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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1) ADM, Bernas vs. Capulong, et al (May 27, 1993) Facts: Respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. They have been refused admission into ADM having found guilty of violating Rule No 3 in the Rules of Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. As a result of an initiation of Aquila Legis, Lennie Villa died of serious physical injuries. Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized due to the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion, which happened in Feb 8-10, 1991. The Disciplinary Board found the respondents guilty of hazing, either by active part or through acquiescence. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, University President, imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. On March 18, 1991, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal. Respondent judge issued the write of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether the respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to dismissal from petitioner university Ruling: Petition is granted and order of respondent judge, who committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of charges against them. There is no indication that such right has been violated. Respondent students’ rights in a school disciplinary proceeding have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled. Minimum standard to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions are (1) students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired (3) informed of the evidence against them (4) right to adduce evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authority to hear and decide the case. Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of the order, they were denied procedural due process. Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross-examine. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students’ participation in a hazing act need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. The charge filed is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. It is not subject to the rigorous requirement of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1) People vs. Nazario (Aug. 31, 1988) Facts: The defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Order, being the owner and operator of a fishpond, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay minimum taxes required of him as fishpond operator. The accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and there is not law empowering municipalities to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators. The trial court returned a verdict of guilty. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not declaring the ordinance null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain Ruling: As a rule, a statue or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. In no way the ordinances at be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager. He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinance. Appeal is DISMISSED.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1) LAO GI, et al vs. CA, CID (Dec. 29, 1989) Facts: On Sept. 3, 1958, the Secretary of Justice found Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia Pieng Hui, to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father is a Filipino citizen. However, on October 3, 1980, the Minister of Justice set aside his citizenship on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. On March 9, 1981, a charge for deportation was filed with the CID against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Jr., his wife and children. In this case, it appears that petitioners are charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authority at a designated port of entry. Issue: Whether due process was denied from the petitioners Ruling: While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the commissioner to require an alien to register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioner is in issue, there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may de directed and required to register as aliens. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extra-ordinary administrative proceeding affecting freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be dented. The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment before any charge should be filed in the CID. A preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. Petition is GRANTED and the questioned order of the respondent CID is set aside. CID is directed to continue hearing the deportation case against the petitioners and thereafter, based on the evidence before it, resolve the issue of citizenship of petitioners, and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or not the petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as aliens. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1) Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995) Facts: Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the AntiGraft Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by CSC. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be given 10% commission. Rivera was further charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions Ruling: Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1) Balacuit, et al vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte & Butuan City, City of Butuan (June 30, 1988) Facts: This is a petition for validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed in April 21, 1969 penalizing those who sell tickets requiring children from 7 to 12 to pay full instead of just one-half. Petitioners are managers of movie theaters. The trial court upheld its validity. Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 is valid and constitutional Ruling: The operation of theaters are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. The City of Butuan, realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate, now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. There must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance. Under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative department. The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, it must be reasonable. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, therefore, null and void. EQUAL PROTECTION (Art. III, Sec 1) People of the Phil vs. Jalosjos (Feb. 3, 2000) Facts: Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Issue: Whether respondent should be given since he is a public official Ruling: The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State. WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Stop and Frisk Posadas vs. CA, People of the Phil (August 2, 1990) Facts: On October 16, 1986, while in the premises of RMC, members of the Integrated National Police of the Davao Metrodiscom spotted petitioner, below 18 yrs old, carrying a "buri" bag and noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade. The petitioner failed to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and was found guilty. CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether the warrantless search on the petitioner is valid Ruling: Under the Rules of Court, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." The search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 9 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Stop and Frisk People of the Phil vs. Mengote (June 22, 1992) Facts: Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. He pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. On August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at Tondo, they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. Mengote was found with a revolver and his companion had a fan knife. Danganan identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon and pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. Issue: Whether the arrest was lawful & whether the revolver is admissible as evidence Ruling: A person can be arrested without warrant after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense or in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accusedappellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses.
it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Obrero. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard. III. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. etc. while there is no need of criminal intent. Ma. A locksmith. Badiang. Capt. The authority given by Ma. Dumlao (June 18. Besides. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest. A search warrant is still necessary. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Davao City. Capt. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Obrero recovered handgun. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. Issue: Whether the articles were inadmissible as evidence for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures Ruling: Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. The care and upkeep of their residence was left to two (2) houseboys. Capt. In June 1988. On April 12. Luisa was contacted by telephone to ask permission to search the house. they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. The criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED. and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. The key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by petitioners. Petitioner Ma. Layague. 1992) Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at Skyline. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet. . Luisa Veroy. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. hence. he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. 1990. However. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. Obrero and Major Macasaet conducted the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon. The following day. assuming that there was indeed a search warrant. Capt. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. (2) a search of a moving vehicle. the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable. Obrero was able to enter the compound. Sec 2) – Consented Search Spouses Veroy vs. While Capt. Undeniably. there must be knowledge that the same existed. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. they transferred to Quezon City where they are presently residing. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Hence. still in mala prohibita. houses. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. printed materials. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant.
As a consequence. Damaso @ Mendoza (August 12. In the case at bench. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Prosecutor Dimaraw found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners. the group. they now have probative value. determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. other than the prosecutor's bare report. on the other hand. the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. Petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid." This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges.. namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest. The judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. i. When they reached the house." xerox copiers and a computer machine. the group saw Tanciangco outside. Hence. respondent judge did not even issue an order stating that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. After a careful analysis of these arguments. Consequently. III. the case against him still will not prosper. the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. allowed the authorities to enter it. Issue: Whether the order of arrest issued is valid Ruling: Petitoiner points to the fact that the information was filed at around 4:00 p. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation. Hearsay evidence. his alleged helper. but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan. Sec 2) – Arrest Warrant Abdula vs. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. ACCORDINGLY. saw radio sets. 1995. Sec 2) – Consented Search People of the Phil vs. still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens. at the very least. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare. one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence. Moreover. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. being personal one." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. But the record is silent on this point.e. the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio. It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment or. Damaso was originally charged in an information filed before the RTC Dagupan with violation of PD 1866 in furtherance of. At first. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house. The judge must decide independently. None of these exceptions is present in this case. It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. the . On 3 January 1995. Morados stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Damaso and guided the group to the house rented by appellant. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza. The trial court found him guilty of the said offense. there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. The group again required Morados to go with them.m. 2000) Facts: After evaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar. cannot be given credence. of the January 2. (2) search of a moving vehicle. the group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. rather. III. or in connection with the crime of subversion. upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. Upon entering the house. Thus. It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally. 1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or on January 3. 1992) Facts: On June 18. or incident to. cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. 1988. When they reached the house. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. whether objected to or not. petitioner argues. the respondent judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. Guiani (February 18. even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence. The judge. as Respondent Court did in this case. The testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal knowledge. But. and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. we find merit in the contention of petitioners. What is required. he must have supporting evidence. Issue: Whether there was a valid search and seizure Ruling: In the case at bar. she denied it. there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction. the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Tanciangco and Morados. respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed. for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
premises considered. warrant of arrest should be declared null and void. the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. WHEREFORE. .
1993) Facts: On December 13. Moreover. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. they opened it and found the marijuana.00 marked money. The "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III. may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. contraband. or otherwise subject to seizure. Musa (January 27. The plastic bag was. . Ani gave Mari Musa the P20. the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. in the kitchen. Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. They then searched the entire house and. Amado Ani conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Zamboanga City. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. After receiving the money. In the case at bar. WHEREFORE. the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. however. Issue: Whether the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen is valid Ruling: The Constitution declares inadmissible. a buy-bust was planned. Ani inspected the contents and was convinced that the contents were marijuana. exceptions to this rule are recognized. the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the RTC AFFIRMED. in any way. III. any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected. In the instant case. Sec 2) – Warrantless Search: Incident to Arrest People of the Phil vs. as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest. The next day. Sgt. Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. they had no clue as to its contents. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. Ani. In a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher. The guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find. not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. diminish. The NARCOM agents could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. When the appellant refused to respond. the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana. the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. The warrantless search and seizure. therefore. 1989. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime. Ani approached Mari Musa. Sgt. The trial court found Musa guilty of selling marijuana. when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen. The two NARCOM teams sped towards Sgt. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not. the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
III. 1984 at 11:30 am. The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves. At 12:00 nn. ROQUE was accused of rebellion. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains. Policemen proceeded to where the mauling incident took place. III. The policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. Gerente (March 10. Some searches may be made without a warrant. assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. for possible effective results in the interest of public order. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although. The extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. It is an all. Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. hitting the latter on the different parts of his body. he. that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling.embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED . a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. Roque. 1990. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible in court Ruling: The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure. Issue: Whether the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and whether probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. Gerente had in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs. ordinarily. Pano. et al (October 8. What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. The policemen proceeded to the house of the Gerente and introduced themselves as policemen. the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. while the Search Warrant is hereby annulled and set aside. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. this. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. They seized documents and written materials. Such being the case. Sec 2) – Warrantless Search: Incident to Arrest Nolasco. without a search warrant. the personalities seized may be retained. ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest. we are of the opinion that in her respect. Tolentino vs. the CSG searched the residence of Roque wherein a search warrant was previously issued at 9:00 am. the search did not need a search warrant. Sec 2) – Warrantless Arrest People of the Phil vs. thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim. which is a crime against public order. Blace. in fact. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against NOLASCO. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. The Court does not agree. Ruling: The court finds merit in the petition. portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as. WHEREFORE. the personalities seized may be retained by the CSG for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles. 1993) Facts: On April 30. 1985) Facts: On August 6. with two other companions. for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. and it has been stated that there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. On the same date. that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time. They frisked the appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.
Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. The seizure of evidence in ‘plain view’ applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. Bulacan. The seizure was illegal. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. The Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. absent which such search and seizure becomes ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of said constitutional provision. A search warrant was issued. The search yielded firearms and ammunition. seizure of evidence in “plain view” is justified when there is: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties.” It shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction. People of the Phil (May 31. SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration stating that the person named therein had not been issued a firearm license referred to a different Vicente “Vic” del Rosario. . III. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both. cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to petitioner. Norzagaray. Sec 2) – Warrantless Search : Plain View Del Rosario vs. Issue: Whether the search conducted was illegal and whether the evidence seized were inadmissible Ruling: The Court finds the petition impressed with merit. Such certification referred to another individual and thus. Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant. Section 2. 2001) Facts: In May 1996. Specifically. The certification stated that Vicente “Vic” del Rosario of Barangay Bigte. the police officers conducted a search of the house. The Court ACQUITS petitioner of the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. With respect to the revolver that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioner’s house. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial “fruit of a poisonous tree. As against this. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner’s house. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioner’s house. petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe. The firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. After appellant gave his permission. Norzagaray. and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. CA dismissed the petition. the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. organization or coalition. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication. by displaying it on his car. whether public or private. and orderly elections. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. he is expressing more than the name. a senatorial candidate. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11. he. the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. . television and print political advertisements. Act No. Issue: Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence Ruling: The tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. on the same day. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied. SPEECH. All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez. should lean in favor of freedom. at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party. Section 21 provides that it is unlawful publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place. Section 15 provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21. 4200. or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free. Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit. Sec 4) – Forms of Restriction Adiong vs. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. Sec 3) Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Article III). assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. public or private. on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. CA. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Issue: Whether the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them. honest. The prohibition becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. private respondent Rafael S. and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. For in the ultimate analysis. 2347 of the COMELEC is DECLARED NULL and VOID. Clearly. III. III. the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. Petition is GRANTED. The petitioner believes that with the ban on radio. 1994) Facts: On 2 May 1990. Zamora. The Court is constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition. 2347. the police. Ortanez (August 4. being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. COMELEC (March 31. mobile or stationary. 1992. the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper. the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. 1992 elections. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATON (Art. 4. local officials and COMELEC. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle. Act No. to convince others to agree with him. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence. except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards. he is espousing ideas. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. Rep. primarily his own and not of anybody else. 1992) Facts: On January 13. the expression becomes a statement by the owner. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
is not an absolute right. et al (April 29. much less to any matter purely personal to them. in the circumstances of this case. airing. verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family. Sec 4) – Forms of Restriction Ayer. The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. and his movie production company. distribution or exhibition of said or similar film. Ruling: Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. III. . private respondent filed a Complaint with application for TRO with the RTC of Makati. The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection. Issue: Whether the granting of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners is a restraint on their right of free expression. Ayer Productions. showing. and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. envisioned. which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy. SPEECH. reproduction and/or exhibition of his name. The production and filming of the projected motion picture does not. is the "balancing of interest test". or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies." The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use. an Australian film maker. The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation". film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production. The production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit. the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. On 23 February 1988. constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. et al vs. or picture. On 21 December 1987. in other words. Capulong. television and the movies. Respondent court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. appropriation. It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press. 1988) Facts: Petitioner Hal McElroy. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release. Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Order of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as well as the other government agencies consulted. no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. There was." 6 like the right of free expression. no reference whatsoever (whether written. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone. To exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.
Eslao vs. A prima facie case was found against petitioners and the case was recommended for trial by a general court martial. with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Thus. The Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition . PMA Superintendent Dayan verbally instructed the PMA Board of Officers to take the testimonies of certain witnesses. a PMA Board of Officers was created to investigate the alleged involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA. including the freedom of speech. April 22. Public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. SPEECH. III. The next day. Petitioner Kapunan was allegedly summoned to the General Headquarters of the AFP for a dialogue. the Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. 1988) Facts: In the aftermath of the failed August 28. have to be considered. Quezon City [Rollo. petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. Sec 4) – Forms of Restriction Kapunan. no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct. 8. discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. et al (December 6. 1999) Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo R. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self. Jaime Olmedo. Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of libel Ruling: With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant. but ordered that he remain under confinement as an accused in the case before respondent General Court Martial No. Without free speech and assembly. Petitioners' motion to dismiss was also denied. These statements became the basis for the recommendation of the AFP Board for the filing of charges against petitioners. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. After their. De Villa ordered the release of Kapunan in connection with the Olalia case since no charges had been filed therein. De Villa. Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation and that the accused meant and intended to convey. unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is. even if the defamatory statement is false. he and some 37 families went to see then NHA General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan. Based on the newspaper article. 361 of the RPC. as in fact he did mean and convey false and malicious imputations that said Jaime Olmedo is engaged in landgrabbing and involved in illegal gambling and stealing of chickens at the Tondo Foreshore Area. 1987 coup d'etat. 1987 he was ordered confined under "house arrest". 1988. may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. p. In April 1986. through connivance with NHA officials. His allegation that. 70]. The non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy. an officer in the AFP. Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. gambling. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. individual rights may be curtailed. On May 19. It would. RTC. For that matter. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case. infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. it must be noted that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner. theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed. irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. The trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel. particularly that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his detention at his quarters in Camp Aguinaldo. lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with. III. complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General. to a certain degree. but upon his arrival thereat on September 4. 1986. an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.governing community. Gen. Issue: Whether Kapunan may issue press statements or give press conference during the period of his detention Ruling: On the matter of the restriction imposed on petitioner Kapunan as conditions for his "house arrest". Sec 4) – Forms of Restriction Vasquez vs. People (September 15. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. CA. Hence. because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. SPEECH. He has been so detained since then. above all. Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. a news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
SPEECH. Bagatsing. Bagatsing. sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. it must come to terms with. seeking reelection. artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene. seized and confiscated from dealers. newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks. and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. distributors. in the legitimate exercise of police power. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger. They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right. and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. to justify State action to stop the speech. a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also. Issue: Whether the said provision is unconstitutional Ruling: there is no total ban on political ads. Western Police District. SPEECH.A. or scientific value. To that extent. pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. §11(b) of R. an easy one to answer. lacks serious literary. has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary. appeals to the prurient interest. barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. 1989) Facts: On December 1983. time and space for political campaigns. The established basic guidelines are. Ramon D. political. that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech. Cabrera (October 5. The petition is DISMISSED. however. in a patently offensive way. there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC. plainly and simply. if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger). The main purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. magazines. III. COMELEC (March 31. However. the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. and be held accountable for. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. The petition is GRANTED. Auxilliary Services Bureau. while Garcia is governor of Cebu Province. CA.A. Media ads do not partake of the 'real substantive evil' that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to information. Any restriction on speech is only incidental. publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene. Osmeña is candidate for President of the Philippines. Meanwhile. 6646. that if "the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. as it is far from being a settled matter. as we averred. and (c) whether the work. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections. It appearing. What the Court is impressing. The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The restriction on speech is limited both as to time and as to scope. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates. that the magazines subject of the search and seizure have been destroyed. On December 7. artistic. 1983." 12 the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Among the publications seized. No. to suppress smut provided it is smut. that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality. the case is moot and academic. 1998) Facts: §11(b) of R. due process. The clear-and-present-danger test is not. elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. applying contemporary standards' would find the work. taken as a whole. III. the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. Commission on Elections "have called into question the validity of the very premises of that decision. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. Issue: Whether the publications were validly seized Ruling: The issue is a complicated one. plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent. the Government must allow it (the speech). the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech. if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. much less restriction on the content of the speech. (2) present. No. Sec 4) – Contempt and Obscenity Pita vs. In free expression cases. Garcia vs. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity. and has not been. Thee presumption is that the speech may validly be said. to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person. is that the question is not. prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes. . (b) whether the work depicts or describes. taken as a whole. there is no challenge on the right of the State. in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided. Sec 4) – Forms of Restriction Osmeña. however. except to the COMELEC. The CA dismissed the appeal. It is easier said than done to say. INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila. indeed. In the case at bar." Apparently. an assumption that. and later burned. It has no choice. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of merit.
121 and 128. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech. does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise. Dr. Martin's passport. The petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court. The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A person. save for specified exceptions. including religious speech. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. petitioner entered the clinic of her husband and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. and 121." and is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. et al (July 26. Sec 4) – Contempt and Obscenity Iglesia ni Cristo vs. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. If it fails to discharge this burden. has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. Martin and his alleged paramours. CA. cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. diaries. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. The RTC enjoined the petitioners from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. CA." The trial court ordered BRMPT to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. Prior restraint on speech. 119. 115. quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. 1996) Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. Issue: Whether the program is constitutionally protected as a form of expression Ruling: The Court reverses the ruling of the appellate court. III. In xrating the TV program of the petitioner. Issue: Whether the petitioner should return the documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. a duly organized religious organization. III. 1982. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Hence. Sec 3) Zulueta vs." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. and photographs. by contracting marriage. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Dr. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage. But one thing is freedom of communication. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. its act of censorship will be struck down. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. as prescribed by law. 116. On March 26. 119. greetings cards. 1996) Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. It failed in the case at bar. any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. . PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATON (Art. cancelled checks. On appeal. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. including religious speech. the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. Martin (February 20. doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. SPEECH.
A student's rights. there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. therefore. but subject to qualification. Moreover. 1984) Facts: Certiorari. in view of their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein. the non-academic employees. the penalty imposed being unduly severe. permit must be sought from its school authorities. stopped their work because of the noise created. however. SPEECH. et al vs. Petitioners are students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation and pursuant to a permit. This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester. If it were a private place. The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. Also. even on controversial subjects. Ramento. or on the campus during the authorized hours. their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. along with other students. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. do not embrace merely the classroom hours. . They continued their demonstration. disturbance of the classes being held. giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. which for any reason — whether it stems from time. Admittedly. the public place where and the time when it will take place. . the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. prohibition and mandamus proceeding. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost. They do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. . Sec 4) – Assembly and Petition Malabanan. with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so." : "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. within hearing distance. except on a showing . in class or out of it. Even if. if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. Necessarily." As tested by such a standard. any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is not to be limited. or on the playing field. they held a general assembly. They manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. III. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent. what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. place. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression. In granting such permit. as a result. there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. it was continued longer than the period allowed. If the assembly is to be held in school premises. They are entitled to do so. it is also an important part of the educational process. he may express his opinions. It must be in their favor." While the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized. They marched toward outside the area covered by their permit. But conduct by the student. There was. Issue: Whether there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech Ruling: This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento. or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is. not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. The rally was held at a place other than that specified. . Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. . of course. however. The petition is GRANTED. much less denied. it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. et al (May 21." Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly. When he is in the cafeteria. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. . which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully. there be violations of its terms.
is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection. nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo. set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. incidentally. et al vs. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans. motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner. Issue: Whether there was a violation of the rights of free speech and assembly Ruling: The Court accepts the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time. These acts were done even after their leaders had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. III. Grievances. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. 1981 in front of the Supreme Court building. through appropriate petitions. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. such right. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement. Henceforth." to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. CA. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist. any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof. Thus. The resolution was approved by the Minister of Education. however. officials and employees. The term "public use. 1987) Facts: During the period July 8-10. natural and inherent though it may be. SPEECH." The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. Manalo. the late Felix Y. . if any. Indeed. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts. When the parcel was ascertained to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Culture and Sports. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure and he explained: "According to your guidelines. Manalo. that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. who. This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration. Sec 5) – Non-Establishment Clause Manosca. Contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. admittedly. rather than to grant. intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17. has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. Activism and Nationalism-Olalia." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. as condemnation. characteristic." not having been otherwise defined by the constitution. but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. et al (January 29. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines. for the use. . it passed a resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. like police power and taxation. benefit. uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. 1987. also often referred to as expropriation and. . for what should be significant is the principal objective of. i. instead.e. the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo. respondent Union of Filipro Employees. directly or indirectly. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question. However. The individuals herein cited are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution. III. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. an inherent power of sovereignty. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks. provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate. and petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity. 1996) Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at Taguig. the exercise of the power. achievement. Moreover. “ Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and.. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. Sanchez (September 30. the exercise of the power. Petition is DENIED. a religious entity. rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. not the casual consequences that might follow from. must be ventilated through the proper channels. with less frequency. or support of Iglesia ni Cristo. national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event. or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Issue: Whether the resolution gives preference to members of Iglesia ni Cristo Ruling: Eminent domain. that the act would constitute an application of public funds. free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices. is. under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference. Metro Manila. Sec 4) – Assembly and Petition Nestle vs. "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. it is not at all to be said. that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
a corporation that operates under DSWD. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. 2003) Facts: Petitioner IDCP. et al (July 9. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III. political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat. the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs. of their religious right to classify a product as halal. to profess his beliefs. EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State. Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. Under the EO. On October 26. these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. and to live as he believes he ought to live. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products. In a society with a democratic framework like ours. OMA deals with the societal. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars. entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations. Executive Order 46. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status. like herein petitioner. Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. INC (IDCP) vs. respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people. The petition is GRANTED. legal. Issue: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion Ruling: The Court grants the petition. Thus. III. the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. especially to Muslim communities. properly labeled and safe. . s. even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. 2000. well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience. is hereby declared NULL AND VOID. consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Unlike EO 46. Office of the Executive Secretary. classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. 2001." Without doubt. by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal. Also. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations.
While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion. to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem. of other persons. love of country and admiration for national heroes. science. for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism. . there is no warrant for their expulsion. both religious and patriotic. not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution. or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety. patriotism. of a serious evil to public safety. sing the national anthem. Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause Ebralinag. through the iron hand of the law. that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (March 1. Forcing a small religious group. freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. and learn not only the arts. et al vs." Absent such a threat to public safety. this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag. Issue: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private). public health or any other legitimate public interest. we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent. the rights and duties of citizenship. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens. to receive free education. They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. respect for human rights. on account of their religious beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. and moral and spiritual values. saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge Ruling: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights. public morals. the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect. what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control. to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs. for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. the democratic way of life and form of government. After all. sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. 1993) Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag. sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. appreciation for national heroes. III. public morals. will hardly be condusive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. for refusing. under the 1987 Constitution. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses. "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities.
therefore. approached Judge Adoracion G. is not open to any constitutional objection. from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. The constitution embraces two concepts. and petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged. or the Solicitation Permit Law.500.K. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Inc. as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. in the case at bar. However. is of no consequence. Petitioner questions the applicability of PD No. Villalon-Pornillos. partnership or association registered with the Commission.. Haligi at Saligan ng Katotohanan. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied. the Pillar and Ground of Truth). The first is absolute but.00. at some slight inconvenience. Petitioner is compelled to change its corporate name and be barred from using the same or similar name on the ground that the same causes confusion among their members as well as the public. in attaining a permissible end. Bulacan. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 2001) Facts: Respondent Iglesia ng Dios Kay Cristo Jesus. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions.S. the SEC merely compelled petitioner to abide by one of the SEC guidelines in the approval of partnership and corporate names. Thus. "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose. Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. as correctly observed by the SEC. Angeles and solicited from her a contribution of P1. it excludes. even though the collection be for a religious purpose. the general regulation. named Iglesia ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD. In so doing. Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause Centeno vs. merely descriptive of and also referring to the members. et al (September 1. the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay. the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Church of God Jesus Christ the Son of God the Head. Iglesia (December 12. Issue: Whether the court of appeals failed to properly appreciate the scope of the constitutional guarantee on religious freedom Ruling: The additional words "Ang Mga Kaanib " and "Sa Bansang Pilipinas. considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of PD No. of solicitation. since both petitioner and respondent corporations are using the same acronym — H. III. In every case. in the nature of things. Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause Ang Mga Kaanib vs. The instant petition for review is DENIED. the second cannot be. freedom to believe and freedom to act. Malolos. SEC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to change its corporate name. Haligi at Suhay ng Katotohanan (Church of God in Christ Jesus. or kaanib. It does not authorize the use by petitioner of the essential and distinguishing feature of respondent's registered and protected corporate name. Haligi at Saligan ng Katotohanan to change its corporate name to another name that is not similar or identical to any name already used by a corporation. namely its undertaking to manifest its willingness to change its corporate name in the event another person. but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Accordingly. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. and other similar names. Church of God in Christ & By the Holy Spirit. Even the exercise of religion may be regulated. However. the power to regulate must be so exercised. the chairman of the group. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It does not follow. Issue: Whether State regulating solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution. 1564. hence what the law does not include. ." in petitioner's name are. not to mention the fact that both are espousing religious beliefs and operating in the same place. 1994) Facts: Sometime in 1985. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute. petitioner cannot be held criminally liable. which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds. This is especially so. of respondent who are likewise residing in the Philippines. in the public interest. or entity has acquired a prior right to the use of the said firm name or one deceptively or confusingly similar to it. firm. An information was filed against Centeno for violation of PD No. Ruling: All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature. as earlier demonstrated.. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The fact that there are other non-stock religious societies or corporations using the names Church of the Living God. Petitioner Martin Centeno. Respondent corporation filed with the SEC a petition to compel the Iglesia ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus. 1977 a new non-stock religious society or corporation. Sometime in 1976. III. These words can hardly serve as an effective differentiating medium necessary to avoid confusion or difficulty in distinguishing petitioner from respondent. Ordering petitioner to change its corporate name is not a violation of its constitutionally guaranteed right to religious freedom. is a non-stock religious society or corporation registered in 1936. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the decision of the SEC En Banc. one Eliseo Soriano and several other members of respondent corporation disassociated themselves from the latter and succeeded in registering on March 30. that is. 1564. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. Inc.
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. This is not to say that such freedom. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman. et al vs. filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. III. et al (July 22. Sec 5) – Non-Establishment Cause Garces. there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. rather the presumption is against its validity. the celebration of which is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. President of the Malaya Films. The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution. such standard set forth in Executive Order No. reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only. Gonzalez. some difficulty in determining what is obscene. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. such classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. not with tax money. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed. The film is an integral whole and all its portions. that the questioned resolutions did not contravene any constitutional provision since the image was purchased with private funds. Wilfredo C. . to safeguard other constitutional objections. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only. duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite. Gen. 1985) Facts: The motion picture. Estenzo. Judgment of the lower court AFFIRMED. After the fiesta. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. Katigbak. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church. Hon. et al vs. with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. petitioner parish priest refused to return custody of the image to the council until after the latter. by resolution. Ruling: Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. 1981) Facts: A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to Resolution No. however. are essential for the integrity of the film. Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. If such a distinction were sustained.' "." FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. For petitioners. On the question of obscenity. determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. Nonetheless. Issue: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion. Sec 4) – Contempt and Obscenity Gonzales." The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. 5 of said council. SPEECH. et al (May 25. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint. this Court DISMISSES this petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For Adults Only. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. WHEREFORE. is absolute. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state. however. and in the light of the facts of this case. including those to which the Board now offers belated objection. San Vicente Ferrer. It can. therefore. there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. and in connection with a socio-religious affair. The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state. III." without any deletion or cut. as is the freedom of speech. Issue: Whether the resolution contravene the constitutional provision that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion” Ruling: The Supreme Court held. There is.
CA granted the said motion but with conditions that a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence. Issue: Whether petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail was unduly restricted Ruling: Petitioner contests the condition that he secure such certification/guaranty from the Mayor. or public health" and "as may be provided by law. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order. Issue: Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced. The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. III. III. The condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. even on grounds other than the "interest of national security. Sec 6) Silverio vs. claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel. The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision in the Constitution. RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Art. RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Art. public safety. Gaviola. he should be taken into custody. For violation of the conditions of his bail bond. it must be with prior notice to the court. On 14 October 1985. he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. public safety or public health Ruling: There is no reversible error. compelled to return. In due time. CA denied the petition. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security. In all other respects. . the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. if abroad. 1991) Facts: Petition for Review on Certiorari. People of the Philippines (June 6. It is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond. and that a hold departure order be issued against him and that he surrender his passport. The RTC issued the order as the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused he has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court. petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. The RTC denied the motion to fix bail for his provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. Besides. CA. CA. petitioner was convicted of estafa. It should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. Article III. a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode. People of the Philippines (April 8. petitioner was charged with violation of the Revised Securities Act. 2001) Facts: For misappropriating amounts. The bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him. which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Sec 6) Yap vs. The judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. People of the Philippines filed a motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not absolute rights. On 26 January 1988. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. the resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED. Notably. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending. he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided. which is that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. inspection. It was denied on the ground that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it. As such. III. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and are entitled to access to official records. The GSIS. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. as petitioners may specify. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. Petitioners are practitioners in media. In sum." Similarly. Belmonte (February 13. as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity. is meritorious. whoever they may be. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. moral and artistic thought and data relative to them. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature and may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. by virtue of their constitutional right to information. et al vs. summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. The right to information is not absolute. that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. Ruling: An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political. the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy. . and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. Issue: Whether the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought." The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Its funds assume a public character. This right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan or access to such documents. GSIS General Manager. A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings. the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners. was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. It is limited to "matters of public concern". and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Valmonte wrote to Belmonte. and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon. except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The petition. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government. as the GSIS may deem necessary. Imelda Marcos. Petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS. not incompatible with this decision. considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. The instant petition is hereby GRANTED and respondent General Manager of the GSIS is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa. However. the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest". which to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the such members who were able to secure such clean loans. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists. subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination. requesting the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan on guaranty of Mrs. in granting the loans. The postulate of public office as a public trust. abstracts. 1989) Facts: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction. would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied. Sec 7) Valmonte. is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. Right to privacy is constitutionally protected. Moreover. institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power.
part of the general 'public' which possesses the right. LITEX sought review thereof. With regard to petitioner's request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials. in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. In the final analysis. Sec 7) Gonzales vs." Respondent Zamora. or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. vs. The CIR dismissed the case as regards the six employees but ordered the reinstatement with backwages of Blanco. in his official capacity as Executive Secretary. known to the employee and pertaining to duties which he discharged. The Supreme Court held that the closed-shop agreement was a valid form of union security. It was grave abuse of/discretion for respondent Court to order the reinstatement with backwages of Blanco who was found to be in an identical position as the five other employees whose separation from the service was upheld by the said Court. orders and instructions of the employer which were reasonable and lawful. subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality. et al (August 14. RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE (Art. Narvasa. with the exception that respondent Zamora is ORDERED to furnish petitioner with the information requested. it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance. The Court of Industrial Relaitons (CIR) certified LEA as the sole bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of LITEX. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business. as it relates to or affects the public. 6713. has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioner's letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern. 2000) Facts: Petition for prohibition and mandamus. his dismissal would have been demanded by LEA considering that he was one of those investigated by LEA's grievance committee which had approved the recommendation to dismiss them on the charge of being members of another union. Blanco and several LITEX employees organized the Confederation of Industrial and Allied Labor Organization (CIALO). LEA entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with LITEX which was to expire in 1965. In 1964. Court of Industrial Relations (November 12. Sec 8) Lirag Textile Mills. LITEX dismissed 18 of its employees found to have violated the union Constitution and by-laws and the CBA for having joined the CIALO. 1981) Facts: Employed in 1959 by LITEX. III. and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang." This law provides that. LEA's Constitution and by-laws also provided for the expulsion of members who are affiliated with other labor unions. Six of the dismissed employees and Blanco filled a case for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether the CBA is a restriction of the right of freedom of association. Falling to obtain reconsideration of the ruling. Ruling: Petition is meritorious. Respondent Blanco could be dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience to rules. The appealed Decision in so far as it held that petitioner violated the Industrial Peace Act in dismissing respondent Epifanio D. If his name was not included in the list of 18 employees recommended for dismissal. in the performance of their duties. In 1960.. Blanco. is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon A. And if he had not been dismissed by the company. the Litex Employees Association (LEA). and therefore." However. copies of their appointments. otherwise knows as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The petition is dismissed. the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government. Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Blanco and ordering his reinstatement by petitioner. Issue: Whether the petitioner has to right to such information Ruling: Section 7 of the Bill of Rights is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. Blanco joined the then existing labor union. either because these directly affect their lives. Inc. Gonzales. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. III. a term which "embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters of public concern". The CBA contained a closed-shop provision. all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. The right to information as a public right and "when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. . and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. it was because he had been dismissed three days before by the company.
though. Access to public documents and records is a public right. as well as the final agreement. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest. cleaning and maintenance of streets and street lights and establishments of parks. The inferior court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. Sec 7) Chavez vs. The petition is GRANTED. 1998) Facts: Petitioner. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the plaintiff association. Dionisio (June 30. Issue: Whether such membership collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association Ruling: There is no dispute that the title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title. since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding. as well as other government representatives. The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. on the other hand. The dues collected are intended for garbage collection. that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. that petitioner's action is premature. The constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to government acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. prior to their consummation or conclusion Ruling: The petition is imbued with merit. Sec 8) Bel Air vs. invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest. PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure. PCGG. Gunigundo (December 9. RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE (Art. III. as it relates to or affects the public. among them. One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association which is being collected by the Board of Governors. in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. and (4) other confidential information. The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records. The recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. its officers and all government functionaries and officials are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement. Respondents. and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers. relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The questioned decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Respondent PCGG. The agreements which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. like the other members. III. defendant in this case. demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. i. salary of security guards. The transaction between the defendants and the original seller (defendant's immediate predecessor) is a sale and the conditions have been validly imposed by the said vendor/the same not being contrary to law. because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. 1989) Facts: Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant for the collection of the association dues assessed on the lot owned by the defendant as member of the plaintiff association. (2) trade secrets and banking transactions. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen. Without applying for membership in plaintiff association. documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7. automatically became a member because he is the registered owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village. . the Court rules that the petition at bar should be allowed. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. The fact that it has been approved by the Land Registration Commission did not make it a governmental act subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of the right of association. (3) criminal matters. And even if he has. do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.e." since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Issue: Whether the right to information includes access to the terms of government negotiations. morals and good customs and public policy. It is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance. The amount to be paid by each lot owner is computed on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member. They claim. Hence. The following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information.
1995) Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. There was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisite of a lawful taking under police power. Belmonte. another is the legal authority to effect the taking. and any of its agencies against the taking of private property for public without just compensation. Jr. TRO is made permanent. Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. As petitioners failed to pay their loan when it fell due. threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction. A Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property was executed between GSIS and private respondent de la. III. The unwillingness or reluctance of COMELEC to buy print space lies in the heart of the problem. Sec 7) Vda. III. The constitutional right to information is limited to "matters of public concern. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.896. The lower court dismissed the complaint. 2772 directing members of PPI to provide free print space for use as COMELEC space. COMELEC (May 22.. Petitioner vda. Petition is DISMISSED in part as to Section 8. on the strength of Valmonte v. It has not been suggested nor demonstrated that COMELEC has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by legislative authority.00 on or before the expiry date of redemption. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part. Issue: Whether the petitioners were deprived of their right to information. The element of necessity has not been shown by COMELEC. petitioners requested for re-mortgage through repurchase of the subject property. Petitioners filed the instant case before the RTC of Quezon City. et al (October 19. de Urbano wrote the GSIS Board of Trustees (the "Board") to inform them of her desire to redeem the subject property and for advice on the procedure for redemption. Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit. There was no effort to show that the police policies – essentially a power of legislation – has been constitutionally delegated to COMELEC. The requisite for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined: one is the necessity for the taking. It is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. Cruz. Sec 9) PPI vs. petitioner Aurelio Arrienda wrote to the GSIS protesting the said sale and requesting its reconsideration and recall. GSIS responded advising her to pay the total redemption price of P154. Section2 of the said resolution failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory donation. in express terms. GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. . Unable to find financing to repurchase the subject property. Having learned about the sale of the subject property to dela Cruz. PPI asks the SC to declare Resolution 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government. Issue: Whether the resolution violates prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation Ruling: That Resolution No. The petition is DENIED and the impugned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. De Urbano. 2772 does not. Section 2 of Resolution 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain." to "transactions involving public interest. GSIS. 2001) Facts: Petitioners mortgaged their property to the respondent GSIS to secure a housing loan. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the Constitution but not without payment of just compensation. To compel print media companies to donate COMELEC space amounts to taking of private personal property for public use or purposes." The negotiation and subsequent sale of the subject property by the GSIS to private respondent dela Cruz was by no stretch of the imagination imbued with public interest as it was a purely private transaction. Nor can petitioners. The monetary value of the compulsory donation may be very substantial indeed. impute bad faith on the part of GSIS when the latter did not disclose to petitioners that it was negotiating with private respondent dela Cruz for the sale of the subject property as soon as it started the negotiations. et al vs. Section 2 is SET ASIDE as null and void. does not by itself demonstrate that the COMELEC’s original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. GSIS sold the subject property to respondent dela Cruz only after giving petitioners an almost one year opportunity to repurchase the property and only after ascertaining that the purchase price proposed by private respondent dela Cruz in payment of the subject property would benefit the GSIS. Respondent Crispina dela Cruz commenced negotiations with respondent GSIS for her purchase of the petitioners' foreclosed property.
The Snagguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval does not render said resolution null and void. The necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Private respondent Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land in Manila. Spouses Gutierrez.Taking National Power Corporation vs. safety. 25 shows that the subject matter of the law is the regulation of rentals and is intended only for dwelling units with specified monthly rentals constructed before the law became effective. the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors. The facts considered. Said resolution is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioner’s property. and the rentals of the building include those of the lot. et al (February 20. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public. the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health. which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS (Art. private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. CA sustained the trial court. The said award is proper and not unreasonable. The occupancy of a building or house not only suggests but implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they are constructed. Batas Pambansa Blg. Ruling: Petitioner's contention is untenable. which among others is the construction. Issue: Whether the petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines. 1997) Facts: Petition for review of a decision of the CA. Upon learning of the sublease. NPC is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objective. private property for public use or purpose. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation. Sec 9) Moday vs. The trial court ordered the petitioner and all persons claiming possession under her to vacate the premises. or even abrogate it entirely. operation and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution through the Philippines. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. In fact.D. The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the government are the criteria for determining the just compensation. III. Sec 10) Caleon vs. Inherently possessed by the national legislature. III. Because of the high tension current conveyed. belonging to the petitioners. The limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. Just compensation is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of expropriation. The questioned decision and resolution of the CA are affirmed. danger to life and limbs may be cause beneath said wires cannot be discounted. other public entities and public utilities. which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon. Sec 9) . No. TRO is lifted. Agus Development Corporation. It is government’s right to appropriate in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. Ruling: While it is true that plaintiff is only after a right of way easement. Petitioner in leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed which lot belongs to private respondent. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once. The value granted was at P5 per square meter. The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. morals and general welfare. III. 1992) Facts: Petition for review on certiorari. The lease of a building naturally includes the lease of the lot. Its lines have to pass the lands of private respondents. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said resolution and returned it with the comment that expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still other lots available. 20 which has been declared by this Court as a police power legislation. Their power to declare a municipal resolution invalid is on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the mayor to issue. Petitioner only sought an easement of right-of-way and the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Court of Appeals. the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments. Assailed decision the CA is AFFIRMED. it nevertheless deprived defendants of their proprietary rights. Without the consent of the private respondent. for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. It is from P. Instant petition is DENIED. to remove whatever improvement she introduced on the property and to pay private respondent. Issue: Whether or not the lease of an apartment includes a sublease of the lot on which it is constructed. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid. as would constitute a ground for ejectment under Batas Pambansa BLg. 1991) Facts: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate the petition for expropriation of a parcel of land. CA (Jan. 18. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. CA dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Ruling: The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the CA. every contract affecting public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. CA (April 7. 25. . while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property. Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
III. While the contract was entered into before the effectivity of the Maceda Law. dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. but petitioner still accepted the late payments. cancelled the said notice of rescission. Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. however. They defaulted in the payment of their monthly amortizations. contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. Sec 10) Siska Development Corporation vs. Office of the Pres. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS (Art. The will of the obligor and obligee must be observed. wife of respondent Jose Sering. . 1994) Facts: Petition for certiorari. However. the obligation of their contract must not be impaired. At most. transferred all her rights and interests over the aforesaid lot in favor of respondent Socorro Sering. As a rule. with the consent of petitioner. a subdivision owner-developer.. petitioner's line of argument invokes the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (Art. The requirement of notice of the rescission under the Maceda Law does not change the time or mode of performance or impose new conditions or dispense with the stipulations regarding the binding effect of the contract. Petitioner. Petitioner. Guadalupe Sering. after private respondents updated their payments. Petitioner sent private respondents a notice of rescission of the Contract to Sell for failure to pay the monthly amortizations on time. When respondent Jose Sering offered to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price. Issue: Whether the relationship between the parties is governed solely by the Contract to Sell because said contract was entered into long before the passage of the Maceda Law Ruling: Private respondents never received the notice of rescission sent by petitioner. imposes new conditions. the rescission took place when the said law was in full force and effect. Spouses Sering (April 22. jurisprudence requires that a written notice be sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. Petitioner. jurisprudence made necessary a notice of rescission. The sending of a notice of cancellation to the buyer is mandated by the Maceda Law. it merely provides for a procedure in aid of the remedy of rescission. however. Petition is DISMISSED. imposed the condition that private respondents' account "must be kept current" and that should it be necessary to rescind the contract for a second time. the second rescission would be final. said respondent protested that he had not received any notice of rescission from petitioner. Sec. Private respondents assumed the transferor's obligation by paying the monthly amortizations for the lot. entered into a Contract to Sell with Guadalupe Sering. 10). Private respondents again defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations. But even before the effectivity of said law. alleging that the contract had already been cancelled. The purpose of said clause is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. an employee of petitioner refused to accept the payment. Without expressly stating so. III. Neither does it withdraw the remedy for its enforcement. While juridical action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.
there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art.A. it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent. Parenthetically. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain. An ordinance is a law. as an inherent power of the State. which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and. Sec 9) Municipality of Parañaque vs.M. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. purpose or welfare. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. Thus. 2. V. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints. it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. 3. The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. The local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. in behalf of the LGU. which the latter did not accept. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. The trial dismissed the case. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. 7180 in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant. Section 19 of RA 7160. R. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated. The Court holds that the principle of res judicata. can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 1998) Facts: The Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V. dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. III. Petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner’s proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property. also lays down the parameters for its exercise. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive. the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. Issue: Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19. once all legal requirements are complied with. but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. The very nature of eminent domain.M. which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. other public entities and public utilities. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property. like police power. There is payment of just compensation. as required under Section 9. The complaint was filed “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. CA affirmed the said decision. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use. Thus. An LGU. Ruling: The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government. In this case. 4. imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. . but also clearly defeat social justice. which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs. but said offer was not accepted. to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. like the Municipality of Parañaque. Realty Corporation (July 20. and other pertinent laws. Article III of the Constitution.
A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed. Normally. the Government has all the right to build the bridge. ship-to. They are also operators of "shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore public marine coastal radio stations. free of charge. that Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the judgment appealed from AFFIRMED. and certainly. 1996) Facts: NAPOCOR took possession of a land. for it believed the property was public land. the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. In sum.Taking National Power Corporation vs. which is only fourth in the order of priority of services to be offered by the present maritime project. III. is guilty of an uncompensated taking. Petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of sale it entered into with the private respondent when it authorized its president to negotiate that payment “shall be effected only after Agus I HE project has been placed in operation. Mangondato (March 11. admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. 1990) Facts: The petitioners are self-described "Filipino entrepreneurs deeply involved in the business of marine radio communications in the country. (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Respondent demanded compensation from NAPOCOR.not ordinary inflation and increase in land values . And certainly. by providing for free public correspondence. Among other things. . (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. The petition is DISMISSED. Sec 9) . CA. A number of circumstances must be present in the ‘taking’ of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. There can hardly be any valid argument against providing for public corresponding. Reyes replied that MARCAPI’s main business concern is public correspondence. designed to ensure safety of lives at sea. in essence. which is hereby reduced from twelve percent (12%) to the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum. the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain. under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes. however. as indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1. although not entirely useless. Obviously. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court was justified in deviating from the well-settled doctrine that just compensation is the equivalent of the value of the property taken for public use reckoned from the time of taking Ruling: The general rule in determining “just compensation” in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. the owner of the boat can not charge the builder of the bridge for lost income. the State can do no less. DOTC unveiled a maritime coastal communications system project. it will offer distress and safety communications service which is obligatory in the maritime mobile service.was the direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992. Sec 9) . Ruling: There is no merit in this petition. owned by private respondent. except as to the interest on the monthly rentals.000. The general rule. Certainly.Taking Marine Radio. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owner’s land arising from the expropriation. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid ‘financial assistance’ to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. The petitioners brought the instant suit. However. and are holders of certificates of public convenience duly issued by the NTC. et al (November 6. Issue: Whether the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just compensation. and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. filed suit. Reyes.shore and shore-to-ship public corresponding. Primarily. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. Sec. et al vs. free of charge. It does not seem that the DOTC. petitioner has failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation. (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. The petitioner has the burden of proving its claim that its occupancy and use . they handle correspondence between vessel passengers or crew and the public. barely a month after. Clearly. amid these hard times. this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly caused by petitioner’s use of the land. among other things. It is compatible with State aims to serve the people under the Constitution. It was set out to provide. The exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to respondent. III. Only in 1990 did the petitioner recognize private respondent’s ownership and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. Rather. An examination of the undisputed factual environment would show that the “taking” was not really made in 1978.” It was only then that petitioner’s intent to expropriate became manifest as private respondent disagreed and. The Court is not of the thinking that the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just compensation. alleging. the Government merely built a bridge that made the boat obsolete.” The petitioner’s entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority.
2000) Facts: Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in an Agrarian Case for the determination of just compensation regarding properties which were taken by DAR. due process must be observed in the taking. secondly. are declared unconstitutional and. Issue: Whether the government had the right to expropriate the said areas Ruling: The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.D. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the judgment. The petitions are hereby GRANTED. the payment of just compensation must be made: and thirdly. null and void ab initio. the requirement of due process may not necessarily entail judicial process. The provision of P. conformably. the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged violation. thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged. varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of each case. Nos. 1987) Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Letter of Instruction instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program and to adopt slum improvement as a national housing policy. however. its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. NHA. However. primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners. The questioned decrees transgress the petitioners' right to just compensation. It is enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or practical necessity. Paying in cash. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. Ong. There are exceptional situations when. Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law. But where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's property.A. The Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the sites included. therefore. The decision of the government to acquire a property through eminent domain should be made known to the property owner through a formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding is contemplated. 1669 which allows NHA. therefore. The President issued Proclamation No. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined beforehand by a statute. his right to due process of law has been violated. Issue: Whether just compensation should always be paid in cash. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final judgment.543. This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for the purpose of just compensation. 1669 and 1670 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process of law and.D. P. provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. Republic of the Philippines (May 21. 1669 and 1670 are unconstitutional and void. There is certitude with regard to this assertion. In the instant petitions. D. It is noted that the smaller the land. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. the actual or symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were promulgated. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money. do not by themselves. they must fail the test of constitutionality. to put portions of the expropriated area to commercial use in order to defray the development costs of its housing projects cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. 6657. Diaz. has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. Sec 9) – Public Use Manotok. as petitioner demands. at its sole option. A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3.070. And so. Hence. The Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. The State is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: first. The President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners of the property for the acquisition of the same. Land Bank of the Philippines. The decrees. we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670 which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated. in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Ruling: The judgment mandated compensation to the petitioner "in the manner provided by R. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. which of course. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. A necessity must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes but accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity. The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same. the taking must be for a public use.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond. is not compatible with such judgment. Aquino (September 7. Having violated the due process and just compensation guarantees. et al vs. The traditional method for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. III. III. did not materialize as the negotiations for the purchase of the property failed. it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights. . to which execution must conform. the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment. as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated. Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Sec 9) – Just Compensation Santos vs. Nos. This. 6657. the bigger the payment in money. The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which are the assessed values of the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher value because. there is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or selections. P.
Ruling: Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases.. the trial court upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. The CA upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement. III. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Issue: Whether the expropriation order is final and whether the purpose of said expropriation is indeed for public use. . growth and future needs of the enterprise. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. Private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 as agreed. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation. Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The term “necessary”. one of which is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. Petitioner and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement. The trial court reconsidered the order. In the exercise of eminent domain. does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings. More than 10 years later. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken. Petitioner contended that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation. However. the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The trial court annulled the said compromise agreement. 2001) Facts: Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA) initiated expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of Riceland. Philippine Vinyl Corp. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Phil Export Processing Zone (January 16. in this connection. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law. Equity dictate that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the determination of just compensation and for its prompt payment to the petitioner. it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice. As long as the purpose of the taking is public. the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable. then the power of eminent domain comes into play. the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Sec 9) – Public Use Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation.
the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial. The issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings were authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who signed the complaint were authorized representatives are evidentiary in character determinable only in the trial proper. At such point or state. and taking into consideration the presence of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and of the use of superior strength. The plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. and the absence of any appreciable mitigating circumstance. fix the rental for the use and the occupation of the disputed property. Ruling: The CA was correct in its rulings. III. sufficient it to say that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. in spite of petitioner’s opposition. hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. the former had not yet been held to answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and convicted. (2) the necessity of the taking. hence. the trial court should not immediately issue an order of expropriation. in its final decision. or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Quitain. If there are objections and defenses that require the presentation of evidence and the hearing of arguments. the trial court issued a Writ of Possession. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. violated their right to counsel as the confrontation between the State and them had not yet begun. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. to counsel. The extra-judicial statements of appellants were not assisted by counsel. et al (June 15. from the date of NPC’s entry until its deposit of the full amount required under the 1997 Rules. III. but in the interest of substantial justice. the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense. EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. the petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its answer. With the revision of the Rules. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the ‘just-ness’ of the decreed compensation. 1992) Facts: The accused were convicted by the trial court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and Multiple Frustrated Homicide. In the instant case. in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPC’s Motion for the issuance of the Writ.. was violative of the constitutional right of the appellants to be represented by counsel in all stages of the investigation. the full amount required under the aforecited Rule. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. at such stage. It may appear to be harsh and encompassing. also within ten days from the finality if this Decision. i. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not holding that the confrontation arranged by the Caloocan City police between the private complainant and her witnesses and the appellants. decree. (2) NPC shall deposit. The police could not have. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project. 1999) Facts: Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the NPC is seeking to expropriate. the appellants were not yet entitled. but judicial review limits the exercise of eminent domain to the following areas of concern: (1) the adequacy of the compensation. with the modification that the appellants are held guilty of the offense of robbery with homicide . Police line up is not part of the custodial inquest. therefore. when the appellants were identified by the complainants at the police line-up. despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit. However. Ruling: Anent the allegation of the appellants that their identification by the private complainants at the police headquarters in the absence of their counsel violated their constitutional right to counsel.e. and (3) the trial court shall. wherein the latter were presented to the former for purposes of identification. Sec 9) – Just Compensation Robern Development Corporation vs. Thus. the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed. and (3) the public-use character of the purpose of the taking. the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a period of ten days from the finality of this Decision within which to file its answer. The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Sec 12) – When Right Attaches People of the Philippines vs. The determination of ‘just compensation’ in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. no statute. NPC (September 23. Eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken. once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners. Dimaano. considering that the trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be deposited. Issue: Whether the Writ of Possession validly issued.
There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. On reasonable doubt." These extrajudicial confessions made by the accused extracted during custodial investigation have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim. Issue: Whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-defense Ruling: The testimony to the confession of Marra is of significant weight. Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short. Granting that Atty. who heard the confession. . he cannot be a special counsel. Any person. Yhere are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation. In the case at bar. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness. was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds. Ruben Zerna). As a legal officer of the municipality. was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice Ruling: It can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula was investigated immediately after his arrest. Sec 12) – When Right Attaches People of the Philippines vs. III. They were just probing into a number of possibilities. the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. JUANITO GARAY. 1994) Facts: After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked. but the admissibility thereof shall also be passed upon. Marra. but in such a case it must be given in substance. is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. by any person on his behalf. In any event. still his confession is inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people. in whole or in part. et al (September 20. Obviously. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. Bandula (May 27. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. counsel came in only two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. including the maintenance of peace and order. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. Marra initially denied any participation in the killing. appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. in certain circumstances. Indeed. the conviction of accused-appellant AURELIO BANDULA Y LOPEZ by the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. otherwise competent as a witness. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. Sec 12) – When Right Attaches People of the Philippines vs. and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who. the same must be rejected in toto. these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. Zerna assisted accused when he executed his extrajudicial confession. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. Certainly. III. by the nature of his position. it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. hence. counsel of the police. even without his admission. Marra admitted the act although he alleged it was done in self-defense. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. And. Ruben Zerna. The judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities therein stated is hereby AFFIRMED. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae. he had no counsel present. shall be inadmissible in evidence. counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Art. public or private prosecutor. In addition. III. as earlier discussed. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. 1994) Facts: The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nelson Tandoc. If at all. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. the case against appellant has been duly established by the other evidence of the prosecution. and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. 12. Understandably. the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged. appellant gave a different version of the incident in court. he could have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. Nevertheless. the suspect is taken into custody. when confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it. a lawyer. In fine. Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confessions executed suffer from constitutional infirmities. If there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation. any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against him and. the Court cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings delineated have been given. 1987) Facts: Death sentences were imposed on each of the three accused-appellants for the crime of murder. the degree of explanation required will necessary vary. either retained or appointed. They executed two confessions more. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice. While in custody. depending upon the education. Issue: Whether or not these statements. but twice. may be waived. Olvis. Article II. Now. of Republic Act 6425. as any extrajudicial confession confronting the Court. intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Forced re-enactments. and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. III. in relation to Section 2(e). While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one. as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs. it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found GUILTY of homicide. Ruling: By custodial interrogation. The lack of counsel makes those statements. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken. As a rule. there can be no questioning. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel. there is a denial of the right. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled. All evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence. in contemplation of law. Ruling: Prior to any questioning. including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel. Short of this. questioning is initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned. Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights. can stand up in court. Atty. (m). incompetent evidence. 1986) Facts: The Court of First Instance of Manila convicted accused accused Nelia Nicandro y Velarma of violation of Section 4. and (o) Article I.' even if it were otherwise voluntary. since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension. it must be made knowingly and intelligently. however. it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20. 'involuntary.incrimination. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension. his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. was acquitted. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. the three executed five separate written confessions each. if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him. Like other constitutional rights. . technically. the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. To be valid. the right against self-incrimination. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. (f). CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary. Anacleto Olvis. The three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City suboffice. The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. But the accusedappellants were denied their right to counsel not once. Issue: Whether the court gravely erred in admitting prosecution evidence which were obtained in violation petition of accused constitutional rights. he must also explain their effects in practical terms. may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking. and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. there is nothing there that would show that Atty. as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act). Sec 12) – Counsel of Choice People of the Philippines vs. but refused to reduce her confession to writing. Navarro. Accused firstnamed. The defendant. Nicandro (February 11. The accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. et al (September 30. III. The first confessions were taken in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs Counsel. Likewise. While it is stated therein that this Office had just requested the services of Atty. (1). Accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. and to be informed of such right. The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain. appellant orally admitted having sold the 4 sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket. and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incriminate tion and his right to retained or appointed counsel. the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent. Article IV of the Constitution. Sec 12) – To Be Informed People of the Philippines vs. like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self.
Consequently. if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. The appellant's point is well taken. Dacoycoy. III. Sec 12) – Waiver of Rights Magtoto vs. III. and the appellant. knowingly and intelligently. Enrile. Dacoycoy filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. the 1987 Constitution now clearly and explicitly requires that the waiver be in writing and in the presence of counsel. to be prospective. 1973. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. It must be stressed. no finding of guilt thereof may be made against him. such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused. That there were no eyewitnesses to the crime imputed to the accused. And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial confession was made involuntarily. that the waiver of those rights be made in the presence and with the assistance of the suspect's counsel. and that the only evidence linking them thereto are their extrajudicial confessions which were executed by them without the assistance of counsel of their choice." which this Court granted. who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel. Sec 12) – Waiver of Rights People of the Philippines vs. has since been reiterated in several subsequent cases. was already existent. The need of assistance of counsel as a pre-requisite for according validity and effect to a waiver of rights in custodial investigation laid down by the 1973 Constitution. et al. its subsequent rulings imposed the requirement. a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel. . and which they both subsequently repudiated at the trial. Since appellant Latoga's extrajudicial confession was admittedly given by him without the assistance of counsel. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. is ACQUITTED. even if presented after January 17. 1975) Facts: Petition for writs of certiorari. because they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution. it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed. et al (May 8. 1973. Now. although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions. is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17. the principle was made to apply to confessions given by suspects during custodial investigations prior to April 26. Angeles Latoga y Lagco @ Ely and @ Angel. et al (March 3. All the confessions involved in said cases are hereby declared ADMISSIBLE in evidence. 1992) Facts: Latoga and Dacoycoy were found guilty of the felony beyond reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court in 1982 for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Of course. The defense need not prove that its contents are false. it should not have been admitted in evidence against him. His extrajudicial confession must be disallowed and his conviction set aside. Even as the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of any confession given by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in evidence. his fundamental right to prove that his confession was involuntary still stands. While initially. 1983 This Court has construed the provision as allowing a waiver by a suspect of his rights while under custodial investigation. Conversely. Manguera. Issue: Whether the trial court grievously erred in admitting and basing the decision of conviction of the accused solely on his extra-judicial confession Ruling: That Latoga's confession was given and signed without assistance of counsel of his choice is not disputed. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. as just pointed out. The appeal proceedings pending only as regards Angeles Latoga. Judgment of the Trial Court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. and since that confession constitutes his only link to the felony of robbery with homicide with which he is charged. Issue: Whether the order of the respondent judges were correct Ruling: This constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. The doctrine in Morales v. and that confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence against the accused. a confession is admissible in evidence without previous proof of its voluntariness on the theory that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved. Respondent judges declared the confessions of the accused in the two cases as admissible and declared the inadmissibility of the confessions of the accused in the third case. It is incompetent as evidence and must be rejected. this Court's holding was that such a waiver was valid and could properly be given effect merely upon some adequate showing that it had been made voluntarily.
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.000. Appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight. life imprisonment or death. Jr. The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua.00 is unreasonable. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly. Petitioner filed a Reply. . The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. III.000. Ruling: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail.00 is more reasonable. Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail for the provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5.000. P5.000.500. it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. contending that the proposed bail of P5. However.500. III. The accused filed a petition for bail. in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. Petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal. 1999) Facts: The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of murder.500.00. however. where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending. which was opposed by the prosecution. the CA required the confiscation his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail.00. CA. People of the Philippines (June 6. bail must be denied. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level. Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5.000. Manes (February 17. Sec 13) People of the Philippines vs. and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail. Thus. CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General.500. despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail.00. BAIL (Art.500. the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. vs. Sec 13) Yap. BAIL (Art. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced from P5. the setting of bail in the amount of P5. excessive. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused.500. the accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. What is more. as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of. When an accused is charged with a capital offense. such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. The trial court. particularly.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail. Ruling: Under the law. appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail. we believe that the amount of P200.000. In the present case. petitioner was convicted of estafa. or life imprisonment or death.00 to P200. In this case. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner. Although it cannot be controverted that the CA. Issue: Whether the trial court committed a serious error of law when it went on with the trial of the case without hearing the petition for bail that was set for hearing several times. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail.500. the setting of the amount at P5. the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements. cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as a punishment. for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest opportune time.000.000. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious. did not hear the petition for bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial or whenever so required by the court. 2001) Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5. the issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. It was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.000. and evidence of guilt is strong.5 million.
such determination subsists even on appeal. That being the situation. there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal. the lower court issued an order of release. at the time of the commission of the double murder. By virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge. was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. 1997) Facts: The accused. People of the Philippines (January 16. Obosa filed a bailbond. Issue: Whether the accused may be granted bail after such conviction for homicide. which the lower court approved. despite conviction for a lesser offense. accused Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. with three others. the accused Obosa was a virtual "escapee". the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong. appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. a non-capital offense. who is charged with a capital offense. that discretion — particularly with respect to extending the bail — should be exercised not with laxity. after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged. CA cancelled the petitioner’s bail bond and nullified the trial court's order which granted bail to petitioner. BAIL (Art. Likewise. The Prosecutor recommended no bail. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. even factual questions may be increased and may once more be weighed and evaluated. after conviction. On appeal. as the entire case is submitted for review. CA. in the ordinary course of things. trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail. While the accused. may upon application be bailed at the discretion of the court. At the time of the commission of the two offenses. The lower court found the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. or worse. Bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. to the appellate court's sound discretion. accused was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of the accused therein. Ruling: An appellant who. III. the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. as hereinabove stated. but with caution and only for strong reasons. was charged with murder on two counts. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that. as it had done so in this case. Sec 13) Obosa vs. In such an instance. the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever present. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that. It inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions. as the evidence of guilt was strong. though convicted of an offense not punishable by death. . On the same day. with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. since such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. he was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him. In fact. While accused Obosa was out of prison.
Accordingly. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged. public policy. particularly in the rules of procedure. The assailed judgment is SET ASIDE. public order. This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. having agreed to remain in legal custody. morals. that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.000. Ruling: Bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20. However. or good customs. III. who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. be stressed that under the present state of the law. private respondent has.000. appellant secured the services of a new lawyer. 31 To that extent the right is absolute. therefore. III. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody. the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 1999) Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9) years old. Issue : Whether the right to bail may. in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. On appeal. BAIL (Art. Prado. It is. Ompong. Issue: Whether the accused-appellant was deprived though no fault of his own to be defended by a person authorized to practice law amounting to denial of due process Ruling: The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. and whether such right may be waived.00.. Sec 13) People of the Philippines vs. due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present. Rebellion is punishable with the penalty of prision mayor. Sec 14) – Right to be Informed People of the Philippines vs. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. within a reasonable time. under certain circumstances. At the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent. Donato. The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State.000. rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20.00. Igmedio S. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. 1991) Facts: Respondent judge granted bail to the accused Salas.00. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights. however. 187 was issued by the President. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law. It is not favorable to him. be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. Upon the other hand. Salas (June 5. a bailable offense. and. all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. waived his right to bail. Jr. It must. which makes it bailable. however. Atty. however. and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for new trial. who was charged for the crime of rebellion.00 without hearing the prosecution. During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail. The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Consequently. bail also becomes a matter of right. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The Orders of respondent Judge are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.000. by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. who discovered that Gualberto C. Therefore. then later at P50. Santocildes (December 21. it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30. without counsel.
The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. prosecutors. Judge Arcilla. Sec 14) – Speedy. To be sure. What the constitution prohibits is vexatious. The trial court issued an Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. as an accused. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police. as well pointed out. The reasons for the prosecution's postponements were reasonable and were not intended merely to delay the proceedings of the case. the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting petitioner. capricious and oppressive delays. there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for. Capricious action. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court finds that there is no basis for petitioner's allegation that his constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated. capricious or oppressive. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. 1999) Facts: Mayor Sanchez and the rest of the accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts. Public and Impartial Trial People of the Philippines vs. et al (January 25. The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. and in the absence of any showing that the same were capricious. Oppressive connotes an unjust or cruel exercise of power or authority. by the barrage of publicity. to speedy trial. III. Ruling: The petition is without merit. For another. for the purpose of annoying and embarrassing another or one lacking justification and intended to harass. Not every delay in the trial is vexatious. . RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that the Criminal Case filed against him be ordered dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prove its case despite 11 postponements spread over an unreasonably long period of one year and three months in violation of the right of petitioner. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity. Not all the eleven postponements were made at the instance of the prosecution. there was no proof that they were duly served with subpoena. not simply that they might be. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. would not be sufficient. especially in the criminal field. vexatious suggests an act which is willful and without reasonable cause. III. just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved. therefore. that is. The hearing of the case had to be postponed several times because there was no proof that the prosecution witnesses were duly served with subpoena. For one. a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration. Issue: Whether the publicity given to this case impaired the right to a fair trial of the accused Ruling: It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity. The petition is DENIED for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error. The other reasons for the postponement of the hearing are circumstances beyond the control of the prosecution. In the legal firmament. on the other hand. Sec 7). It would be unjust to pounce on the absence of the witnesses as a basis for dismissing the case when there was a valid excuse for their absence. it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.Speedy. 1999) Facts: Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" the case invoking his right to a speedy trial. One must take into account that a trial is always subject to reasonable delays and postponements. It secures rights to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of the State to seek justice. Mayor Sanchez. manufactured by them ministers of justice. Public & Impartial Trial Tai Lim vs. means willful and unreasoning action. gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. People of the Philippines (October 26. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. Issue: Whether the petitioner was deprived of his right to speedy trial.
1991) Facts: Petitioner assails the order of Judge Gines. Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. The court ruled the case against respondent shall remain pending. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. Ruling: the Court finds that said right has not been violated in the case at bar and thus holds that the dismissal of the case as regards private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature and erroneous. not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. he virtually waived these rights. hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. Labo. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. The lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. (2) that the accused has been notified. Private respondent escaped from his detention center and failed to appear in court. In this case. subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness. Issue: Whether the accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. While accused persons do have rights. nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the case. The judgment of the trial court in so far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega. Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial. The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. Jr. there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. Jr. Sec 14) – Right to Confront and Be Heard Gimenez. and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. Floresca (May 27. Sec 14) – Speedy. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. Also. Judge Nazareno. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable law. which dismissed the criminal case against Labo and Floresca. The respondent court issued the now assailed Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice Guerrero to appear despite the vigorous objection of the fiscal who requested that the hearing of the case be deferred as the Fiscal's Office was then conducting a preliminary investigation with respect to Benefredo Esquivel. Public & Impartial Trial People of the Philippines vs. It secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. this was denied by the lower court. The lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross examine the witnesses against him. Mercado vs. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia. The petition is GRANTED in part. Issue: Whether the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated to entitle them to the dismissal of the case. body operations. . An information for libel was filed against Labo and Francis Floresca in connection with the publication of the article captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice". 1988) Facts: Private respondent was charged with the crime of murder. all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. Accused Labo and Floresca waived their right to appear at the hearing of the case. Judge Gines. His right to present evidence on his behalf. may be waived by him. de la Vega (April 15. III. However. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. medical attention. An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and crossexamine witnesses who testified against him. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative. many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights. Ruling: A "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment. a right given to him for his own benefit and protection. The Orders of public respondent judge are SET ASIDE. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice. without prejudice on the part of the said accused to crossexamine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person. the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. Said absences are evidently not capricious. oppressive. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega. the lower court erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. III. as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations. He is still presumed innocent. However. The Court is convinced that private complainant's absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious reasons therefor.
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel. Hon. he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to him at his request. All the 14 trial dates — except 3 — fell on a Saturday. Hearings were conducted on 14 separate occasions without objection on their part. During all the 14 days of trial. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. Carbonnel. It is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. 1973) Facts: The arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge. particularly at the trial of the case. no matter with what offense he may be charged. no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. the trial proceeded. but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. unless so represented. that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. without objection on the part of respondent policemen. most regrettably. as police officers under suspension because of the cases. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Sec 7). Ruling: In convicting an accused. Garcia. it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights.Speedy. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for. and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. his being well-versed on the case. In any case. The writ of certiorari prayed for is GRANTED nullifying. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. Lorenzana vs. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. In this case. 1999) Facts: The accused was found guilty of the crime of rape. and his knowing the fundamental procedures. and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo. Domingo. Public and Impartial Trial Hon. the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process. There was only 1 day when Atty. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge. There were a number of changes as to the lawyers assigned to the accused. III. there is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. Calo. Issue: Whether respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of right to public trial guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as the petitioner. This Court finds and must hold. essential laws and existing jurisprudence. . which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. Some are smaller than others. Ruling: The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. Bermas (April 21. it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental nights. too. who acted not only in defense of their clients. Consengco. and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel. Sec 7). Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who. III." Then. was absent. But at the insistence of Pat. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection. his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused. There is to be no ban on such attendance. relatives and counsel present. setting aside. desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days. Issue: Whether the accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant counsel.Right to be Informed People vs. Carbonnel (July 25. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings.
It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. 1991) Facts: Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder and was found guilty. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents. Sec 15) Moncupa vs. and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has. The next day. SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not rejecting the paraffin test results as inadmissible evidence. The petition is GRANTED. before the RTC of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. Gamboa (February 25. This petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby DISMISSED for having become moot and academic. If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest. that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. where there is present a denial of due process. together with others. It was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Sec 15) Ilagan. the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. Enrile. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Indeed. Petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. a capital offense. et al (October 21. Arellano. Sec 17) People of the Philippines vs. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. The petitioner was temporarily released from detention. and /or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Gorospe. the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them. where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Art. Castro (January 30. Ruling: As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against him. III. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. in the light of subsequent developments. Enrile. Issue: Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release. . or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest. 1985) Facts: Ilagan was arrested on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. Ruling: The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitutes restraints on the liberty of Mr. become arbitrary. III. was arrested and detained. III. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. He was subjected to paraffin test. 1986) Facts: Petitioner. Kintanar. Risonar detained on the basis of a Mission Order. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Art. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms. the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Ver. It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. Ruling: The petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion. was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Issue: Whether this petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. Moncupa. The Writ had served its purpose. on the allegation that he was a staff member of NDF. Respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion against the detained attorneys. One of the visiting lawyers. et al vs. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void.
the criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved. The NBI suggested that hair strands be pulled. Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of special complex crime of rape with homicide SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III. The RTC initially issued a TRO but later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. President of NIASSI. III. The hair strands taken from accused-appellant and the victim were later indorsed to the NBI for laboratory testing. Issue: Whether the petitioner is deprived of his right to speedy disposition of his cases Ruling: The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit. petitioner caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections from its various clients. Lucañas. The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to GRANT the same. or palpable excess of authority.. However. for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. Issue: Whether the taking of the hair strands from the accused without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation was in violation of his right against self incrimination. prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution. filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. Sec 17) People of the Philippines vs. were sent to the NBI for laboratory examination. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for graft. while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's. Rondero (December 9. the criminal complaints still remained unresolved. Codilla. from root to tip. Sec 16) Angchangco vs. Calo. The hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime. Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination of the accused was violated Ruling: The right against self-incrimination has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion. or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. III. estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of execution. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. together with hair specimens taken from the victim and accused-appellant. manifest injustice. SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act. petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. An act. as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion. Sec 17) People of the Philippines vs. It has been held that to require a person to remove his garments would not be violative of the right against self-incrimination. . or the removal or replacement of garments or shoes. or station. To require the accused to put on a pair of pants and a hat to determine whether they fitted him for measuring or photographing of a party. thus violating their right against self-incrimination. thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases. this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion. there being no other plain. whether testimonial or passive. 1993) Facts: Accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. not cut. When petitioner retired in September 1994. Ruling: What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accusedappellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Assailed judgment of the court is AFFIRMED. Atty. Comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's. board. Ombudsman. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal. trust. from the suspect and from the victim on the four regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands. et al (February 13. Putulin (June 30. SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES (Art. In 1989. Atty. as a consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied. Jr. that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. but not to act one way or the other. 1999) Facts: Accused was convicted of the crime of homicide. This should be distinguished from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute which are not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. It is correct. 1997) Facts: Prior to his retirement. may be presented. Ombudsman Cases are ordered DISMISSED. Although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination. The Office of the Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of petitioner. The Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution. speedy. Appellant asserts that the police investigators induced positive identification by placing him and the two other appellants in a police line-up by themselves only and by having them undress. It prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused. corporation. Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed. are not within the privilege against self-incrimination too. like requiring him to take part in a police line-up. the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him. or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. Decision of the RTC is MODIFIED.
during and after the trial. the accused’s right to a speedy disposition of the case is just as much prejudiced as when the prosecution is prolonged or deferred indefinitely. More than 10 years after the case submitted for decision. and the same were later introduced as evidence during the trial. SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. the right to counsel. and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel. He suspected that the money may have been stolen and reported it to Central Bank officials. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby DENIED. Accordingly. this constitutional privilege applies not only during the trial stage. 2001) Facts: Petitioner is Vice-President and Treasurer of Home Savings Bank. Where the court does not act promptly on the adjudication of a case before it and within the period prescribed by law. She was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Issue: Whether there was a violation of his constitutional right when he the police stripped him of his clothing and personal items. but also when the case has already been submitted for decision. Sec 17) People of the Philippines vs. quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. or his garments or shoes removed or replaced. Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent. 1996) Facts: Paynor was charged with the crime of murder. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. 1920) Facts: Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. III. Sec 16) Licaros vs. Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been violated Ruling: The Petition is meritorious. (2) petitioner has suffered vexation and oppression by reason of this long delay. III. as against petitioner criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan is DISMISSED. . III. Ruling: The protection of the accused under custodial investigation. of course. appellant was detained at the police station. Sandiganbayan (November 22. The corollary to the proposition is that. Summers (September 8. the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision. An examination by reputable and disinterested physicians with due care will be taken as not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Section 16. which is invoked by appellant. without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. In fact. SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES (Art. an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. x x x and covers the periods before. Petitioner was included in the charge for robbery as an accessory. Paynor (September 9. (3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it. (6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay and even admitted that the case was one of those that got “buried” during its reorganization. Unlike the right to a speedy trial. and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. with all the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a case be looked upon with care and caution when that case has already been submitted to the court for decision. that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (5) he did not employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case. refers to testimonial compulsion. Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. and (7) petitioner was merely charged as an accessory after the fact. As held in People vs. is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.i this constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. Gamboa. affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must. Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases ‘before all judicial. That the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner for violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case is justified by the following circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the resolution of the case is inordinately long. No objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. (4) he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case. Money was deposited in the said bank on representation that it came from some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo.’ This protection extends to all citizens. be decided as cases arise. Sec 17) Villaflor vs. The court ordered to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured. Section 12. Ruling: The constitutional guaranty. On the strength of a positive identification of a witness. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. The Petition is hereby GRANTED and.
1999) Facts: The case is an appeal via certiorari taken by petitioner from a decision of the Court of Appeals that denied due course to his motion for probation in a criminal case arising from his conviction of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. as the perpetrator of the crime. Respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. A person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting. III of the Constitution. Petitioner was convicted for violation of BP 22.ii It may not be considered as an ex post facto law. DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED. respondent confirmed that there was indeed one. President Marcos was vested with legislative powers concurrently with the Batasan Pambansa. Presidential Decree No. providing that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. People. 12 and 17 of Art. he could no longer apply for probation since he had appealed. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion. Judge Pascua (August 20. paraffin. Hon. a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It is not ex post facto in its application. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence. petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation. However. herein complainant. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. CA. The Court DENIES the petition. Subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type. EX POST FACTO & BILL OF ATTAINDER (Art. not applicable to him. Issue: Whether petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under PD 968 since he had appealed from his conviction in 1988. 2004) Facts: Yatar was sentenced to death the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. Sec 17) People of the Philippines vs. Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy of the complainant was violated. For Gross Ignorance of the Law respondent Judge Herminia M. 2001) Facts: This is an administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Miguel Argel against Judge Herminia M. Ruling: In criminal cases. III. hence.000. 1988. . Yatar (May 19. in the presence of counsel. as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Sec 22) – Ex Post Facto Fajardo vs. 1985. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Sec 21) – 1st Jeopardy Terminated Argel vs. and. Station Commander (February 1.incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. However. is null and void on the ground that at that time President Marcos could no longer exercise legislative powers as the Batasan Pambansa was functioning and exercising sole legislative powers. The right against self. an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application. SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent and the decision became final and immutable on the same day. like the Probation Law that it amends. Presidential Decree No. An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission. Pedronio. photographing. Complainant alleged that Judge Pascua convicted him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by respondent. Ruling: This contention is untenable. Hence she "revised" her previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the accused guilty of murder. PD 1990 became effective on July 16.iii At the time of the commission of the offense charged-violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22--in 1981. It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30. petitioner was convicted on May 26. III. when she re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private complainant that there was such an eyewitness. Pascua. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment] except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. Pascua is FINED P20.00. 968. issued on October 5. At that time. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. At that time. Ruling: The contention is without merit. petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal. after PD 1990 amending Presidential Decree No. blood and DNA. 1990. Petitioner maintains the view that PD 1990. Issue: Whether the blood sample taken from appellant as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. but against testimonial compulsion. 2000. Respondent Judge alleged that she rendered the judgment of acquittal dated 22 July 1993 because she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the accused. is not penal in character. Petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981. 1986. became effective in 1986. III. and he appealed.
however. Yet. Otherwise put. Meanwhile. Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. In October 1996. dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s obligation was purely civil in nature and for complainant’s failure to attend the hearings. Nuada. III. accused therein. 2004) Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. Sec 21) – 1st Jeopardy Terminated Merciales vs. Petition is DENIED. he deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the prosecution has rested its case. that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. The case cannot bar petitioner’s prosecution. the accused moved to set the case for hearing. More particularly. a complaint for estafa against petitioner was filed petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Ruling: It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. It is as if there was no acquittal at all. the complaint was refiled charging the same offense against petitioner. The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. The public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused. CA. the same is null and void. 2001. DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. but more so the offended party. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law. it is not only the State. that is. People (June 14. It cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction. (2) the court has jurisdiction. she ascribes prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which attended the prosecution’s premature resting and the trial court’s grant of the demurrer to evidence when the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed. Petition is GRANTED. Indeed. Ruling: The dismissal of a similar complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the petitioner. 2002) Facts: Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA denying her petition to annul the Order of the RTC of Legazpi City which dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by private respondents. Sec 21) – 1st Jeopardy Attached Vincoy vs. and (4) they are convicted or acquitted. Issue: Whether the dismissal of the first complaint is a bar for petitioner’s prosecution. People. DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. It was. In May 1996. and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. CA. due process. et al (March 18. (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty thereof. . despite repeated moves by the accused for the trial court to continue hearing the case. invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. Issue: Whether the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy. or the case is dismissed without their consent. the dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite. Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused’s right to double jeopardy. III. The case was set for oral argument on December 11.
. However. yet contrary to the findings of respondent judge. On the same day. Nitafan. respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent’s right against ex post facto law. Imelda Marcos (February 1. This Court. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. . suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. much less entered a plea in those cases pending before the said Branch. the information in this case appears peremptorily dismissible. the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are not applicable. Respondent judge concluded that “since the date of violation alleged in the information was prior to the date and complete publication of the Circular charged to have been violated. 1999) Facts: Three criminal informations were filed against Marcos for violation of Central Bank Circular No. Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a criminal charge. 960. Sec 21) – 1st Jeopardy Attached EX POST FACTO & BILL OF ATTAINDER (Art. It is respondent judge’s posture that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila. Issue: Whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter’s right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy Ruling: The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. III. Without private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to quash the informations. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge. On ex post facto law. The filing of a motion to quash is a right that belongs to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Those cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the time respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Respondent judge issued an order dismissing criminal case no. still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. Respondent judge has no other basis on whether private respondent had already been arraigned. Petition is GRANTED. Sec 22) – Ex Post Facto People vs. for to apply the Circular to acts performed prior to its date and publication would make it an ex post facto law. neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. Hon. respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondent’s right to double jeopardy was violated. which is a violation of the Constitution. the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. much more the lower courts. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to those cases in Branch 26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three informations pending in his sala. III. will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of private respondent was “part of a sustained political vendetta” by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondent’s right against double jeopardy. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law.
i ii iii .