the system appeared to have shifted an additional
2 pointer-widths down, representing a 12-mile overshoot for landing.

A bank angle of 55 ° left was attained in pulse mode, ring A, and

held until guidance initiate at approximately 280K feet. The first
error indication on the display was cross range to the right, indicat-
ing that spacecraft 6 was left, or north, of the desired path. The
value of cross range indicated was approximately 1.5° to 2° right, and
the value of down range, indicated from the center point of the horizon,
was approximately 2.5_ do_m, or an indicated 55-to-60 mile overshoot.

The control configurations used during reentry started with ring A
in the pulse mode which provided sufficient authority to maintain the
bank angle. When guidance initiate occurred the bank angle was in-
creased to approximately 55 ° to effect correction of the down-range
needle. This increased bank angle provided decreased lift and brought
the down-range needle up toward the reference marking on the instrument
face. As the needles started moving, the bank angle was decreased to
approximately 45 ° which was very close to the updated bank angles of
47° right and left. When the down-range needle reached the reference
marking, the cross range became zero and crossed to the opposite side.
The pointers were allowed to move slightly above the reference marking
to permit a roll to the right which in turn produced a small increment
of lift and brought the pointer back to the zero point. A right bank
angle was selected to bring the cross-range pointer back to the center
or null position. This particular reentry condition_ where the initial
errors were small, had not been practiced on the simulator. As a result,
to reverse the bank angle rapid_y, to reduce transients, and to keep the
pointer exactly on the mark, the rate command control mode was selected
for the reverse bank maneuver. This control mode provided the authority
to reverse bank immediately and keep the rates damped. The reverse bank
was held at approximately 47 °. When the cross-range pointer came back
to the center, the control was reversed to a left bank angle of approxi-
mately 45° . The cross range held null, but, after the time of peak
acceleration, the pointer started moving to the right, indicating a
landing north of the desired landing point. The bank angle was in-
creased slightly to between 500 and 55°; however, the cross range error
continued increasing to the rigkb, but did not go beyond the full deflec-
tion position on the low scale. As the reentry accelerations were de-
creasing from the peak of 4.3g, the fuel in ring A of the reentry con-
trol system was exhausted. (This was noted because there was no apparent
response to the roll command from the attitude control stick.) The re-
dundant ring 9 was selected and the desired bank angle was re-established.
As the reentry continued, the down-range pointer held at the reference
mark, and the bank angle was increased to favor the cross-range error
which was off to the right and holding steady. This was the final error
indication as the spacecraft passed through 80K feet, at which time the
cross-range pointer was displaced to the right and the downrange error
indication was locked on the reference line. This bank angle was main-
tained to drogue parachute deployment. Landing and recove_.- The postlanding condition was nomi-

nal. Excellent }{F communications were established with the Mission Con-
trol Center at Cape Kennedy. The spacecraft was in excellent condition
and the crew elected to open the hatches to provide cooling after the
flotation collar had been installed and inflated. The hatches were
secured prior to the spacecraft being hoisted aboard the carrier

U.S.S. Wasp. After the spacecraft was secured in the recovery trans-
portation dolly, the power-down sequence was accomplished and the crew
egressed to the deck of the ship.

(fine scale)

Elevationangle, deg.

Figure7.1.2-1. - Onboardtarget-centered
coordinateplotof rendezvous.

_he Gemini VI-A mission presented two new major aspects of the man-
ned spaceflight program to medical support personnel. First, this was
the initialflight in a planned series of rendezvous missions. In these
missions there are essentially no new or novel environmental conditions
imposed upon the crew. Major emphasis shifted from attempting to detect
and record all biomedical changes in the crew members_ which might re-
sult from the space-flight experience, to attempting to provide optimum
operational medical support and monitoring for mission safety. Second,
the fact that Gemini VI-A was launched approximately i week after Gem-
ini VII afforded medical personnel an early opportunity to evaluate the
adequacy of plans for simultaneous medical assessment and support of up
to six crewmen in the available facilities at the Kennedy Space Flight
Center. In responding to these new mission support requirements, medical
operations personnel gained understanding which will permit realistic_
detailed planning for medical support of future space missions.

7.2.1 Preflight

f • Clinical background data.- Pertinent medical records were

reviewed and summarized for the prime and backup crews. Because the
command pilot of the flight crew and both members of the backup crew
had previous space-flight experience, clinical and physiological data
characterizing the individual responses of these men to actual flight
were available for direct comparison with data obtained during the
Gemini VI-A mission. Testing for drug sensitivity and skin reaction to
the biosensor materials was finished in early October, 1965, in prepa-
ration for the first attempted launch of Gemini VI. It was not necessary
to repeat these procedures. Tilt-table tests.- Since significant changes in the reflex

responses of the cardiovascular system have been measured in all Gemini
missions, similar changes were expected to occur during the Gemini VI-A
flight. _hree preflight tilt-table tests were conducted on each of the
flight crew members, and the results were tabulated and plotted for com-
parison with postflight measurements. Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2 present
these tilt responses.

7.2.1. 3 Physical fitness and diet.- _he command pilot thought that
the best physical preparation for the mission would consist of physical
activity commensurate with the amount of exercise he anticipated would
be required in the conduct of the flight. _his approach was based on the
assumption that the probability of an emergency landing, which would
place high demands on the crew for feats of physical strength and

endurance, was so low as to be negligible. The pilot had adopted a
routine to achieve and maintain a high level of physical stamina at the
time he entered into crew training. It was his practice to exercise vig-
orously for approximately i hour a day, using a program designed to main-
tain a high level of strength and endurance. He continued on this
program until the morning of the flight.

_he crew wished to avoid the necessity for defecation during the
flight in order not to be distracted from their progress toward the ac-
complishment of rendezvous. _hey scheduled a preflight trial on a low-
residue diet with administration of a mild laxative planned at the
conclusion of the low-residue dietary period. The crew determined, to
their satisfaction_ that use of the low-residue diet and laxative regime
would increase the probability that they could fly up to 48 hours, if
necessary, without discomfort or inconvenience because of a requirement
for bowel evacuation. The low-residue diet and laxative regime were
employed during the final 4 days prior to the scheduled launch on
October 25, 1965, and on December 9, 1965, in anticipation of launch on
December 12. When this second launch attempt was postponed, the crew
remained on the low-residue diet in preparation for the rescheduled
launch date of December 15_ 1965. Medical examinations and crew status.- Both members of the

flight crew developed mild upper respiratory infections during the last
2 weeks prior to their scheduled launch date of December 12_ 1965. Each
reported the symptoms immediately_ the condition was treated_ and was
followed closely by the crew flight surgeons. The illness was diagnosed
as a localized viral upper respiratory infection and was treated without

The flight crew was examined on December i, December 9, December 12,

and December 15, 1965. They were found medically qualified for flight
on each occasion. Results of blood and urine analyses performed in con-
junction with the first two examinations are shown in Tables 7.2-1
through 7.2-11!.

During the December i, 1965, ex_nination, the flight and backup crews
for Gemini VI-A were examined by the crew flight surgeons while the
flight crew for Gemini VII was undergoing a comprehensive F-3 day medi-
cal examination by the team of specialist consultants. This overlapping
examination was scheduled to avoid conflicts which otherwise would have
occurred in the training plans of the crews for the two spacecraft. The
examinations were accomplished without difficulty and with a minimum of
delay. The activity demonstrated that the medical examining facility at
Cape Kennedy is capable of being used for medical examinations planned
in support of Apollo flights.

UNCLASSIFIED 7-3 Launch preparations.- Application of biomedical sensors,
instrumentation checkout_ and suiting were accomplished on schedule on
December 12_ 1965, and again on December 15, 1965. All bioinstrumenta-
tion functioned properly during the attempted launch on December 12,
1965. _he reaction of both flight crew members to the engine shutdown
was completely professional and appropriate to the situation. Changes
in heart rate and respiratory pattern were barely perceptible in either
crew member throughout the emergency sequence.

On the morning of December 15, 1965, the oral temperature probe in

the pilot's helmet was found to be inoperative during bioinstrumentation
checkout. A replacement unit was not available and a decision was made
to proceed with crew ingress on schedule since the measurement was not
mandatory for launch.

7.2.2 Inflight

This section of the report includes analysis of events from lift-off

to spacecraft landing, an elapsed time of approximately 25 hours 52 minutes. Physiological data monitoring.- Physiological information

f acquired by the Gemini bioinstrumentation system, as well as certain
physiologically important environmental conditions measured in the space-
craft, was transmitted from the spacecraft and monitored in real time by
physicians at the Mission Control Center - Houston (MCC-H), and by aero-
medical flight controllers at remote network tracking sites. Additional
physiological data were stored on the biomedical tape recorders located
in the spacecraft. Physiological phenomena telemetered to the ground
included two leads of electrocardiogram, a pneumogram (respiration),
oral temperature, and blood pressure from each crew member. Because
spacecraft 7 was also in orbit at the same time, physiological data
telemetered to the remote tracking stations were not transmitted to
MCC-H during station passes. Post-pass replay of these data was possi-
ble upon request. The quality of the analog data recorded at the MCC-H
was satisfactory for analysis and assessment of the crew's physiological
condition. Electrocardiograms and respiration traces from each crew mem-
ber were also recorded on the onboard biomedical tape recorders during the
entire flight. Portions of these records will be replayed in analog form
for review at a later date. Electrocardiograms and heart rate: Electrocardiographic

patterns and heart rate remained within normal limits throughout the
flight. At the MCC-H_ heart rate information was displayed graphically
on trend plots prepared manually in the Life Systems Staff Support Room.
(See fig. 7.2-3(a) and (b).)

7.2.2. i. 2 Respiration: Respiration rates_ as determined from
telemetered impedence pneumograms_ were well within expected normal

7.2.2. i. 3 Blood pressure: Two blood pressure measurements were

obtained from each crew member during the flight. _hese values were
consistent with preflight determinations and are shown in figures 7.2-3(a)
and (b). Blood pressure determinations from both crewmen were obtained
during crew status reports. The pilot reported that a sensation of in-
creased pressure under the blood pressure cuff existed throughout the
mission. There were no other problems with the blood pressure measuring
system on this flight.

7.2.2. I. 4 0ral temperature: The flight plan called for oral tem-
perature from each crew member during the crew status reports. However_
because the pilot's oral temperature probe was inoperative_ readings
were obtained from the command pilot only and were normal. Medical observations. - Lift-off and powered flight: _he crew_ because of having

experienced an engine shutdown on December 12, 1965, was exceptionally
well qualified to comment on the sensations of actual lift-off. _hey
confirmed that the physical sensation of lift-off is unmistakable. [he
visual cues inside the spacecraft, such as the clock starting_ needles
moving, et cetera, are of less significance than the sensations of the
buildup of thrust perceived from the sound and vibration. They also
described a slight_ but definite "eyeballs-in" acceleration and a brief_
but definite period of slight lateral oscillation. The crew experienced
a maximum acceleration of slightly greater than 7g without difficulty.
There was no difficulty experienced from the vibration associated with
powered flight and no POlO was noted. Neither crew member experienced
vertigo or disorientation during powered flight_ and there were no un-
usual sensations described upon insertion into orbit with transition to
weightless flight. Food: _hree meals per crew member of Gemini flight food
were stowed aboard the spacecraft. _he crew found_ however, that they
were too busy during the first 12 hours of flight to prepare the recon-
stituted foods. During this time, they shared one meal, eating only the
bite-sized foods, leter, they prepared and ate the remaining food items.
The crew stated that they were not especially hungry during the busy
portion of the flight, but that they became quite hungry later, eating
and enjoying the food. The juices were especially recommended for their
palatability and thirst-quenching quality.

- UNCLASSIFIED 7- 7 3 Water: An ample quantity of potable water was available
to the crew in the spacecraft drinking-water system. A modified water
dispensing nozzle discharged a measured amount of approximately 1/2 ounce
of water each time the release mechanism was actuated. _he total number
of discharges was displayed on a cumulative digital counter. This sys-
tem of recording drinks was satisfactory and presented no problems other
than the fact that the counter was not set on zero at lift-off_ but
rather on a five-digit number. This complicated the calculations nec-
essary for recording the volume of each drink. The command pilot con-
sumed 64 i/2 ounces of water, the pilot 81 I/2 ounces. Waste management and personal hygiene: Neither crew

member used the defecation bag during this flight. _he crew experienced
difficulty with the assembly of the urine disposal system. _he quick-
disconnect attaching the urine receiver hose to the water management
panel required excessive force to make the connection. Both crew mem-
bers had to release their restraining strapsj turn around in the seat_
and work together to attach this connection. This operation required
excessive time_ and both crew members were aware of an uncomfortable
amount of body heat generated during this activity. Otherwise_ the op-
eration of the urine system was acceptable with very little spillage of
urine when minimal precautionary measures, such as a towel or tissue to
prevent spillage, were used. Personal hygiene presented no problem.
For oral hygiene purposes, the command pilot used the chewing gum only.
The sealed premoistened sanitary wipes were satisfactory for cleansing
purposes. Sleep: Both crew members were very tired following com-
pletion of the station-keeping activities and slept soundly. _he com-
mand pilot slept 5 hours and the pilot slept 4 hours i0 minutes. During
sleep the crew had their visors open and their gloves off. The filters
on the spacecraft windows provided sufficient light attenuation for
sleep. Each crew member awoke spontaneously at a different time during
the sleep periods. Both crew members emphasized the importance of sched-
uling sleep periods at the end of a period of concentrated effort, such
as rendezvous, rather than trying to carry out some other demanding task
such as extravehicular activity at that time. Physical status and comfort: The crew thought that the
environmental control system was not adequate to maintain comfort during
powered-up periods of flight. Each recalled that any amount of physical
activity generated a heat load leading to a buildup of sweating. It was
necessary to relax and remain relatively inactive to become comfortable.

During sleep_ however_ when activity was at a minimum and several space-
craft systems were powered down_ the system responded well and the suit
flow had to be reduced to prevent over-cooling.

After insertion into orbit; both crew members removed their gloves
and later felt that their helmets should have been removed at that time
also. The spacecraft 6 crew actllally wore their helmets during the en-
tire flight. Both crew members experienced discomfort in the upper back_
shoulder_ and neck muscles. They attributed this to the fact that they
had to lean forward with their helmets on during the active portions of
the flight in order to perform their activities. _he pilot_ who fre-
quently had to bend forward to perform calculations and monitor the
instruments, also developed a superficial abrasion on his forehead which
persisted during the immediate postflight period.

The extremes of contrast and suddenness of change when transi%ioning

from light to dark phases of flight bothered the crew considerably. The
command pilot described the situation as analogous to mild snowblindness
and recommended that some sort of visual protection be provided for this

The command pilot experienced some nasal stuffiness and discharge

during the latter phases of the flight. He requested_ and later took,
one actifed tablet approximately 3 1/2 hours prior to retrofire to pre-
clude earblock on reentry. He experienced effective relief.

The crew was not aware of unusual odors at any time during the
flight. They did, however, notice an acrid odor upon opening the snor-
kel; shortly after landing on the water. Because of this; they remained
on the suit ventilation circuit for the period of time necessary for the
odor to dissipate. _his odor was described as being similar to that
near the heat shield of a spacecraft that has recently reentered. The
crew experienced no other medical problems on this flight. Retrofire and reentry: Both crew members agreed that

the 4.8g peak experienced on reentry was much more noticeable than the
7g peak experienced during powered flight. They experienced moderately
severe oscillations when the spacecraft was suspended from the parachute.
At single-point release_ there was a particularly abrupt translation
during which both crew members experienced the normal jolt forward. The
landing sequence was uneventful and the crew experienced no unusual
symptoms during descent.

7.2.3 Postflight

This portion of the report includes medical information gathered

after the time of spacecraft landing_ _hese data were obtained during
several clinical examinations, a medical debriefing_ and by laboratory
examinations of blood and urine. Postflight deviations from normal were
limited to the following:

(a) Mild transient reduction in pulse pressure and elevation of

heart rate during the postflight tilt procedures as compared to the pre-
flight tilt studies.

(b) Very mild crew fatigue

(c) Hemoconcentration Recovery activities.- Medical recovery activities were

planned in advance of the mission and were modified only as dictated by
the observed medical responses of the crew. Because these medical re-
sponses were normal, there was essentially no modification to preflight
medical planning for the recovery phase of the flight.

f Planned recovery procedures: Following recovery of the

crew and suit removal_ a detailed examination by the medical evaluation
team who examined the crew preflight was planned. This team consisted
of the NASA recovery physician, an opthalmologist, and otorhinolaryn-
gologist_ a neuropsychiatrist_ a specialist in internal medicine_ and
a laboratory pathologist. Tilt procedures were planned twice on the day
of recovery and daily thereafter until the responses had returned to pre-
flight values. Narrative: After landing_ the crew reported that they

were con_fortable in the spacecraft. They elected to remain in their
pressure suits and in the spacecraft until recovery aboard the U.S.S.
Wasp. _he seas were unusually calm on the day of recovery, no drugs
were taken_ and no symptoms of seasickness were reported by the crew.
Following a normal spacecraft retrieval_ the crew egressed without dif-
ficulty. _hey had no adverse symptoms upon standing and being welcomed
aboard the ship. Immediately thereafter, they walked unassisted to the
ship's sick bay where the initial postflight medical examinations were
performed. At no time during the recovery or postflight phase of the
mission did the crew report any subjective symptoms of low blood pres-

y. 2.3.2 Examinations.- A detailed medical examination was conducted

by the medical evaluation team as soon as the crew had arrived in sick
bay. Medical observations began with the doffing of the crew's space

suits. Of the slightly more than 4 hours that both crew members spent
in sick bay, 3 hours iO minutes were used to examine the command pilot
and 2 hours 50 minutes were required for the pilot. With the exception
of the relatively minimal orthostatic hypotensive tilt response and
mild hemoconcentration, no significant abnormalities were noted during
this examination. The findings are summarized in table 7.2-IV.

Both crew members exhibited a mild reaction to the tape used to

fasten the body sensors on the thoracic wall. The skin was in excellent
condition with good turgor and there was no desquamation. The underwear
was only moderately saturated with perspiration and appeared to be quite
clean. Body odor was nearly absent. _here was no skin eruption other
than that mentioned where the biosensors had been attached. Specifi-
cally, there was no maceration in the axillae or perineal areas. Scalp
scaling was not present. _he pilot had a very superficial abrasion
across his forehead because of helmet pressure. The crew was only mini-
really fatigued and appeared well rested following recovery.

The internist examined the command pilot early on arrival in sick

bay and noted some narrowing and slight irregularity of the retinal
arterioles. Later, the opthalmologist observed these same findings,
mainly in the inferior temporal area of the left eye. This arteriolar
narrowing had diminished within 3 hours following landing and was absent
that evening shortly before the con_nand pilot retired. _hese fundus-
copic findings were absent in the pilot. Such arteriolar narrowing had
not been observed in prior Gemini crews and was not observed in the
Gemini VII crew. Although one might implicate the lO0-percent oxygen
atmosphere, fatigue, and stress as possible explanations for this phe-
nomenon, the etiology of such an isolated finding cannot be explained
with certainty. No other significant changes from the crew's preflight
medical conditions were noted during the postflight medical examinations.
The crew reported no symptoms nor did they demonstrate any medical se-
quelae during the postflight phase of the mission. Tilt-table studies.- The same tilt-table procedure as used

on the Gemini V mission was employed on Gemini VI-A. Three preflight
and three postflight tilt studies were performed on each crewman. The
postflight tilt procedures revealed only a minimal elevation of heart
rate and decrease in pulse pressure in both crewmen. No adverse symp-
toms were noted at any time. This tilt response returned to normal in
2 days as shown in figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2. This minimal physiological
alteration did not in any way compromise the crew's ability to function
during the inflight or postflight phases of the mission. As on previous
missions, these cardiovascular responses are believed to have occurred
because of true physiologic alteration, although the individual crewman's
tilt responses were influenced by other individual_ operational_ and
environmental variables.

UNCLASSIFIED 7-4 _ Laboratory studies. - Evidence of hemoconcentration was pre-
sent during postflight examination and returned to normal 2 days follow-
ing landing. On the day of recovery_ from the time of arrival in sick
bay until retiring for the night_ the command pilot drank i190 ec fluid
and the pilot drank 1760 ce. Only routine urinalyses were accomplished
amd_ other than a high specific gravity_ no significant changes were
noted. Crew radiation was minimal and is tabulated in table 7.2-V.



(a) Chemistries

Determination Preflight Post flight

Date, 196_ December 9 December 16
Time, e.s.t. $:00 a.m. i:O0 p.m.

Sodium, m Eq/l 144 137

Potassium, m Eq/l 4.7 4.4

Chloride, m Eq/l 102 i01

Calcium, m Eq/l 4.6 5.5

Calcium, mg percent 9.2 ii.0

Magnesium, m Eq/l 2.2 i. 7

Phosphate, mg percent 5.0 3.8 --

Glucose, mg percent 98 102

Urea, N mg percent 2,5 20.4

Total protein, gm percent 7.3 7.5

Albumin, gm percent 4.4 4.3

Uric acid, mg percent 5.8 5.

Total bilirubin, mg percent O. 5 QNSa

Alkaline phosphatase, a
BL units i. 6 QNS

aQuantity not sufficient (to be measured).



(b) Hematology

Determination Preflight Postflight

Date, 1965 December i December 9 December 16 December 18

Time, e_s.t. 8:00 a.m. 8:00 a.m. 12:30 p.m. i0:i0 a.m.

White blood cells/mm 3 9 350 ii 800 9 600 i0 450

Neutrophiles, percent 45 59 63 50

Lymphoeytes, percent 47 27 29 37

Monocytes, percent 4 8 7 5

Eosinophiles, percent 4 i 7

Basophiles, percent 0 0 i

Red blood cells, millions/mm 3 4.455 5.070 4.625 -

f Hematocrit, percent 45.3 46.5 54 45

Reticulocyte count, percent - 0.95 -

Hemoglobin, gm/100 ml 14.6 15.0 16 16.4

Cell morphology Normal Normal Normal Normal


(a) Chemistries

Determination Preflight Postflight

Date, 1965 December 9 December 16
Time, e.s.t. 8:00 a.m. i:00 p.m.

Sodium, m Eq/l 154 139

Potassium, m Eq/l 4.7 4.3

Chloride, m Eq/l 103 107

Calcium, m Eq/l 4.9 5.6

Calcium, mg percent 9.8 ii.2

Magnesium, m Eq/l 2.4 2.2

Phosphate, mg percent 4.2 4. i

Glucose, mg percent 108 112

Urea, N, mg percent 17 16.5

Total protein, gm percent 7.5 8. i

Albumin, gm percent 4.6 5.0

Uric acid, mg percent 7. i 6. i

Total bilirubin, mg percent O. 5 QNS a

Alkaline phosphatase,
BL units i.0 QNS a

aQuantity not sufficient (to be measured)


TABLE 7.2-11.- BLOOD STUDIES - PILOT - Concluded

(b) Hematology

Determination Preflight Postflight

Date, 1965 December i December 9 December 16 December 18

Time, e.s.t. 8:15 a.m. 7:30 a.m. 12:00 a.m. i0:00 a.m.

jWhite blood cells/ram3 7 163 7 038 9 025 6 350

Neutrophiles, percent 50 54 56 56

Lymphocytes, percent 32 34 32 32

Monocytes, percent 8 ii ii 5

Eosinophiles_ percent 2 i i 5

Basophiles, percent 0 0 0 2

Red blood cells, millions/mm 3 5.425 5.470 5.1365

Hematocrit, percent 47.6 48.0 55 45

Reticulocyte count, percent i -

Hemoglobin, gm/lO0 ml 16.2 16.2 17.0 16.4

Cell morphology Normal Normal Normal Normal


(a) Con_nand Pilot Oh

Preflight Postflight

Date, 1965 December i December 9 December 16 December 17

Time, e.s.t. 7:15 0800 0645

Color/appearance Amber_ clear Straw_ clear Straw, clear Straw, clear

Specific gravity 1.025 1.027 1.025 i.030

pH 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0

Albumen, sugar
acetone, bile Negative Negative Negative Negative

C Microscopic 3 to 4 white blood 2 to 3 red blood Infrequent white blood 7 to i0 white blood C
Z cells/hpf Frequent cells/hpf, i to 2 cells and red blood cells, infrequent red Z
mucus threads whlte blood cells/ cells, no casts, nu- blood cells one cylin-
hpf. No casts merous mucus threads droid
No bacterial

-- Volume, cc 360 450 340 267 >
0'_ Om
O_ (b)Pilot £n
-n "11
Preflight Postflight
r1_ Date, 1965 December i December 9 December 16 December 17 r1_
Time, e.s.t. 6:45 a.m. 7:35 a.m. 9:00 a.m. 6:45 a.m.
Color/appearance Amber, clear Straw, clear Straw, clear Straw, clear
Specific gravity i.015 i.015 i.028 i.024

pH 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.5

Albumen_ sugar Trace albumen
acetone, bile Negative Negative Others negative Negative
Microscopic Infrequent white No cells, Occasional white blood I to 2 white blood
blood cells No casts cells, 2 to 3 red blood cells, no red blood
cells, no casts frequent cells_ no casts_ oc-
oxalate crystals cassional mucus threads

Volume, cc 220 400 310 260

i /

(a) Command Pilot

Preflight Postflight

(launch site) (Shipboard) (Shipboard) (launch site)

December 16, 1965 December 16, 1965 December 18, 1965
December 15, 1965 11:50 a.m.e.s.t. 8:05 p.m.e.s.t. 10:05 a.m.e.s.t.

Body weight, ib ......... 176 174.65 177.2_ 177-5

Temperat_e, oral, OF ..... 98.0 98.6 99.0 98.6

C Heart rate, beats/minute . . . 62 74 76 64

Z Skin ............. Clear Minimal

sensor erythema at
sites, good No change,
skin facial
clear Partial clearing of
erythema J.--


Comments ........... Fit for flight Alert, cooperative, Shaven_ slightly Rested, fit
> oriented "tired" >
O_ tn
O_ (b)Pilot £n
"11 -R
_I Preflight Postflight rlI

(_eh sitel (Shipboard) (Sbiphoard) (_uneb

December 15, 1965 December 16, 1965 December 16, 1965 December 18, 1965
11:4.8 a.m.e.s.t. 7:00 p.m.e.s.t, a.m.e.s.t.

Body weight, ib ........ 171 163.D 170.2 168

Temperature, oral, oF ..... 98.0 98.6 98.6 97.7

Heart rate, beats/minute . . . 60 68 70 53

Skin ............. Clear Minimal erythema at No change, facial Partial clearing of

sensor sites, skin clear erythema
slightly dry
Con_nents ........... Fit for flight Mildly fatigued, Shaven, no other Rested, fit !
alert, cooperative, change __

Colmmand Pilot

Film badge location Dose_ mr

Right chest pocket 26 ± 1.5

Left chest pocket 25 ± 2.1

Left thigh pocket 24 ± 1.7

Helmet 25 _ 2.8


Film badge location Dose, mr

Right chest pocket 20 • 1.5

Left chest pocket 24 H 1.4

Right thigh pocket 22 _ O. 2

Helmet 31 ± 7.4

The Gemini using

VI-A radiation film badgesdetector.
a thermoluminescent were read
out 2



...... Heart-rate
--Blood pressure
Darkened area represents pulse pressure

October i0, 1965 October 15, 1965 October 22, 1965

160 -
Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt
150 -

NASA-S-66-95 JAN

.... Heart rate

_. Blood pressure
Darkenedarea represents pulse pressure
December 16, 1965 December 16, 1965 December 18, 1965
Started at landing + 2 hr Started at landing +9.5 hr Started at landing + 49 hr

Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post t.ilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt
150 -
160 - I
.-= 140 -

,_ 130 -

II0 :i:i:i!i!!i!i!iiiii!
.......... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

' i00 !i!::i]i[i]i::iii[i::i]i::i !:!:!:i:_:_:i:i:i:i:i:{:i:i:i:i:i

i:{:!:_:_:_:_:i:i:i:i:i: :' :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::


80 :::::::::::::::_ ............................
_n :_$:':::"'"
":!$i_ ":':':'''":':':':'" s % _"

_ 7o
_ 9o
O __ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: %

60 - _i ..4,,',



I I I I i I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I i i lllJl J I IIII llilll IIII I llill I il llll III lllill III III I I I I I I i

300 5 0 5 i0 I 0 5 0 5 0 5 i0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 i0 15 0 5
Elapsed time, rain
(b) Postflight tilt studies.
Figure 7.2-1. - Concluded.

NASA-S-66-92 JAN

.... Heart rate

Blood pressure

Darkenedarearepesents pulse pressure


3o l]ttlllllillilllllnlll
I,,,,II,,,, llnlil,nnnl,llnl
0 5 0 5 i0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5
Elapsed time, rain

(a) Preflight tilt studies.

Figure 7.2.-2. - Tilt table studies, pilot.


...... Heart rate

-- Blood pressure
Darkenedarea presents pulse pressure

December16, 1965 December16, 1965 December18, 1965

Started at landing + 1 hr Started at landing + 8.5 hr ;tarred at landing + 47.5 hr

re-tilt I Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° ! Post-tilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° I I

"_ I :.q
120 L
_7 %,* It
-_ii0 I

".'r- 100

-1- 90
_; 8O
_ 70

o 60
50 ,t

0 5 0 5 10 0 5 0 5 0 5 10 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 10 15 0 5
Elapsed time, min
(b) Postflight tilt studies.
Figure 7.2-2. - Concluded.




I Highheart
rate Sleepperiod,
actual ; I
I / _ ,-- Florida night I
I Peak heart rate _l.___l,_-_ Mean heart rate / I I

"L_-" J i i ,
F Liftoff _ _OW
heart rate , I
I Post blackout
I B Iood pressurem Blood pressure- -_ II ,

Preretrofire-_ I
' \ Pre blackout-_

rate _ T_ T i --
- I
T :. .
i _'x 6 :
r .t- T .- _ .'r_
/ t q" ,,_,'ll

'_ #1 I

.. • - ".J.x ' " " " - '-- / I ,

" • q- _.s. J "_LJ
r_ "" t
t I
)iration rate, breaths/rain I

I _ I
I m J
-2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 20 11 12 13 24 25 1'6 27 18 29 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Ground elapsedtime, hr

(a) Commandpilot.

FLgure7.2-3. - Physiological measurements.


Three scientific experiments were conducted on the Gemini VI-A

mission to extend man's knowledge of space and to further develop the
ability to sustain life in the space environment. These experiments are
listed in table 8.0-I. One originally scheduled experiment (D-3_ Mass
Determination) was deleted from this mission because of the major empha-
sis necessary for rendezvous with spacecraft 7, a fully passive target

Only a preliminary evaluation of the experiment results is presented

in this report_ because of the nature of these experiments. In most
cases_ detailed evaluations and conclusions will be published after all
data for each experiment have been analyzed.


Experiment Experiment title Principal experimenter Sponsor


D-8 Radiation in spacecraft Research and Technology Division, Department of Defense

Air Force Weapons Laboratory,

C Kirtland Air Force Base,

New Mexico Z

N (]
S-5 Synoptio terrain Theoretical Division, NASA Goddard Office of Space Sciences
(_ photograph Space Flight Center, Greenbelt,
OO _Zand O_
"11 "11
rl_ s-6 synoptic weather National Weather Satellite Center, Office of Space Sciences r_
photography U.S. Weather Bureau_ Suitland,



8.1.1 Objective

The purpose of the D-8 experiment is to measure the intensity and

distribution of radiation inside the spacecraft with particular emphasis
on measurements in the vicinity of the crew.

8.1.2 Equipment

The D-8 experiment on Gemini VI-A differed from that on Gemini IV

in the location of two of the passive dosimeters and in the addition of
a removable brass shield on the tissue equivalent ionization chamber
(TEIC) of the command pilot's hatch. This shield was designed to provide
shielding equivalent to that which the crew members' muscles and abdomen
would provide for the interior regions. During one of the passes through
the South Atlantic radiation anomaly, the shield was to be removed while
the radiation survey was being performed with the hand-held dosimeter.

8.1.3 Procedure

The experiment on Gemini VI-A was designed to provide information

in addition to that obtained on Gemini IV. Information provided by the
experiment on Gemini VI-A was as follows:

(a) An additional quantity of portable dosimeter survey data from

the South Atlantic anomaly to provide missing information not obtained
on Gemini IV.

(b) A comparison of internal (shielded) versus external human dos-

age during passage through the anomaly_ and a correlation of this dosage
with that received at the various other locations of the survey.

(c) Passive dosimetry data correlation with the shielded and un-
shielded active dosimeter readings.

The D-8 experiment was programmed for the anomaly passes occurring
on revolutions 5 and 6 with a possible inclusion of surveys during rev-
olutions 19_ 20_ and 21. As it became apparent that Gemini VI-A would
be a l-day mission_ a review of the anomaly passes was made and revolu-
tions 7 and 8 were considered in lieu of 19, 20, and 21.

8.1.4 Results

The D-8 experiment was scheduled to be performed on revolutions 5

and 6 at 06:35 and 08:10 g.e.t., respectively.

At 06:35 g.e.t, the survey was performed by the pilot as scheduled_

however_ the command pilot was occupied with station keeping and did not
remove the shield from the sensor. The O8:10 g.e.t, run was not per-
formed because of crew activities during station keeping operations.
Because no report was received from the crew to indicate deviations from
the scheduled experiment performance, it was not rescheduled for later
revolutions. As a result, no data were obtained with the brass shield
removed from the chamber and only one survey of the anomaly was made.
Analysis of the data from the one survey and the contents of the passive
dosimeters is still in progress. Quick-look data indicate that the dose
rate level stayed below i00 millirads/hour.

The crew reported that the hand-held survey instrument came out of
its holder during the spacecraft pitch-down to the two-point suspension.
Testing of the flight item on a centrifuge to 40g, subsequent to its
retrieval after landing, failed to loosen the instrument from its holder.
It is possible that the unit was not properly locked into place after
use. _

8.1.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, valuable additional data were attained concerning

radiation in space but the primal7 objectives of this experiment on this
mission were not attained.


8.2.1 Objective

The objective of experiment S-5 was to obtain high-quality, small-

scale color photographs of terrain features for geological and geograph-
ical research. Pictures were especially desired ofsouthern Mexico,
Africa_ and Australia to increase the coverage of these areas which are
relatively poorly mapped.

8.2.2 Equipment

Four 70-mm camera film magazines containing color film were onboard
the spacecraft_ each magazine having a 60-frame capacity. These maga-
zines_ used with a 70-mm still camera, were also used for the S-6 exper-
iment. A haze filter and an exposure meter were available to be used at
the discretion of the crew.

8.2.3 Procedure

The crew was instructed to take_ subject to fuel and power restric-
tionsj vertically oriented_ systematic overlapping pictures of Mexico_
Africa_ and Australia_ or any other area showing cloud-free terrain. As
in previous Gemini missions_ it was stressed that any picture of the
earth's surface was valuable_ even if the planned procedure could not be
followed exactly.

8.2.4 Results

Despite the pressure of rendezvous operations_ a substantial number

of terrain photographs were taken. The quality of the pictures range
from poor (caused chiefly by cloud cover) to excellent. A number of the
pictures appear to have color rendition and clarity equal to or better
than the best pictures taken on previous flights.

Twenty-eight pictures of fair to excellent quality were taken over

Africa. Of these, ii were taken in sequence over Mauritania and Upper
Volta, and show extensive areas of stabilized sand dunes as well as
areas of currently active self dunes. One picture taken over Ethiopia
shows a portion of the Rift Valley. Another_ showing a part of the
Hamada du Dra in southern Algeria, includes a number of structural line-
aments. Other pictures taken over North Africa appear to be of great
potential value in the study of Pre-Cambrian structure, Cenozoic vulcan-
ism, aeolian landforms, and soil mapping (see fig. 8.2-i(a)). An

especially interesting series of four pictures taken over Somalia shows
the drainage pattern and major structures of Cenozoic marine sediments
in an area not previously photographed from manned spacecraft. (See
fig. 8.2-i(b)). Other photographs include portions of northwest Aus-
tralia_ showing near-shore topography in the Shark Bay area_ and the
front of the Himalayas in Nepal.

8.2.5 Conclusions

The S-5 experiment can be classified as very successful_ especially

in view of the demands of the rendezvous operations. The pictures pro-
vide coverage of areas not previosly photographed_ and the pictures
should be extremely useful for geological mapping. Of particular inter-
est are the photographs of the southern Sahara_ which is the transition
zone between desert and equatorial jungle.

NASA-S-66-143 JAN

(a) Sudan, showing Cenozoic volcanics in the Jebel Marra.

Figure 8.2-1. - Experiment S-5, typical synoptic terrain photography.

NASA-S-66-2 09 JAN

(b) West coast of Somalia, in eastern Africa, showing drainage

patterns in Cenozoic marine sediments.

Figure 8.2.-1. - Concluded.


8.3.1 Objective

The objective of experiment S-6 was to obtain high-resolution color

photographs of clouds and weather systems in equatorial regions for mete-
orological studies.

8.3.2 Equipment

Four 70-mm camera film magazines containing color film were onboard
the spacecraft, each magazine having a 60-frame capacity. These maga-
zines, used with a 70-mm still camera, were also available for the S-5
experiment and for the general photography requirements during rende-
zvous. A haze filter and an exposure meter were available to be used
when needed.

8.3.3 Procedure

/ Prior to the flight, the crew was briefed on the types of clouds and
weather systems of interest for the experiment. During the mission, me-
teorologists from the _vironmental Science Services Administration se-
lected specific areas likely to contain cloud patterns of interest, based
on TIROS weather satellite pictures and worldwide weather maps. These
areas were included in the flight plan when possible. Additional photo-
graphs were made at the crew's discretion.

8.3.4 Results

About I00 high-quality photographs containing clouds were taken

during the flight. Nearly all of these were taken over the eastern North
Atlantic Ocean, Africa, the _ southern Indian Ocean, western Australia, and
the Gulf of Mexico during revolutions 13, 14 and 15. An area of cloudi-
ness associated with a cold front in the mid-Atlantic Ocean showing cloud
shadows on a lower cloud layer was photographed. Pictures of several
cloud eddies near the Canary Islands (fig. 8.3-i(a)) are among the most
interesting photographed to date from space. Open_ cellular patterns of
cumulus clouds west of Cape Blanc, Spanish West Africa, appear in a series
of seven pictures. One of the photographs in this series is shown in
figure 8.3-i(b)). Another series taken over central and east Africa show
elongated bands of cirrus clouds over Nigeria. Thin, cellular patterns
of cumuloform clouds appear over Cameroon and the Central African
Republic, and many convective-type clouds cover an area between Lake
Victoria and Mauritius. Several pictures show sun reflection patterns

from the sea surface and from a swampy region near the White Nile River.
A series of eight pictures over the southern Indian Ocean show interest-
ing cellular clouds, cirrus cloud bands, and cumulus cloud streets.

8.3.5 Conclusions

A detailed study of the photographs will require extensive analysis

and evaluation. However, the S-6 experiment can be classified as a suc-
cess. The photographs will be compared with available TIROS pictures and
conventional weather data will be used in analyzing the cloud patterns.
Pictures that were taken in an overlapping series will be especially
helpful because they depict larger scale weather patterns than can be
shown in a single picture.

NASA-S-66-208 JAN

(a) View taken at approximately 10:44 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965 during
Revolution 14 over the Canary Islands in the eastern Atlantic Ocean. The
cloud eddy at the center formed about 50 miles downwind (southwest) of
Tenerife Island which appears in the corner of the photograph. The open
center of the vortex is about 15 miles in diameter.
Figure 8.,3-1. -Experiment S-6, two typical synoptic weather photographs
taken on successive orbital revolutions 14 and 15.

NASA-S-66-207 JAN

(b) View taken at approximately 12:23 G.m.t. on December 16, 1965 during
Revolution 15 looking west over the eastern Atlantic Ocean about 400 miles
west of Cape Blanc, Spanish West Africa. The small lines of cumulus clouds
have formed open cellular patterns in the southern section of a high pressure
region. Surface winds were easterly while the upper-air winds at the 500
millibar level were northerly. Subsidence of the air aloft suppressed the
vertical development of the clouds.

Figure 8..3-1. - Concluded.


The performance of the spacecraft, launch vehicle, flight crew,

and mission support was very satisfactory for the Gemini VI-A mission,
and all objectives of the mission were accomplished. The flight con-
tributed significantly to the knowledg_ of manned space flight_ espe-
cially in the area of man's ability to perform the necessary functions
to accomplish rendezvous and station keeping.

The following conclusions were obtained from data evaluation and

crew observations of the Gemini VI-A mission.

I. The rendezvous procedures and associated equipment were satis-

factory for a eoelliptic parking orbit rendezvous technique. Backup
calculations, using onboard spacecraft data, were adequate to monitor
and evaluate the progress of the rendezvous maneuvers.

2. Station keeping can be performed within i foot to 200 feet of

a target and with a minimum fuel and power usage in the horizon scan
mode. The out-of-plane positions from the target are the most accept-
able and the in-plane positions above or below the target are the most

3. The malfunction detection system performed perfectly during

the Gemini VI-A launch attempt by shutting down the engine prior to
lift-off, when the tail plug dropped out prematurely. By combining
all data inputs, the crew did correctly assess the situation and did
not initiate an uncessary ejection which would have precluded the ac-
complishment of this rendezvous mission.

4. The Mission Control Center in Houston and the associated Manned

Space Flight Network successfully supported two manned spacecraft in
orbit simultaneously.

5. The GLV-6 performance was near nominal, and the spacecraft was
placed in an acceptable orbit for rendezvous with Gemini VII. As a
result of the premature release of the tail plug which caused the abort
of the first Gemini VI-A launch attempt, modifications were made to the
tail-plug installation. These modifications proved to be satisfactory
in the subsequent launch of Gemini VI-A.

6. A film was deposited on the spacecraft windows during the

launch phase similar to that experienced on previous flights. This film
interfered with visibility, particularly when direct impingement of the
sunlight occurred on the spacecraft windows.

7. Air-to-ground radio transmissions from the command pilot were
marginal at various times during the mission. The major cause of the
problem was the unusually high air noise in the command pilot's pressure
suit; however, there were other contributing factors which are still
being investigated.

8. The flight crew was somewhat warm during periods of high acti-
vity throughout the rendezvous phase of the flight because of higher
than expected metabolic heat loads.

9. The overall operation of the rendezvous radar system was ex-

cellent_ with the system maintaining continuous lock from a range of
235 nautical miles until the radar was turned off at a distance of
20 feet.

i0. Overall cabin lighting was satisfactory for both day and night

Ii. The acquisition lights [_ilized on spacecraft 7 were not visi-

ble beyond 15 to 16 miles. It is desired to provide lights which can be
acquired at ranges up to 30 miles to assure that optical backup rendez-
vous techniques may be used.

12. The voice tape recorder failed after the second cartridge had
been used. The failure was determined to have been caused by a broken
belt between the motor and the reduction wheel.

13 . The delayed-time telemetry tape recorder failed at approximately

22 hours ground elapsed time because of a bearing seizure. (This same
failure occurred during the Gemini VII mission.) Corrective action has
been determined and implemented in spacecraft 8 and up.

14. The difficulty encountered when closing the centerline stowage

box is attributed to a deformation of the structure which was caused
by the effects of cabin differential pressure.

15. One set of pyrotechnics in the docking system_ all armed by

one electrical circuit, failed to fire. However_ the redundant set of
pyrotechnic devices did operate properly and all functions were performed
as required. The failure was found to be caused by a crew-operated
arming switch which was sensitive to ambient pressure changes.


The following recommendations are made as a result of data evalu-

ation and crew observations of the Gemini VI-A mission.

I. Extravehicular activity should not be scheduled on the same

day as rendezvous because of the excessive workload on the crew to pre-
pare for and accomplish both tasks.

2. Corrective action should be taken to prevent film deposit on

the spacecraft windows during the launch phase of the flight.

3. The centerline stowage structure should be modified to assure

that no door opening or closing problems are encountered when the cabin
is pressurized.

4. A study should be conducted to determine proper drive-belt

tension and operating conditions in order to modify the voice tape re-
corder and preclude belt failures during flight.

5. Capsule communicators should relay voice data slowly enough

that it can be correctly recorded by the crew_ and on lengthy data re-
"- lays, the communicators should break transmission periodically to de-
termine if the crew is receiving and recording the data.

6. _he remote sites should inform the crew when acquisition and
loss of signal occur to provide the crew with inflight position during
the busy rendezvous maneuver.

7- The optical sight mounting and checkout procedures should be

modified to assure that accurate boresight alignment is attained when
the sight is installed in orbit.

8. The effective intensity of the target acquisition lights should

be increased to make them "visible at ranges up to 30 miles.

9. Star charts should be improved to permit more accurate measure-

ments of star angles from orbital track.

i0. A light meter similar to the spot meter used on Gemini VI-A
should be utilized for all photography of objects in space during manned

ii. The Apollo hand-held sextant is too bulky for use as flight
gear. The sextant should be smaller and mounted to the spacecraft.


12. The sequential switches should be modified to preclude the

possibility of a malfunction caused by pressure changes. Also, a study
should be performed to evaluate the need for the interlock of the docking-
bar and latch-jettison sequence circuit with the fairing jettison circuit.

13. _he presently utilized reentry control procedures should be

modified to assure that adequate reentry control system propellants re-
main for spacecraft stabilization below 50 000 feet in case the drogue
parachute should not function properly.

14. Medical tests that are not necessary to complete immediately

after recovery should be postponed until critical debriefing of the crew
has been accomplished.

ii. 0 REF]_I_ENCES

I. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report for

Gemini - Titan I (GT-I). MSC-R-G-64-1, NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center, May 1964.

2. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report GT-2,

Gemini 2. MSC-R-G-65-1, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Feb. 1965.

3. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report GT-3,

Gemini 3. MSC-C-R-65-2, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, April 1965.

4. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report,

Gemini IV. MSC-G-R-65-3, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, June 1965.

5. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report,

Gemini V. MSC-G-R-65-4, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,
August 1965.

6. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report,

Gemini V!. MSC-G-R-65-5, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Oct. 1965.

7. Gemini Mission Evaluation Team: Gemini Program Mission Report,

Gemini VII. MSC-G-R-66-1, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,
Jan. 1966.

8. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. : Gemini Spacecraft Number 6 Performance/

Configuration Specification. Rept. A900-6, Feb. 1965.

9. Aerospace Corp. : Systems Test Objective for Gemini Launch Vehicle

NASA Mission Gemini VI. TOR-669(6126-8).3. Dec. 1965.

I0. NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Project Gemini Preflight Orbital

and Reentry Trajectory Data for Gemini VI. MSC Internal
Note 65-FM-125, Sept. 1965.

ii. International Business Machines Corp. : Gemini Reentry Math Flow 6

Description. II_ No. 64-528-00021.

12. NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Recovery Operations Manual.

13. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. : Gemini Spacecraft Postflight RCS Deactiv-

ation. SEDR F-399, March 1965.


14. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. : Postflight Evaluation Procedures for

Spacecraft 6. SEDR F499-6, Nov. 1965.

15. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.: Corrosion Control Procedures for

Recovered Spacecraft, PS 186, Aug. 1965.



12.1.1 Spacecraft Histories

Spacecraft histories at the contractor's facilities in St. Louis,

Missouri, are shown in figures 12.1-1 and 12. i-2, and at Cape Kennedy,
Florida, in figures 12.1- 3 and 12.1-4. Figures 12.1-I and 12.1-3 are
summaries of activities with emphasis on spacecraft systems testing
and prelaunch preparation. Figures 12.1-2 and 12.1-4 are summaries of
significant, concurrent problem areas.

12.1.2 Gemini Launch Vehicle Histories

Gemini launch vehicle (CLV) histories at the contractor's facilities

at Denver, Colorado, and Baltimore, Maryland, are shown in figure 12.1-5_
and at Cape Kennedy, Florida, in figure 12.1-6. Figure 12.1-5 is a
summary of significant manufacturing and factory-test activities, in-
_ cluding concurrent problem areas. Figure 12.1-6 summarizes the GLV
test and prelaunch preparation activities and also presents a summary
of the significant, concurrent problem areas.

g _

f::il Troubleshootoxygenhigh rate, RCSheaters, waterpressure, and inadvertentmalfunction lights.

_laceR and R umbilical in R and Rsection
eRePlaceRCSTCA's3 and 4
_laceheaterson D-packageand B-ring in RCS

• ReplaceOAMSfuel tank

C_ I1
• Correct leak in secondarycoolant
dacecabinrelief valve

_> l DemateRCSand reworkwire bundle _>.

Oe) _ ReplaceOAMSTCA's5 and 8

(,2')m 1 _ ReplaceIMU static powersupply (f)

-rl 1 _ "-i1
I"11 • Install newsuit loopheat exchanger-_.. > I-I'1
• Replaceoxygendemandregulators (m_

• Replacescratched RHhatch window

• Replacetwodamagedsegmentsof coolant systemlines

• Repairdamagedwire bundle

4 11 18 25 2 9 16 23 6 13 20 27 4 ii 18 25
Apr 65 May 65 June 65 July 65

Figure 12_.
1-2.- Spacecraft6 significant problemareasat contractor facility.
NASA-S-65-1i, 258A


Modificationsand pyrotechnic build up

Integratedtest with GAIV(Plan X1

Preparefor pad

Hoist spacecraftand connectcables

Hurricane Betsy Pre-mateverification test

C: , and mate (_
Z Electrical interface integratedvalidation and joint Gand C

Joint combinedsystemstests _'_

t"" t""
(F) Launch vehicle tanking _f)

._ Flight configu ration modetest _._

I"rl wet mocksimulatedlaunch preparation m
_:_ Wetmocksimulatedlaunch
Simultaneouslaunch demonstration _:_

Demate,battery replacement,and remate


Clean-up and simulatedflight

Service and pre-count
Final count
Mission canceled

8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 3 10 17 24 7 14 21 28
Aug 65 Sept65 Oct 65 Nov65
(a) Prior to October25, 1965.
Figure 12.1-3. - Spacecraft6 test history at CapeKennedy.
Gemini]ZEfinal count missioncancelled

r,_t Filrijl , l
X-ray OAMSfuel and oxidizer tanks
II I _-'.'l I I I L::_II t I I I::3 I I I I I I

PurgeOAMSand RCS regulators

I I I!:.'1 III I_:_111 Jill:i:] III II I

]dder permeabilitychecks
_.'.'1I I I I E:!I ] I I I I _::l I I I I I I

Simultaneity and engine leakchecks

I I I t::i ] I I I I }:;1 I I I I I I

Moveto cryogenicsbuilding
Purgeand functionally checkOAMSand RCS regulators
C_ 1:':4i I I I _ i-;-] i I I I I I
De-servicedrinking water (_
Suit circuit leakchecks
I I _::1I I I I I I
Trial-fit a,d,apter
batteries ('_

_p; Servicehypergolics
II1 .
ii water _f)
O_ Install flight batteries C/')
--I'1 Final padpreparations "I"1
!"1'3 GeminiE]E launch and cable I-I"1
Final systemstest
Replaceand test computer
Replaceand test voicetaperecorder
Serviceand precount
Launch attempt
7 24 31 7 14 2t 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20

Oct65 Nov65 Dec65 Jan 66 Feb60 r_

(b) Subsequentto October25, 1965. ,,m
Figure 12.1-3. - Concluded.

Install new radomegasket o'_

I ' Install emergencymanualcomputer control
/ Install seal in PCMprogrammer
/ Changedisconnectsin cryogenic system
/ Emergencydockingreleasemodification
/ II I Install digital ClOCk
/ II Voicecontrol center modification
I Ii l_stall flotation blocksin R and R section
I 7 ilil' I Move"out of tape" light
mi]I._I Replace UHFwhipantenna
I Programmer modification
/ I { fii] I- Ii_I[Rep lacemultiplexers C:
C I lllilill IIi!llI I Replaceno. 2 suit fan (noiseproblem)
Z /I IIFiil/l_illl_ilIIII III Reinstall
llllIiil rategyro
Re boresightradar
' (=_
"- I '""_II "_:'
_ 1 I Rep,ace
_" I I _odify TDAumbilical in Rand R section
, )emateR and R for TDA recheck
cn _ I Radarto St Louis for specialtest
I I ReplaceC02 partial pressure transducer (,C)
--I1 l Replacedc-dc converter --I"1
rn _ II Radarremovaland pressure check I-n
E2 II ii_ I il_ Cleanleft and right windows
iil]/ !ili ll Install gassealedtelemetry transmitter

ii I IF lii
[,ill I IMU replaced
: ill/ HIII Ill II I Replacesecondaryhorizon sensor andelectronicpackage
ii I_llilllI
I Install newdockingbar
I I E::illllliil I Install modifiedhardline umbilicalin Rand R section
I [_!IIIl[iili!l
I::i / I::il
I ii Changewater
I Computer
I /I ,t, I f;!,/ _i1111
Ill ill]Ill..........................
_::i ::i .i ::; Install modifiedb,om,ed,
8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 [ 3 I0 17 24
Aug 6.5 Sept 65 I oct
Figure 12.1-4. - Spacecraft6 significant problemsat CapeKennedy.

__._r_a_o_ _ Ba,timore,Maryland

_. _ _ _/.z_ Tank fabrication and test 25

3°131 I II IIHo.zonta,
Manufacturing requirements: 16 Feb5 !- I I
Tankscleanedand I
purged 5 23 3o3,_ StagesI and II erectedin VTF
• Visual ins)ection Feb23 Tank splice complete
• Dyepenetrant tests Feb25 - Engine installations complete [] Post erection inspection
• Radiographicins)ection Mar 30- Stage13 horizontal tests complete
• Weldeddycurrent checks Apr 3 - StageI horizontal tests complete _ Vertical tests
C • Hydrostatic : C
Z .Chemical cleaning
• Helium checks IA Power-on Z
(_ • Nitrogenpurge
• Dewpoint checks
II n
_. Jul 30 -Tank roll-out inspection I Vat review I >
¢../.1 Aug 13- Customercertification i I I •
¢J3 Aug 16-Tanksair-lifted to Baltimore De-erectstages1 and I-I | (J3
m t I I . ¢._
I Tank leak checksA
I I I == "-n
rl-I Weightand balancechecks A 1"31
Rollout inspection A
Preparationto ship I
Stage[shipped ,_
Stage£I shipped,_.
Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug
1964 1965

Figure 12.I-5.- GLV-6history at Denverand Baltimore.



Erect stages I and 1I

• Iiiiiiiiiiii,lii ili:iiii;m.*.
:_ 'i! _i

to la borator for reverification



Z Iriil
rIIIIlilI Sub systemsreverification tests Z
Engineharnessand )ressure
r =

O_ Iil ChangedstageI thrust chambervalve bolts (,f)

":' [il !ill
lllIilllill Simulated*light
Final preparationsand precount :>
m Changeden, ine-driven hydraulic pumpson stagesI and
rrl i-i"1
u lil IlIi]lllIi!lllll
Orifice size chant ed in oxidizer pressurant pressure switch

I!il Critical systemsre-test

It " n,ec,t plug,droppedo!! pri,or !o I,if!.off

Padd,,,scon, Launch

Iiil dust capfrom I::_

Removed II Ill
subassemblyI::_ I I[ Itf:il
no. 2II gasgenerator
I[1_::_ I III I_!:

Paddisconnect plug safetywired

17 24 3] 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26
Oct 65 Nov65 Dec65
(b) Subsequentto October25, 1965. '.o
Figure 12.1-6. - Concluded.



The weather conditions in the launch area at Cape Kennedy, Florida,

were satisfactory for all operations.on the day of the launch,
December 15, 1965. Surface weather observations in the launch area
taken at $:37 a.m.e.s.t. (13:37 G.m.t.) were as follows:

Cloud coverage ..... 2/10 covered, scattered at ii 000 feet

Wind direction, deg .............. 200

Wind velocity, knots ................ 4

Visibility, miles ............... 7

Pressure, in. Hg ................. 29.93

Temperature, °F ................... 65

Dew point, °F .................. . . 67

Relative humidity, percent ......... 97

Weather observations taken at 15:29 G.m.t., December 16_ 1965,

onboard the U.S.S. Wasp located at latitude 23°22 ' N., longitude 67053 ' W.
were as follows:

Cloud coverage ...... 4/10 covered, scattered at 2500 feet

Wind direction, deg ...... 40

Wind velocity, knots ........... 6

Visibility, miles ...... I0

Temperature, _F ......... 76

Dew point, °F ............ 66

Relative humidity, percent ..... 62

Sea temperature, °F ...... 76

Sea state ...... calm, I to 3 foot swells

Table 12.2-1 presents the l_unch area atmospheric conditions at
the time of lift-off (12:39 G.m.t.). Table 12.2-!I provides weather
data in the vicinity of Cape Kennedy at 15:30 G.m.t. on December 16,
1965. Figures 12.2-1 and 12.2-2 present the launch area and reentry
area wind direction and velocity plotted against altitude.


AT 12:39 G,m.t., DECEMB_ 15, 1965

Altitude s Temperature s Pressure s Density,

ft a °Fa ib/sq fta slugs/cu ft a

0 x 103 64.4 2116.7 2336.3 × 10 -6

5 57.4 1773,6 1986.7

i0 46.9 1478.9 1693.1

15 31,6 1226.4 1453.1

20 15.3 1010.6 1239,9

25 -5.6 826,6 1060.8

30 -24.7 670.0 897.4

35 -45.2 537,6 755,9

40 -74.4 426,5 635.8

45 -81.6 334,2 515.2

50 -94,4 2_9,8 414. 3

55 -101.2 200.5 325.8

60 -99.6 154,6 250,1

65 -89.3 119.7 188.4

70 -82.7 93.4 144,4

75 -78.2 73.1 111.6

80 -76.9 57,2 87.1

85 -77.3 44.9 68.5

90 -72.4 35.3 53,2

95 -66.2 27, 8 41, i

i00 -49.9 22. i 31.4

105 -47.2 17.8 24.8

ii0 -40,2 14.2 19.6

115 -33,4 11.3 15,5

asee note a at end of table.


AT 13:39 G.m.t., DECT_MBER 15, 1965 - Concluded

Altitude_ Temperature ,_ Pressure, Density,

ft a °Fa ib/sq ft a slugs/cu ft a

120 × 103 -22.9 9.1 12.2 × 10 -6

125 -12.0 7.4 9.7

130 -i 6.0 7.7

135 19.8 5.0 6.0

14o 20.6 4.1 5.o
145 24.7 3.4 4. i

150 24.8 2.8 3.4

155 36.9 2.3 2,7

160 41.20 i.9 2,2 -

165 49. 4 io6 i° 8

17o 57.7 i. 3 i. 5
175 49.4 i. i i. 3
180 46.1 0°9 i.i

aAccuracy of readings is as follows :

Pressure Density
Altitude_ Temperature
ft error_ °F rms error_ rms error_
percent percent

0 to 60 X 103 i i 0.5
60 to 120 i i .8

120 to 180 4 1.5 1.0


AT 15:30 G.m.t., DECnMBER 16_ 1965

Altitude_ Temperature, Pressure_ Density_

fta'b °Fa ib/sq fta slugs/cu fta

0 X 103 73.8 2119.2 2296 × 10-6

5 58.3 1775.8 1990.9
i0 46.9 1481.i 1701.6
15 30.6 1228.8 1461.1
20 13.5 1012.6 1248.2
25 -2.7 828.5 1058.i
30 -23.3 672.5 899.i
35 -44.7 540.3 759.6
40 -66.8 428.7 637.2
45 -87.3 335.7 562.4
50 -95.4 260.9 417.9
55 -103.0 201.4 329.5
60 -98.0 155.4 250.5
65 -90.2 120.5 19o.2
70 -84.5 94.0 146.i
75 -79.6 73.4 112.7
80 -75.1 57.6 87.3
85 -73.3 45.3 68.3
90 -71.0 35.7 53.4
95 -63.0 28.2 41.3
iO0 -56.9 22.3 32.2
105 -51.0 17.7 25.2

asee note a at end of table.

bsee note b at end of table.


AT 15:30 G.m.t. _ DECEMBE_ 16, 1965 - Continued

Altitude, Temperature, Pressure _ Dens ity,

ft a'b °Fa Ib/sq ft a slugs/cu ft a

llO X 103 -38._ 14.2 19.6 X 10 -6

115 -35.7 ii. 7 15.5

220 -23.1 9.4 12.2

125 -ii. 6 7.7 9.5

130 15.1 6.3 7.8

135 14.6 5.2 6.4
140 14.9 4.4 5.2

145 14.5 3.5 4.3

150 20.2 2.9 3.5

155 28.7 2.5 2.9 --

i6o 40.4 2.o 2.3

165 42.6 i. 7 I. 9

170 40.7 i. 4 i. 6

175 32.0 i. 2 i. 4

180 27.8 i. 0 i. I

190 30. 2 - .7472

200 -13.o .5561

210 -67.2 - .4162

220 -85.0 - .2747

230 -95.8 .1742

240 -88.6 •0993

250 -86.8 .o612
260 -113. 8 .0379

asee note a at end of table.

bsee note b at end of table.



AT 15:30 G.m.t., DECEMBER 16, 1965 - Concluded

Altitude_ Temperature_ l°ressure_ Density_

ft a_b °Fa lb/sq ft a slugs/cu ft a

270 × 103 -113.8 - .0379 x 10 -6

280 -125.2 .0241

290 -135.4 .0079

300 -135.4 .0044

aAccuracy of readings is as follows:

Pressure Density
Altitude, Temperature
rms error, rms error_
f ft error, °F
percent percent

0 to 60 x 103 i i i

60 to 120 i i 8

120 to 180 4 1.5 1.0

bAbove 180 000 feet, the data are from a special high altitude
sounding rocket launched from Eglin AFB at 19:22:02 C.m.t.











< 90 _







10 _

120 180 240 300 360 0 40 80 120 160 200 240
0 60 120
Winddirection, degfrom north Windvelocity,knots
Figure 12.2-L -Variation of winddirectionandvelocitywith altitudefor the launcharea at 12:39G.m.t., December
15, 1965.




150 1
140 _


12o _

11o _ Y

_- I00 f

so _

_o _ S
o ,_ _
60 120 180 240 300 360 0 40 80 120 160 200 240
Winddirection, degfrom north Windvelocity,knots
(a)Rawinsonde and Rocketsondedatabetweensealeveland 182Kft at 14:20G.m.t.
Figure 12.2-2. - Variationof winddirectionandvelocitywith altitudefor the reentryareaon December16, 1965.

NASA-S-66-235 JAN

230 X 10 3


° ;

218 \

216 G/ k_ _/_

_ 9
d 212
< 210

206 C_

204 )


180 240 300 360 0 40 80 120 160

0 60

Wind direction, deg from north Wind velocity, knots

(b) Rocketsonde data between 190K and 230K ft at 19:22 G.m.t.

Figure 12.2-2. - Concluded.


After the Gemini VI launch attempt on October 25, 1965, the flight
readiness of the Gemini VI-A space vehicle was determined at the review
meetings noted below.

12.3.1 Mission Briefing

The Mission Briefing was conducted by the Mission Director on

December 2_ 1965_ at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida. All
elements reviewed their status and were found in readiness to support
the mission.

12.3.2 Spacecraft Flight Readiness Review

The Flight Readiness Review_ covering the Gemini VI-A operations

and activities after the vehicle was taken down on October 25, 1965,
was held on December 9 and i0, 1965. All systems were found ready for

12.3.3 Launch Vehicle Flight Safety Review Board

The Air Force Space Systems Division Flight Safety Review Board
met on December ii, 1965, at Cape Kennedy and recommended to the Mission
Director that the launch vehicle be committed to flight.

Following the launch attempt on December 12, 1965, a second Flight

Safety Review Board meeting for Gemini VI-A was held on December 14_
1965, and the Board assured the Mission Director that all systems were
acceptable. It recommended that the launch vehicle be committed to




Supplemental reports for the Gemini VI-A mission are listed in

table 12.4-I. The format will conform to the external distribution
format of the NASA or external organization preparing the report. Each
report will be identified on the title page, as being a Gemini VI-A
supplemental report. The same distribution will be made on the supple-
mental reports as that made on the Mission Report.


Number Report title Responsible Completion

organization date

i. Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report- Aerospace Corporation Feb 14, 1966
NASA Mission Gemini/Titan GT-6A Standing requirement

2. Launch Vehicle No. 6A Flight Evaluation Martin Company Jan 30, 1966
Standing requirement
Z 3. MBFN Performance Analysis for GT-6 and Goddard Space Feb 16, 1966
GT-6A/7 Mission Flight Center Standing requirement
4o Gemini GT-6A IGS Evaluation
Reconstruction Trajectory TRW Systems Jan 30, 1966
Standing requirement p--

5. GT-6A Inertial Guidance System and International Business Jan 30, 1966
(_ Computer Analysis Machines Corporation Standing requirement
"11 "11
Pll rll


Tables 12.5-1, 12.5-II, and 12.5-111 list the mission data which
were available for evaluation. The trajectory and telemetry data will
be on file at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Computation and
Analysis Division, Central Metric Data File. The photographic data
will be on file at the MSC Photographic Technology Laboratory.


Data description

Paper recordin6s Reentry phase

Spacecraft telemetry measurements Plots and tabulations of all system param-

(revolutions 3-6 and ll-16) eters for the following approximate
times (g.e.t.):
GLV telemetry measurements (launch)
25:17:25 - 25:17:27
Telemetry si_aal-strength recordings 25:19:22 - 25:25:44
25:30:03 - 25:38:22
MCC-H plotboards 25:43:58 - 25:47:23
25:47:49 - 25:52:06
_gnetic tape
Event tabulations
Experiment D-8 parameters
(revolutions 3-6) Sequence of event tabulations versus time
(including thruster firing) for ascent;
Radar data revolutions i-6, 12 and 13; and selected
real-time passes for revolution 16 and
IP-5600 trajectory data (Confidential) reentry

C-band (launch phase - Confidential) Special computations

Natural coordinate system Ascent phase (Confidential)

Final reduced IGS computer word flow tag correction

Trajectory data processed at M_C and GSFC Special aerodynamic and guidance
Voice transcripts (Confidential)
Steering deviation calculation
Merged air-to-ground and onboard recorder
Mod III RGS versus IGS velocity
Technical debriefings comparison

GLV reduced telemetry data (Confidential) Orbital phase

Engineering units versus time plots OAMB propellant remaining computations

for revolutions 1-6
Spacecraft reduced telemetry data
OANB thruster activity computations for
Ascent phase revolutions 1-6

Selected time history tabulations Experiment D-8 tabulations for revolu-

tions 3-6
Orbital phase
Reentry phase
Parameter tabulations and plots (statis-
tical) for revolutions 1-6, 12, and 13 RCS propellant remaining and thruster
activity computation
Time history tabulations of selected
parameters for selected times for revo- Attempted Launch
lutions 2-6, 15, and l6
Paper recording
Band pass tabulations for revolutions
1-6, 12_ and 13 GLV telemetry measurements



Gemini VI-A

Number of
Category of photographic data Motion picture
still photo- film, footage

Launch and prelaunch i0 7478


C Swimmer deployment and installation of collar 99 900 _..

Aircraft carrier 900 7

_-_ Loading of spacecraft and arrival of flight crew 77 _'_

r-- p--
Inspection of spacecraft 130 >
_ Mayport, Florida 300 _

._ General activities 32 "11

m RCS deactivation 21

Postflight inspection 78

Onboard spacecraft

16-mm sequential camera 1300

70-mm still camera 194

Experiments S-5 and S-6, synoptic terrain 102

and weather photography

Pictures of spacecraft 7 and other miseel- 92

laneous pictures

aEngineering sequential film only.



Gemini VI-A Launch Attempt

Sequential film Size, Location Presentation length,
coverage item _ feet

1.2-14 16 Stage II umbilical tower_ GLV, explosive bolt 224

C second level action

Z 1.2-15 16 50-foot tower, 19-7A GLV, launch 215 Z

1.2-16 16 East launcher GLV, possible 216

± ue± leakage

1.2-17 16 West launcher GLV, possible 216

fuel leakage

"11 1.2-18 16 North launcher GLV, engine 216

p_ observation m

1.2-19 16 South launcher GLV, engine 216


1.2-20 16 Umbilical tower, GLV, umbilical 216

first level disconnect

Gemini VI-A Launch

Sequential film Size, mm Location Presentation Potal length

coverage, item of film, feet

1.2- 9 16 50-foot tower, 19-1 GLV launch 180

1.2-11 16 50-foot tower, 19-7A GLV launch 180

C 1.2-12 16 50-foot tower, 19-7A Spacecraft launch 81

1.2-13 16 50-foot tower, 19-2 Spacecraft launch 80 C

1.2-i_ 16 50-foot tower, 19-7A GLV, launch ii0 Z

1.2-16 16 East launcher GLV, possible fuel leakage 170 r--
1.2-17 16 West launcher GLV, possible fuel leakage 130
1.2-18 16 North launcher GLV, engine observation 200

1.2-19 16 South launcher GLV, engine observation 155

"_ 1.2-20 16 Umbilical tower, first level GLV, umbilical disconnect 140 "I_

i.2-21 16 Umbilical tower, second level GLV_ umbilical disconnect 146

1.2-22 16 Umbilical tower_ fourth level GLV_ umbilical disconnect 200

1.2-23 16 Umbilical tower, fifth level GLV_ umbilical disconnect i_0

1.2-24 16 Umbilical tower, sixth level GLV, umbilical disconnect 140

1.2-25 16 Umbilical tower, sixth level GLV, umbilical disconnect 210

1.2-26 16 Umbilical tower, top level, no. i GLV, upper umbilical disconnect 80
1.2-27 16 Umbilical tower, top level, no. 2 J-bars and lanyard observation 140

1.2-28 16 50-foot tower, 70o50 ' Spacecraft umbilical disconnect 217

1.2-29 70 South of Pad 19 GLV and spacecraft launch ID

1.2-30 70 West of Pad 19 GLV and spacecraft launch 30 ,

1.2-31 16 Complex 34 Tracking 337 _o



Gemini VI-A Launch

Total length
Bequential film Size, m Location Presentation
coverage, item of film, feet

1.2-32 16 West of Pad !9 Tracking 401

C 1.2-33 16 South of Pad 19 Tracking 385

1.2-34 16 South of Pad 19 Tracking 310 Z

_._ 1.2-35 16 South of Pad 19 Tracking 375

__xT_, 35 Northwest of Pad 19 Tracking 360 _'_
1.2-38 35 South of Pad !9 Tracking, IGOR 377
1.2-39 35 Patrick Air Force Base Tracking, IGOR 180
1.2-40 70 North of Pad 19 Tracking, ROTI 125

"11 1.2-41 70 Cocoa Beach Tracking, ROTI 130 _'_

r1'1 225 I'rl
None 35 Aircraft no. L-4011 Tracking

The postflight inspection of the spacecraft 6 reentrY assembly was

conducted in accordance with reference 14 at the contractor's facility
in St. Louis, Missouri, from December 21, 1965, to January 14_ 1966. The
rendezvous and recovery (R and R) section was returned to St. Louis for
postflight inspection, and the recovery parachutes were returned to
Cape Kennedy for damage charting.

Certain items of equipment were removed from the spacecraft on-

board the prime recovery ship and disposed of in accordance with Space-
craft Test Requests (STR) 600OD, 6002 through 6007, 6012 and 6013.

The reentry assembly was received at St. Louis in good condition,

and the external appearance was similar to spacecraft 3, 4, and 5.
The following is a list of the discrepancies noted during the detailed
inspection of the reentry assembly:

(a) A residue was on the exterior surface of both hatch windows.

(b) The voice tape recorder would not advance the tape in the

(c) The upper right-hand docking fitting pin on the R and R sec-
tion was extended.

(d) Reentry heating marks on the R and R section docking fitting

doors indicated that they had not completely closed after the docking
latches were jettisoned.

(e) The left-hand hatch actuator breech pressure line end tip
was broken off in the breech.

(f) Leaks were detected in the right-hand secondary oxygen

bottle at the inlet to the bottle and at the outlet shutoff valve
"B" nuts.

(g) Two fuses in the electrical fuse blocks were blown.

(h) Seven pyrotechnic cartridges in the R and R section had not

been detonated.

(i) Insulation around some of the reentry control system (RCS)

thrusters was protruding.


(j) Pyro switch "G" electrical continuity checks indicated the

switch had not opened.

(k) The TB!2 terminal strip was found to have reversed nomencla-

12.6.1 Spacecraft Systems Structure.- The overall appearance of the spacecraft

structure was good. The appearance of the heat shield was normal, and
the stagr_tion point was located 13.7 inches below the horizontal
centerline and 0.4 inch to the left of the vertical centerline. The
heat shield was removed and dried. The dry weight of the heat shield
was 316.98 pounds without the insulation blankets. Two plugs were re-
moved from the heat shield for analysis in accordance with STR 6010.

Residue similar to that on the windows of previous spacecraft was

noted, and STR 6008 was written to determine the constituents.

The upper right-hand docking fitting pin on the R and R section was
extended. The other two docking fitting pins were retracted. Reentry
heating marks on the docking fitting doors indicated that they had not
completely closed although all three of the release cables had been
cut by the pyrotechnic cutters. The lower docking fitting door was
found in the retracted position when recovered by the prime recovery
ship, and it released when the R and R section shingles and insulation
were removed.

Examination of the environmental control system (ECS) door and

well interior indicated no leakage of water into the spacecraft.

A radiation check of the spacecraft indicated no radioactivity

except at the C02 sensor which had a reading of 1.3 milliroentgens. Environmental control system.- Drinking water samples

were taken and dispositioned for analysis in accordance with refer-
ence 14. The total water removed was 14.0 pounds.

The lithium hydroxide cartridge was removed from the ECS package
and weighed. The cartridge weighed 103.0 pounds with a center-of-
gravity 8.066 inches from the bottom of the cartridge.

Leaks were detected in the right-hand secondary oxygen bottle at

the inlet to the bottle (small leak at "B" nut) and outlet shutoff
valve (heavy leak at "B" nut -- possibly 20-30 cc/min). The torque-paint

seal on the outlet shutoff valve "B" nut had been broken, and marks
indicated that the nut had been tightened after the torquing paint seal
had been applied. Residual pressures remaining in the left-hand and
right-hand secondary oxygen bottles were 4164 psig and i14 psig, re-
spectively. STR 6033 was written to investigate the anomaly.

The coolant and ventilation systems were investigated per STR 6510
because the crew complained of being too warm. Communications system.- The external appearance of all

the communications equipment bays was good. A small amount of corro-
sion was evident on the coaxial switches and connectors.

The command pilot's pressure suit, biomedical harness and helmet,

and the pilot's helmet and biomedical harness, and the light-weight
headset were returned to St. Louis to conduct the test outlined in
STR 6023A.

The voice tape recorder was removed, tested, and dispositioned

per STR 6028. The capstans would not turn when the motor was running. Guidance and control system.- The inertial measurement

unit (IMU) system, attitude control maneuver electronics (ACME) system,
computer, auxiliary control power unit (ACPU), horizon sensor electron-
ics, and the rendezvous radar were removed, rinsed, dried, and packaged
aboard the prime recovery ship in accordance with reference 15. The
equipment was dispositioned at Mayport, Florida to the vendor repre-
sentatives per STR's 6002A through 6007A. pyrotechnics system.- Pyrotechnic resistance checks were

performed on all actuated pyrotechnic devices per reference 14. The
postflight visual inspection of the wire bundle guillotines, parachute-
bridle release mechanisms, drogue parachute mortar, docking-bar release
mechanism, and other pyrotechnics disclosed that all appeared to have
functioned normally.

The hatch actuator breeches, rocket catapults, seat pyrotechnic

devices, and other unfired pyrotechnic devices were removed for storage
and subsequent disposition per reference 14.

The electrical connector to the mild detonating fuse (MDF) deton-

ator on the right-hand side of the Z192 bulkhead had the bayonet pins
sheared off and was hanging loose from the cartridge. This condition
has been noted on previous missions and is considered acceptable.
Both MDF detonators had high order detonation.


Pyrotechnic resistance checks of the R and R section revealed

that the seven pyrotechnics had not detonated. Subsequent electrical
continuity checks of the retro-squib bus no. 1 circuitry revealed that
a relay in the docking relay panel had not latched. STR 6507 was
written to investigate the anomaly.

One of the left-hand hatch actuator breech flexible pressure lines

had the tip broken off in the breech. Instrumentation and recording system.- The pulse code

modulation (PCM) tape recorder was removed aboard the prime recovery
ship and dispositioned to St. Louis for failure analysis per STR 6020.

The PCM programmer, instrumentation package no. 2_ high-level

multiplexer, and low-level multiplexer were removed, rinsed, dried,
and packaged aboard the prime recovery ship in accordance with ref-
erence 15.

The biomedical tape recorders were removed onboard the recovery

ship and returned to the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Houston. A
failure analysis of serial number 006 was conducted per STR 6034. Electrical system.- The main and squib batteries were

removed and discharged in accordance with reference 14. The following
table lists the ampere-hours remaining in the battery after flight
when discharged to the level of 20 volts with the battery still de-
livering the currents specified in reference 14.

Main Serial Discharge, Squib Serial Discharge,

number Amp-hr number Amp-hr

1 163 42.5 l 132 12.0

2 170 33.8 2 131 12.7

3 172 36.7 3 120 12.6

4 190 41.3

The main and squib batteries were recharged and placed in bonded
storage for ground test use.

The current leakage caused by salt water immersion was checked
and the resistances below 5 ohms were recorded in reference 14.

The fuse block status check in accordance with reference 14 was

performed, and the following fuses were blown:

(a) Fuse no. 4-5, pin 2, fuse block XF-C

(b) Fuse no. 3-18, pin 4, fuse block XF-K

The aerospace ground equipment (AGE) test point inspection was

performed per reference 14, and residue and rust were found in AGE
test point no. 21 behind access door no. 39.

During the pyro switch electrical continuity check per reference 14,
pyro switch "G" indicated a continuous circuit. The pyro switch was
removed for failure analysis per STR 6511.

Inspection of the TBI2 terminal strip revealed that the nomencla-

ture on the terminal studs was reversed. Crew station furnishinss and e_uipment.- The appearance

of the cabin interior was good. The flight crew equipment removed on
the prime recovery ship was dispositioned in accordance with STR 6000D.
Functional checks of the mechanical linkages were performed in accord-
ance with reference 14 and no anomalies were noted.

The ejection seats were removed and deactivated per reference 14.
The residual pressures in the left-hand and right-hand egress kits
recorded during deservicing were 1650 psig and 2050 psig, respectively.
The latching of the centerline stowage compartment door was checked
without the stowage boxes. The door operated normally. The urine
system quick-disconnect assembly anomaly reported by the crew will be
investigated per STR 6016. Propulsion system.- The reentry control system (RCS)

thrust chamber assemblies (TCA's) appeared normal. Peripheral cracks
were noted in some thrusters. A residue was noted in the throat of
some thrusters and the thermal insulation was protruding from around
some TCA's.

The RCS section was deactivated at Mayport, Florida, and purge

gas samples were sent to Patrick AFB, Florida, for analysis prior to
moving the spacecraft into the contractor's industrial area. No pro-
pellants were obtained from either the '_" or "B" systems for analysis.
The RCS section was removed, vented, and vacuum dried for disposition
per STR 6503.

12-36 UNCLASSIFIED Landin_ system.- The single-point bridle release mech-

anism and the main parachute forward and aft bridle release mechanisms
appeared to have functioned normally.

The main parachute_ drogue parachute, and pilot parachute were

returned to Cape Kennedy for waslhing_ drying_ damage charting, and
further analysis per STR 6001.

Visual examination of the R and R section revealed that the apex

line cutter and pilot parachute mortar had not been actuated. This is
normal for a nominal parachute recovery. Postlandin_ recovery aids.- The flashing recovery light

and the hoist loop doors appeared to have functioned normally but the
doors were not recovered_ which was normal.

A block of styrofoam flotation material from the right-hand side

of the RCS section was returned as a loose piece. This flotation
material was removed on the prime recovery ship for access to the sea
dye marker container. Experiments.- The experiment equipment was removed on -

the prime recovery ship and dispositioned per STR 6000D.

12.6.2 Continuing Evaluation

_he following is a list of the spacecraft test requests (STR's)

that have been approved for the postflight evaluation of reported space-
craft anomalies:

number System Purpose

6006B Guidance and To determine the cause of the apparent

control bias error in the computer.

6008 Structure To determine the composition and origins

of the residue on the windows.

6016 Crew station To determine the cause of the difficulty

in connecting the urine system quick

6020 Instrumentation To determine the cause of the PCM tape

and recording recorder malfunction.

6022 Crew station To perform failure analysis and repair

the 16-mm sequence camera.

6023A Communications To evaluate the voice quality of the UHF

voice transmission system including hel-
mets_ microphones_ VCC_ and UHF trans-

6026 Instrumentation To determine the cause of the malfunction

and recording of the low-level multiplexer during flight.

6028 Communications To determine if the voice tape recorder

malfunctioned during flight, and to com-
pare ground test performance with mis-
sion performance.

6029 Instrumentation To determine the cause of the failure of

and recording the pilot's oral temperature probe.

6030 Crew station To determine the cause of the reported

boresight shift in the optical sight.


6031 Crew station To determine the cause of the deformation

of the center stowage frame experienced
in flight.

6033 Environmental To determine the cause of the leakage

control system at the "B" nuts on the right-hand
secondary oxygen bottle.

6034 Instrumentation To determine the cause of the malfunction

and recording of the biomedical recorder.

6507A Pyrotechnics To investigate anomaly associated with

seven unfired pyros in the R and R sec-

6511 Electrical To investigate anomaly associated with

pyro switch "G" continuity tests.

6519 Guidance and To investigate the anomaly associated

control with the Flight Director Indicator
needle displacement.


Addressee Number of copies


National Aeronautics and Space Administration 50

Attention: Director, Gemini Program, MG
Washington, D. C. 20546

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2

Attention: Library 3 USS-IO
Washington, D. C. 20546

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058

Director, AA i

Deputy Director, AB I

Special Assistant to the Director, AC i

Chief of Center Medical Programs, AH 2

Legal Office, AL i

Center Medical Office, AM 3

Flight Medicine Branch, AM2 2

John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA 2

Attention: Launch Site Medical Operations, HU
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

Public Affairs Office, AP i

Chief of Historical Branch, AP6 i

Flight Safety Office, AR 4

John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA i

Attention: Flight Safety Office, HY
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

Addressee Number of copies

Assistant Director for Administration

Mail and Records Management Branch, BF5 i

Forms and Publications Section, BF52 i18

Records Depository, BF6 1

Procurement and Contracts Division, BG 1

Gemini and Flight Support Procurement Branch, BG61 1

Management Services Division, BM 1

Technical Information Preparation Branch, BM 5 3

Technical Information Dissemination Branch, BM6 16

Program Budget and Presentation Branch, BR4 1

Assistant Director for Flight Crew Operations, CA i

Astronaut Office, CB 28

Flight Crew Support Division, CF ll

John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA 1

Attention: Cape Simulator Operations Section, HW
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

Assistant Director for Engineering and Development, EA 2

Information Systems Division, EB 5

Crew Systems Division, EC 5

Computation and Analysis Division, ED 5

Instrumentation and Electronics Systems Division, EE 5

Guidance and Control Division, EG 5

Propulsion and Power Division, EP 5

Structures and Mechanics Division, E9 5

Addressee Number of copies

Advanced Spacecraft Technology Division, ET 5

Experiments Program 0ffice, EX 5

O. Smistad, EX42 I

E. 0. Zeitler, EX43 I

Assistant Director for Flight Operations, FA 3

Flight Control Division, FF 7

Landing and Recovery Division, FL 4

Mission Planning and Analysis Division, FM 13

Flight Support Division, FS 4

Gemini Program Office, GA i0

Gemini Program Office Files, GA 20

Program Control, GP 7

Spacecraft, GS 8

Test 0perations, GT 8

Vehicles and Missions, GV 8

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Manned Spacecraft Center
Attention: Gemini Program Office Representative, GV2
c/o Martin Company
Mail No. 388
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Manned Spacecraft Center
Attention: Gemini Program Office Representative, GV3
c/o Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
Sunnyvale, California 94086

Mission Evaluation Team, GX 12

Addressee Number of copies

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

Manned Spacecraft Center
Attention: Resident Manager, GM
c/o McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
Lambert-St. Louis Municipal Airport
Post Office Box 516
St. Louis, Missouri 63166

John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA i

Attention: Gemini Program Office Resident Manager, NS
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, PA 34

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

White Sands Test Facility
Attention: Manager, RA
Post Office Drawer MM
Las Cruces, New Mexico 88001

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Ames Research Center --_
Attention: Director, 200-1
Moffett Field, California 94035

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

Ames Research Center
Attention: Library, 202- 3
Moffett Field, California 94035

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Ames Research Center
Attention: Project Biosatellite, 201-2
Moffett Field, California 94035

National Aeronautics and Space Administration I

Electronics Research Center
Attention: Director
575 Technology Square
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Flight Research Center
Attention: Director
Post Office Box 273
Edwards, California 93523

Addressee Number of copies

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

Flight Research Center
Attention: Library
Post Office Box 273
Edwards, California 93523

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Goddard Space Flight Center
Attention: Director, i00
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

Goddard Space Flight Center
Attention: Library, 252
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Goddard Space Flight Center
Attention: Chief, Manned Flight Operations
Division, 550
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Goddard Space Flight Center
Attention: L. R. Stelter, Chief
NASA Con_nunications Division
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771

National Aeronautics and Space Administration I

Goddard Space Flight Center
Attention: Dr. P. D. Lawman
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771

John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA 2

Attention: GSFC Launch Operations
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Goddard Space Flight Center
Attention: Liaison Representative, GSF-L
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058

Addressee Number of copies

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 1

Attention: Director, 180-905
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, California 91103

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 5

Attention: Library, 111-113
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, California 91103

John F. Kennedy Space Center_ NASA

Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

Director, DIR I

Deputy Director_ DEP i

Deputy Director, Launch Operations, DLO i

Library, GA72 5

Public Affairs Office, PAO i

Assistant Center Director for Launch Vehicle i

Operations, LVO

Assistant Center Director for Information I

Systems, INS

Assistant Center Director for Spacecraft

Operations, SCO

Manager for Gemini Operations, SC0-7 i

Spacecraft Operations Surveillance Division, SC0-2 I

Test Conductor's Office, SC0-5 i

Space Vehicle Planning and Supervision Office i

Program Planning and Control Office, PPR 3

KSC Data Branch, INS-13 2

Addressee Number of copies

John F. Kennedy Space Center_ NASA 1

Attention: Liaison Representative, HAll3
c/oManned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 1

Langley Research Center
Attention: Director, 106
Langley Station
Hampton, Virginia 2336_

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

Langley Research Center
Attention: Library, 185
Langley Station
Hampton, Virginia 23365

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 1

Langley Research Center
Attention: Liaison Representative, RAA
c/oManned Spacecraft Center
Houston_ Texas 77058

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 1

Lewis Research Center
Attention: Director, 3-2
21000 Brookpark Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44135

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

Lewis Research Center
Attention: Library_ 3-7
21000 Brookpark Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44135

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 1

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Attention: Director_ DIR
Huntsville, Alabama 35832

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 5

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Attention: Library, MS-1G
Huntsville, Alabama 35812

Addressee Number of copies

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

George C. Marshall Space Fli_t Center
Liaison Representative, RL
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

John F. Kennedy Space Center
Western Test Range Operations Division
Attention: Director
Post Office Box 425
Lompoc, California 93438

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Wallops Station
Attention: Director
Wallops Island, Virginia 23337

National Aeronautics and Space Administration i

Western Operations Office
Attention: Director
150 Pico Boulevard
Santa Monica, California 90406


Executive Officer, MOLProgram Office, SAF-SL 1

Attention: Col. Richard L. Dennen
Headquarters, USAF
The Pentagon
Room 5E417
Washington, D.C. 20301

Office of the Secretary of Defense 1

Office of the Director of Defense
Attention: Col. Robert A. Duffy
Research and Engineering
The Pentagon
Room 3D-I085
Washington, D.C. 20301

Department of Defense Manager 3

Marmed Space Flight Support Operations, DDMS
Attention: Col. R. G. 01son
Air Force Eastern Test Range
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida 32922

Addressee Number of copies

Department of Defense Representative 1

Liaison Officer, ZR2
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058


Commander_ Headquarters (SCGR) 1

UBAF Systems Command
Attention: Department of Defense Manager for
Space Flight Support Operations
Andrews AFB_ Maryland 21605

Commander _ RIRGV 3
National Range Division (Patrick)
USAF Systems Command
Patrick AFB_ Florida 32922

Commander _ ETG 2
Air Force Eastern Test Range
USAF Systems Command
Patrick AFB, Florida 32922

_SC (_) 1
Andrews AFB
Washington_ D.C. 20331

Chief, Patrick Test Site 0ffice_ RETPQC i

Quality Assurance Division_ Gemini Program
USAF Systems Command
P. 0. Box 4507
Patrick AFB_ Florida 32922

Commander, SSG i
Headquarters, Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045

Colonel Russel M. Herrington_ Jr. _ SSB l0

Assistant for Programs 623A and 624A
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045


Addressee Number of copies

Deputy for Launch Vehicles, SSV 2

Headquarters, Space Systems Division
UBAF Systems Co_nand
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045

Chief, Agena Directorate, SSVA i

Headquarters, Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045

Chief, Gemini Agena Division, SSVAT I

Agena Directorate
Headquarters, Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045

Director, Gemini Launch Vehicles, SSVL 5

Headquarters, Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045

Advanced Development Directorate 1

Attention: Lt. Col. _heodore D. Little, SSTD
Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command
E1 Segundo, California 90245

Research and Technology Directorate, SSTR 1

Attention: Col. N. J. Keefer
Headquarters, Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command
Los Angeles Air Force Station
Air Force Unit Post Office
Los Angeles, California 90045

Addressee Number of copies

Commander s Detachment 2_ ZR1 10

Headquarterss Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Command Field Office
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston; Texas 77058

Commander 6555th Aerospace Test Wing s DWG 1

Space Systems Division
USAFSystems Command
PatrickAFB, Florida 32922

Chief, Gemini Launch Vehicle Division s DWD 5

6555th Aerospace Test Wing
Space Systems Division
USAFSystems Command
Patrick AFB, Florida 32922

Chief, SLV-III Division_ DWC 1

6555th Aerospace Test Wing
Space Systems Division
USAF Systems Con_nand
Patrick AFB, Florida 32922

Co_ander, Headquarters_ Air Rescue Service 3

Military Air Transport Service
Orlando AFB_ Florida 32813

Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory 1

Research and Technology Division
Air Force Systems Command, USAF
AFPRL (RPRPP/Mr. Martinkovic)
Edwards_ California 93523

Office of Director for Research 1

Aerospace Medical Division
Attention: Lt. Col. S. C. White s USAF s MC
Brooks AFB, Texas 78235

USAFSystems Command/Air Training Command Office 1

Liaison Representative_ ZR 3
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058

Addressee Number of copies

Department of the Air Force 1

USAFHospitalAndrews (Hq. Comd. USAF)
Attention: Medical Library
Andrews AFB, Washington, D. C. 20331


Chief of Naval Operations 1

_he Pentagon
Room 4E636
Washington, D.C. 20301

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 1

Norfolk Naval Base
Norfolk, Virginia 23500

Connnander, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 4 3

Norfolk Naval Base
Norfolk, Virginia 33500

Co_muander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier 3 --

Code 34
Box llO
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 94100


U.S. General Accounting Office 1

Liaison Representative, ZS1
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058


Chief, Spaceflight Meteorological Group 1

U.S. Weather Bureau
Washington, D. C. 20234

Spaceflight Meteorology Group 1

U.S. Weather Bureau
c/o Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058

Addressee Number of copies

Spaceflight Meteorology Group, WO i

U. S. Weather Bureau
c/o John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

National Weather Satellite Center i

Attention: K. Nagler
U. S. Weather Bureau
Suitland, Maryland 21668


Mr. R. C. Stiff, Jr. I

Vice President and Manager of the
Liquid Rocket Operations
Aerojet-General Corporation
P. O. Box 1947
Sacramento, California 95801

Mr. L. D. Wilson i
f Gemini Program Manager
Liquid Rocket Operations
Aerojet-General Corporation
P. O. Box 1947
Sacramento, California 95801

Mr. R. M. Groo i
Aerojet-General Corporation
Eastern Test Range Office
Hangar U
P. 0. Box 4425
Patrick AFB, Florida 32922


Dr. Walter C. Williams, Vice President and I

General Manager of Manned Systems Division
AErospace Corporation
P. O. Box 95085
Los Angeles, California 90045

Mr. Bernhard A. Hohmana, Group Director i0

Gemini Launch Systems Directorate
Aerospace Corporation
P. 0. Box 95085
Los Angeles, California 90045

Addressee Number of copies

Mr. L. M. Weeks, Group Director, M0L 1

Systems Engineering Office
Aerospace Corporation
P. 0. Box 95085
Los Angeles, California 90045

Mr. Richard E. Day, Director, Systems Operations _ M0L i

Systems Engineering Office
Aerospace Corporation
P. 0. Box 95085
Los Angeles, California 90045

Dr. Leon R. Bush i

Director, Systems and Guidance Analysis
Gemini Launch Systems Directorate
Aerospace Corporation
P. 0. Box 95085
Los Angeles, California 90045

Mr. Newton A. Mas 6

Manager, Gemini Program
Aerospace Corporation
P. 0. Box 4007
Patrick AFB_ Florida 32922


Mr. G. C. Sebold i
Vice President, Convair Division
General Dynamics Corporation
P. O. Box i128
San Diego, California 92112

Mr. R. W. Keehn 6
Manager, Gemini Target Vehicle Project Office
Convair Division
General Dynamics Corporation
P. 0. Box I128
San Diego, California 92112

Mr. B. G. McNabb 2
Manager, Base Operations
Convair Operations
General Dynamics Corporation
P. 0. Box 999
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Addressee Number of copies

Mr. J. M. Fitzpatrick i
Manager, Houston Office
General Dynamics Corporation
1730 NASA Road i
Suite 204
Houston, Texas 77058


Mr. R. R. Kearton i
Vice President and General Manager
Space Systems Division
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
P. 0. Box 504
Sunnyvale, California 94088

Mr. G. H. Putt i
Vice President and Assistant General Manager
Space Systems Division
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
P. O. Box 504
- Sunnyvale, California 94088

Mr. J. O. Shoenhair i
Assistant General Manager, NASA Programs
Space Systems Division
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
P. O. Box 504
Sunnyvale, California 94088

Mr. L. A. Smith 8
Manager, Gemini Program
Space Systems Division
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
P. O. Box 504
Sunnyvale, California 94088

Mr. B. E. Steadman 1
Manager, Houston Area Office
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
16811 E1 Camino Real
Houston, Texas 77058

Addressee Number of copies


Mr. V. R. Rawlings, Vice President 1

Mail No. 14
Martin-Marietta Corporation
Baltimore, Maryland 21203'

Mr. Bastian Hello i

Director_ Lifting Body Progra_
Mail No. 3070
Martin-Marietta Corporation
Ba!timore_ Maryland 21203

Mr. W. D. Smith 8
Director, Gemini Program
Mail No. 3134
Martin-Marietta Corporation
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Mr. O. E. Tibbs, Vice President i

Mail No. A-I
Canaveral Division
Martin-Marietta Corporation
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Mr. J. M. Verlander 4
Gemini Program Director
Mail No. B-1605
Canaveral Division
Martin-Marietta Corporation
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Mr. J. Donald Rauth _, Vice President i

Mail No. A-I-I
Denver Division
Martin-Marietta Corporation
P. O. Box 179
Denver, Colorado 80200

Mr. John J. Laurinec i

Gemini Program Manager
Mail No. C-222-I03
Denver Division
Martin-Marietta Corporation
P. O. Box 179
Denver, Colorado 80200

Addressee Number of copies

Mr. Colin A. Harrison i

Martin Company
1720 NASA Road i
Suite 106
Houston, Texas 77058


Mr. Walter F. Burke 25

Vice President and General Manager
Spacecraft and Missiles
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
Lambert-St. Louis Municipal Airport
P. O. Box 516
St. Louis, Missouri 63166

Mr. R. D. Hill, Jr. 5

Base Manager
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
P. O. Box M
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Mr. Frank G. Morgan i

McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
1730 NASA Road 1
Suite 101
Houston, Texas 77058