5

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990 the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, the
6
appellate court certified this case to us for review.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The antecedent facts are as follows:
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21,
JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused- Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his
appellant. sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed
their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like
to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still
SARMIENTO, J.: holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and
Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja
1
In a decision dated October 31, 1984, the Regional immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall
Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew
Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
7
Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and motorcycle, to the municipal building. Upon
Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple
Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain informed the police on duty of the incident. That
at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the
were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly
8
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral occurred. There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd
damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled
9
2
costs." The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, face down inside the bedroom. The group stayed for
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno
Iloilo. inspected the scene and started to make a rough
sketch thereof and the immediate
10
surroundings. The next day, February 22, 1981, at
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman
course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from
Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back
the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their
to the scene of the killing to conduct further
appeal and before judgment thereon could be
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand,
rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the
was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain
accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr.,
Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman
withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue
Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio
their respective applications for parole before the
Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company
then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole
3 stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been
Division.
informed of the incident, were already there
conducting their own investigation. Patrolman
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered
4 Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of
a decision on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim
modified the appealed decision in that the lone
was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for
appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
autopsy.
indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the
amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was 7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width,
performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; located at the base of the left
after completed, a report was made with the armpit directed toward the left
following findings: thoracic cavity.

PHYSICAL FINDINGS 8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width,

11 cm. in length, directed toward
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 the left deltoid muscle, located at
inches in height, body moderately the upper 3rd axilla left.
built and on cadaveric rigidity.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width,
EXTERNAL FINDINGS 11.5 cm in length, located at the
anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, left, directed downward.
9 cm. in length, located at the lower
3rd anterior aspect of the arm, 10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5
right, directed upward to the right cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length,
axillary pit. medial aspect, palm right.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, 11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac
located at the proximal 3rd, area, right, directed inward with
forearm right, posterior aspect with portion of large intestine and
an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 mysentery coming out.
cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the 12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width,
forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound located at the posterior portion of
exit. the shoulder, right, directed
downward to the aspex of the light
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, thoracic cavity.
located at the middle 3rd, posterior
aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in 13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width,
width. 10 cm. in length, located at the
medial portion of the medial border
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth of the right scapula.
visualizing the right lateral border
of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, 14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width,
right located 1.5 inches below the 4.5 cm. in length, located at the
right nipple. posterior aspect of the right elbow.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2
cm. in depth, directed inward to the cm. in length, located at the
thoracic cavity right, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd,
left midclavicular line at the level of forearm, right.
the 5th rib left.
16. Lacerated wound at the
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 anterior tantanelle with fissural
cm. in depth directed toward the fracture of the skull.
right thoracic cavity, located at the
mid left scapular line at the level of INTERNAL FINDINGS:
the 8th intercostal space.
 1. Stab wound Based on the foregoing and on the investigations
No. 5, injuring the conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C.
left ventricle of Company, an information for murder dated August
the heart. 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo
against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
2. Stab wound The information read as follows:
No. 6, severely
injuring the right The undersigned Provincial Fiscal
lower lobe of the accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
lungs. AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime
of MURDER committed as follows:
3. Stab wound
No. 7, injuring the That on or about the 21st day of
right middle lobe February, 1981, in the Municipality
of the lungs. of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the
4. Stab wound jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
No. 11, injuring named accused with four other
the descending companions whose identities are
colon of the large still unknown and are still at large,
intestine, thru armed with sharp-pointed and
and thru. deadly weapons, conspiring,
confederating and helping each
5. Stab wound other, with treachery and evident
No. 12, severely premeditation, with deliberate
injuring the apex intent and decided purpose to kill,
of the right lungs and taking advantage of their
(sic). superior strength and number, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault,
CAUSE OF DEATH: MASSIVE
stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE
Peñacerrada, with the weapons
LACERATED, STABBED (sic),
with which said accused were
INCISED AND PUNCTURED
provided at the time, thereby
WOUNDS.
inflicting upon said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada multiple wounds on
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found
different parts of his body as shown
sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal
by autopsy report attached to the
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart,
12 record of this case which
lungs and intestines of the deceased." multifarious wounds caused the
immediate death of said Lloyd D.
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Peñacerrada.
Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in
the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and
protective custody for "having been involved" in the 14
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be
taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his
wife, Fausta, was already detained having been When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and
indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force.
13 Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
15
however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have
witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on
October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio,
20
prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was and walked home; he took a short-cut
21
therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo route. While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales
on the basis of which an Amended spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
16 22
Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as he heard cries for help. Curiosity prompted him to
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein approach the place where the shouts were
appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away,
and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused he hid himself behind a clump of banana
23
except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty trees. From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the
to the crime. accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing
and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who recognized all the accused as the place was then
24
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; awash in moonlight. Huntoria further recounted
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay that after the accused were through in stabbing and
Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and
Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses
Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from
25
Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and the "linasan". Huntoria then proceeded on his way
Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow. home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he
26
saw to his mother and to his wife before he went to
27
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the sleep. Huntoria explained that he did not
autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd immediately report to the police authorities what he
28
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, witnessed for fear of his life. In October 1981
1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of however, eight months after the extraordinary
17
Ajuy. His findings revealed that the victim suffered incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly
wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him
wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of
that only one weapon might have caused all the his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio
wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy,
victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and
29
and different characteristics of the wounds, the related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981.
probability that at least two instruments were used is
18
high. The police authorities and the P.C. operatives Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada
for their part testified on the aspect of the in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to
investigation they respectively conducted in relation rape her, all the accused denied participation in the
to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio
30
the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep in his
her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja house which was located some one kilometer away
31
related the events surrounding the surrender of the from the scene of the crime when the incident
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the happened. He asserted that he only came to know of
location of the houses of the accused, as well as on it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta
other matters. Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21,
32
1981 to inform him.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on
Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the The trial court disregarded the version of the defense;
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
19
30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales,
his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court
erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus,
of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in Huntoria's credibility. is beyond
33
not appreciating his defense of alibi. question.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's
34
errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the defense of alibi. The appellate court, however,
appellate court held that: found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the
accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate
. . . Huntoria positively identified all court:
the accused, including the herein
accused-appellant, as the assailants Finally, we find that the trial court
of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, erroneously sentenced the
1982) The claim that Huntoria accused-appellant to 12 years and 1
would have difficulty recognizing day to 17 years and 4 months
the assailant at a distance of 15 to of reclusion temporal. The penalty
20 meters is without merit, for murder under Article 248
considering that Huntoria knew all is reclusion temporal in its
the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If maximum period to death. As there
Huntoria could not say who was was no mitigating or aggravating
hacking and who was stabbing the circumstance, the imposible
deceased, it was only because the penalty should be reclusion
assailant were moving around the perpetua. Consequently, the appeal
victim. should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. With regard to the
As for the delay in reporting the indemnity for death, the award of
incident to the authorities, we think P40,000.00 should be reduced to
that Huntoria's explanation is P30,000.00, in accordance with the
satisfactory. He said he feared for rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g.,
his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
450 (1980): "The natural reticence SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128
of most people to get involved in a SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista,
35
criminal case is of judicial notice. As G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).
held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the
initial reluctance of witnesses in The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon
this country to volunteer certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty
information about a criminal case imposed being reclusion perpetua.
and their unwillingness to be
involved in or dragged into criminal After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the
investigations is common, and has prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict
been judicially declared not to the appellant of the crime charged.
affect credibility.'"
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the
It is noteworthy that the accused- police authorities leave much to be desired.
appellant self admitted that he had Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
36
known Huntoria for about 10 years sworn statements even gave the date of the
and that he and Huntoria were in commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981."
good terms and had no 37
Moreover, the sketch he made of the scene is of
misunderstanding whatsoever. little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged
(TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said various blood stains and their locations relative to the
that he could not think of any scene of the crime, there was however no indication
reason why Huntoria should as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
versions proferred on where the killing was carried Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a more definite clue as to which version is To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all
more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts the accused, including the appellant, take turns in
it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about
Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in
stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood
ground directly under it. And this circumstance would concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to
provide an additional mooring to the claim of 20 meters away from where the crime was being
attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other committed. According to him, he recognized the six
hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was accused as the malefactors because the scene was
committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that
then blood stains in that place would have been more the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
than in any other place. cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could
not determine who among the six accused did the
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon
conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal was used by each of them.
Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto
Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 ATTY. GATON
failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." (defense counsel
It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just on cross-
so he could be safe from possible revenge by the examination):
victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that
Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of Q And you said
other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, that the moon
without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators was bright, is it
of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an correct?
investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
38
complaint four other unnamed persons, aside from
A Yes, Sir.
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have
conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Q And you would
like us to
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it
understand that
is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the
you saw the
autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed
hacking and the
instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility
stabbing, at that
that one bladed instrument might have caused all.
distance by the
Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy
herein accused as
report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission
identified by you?
that she alone was responsible for the killing appears
not at all too impossible. And then there is the
A Yes, sir,
positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only
because the
five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen
moon was
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss
brightly shining.
more the significance of these wounds later.

Q If you saw the

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the
stabbing and the
conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to
hacking, will you
be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
please tell this
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed
Honorable Court
who was hacking A Yes sir, I cannot
the victim? positively tell who
did the hacking.
A Because they
were surrounding Q And likewise
Peñacerrada and you cannot
were in constant positively tell this
movement, I Honorable Court
could not who did the
determine who stabbing?
did the hacking.
A Yes sir, and
ATTY. GATON: because of the
rapid
The movements.
interpretation is
not clear. Q I noticed in your
direct testimony
COURT: that you could
not even identify
They were doing the weapons used
it rapidly. because
according to you
it was just
A The moving
flashing?
around or the
hacking or the 39
"labu" or "bunu" A Yes, sir.
is rapid. I only
saw the rapid (Emphasis
movement of supplied)
their arms, Your
Honor, and I From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a
cannot determine definite and specific act committed, or contributed,
who was hacking by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
and who was
stabbing. But I It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the
saw the hacking findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals
and the stabbing which would categorize the criminal liability of the
blow. appellant as a principal by direct participation under
Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
ATTY. GATON: Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the
prosecution that inculpates him by inducement,
Q You cannot under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by
positively identify indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3
before this Court thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing
who really did the appellant perform to support the ultimate
hacked Lloyd punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Peñacerrada?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how
criminal liability is incurred.
 Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised
liability shall be incurred: Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the
40
1. By any person committing a external world." In this instance, there must
felony (delito) although the therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
wrongful act done be different from appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the
that which he intended. body of the victim that produced his death.

2. By any person performing an act Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted
which would be an offense against quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or
persons or property, were it not for who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness
the inherent impossibility of its did not say, because he could not whether the
accomplishment or on account of appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact,
the employment of inadequate or Huntoria does not know what specific act was
ineffectual means. performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity
then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by
(Emphasis supplied.) Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim
sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is
sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there
incurred is through the commission of a felony.
are six accused charged as principals, it follows to
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
reason that one of the six accused could not have
hand, provides how felonies are committed.
caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as
well be the appellant, granted ex gratia
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and
argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
omissions punishable by law are
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he
felonies (delitos). not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that
time) and practically the father of the five accused?
Felonies are committed not only by And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it
means of deceit (dolo) but also by is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or
means of fault (culpa). three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all
the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three,
There is deceit when the act is or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is
performed with deliberate intent; possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds,
and there is fault when the including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have
wrongful act results from been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her
imprudence, negligence, lack of womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there
foresight, or lack of skill. being not an iota of evidence that the appellant
caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with
(Emphasis supplied.) the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there conviction can not be sustained.
must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission
must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is
and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out
by means of deceit or fault. to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since
he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at
lower courts both found, that the appellant has once to the police authorities the crime he
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd had witnessed should not be taken against him and
41
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to should not affect his credibility, here, the
what act was performed by the appellant. It has been unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
 42
engenders doubt on his veracity. If the silence of saw to the wife of
46
coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks the victim.
43
renders his credibility doubtful, the more it should
be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, x x x x x x x x x
Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly
witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His (Emphasis ours.)
lame excuse that he feared his life would be
endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that
showing that he was threatened by the accused or by
under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the
anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible
44 very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself,
retaliation from the accused, why did he finally
from his landlord who provides him with the land to
volunteer to testify considering that except for the
till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were
beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means
already under police custody, the rest of the accused
to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this
were then still free and around; they were not yet
45 instance, volunteering his services as a purported
named in the original information, thus the
eyewitness and providing that material testimony
supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear
which would lead to the conviction of the entire
and present when he testified.
family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has
confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would,
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria
witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family
that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because
stated that one of the principal reasons why he the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's
testified was because the victim was also his landlord. family assumed a greater urgency considering that he
ceased to be employed as early as May
47
x x x x x x x x x 1981. Volunteering his services would alleviate the
financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved
Q Now, Mr. quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after
Huntoria, why did he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's
it take you so long widow, he was taken under the protective wings of
from the time the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him
you saw the employment and provided lodging for his
48
stabbing and family. Given all the foregoing circumstances, we
hacking of Lloyd can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable
Peñacerrada witness, to say the least.
when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada At any rate, there is another reason why we find the
about what alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of
happened to her Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our
husband? customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family
tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and
A At first I was insulated by their adult children from any possible
then afraid to tell physical and emotional harm. It is therefore
anybody else but improbable for the other accused who are much
because I was younger and at the prime of their manhood, to
haunted by my summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-
49
conscience year old father, the appellant, in the killing of their
and secondly the lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed
victim was also an adversary. And considering that the appellant's
my landlord I residence was about one kilometer from the scene of
50
revealed what I the crime, we seriously doubt that the appellant
went there just for the purpose of aiding his three
robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta),
not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and
Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the
latter were a perceived enemy.

51
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, under
appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
which the participation of the appellant is not beyond
cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts

should not at once look with disfavor at the defense
of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence
on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
52
accused.

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition
vs. for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including
Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
D E C I S I O N petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
4
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days
CARPIO, J.:
later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
The Case postponing his arraignment until after his
5
1 2
arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of
The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the the filing of this petition, the motion remained
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub- unresolved.
silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable
the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to
accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second
The Ruling of the Trial Court
prosecution.

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC

The Facts
dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s
petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries 6
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Hence, this petition.
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line
of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to
absconding appellants because his appeal before the
the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the 7
conviction.
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence. Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the
merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
3 constitutional right not to be placed twice in
offenses in the two cases.
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars
his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s
been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. escape from custody or violation of the terms of his
82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of
8
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule
submits that the multiple consequences of such 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
crime are material only to determine his penalty. authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to
"also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On foreign country during the pendency of the appeal."
the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
(e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary
the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge question on the applicability of the Due Process
in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No.
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
homicide and damage to property. jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
9
Esparas undercuts the cogency of its ruling
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to
Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to
comment to the petition as the public respondent an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to
judge is merely a nominal party and private death for importing prohibited drugs even though
respondent is represented by counsel. she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated
The Issues the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
10
of Rule 124.
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1)
whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s
arrest following his non-appearance at the non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional more evident when one considers the Rules of
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under
11
Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
The Ruling of the Court
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
(subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the
produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender,
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in
will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
the same offense bars further proceedings in
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive
Criminal Case No. 82366. without standing.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of
provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
Standing 12
scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner medium period; if it would have constituted a less
sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
was released days after the MeTC ordered imposed.
petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as Any person who, by simple imprudence or
of the filing of this petition. negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be minimum period shall be imposed.
"twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
13
offense" protects him from, among others, post- When the execution of the act covered by this article
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
14
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case damages to three times such value, but which shall
No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure
and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong
submitting that the two cases concern the same which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled light felony.
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which
15
the other does not."
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable:
We find for petitioner.
1. When the penalty provided for the
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, offense is equal to or lower than those
its Consequences on Persons and provided in the first two paragraphs of this
Property are Material Only to Determine article, in which case the court shall impose
the Penalty the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the which they may deem proper to apply.
same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi- with violation of the Automobile Law, to
offenses. The text of the provision reads: death of a person shall be caused, in which
case the defendant shall be punished by
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by prision correccional in its medium and
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, maximum periods.
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from crimes and intentional crimes:
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised
person performing or failing to perform such act, Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
taking into consideration his employment or crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical merely determines a lower degree of criminal
condition and other circumstances regarding liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.
persons, time and place. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason,
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
displayed in those cases in which the damage negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
danger clearly manifest. willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided the act itself is punished; in negligence or
for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
such help as may be in this hand to give. dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible
into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
"negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
scheme for either or both quasi-offenses mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple require that the corresponding penalty should be
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi- fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition each crime when committed willfully. For each
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
16
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," unlike corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
act. These structural and conceptual features of penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II willful act would constitute a grave felony,
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death,
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to
separately defined and penalized under the the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
18
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As whole class, or series, of crimes. (Emphasis
early as the middle of the last century, we already supplied)
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the This explains why the technically correct way to
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
17 19
in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on results in damage, either to person or property.
three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment
in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in
(2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence,"
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier.
conceptually incompatible with the element of Since then, whenever the same legal question was
imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
20
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law (the normative subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
ancestry of our present day penal code) and since regardless of the consequences alleged for both
21
repeatedly reiterated, stands on solid conceptual charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently
foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement answered in the affirmative in People v.
22 26
in People v. Faller that "[r]eckless impudence is not Belga (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc,
27
a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero (promulgated in 1959,
23
committing it x x x," has long been abandoned unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
28
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 Narvas (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc,
29
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva (promulgated in
1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People
30
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under v. Macabuhay (promulgated in 1966 by the Court
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
31
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found Buan (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc,
24
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
32
dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an Appeals (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
33
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional Manila (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division,
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous second prosecutions as constitutionally
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double The reason for this consistent stance of extending
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second the constitutional protection under the Double
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon "serious physical injuries and damage to property
which the second prosecution was based. thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s
prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded
34
Reckless Imprudence Bars on the same act, the Court explained:
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
a means to commit other crimes such that offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
25
with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior result should affect one person or several persons,
case against the same accused for "reckless driving," the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and
arising from the same act upon which the first
the same, and can not be split into different crimes the same, and can not be split into different crimes
35
and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied) and prosecutions.

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double x x x x

jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon. . . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by
the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical
against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
36
Estipona, decided by the pre-war colonial Court in through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
November 1940, allowed the subsequent Instance of the province, where both charges are
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence derived from the consequences of one and the same
resulting in damage to property despite his previous vehicular accident, because the second accusation
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
39
the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon offense. (Emphasis supplied)
which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s
inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any effectively overruled Estipona.
rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in
37
1982 in Buerano. There, we reviewed the Court of It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in
Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not
conviction for "slight and less serious physical escape the Court’s attention:
injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the
same act upon which the second charge was based.
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar,
The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
38 in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969
reversed on the strength of Buan:
(page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of
Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory
the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case
vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA property through reckless imprudence should be set
1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that – jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once consequence must perforce follow where the same
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless reckless act caused merely damage to property-not
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of cannot be equated with any amount of damages
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally 40
mishap." (Emphasis supplied)
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it favor the mantle of protection afforded by the
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
result should affect one person or several persons, 41
case than People v. Silva, a Diaz progeny. There,
the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations
with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical
Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his for damage to property through reckless
acquittal of the former, the accused sought the imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court
quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of
and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the following language: .
issue following Diaz and its progeny People v.
42
Belga: The question for determination is whether the
acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
holding: — damage to property through reckless imprudence.

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518,
within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless
and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’
from a collision between the two automobiles driven After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case
by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were the city attorney filed an information in the Court of
filed in the same justice of the peace court, in First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused
connection with the same collision one for damage with damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case The amount of the damage was alleged to be
No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed
involved in the collision, and another for multiple a motion, and on appeal by the Government we
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants The next question to determine is the relation
were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City
moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against property thru reckless imprudence charged in the
him by the injured passengers, contending that the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the double jeopardy is whether or not the second
Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose included in the offense charged in the former
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the test is whether the evidence which proves one
case for damage to property through reckless would prove the other that is to say whether the
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have
vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded been sufficient to support the second charge and
to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of
Belga had waived the second stage of the the other. x x x
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance x x x x
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
disposes of the contention of the prosecuting Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not have been The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this
joined with the charge for homicide with serious petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the conceptually incompatible substantive and
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
contention might be true. But neither was the defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised
for slight physical injuries through reckless Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies
of homicide with serious physical injuries through falling under either of two categories: (1) when a
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the single act constitutes two or more grave or less
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
46
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which light felonies ); and (2) when an offense is a
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is necessary means for committing the other. The
not now in a position to press in this case the more legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
serious charge of homicide with serious physical accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties,
injuries through reckless imprudence which arose will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the
out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of most serious crime.
which the defendant have been previously cleared
43
by the inferior court. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous
Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the 47
recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
44
application." We declined the invitation, thus: consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court
erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under
thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when
State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of imprudent acts and their consequences. However,
the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of the complexities of human interaction can produce a
dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models
Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the multiple non-crime damages to persons and
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We property with varying penalties corresponding to
find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
of which are analogous or similar to those in the quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s
present case, will yield no practical advantage to the framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
government. On one hand, there is nothing which offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the consequences (excluding those amounting to light
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. collectively alleging all the consequences of the
45
Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. (Emphasis single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately
supplied) following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one The above-quoted provision simply means that if
line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of there is only damage to property the amount fixed
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
one quasi-crime with its multiple physical injuries there should be an additional
48
consequences unless one consequence amounts to penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
a light felony, in which case charges were split by split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting another for the damage to property, x x
53
to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge x. (Emphasis supplied)
with the second level courts and, on the other hand,
resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically,
49
the charge with the first level courts. Expectedly, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned
(and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are
50
Republic Act No. 7691, the MeTC has now exclusive irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
original jurisdiction to impose the most serious choosing one framework over the other. Either (1)
penalty under Article 365 which is prision we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
correccional in its medium period. breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses
(except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under
will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
penalized as grave or less grave felonies because consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II
acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the
resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and
other acts are penalized as grave or less grave sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of
apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried their number and severity, separately penalize each
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the
or less grave offenses. distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under
Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of cases.1avvphi1
the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge,
51
regardless of their number or severity, penalizing A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our
each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. scheme of government denying it the power to
52
Jose, we interpreted paragraph three of Article make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48
serious physical injuries," as follows: is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under
Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two
follows: or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for
When the execution of the act covered by this article committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in
shall have only resulted in damage to the property of Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine that double jeopardy does not bar a second
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said prosecution for slight physical injuries through
damage to three times such value, but which shall in reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge
no case be less than 25 pesos. for that offense could not be joined with the other
charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
Code: apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
charge for slight physical injuries through reckless only one information shall be filed in the same first
55
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation level court.
for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
grave felonies. This same argument was considered of their constitutional right under the Double
and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
[Silva] x x x: beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But caused is more than compensated by the certainty
neither was the prosecution obliged to first of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
through reckless imprudence before pressing the consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
more serious charge of homicide with serious minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of be imposed under a single prosecution of all
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct
position to press in this case the more serious charge concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
of homicide with serious physical injuries through schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant cushion the effect of this ruling.
has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and
appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
serious physical injuries through reckless Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double
province, where both charges are derived from the jeopardy.
consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President
appellant in second jeopardy for the same of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
54
offense. (Emphasis supplied) Representatives.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. SO ORDERED.

By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not
to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365

should proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences. In
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988 premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, was to weaken the defense; that
vs. the wrong done in the commission
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN of the crime was deliberately
SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants. augmented by causing another
wrong, that is the burning of the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. body of Bayani Miranda.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused- CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
appellants.
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial
court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty
on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
MEDIALDEA, J.:
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong, the
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate,
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the
WHEREFORE, the accused
crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of
Fernando Pugay y Balcita and
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
of Cavite, under an information which reads as
pronounced guilty beyond
follows:
reasonable doubt as principals by
direct participation of the crime of
That on or about May 19, 1982 at
murder for the death of Bayani
the town plaza of the Municipality
Miranda, and appreciating the
of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
aforestated mitigating
Philippines, and within the
circumstance in favor of Pugay, he
jurisdiction of this Honorable
is sentenced to a prison term
Court, the above-named accused,
ranging from twelve (12) years
conspiring, confederating and
of prision mayor, as minimum, to
mutually helping and assisting one
twenty (20) years of reclusion
another, with treachery and
temporal, as maximum, and
evident premeditation, taking
Samson to suffer the penalty
advantage of their superior
of reclusion perpetua together with
strength, and with the decided
the accessories of the law for both
purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a
of them. The accused are solidarily
combustible liquid to the body of
held liable to indemnify the heirs
Bayani Miranda and with the use
of the victim in the amount of
of fire did then and there, wilfully,
P13,940.00 plus moral damages of
unlawfully and feloniously, burn
P10,000.00 and exemplary
the whole body of said Bayani
damages of P5,000.00.
Miranda which caused his
subsequent death, to the damage
Let the preventive imprisonment
and prejudice of the heirs of the
of Pugay be deducted from the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
principal penalty.
That the crime was committed
Cost against both accused.
with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was
interposed the present appeal and assigned the already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then,
following errors committed by the court a quo: the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a
human torch out of him.
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS with water the burning body of the deceased. Some
APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE people around also poured sand on the burning
ITS ADMISSION THAT THE body and others wrapped the same with rags to
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT extinguish the flame.
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. The body of the deceased was still aflame when
police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the
NOT FINDING THAT THE scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were
SUPPRESSION BY THE responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the
IS FATAL TO ITS CASE. authors thereof.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital
LENDING CREDENCE TO THE for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF brought Gabion, the two accused and five other
EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE persons to the Rosario municipal building for
OF THE MANY SUSPECTS interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE the written statements of Gabion and the two
(Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, accused, after which Gabion was released. The two
Rollo). accused remained in custody.

The antecedent facts are as follows: After a careful review of the records, We find the
grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be
the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to without merit.
run errands for Pugay and at times they slept
together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the
fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, incident, accused-appellants gave their written
Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one statements to the police. The accused Pugay
was a ferris wheel. admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured
a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo contents thereof was water and then the accused
Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused
comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement
Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did
These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of
happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased note is the fact that both statements did not impute
walking nearby, they started making fun of him. any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with commission of the offense.
a piece of wood.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-
Not content with what they were doing with the appellants repudiated their written statements
deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of alleging that they were extracted by force. They
gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel claimed that the police maltreated them into
and poured its contents on the body of the former. admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the
Gabion for the commission of the offense. mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The mother
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of of the deceased likewise testified that she never
the accused-appellants were mentioned and talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides,
contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his
for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The friend and both Pugay and the other accused
said court categorically stated that "even without Samson testified that they had no previous
Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony no reason to testify falsely against them.
which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated,
self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay In support of their claim that the testimony of
and Samson" (p. 247, Records). Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline
on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's
suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to testimony on cross-examination that, after telling
the incident. They claim that despite the fact that Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he
there were other persons investigated by the police, (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was
only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during only when the victim's body was on fire that he
the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate noticed a commotion.
non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be However, explaining this testimony on re-direct
adverse to the prosecution. examination, Gabion stated:

There is no dispute that there were other persons Q. Mr. Gabion,

who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact you told the
there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the Court on cross-
written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one examination that
Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and you were reading
imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline comics when you
and setting the deceased on fire to the accused- saw Pugay
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. poured gasoline
They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the unto Bayani
information filed. Considering that their testimonies Miranda and
would be merely corroborative, their non- lighted by
presentation does not give rise to the presumption Samson. How
that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse could you
if produced. This presumption does not apply to the possibly see that
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. incident while
vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, you were reading
the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the comics?
prosecution to decide.
A. I put down the
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the comics which I
eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the am reading and I
latter requested by the mother of the deceased to saw what they
testify for the prosecution in exchange for his were doing.
absolution from liability but also because his
testimony that he was reading a comic book during Q. According to
an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and you also before
experience. Bayani was
poured with A. Because I pity
gasoline and Bayani, sir.
lighted and
burned later you Q. When you saw
had a talk with Pugay tickling
Pugay, is that Bayani with a
correct? stick on his ass
you tried
A. When he was according to you
pouring gasoline to ask him not to
on Bayani and then later
Miranda I was you said you
trying to prevent asked not to
him from doing pour gasoline.
so. Did Pugay tell
you he was going
Q. We want to to pour gasoline
clarify. According on Bayani?
to you a while
ago you had a A. I was not told,
talk with Pugay sir.
and as a matter
of fact, you told Q. Did you come
him not to pour to know..... how
gasoline. That is did you come to
what I want to know he was
know from you, if going to pour
that is true? gasoline that is
why you prevent
A. Yes, sir. him?

Q. Aside from A. Because he

Bayani being was holding on a
tickled with a container of
stick on his ass, gasoline. I
do you mean to thought it was
say you come to water but it was
know that Pugay gasoline.
will pour gasoline
unto him? Q. It is clear that
while Pugay was
A. I do not know tickling Bayani
that would be with a stick on
that incident. his ass, he later
got hold of a can
Q. Why did you of gasoline, is
as(k) Pugay in the that correct?
first place not to
pour gasoline A. Yes, sir.
before he did
that actually? Q. And when he
pick up the can
 of gasoline, was Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al.
that the time you 37 Phil. 1371).
told him not to
pour gasoline The next question to be determined is the criminal
when he merely responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken
pick up the can the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel
of gasoline. and holding it before pouring its contents on the
body of the deceased, this accused knew that the
A. I saw him can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
pouring the flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice
gasoline on the even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to
body of Joe. exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that
Q. So, it is clear may be committed by his companions who at the
when you told time were making fun of the deceased. We agree
Pugay not to with the Solicitor General that the accused is only
pour gasoline he guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence
was already in defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
the process of amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470,
pouring gasoline this Court ruled as follows:
on the body of
Bayani? A man must use common sense
and exercise due reflection in all
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, his acts; it is his duty to be
July 30, 1983, pp. cautious, careful, and prudent, if
32-33). not from instinct, then through
fear of incurring punishment. He is
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, responsible for such results as
Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion anyone might foresee and for acts
stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to which no one would have
make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay performed except through
get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the culpable abandon. Otherwise his
ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the own person, rights and property,
process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the all those of his fellow-beings,
deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; would ever be exposed to all
and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased manner of danger and injury.
on fire.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must
However, there is nothing in the records showing suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4)
that there was previous conspiracy or unity of months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
criminal purpose and intention between the two years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
accused-appellants immediately before the maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his
between the deceased and the accused Pugay or conviction of murder, is proper considering that his
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that
was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay gasoline had just been poured on him is
and his group merely wanted to make fun of the characterized by treachery as the victim was left
deceased. Hence, the respective criminal completely helpless to defend and protect himself
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not
different acts directed against the deceased is agree.
individual and not collective, and each of them is
liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for
the accused Samson had some reason to kill the P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents
deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The
is adequate evidence showing that his act was indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the
merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is
the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack increased to P43,940.00.
must be deliberate and the culprit employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral
without risk to himself arising from any defense damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as
which the offended party might make. found by the court a quo.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the
knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
the deceased was gasoline and a flammable accused-appellants.
substance for he would not have committed the act
of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. SO ORDERED.
Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended

to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act,
however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim
would cause at the very least some kind of physical
injuries on his person, a felony defined in the
Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he
must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the
aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record
establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of
homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed
to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a
fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The
eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay
and Samson were stunned when they noticed the
deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-
17).<äre||anº•1àw>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must

suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

G.R. No. 190889 January 10, 2011 When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded
4
not guilty to the offense charged. During pre-trial,
ELENITA C. FAJARDO, Petitioner, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 1. The search warrant subject of this case
exists;
D E C I S I O N
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same
NACHURA, J.: person subject of the search warrant in this
case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road,
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of
1
the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of 3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27,
2
August 29, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court 2002 but does not live therein;
(RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner
guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 4. Both accused were not duly licensed
1866, as amended. firearm holders;

The facts: 5. The search warrant was served in the

house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio morning of August 28, 2002; and
(Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, 6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio
Aklan, committed as follows: were not arrested immediately upon the
arrival of the military personnel despite the
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in fact that the latter allegedly saw them in
the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of possession of a firearm in the evening of
5
Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, August 27, 2002.
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC
6
and mutually helping one another, without authority and the CA, these are the chain of events that led to
of law, permit or license, did then and there, the filing of the information:
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in their possession, custody and control two (2) In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the
receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group
M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police
M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt.
pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty- Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned
five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita
and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay
which items were confiscated and recovered from Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking
their possession during a search conducted by liquor at the residence of petitioner were
members of the Provincial Intelligence Special indiscriminately firing guns.
Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office,
Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) Along with the members of the Aklan Police
03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG
3
Regional Trial Court of Aklan. proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they
noticed that several persons scampered and ran in
different directions. The responding team saw
Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots
at the policemen before entering the house of Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any
petitioner. documents showing their authority to possess the
confiscated firearms and the two recovered
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D.
between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
after which, she entered the house and locked the 8294, was filed against them.
main door.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen that the issuance of the search warrant was
desisted from entering petitioner’s house but, in defective because the allegation contained in the
order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not
they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this
waited for further instructions from P/Supt. pertinent portion of the application:
Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out
of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the That this application was founded on confidential
police troops. No agreement materialized. information received by the Provincial Director,
7
Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28,
2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 They further asserted that the execution of the
Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was
house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the inside the house at the time of the search, was not
house and throw something. The discarded objects asked to accompany the policemen as they explored
landed near the wall of petitioner’s house and inside the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the
the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 living room (sala).
Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and
Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She
RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by
objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of the raiding team, because the items allegedly
.45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff
number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, sergeant of the Philippine Army.
with a defaced serial number. The recovered items
were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol
(SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in tucked in her waistband when the raiding team
applying for and obtaining a search warrant. arrived. She averred that such situation was
implausible because she was wearing garterized
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.
8

Together with a barangay captain, barangay

kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, Ruling of the RTC
the police team proceeded to search petitioner’s
house. The team found and was able to confiscate
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused,
the following:
holding that the same were already denied in the
Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005,
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search
Armalite Rifle; Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders
were not appealed and have thus attained finality.
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were
5.56 Caliber; and estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest
since they participated in the trial by presenting
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for
Caliber 45 pistol. bail, they have effectively waived such irregularities
and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of To convict an accused for illegal possession of
firearms, the RTC explained: firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended,
two (2) essential elements must be indubitably
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject
former soldier, having served with the Philippine firearm ammunition or explosive which may be
Army prior to his separation from his service for proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or
going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy accused in possession of the same, and (b) the
Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable about negative fact that the accused has no license or
different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition
former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and or explosive which fact may be established by the
disassemble firearms. testimony or certification of a representative of the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of has no license or permit to possess the subject
Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).
which are the usual depositories for firearms,
explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that The judicial admission of the accused that they do
those firearms and ammunition were left behind by not have permit or license on the two (2) receivers
Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN
the fact remains that it is a government property. If 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle,
it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56
proper place to store those items. The logical caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45
explanation is that those items are stolen property. ammunition confiscated and recovered from their
possession during the search conducted by members
x x x x of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4
9
of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted
possession which includes not only actual physical of illegal possession of firearms and
possession but also constructive possession or the explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1
subjection of the thing to one’s control and of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
management. This has to be so if the manifest intent which provides:
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the
same perils to public security, which the law The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00)
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary powered firearm which includes those with bores
concept of the possession can have no bearing bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
whatsoever. such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
x x x x caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic
and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a
That no other crime was committed by the person
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
arrested.
accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same,
even if such possession was made in good faith and Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
without criminal intent. imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine
of ₱30,000.00.
x x x x
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or
for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order information must charge but one offense, except
dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
Notice of Appeal with the CA. single punishment for various offenses.

Ruling of the CA A reading of the information clearly shows that

possession of the enumerated articles confiscated
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under
RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as
13
held that the search warrant was void based on the amended by R.A. No. 8294. Illegal possession of two
following observations: (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle,
thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45
Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the
the fact that appellants had no license to possess said section, viz.:
firearms as required by law. For one, he failed to
make a categorical statement on that point during The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
the application. Also, he failed to attach to the and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00)
application a certification to that effect from the shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine powered firearm which includes those with bores
National Police. x x x, this certification is the best bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser
has no license or permit to possess a firearm. There calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
was also no explanation given why said certification caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
was not presented, or even deemed no longer other firearms with firing capability of full automatic
necessary, during the application for the warrant. and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,
Such vital evidence was simply ignored.
10 That no other crime was committed by the person
14
arrested.
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside
petitioner’s residence were declared inadmissible in On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2)
evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1
policemen outside the house of petitioner before US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a
the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, defaced serial number, is penalized under paragraph
pursuant to the plain view doctrine. 1, which states:

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition,
of illegal possession of a part of a disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition
firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of or instruments used or intended to be used in the
P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to manufacture of firearms or ammunition. – The
an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision pesos (₱15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
correccional, and ordered to pay a ₱20,000.00 fine. person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered
11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and
motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
12
December 3, 2009. Hence, the present recourse. ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the 15
crime was committed.
information filed against petitioner and Valerio
charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13
of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:
This is the necessary consequence of the our review since, by virtue of the CA’s Decision,
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which petitioner and Valerio have been effectively
categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from acquitted from the said charges. The present review
being possessed without a license, according to their is consequently only with regard to the conviction
firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.
mandated different penalties for illegal possession of
firearm according to the above classification, unlike The Issues
in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty
for the illegal possession of any kind of firearm. Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the
Section 1 of the old law reads: discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come
within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was
or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise
Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. – The absent is a positive showing that any of the two
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period receivers recovered by the policemen matched the
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, waistband of her shorts when the police elements
acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or had knowledge of or consented to the alleged
instrument used or intended to be used in the throwing of the receivers.
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
(Emphasis ours.) Our Ruling

By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal We find merit in the petition.
possession of firearm should now particularly refer
to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized
First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers.
firearm is classified, and should there be numerous
We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view,
guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then
hence, admissible.
grouped according to the categories stated in
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of
It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D.
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant
16 and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III,
case, because different penalties are imposed by
the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:
do so would result in duplicitous charges.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be
except upon probable cause to be determined
convicted of as many offenses as there were charged
17 personally by the judge after examination under
in the information. This accords propriety to the
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
diverse convictions handed down by the courts a
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
quo.
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
including the validity of the search warrant that led rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article –
to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the they waited for daybreak to apply for a search
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any warrant.
purpose in any proceeding.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava
There are, however, several well-recognized clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio
exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw
obtained through a warrantless search and seizure suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier
may be admissible under any of the following sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in might be contraband items, or evidence of the
violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in offense they were then suspected of committing.
plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned
his right against unreasonable searches and out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
18
seizures.
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Nava’s testimony are
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the elucidating:
"plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in
the position to have that view, are subject to seizure Q When you arrived in that place, you saw
19
and may be presented as evidence. It applies when policemen?
the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a A Yes, sir.
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
Q What were they doing?
discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of A They were cordoning the house.
a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an Q You said that you asked your assistant
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from team leader Deluso about that incident.
which he can particularly view the area. In the What did he tell you?
course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence A Deluso told me that a person ran inside
incriminating the accused. The object must be open the house carrying with him a gun.
20
to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
Q And this house you are referring to is the
Tested against these standards, we find that the house which you mentioned is the police
seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol officers were surrounding?
outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of
the plain view doctrine. A Yes, sir.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the Q Now, how long did you stay in that place,
house and of the other law enforcers around the Mr. Witness?
premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and
Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00
caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure o’clock up to 12:00 o’clock the following
and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and day.
the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when
the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable Q At about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning
ground for the latter to believe that a crime was of August 28, 2002, can you recall where
being committed. There was thus sufficient probable were you?
cause for the policemen to cordon off the house as
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you? x x x x

A I was at the back of the house that is Q So, what else did you do if any after you
being cordoned by the police. shouted, "take cover?"

Q While you were at the back of this house, A I took hold of a flashlight after five
do you recall any unusual incident? minutes and focused the beam of the
flashlight on the place where something
A Yes, sir. was thrown.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what Q What did you see if any?
was that incident?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of receiver of cal. 45.
the house and threw something.
x x x x
Q And did you see the person who threw
something out of this house? Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 o’clock that
early morning of August 28, 2002, do you
A Yes, sir. recall another unusual incident?

x x x x A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who Q And can you tell us what was that
was that person who threw that something incident?
outside the house?
A I saw a person throwing something there
A It was Zaldy Valerio. and the one that was thrown fell on top of
the roof of another house.
COURT: (to witness)
Q And you saw that person who again
Q Before the incident, you know this person threw something from the rooftop of the
Zaldy Valerio? house?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know him? Q Did you recognize him?

A Because we were formerly members of A Yes, sir.

the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Q Who was that person?
x x x x
A Zaldy Valerio again.
PROS. PERALTA:
x x x x
Q When you saw something thrown out at
the top of the house, did you do something Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy
if any? Valerio thr[o]w something out of the
house?
A I shouted to seek cover.
 A I was on the road in front of the house. the law enforcer observes that the seized
item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw otherwise subject to seizure.
him thr[o]w something out of the house?
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two
A He was on top of the house. receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability
for their possession, however, should fall only on
x x x x Valerio and not on petitioner.1avvphil

Q Later on, were you able to know what The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find
was that something thrown out? that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of
part of a firearm.
A Yes, sir.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal
possession of firearms attaches, the following
Q What was that? 22
disquisitions in People v. De Gracia are instructive:
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and
x x x x ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical
Q And what did he tell you? possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and
A It [was] on the wall of another house and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
it [could] be seen right away. of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the
same perils to public security, which the law
x x x x penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To
Q What did you do if any? accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing
A We waited for the owner of the house to whatsoever.
wake up.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive
x x x x possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to
possess to constitute a violation of the law? This
Q Who opened the fence for you?
query assumes significance since the offense of
illegal possession of firearms is a malum
A It was a lady who is the owner of the prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case
house. good faith and absence of criminal intent are not
valid defenses.
Q When you entered the premises of the
house of the lady, what did you find? When the crime is punished by a special law, as a
rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
21
(sic) perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have the act must be distinguished. A person may not
been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he
was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
initial sighting the seized contraband be identified very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first
and known to be so. The law merely requires that (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it one in actual physical possession, was seen at the
is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and rooftop of petitioner’s house. Absent any evidence
consciously. pointing to petitioner’s participation, knowledge or
consent in Valerio’s actions, she cannot be held
In the present case, a distinction should be made liable for illegal possession of the receivers.
between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession, without criminal intent, is Petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the
a firearm, it must still be shown that there assumption that one of the thrown receivers
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her
part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the
however, without regard to any other criminal or prosecution failed to convert such assumption into
felonious intent which the accused may have concrete evidence.
harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent
here refers to the intention of the accused to Mere speculations and probabilities cannot
commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of
firearm. This is not important in convicting a person an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order same whether the offenses are punishable under the
that one may be found guilty of a violation of the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of
25
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he special law. The quantum of proof required by law
intended to possess the same, even if such was not adequately met in this case in so far as
possession was made in good faith and without petitioner is concerned.
criminal intent.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioner’s
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or waistband was not identified with sufficient
harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the
be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover,
possession of this kind of weapon, such as SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG
physical or constructive possession, for as long as arrived in petitioner’s house. It is not unlikely then
the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense that the receivers later on discarded were
23
committed. components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this These findings also debunk the allegation in the
case, part of a firearm, is committed when the information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in
holder thereof: committing illegal possession of part of a firearm.
There is no evidence indubitably proving that
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof petitioner participated in the decision to commit the
criminal act committed by Valerio.
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess
24
the firearm. Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner
on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor
constructive possession of the subject receivers. The was not adequately overcome by the evidence
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only adduced by the prosecution.
saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers
were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal
holding the receivers, before or during their disposal. possession of part of a firearm.

At the very least, petitioner’s possession of the In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must
receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who
possessed the same does not have the
26
corresponding license for it.

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal

possession of part of a firearm must yield these
requisites:

(a) the existence of the part of the firearm;

and

(b) the accused who possessed the same
does not have the license for the firearm to

which the seized part/component
corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond

reasonable doubt the

elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one

with the markings "United States Property" and the
other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly
presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1,
respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava
as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio
27
discarded them. His testimony was corroborated
by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the
28
recovery of the receivers.

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that,

upon verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is
not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any
29
type, kind, or caliber of firearms. To substantiate
30
his statement, he submitted a certification to that
31
effect and identified the same in court. The
testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
32
second element.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10,
2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo
y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012 Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James
M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner, approval. After explaining the situation to him,
vs. Ysidoro approved the release and signed the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes
2
of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. Mayor Ysidoro
D E C I S I O N instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult
the accounting department regarding the matter. On
being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising
ABAD, J.:
clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed
the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with emergency situation justifying the release of the
illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering
goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to
from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of
its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the
reconsideration projects affecting the homes of
matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor
victims of calamities.
as per auditing rules.

The Facts and the Case On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's
accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of subject SFP goods were intended for its target
illegal use of public propertry (technical beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding
1
Code. Implementation Guidelines for Local Government
3
Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus,
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP
operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) beneficiaries.
that provided construction materials to indigent
calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of
The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for the subject goods to a project also meant for the
construction. poor of the municipality was valid since they came
from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the
victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in
done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed
for the reason that they had to find food for their out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001
Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
could result in the loss of construction materials
particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found
Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding malversation. But, since his action caused no
Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished damage or embarrassment to public service, it only
children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied.
sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public
And since she had already distributed food to the property to a pubic purpose other than that for
mother volunteers, what remained could be given to which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
the CSAP beneficiaries. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied
Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8,
 9
2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision the CSAP housing projects. The creation of the two
to this Court. items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to
appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in
The Questions Presented the annual budget.

In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s Since the municipality bought the subject goods
finding that he committed technical malversation. using SFP funds, then those goods should be used
He particularly raises the following questions: for SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for
identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding
1. Whether or not he approved the programs. The target clientele of the SFP according
10
diversion of the subject goods to a public to its manual are: 1) the moderately and severely
purpose different from their originally underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to
intended purpose; 72 months; and 2) the families of six members
whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and
11
below. This rule provides assurance that the SFP
2. Whether or not the goods he approved
would cater only to the malnourished among its
for diversion were in the nature of savings
people who are in urgent need of the government’s
that could be used to augment the other
limited resources.
authorized expenditures of the
municipality;
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he
approved the distribution of the goods to those
3. Whether or not his failure to present the
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own
municipal auditor can be taken against him;
homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro
and
could not legally distribute the construction
materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither
defense for technical malversation. could he distribute the food intended for the latter
to CSAP beneficiaries.
The Court’s Rulings
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already
One. The crime of technical malversation as constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore,
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal the same could already be diverted to the CSAP
4
Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an 12
beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People which
accountable public officer; b) that he applies public states that funds classified as savings are not
funds or property under his administration to some considered appropriated by law or ordinance and
public use; and c) that the public use for which such can be used for other public purposes. The Court
funds or property were applied is different from the cannot accept Ysidoro’s argument.
purpose for which they were originally appropriated
5
by law or ordinance. Ysidoro claims that he could
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings.
not be held liable for the offense under its third
The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout
element because the four sacks of rice and two
the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-
boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries
June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project,
were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a
leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The
specific purpose. fact that Polinio had already distributed the food
items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining
the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded
00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths
6
2001. This appropriation was based on the are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of
7
executive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for sardines, the view that the subject goods were no
the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and longer needed for the remainder of the year was
8
Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers quite premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the
that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply crime.1âwphi1
funds, already appropriated for a determined public
purpose, to some other purpose. Thus: But criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
Funds shall be available exclusively for the specific particular public purpose to another public purpose.
purpose for which they have been appropriated. No The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the
ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
appropriations from one item to another. However, becomes a criminal offense because positive law
the local chief executive or the presiding officer of forbids its commission based on considerations of
13
the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be public policy, order, and convenience. It is the
authorized to augment any item in the approved commission of an act as defined by the law, and not
annual budget for their respective offices from the character or effect thereof, that determines
savings in other items within the same expense class whether or not the provision has been violated.
of their respective appropriations. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely
14
irrelevant.
The power of the purse is vested in the local
legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble
gives the Sanggunian the power to determine or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the
whether savings have accrued and to authorize the crime of technical malversation. The law and this
augmentation of other items on the budget with Court, however, recognize that his offense is not
those savings. grave, warranting a mere fine.

Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the
auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
the subject goods, such finding should be respected. Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to
present the municipal auditor at the trial, the SO ORDERED.
presumption is that his testimony would have been
adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes
against the rule on the presumption of innocence
and the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official functions.

Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for
assuming that had the municipal auditor testified,
his testimony would have been adverse to the
mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the
transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not
necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it happened
to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore,
be drawn into speculations regarding what the
municipal auditor would have said had he appeared

and testified.

Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith
since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from

Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be
distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal
G.R. No. 144640 June 26, 2006 August 3, 1993 from Larapan, Linamon,
Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City for an
RODOLFO TIGOY, Petitioner, agreed amount of TEN THOUSAND
vs. (P10,000.00) Pesos per truck or a total of
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos,
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Philippine Currency for the carriage of
cement and other merchandise owned by
D E C I S I O N the party of the Second Part;

AZCUNA, J.: 5. That any legal controversy involving the

cargo or of and when the cargo trucks are
not actually used for the purpose herein
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
stipulated, it is agreed that the same is the
Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution,
sole responsibility of the party of the
dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000,
Second Part without any liability of the
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 1
party of the First Part.
No. 20864 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy," acquitting Nestor
Ong for insufficiency of evidence, while convicting In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly
Rodolfo Tigoy for violating Section 68 of Presidential ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo
Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code Tigoy who had been employed by him as truck
of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order drivers for two (2) years and ten (10) years,
(E.O.) No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles respectively, to bring the two trucks to Lolong
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is
about fifteen (15) minutes away from Iligan City. He
instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in
The facts of the case are as follows:
Larapan for the loading of the construction materials
by Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the
On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been
trip to Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with
engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since
Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly
1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad
went home to return to Larapan at four o’clock in
Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent
the morning the next day. When they arrived, the
to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction
trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were
materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog 2
half-covered with canvas. Before departing, they
City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly
allegedly checked the motor oil, water, engine and
entered into between Ong and Bertodazo, the
tires of the trucks to determine if the same were in
salient portions of which state:
good condition.

1. That the party of the First Part is an

That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior
owner of Cargo Trucks with place of
Inspector Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of
business at Iligan City; Police of Ozamis City), while escorting Provincial
Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in
2. That the party of the Second Part is a Ozamis City, along with the members of the Special
businessman dealing in buy and sell of Operation Group, received a dispatch from the
General Merchandise, dry goods and 466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong,
construction materials; Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue
and green loaded with cement, that were going
3. That the party of the Second Part will towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint.
engage the services of the two (2) cargo Upon receiving the report, Tome, along with PO2
trucks of the party of the First Part; Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded
their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept
3
4. That the services agreed upon should be the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City.
rendered by the party of the First Part on
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only with Teodoro Echavez, Juanito Taruc and Lucio
one in uniform among the police officers, flagged Penaroya, to investigate.
down the two trucks but the same just sped away
and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal
City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the the registration papers of the two trucks and
trucks and overtook the same at Barangay Manabay. appearing therein was the name of Nestor Ong as
They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the the owner. After ascertaining that the sawn lumber
two trucks to stop. loaded on the two trucks did not have supporting
documents, Dingal and his companions scaled the
According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet. Loaded in
driver who had alighted from the green truck why he the blue Nissan ten-wheeler truck were 229 pieces
did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did not of lumber with a total volume of 6,232.46 board
answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the feet; and, in the green Isuzu eight-wheeler truck, 333
truck, the driver replied that there is "S.O.P," which pieces of lumber with a total volume of 5,095.5
4 7
means grease money in street parlance. This raised board feet. Consequently, the lumber and the
the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded vehicles were seized upon the order of the DENR
8
with "hot items." Regional Executive Director.

Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against
behind the green truck and was being driven by Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and
Sumagang was intercepted by PO3 Real. Upon petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products
inspection, the police officers discovered piles of without legal permit, thus:
sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both
trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at
the lumber but the latter could not produce any. Barangay Catadman, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
The drivers were brought and turned over to the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
investigator at the City Hall in Ozamis City. The together and mutually helping each other, for a
truckmen, namely, Felix Arante and Doro Lopez, and common design, did then and there willfully,
another passenger whom Tigoy identified as Lolong unlawfully, feloniously and illegally possess and
Bertodazo, who were riding with them in the trucks, transport without the necessary legal documents nor
were not investigated. According to Nuqui, they did permit from the lawful authorities, sawn dipterocarp
not notice that the group had left. It was later lumbers (Philippine Mahogany), in the following
learned that they were instructed by Sumagang to manner, to wit: accused Nestor Ong, being the
inform Nestor Ong of the incident. owner of 2 ten wheeler trucks with Plate Nos. GDA-
279 and PNH-364 facilitated and allowed the use and
Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to transport of above-stated sawn [lumber] from
the ICC Arts Center and informed the Provincial Larapan, Lanao del Norte, but intercepted by the
Director of the apprehension. Meanwhile, the PNP authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused
drivers, Tigoy and Sumagang, were detained at the Lolong Bertodazo facilitated the loading and
Ozamis City Police Station while Arante and Lopez transport of said sawn lumbers, while accused
were released.
5 Nestor Sumagang y Lacson drove the Nissan 10
wheeler cargo truck bearing Plate No. GDA-279
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the which was loaded with 333 pieces of said sawn
Department of Environment and Natural Resources dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of
– Community and Environment and Natural assorted sizes equivalent [to] 5,095.5 board feet
6
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO), after receiving a which was concealed under piled bags of cement,
call from the Ozamis City Police Station that two which lumbers [were] valued at P134, 242.36; while
trucks were apprehended transporting sawn lumber accused Rodolfo Tigoy drove the 8 wheeler Isuzu
without a permit and were brought to the City Hall, truck bearing Plate No. ONH-364, which was loaded
sent Rolando Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together and transported with 229 pieces of sawn dipterocarp
lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes
equivalent to 6,232.46 board feet which was Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 6,
concealed under piled bags of cement which 2000 modifying the ruling of the lower court, thus:
lumbers [were] valued at P92,316.77 or total value
of P226,559.13, without, however, causing damage WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
to the government, inasmuch as the aforestated MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Nestor Ong is
lumbers were recovered. acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and his two
(2) trucks are ordered returned to him. The
CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, conviction of Rodolfo Tigoy is upheld and the
as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of decision dated October 11, 1996 is AFFIRMED in all
1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the respects.
9
Revised Penal Code.
11
SO ORDERED.
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty
during the arraignment. Sumagang died after the On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of
case was filed while the other co-accused, Lolong Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration praying for his
Bertodazo, was not arrested and has remained at acquittal but the same was denied on August 23,
large. 2000.

On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court Hence, this petition, with the following assignment
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of of errors:
which reads:
I
WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and
Rodolfo Tigoy [GUILTY] beyond reasonable doubt of THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
possession of dipterocarp lumber [VALUED] at more "COLLUSION" BETWEEN LOLONG BERTODAZO AND
than P22,000.00 without the legal documents as PETITIONER TIGOY;
required by existing laws and regulations, penalized
as qualified theft, this Court sentences them to an
II
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years and
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY
three (3) months of reclusion temporal. The lumber
DISREGARDING THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG
and the conveyances used are forfeited in favor of
the government. With costs. BERTODAZO AGAINST HIS PENAL INTEREST;

The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber III

and conveyances in accordance with the existing
laws, WITHOUT DELAY. Let the Court of Appeals, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
Fourteenth Division, before which accused Ong’s PETITIONER TIGOY TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
appeal of this Court’s denial of his action for replevin LUMBER HE WAS TRANSPORTING; AND,
relative to his trucks is pending, be furnished with a
copy of this judgment. IV

With costs. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONER TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
12
SO ORDERED.
10 POSSESSION OF THE UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.

Declaring that "constructive possession" of Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is
unlicensed lumber is not within the contemplation of whether or not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber
prosecution to prove the complicity of Ong, the without the necessary permit in violation of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was Tigoy
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code (as he was the driver of the green truck and who
of the Philippines, provides: came to the road block first, being the lead driver)
offered "S.O.P." which to witness Tome meant that
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting the trucks were carrying "hot items."
Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. –
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove Why would the drivers refuse to stop when
timber or other forest products from any forest land, required? Did they fear inspection of their cargo?
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is
or from private land, without any authority, or grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of
possess timber or other forest products without the the trucks? The only logical answer to all these
legal documents as required under existing forest questions is that the drivers knew that they were
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the carrying contraband lumber. This Court believes that
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the the drivers had knowledge of the fact that they were
Revised Penal Code. . . . transporting and were in possession of
13
undocumented lumber in violation of law.
There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the
above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when
collecting timber or other forest products without a the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law
license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest such as in the present case, the commission of the
products without the required legal documents. prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that
the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of prohibited by the special law, and that it is done
14
transporting lumber without a permit which is knowingly and consciously.
punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He,
Sumagang and the rest of their companions were Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an
apprehended by the police officers inflagrante offense is not necessary to prove
15
delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by
16
from Larapan to Dipolog City. circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from
the mode, method and manner by which the offense
Petitioner maintains that he could not have is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and
about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He design, concerted action and community of
17
believed that what he was transporting were bags of interest. It is not even required that the
cement in view of the contract between Ong and participants have an agreement for an appreciable
18
Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo period to commence it.
loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the
bags of cement. Petitioner’s actions adequately show that he
intentionally participated in the commission of the
This contention by petitioner, however, was not offense for which he had been charged and found
believed by the lower court. In declaring that guilty by both the trial court and the Court of
petitioner connived with Bertodazo in transporting Appeals.
the subject lumber, the court a quo noted:
Finding that petitioner’s conviction was reached
x x x The evidence of the prosecution established without arbitrariness and with sufficient basis, this
that the two drivers of accused Ong refused to stop Court upholds the same. The Court accords high
at a checkpoint, a fact admitted by both in their respect to the findings of facts of the trial court, its
affidavit, Exhs. "E" and "E-2". Likewise, the two calibration of the collective testimonies of the
drivers refused to stop on the national highway near witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of
a bus terminal when required by a uniformed the evidence of the parties as well as its
19
policeman. When finally accosted, one of the drivers, conclusions especially when these are in
whom witness Tome identified as the driver of the agreement with those of the Court of Appeals, which
is the case here. As a matter of fact, factual findings
of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are generally final and
20
conclusive.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the

Decision and Resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and
August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 are

hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910 On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock,
the defendant, who had received for the night, was
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, suddenly awakened by some trying to force open
vs. the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant. out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
Gibb & Gale, for appellant. being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee. his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of
vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the
CARSON, J.:
intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet
and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital
At that moment he was struck just above the knee
facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
by the edge of the chair which had been placed
accused himself, because from the very nature of
against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
these facts and from the circumstances surrounding
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no
by the person who had forced the door open, whom
other evidence as to these facts was available either
he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of
to the prosecution or to the defense. We think,
after events, it is probable that the chair was merely
however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the
thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of
doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching
the door against which it rested. Seizing a common
those details of the incident as to which there can be
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
be substantially correct: Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook by the defendant, who immediately recognized him
at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded,
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, he called to his employers who slept in the next
deceased, was employed as a house boy house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley
solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in
not long prior to the date of the incident just
the house except the two servants, who jointly
described, one of which took place in a house in
occupied a small room toward the rear of the
which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
porch running along the side of the building, by
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
which communication was had with the other part
personal protection.
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The
The deceased and the accused, who roomed
door of the room was not furnished with a
together and who appear to have on friendly and
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
of security, had attached a small hook or catch on
understanding that when either returned at night,
the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
he should knock at the door and acquiant his
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the
house early in the evening and gone for a walk with
room there was but one small window, which, like
his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
and window, there were no other openings of any
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned
kind in the room.
from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino
and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28,
Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few 4 He who acts in defense of his person or
moments after the party separated, Celestino and rights, provided there are the following
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon attendant circumstances:
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon (1) Illegal aggression.
one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
went to the aid of the wounded man. employed to prevent or repel it.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under part of the person defending himself.
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because
he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
Under these provisions we think that there can be
despite defendant's warnings.
no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, who forced open the door of his room had been in
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant
playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought believed him to be. No one, under such
to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, circumstances, would doubt the right of the
refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
to make Ah Chong believe that he was being the thief having forced open the door
attacked by a robber. notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated
warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not
Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
he died from the effects of the wound on the small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
following day. advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant
would have been wholly justified in using any
The defendant was charged with the crime of available weapon to defend himself from such an
assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for
court of simple homicide, with extenuating the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one first blow.
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed
by law. But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder
was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
At the trial in the court below the defendant defendant nor his property nor any of the property
admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual under his charge was in real danger at the time
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
exercise of his lawful right of self-defense. "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that — the use of the knife to defend his person or his
property or the property under his charge.
The following are not delinquent and are
therefore exempt from criminal liability: The question then squarely presents it self, whether
in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
xxx xxx xxx responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
when he committed the act. To this question we criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite
think there can be but one answer, and we hold that of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the
under such circumstances there is no criminal absence of express provisions modifying the general
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance rule, such as are those touching liability resulting
or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and
faith. acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if from that which he intended to commit. And it is to
such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to be observed that even these exceptions are more
negative a particular intent which under the law is a apparent than real, for "There is little distinction,
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
and works an acquittal; except in those cases where supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
the circumstances demand a conviction under the (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and,
penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in again, "There is so little difference between a
cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to
Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or do harm that one of them may very well be looked
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore,
act committed by him, even though it be different the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do
from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's harm, which the criminal shows by committing it,
Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's and since this disposition is greater or less in
Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 proportion to the harm which is done by the crime,
Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, follows the same proportion; it is greater or less
38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., according as the crime in its own nature does
500.) greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as
it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the
discussion, and the only question worthy of same whether the corruption was of one particular
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is form or another.
an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts
crimes and offense therein defined, do not and ommissions punished by law.
specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constituting the crime or offense must be committed Acts and omissions punished by law are
with malice or with criminal intent in order that the always presumed to be voluntarily unless
actor may be held criminally liable, the commission the contrary shall appear.
of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects
the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it An person voluntarily committing a crime or
appears that he is exempted from liability under one misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the even though the wrongful act committed be
code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true different from that which he had intended
that contrary to the general rule of legislative to commit.
enactment in the United States, the definitions of
crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the
rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that
meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this
malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of
article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
intention) there can be no crime; and that the word criminal negligence."
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con
malicia," which were expressly set out in the And to the same effect in its sentence of December
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was . . . Considering that the moral element of
redundant, being implied and included in the word the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.) absence in the commission of an act
defined and punished by law as criminal, is
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention not a necessary question of fact submitted
to commit the crime can only be said to exempt to the exclusive judgment and decision of
from criminal responsibility when the act which was the trial court.
actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in intent or malice to be an essential element of the
his discussion of the provisions of this article of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
code that in general without intention there can be becomes clear also from an examination of the
no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada
are more apparent than real.
He who shall execute through reckless
negligence an act that, if done with malice,
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, would constitute a grave crime, shall be
says: punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first correccional in its minimum degrees if it
article, which declared that where there is shall constitute a less grave crime.
no intention there is no crime . . . in order
to affirm, without fear of mistake, that He who in violation of the regulations shall
under our code there can be no crime if commit a crime through simple imprudence
there is no act, an act which must fall within or negligence shall incur the penalty
the sphere of ethics if there is no moral of arresto mayor in its medium and
injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.) maximum degrees.

And to the same effect are various decisions of the In the application of these penalties the
supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its courts shall proceed according to their
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of discretion, without being subject to the
the following language: rules prescribed in article 81.

It is necessary that this act, in order to The provisions of this article shall not be
constitute a crime, involve all the malice applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
which is supposed from the operation of crime is equal to or less than those
the will and an intent to cause the injury contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which may be the object of the crime. which case the courts shall apply the next
one thereto in the degree which they may
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein consider proper.
it held that "considering that, whatever may be the
civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made The word "malice" in this article is manifestly
by the appellant in the civil registry and in the substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
parochial church, there can be no crime because of intent," and the direct inference from its provisions
the lack of the necessary element or criminal is that the commission of the acts contemplated
intention, which characterizes every action or
therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), There can be no crime, large or small,
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any without an evil mind. In other words,
criminal liability on the actor. punishment is the sentence of wickedness,
without which it can not be. And neither in
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the philosophical speculation nor in religious or
Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning mortal sentiment would any people in any
the word "willful" as used in English and American age allow that a man should be deemed
statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore
been said that while the word "willful" sometimes a principle of our legal system, as probably
means little more than intentionally or designedly, it is of every other, that the essence of an
yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little offense is the wrongful intent, without
further and approximate the idea of the milder kind which it can not exists. We find this
of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent doctrine confirmed by —
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to
mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without law, equally with the modern, is distinct on
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And this subject. It consequently has supplied to
Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi
means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make
purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and man guilty unless his intention were
the American statutes defining crimes "malice," so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus
"malicious," "maliciously," and "malice actus, "an act done by me against my will is
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more not my act;" and others of the like sort. In
purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
difference between them is not great;" the word differs from civil. So also —
"malice" not often being understood to require
general malevolence toward a particular individual, Moral science and moral sentiment teach
and signifying rather the intent from our legal the same thing. "By reference to the
justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. intention, we inculpate or exculpate others
428 and 429, and cases cited.) or ourselves without any respect to the
happiness or misery actually produced. Let
But even in the absence of express words in a the result of an action be what it may, we
statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold
"maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one him innocent." The calm judgment of
of the various modes generally construed to imply a mankind keeps this doctrine among its
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general jewels. In times of excitement, when
principles it will always be found that with the rare vengeance takes the place of justice, every
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a guard around the innocent is cast down.
crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. But with the return of reason comes the
Bishop, who supports his position with numerous public voice that where the mind is pure, he
citations from the decided cases, thus forcely who differs in act from his neighbors does
present this doctrine: not offend. And —

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence In the spontaneous judgment which springs
differ more from civil than in the rule as to from the nature given by God to man, no
the intent. In controversies between private one deems another to deserve punishment
parties the quo animo with which a thing for what he did from an upright mind,
was done is sometimes important, not destitute of every form of evil. And
always; but crime proceeds only from a whenever a person is made to suffer a
criminal mind. So that — punishment which the community deems
not his due, so far from its placing an evil
 mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element
of the martyr. Even infancy itself in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
spontaneously pleads the want of bad act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
intent in justification of what has the evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
appearance of wrong, with the utmost criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
confidence that the plea, if its truth is negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
credited, will be accepted as good. Now Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
these facts are only the voice of nature circumstances as they appear to him."
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson,
then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P.,
other doctrines, because first in nature 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
from which the law itself proceeds, that no Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal.,
man is to be punished as a criminal unless 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to
his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good
Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.) faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the
mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all they appeared to him at the time when the mistake
things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of was made, and the effect which the surrounding
abstract justice result from the adoption of the circumstances might reasonably be expected to have
arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), wise, upon which he acted.
without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same If, in language not uncommon in the cases,
doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the one has reasonable cause to believe the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class existence of facts which will justify a killing
of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their — or, in terms more nicely in accord with
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the principles on which the rule is founded,
the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases if without fault or carelessness he does
at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts believe them — he is legally guiltless of the
have always held that unless the intention of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and
lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts so the life of an innocent person is
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is unfortunately extinguished. In other words,
clear and beyond question the statute will not be so and with reference to the right of self-
construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes defense and the not quite harmonious
76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
excuses no man has been said not to be a real sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
departure from the law's fundamental principle that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-
"the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and defense, he is justified in acting on the facts
if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law as they appear to him. If, without fault or
in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. carelessness, he is misled concerning them,
300, and cases cited.) and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be the
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, law will not punish him though they are in
and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring truth otherwise, and he was really no
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in occassion for the extreme measures.
strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti large array of cases there cited.)
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in
all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). The common illustration in the American and English
(Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.) textbooks of the application of this rule is the case
where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at
night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a that A is more criminal that he would have
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands been if there had been a bullet in the
his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that require that a man so attacked must, before
the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain
life and property are in imminent danger at the how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which
hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the would entirely take away the essential right
facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he of self-defense. And when it is considered
would be innocent of the commission of any crime that the jury who try the cause, and not the
and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
he knew the real state of the facts when he took the grounds of his apprehension, no danger can
life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of be supposed to flow from this principle.
the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the
facts overcomes the presumption of malice or To the same effect are various decisions of the
criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" which are here set out in full because the facts are
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
the same time the presumption established in article
1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was QUESTION III. When it is shown that the
committed "voluntarily." accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: light than reflected from the fire, and that
the man with his back to the door was
If the party killing had reasonable grounds attending to the fire, there suddenly
for believing that the person slain had a entered a person whom he did not see or
felonious design against him, and under know, who struck him one or two blows,
that supposition killed him, although it producing a contusion on the shoulder,
should afterwards appear that there was no because of which he turned, seized the
such design, it will not be murder, but it will person and took from his the stick with
be either manslaughter or excusable which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
homicide, according to the degree of gave the unknown person a blow, knocking
caution used and the probable grounds of him to the floor, and afterwards striking
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in him another blow on the head, leaving the
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, unknown lying on the floor, and left the
Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.) house. It turned out the unknown person
was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, assistance as soon as he learned his
enforced the doctrine as follows: identity, and who died in about six days in
consequence of cerebral congestion
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, resulting from the blow. The accused, who
sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an confessed the facts, had always sustained
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
and using violent menaces against his life as whom he visited during his sickness,
he advances. Having approached near demonstrating great grief over the
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a occurrence. Shall he be considered free
club in his hand, strikes B over the head from criminal responsibility, as having acted
before or at the instant the pistol is in self-defense, with all the circumstances
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
turns out the pistol was loaded with powder Penal Code? The criminal branch of
only, and that the real design of B was only the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists because of which, and almost at the same
rational necessity for the employment of money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
the force used, and in accordance with distinguishing immediately the voice of one
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code of his friends (who had before simulated a
condemned him to twenty months of different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and me," and hastening to his assistance,
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was finding the body lying upon the ground, he
acquitted by the supreme court, under the cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's
following sentence: "Considering, from the sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
facts found by the sentence to have been been the victim of a joke, and not receiving
proven, that the accused was surprised a reply, and observing that his friend was a
from behind, at night, in his house beside corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he
his wife who was nursing her child, was be declared exempt in toto from
attacked, struck, and beaten, without being responsibility as the author of this
able to distinguish with which they might homicide, as having acted in just self-
have executed their criminal intent, defense under the circumstances defined in
because of the there was no other than fire paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
light in the room, and considering that in criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga
such a situation and when the acts did not so find, but only found in favor of
executed demonstrated that they might the accused two of the requisites of said
endanger his existence, and possibly that of article, but not that of the reasonableness
his wife and child, more especially because of the means employed to repel the attack,
his assailant was unknown, he should have and, therefore, condemned the accused to
defended himself, and in doing so with the eight years and one day of prison mayor,
same stick with which he was attacked, he etc. The supreme court acquitted the
did not exceed the limits of self-defense, accused on his appeal from this sentence,
nor did he use means which were not holding that the accused was acting under a
rationally necessary, particularly because justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as
the instrument with which he killed was the to the identity of the person calling to him,
one which he took from his assailant, and and that under the circumstances, the
was capable of producing death, and in the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
darkness of the house and the consteration employed were rational and the shooting
which naturally resulted from such strong justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March
aggression, it was not given him to known 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
or distinguish whether there was one or
more assailants, nor the arms which they QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated
might bear, not that which they might in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
accomplish, and considering that the lower large stone thrown against his window — at
court did not find from the accepted facts this, he puts his head out of the window
that there existed rational necessity for the and inquires what is wanted, and is
means employed, and that it did not apply answered "the delivery of all of his money,
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it otherwise his house would be burned" —
erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of because of which, and observing in an alley
Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of
266.) . whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, next morning was found dead on the same
to his house, which was situated in a retired spot. Shall this man be declared exempt
part of the city, upon arriving at a point from criminal responsibility as having acted
where there was no light, heard the voice of in just self-defense with all of the requisites
a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, of law? The criminal branch of the
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" requisites of law? The criminal branch of
 the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there
existed in favor of the accused a majority of
the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable

necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months
of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme
court acquitted the condemned, finding
that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a

remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense
of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p.
128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the
case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a
thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,

both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all
the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of
his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts,

or in the means adopted by him to defend himself
from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence

imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he
is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.





G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go
with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, party into two groups with defendants Oanis and
vs. Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
GALANTA, defendants-appellants. supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's
house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf. was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta. where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was
Attorney Torres for appellee. sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling,
immediately returned to her own room which was
very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour.
MORAN, J.:
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the
room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio
back towards the door where they were,
Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal
.32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were,
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded,
after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of
and looking at the door where the shots came, she
homicide through reckless imprudence and were
saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from
entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that
one year and six months to two years and two
the person shot and killed was not the notorious
months of prison correccional and to indemnify
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately
paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the
from this judgment. killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as
to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The
Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro,
Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get caused his death.
him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly
called for his first sergeant and asked that he be
These are the facts as found by the trial court and
given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta,
fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave,
D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported
however, a different version of the tragedy.
at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief
were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram
of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated
Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas
the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he
contained in the telegram. The same instruction was
too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to
given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
the room thus indicated and upon opening the
called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of
curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are
police was asked whether he knew one Irene,
Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose
and Irene woke up and as the former was about to
morals of the same name. Upon request of the
sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson
Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to
leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and
locate some of his men to guide the constabulary
soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at misleading questions had been put which were
Tecson. unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in
every detail of the occurrence. Under these
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in
opened the curtain covering the door and after disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial
having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta court.
at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while
the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while
until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back
thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired
upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then at him simultaneously or successively, believing him
apparently watching and picking up something from to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made
the floor, he fired at him. previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity.
And the question is whether or not they may, upon
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest
exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because performance of their official duties, both of them
they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no
be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the
watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up lower court held and so declared them guilty of the
something from the floor; on the other hand, crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We
Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the are of the opinion, however, that, under the
latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after circumstances of the case, the crime committed by
he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that appellants is murder through specially mitigated by
he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the circumstances to be mentioned below.
latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that
when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of
on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
when each of the appellants tries to exculpate of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim
himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when
the other; but their mutual incriminating averments the mistake is committed without fault or
dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still someone trying to open the door. He called out
sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by twice, "who is there," but received no answer.
appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped
by both appellants themselves in their mutual from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the
recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he
Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit was struck by a chair which had been placed against
up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis the door and believing that he was then being
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and
was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be
considering that the trial court had the opportunity his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked
and so hold that no error was committed in as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a
accepting her testimony and in rejecting the friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. demanded his money or life. He was killed by his
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was
testimony will show not only that her version of the real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded
tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all and that his life and property were in imminent
indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these
instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal
committed without any fault or carelessness "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right
because the accused, having no time or opportunity to life which he has by such notoriety already
to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does
but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, something which places his captors in danger of
and such facts justified his act of killing. In the imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as
instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands
which would press them to immediate action. The of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a
person in the room being then asleep, appellants basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it
had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his never can justify precipitate action at the cost of
identity without hazard to themselves, and could human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of
even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable the appellants has cost an innocent life and there
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action
unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, of such character in the mind of a reasonably
is the only legitimate course of action for appellants prudent man, condemnation — not condonation —
to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him. The crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury
justified in using such force as is reasonably caused to another should be unintentional, it being
necessary to secure and detain the offender, simply the incident of another act performed
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el
yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa
in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que
to dangerous means when the arrest could be ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion
effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como
doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this
in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
not be subject to any greater restraint than is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such
criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity
violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; of the intended victim cannot be considered as
U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life- to support a plea of mitigated liability.
termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the
peace of the community, but these facts alone As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime
constitute no justification for killing him when in committed is murder with the qualifying
effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a
no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article
upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to
242). such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal
liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense

committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In the instance case, only the
first requisite is present — appellants have acted in
the performance of a duty. The second requisite is
wanting for the crime by them committed is not the
necessary consequence of a due performance of

their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get
him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and
they are overpowered. But through impatience or
over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances,
they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by
killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making
any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to
article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and
appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and
accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories
of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of
P2,000, with costs.

G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012 Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno
(Puno) who were members of the Integrated
2
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan
vs. Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen,
respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu,
Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either
G.R. No. 122677
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or
civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan,
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A.
Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged
MANGUERRA, Petitioners,
with murder, multiple attempted murder and
vs.
frustrated murder in three Informations, the
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF
inculpatory portions of which read:
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Criminal Case No. 16612:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in
G.R. No. 122776 Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
PUNO, Petitioners, public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains,
vs. Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. mutually helping one another, and while responding
to information about the presence of armed men in
D E C I S I O N said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof,
thus committing the offense in relation to their
PERALTA, J.: office, did then and there, with treachery and
evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the
zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with
justified when their duty could be performed automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup
occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are
has homicide or murder been a function of law necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body,
enforcement. The public peace is never predicated thereby causing the direct and immediate death of
on the cost of human life. the latter.

3
These are petitions for review on certiorari under CONTRARY TO LAW.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 30,
1
1995 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Criminal Case No. 16613:
Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for
murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in
attempted murder, respectively. The cases are Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains,
and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense
were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and
 8
mutually helping one another, and while responding indisposed – entered individual pleas of not
9
to information about the presence of armed men in guilty. A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily
said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, surrendered to the authorities, and at his
10
thus committing the offense in relation to their arraignment likewise entered a negative plea. In
office, did then and there, with treachery and the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David,
evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a
feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No.
11
Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and 16612. Said motion was heard on the premise, as
Raul V. Panlican with automatic weapons by firing previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden the defense, that these cases would be jointly tried
by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would
Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the
12
commenced the commission of murder directly by merits. On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan
13
overt acts of execution which should produce the granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612. Yapyuco
murder by reason of some cause or accident other likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the
than their own spontaneous desistance. same was also granted on May 21,
14
1991. Pamintuan died on November 21,
15
CONTRARY TO LAW.
4 1992, and accordingly, the charges against him
were dismissed.
Criminal Case No. 16614:
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in remaining accused waived the pre-trial
16
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, inquest. Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this and picked up from where the presentation of
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all evidence left off at the hearing on the bail
public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, applications.
Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense
Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and The prosecution established that in the evening of
mutually helping one another, and while responding April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera,
to information about the presence of armed men in Panlican and Licup were at the residence of
said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations
thus committing the offense in relation to their between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided
office, did then and there, with treachery and to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the
evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and religious procession had passed. As they were all
feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who
C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup
Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions
inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva
necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
which would have produced the crime of murder, dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a
but which did not, by reason of causes independent curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
of the defendants’ will, namely, the able and timely instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded
17
medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, and bleeding profusely.
which prevented his death.
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5 defense would claim, allegedly did not see any one
18
on the road flag them down. In open court, Flores
19
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having executed a sketch depicting the relative location of
6
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, the the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of
accused – except Pabalan who died earlier on June Salangsang where they had come from and the
7
12, 1990, and Yapyuco who was then allegedly house situated on the right side of the road right
after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel
turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Corporation plant, affirmed the presence of his
Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post companions at his residence on the subject date and
and opened fire at him and his companions. He time, and corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’
could not tell how many firearms were used. He narration of the events immediately preceding the
recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his
Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of guests shortly after the procession had passed his
the jeepney when he saw from behind them house and reminding them to proceed carefully on
Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Naron’s the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when
house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a
introduced himself and his companions to be distance which was shortly followed by Flores’
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded to
Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the
flagged. At this point, he was distracted when lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s house
Villanueva cried out and told him to summon where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or
27
Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup less six people whom he could not recognize. At
were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being
house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men
observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved
Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva
20
jeepney to be taken to the hospital. This was and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but
corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of
as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney
with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the
him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the same jeepney which he remembered to be that
21
nearby St. Francis Hospital. frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the
barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his
Flores remembered that there were two sudden mother’s house and in the morning, a policeman
bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded each came looking for him with whom, however, he was
28
other, and that they were given no warning shot at not able to talk.
22
all contrary to what the defense would say. He
professed that he, together with his co-passengers, Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident
were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the was dark because the electric post in front of
hospital and inside it he observed two men, each Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he arrived,
holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He and that none of the neighboring houses was
continued that as soon as he and his companions illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to
had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of whether it was Yapyuco’s group or the group of
the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to
23
with his two armed companions. He further the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it
narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by
Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured
24 29
expired on April 7, 1988. He claimed that all the companions to the hospital.
accused in the case had not been known to him prior
to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine
identified to be his wife’s uncle and with whom he National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas,
denied having had any rift nor with the other affirmed that she had previously examined the
accused for that matter, which would have firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners
25
otherwise inspired ill motives. He claimed the in the shooting and found them positive for
bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the gunpowder residue. She could not, however,
passenger side and that there were no other bullet determine exactly when the firearms were
holes at the back or in any other portion of the discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms
26
vehicle. were discharged that night nor the relative positions
of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to right leg; another, through-and-through wound at
administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the the middle portion of the right forearm; and third
other accused because the opportunity therefor one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and
came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He
having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the
found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have
had punctured the door at the passenger side of the been exposed and the assailant must have been in
vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the
explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets that level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the
hit at an angle might have been fired while the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left
jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward side and crossed over to and exited at the right,
in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the which suggested that the gunman must have been
30
curve on the road. Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, positioned at Licup’s left side. He explained that if
administrative and supply officer of the INP- this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in the
Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the forearm, then the former must have been fired after
issuance of firearms and ammunitions to members Licup had changed his position as a reaction to the
of the local police force and CHDF and CVO first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on
members, identified in court the memorandum the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at
receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario the victim’s back and hit the jeepney at a downward
33
Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and angle without hitting any hard surface prior.
31
Yapyuco.
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the forearm must have been caused by a bullet fired
Makati Medical Center, examined the injuries of from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of
Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability
multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that
Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior he might have changed position following the
aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these infliction of the other wounds, unless there was
wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 more than one assailant who fired multiple shots
and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however,
the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup
theorized that this wound would be caused by a having changed position especially if the gunfire was
firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of
the assailant and the victim were both standing Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could
upright on the ground and the firearm was fired be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered
from the level of the assailant’s waist; but if the ahead of the others because it would have caused
victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head
34
horizontal so that with the shot coming from his lying low and steady.
front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward.
He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the
Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed
32
seated victim and exit at a lower level. that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan
and Puno had been administratively charged with
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of
alive when examined. On the patient, he noted a the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact
lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989
head – one consistent with being hit by a hard and and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from
35
blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) service. Dolly Porqueriño, stenographer at the
gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the
that Licup was upright when fired upon from the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the
front: one is a through-and-through wound in the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988
middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the which he had previously prepared at his office. This,
according to her, together with the sketch showing came bursting from the direction of Naron’s house
39
the relative position of the responding law enforcers directly at the subject jeepney.
and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the
incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the
36
Central Office for consideration. The jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at Pamintuan
Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these that they were San Miguel Corporation employees.
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then
which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, immediately searched the vehicle but found no
Cunanan and Puno. firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom
they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men
the defense. He identified himself as the commander returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and
of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney.
Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was
40
Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose likewise gone.
jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and
Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of Yapyuco explained that the peace and order
April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in
physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a bad shape, as in fact there were several law
summon for police assistance from David, who enforcement officers in the area who had been
41
supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning ambushed supposedly by rebel elements, and that
a reported presence of armed NPA members in he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main reported sightings of unidentified armed men
station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the 42
therein. That night, he said, his group which
time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all,
he decided to respond and instructed his men to put comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan
43
on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with Police Substation, the team composed of
37
them. Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed
by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of
44
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he them, including himself, were armed. He denied
and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that that they had committed an ambuscade because
he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney
45
firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, would have been killed. He said that the shots
Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney
captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also did not come from him or from his fellow police
brought in a number of armed men and that there officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled
were likewise Cafgu members convened at the in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots
residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the
46
announced the approach of his suspects, hence spot on the road where they were assembled.
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle
of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not
conveying the victims would make an inevitable communicated with any one of the accused after the
turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan incident because he was at the time very confused;
announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with yet he did know that his co-accused had already
Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it been investigated by the main police station in San
down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself,
47
instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and Cunanan and Puno. He admitted an administrative
swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of
38
his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire which they had been ordered dismissed from
warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed
forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an
tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly
investigation independently conducted by their acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of
48
station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case
No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995
the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged Joint Decision reads:
the volatility of the peace and order situation in his
jurisdiction, where members of the police force had WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He follows:
said that he himself has actually conducted
investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador
elements had been trying to infiltrate the Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
and that he has accordingly conducted "clearing Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang
operations" in sugarcane plantations in the and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby
barangay. He intimated that days prior to the found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as
of the presence of NPA members in the area. defined and penalized under Article 249 of
Corroborating Yapyuco’s declaration, he confessed the Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of
having investigated the shooting incident and them with the mitigating circumstance of
making a report on it in which, curiously, was voluntary surrender, without any
supposedly attached Pamintuan’s statement aggravating circumstance present or
referring to Flores as being "married to a resident of proven, each of said accused is hereby
Barangay Quebiawan" and found after surveillance sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
to be "frequently visited by NPA members." He penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the
that night and that the chief investigator was able to minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE
49
gather bullet shells from the scene. (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand severally, the heirs of the deceased victim
but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well as the Leodevince Licup in the amounts of
50
latter’s documentary evidence. Mario Reyes, ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and
Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,
waived their right to present evidence and and to pay their proportionate shares of the
51
submitted their memorandum as told. costs of said action.

The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency
whether the accused had acted in the regular and of evidence, all the accused charged in the
lawful performance of their duties in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y
maintenance of peace and order either as barangay Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco,
officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y
and hence, could take shelter in the justifying David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y
circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y
Revised Penal Code; or whether they had Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby
52
killing them. With the evidence in hand, it found acquitted of the offense of Multiple
Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Attempted Murder charged therein, with
Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate costs de oficio.
offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused
16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y
murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes
 y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y police operation but was the result of either a
Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and
57
offense Attempted Homicide, as defined amateurish attempt to gain commendation.
and penalized under Article 249, in relation
to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the These findings obtain context principally from the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting them open court statements of prosecution witnesses
with the mitigating circumstance of Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the
voluntary surrender, without any circumstances prior to the subject incident. The
aggravating circumstance present or Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw
proven, each of said accused is hereby jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially
penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and since – as it turned out after the search of the
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the vehicle – they had no firearms with them, and
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY hence, they had nothing to be scared of. It
58

of prision mayor as the maximum; to observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been
indemnify, jointly and severally, the bona fide residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it
offended party Noel Villanueva in the would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay
amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and captain no less, not to have known them and the
compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 location of their houses which were not far from the
as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay scene of the incident; so much so that the presence
their proportionate share of the costs of of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in
said action. Salangsang’s house that evening could not have
possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted
53
SO ORDERED. that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated April 11,
1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout the identities of the victims as well as his apparent
which caused injuries to Villanueva and which certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the
59
brought the eventual death of Licup has been subject Tamaraw jeepney. It surmised how the
committed by petitioners herein willfully under the defense, especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could
54
guise of maintaining peace and order; that the acts have failed to explain why a large group of armed
performed by them preparatory to the shooting, men – which allegedly included Cafgu members from
which ensured the execution of their evil plan neighboring barangays – were assembled at the
without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear house of Naron that night, and how petitioners were
intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the
that the fact they had by collective action target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners
deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm had already known that their suspect vehicle would
and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts be coming from the direction of Salangsang’s house
negates their defense of lawful performance of – such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the
55
official duty; that the theory of mistaken belief manner by which they advantageously positioned
could not likewise benefit petitioners because there themselves at the scene to afford a direct line of fire
was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the
basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the
report that the victims were armed NPA members, electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses
60
and they have not been able by evidence to preclude were deliberately not lit that night.
ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
56
when they acted as they did; that there was The Sandiganbayan also drew information from
insufficient or total absence of factual basis to Flores’ sketch depicting the position of the Tamaraw
assume that the occupants of the jeepney were jeepney and the assailants on the road, and
members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the
and that the shooting incident could not have been right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of
the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that
hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside their participation in the shooting in view of the
the yard of Naron’s residence and the shots were weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation
fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance
them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the of official duty and the declaration of some of them
report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of in their affidavits to the effect that they had been
petitioners had been tested and found to be positive deployed that evening in the front yard of Naron’s
of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they residence from which the volley of gunfire was
61 66
had indeed been discharged. discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.

The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be As to the nature of the offenses committed, the
overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location circumstance of treachery has not been proved
of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot because first, it was supposedly not shown how the
wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of aggression commenced and how the acts causing
the bullets that caused such damage and injuries; injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began
particularly, the number, location and trajectory of and developed, and second, this circumstance must
the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious
jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn
the right side of the street and inside the front yard from mere suppositions or from circumstances
of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the immediately preceding the aggression. The same
lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and finding holds true for evident premeditation because
the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of between the time Yapyuco received the summons
62
petitioners. for assistance from Pamintuan through David and
the time he and his men responded at the scene,
This evidentiary resumé, according to the there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for
Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners’ the materialization of all the elements of that
67
admission that they did discharge their firearms, but circumstance.
also provided a predicate to its conclusion that
petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that
common purpose, design and objective to harm the his injury required leave from work for 60 days
unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was which were all charged against his accumulated
68
no conclusive proof of who among the several leave credits; that he was earning ₱8,350.00
69
accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured monthly; and that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for the
70
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney. Also, Teodoro Licup
Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on had stated that his family had spent ₱18,000.00 for
all those who were shown to have discharged their the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during the wake,
firearms that night – petitioners ₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in
63
herein. Interestingly, it was speculated that the attorney’s fees for the prosecution of these
71
manner by which the accused collectively and cases. He also submitted a certification from San
individually acted prior or subsequent to or Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his
72
contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that deceased son. On these bases, the Sandiganbayan
they were either drunk or that some, if not all of ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to
them, had a grudge against the employees of San indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and
64
Miguel Corporation; and that on the basis of the compensatory damages and ₱120,000.00 as
self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate
could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased
incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual
authorities in Pampanga as well as by the damages and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary
65
NAPOLCOM. It likewise found very consequential damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
the fact that the other accused had chosen not to
take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied;
was incumbent upon them to individually explain hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the evidence. They question their conviction of the
Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy and labels the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson
same to be conjectural. He points out that the court and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and
a quo has not clearly established that he had by had waived their right to present evidence in their
positive acts intended to participate in any criminal behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all
object in common with the other accused, and that accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not
his participation in a supposed common criminal participate in the presentation of the evidence by
object has not been proved beyond reasonable the accused police officers and, hence, the finding
doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is
77
Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the hardly based on an established fact. Also, they
shooting incident when the wounded passengers believe that the findings of fact by the
73
were taken to the hospital on his jeepney. He also Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible
points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan’s evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the
declaration that the incident could not have been court itself and those presented in a separate trial.
the product of a well-planned police operation, but They label the assailed decision to be speculative,
rather was the result of either a hidden agenda conjectural and suspicious and, hence, antithetical to
concocted against the victims by the barangay the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
78
officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their prosecution. Finally, they lament that the finding of
part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the
were the latter alternative, then he could hardly be prosecution has not even shown that they were with
found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but the other accused at the scene of the incident or
rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide that they were among those who fired at the
74
and frustrated homicide. He laments that, victims, and neither were they identified as among
79
assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the the perpetrators of the crime.
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must
nevertheless be exonerated because he responded In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise
to the scene of the incident as a bona fide member dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that
of the police force and, hence, his presence at the judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the
scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the
of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful result of a legitimate police operation or a careless
performance thereof – a fact which has been plot designed by the accused to obtain
affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it commendation, conspiracy has not been proved
dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they believe
75
misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno. He the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are
also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and concerned, shown that they had ever been part of
attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as
well as the other accused in these cases, had that alluded to in the assailed decision. They
entertained the belief that the suspects were armed advance that as police officers, they merely followed
76
rebel elements. orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were
not privy to the conversation among the latter,
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting.
Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond community of criminal design with the rest of the
80
reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was accused. They affirm Yapyuco’s statement that
81
based on acts the evidence for which has been they fired warning shots at the subject jeepney, but
adduced at a separate trial but erroneously only after it had passed the place where they were
attributed to them. They explain that there were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged
two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police down as it then became apparent that it was going
officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno to speed away – as supposedly shown by bullet holes
and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the
comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill
themselves who had waived the presentation of motives that would have otherwise urged them to
commit the crimes charged, especially since none of memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due
the victims had been personally or even remotely process to said petitioners in view of their
known to either of them. That they were not agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on
intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by
by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles their manifestation to forego with the presentation
at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, of their own evidence. The right to present
they immediately held their fire when Flores witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is
identified themselves as employees of San Miguel jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony
Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their binds the other accused, especially where the latter
87
intent, then they could have easily fired at the has failed to register his objection thereto.
82
victims directly.
The decision on review apparently is laden with
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the conclusions and inferences that seem to rest on
Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the
conspiracy as established by the fact that all records of the case and found that evidence
accused, some of them armed, had assembled nonetheless exists to support the penultimate
themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
though having previously known that it would be
coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that I.
the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon
demonstrates a community of purpose and design to It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records
83
commit the crimes charged. It believes that that petitioners were at the situs of the incident on
criminal intent is discernible from the posts the the date and time alleged in the Informations.
accused had chosen to take on the road that would Yapyuco, in his testimony – which was adopted by
give them a direct line of fire at the target – as Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra, Mario
shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had
84
Tamaraw jeepney. This intent was supposedly been offered in evidence by the
realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores 88
prosecution, explained that their presence at the
and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a scene was in response to the information relayed by
85
supervening consequence. It refutes the invocation Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements
of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by
was no factual basis to support the belief of the the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay
accused that the occupants were members of the Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that
NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had petitioners now appeal to justification under Article
previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the
vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it
merely responded to the call of duty when was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation
summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is that the shooting transpired when it became
convinced that they had exceeded the performance apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to
thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not there
occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
86
instead. aboard, and who among them had discharged the
bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes injured Villanueva.
and Manguerra that the evidence adduced before
the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based The first duty of the prosecution is not to present
thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP 89
the crime but to identify the criminal. To this end,
explains that said petitioners, together with the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence
Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had 90
the joint counter-affidavit of Andres Reyes and
previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial 91
Manguerra; the counter-affidavit of Mario Reyes;
and as directed later on submitted the case for 92
the joint counter-affidavit of Cunanan and Puno;
decision as to them with the filing of their 93
the counter-affidavit of Yapyuco; and the joint
 94
counter-affidavit of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno the accused actually discharged their firearms that
executed immediately after the incident in question. night, her report pertaining to the examination of
In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible
"[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of
when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in Naron’s house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said
air and when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
95
stop; in their earlier affidavit they, together with seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such
Yapyuco, declared that they were "constrained x x x finding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence
to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted,
96
vehicle." Yapyuco’s open court declaration, which they may not evade the effect of their having
was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their
discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the
subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-
104
flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when accused, Yapyuco.
97
it came clear that it was trying to escape. He
suggested – substantiating the implication in his Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of
affidavit that it was "the whole team [which fired] at one accused is admissible only against said accused,
98
the fleeing vehicle" – that the bullets which hit the but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if
passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have the declarant or admitter repeats in court his
come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case,
Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres during the trial and the other accused is accorded
Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the
99
arrival of the suspect vehicle. admission is admissible against both accused
because then, it is transposed into a judicial
105
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their admission. It is thus perplexing why, despite the
affidavits, declared that it was only Manguerra from extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and
their group who discharged a firearm but only into Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating
100
the air to give warning shots, and that it was the them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive
"policemen [who] directly fired upon" the their right to present evidence when, in fact, they
101
jeepney. Manguerra himself shared this could have shown detailed proof of their
102
statement. Yet these accounts do not sit well with participation or non-participation in the offenses
the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they
the passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in had been denied due process in this regard, as they
both her report and testimony, described to have opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the
come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits
oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory
Yapyuco’s claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire admissions of their co-accused.
directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn
and had already moved past them such that the line II.
of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an
oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim The availability of the justifying circumstance of
that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or
after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the
vehicle was already right in front of the yard of performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of
Naron’s house sitting on the right side of the road his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the
after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes offense committed is the necessary consequence of
and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line the due performance of such duty or the lawful
103
of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it. 106
exercise of such right or office. The justification is
based on the complete absence of intent and
While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as
challenge for being inconclusive as to who among guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with
 107
criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the
invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even
injury or has committed the offense charged for assuming that they were as the accused believed
which, however, he may not be penalized because them to be, the actuations of these responding law
the resulting injury or offense is a necessary enforcers must inevitably be ranged against
consequence of the due performance of his duty or reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate
the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must course of performance of policing duties. The rules
be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be
crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must
performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to always exercise the highest caution, do not require
prove such hypothesis. that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon
if the person to be accosted does not heed his call.
We find that the requisites for justification under Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged
obtain in this case. pride. Police work requires nothing more than the
lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the completion of the process pertains to other
108
situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement government officers or agencies.
operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat
the claim that all of them – who were either police A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified
and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
the maintenance of peace and order – were bound secure and detain the offender, overcome his
to, as they did, respond to information of a resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, escapes, and protect himself from bodily
109 110
therefore, is the specific duty to identify the harm. United States v. Campo has laid down the
occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of
firearms inside it to validate the information they the authorities is not authorized to use force, except
had received; they may even effect a bloodless in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the
arrest should they find cause to believe that their subject of resistance, and finds no other means to
suspects had just committed, were committing or comply with his duty or cause himself to be
were bound to commit a crime. While, it may respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury
certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing or death results from the exercise of such force, the
offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence same could be justified in inflicting the injury or
suggests that the accused were acting under an causing the death of the offender if the officer had
111
official order to open fire at or kill the suspects used necessary force. He is, however, never
under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the
the absence of reference to the victims having offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to
launched such aggression as would threaten the dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
112 113
safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited otherwise. People v. Ulep teaches that –
such defiance of authority that would have
instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may
embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self- be used only as a last resort, and under
defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented circumstances indicating that the offender cannot
at the trial to show that the accused were placed in otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does
real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily
except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police
were armed and were probably prepared to conduct officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma
hostilities. when pressured by a situation where an immediate
and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it
But whether or not the passengers of the subject must be stressed that the judgment and discretion
jeepney were NPA members and whether or not of police officers in the performance of their duties
must be exercised neither capriciously nor in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the
oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco –
absence of a clear and legal provision to the which they could actually have used to pursue their
contrary, they must act in conformity with the suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in
dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit flight.
and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance
trigger-happy law enforcement officers who Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law.
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force, and
persons they are apprehending. They must always it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
bear in mind that although they are dealing with necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed
criminal elements against whom society must be in that respect. Although the employment of
protected, these criminals are also human beings powerful firearms does not necessarily connote
114
with human rights. unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not
seem to have been confronted with the rational
115
Thus, in People v. Tabag, where members of the necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney
Davao CHDF had killed four members of a family in occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered
their home because of suspicions that they were why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent
NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-
by invoking among others the justifying anxiety or impatience or simply their careless
circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they
Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the
them liable for murder said, thus: moment they actualized such resolve, thereby
inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the
paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and
Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no limb – all of which could not have been the
means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their
duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in duties.
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no III.
evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife
Wendelyn, and their children were members of the At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the
NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In
they were entitled to due process of law. On that the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a
fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have
humble home expecting for the dawn of another justified the act or omission which is the subject of
118
uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake
the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
119
the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a negates the intent component of the crime. It may
116
merciless vigilante-style execution. be a defense even if the offense charged requires
120
proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the
121
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not
directly at the jeepney by claiming that it failed to look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other
122
heed the first round of warning shots as well as the person. A proper invocation of this defense
signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
123 124
is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and
but because it was pacing the dark road with its (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit
125
headlights dimmed missed petitioners’ signal to the crime or the existence of the mental state
stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the which the statute prescribes with respect to an
126
passengers thereof were drunk from the party they element of the offense.
117
had just been to, still, we find incomprehensible
petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms when
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion
128
non-liability is found in United States v. Ah for the extreme measure. x x x
127
Chong, but in that setting, the principle was
129
treated as a function of self-defense where the Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v.
physical circumstances of the case had mentally 130
People, the justification of an act, which is
manifested to the accused an aggression which it otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact,
was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of
of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his 131
the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained
bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no that –
response from the intruder after having demanded
identification, believed that a robber had broken in. The question then squarely presents itself, whether
He threatened to kill the intruder but at that in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
moment he was struck by a chair which he had responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
placed against the door and, perceiving that he was facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the from criminal liability if the facts were as he
intruder who turned out to be his roommate. supposed them to be, but which would constitute
Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had known the true state of the facts at the time
had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court when he committed the act. To this question we
explained: think there can be but one answer, and we hold that
under such circumstances there is no criminal
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad
all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). 132
faith.

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element IV.

in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from homicide and frustrated homicide has been
criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all
negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the
circumstances as they appear to him." x x x accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of
reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts the defense of the accused does not relieve the
which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt
in accord with the principles on which the rule is 133
beyond reasonable doubt. By reasonable doubt is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of
believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide; the whole proof and an inability, after such
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
134
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In certainty of guilt. The overriding consideration is
other words, and with reference to the right of self- not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt
is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained 135
as to his guilt.
in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus
self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
he is misled concerning them, and defends himself 136
evidence. Corpus delicti consists of two things:
correctly according to what he thus supposes the first, the criminal act and second, defendant's
facts to be, the law will not punish him though they 137
agency in the commission of the act. In homicide
(by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution around the time of the incident. But as the
must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that
dead; (b) that the death was produced by the Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these
criminal act of some other than the deceased and cases even before his opportunity to testify in court
141
was not the result of accident, natural cause or emerged.
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill
responsible for the act which produced the death. In motives evades relevance and materiality. Motive is
other words, proof of homicide or murder requires generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, an element of a crime. It gains significance when the
that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), commission of a crime is established by evidence
that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist purely circumstantial or otherwise
in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the 142
inconclusive. The question of motive is important
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors defendant is or is not the person who committed the
before, at the time or immediately after the killing of act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant
the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate was the one who caused the death of the deceased,
act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively it is not so important to know the reason for the
138
presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent deed.
143

to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to

crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning
particularly to the material results following the their claim that they did not intend to kill anyone of
unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for the victims, admit having willfully discharged their
139
all the consequences thereof. Evidence of intent service firearms; and the manner by which the
to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the
attempted homicide, as the same is an essential jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the
element of these offenses, and thus must be proved shots were intended for the persons lying along the
with the same degree of certainty as that required of line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound
140
the other elements of said offenses. where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in
itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to kill, and that there are instances where the
petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, attendant circumstances conclusively establish that
in negating the allegation that they had by their acts the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to
intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention
petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, with which a specific act is committed, it is always
whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is proper and necessary to look not merely to the act
certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as
as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions they develop in the evidence.
144

that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the

motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who The firearms used by petitioners were either M16
their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber
conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity 145
carbine. While the use of these weapons does not
of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that always amount to unnecessary force, they are
Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level
relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not
with NPA members and that the San Miguel difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers
Corporation plant where the victims were employed thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed
was being penetrated by NPA members. He also that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was
affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as
number of ambuscades launched against members much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof
of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers
neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire
was aimed at the tires – especially considering that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty
petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
lawless elements in the streets.
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on merely criminal negligence, the killing being
the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the intentional and not accidental. In criminal
likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and negligence, the injury caused to another should be
in fact even the driver himself – of being hit and unintentional, it being the incident of another act
147 148
injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain performed without malice. People v. Guillen and
149
to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the People v. Nanquil declare that a deliberate intent
uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v.
150
them that it was proceeding to evade their Castillo, we held that that there can be no
authority. And in instances like this, their natural and frustrated homicide through reckless negligence
logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of
upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of
hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we frustrated homicide cannot exist.
found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’
actuations leaned towards the latter. Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited
conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan,
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to likewise militates against their claim of reckless
bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the imprudence.
passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying
the wheel, together with all the consequences Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
arising from their deed. The circumstances of the there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree
shooting breed no other inference than that the to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It
accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
146
State tells that: before, during and after the commission of the
crime, showing that they had acted with a common
This rule that every person is presumed to purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it
contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. acts towards the accomplishment of the same
Because men generally act deliberately and by the unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
determination of their own will, and not from the combined acts, though apparently independent of
impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
every man always thus acts, until the contrary indicating a closeness of personal association and a
appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found,
killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide continues until the object of it has been
do not of themselves show that it was not intended, accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up.
but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason
the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
burden of proof is on him to show that it was an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
otherwise. complicity. There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
151
V. common design and purpose.

Verily, the shooting incident subject of these Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement
petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of for an appreciable period prior to the
killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss occurrence.1a\^/phi1 From the legal viewpoint,
Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of
the offense, the accused had the same purpose and with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in
152
were united in its execution. The instant case the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they
requires no proof of any previous agreement among perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and
petitioners that they were really bent on a violent evading arrest. The same is true with treachery,
attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof
conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment that the mode of attack was consciously and
petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had deliberately adopted by petitioners.
converged and strategically posted themselves at
the place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
find that petitioners had been ignited by the Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an
common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to
flee and evade their authority when it suddenly Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees
occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to than that prescribed for principals in a consummated
escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to
signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
at that point, petitioners were confronted with the surrender, and there being no aggravating
convenient yet irrational option to take no chances circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate
by preventing the jeepney’s supposed escape even if Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed
it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty
such was their common purpose. And by their from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have
concerted action of almost simultaneously opening denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision
fire at the jeepney from the posts they had correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
deliberately taken around the immediate reclusion temporal.
environment of the suspects, conveniently affording
an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve However, upon the finding that petitioners in
their object as shown by the concentration of bullet Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed attempted
entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order.
angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2)
is no definitive proof that tells which of all the degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide,
accused had discharged their weapons that night which is prision correccional. Taking into account the
and which directly caused the injuries sustained by mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be
the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since only meted out on petitioners is within the minimum
herein petitioners were shown to have been in period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months
possession of their service firearms that night and and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months
had fired the same, they should be held collectively of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the
responsible for the consequences of the subject law sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence
enforcement operation which had gone terribly Law must be within the range of the penalty next
153
wrong. lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
VI. of arresto mayor.

The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners We likewise modify the award of damages in these
are guilty as co-principals in the crimes of homicide cases, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
and attempted homicide only, respectively for the and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to
death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the
sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and
acquittal together with the other accused, of the ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel
charge of attempted murder with respect to the Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay,
154
unharmed victims. The allegation of evident jointly and severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00 as
premeditation has not been proved beyond actual and compensatory damages and ₱20,000.00
reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages
should be deleted, there being no aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the
crimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The
joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995,
are hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners

are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case
No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is
hereby modified to Two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of
₱77,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00

in moral damages, as well as Noel
Villanueva, in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, and
₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163927 January 27, 2006 In the meantime, Eusebio died intestate and was
survived by his son, Cleto. Elias Gaviola also died
ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA, Petitioner, intestate and was survived by his son, Alfonso.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Almost 30 years thereafter, on October 1985, Cleto
filed a complaint against Alfonso and four others for
D E C I S I O N recovery of possession of a parcel of land and
execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The
CALLEJO, SR., J.: property involved was located on the north of Lot
1301 and covered by TD No. 1546. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-0600.
Before the Court is a petition for review of the
1
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
2
No. 24413 affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial The plaintiff therein alleged that the houses of the
Court (RTC) of Nava, Biliran, Branch 16, in Criminal defendants were located in the property that had
Case No. N-1901, where petitioner Alfonso Gaviola been adjudicated to his father, Eusebio Mejarito, in
was convicted of qualified theft. Civil Case No. 111. He prayed that the court issue
judgment as follows:
The antecedents are as follows:
a) Ordering [the] immediate execution of
judgment in Civil Case No. 111, against
On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint
defendants Segundo Gaviola and Alfonso
against Eusebio Mejarito in the then Court of First
Gaviola;
Instance of Carigara, Leyte, for quieting of title with
a plea for injunctive relief. The suit involved a
40,500-square-meter parcel of coconut land located b) Ordering all defendants evicted from any
in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as portion of the land they presently occupy as
Cadastral Lot 1301 and covered by Tax Declaration residential;
3
(TD) No. 743. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 111. Eusebio, for his part, claimed ownership c) Ordering all defendants to pay rent in
over the property. favor of the plaintiff with legal interests
imposed reckoned from June 1984 until full
On July 29, 1955, the trial court ordered the payment of what is due and/or until their
dismissal of the complaint and declared Eusebio the complete and absolute eviction from their
lawful owner of the property. The dispositive portion respective residences which rent liabilities
of the decision reads: when computed annually for each of them
is in the sum of PESOS: THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED (P3,600.00), Philippine
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the Court renders
Currency;
judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint and
declaring the defendants the absolute owners and
entitled to the possession of the disputed land. The d) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff
preliminary injunction which was granted by this jointly and severally the sum of PESOS:
Court through Judge Lorenzo Carlitos is ordered THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00), Philippine
dissolved, with costs against the plaintiffs. Currency, representing moral damages;

SO ORDERED.
4 e) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff
jointly and severally the sum of PESOS:
TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00),
The decision became final and executory. On
Philippine Currency, representing attorney’s
September 3, 1955, the trial court ordered the
fee and litigation expenses.
sheriff to place Eusebio in possession of the
5
property. The sheriff complied with the order on
December 19, 1958.
6 Plaintiff prays for such relief and other remedies as
7
may be just and equitable in the premises.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants entrusted the land to the care of his nephew, Rafael
averred that the property in which their houses were Lozano.
located is different from that which was adjudicated
by the court in Civil Case No. 111 to Eusebio At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio
Mejarito. Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a
barangay councilman, saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo
The parties could not agree on the identification and Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut
metes and bounds of the parcel of land claimed and trees in Lot 1301. Under the supervision of the
owned by the plaintiff and those claimed and owned spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they
by the defendants. This impelled the court to
appoint Bienvenido Ricafort, the Officer-in-Charge of gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the
14
the sub-office of the Provincial Assessor, as coconut trees. The Officer-in-Charge of the
Commissioner, to resurvey the property subject of Maripipi Police Station then filed a criminal
the complaint. A sketch of the property was complaint for qualified theft against the spouses
prepared, indicating the location of the plaintiff’s lot Gaviola and those who gathered the coconuts in the
(Lot 1301) and the parcel of land where the house of 15
municipal trial court. In the meantime, the
Gaviola stood (Lot 1311). The Commissioner also coconuts were entrusted to the care of the barangay
8
prepared a report stating that the property captain.
adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in Civil Case No. 111
was Cadastral Lot No. 1301, while that which On February 6, 1998, an Information was filed with
belonged to Elias Gaviola was Cadastral Lot No. the RTC of Naval, Biliran, against the spouses Alfonso
1311; and the old one-storey house of defendant and Leticia Gaviola for qualified theft. The
Alfonso Gaviola was located in the latter lot. The accusatory portion of the decision reads:
9
defendant did not object to the report.
That on or about the 6th day of September 1997, at
On May 4, 1990, the court rendered judgment in around 9 o’clock in the morning at Brgy. Calbani,
favor of the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0600 and Municipality of Maripipi, Province of Biliran,
ordered the complaint dismissed. The court ruled Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
that the parcels of land occupied by the defendants, Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
inclusive of Lot 1311, were different from the conspiring and confederating with one another, and
property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in Civil with intent to gain, did then and there unlawfully,
Case No. 111, which is actually Lot 1301. The court feloniously, deliberately took, harvested and
also ruled that the plaintiff had no cause of action gathered one thousand five hundred (1,500) coconut
for the execution of the court’s decision in Civil Case fruits from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without
No. 111 because such decision had long been the consent and authority of the latter, to the
10
enforced, per report of the sheriff. damage and prejudice of the owner amounting
to P3,000.00.
Eusebio appealed the decision to the CA which
rendered judgment on September 18, 1992, 16
Contrary to Law.
11
affirming the decision of the RTC. The appellate
court declared that the house of Alfonso Gaviola was
Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon
located in Lot 1311 covered by TD 1611 under the
his instructions, but insisted that the trees from
name of Elias Gaviola. Cleto filed a petition for
which they were taken were planted on Lot 1311,
review on certiorari with this Court, which was
12 the property he had inherited from his father, Elias
denied due course in a Resolution dated March 24,
Gaviola; the property of private complainant Cleto
1993. Thus, the CA decision became final and
Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent to his lot. Alfonso
executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution,
testified that the property was placed in his
a copy of which Sheriff Ludenilo S. Ador served on
13 possession by the sheriff since August 5, 1993, and
the defendants on August 5, 1993.
that since then he had been gathering coconuts
every three months without being confronted or
In the meantime, Cleto Mejarito left the Philippines 17
prosecuted by anybody. He insisted that his claim
and stayed in the United States of America. He
 was based on the decision of the RTC in Civil Case September 6, 1997 that he was charged of qualified
18
No. B-0600, which was affirmed by the CA. theft.

On April 13, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment Moreover, his honest belief that he owned the land
convicting Alfonso of qualified theft. The fallo of the negates intent to steal, an essential element of the
decision reads: felony of theft. He argues that the RTC in Civil Case
No. B-0600 declared him to be the owner of the
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfonso property where the coconut trees were planted; the
Gaviola y Dimakiling guilty beyond reasonable doubt property was placed in his possession by the sheriff
of the crime of qualified theft; hereby imposing upon and, since then, he had planted bananas and
him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment gathered coconuts from the coconut trees.
from Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Ten (10)
days of prision correccional, maximum period, as the In its comment on the petition, the Office of the
minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) day of Solicitor General avers that the decision of the RTC,
prision mayor, minimum, as the maximum. which was affirmed by the CA, is in accord with the
evidence on record. The OSG maintains that under
The accused shall pay the private complainant Cleto the decision of the then CFI in Civil Case No. 111, the
Mejarito, through his duly authorized RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 and that of the CA
representative, exemplary damages in the amount affirming on appeal the RTC ruling, the owner of Lot
of P20,000.00 and liquidated damages in the amount 1301, the property from which the coconuts were
of P3,000.00. taken, was Eusebio Mejarito, the private
complainant’s father.
19
SO ORDERED.
We rule against the petitioner.
The trial court ruled that the accused took the
coconuts from the coconut trees planted on Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft
Cadastral Lot 1301 which was owned by Cleto as follows:
Mejarito, and not on his own property, Lot 1311, as
he claimed. Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain
Alfonso Gaviola appealed the decision to the CA but without violence, against or intimidation of
which rendered judgment, on October 1, 2003, persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
affirming the decision of the RTC. He then filed a property of another without the latter’s consent.
motion for reconsideration of the decision, which
the appellate court denied. Theft is likewise committed by:

Alfonso, now the petitioner, raises the following 1. Any person who, having found lost
issues in the instant petition: (1) whether the property, shall fail to deliver the same to
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the local authorities or to its owner;
he had intent to gain when the coconuts were taken
upon his instruction; and (2) whether he is liable for 2. Any person who, after having maliciously
exemplary and liquidated damages. damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or objects
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the of the damage caused by him; and
prosecution failed to prove animus lucrandi (intent
to gain) on his part. He asserts that he had been 3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed
taking coconuts from the property in broad daylight estate or a field where trespass is forbidden
three times a year since August 5, 1993 on his or which belongs to another and without
honest belief that he was the owner of the land the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
where the coconut trees were planted. He points out upon the same or shall gather fruits,
that it was only after he took coconuts on 20
cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of theft are: (1) that there be property, meaning the intent to deprive another of
taking of personal property; (2) that said property his ownership/lawful possession of personal
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with property which intent is apart from, but concurrent
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without with the general criminal intent which is an essential
the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be element of a felony of dolo (dolos malus). The animo
accomplished without the use of violence against or being a state of the mind may be proved by direct or
21
intimidation of persons or force upon things. circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and
conduct of the accused before, during and after the
The provision was taken from Article 530 of the taking of the personal property. General criminal
Spanish Penal Code which reads: intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact
that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin to have willed the natural consequences of his own
violencia o intimidación en las personas ni acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed from the
fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas taking of personal property without the consent of
muebles ajenas sin la voluntad, de su the owner or lawful possessor thereof. The same
dueño. may be rebutted by the accused by evidence that he
took the personal property under a bona fide belief
23
that he owns the property.
2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida
y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la 24
apropiaren con intencion de lucro. In Black v. State, the State Supreme Court of
Alabama ruled that the open and notorious taking,
without any attempt at concealment or denial, but
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o
an avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption
utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño
that there is no animus furandi. But, if the claim is
causado, salvo los casos previstos en los
dishonest, a mere pretense, taking the property of
artículos 606, num. 1., 2. y 3; 608, num. 1;
another will not protect the taker:
610, num. 1.; 611;613; segundo párrafo del
617 y 618. (Art. 437 del Cod. Penal de 1850.
– Art. 379, Cdo. Franc. – Art. 331, Codigo xxx "In all cases where one in good faith takes
Brasil. – Art. 151, Cod. Austr. – Arts. 461 y another’s property under claim of title in himself, he
508, Cod. Belg. – Art. 242, Cod. Alem. – is exempt from the charge of larceny, however
Arts. 422 y 423, Cod. Port. – Art. 402, Cod. puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the
22
Ital.) same is true where the taking is on behalf of
another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the
claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not
According to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
protect the taker."
theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the
premises of a plantation:
The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive
another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be
out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of
punished by the penalties next higher by two
his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the
degrees than those respectively specified in the next
taker honestly believes the property is his own or
preceding article, if committed by a domestic
that of another, and that he has a right to take
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
possession of it for himself or for another, for the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large 25
protection of the latter.
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond 26
or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of In Charles v. State, the State Supreme Court of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any Florida ruled that the belief of the accused of his
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil ownership over the property must be honest and in
disturbance. good faith and not a mere sham or pretense.

For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have In the present case, the trial court found the
an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal petitioner’s claim of having acted in the honest
belief that he owned Lot 1301 when he ordered the The findings of the RTC were affirmed by the
harvesting of the coconuts barren of probative appellate court. The well-entrenched rule is that the
weight. The trial court ruled that the petitioner even findings of facts of the trial court, affirmed by the
admitted in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the private appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent
complainant’s property was separate from his: any evidence that the trial court and the appellate
court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted
The accused have put up a defense of ownership cogent facts and circumstances of substance which,
although from the records of Civil Case No. B-0600, if considered, would warrant a modification or
Alfonso Gaviola, et al., thru their counsel admitted reversal of the outcome of the case. We have
that from the evidence of Cleto Mejarito especially reviewed the records and find no justification to
Exh. "E," Writ of Execution, it appears that the modify, much less reverse, the findings of the trial
decision was already executed on December 22, and appellate courts.
1958.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance or even
Further admitted that: unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the
metes and bounds of the private complainant’s
"The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola property, Lot 1301, vis-à-vis that of his own, Lot
(Alfonso) is stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the 1311. Indeed, in his Memorandum in Civil Case No.
land of Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff B-0600, petitioner as one of the defendants below,
(Cleto Mejarito), the land having been adjudicated to categorically stated:
his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by
virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exh. "A") (See also Exh. From the above enumeration or statement of
"6," Tax Declaration No. 3437, reverse side). boundaries, it is clear that these three parcels of
land are distinct and separate from each other, as
Alfonso Gaviola could not have made a mistake to the following observations can be made:
extricate themselves from the ejectment, Cleto
Mejarito wanted to pursue in Civil Case No. B-0600. 1. land of plaintiff and Elias (Alfonso)
Gaviola:
They submitted a well entrenched analyses as they
concluded further; to quote: a. Both have the same northern
boundary: Isabela Mejarito. But
"Finally, that these three parcels of lands are the same can be explained by the
separate and distinct from each other is confirmed fact that sometime in 1934 Isabela
by the cadastral survey were the lands of plaintiff Mejarito, through Pastor Armoela,
(Cleto Mejarito), of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) and of sold the land now owned by Elias
Segunda Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot (Alfonso) Gaviola to him. See Ex.
Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only "15." In fact, the first time that the
that, their definite locations and boundaries are land bought by Elias Gaviola was
even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court- declared in his name was in 1935
appointed commissioner, which sketch is now in Tax Dec. No. 2839 (Exh. "14")
marked as Exhibits "H" and series" (Memorandum of which cancelled in part Tax Dec.
defendants Gaviolas dated April 13, 1989, in Civil No. 1942 (Exh. "16") in the name
Case No. B-0600). of Isabela Mejarito.

The general rule is that a judicial admission is What caused the confusion
conclusive upon the party making it and does not (identical northern boundary of
require proof; except when it is shown that the the lands of plaintiff and Elias
admission was made through palpable mistake and Gaviola) was that the northern
(2) when shown that no such admission was in fact boundary (Isabela Mejarito) of the
27
made. (Atillo III vs. C.A. 266 SCRA 596). land of plaintiff was not adjusted
accordingly despite the sale. It
 should have been changed to Elias considered, these apparent discrepancies vanish into
Gaviola to reflect the sale. thin air.

b. The southern boundary of the Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate
land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is and distinct from each other is confirmed by the
stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually cadastral survey where the lands of plaintiff, of Elias
the land of Melecio Gaviola is now Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated as
owned by plaintiff the land having Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303,
been adjudicated to his respectively. Not only that, their definite locations
predecessor-in-interest Eusebio and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch
Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. prepared by the court-appointed commissioner,
111 (Exhibit "A") (See also Exh. "6," which sketch is now marked as Exhs. "H" and series,
Tax Dec. No. 3437, reverse side) of plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is
attached even states that the house of defendant
2. land of plaintiff and Hermenegildo Alfonso Gaviola is located on the land of Elias
(Segundo) Gaviola: Gaviola; and while said report enumerates the
houses located on the land of plaintiff, neither the
a. The eastern boundary of the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola nor of
land of plaintiff is stated as defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the other
28
"Hermenegildo Gaviola," father defendants are among those mentioned therein.
and predecessor-in-interest of
defendant Segundo Gaviola; Moreover, petitioner’s land is residential, while that
of the private complainant is coconut land. There are
b. The western boundary of the no coconut trees in the lot owned by petitioner, nor
land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (Exh. is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on
"31-A") was previously declared as private complainant’s property at any time, believing
Melecio Gaviola. But after the case that it was his own land. Petitioner could thus not
(Civil Case No. 111, Exh. "A"), it have mistaken the property of the private
was changed to "Eusebio complainant for that of his own.
Mejarito," predecessor-in-interest
of plaintiff by virtue of said case. We further note that petitioner failed to adduce
(Exh. "31-A" and "30-A." evidence to corroborate his claim that, prior to
September 6, 1997, he had gathered coconuts from
So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of the coconut trees on the private complainant’s
the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo property three times a year, and that the latter or his
Gaviola), and that they are two distinct and separate caretaker was aware thereof but failed to
lands. remonstrate.

29
Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola In United States v. Villacorta, the Court debunked
(father of defendant Alfonso), and of defendant the claim of the appellant therein that he should not
Segundo Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola be held criminally liable for theft (larceny) for
before) are separate and distinct from each other is honestly believing that he owned the land from
shown by the fact that they have been covered which he took the paddy. That case is on all fours
by different sets of tax declarations since as early as with the present case, in that there was also a court
1906. It should be noted that the tax declarations ruling declaring the private complainant therein as
that cover each land do not merge with, overlap, or the owner of the land on which the paddy grew. The
cancel, each other. There appear apparent minor Court therein ratiocinated as follows:
discrepancies but they can easily be explained by
two events: the sale of a portion of the land of The attorney for the appellant in this court attempts
Isabela Mejarito to Elias Gaviola and the decision in to show that the defendant could not be guilty of
Civil Case No. 111. If these two events are larceny, even though it be admitted that he took and
carried away the paddy in question, for the reason
that he claimed to be the owner of the land. That
question had been decided against him by a court of
competent jurisdiction and he made no objection to
said decision. After that decision he could no longer

claim that he was the owner of the land from which
he took and carried away the paddy, and moreover,
it was shown during the trial of the cause that
Domingo Corpus, by his laborers, had actually
planted the paddy upon the land in question. It is
difficult to understand upon what theory the
defendant could justify his claim that he was the

owner of the paddy, after a final decision had been
rendered against him to the contrary, and when it
was clearly proven that he had not even planted it.
The paddy had been planted by Domingo Corpus
upon land which a court of competent jurisdiction
decided belonged to him and had been harvested by
him and piled upon the land at the time the
defendant entered the land and took and carried it
away. The defendant neither planted the paddy nor
reaped it. The court decided, before he took and
carried away the paddy, that the land belonged to
Domingo Corpus. The defendant must have known

that the paddy did not belong to him. In view of the
litigation, he must have known to whom it did
30
belong.

In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner’s
claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from the
private complainant’s land is a mere pretense to
escape criminal liability.

We rule that there is factual and legal bases for the
award of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
31
Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code,

exemplary damages may be awarded when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, the petitioner is guilty
not only of simple theft but of qualified theft.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931 happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling
for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
appellee, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards
vs. the left behind the accused, with such violence that
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant. the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the
fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any
VILLAMOR, J.: indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio
Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to
the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First
behind the combatants when he left his house to
Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of
satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with
feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the
the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the
contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle,
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
respectively, and were on good terms with each
costs. The crime charged against the accused is
other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and
homicide, according to the following information:
instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was
only defending his possession of the bolo, which
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in
Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his
the barrio of Calunod, municipality of
conduct was perfectly lawful.
Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis,
the accused Donato Bindoy willfully,
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest,
unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and
judging by the description given by the sanitary
with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam,
inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies
inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in
with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
the chest which caused his instant death, in
violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound
which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial
defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally
court, and his counsel in this instance contends that
and without malicious intent.
the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime
of homicide. Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen
Angot, testified having seen the accused stab
Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6,
incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect
1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the
that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow
barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,
testified that she knew of her husband's wound
Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her
the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas
before his death.
(alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato
Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to
Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution
already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam
she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The
words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of
in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we
disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did
Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the so deliberately and with the intention of committing
market. Emigdio left his house to see what was a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant
had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would with costs de oficio. So ordered.
have had to answer for his act, since whoever
willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs
criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the
Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the
case.

The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas,
corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas
and Bindoy were actually struggling for the
possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let
go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew

towards his left side, at the very moment when
Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit
in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because
Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness
adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home
later, and asked him about his wound when he
replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then
continued: "Please look after my wife when I die:
See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This
wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me,
nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this
witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal

evidence adduced by the fiscal.

We have searched the record in vain for the motive
of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly
facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it
well to repeat what this court said in United
States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:

The attention of prosecuting officers, and

especially of provincial fiscals, directed to
the importance of definitely ascertaining
and proving, when possible, the motives

which actuated the commission of a crime
under investigation.

In many criminal cases one of the most

important aids in completing the proof of

the commission of the crime by the accused
is the introduction of evidence disclosing
the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.

In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion
and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to
acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed,
G.R. No. L-42122 December 1, 1934 deceased remained in the care of a local
"curandero." This treatment failed to stop the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- hemorrhage, and the deceased died on the 15th of
appellee, April, 1934.
vs.
INOCENTES MOLDES, defendant-appellant. The theory of the defense was that appellant was
behaving at the dance, that the deceased was the
Fidel J. Silva for appellant. aggressor, that he struck him on the dance floor with
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for appellee. a cane, and that when appellant ran from the house,
deceased followed him about 200 yards until they
came to a creek and appellant could not retreat any
further, and that when being attacked by the
deceased with a cane and a bolo, he succeeded in
wrenching the bolo from the hands of the deceased
HULL, J.:
and in self-defense inflicted the wound.
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First
While there is testimony to the above effect, the
Instance of Leyte of the crime of homicide. On the
witnesses for the defense were not believed by the
night of the 3rd of April in the barrio of Maya,
trial court, and the testimony to that effect does not
municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, there was
read as clear and convincing as does that of the
a dance in a private house, and the deceased was
witnesses for the prosecution.
the master of ceremonies at that dance. The
appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was
reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not
the porch of the house and with his bolo began intend to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted
cutting down the decorations. He descended into but struck only in the dark and in self-defense.
the yard of the house and challenged everyone to a
fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in
chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When
challenged for a fight. one resorts to the use of a lethal weapon and strikes
another with the force that must have been used in
The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the
speaking to him in a friendly manner, and as natural consequences of his act.
deceased had about reached the ground, appellant
struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant
left arm, which was described by the sanitary that if the deceased had secured proper surgical
inspector on post mortem examination as follows: treatment, the wound would not have been fatal. In
the outlying barrio in which this assault took place,
A long incised wound located on the lower proper modern surgical service is not available.
portion of the left arm directed inwards
downwards and extending as low as the The general rule is "... that he who inflicts the injury
anticubital fossa and cutting the inferior is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted
part of the biceps muscle, and the branches is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or
of the brachial artery. It measured 2 inches endanger life, even though the immediate cause of
long, 2 ½ inches wide and 1 ½ inches deep. the death was erroneous or unskillful medical or
surgical treatment ... ." (29 C. J., 1081, and the
As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a numerous cases there cited.)lawphil.net
slight wound in the back and ran away from the
scene of action. Ruling Case Law is in strict accord with Corpus Juris.

The wound was seen and treated the next morning . . . The principle on which this rule is
by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the founded is one of universal application, and
 lies at the foundation of all criminal were not insisted upon at the trial, and no exception
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to was taken to the rulings of the court.
be held to contemplate and to be
responsible for the natural consequences of Fixing the period of confinement at six years and one
his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight
with a deadly weapon in such manner as to months, and one day of reclusion temporal, the
put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a judgment appealed from as thus modified is
consequence of this felonious and wicked affirmed. No expression as to costs. So ordered.
act, it does not alter its nature or diminish
its criminality to prove that other causes co-
operated in producing the fatal result.
Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the
wound or its unskillful and improper
treatment, which were of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which

might naturally follow in any case, must in
law be deemed to have been among those
which were in contemplation of the guilty
party, and for which he is to be held
responsible. But, however this may be, the
rule surely seems to have its foundation in a
wise and practical policy. A different

doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a
salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the
conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment
of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be
easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death,
and thereby to open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might
escape conviction and punishment. . . . (13
R. C. L., 751, 752; 22 L. R. A., New Series,

841.)lawphil.net

This court in the case of United States vs. Escalona
(12 Phil., 54), following a decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, adopted the same rule.

Therefore this contention of appellant must be held
to be without merit.

During the trial, counsel for the defense asked

several questions as to the character and habits of
the deceased, but the court sustained the objections
of the fiscal as to the propriety of such questions.
Appellant urges that this was prejudicial error. That
such questions were relevant to the issue then in
question is not obvious. It is not necessary to pass
upon the merits of this contention, as such questions

G.R. No. L-539 January 27, 1948 which moment the accused Meliton Buyco, now
appellant, who was on patrol with his six
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, companions, fired in the air two discharges from his
vs. Thompson submachine gun; that Eusebio Davila,
MELITON BUYCO, defendant-appellant. who saw Meliton Buyco fire, approached the latter
and prohibited him from firing again to avoid
C. Golez and Espeleta & Espeleta for appellant. personal injury among those present; that Meliton
Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Buyco replied that Davila leave him alone because
Acting Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee. he was an agent of the law; that minutes later
Meliton Buyco got hold with is left hand of the back
around the left shoulder of Apolonio Ikoy, who was
HILADO, J.:
the one who had boxed Cornelio Soliman, and
pushed him forward, firing at him with a discharge
Appellant was charged in and convicted by the Court
from his Thompson submachine gun which killed him
of First Instance of Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 405,
right then and there. Another bullet of the same
now subject of this appeal, wherein the information
discharge by Meliton Buyco found its mark in the
alleged that on or about February 22, 1946, in the
body of Irineo Gellangala, who was in almost a
municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
straight line from the spot from which Apolonio Ikoy
said appellant, being a first class private of the
was; that Irineo Gellangala fell and died
Military Police in said province, with deliberate
instantaneously; that the accused appellant Meliton
intent, treachery and abuse of authority, and with a
Buyco fired another shot aimed at a group of
decided purpose to kill, did then and there fire
persons, among them Pedro Zambales and his son
several shots with a Thompson submachine gun
Napoleon Zambales, and a bullet of this last shot hit
against Ireneo Gellangala, Apolonio Ikoy, and
Napoleon Zambales, who died after six days in St.
Napoleon Zambales, hitting them on different parts
Paul's Hospital, City of Iloilo; that Eusebio Davila
of their bodies and as a result Irineo Gellangala and
tried to place Meliton Buyco under arrest but the
Apolonio Ikoy died and as a result Irineo Gellangala
latter threatened him with his Thompson
and Apolonio Ikoy died instantaneously and
submachine gun, and when Eusebio Davila
Napoleon Zambales died a few days later. The trial
attempted to succor the three wounded persons,
court, presided over by his Honor, Judge Jose
Meliton Buyco warned him to withdraw from the
Quisumbing, after due trial, rendered judgment on
spot, and in view of this attitude on the part of the
May 8, 1946, finding the following facts as proven
accused, Eusebio Davila desisted from his purpose
through the testimony of the eye-witnesses Eusebio
through fear that he might be another victim of
Davila, Pedro Zambales, and Juanito Espera, and that
Meliton Buyco.
of Doctor Ramon V. Ferrer, who performed the
autopsy of the corpse of Apolonio Ikoy and
Upon examination of the corpse of the deceased
examined that of Irineo Gellangala, and Manuel F.
Apolonio Ikoy by Doctors Ferrer and Cartagena,
Cartagena, who operated upon the now deceased
there were found three wounds in his body, one
Napoleon Zambales: that during a dance on the
which entered the found three wounds in his body,
occasion of the feast of the patron saint of barrio
one which entered the back on the level of the right
Trapiche, municipality of Oton above mentioned,
scapula, another a little below toward the angle of
"between 12 and 12 of the midnight of February 22,
the right scapula, and a third on the left side near
1946," there was a verbal brawl followed by a fist
the lumbar region, which wounds caused the
fight between Cornelio Soliman and an unknown
instantaneous death of Apolonio Ikoy (Exhibit C); on
individual who later resulted to be a resident of Iloilo
the corpse of Irineo Gellangala there was found one
City; that Eusebio Davila, chief of the Municipal
wound in the head penetrating the upper part of the
Police of Oton, and Juanito Espera, a municipal
hind occipital bone emerging through the frontal
policeman, who were at the place of the incident,
bone, which likewise caused the instant death of
intervened to pacify the fighters; that the latter had
said deceased (Exhibit D); and in the corpse of
been scarcely pacified when a third party intervened
Napoleon Zambales there were found the following
delivering fist blows upon Cornelio Soliman which
wounds according to the medical certificate, Exhibit
knocked him to the ground; that Eusebio Davila
B:
attempted to help Cornelio Soliman to his feet, at
 A bullet wound allowing entrance of 45 cal. y de sus compañeros Enrique Bernales y
bullet situated at the epigastric region with Braulio Taleon y del musico Antonio
the bullet lodging just anterior to the skin of Herradura.
the lumbar region to the left side of the
eight vertebrae; El testimonio de teniente Jose M. F. Belo no
tiene materialidad al caso de autos ni
Two wounds in the stomach, one at its constituye defensa a favor del acusado
anterior and another at its posterior aspect; Meliton Buyco.
and three wounds at different loops of the
small intestines. El testigo Antonio Herradura, a quien el
juzgado estuvo observando en todo el curso
The defense, through the testimony of the appellant de su declaracion, no ha infundido
Meliton Buyco and of his companions, the MP confianza alguna en el animo del juzgado;
soldier Enrique Bernales and Corporal Braulio pues desde el comienzo de su testimonio ha
Taleon, and Lt. Jose M. F. Pelo, and the musician estado mintiendo hasta el exretmo de decir
Antonio Herradura, attempted to prove that on the que no revelo a ninguno lo que el habia
night in question Corporal Braulio Taleon, the visto en la noche de autos y que solo lo
appellant Meliton Buyco, and Pvt. Enrique Bernales, revelaba por primera vez en aquel dia
and four other companions, arrived at barrio cuando declaraba en la vista como tesigo;
Trapiche from their station in Guimbal, near the Ilego tambien a afirmar que no se vio ni se
auditorium where a dance was being held; that the entrevisto con cualquiera de los abogados
jeep used by them developed engine trouble, and de la defensa y que estos le presentaron a
while they where fixing it, they heard that a fight el como testigo sin saber de lo que el tenia
was going on inside the auditorium causing public que declarar; lo cual el juzgado cree que es
disorder which the municipal policemen under the una falsedad. Ningun abogado, por mas
command of Chief Eusebio Davila could not pacify; leve que sea el delito o falta atribuido a su
that the accused Meliton Buyco, followed by Cpl. cliente, cometera la imprudencia de
Braulio Taleon and Private Enrique Bernales, entered presentar a su testigo sin antes anterarse
the auditorium, intervened in the fight to pacify the de lo que el testigo tiene que declarar.
combatants, but were unsuccessful; that one of the
combatants hurled himself against Corporal Taleon, Sobrer el testimonio del acusado Meliton
wrested from the latter his rifle and aimed the same Buyco y de sus compañeros Enrique
at him, who had fallen on the ground; that the Bernales y Braulio Taleon, el juzgado
appellant, upon seeing this, fired a shot from his tampoco les da credito. El Exhibit E,
Thompson submachine gun at the individual who presentado en contrapruebas, que es la
afterwards resulted to be Apolonio Ikoy, the latter transcripcion fiel by correcta de las notas
falling dead; that after these events, and for fear of taquigraficas tomadas por el taguigrafo Sr.
reprisal which might come from the relatives of Alfredo b. Coruña de la declaracion del cabo
Apolonio Ikoy, the MP patrolmen fled from the place Braulio Taleon el febrero 23, 1946, ante la
and finally reached their detachment station in (el) fiscal Sr. Jose M. Zambarrano, que se
Guimbal, where they reported the incident to their constituyo en el lugar del suceso para
chief, Lt. Belo. investigar el caso de autos, y en el que
entre otras cosas Braulio Taleon declara
The trial judge, who saw, heard and observed the que:
testify, did not believe the version given by the
latter. Below we quote the analysis that His Honor . . . I just feel he was trying to grab my
made of the defenses version as related by its Thomson, but he was notable to get the
witnesses: Thompson. . . . (El subrayado es nuestro);

E juzgado no de credito a la version contradice la pretension de la defensa de

presentada por la defensa mediano que Apolonio Ikoy arrebatoel Thompson
(mediante) el testimonio de Meliton Buyco, submachine gun de Braulio Taleon, cuando
 este estaba caido en tierra, y que le apunto weapon against the corporal when he (Ikoy) was
con dicha arma. shot by the accused. Among other things, the
Solicitor General points out that Taleon testified
Braulio Taleon trato de explicar esta before the fiscal on the very day following the
contradiccion, diciendo que cuando le incident to the effect that Ikoy did not succeed in
investigaba el fiscal Zambarrano no se getting hold of his gun (see also t.s.n., PP. 79-80).
acordaba de todo lo ocurrido en la noche de That Taleon's gun allegedly wrested from him by
autos por haberse desvelado aquella noche, Ikoy was not exhibited as evidence at the trial
y que en el dia la vista, Mayo 2, 1946, ya se although it appears that immediately after the
acordaba muy bien de los detalles del incident it was taken by Taleon with him, is also
suceso. Al efecto, cuando el juzgado le hizo mentioned by the Solicitor General as another
repetir Braulio Taleon, druante la sesion de indication of the improbability of the version of the
la tarde, lo que el habia de clarado en ingles defense. It is stated in this connection that if Ikoy
durante la sesion de la mañana el testigo lo really was holding Taleon's gun when appellant fired
repitio rapidamente en el mismo lenguaje at him, it must have been hit "by the bullets aimed
ingles palabra por palabra y sin parar hasta at Ikoy." From the evidence, even that of the
terminar. Esto demuestra, como lo ha defense, it appears that the accused so fixed the
observado el juzgado, que la declaracion de firing mechanism of his submachine gun that a single
Braulio Taleon estaba preparada de pull at the trigger would fire several bullets
antemano y bien estudiada de memoria con automatically in succession. It is also pointed out
el proposito de no equivocarse en su that the admitted flight of the "MP's after the fall of
testimonio. Ikoy, from fear of retaliation from the latter's
relatives, is indicative of guilty conscience, for
En cuanto a la declaracion del acusado otherwise, since they were all armed with Thompson
Meliton Buyco, estando la misma amoldada submachine guns, surely better armed than those
al testimonio de sus testigos a quienes el relatives could possibly be, that fact would have
juzgado no da credito, no merece favorable enabled them to stand their ground if they really
consideracion del juzgado. were legally performing their duty.

Es un hecho no discutido que la causa de la It seems very unlikely that Ikoy, a plain citizen, who
muerte de Apolonio Ikoy, Ireneo Gallangala had had no trouble with Corporal Taleon, from aught
y Napoleon Zambales se (ha) debido a las that appears in the record, should assault this officer
heridas causadas por el acusado Meliton of the law, who was armed with a weapon no less
Buyco al disparar descargas de su deadly than a Thompson submachine gun and was
Thompson submachine gun contra ello. accompanied by several members of the MPC all
(Appendix, Appellant's Brief, pp. VII-X.) likewise armed. And it is still harder to conceive
under such circumstances that Ikoy, not satisfied
with allegedly downing the corporal, should wrest
On page 70 of the stenographic transcript there
from him his gun and attempt to fire at him with it,
appear, indicating the way the trial judge was
within sight and near presence of the latter's
impressed by the testimony of the defense witness
companions. For these and other reasons not
Herradura, the following question and answer:
necessary to set forth, it is no wonder that the trial
judge not only was not favorably impressed by the
JUZGADO: ¿Debe usted tener en cuenta que
version of the defense but positively believed that
el Juzgado esta observando su actitud y
the witnesses who gave that version were not telling
manera de declarar en este asunto? — R. Si,
the truth.
Señor.
On the other hand, the accused admits the killing
There is much in what the Solicitor General says in
and his counsel frankly asserts in his brief (p. 7) that
his brief about the unlikelihood of the defense's
his client, acting in defense of the person of Corporal
version to the effect that Ikoy attacked Corporal
Taleon "directed a burst of TG (Thompson Gun)
Taleon, felling him down, wrested from him his
shots to Taleon's assailant." Here, then, is an
Thompson submachine gun, and was aiming the
admission that the accused discharged more than the death of McKay, it is not so important to know
one shot at the deceased. Having thus admitted that the exact reason for the deed." In the case at bar the
he killed the victim, it was incumbent upon the accused admits having caused the death of the
accused to offer a justification satisfactory to the victims, aside from the evidence against him.
courts to exculpate him. He endeavored to do this —
to carry the burden of proof that had been shifted In the Balmori case, supra, we find the same idea
on him — through the witnesses that he presented expressed in a different way thus;
at the trial and himself. The trial judge who saw,
heard, and observed the witnesses testify was But, argues counsel, why should they set
impressed by them in the manner described in his the fire in the presence of Agapita Rivera,
own words quoted above. A careful review of the well knowing that their act was seen. We do
evidence and the record has failed to indicate not definitely know. Neither did we know,
sufficient reasons for our disturbing the findings of in a case before us some months ago, why
fact made by the trial judge. Defense counsel the accused, in apparent cold blood, killed
strenuously argues in effect that it is unbelievable three grown persons and a little babe in
that the appellant should have killed the victim if it plain view of several persons. We know only
had not been for the purpose of defending his that he did it. While motive is generally of
corporal from the alleged threat of Ikoy to shoot. great importance in a criminal case, it is not
However, here is a case where the defense thus absolutely indispensable. The evidence in
setup has failed to be established to the satisfaction the case relating to the actual commission
of the courts of justice. In such a case, the killing of the crime may be so overwhelming that
being admitted, the law presumes that there was the question of motive may become
therefor (U.S. vs. Ricafort, 1 Phil., 173, U.S. vs. secondary. (U.S. vs. Balmori, 18 Phil., 578,
McMann, 4 Phil., 561; U.S. vs. Reyes, 18 Phil., 495; 590.)
U.S. vs. Balmori, 18 Phil., 578; People vs. Francisco,
44 Off. Gaz., 4847.) The law must be applied to the
The trial judge found and held that the defendant
facts. In the mind and eyes of the law in such cases,
was guilty of the crime charged; namely, triple
even though the motive might have been
murder, and imposed upon him the penalty
successfully cancelled from the human perception of
of reclusion perpetua, with indemnity to the heirs of
others, and might be known only to the agent and to
Apolonio Ikoy in the sum of P2,000, to the heirs of
his God, still there it was impelling the agent to the
Irineo Gellangala in the sum of P2,000, and to the
criminal transgression. The defense would have us
heirs of Napoleon Zambales also in the sum of
deem it strange that the appellant should have
P2,000, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
willfully killed the three victims above named. But
the costs. In this we do not fully concur with his
truth is at times stranger than fiction, and under the
Honor.
established facts the actual case is one of those
instances.
The evidence discloses, as found by the same judge,
that Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala died from
As said in the Ricafort case, supra, ". . . In this, as in
bullets discharged by the same shot which was
almost every crime apparently without motive, the
aimed at the former. It will be remembered that the
motives which might exist are innumerable —
shot was fired from a submachine gun and, as
motives unknown perhaps to the relatives of the
already stated, it appears that the appellant to fixed
deceased who testified at the trial and not even
the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single
disclosed to the three who cooperated in a certain
pull at the trigger would fire several bullets
measure in the crime."
automatically in succession. Viada (Vol. II, 5th ed., p.
529), commenting on article 90 of the Spanish Penal
In the McMann case, supra, the court said: "The Code, corresponding to article 48 of our Revised
question of motive is of course very important in Penal Code, gives an example of the first case
cases where there is doubt as to whether the mentioned therein of a single act constituting two or
defendant is or is not the person who committed the more grave or less grave felonies as follows: A
act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond all person fire a gun against another with intention to
doubt that the defendant was the one who caused kill the latter, and not only kills him but also a third
person who was beside the victim: here, he says we Revised Penal Code. — per Arellano, C. J., in
have a single act, a single shot, which produces two U.S. vs. -Maisa, 8 Phil., 597).
homicides. In the instant case, as regards Apolonio
Ikoy, the evidence discloses that, while Apolonio By virtue of article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Ikoy had his back towards Meliton Buyco, the amended by Act No. 4000, the murder and homicide
defendant-appellant, the latter got hold of the thus resulting from that single discharged should be
former's right shoulder, pushed him forward and punished with the capital penalty, i.e., the penalty
while Ikoy's body was moving in the direction of the for the more serious offense in the maximum period
push, Buyco fired at this back (t.s.n., p. 14). It, or degree.
therefore, appears that the aggressor employed
means, methods or froms in the execution of the As to the death of Napoleon Zambales, the evidence
crime which tended directly and specially to insure reveals that it resulted from another and different
its execution without risk to himself from the shot by the same defendant-appellant from the
defense which the offended party might make — same gun. The evidence discloses that after
that the act was committed with treachery. This discharging the shot which killed Apolonio Ikoy and
qualified the killing of Apolonio Ikoy as murder (Rev. Irineo Gellangala, the accused holding his gun with
Penal Code, art. 248). the barrel pointing the direction where he was
facing, changed his position to face toward one side
The killing of Irineo Gellangala under the evidence and fired another burst from the gun, which shot hit
must be classified as homicide, because the wrongful Napoleon Zambales (t.s.n. p. 5). Six days later this
act done consisting in the killing of Ireneo Gellangala third victim died in St. Paul's Hospital. Under art.
constituted a felony (delito) for which said agent is 249, in relation to article 4, paragraph 1, of the
criminally liable, pursuant to article 4, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, the instant defendant must be
of the Revised Penal Code (see also U.S. vs. Diana, 32 held to have thereby committed the crime of
Phil., 344), which act is presumed to be voluntary homicide. In U.S. vs. Gloria. 3 Phil., 333, 335, this
(U.S. vs. Gloria, 3 Phil., 333, 335). Court held that:

It makes no difference whether the . . . All acts punishable by the law are
defendant's intention was to strike Dionisio presumed to be voluntary in the absence of
Legara with the butt of the billiard cue or proof to the contrary. With respect to
not, for the blow fell on the head of crimes of personal violence, the penal law
Cayetano Gomez. . . . looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the
The same crime would have been aggressor responsible for all the
committed if the injured man and the consequences thereof.
deceased had been Dionisio Legara, instead
of the defendant's nephew, Cayetano This last killing is a separate homicide also included
Gomez; the crime of homicide would have in the charge and proven without objection on the
been committed just the same and one man part of defense counsel. The Supreme Court of Spain
would have been deprived of his life by the held in a dispute, discharges four shots from a pistol,
criminal act of another. (U.S. vs. Diana, 32 mortally wounding with the first one of the
Phil., 344, 348.) combatants and inflicting with the second physical
injuries upon another, should be punished for the
. . . Although the wrongful act be said crimes separately in accordance with article 88
committed against a person other than the of the Spanish Penal Code upon the ground that,
one whom it was intended to injure, this although the shots were fired successively, they did
fact does not excuse the offender from not constitute one single but two diverse act, for the
criminal liability for the voluntary two different persons at whom they were directed
commission of a wrongful act or (II Viada, 5th ed., pp. 633-634). The same Tribunal in
misdemeanor, according to paragraph 3 of its judgment of February 7, 1879, held that a person
article 1 of the Penal Code (Now art. 4 of who, posting himself in front of four individuals, fires
four shots with a pistol saying: "toma tu toma tu,"
wounding two of them, is guilty of four different
crimes of discharged of firearm against a
determinate person, two complexed with that of
physical injuries, since the four shots were produced

by four distinct acts (III Viada, 5th ed., p. 636).

The penalty corresponding to the killing of Napoleon
Zambales, there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, is reclusion temporal in its

medium period (Revised Penal Code. art. 249).

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby
modified so that appellant Meliton Buyco, as he is
hereby, convicted of the crime of murder complexed
with homicide for the deaths of Apolonio Ikoy and
Irineo Gellangala, for which, pursuant to article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, in the opinion of a majority
of this Court the penalty of death should be imposed
upon him, but there being no unanimity in this
respect, said penalty is hereby lowered to reclusion
perpetua; and he is hereby convicted of the crime of

homicide, without any modifying circumstance, for
the death of Napoleon Zambales, for which the
indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 14 year, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal is hereby imposed on him, pursuant to
article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
with section 1 of Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate

Sentence Law), as amended by section 1 of Act No.
4225. In all other respects, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed. So ordered.

























G.R. No. 143294 July 17, 2003 When arraigned on August 5, 1994, appellant
3
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. The Prosecution's Evidence
CIRILO MAGALONA y ONOON alias
"WILLIAM", appellant. On May 25, 1994, the spouses Rosendo and Rosario
Arimbuyutan and their children resided at Sitio
PER CURIAM: Ablang, Barangay Sta. Lucia Old, Zaragoza, Nueva
Ecija. Their hut, including the floor, was made of
1
Before us, for automatic review, is the Decision of bamboo, while the roof was made of "talahib." The
4
the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, Branch 29, floor of their but was three feet above the ground.
Cabanatuan City, in Criminal Case No. 5899-AF,
finding appellant Cirilo Magalona guilty of the At around 3:30 a.m. of said date, while the spouses
complex crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated Arimbuyutan and their children, namely, Rommel,
Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder and Rosendo, Jr., Rosalie, Rosemarie, Regina, Ruby,
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. Roldan and Resty, were sleeping in their hut, there
was an explosion beneath the floor. Said explosion
2
The Information filed against appellant reads: killed Resty and injured Rosario, Roldan, Rosemarie
5
and Rosalie. It also caused a small crater on the
6
That on or about the 25th day of May, ground and damage to the hut up to the roof.
1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the morning, at
Sitio Ablang, Brgy. Sta. Lucia Old, The victims were first brought to the medical center
Municipality of Zaragoza, Province of Nueva of the neighboring town of La Paz, Tarlac, and then
7
Ecija, and within the jurisdiction of this to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. On the way to the
Honorable Court, the above-named hospital, Resty Arimbuyutan died 8 of hemorrhage
9
accused, with intent to kill, evident secondary to "multiple blasting injury."
premeditation, treachery, taking advantage
of night time and with the use of a hand Rosario Arimbuyutan sustained "blastin[g] injury
10
grenade, did then and there willfully, multiple with perforation of the uterus." Rosario
unlawfully and feloniously throw the said Arimbuyutan testified that she sustained injuries
hand grenade under the hut of one from her waist to her knees and underwent a
11
ROSENDO ARIMBUYUTAN, SR. which surgical operation.
exploded, thereby hitting five (5) persons
then sleeping in the said hut, namely: Rosalyn Arimbuyutan sustained a fracture over the
ROSARIO TORRES ARIMBUYUTAN, ROSALYN 12
left kneecap.
ARIMBUYUTAN, ROSEMARIE
ARIMBUYUTAN, ROLDAN ARIMBUYUTAN Rosemarie Arimbuyutan sustained a "blasting injury
AND RESTY ARIMBUYUTAN, which caused 13
left gluteal area (left buttocks)," and was
the instantaneous death of the latter and 14
immediately given medicine for anti-tetanus. Dr.
multiple blasting injuries to the first four- Renato Ang, who attended to Rosemarie, testified
named persons, thus, with respect to them, that without said prompt medical treatment, she
the accused had performed all the acts of could have died of complications that could have
execution which could produce the crime of arisen from the wound she sustained.
15

MURDER, but nevertheless did not produce

it by reason of some causes independent of
Roldan Arimbuyutan sustained "blasting injury
the will of the perpetrator, that is, the 16
multiple posterior chest left." He was given
timely medical attendance extended to
emergency treatment called "tube thoracostomy" to
them which prevented their death, to the 17
prevent his lungs from collapsing. Renato Ang, who
damage and prejudice of the herein victims.
attended to Roldan, testified that without medical
18
treatment, the patient would have died.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Rosario Arimbuyutan testified that they spent The hut was not their permanent residence and they
19 28
P21,400 for hospitalization, medical expenses, as just stayed there during the farming season.
well as, the funeral and burial expenses of her son,
20
Resty Arimbuyutan. While he was taking coffee, Sabater saw a person,
named William, pass by in front of his hut and the
At around 8 a.m. of May 25, 1994, Police Officer hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. He also saw
Rodolfo Gutierrez of the Philippine National Police of William hiding behind the acacia tree in front of his
Zaragoza, together with two police officers and a hut, which was about five (5) to six (6) meters away.
photographer, investigated the grenade-throwing Said acacia tree was between his but and the but of
incident at Sitio Ablang, Barangay Sta. Lucia Old, Arimbuyutan. Then he saw an explosion under the
Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. Gutierrez found a safety lever floor of the hut of Arimbuyutan and saw William
pin (Exhibit "E") and some grenade shrapnels (Exhibit running towards the direction of the "flood
29
"F") near the post of the hut of Rosendo control."
Arimbuyutan, Sr. He was informed that the victims
of the explosion were already brought to the Upon hearing the explosion, Sabater immediately
hospital. He made an investigation report 21 of said took his child and lay face down on the floor in front
incident. 22 He also entered the incident in the of the open door for four to five seconds. He was
23
police blotter. facing their open door; hence, he saw William run
away, and when he noticed that William was not
According to Gutierrez, based on the sworn with somebody, he stood up. He heard the family of
30
statements of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., Bienvenido Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. crying.
Sabater and Adelina Mendoza, the suspect was
appellant Cirilo Magalona alias William. They did not Sabater testified that he recognized the person who
search for appellant anymore because Barangay passed by his hut and who hid behind the acacia tree
24
Captain Florentino Almeda of Sta. Lucia, Zaragoza, to be someone named William, because the latter
Nueva Ecija, brought him to the police station in the frequently went to their place in Sitio Ablang. He
morning of May 25, 1994. Almeda told Gutierrez stated that he also recognized William at 3:30 a.m.,
that since appellant became a suspect of a rape case, because the moon was bright and he had a lighted
appellant had already been in his (Almeda) custody kerosene lamp hanging by the post. Since the door
up to the time he was surrendered to the police of his hut was open, the light from the kerosene
authorities. The rape incident was reported to the lamp illuminated William who was hiding behind the
25
police authorities on May 24, 1994 at 2 p.m. acacia tree near his hut. In the courtroom, he
pointed to the person whom he called "William,"
26
Bienvenido Sabater, 40 years old, a farmer and a who, when asked, identified himself as Cirilo
31
resident of Barangay Patola, Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, Magalona.
testified that on May 25, 1994, he was residing at
Sitio Ablang, Sta. Lucia Old, Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. Sabater testified that appellant was a farm worker of
His immediate neighbor then was Rosendo one Corazon Ramos on a commission basis at Sitio
"Sendong" Arimbuyutan, Sr., whose but was about 32
Ablang.
five (5) to six (6) meters away from his hut. Their
27
huts were fronting each other. Sabater admitted that he did not actually see who
threw the grenade under the hut of Rosendo
Sabater narrated that at around 3:30 a.m. of May 25, 33
Arimbuyutan, Sr.
1994, he was inside his hut sitting on a bamboo bed.
He was pacifying his six-month-old child and, at the Adelina Mendoza, 71 years old, a housekeeper,
same time, drinking coffee, while his wife was testified that she knew appellant because he was her
boiling water for his child's milk. His child was lying neighbor. At midnight of May 22, 1994, while she
on his side while he was gently tapping him to stop was drinking coffee in her house at Sitio Ablang,
him from crying. Sabater demonstrated that he was appellant knocked at her door and conversed with
seated on the bed, which was beside the window on her. He told her that he was very angry at Rosendo
his left, while he was facing the open door. His door Arimbuyutan, Sr. and that he would return and kill
and window had no shutters and were just open. 34
him.
On cross-examination, Mendoza testified that she On July 30, 1998, the trial court pronounced
knew appellant for less than a year. She had seen judgment, thus:
appellant many times but talked to him only once
before the grenade explosion. She admitted that WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused
35
Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. was her nephew. CIRILO MAGALONA y ONOON guilty of the
crime of MURDER with Multiple Frustrated
On December 2, 1996, Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder,
36
executed an Affidavit of Desistance. The Court and hereby sentences him to suffer the
disregarded said affidavit since the prosecution had maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay the
already rested its case and it was the turn of the Spouses Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. and
37
defense to present its evidence. Rosario Arimbuyutan FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for the
Appellant's Escape Deemed Waiver of His Right to death of their son Resty Arimbuyutan,
Present Evidence moral damages of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and actual
In the hearing scheduled on July 18, 1997, appellant damages of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR
did not appear in court. The trial court ordered the HUNDRED PESOS (P21,400.00).
Provincial Warden of Nueva Ecija to explain why he
should not be held in contempt for the non- INASMUCH as the accused Cirilo Magalona
appearance of appellant during the said hearing. In who has been sentenced to death
38
his letter, the Provincial Warden explained that penalty in absentia because he escaped
39
pursuant to a COMELEC Resolution, the Provincial from the custody of members of the PNP
Jail was under the control of the Philippine National who were then in charge of the Provincial
Police (PNP) starting April 23, 1995. He stated that Jail of Nueva Ecija by assigning him to guard
the policemen assigned to the Provincial Jail ordered a co-detainee in a hospital on or about July
appellant to guard a co-detainee who was confined 8, 1997, furnish a copy of this Decision to
in the hospital and who died on July 8, 1997. After the Chief of the Philippine National Police,
the detainee's death, appellant did not return to the Camp Crame, Quezon City for a proper
Provincial Jail. investigation of the anomalous escape of
said accused.
The Court issued an Order dated August 21, 1997
44
directing the PNP Provincial Director of Nueva Ecija SO ORDERED.
to investigate the escape of appellant, which was
40
reiterated in another Order dated February 16, On May 21, 1999, the Provincial Warden of the
1998. In the latter Order, the Court, as prayed for by Provincial Jail of Nueva Ecija informed the trial court
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, deemed the that appellant had been arrested and was detained
45
appellant to have waived his right to present at the Provincial Jail.
evidence. Consequently, the case was considered
submitted for decision. Appellant contends that the trial court erred, thus:

The Trial Court's Ruling I

The trial court held that the testimony of Avelina THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE
Mendoza showed that appellant had a motive to TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES AVELINA MENDOZA
41
harm complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. It AND BIENVENIDO SABATER;
46

also ruled that the testimony of Bienvenido Sabater

established that appellant was responsible for the II
explosion which killed Resty Arimbuyutan and
injured Rosario, Rosemarie, Rosalyn and Roldan, all
42 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
surnamed Arimbuyutan. Moreover, the trial court 47
ACCUSED CIRILO MAGALONA.
considered appellant's escape from prison as
43
persuasive evidence of his guilt.
 The Court's Ruling xxx xxx xxx

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in Q On May 22, 1994 at around 12:00
giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution midnight, do you remember where were
witnesses Avelina Mendoza and Bienvenido Sabater. you?

Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have A Yes, sir.
given any probative value to Avelina Mendoza's
testimony in determining the motive behind the Q Where were you at that time?
incident for two reasons: First, the witness and
appellant are not long-time acquaintances, having A In our house, sir.
talked to each other only once. The alleged
revelation to kill Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. to a
Q Where is that house of yours
stranger during a visit at midnight is contrary to
located?
ordinary human experience. Second, Mendoza is the
48
aunt of complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.
A At Sitio Ablang, sir.
We disagree.
Q What were you doing in your house
at that time?
Appellant cannot consider Avelina Mendoza a
stranger as Mendoza testified that she knew
49
appellant since he was her neighbor. Being A I was drinking coffee, sir.
neighbors, it is not contrary to human experience for
appellant to have visited Mendoza at midnight of Q While you were drinking coffee on
May 22, 1994. It was incumbent on appellant to that date and time, what happened?
disprove said visit. Having failed to do so, the
positive testimony of Mendoza prevails. A Somebody knocked at our door and
had a conversation with me, sir.
Moreover, although Avelina Mendoza is the aunt of
complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., such Q Who is that somebody who knocked
relationship does not, by itself, impair Mendoza's at your door and had a conversation with
50
credibility as a witness. On the contrary, her you?
relationship to Arimbuyutan would deter her from
implicating innocent persons as her natural interest A That man, sir. (Witness pointed to
would be to secure the conviction of the real the accused who when asked his name and
51
culprit." [sic] he answered as Cirilo Magalona).

The testimony of Avelina Mendoza established Q Was Cirilo Magalona alone when he
appellant's motive to kill Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., knocked at your door and had a short
thus: conversation with you?

Fiscal Beltran: A Yes, sir.

Q Mrs. Witness, do you know Cirilo Q What did you talk about?
Magalona alias William?
A He told me that he is angry at Sendo
A Yes, sir. (Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.)

Q Why do you know him? Q Did you ask him why he is angry at
Sendo (Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.)?
A He is my neighbor, sir.
 A Yes, I asked him and he told me that only established that he saw him (appellant) hiding
he is very angry with Rosendo Arimbuyutan behind an acacia tree and then running away from
55
and that he will come back and kill Rosendo the place of the explosion which are insufficient to
Arimbuyutan, sir. prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Hence,
appellant prays for his acquittal.
Q Did you ask him what x x x they
talked about with Rosendo Arimbuyutan, The contention is without merit.
Sr.?
The trial court convicted appellant based on
A No more, sir. He just told me that he circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of the
is very angry with Rosendo Arimbuyutan, commission of the crime is not indispensable for
52
Sr., sir. convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence
56
can sufficiently establish his guilt. There can be a
On cross-examination, Avelina Mendoza further judgment of conviction when the circumstances
testified, thus: proved constitute an unbroken chain of events that
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing
Atty. R. Bansale — the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
57
perpetrator of the crime. Under Rule 133, Section 4
of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is
xxx xxx xxx
sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
Q Can you repeat again what was the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
exact words uttered by Cirilo Magalona on
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
that night of May 22,1994?
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

A I remember some of the words

In this case, although prosecution witness
uttered, that if "Sendong" will report the
Bienvenido Sabater did not see appellant holding a
matter he will return and there will be
hand grenade or throwing it under the hut of
something happened against to [sic]
Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., the following chain of
Sendong "you son of a bitch." events points to appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime:
Q You said that Cirilo Magalona only
had a [talk] with you on the night of May First, on May 22, 1994, appellant told Avelina
22, 1994, why do you think that he will tell
Mendoza that he was very angry at Rosendo
those remarks against [that] person to you? 58
Arimbuyutan, Sr. and would return and kill him.

A It has something to do with the one

Second, on May 25,1994, at about 3:30 a.m.,
that he had raped and he said that if
Bienvenido Sabater saw appellant pass by his but
Sendong will [complain] he will do 59
and the but of Rosendo Arimbuyutan.
something against him, sir.
Third, Sabater saw appellant acting suspiciously as
Q On that night of May 22,1994 when
he went back and forth between his hut and the hut
Cirilo Magalona went to your house, how
of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., which were fronting
long did he stay in your house? 60
each other.

A For a short period after he uttered

53 Fourth, Sabater saw appellant hiding behind the
those [remarks] he already left, sir. 61
acacia tree in front of his hut.

Appellant also asserts that prosecution witness

Fifth, Sabater thereafter saw an explosion under the
Bienvenido Sabater admitted that he did not actually
hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. and saw appellant
see who threw the hand grenade under the hut of
54 fleeing from the place of the incident as he was
Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. He argues that Sabater
running towards the direction of the "flood control" this case and found no reason to disturb the findings
62
at the river. of the trial court.

Sixth, appellant was the only person seen near the In addition, we agree with the trial court that the
hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. before and after flight of appellant after the death of the co-detainee
the explosion. he was guarding at the hospital is taken to signify a
strong sense of guilt and an awareness that he has
73
Sabater testified that he recognized appellant no tenable defense.
63
because he frequently visited their place. He knew
appellant for about two years since he began Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly
64
farming at Sitio Ablang. Sabater also testified that found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
at the time of the incident, the moon shone the crime charged.
65
brightly, and the light from the kerosene lamp near
his open door illuminated appellant who was hiding Nature of the Offense
behind the acacia tree, which was about five (5) to
66
six (6) meters away from his hut. Even if appellant, in detonating a hand grenade
under the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.,
The culpability of appellant is strengthened by his intended to kill Rosendo, but instead killed his son,
flight from the site of the explosion. The Court has Resty, and seriously injured other family members,
ruled that flight of an accused from the scene of the appellant is liable for all the consequences of his
crime removes any remaining shred of doubt on his unlawful act. Where such unlawful act is wilfully
67
guilt. If appellant were not guilty, he would not done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
have fled but would have gone to the hut of cannot be considered as reckless
Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. after the explosion and 74
imprudence. Where malice or intention to cause
rendered assistance to the victims. Moreover, the injury exists, the act should be qualified by the
testimony of Avelina Mendoza established that felony it has produced.
75

appellant had a motive to harm Rosendo

Arimbuyutan, Sr., which is a key element in the web The trial court correctly held that the death of Resty
68
of circumstantial evidence. Arimbuyutan and the injuries sustained by Rosario,
Rosemarie, Rosalyn and Roldan, all surnamed
Further, there is no evidence showing that Sabater Arimbuyutan, were caused by an explosion, which
was impelled by improper motive in testifying qualified the killing to murder under Article 248 of
against appellant; hence, his testimony deserves full the Revised Penal Code, thus:
69
faith and credence. It is well settled that the
positive testimony of a credible witness is sufficient Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not
to support a judgment of conviction because truth is falling within the provisions of Article 246
established by the quality, not the quantity, of the shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
70
evidence. and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of
It is also a well-entrenched rule that when it comes the following attendant circumstances:
to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the appellate
court generally will not overturn the findings of the 1. With treachery, taking advantage of
trial court since the trial judge is in a better position superior strength, with the aid of armed
to determine the issue of credibility, having men, or employing means to weaken the
observed the deportment of witnesses during the defense or of means or persons to insure or
71
trial. Thus, the trial court's findings will not be afford impunity.
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact
xxx xxx xxx
or circumstance of weight and substance which will
alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the
72
case. We have carefully reviewed the records of 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, shipwreck, stranding or a vessel,
 derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of which is reclusion perpetua to death, should be
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, imposed in the maximum period. The trial court,
or with the use of any other means therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
involving great waste and ruin.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position
The trial court, however, incorrectly stated that the that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional
killing was also attended by the qualifying insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
circumstance of treachery. Absent any particulars on nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
the manner in which the aggression was majority that the law is constitutional, and that the
commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at
76
qualify the killing to murder. Treachery cannot be bar.
presumed, but must be proved with the same
quantum of evidence as the crime Damages
77
itself. Nevertheless, the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of explosion, which was alleged in the The actual damages awarded by the trial court in the
Information, is sufficient to qualify the killing to amount of P21,400 for the funeral, burial and other
murder. expenses incurred by the Arimbuyutans due to the
death of Resty Arimubuyutan is deleted. Actual
As stated by the trial court, the injuries of Rosario damages cannot be awarded based merely on a list
and Rosemarie Arimbuyutan. appeared to be fatal 79
of expenses presented by the prosecution, as such
based on their medical certificates and the fact that claim must be adequately supported by
Rosario underwent an operation at the Tarlac 80
receipts. However, in lieu thereof, temperate
81
Provincial Hospital. The prosecutor, however, failed damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may
to ask Dr. Arnold Castro, who attended to Rosario be recovered as it has been shown that the family of
and Rosemarie, if their injuries would have caused the deceased suffered some pecuniary loss, but the
their death without prompt medical treatment. With amount thereof cannot be proved with
respect to Roldan and Rosalyn Arimbuyutan, Dr. 82 83
certainty. An award of P15,000 should suffice.
Renato Ang testified that their wounds would have
caused their death without his prompt medical In addition, we award actual damages to the spouses
78
treatment. Rosendo and Rosario Arimbuyutan in the amount of
P6,900.05 for the medical expenses of Rosario
Considering that the offenses committed against the Arimbuyutan and her children, Rosemarie, Rosalyn
victims were caused by a single act of detonating a and Roldan, which were duly supported by
hand grenade, the trial court found appellant guilty 84
receipts.
of the complex crime of murder with multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder The trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity to
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. To be the heirs of the victim, Resty Arimbuyutan, in the
precise, appellant committed the complex crime of amount of P50,000, without need of proof other
murder with double frustrated murder and double than the fact that a crime was committed resulting
attempted murder. in the death of the victim and that the accused was
85
responsible therefor.
The Penalty
The trial court also correctly awarded moral
Under Article 48 (Penalty for complex crimes) of the damages to the heirs of the victim, Resty
Revised Penal Code, when a single act constitutes Arimbuyutan. However, the amount of P100,000
two or more grave or less grave felonies, as in this should be reduced to P50,000 in accordance with
case, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be 86
prevailing jurisprudence. Moral damages is
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum awarded without need of proof other than the death
87
period. of the victim.

Applying the aforesaid provision of law in this case, WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
the penalty for the most serious crime (murder), Court, Branch 29, of Cabanatuan City, in Criminal
Case No. 5899-AF, finding, appellant Cirilo Magalona
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of murder with double frustrated murder and
double attempted murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim, Resty Arimbuyutan, civil indemnity in the

amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000);
temperate damages in the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000) and moral damages in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000). Appellant
is also ordered to pay the spouses Rosendo and
Rosario Arimbuyutan actual damages in the amount
of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos and Five
Centavos (P6,900.05).

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this
case be forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

























G.R. No. L-48796 June 11, 1981 latter picked up a little girl about
three years old loitering at the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, second floor of the building. Rafael
vs. Ordona a janitor of the House
DIEGO OPERO Y COSIPAG et al., accused; DIEGO International Hotel, told Oliver that
OPERA Y COSIPAG, defendant-appellant. the little girl is residing at Room
314 of the hotel. Oliver called up
Room 314 by telephone and when
nobody answered, he and Barcing
brought the little girl to said Room
PER CURIAM:
314 (pp- 6, 7, & 8, t.s.n., June 15,
1978). Upon reaching Room 314,
Automatic review of the death sentence imposed on
Oliver knocked at the door, and
Diego Opero for robbery with homicide with which
when nobody answered, he
he was charged in the Circuit Criminal Court of
pushed the door open but he
Manila, together with Reynaldo Lacsinto and
smelled foul odor emanating from
Milagros Villegas, who, however, did not appeal
the room. Oliver covered his nose
their conviction with much lesser penalty, the last-
with a handkerchief and together
named, as a mere accessory after the fact. Another
with Barcing and the little girl, they
accused, Asteria Avila was acquitted. entered the room where they saw
prostrate on a bed a dead person
In his brief, appellant raised only the question of the with the face down and both feet
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty on tied. Oliver called up the homicide
him, with the following assignments of error: division of the Manila Police.
Patrolman Fajardo who was
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN assigned to investigate the report
NOT CONSIDERING ARTICLE 4, of Oliver, together with some
PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE REVISED funeral parlor men arrived at the
PENAL CODE IN DETERMINING THE scene, and they saw a small baby
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE crying and trying to get out of a
ACCUSED. crib near the bed of the dead
person. (pp. 9, 10 & 11, t.s.n., Id).
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING ARTICLE 49, The dead body at Room 314 of the
PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE REVISED House International Hotel was that
PENAL CODE IN IMPOSING THE of Liew Soon Ping, Room 314 had
PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED been ransacked and personal
belongings thrown all around. The
For the facts of the case, the narration of which in hands and feet of the dead person
both the People's brief and that of appellant does were tied and the body was
not vary as to the essential ones, We could very well bloated. A towel was tied around
quote from the Appellee's brief, being the more the mouth of the victim.
comprehensive and complete, the following: Photographs of the dead person
and the condition of the room
At about 4:00 o'clock in the were taken under Patrolman
morning of April 27, 1978, Salvador Fajardos supervision (pp. 19, 20,
Oliver, a GSIS security guard 21, 22, 23 & 24, t.s.n., June 15,
assigned to the House 1978).
International Hotel at Ongpin
Street, Binondo, Manila, was Patrolman Fajardo came to know
informed by Demetrio Barcing that the occupants of Room 314
another security guard, that the were Dr. Hong, his wife Liew Soon
Ping who is the victim in this case, Another radio message (Exh. "T",
their three children and two maids, p. 41, rec.) was received by the
namely, Mila and Ester (pp. 26 & police that two other suspects in
27, t.s.n., Id). After conducting a the case, namely, Diego Opero and
preliminary inquiry around the Asteria Avila were picked up by the
vicinity of the incident, Patrolman Samar P.C. and some of the
Fajardo made an advance report missing articles, namely, one (1)
(Exh. "O"; pp. 32, 33 & 34, rec.) camera, flashlight, bill fold, and
naming therein three suspects, other personal belongings were
namely, Diego Opero, Milagros recovered from them (pp. 35 & 36,
Villegas, Asteria Avila and a fourth t.s.n., Id).
unidentified suspect. The names of
these suspects were furnished by Reynaldo Lacsinto was taken to
neighbors of the victim to police headquarters and after
Patrolman Fajardo (pp- 28 & 29, appraising him of his rights under
t.s.n., Id.). the constitution, his statement was
taken in the presence of his father
After establishing the Identity of (pp. 37, 38 & 39, t.s.n., Id; Exhs.
the suspects, a follow up team of "U" & "U-l", pp. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
Manila Policemen composed of 47 & 48, rec,). In his said statement
Patrolmen Luis Lim and Servande to the police, Lasinto admitted his
Malabute was formed to further participation and narrated in detail
investigate the case. A separate the commission of the robbery in
police team composed of Sgt. Room 314 of the House
Yanguiling and several policemen International Hotel.
were sent to Leyte and Samar to
track down the suspects (pp. 30 & The Samar P.C. turned over three
31, t.s.n., Id.). "Dr. Hong, the other suspects, namely Diego
victim's husband who was in Cebu Opero, Milagros Villegas and
when the incident in his residence Asteria Avila to Sgt. Yanguiling who
was committed was contacted by brought said suspects to Manila
the police and informed about the and turned them over to the
death of his wife. homicide division of the Manila
Police, together with some of the
Dr. Hong came back immediately stolen articles (pp. 31 & 32, t.s.n.,
from Cebu and reported to the June 16, 1978). Statements of
police. He (Dr. Hong) made an these three suspects (Exhibits "B",
inventory of the personal effects "C", and "D", respectively) taken by
found missing in his residence. the Samar P.C. were also turned
valued at P30,221.00 (pp. 31, 32 & over by Sgt. Yanguiling to the
33, t.s.n Id; Exhs. 'R' and 'R-l'). homicide division (pp. 34 & 35,
t.s.n. Id). Opero was investigated
While the case was under further at the Manila Police
investigation, the homicide division Headquarters and he gave a
of the Manila Police, received a supplemental statement (Exh.
radio message (Exh. "T-l", p. 40, "FF", pp. 70-74, rec.; p. 36, t.
rec.) relayed thru Col. Narciso s.n. Id) admitting that he had
Cabrera, Chief of the Detective robbed the victim and Identified
Bureau of the Manila Police, that some of the missing articles
Reynaldo Lacsinto one of the recovered from his possession (pp.
suspects could be found in a school 41 & 42, t.s.n. Id). He described in
house in Moriones, Tondo, Manila. detail how he planned the robbery
and named the rest of his victim's eyes, which was tied
coaccused as willing participants. across the mouth; 3) contusion and
He also narrated in his said hematoma on the upper and lower
supplemental statement that he lips caused by a blunt instrument;
and his co-accused Lacsinto 4) abrasions on the right side of
subdued the victim by assaulting the chin; 5) broad linear mark of
her, tying up her hands and feet clothing material on the neck; 6)
stabbing her and stuffing her cord or ligature marks on the left
mouth with a piece of pandesal and right arm, indicating that both
(pp. 70- 74, rec.). arms were tied; 7) abdomen
distended with gas, due to
In her statement to the Manila decomposition; 8) epiglotis,
police (Exh. 'GG', pp. 74 & 75, rec.) hematoma and contusion on the
Milagros Villegas Identified the right side of the tongue; 9)
stolen clothes which were given to contusions and hematoma on the
her by Opero. (pp. 44, 45 & 46, t. s. right cheek; 10) superficial stab
n. Id) wound measuring 0.8 c.m. on the
right side of the chin caused by a
The third suspect, Asteria Avila told sharp bladed instrument; 1 1)
the Manila police that she was not superficial stab wound on the mid-
a party to the crime and upon axilliary line caused by a sharp
advice of her lawyer she did not bladed instrument: 12) stab wound
give any further statement. (p. 47, on the left forearm: 13) cord
t. S. n. Id) markings on both feet.

A reenactment of the crime at the Internal findings reveal an

crime scene was held under the impacted bolus of white bread
direction of Opero portraying - his measuring 3 x 2.5 cm in the
role, with Lacsinto depicting his oropharynx. The tongue has
part, and pictures of the contusion on the right lateral side
reenactment were taken (pp. 51, and an abrasion across the middle
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 & 60, portion. The larynx and trachea are
t. s.n. Id; pp. 79-99, incl., rec.). markedly congested. The cause of
death was due to asphyxiation by
suffocation with an impacted bolus
The body of the victim Liew Soon
into the oropharynx and
Ping was autopsied by Dr. Angelo
compression of the neck with a
Singian, then Chief of the Medico
broad clothing around the neck
Legal Division of the Western
(pp. 6-18, incl., t. s. n. June
Police District. The body was
16,1978; Exh. "BB" pp. 62 & 63,
Identified by the victim's husband.
rec.).
Dr. Singian examined the body of
the victim and issued a death
certificate (Exh. "AA"), and the In his first assignment of error, appellant advances
necropsy report (Exh. 'BB'), with the theory that he never intended to kill the
the following findings: 1) a pale deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, for
yellowish band across the eyes of if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he could
the victim caused by the have easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his
application of a towel, or broad liability should be only for robbery.
piece of cloth across the eyes; 2) a
pale yellowish band across the Appellant's theory finds no basis in the law or in
mouth caused by a similar material jurisprudence. It was been repeatedly held that
as the one applied across the when direct and intimate connection exists between
the robbery and the killing, regardless of which of which the accused intended to
the two precedes the other, or whether they are commit, the penalty corresponding
committed at the same time, the crime committed is to the latter shall be imposed in its
the special complex crime of robbery with maximum period.
1
homicide. If the circumstances would indicate no
intention to kill, as in the instant case were xxx xxx xxx.
evidently, the intention is to prevent the deceased
from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was The foregoing provision has been applied only to
stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance cases when the crime committed befalls a different
of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong person from the one intended to be the victim. This
2
may be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" was the explicit ruling in the case of People vs.
in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150-153, citing decisions of he
had it not slid into the neckline, "caused by the Supreme Court of Spain."
5

victim's own movements, " according to Dr. Singian.

The movements of the victim that caused the
In the instant case, the intended victim, not any
"pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however,
other person, was the one killed, as a result of an
attributable to what appellant and his co-accused
intention to rob, as in fact appellant and his co-
did to the victim, for if they did not hogtie her, she
accused, did rob the deceased. As stated earlier,
could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her
what may be appreciated in appellant's favor is only
mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation.
the mitigating circumstance of not having intended
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed,
It may not avail appellant to contend that the death under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
was by mere accident for even if it were so, which is Code, an entirely different situation from that
not even beyond doubt for the sliding of the contemplated under paragraph 1, Article 49 of the
pandesal into the neckline to produce asphyxiation same Code, where as already explained, the
could reasonably have been anticipated, it is a different felony from that intended, befalls someone
settled doctrine that when death supervenes by different from the intended victim, as when the
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is person intended to be killed is a stranger to the
immaterial that the occurrence of death was by offender, but the person actually killed is the
3
mere accident. What is important and decisive is offender's father, thereby making the intended
that death results by reason or on the occasion of felony which is homicide different from the crime
4
the robbery. These Spanish doctrines were cited by actually committed which is parricide.
this Court in People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil.
992.
Notwithstanding the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of not having intended to commit so
Appellant would also have Article 49, paragraph I of grave a wrong as that comitted, there still remains
the Revised Penal Code apply to him, and faults the one aggravating circumstance to consider, after
court a quo for having failed to do so. The provision either one of the two aggravating circumstances
cited reads: present, that of superior strength and dwelling, is
offset by the mitigating circumstance aforesaid. The
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed higher of the imposable penalty for the crime
upon the principals when the crime committed, which is reclusion perpetua to death,
committed is different from that should therefore be the proper penalty to be
intended — In cases in which the imposed on appellant. 'This is the penalty of death
felony committed is different from as imposed by the lower court.
that which the offender intended
to commit, the following rules shall WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in
be observed: accordance with law and the evidence, except as to
the nonappreciation of the mitigating circumstance
1. If the penalty prescribed for the of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong
felony committed be higher than as that committed, which nevertheless does not call
that corresponding to the offense for the modification of the penalty of death as
imposed by the lower court, is hereby affirmed. Cost
de oficio.

SO ORDERED.













































G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921 possible inability to swim or the strength of the
current, he was borne down into the water and was
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle, drowned.
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant. Two witnesses who were on the boat state that,
immediately after Venancio leaped into the water,
Angel Roco for appellant. the accused told the remaining members of the crew
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee. to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this reason
they made no movement looking to rescue; but
STREET, J.: inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio
did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue
would have been fruitless. The fact that the accused
The rather singular circumstances attending the
at his juncture threatened the crew with violence is,
commission of the offense of homicide which is
therefore, of no moment except tho show the
under discussion in the present appeal are these:
temporary excitement under which he was laboring.
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio
interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig
Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to
River a short distance from the lighthouse and not
watch for the body, in the hope that it might come
far from where the river debouches into the Manila
to the surface and could thus be recovered. Though
Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor.
his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
The crew of this boat consisted of the accused,
Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom
was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused It may be added that Venancio has not returned to
was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a bachelor in
the boat, acting as helmsman, while Venancio the house of an acquaintance; and his personal
Gargantel was at the bow. belongings have been delivered to a representative
of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His
friends and relatives, it is needless to say, take it for
The work raising the anchor seems to have
granted that he is dead.
proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he
accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive
epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel The circumstances narrated above are such in our
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility that
they would work better, if he would not insult them. Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think
The accused took this remonstrance as a display of that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is
insubordination; and rising in rage he moved dead and that he came to his death by drowning
towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, under the circumstances stated. The proof is direct
threatening to stab him. At the instant when the that he never rose to the surface after jumping into
accused had attained to within a few feet of the river, so far as the observers could see; and this
Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in circumstance, coupled with the known fact that
great and immediate peril, threw himself into the human life must inevitably be extinguished by
water and disappeared beneath its surface to be asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death.
seen no more. The possibility that he might have swum ashore,
after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his
companions, we consider too remote to be
The boat in which this incident took place was at the
entertained for a moment.
time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was
distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows
were moored to the shore, but between these and As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for
the boat intervened a space which may be estimated the death thus occasioned the likewise can be no
at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full midday, and there doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in
was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon throwing himself in the river, acted solely in
the scene, the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and
to the surface conclusively shows that, owing to his was in no sense legally responsible for his own
death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice The accused must, therefore, be considered the
between two evils, and any reasonable person under responsible author of the death of Venancio
the same circumstances might have done the same. Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the
As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as
in another man's mind an immediate sense of an attenuating circumstance the fact that the
dander which causes such person to try to escape, offender had no intention to commit so great a
and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.)
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced
injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve
[N.S.], 701. years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the
corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family
In this connection a pertinent decision from the of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the
Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law; and
the brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It it being understood that the accessories appropriate
appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual, to the case are those specified in article 59 of the
after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against
with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the the appellant. So ordered.
injured person and to escape the discharge the latter
had to jump into a river where he perished by
drowning. The medical authorities charged with
conducting the autopsy found that only one of the
wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the
death of the injured person, supposing that he had
received no succour, and that by throwing himself in
the river he in fact died of asphyxia from

submersion. Having been convicted as the author of
the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that
he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious
physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.
The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal,
enunciated the following doctrine: "That even
though the death of the injured person should not
be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect
of the very grave wound which almost completely
severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage
impossible to stanch under the circumstances in
which that person was placed, nevertheless as the
persistence of the aggression of the accused
compelled his adversary, in order to escape the
attack, to leap into the river, an act which the

accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do
after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound
upon him and as the aggressor by said attack
manifested a determined resolution to cause the
death of the deceased, by depriving him of all
possible help and putting him in the very serious
situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the
trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as
consummated homicide, did not commit any error of
law, as the death of the injured person was due to
the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p.
183.)
G.R. No. 118992 October 9, 1997 and as a consequence thereof, the
said offended party suffered
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, serious physical injuries which
vs. injuries required medical
CELERINO CASTROMERO, accused-appellant. attendance and incapacitated her
from performing her customary
work for a period of more than
ninety (90) days by jumping down
through the window of her house.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Contrary to law.
Rape is consummated by the slightest touching of
the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the 4
pudendum. Complete penetration is not required. The Complaint was treated as the Information with
The rapist is likewise liable for the injury suffered by the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Carmelo Q.
the rape victim as a result of her attempt to escape Quizon, after Fourth Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
the assault. Rolando E. Silang added his sworn certification that a
"preliminary investigation was conducted in
accordance" with law. When arraigned on July 20,
The Case
1993, the accused-appellant, assisted by Counsel de
5
Oficio Hermogenes De Castro, pleaded not guilty.
This is an appeal from the August 17, 1994
1
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
2 After a pre-trial conference, trial ensued in due
Region, Branch 10 stationed in Balayan, Batangas in
course. Subsequently, the trial court rendered the
Criminal Case No. 3509 finding appellant guilty of
assailed Judgment, the dispositive portion of which
rape with serious physical injuries.
reads:
3
The Complaint against Appellant Celerino
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
Castromero reads:
accused Celerino Castromero
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
The undersigned offended party
of the crime of Rape With Serious
under oath accuses Celerino
Physical Injuries and hereby
Castromero of the Complex Crime
sentences him to reclusion
of Rape with Serious Physical perpetua, to indemnify the victim
Injuries, defined and penalized
Josephine Baon in the sum of
under Article 335, in relation to
P40,000.00, to pay Josephine Baon
Article 48 and 263 of the Revised
the sum of P20,378.95
Penal Code, committed as follows: representing actual damages and
to pay the costs.
That on or about the 6th day of
February, 1993, at about 2:00
Considering that the accused is a
o'clock in the morning, at Barangay
detention prisoner, he shall be
Tanggoy, Municipality of Balayan,
credited with the period of his
Province of Batangas, Philippines
detention during his preventive
and within the jurisdiction of this
imprisonment.
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a 6
SO ORDERED.
knife (balisong) and by means of
force and intimidation did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and The Facts
feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the offended party Josephine Version of the Prosecution
Baon against her will and consent
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: bed. She averred that she knows
(1) Josephine Baon, the victim; (2) her husband, the accused because the latter is
Esmeraldo Baon, who testified on the medical the nephew of her mother-in-law.
expenses for the injuries his wife suffered because of On February 6, 1993, at around
the crime; and (3) Felipa Baon. The facts gleaned by 2:00 o'clock in the morning while
the trial court from their testimonies are as follows: asleep, she was awakened by the
slam of the kitchen door. She rose
Felipa Baon is the mother-in-law of and went out of the bedroom to
the alleged victim and was check what happened and outside
presented to prove circumstances the room she met the accused. The
of the incident which form part of accused pointed a knife at her and
the "res gestae." She testified that warned her not to shout or else
the accused is her nephew because she would be killed. She got
the accused's father is her first scared.
cousin. On February 6, 1993 at
around 2:00 o'clock in the morning The accused, while holding a knife
while asleep in their house in on the right hand, embraced her
Barangay Tangoy, Balayan, behind the neck, kissed her cheek,
Batangas, she was awakened by a and touched her breasts. Then he
scream of her daughter-in-law pulled her panty until the garter
whose house is situated just five got loose and touched her private
(5) armslength away from theirs. parts. Next, accused pulled down
When she came out to help her his jogging pants and brief. She
daughter-in-law (Josephine Baon), kept herself still because of the
the latter was lying in front of the accused's threat to kill her.
window so, she and her husband Accused then removed her skirt,
carried Josephine into their house. placed himself on top of her, and
Thereat, Josephine related what tried to insert his penis into her
happened to her. According to vagina. Because of the accused'
Josephine, the accused forcibly movement sideways and her
entered her room, placed himself struggle, his penis touched her
on top of her and made his penis private parts.
touch her vagina for several times.
The accused was then holding a When she noticed that the accused
knife. When Josephine was able to was no longer holding the knife,
free herself from the accused, she she pushed him away. As she rose
jumped out of the window where up, the accused grabbed her hands
she fell into the ground. and was about to stab her. So, she
Thereafter, the assistance of immediately jumped out of the
Barangay Captain Codizal was window. When she fell down, she
sought who reported the incident yelled for help from her in-laws
to the police. Felipa Baon executed who responded and carried her to
a sworn statement when their house because she could not
investigated by one SPO2 William move her feet. She requested her
C. Dimaala in the Philippine mother-in-law to bring her to the
Orthopedic Hospital where emergency hospital because of the
Josephine was confined for intense pain she was then
treatment. suffering. Her in-laws reported the
incident to the barangay captain
The next witness was the private who looked for the accused and to
complainant who gave her whom the accused surrendered.
testimony while lying on a bamboo
From the emergency hospital, she in her neck. When the accused
was later transferred to the tried to insert his penis, it touched
Philippine Orthopedic Hospital. her vagina as she put up resistance
Upon examination, it was found and as both of them moved
out that her spinal column was sideways.
broken which required her to
undergo surgical operation. (Exhs. The next witness was Esmeraldo
"E", "E-1" to "E-5"). Baon, the husband of the offended
party whose gist of the testimony
On cross-examination, private relates to the civil aspect of the
complainant averred that it is her crime charged. He testified on the
habit to sleep at night with lights hospital and surgical expenses and
on in and out of her room cost of medicines incurred on
especially when her husband is not account of the injury suffered by
around. In the night of February 5, the offended party caused by her
1993 she slept with the lights on jumping out of the window. The
together with her children, witness also identified the receipts
namely: Joanna Marie and and other relevant documents in
Romualdo. It was at around 2:00 support of the expenses incurred.
o'clock the following morning Although he claimed having
when she was awakened by a slam incurred expenses in the amount
of the door, reason for her to rise- of P242,198.00, the witness was
up to check what happened and able to present receipts covering
she met the accused just outside P20,378.95 only (Exhs. "D-1" to "D-
7
her room as she went out. The 25").
accused then pulled her and
pointed a knife on the left side of Version of the Defense
her neck and touched her private
parts while they were both Raising denial and alibi, the defense presented two
standing with the accused in front witnesses in the person of Appellant Celerino
of her. Castromero and his wife Juliana. The appellant,
through the Public Attorney's Office, narrated the
When she was already lying down following version of the
(upon the orders of the accused) 8
facts:
the accused went on top of her
embracing her with his right arm Juliana Castromero testified that
which also held a knife and she is the wife of the accused. She
touched her private parts. The said that at around 6 o'clock in the
accused tried to insert with his left evening of February 5, 1993 she
hand his penis into her vagina. was with her husband (accused)
and their three (3) children at their
As the knife was pointed at her, house in Tanggoy, Balayan,
the accused warned her not to Batangas. They took their dinner.
shout or she would be killed. It was At about 7 o'clock of the same
the accused's left hand that night her husband went out. Her
touched her breast because his husband returned before midnight
right hand held the knife. The and slept right away. She was
accused used both hands in awake till 1 o'clock because one of
removing her panty with the knife their children had a stomach ache.
still on his hand. The accused When she woke up at 5 o'clock in
removed his jogging pants and the morning, her husband was still
brief and the knife was still pointed sleeping. Her husband woke up at
 6:00 A.M. After taking his The Court's Ruling
breakfast, her husband went to his
work in Dalig, Balayan, Batangas. The appeal is not meritorious.
Her husband is a threshing
machine operator. While her Credibility of Witnesses
husband was on his job, some
policemen came to their house and
In his brief, the appellant simply denies the charge of
were looking for him. Her husband
rape with serious physical injuries and insists on his
was being suspected of entering 10
alibi. He also alludes to the following as indications
other's (sic) dwelling. (TSN, pp. 2-8,
of his innocence: he voluntarily went to the police
April 7, 1994 and pp. 2-9, April 28, 11
station with the barangay captain; he pleaded not
1994) 12
guilty to the charge; and he vehemently denied
13
committing the crime. Finally, he adds, "if a
Celerino Castromero testified that reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of
at around 6 o'clock in the evening 14
acquittal."
of February 5, 1993 he took his
supper together with his wife and
In deciding this appeal, we are guided by the
children. At about 7 P.M. he left
following principles formulated specifically for the
and played (or gambled) in a
review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape, while
nearby house. At 11:30 P.M., he
easy to make, is difficult to prove and even harder
went home. After his arrival at
for the person accused, though innocent, to
their house, he went to sleep right
disprove; (2) because rape, by its very nature,
away. He woke up at 5 o'clock of
involves only two persons, the testimony of the
the following morning. He
complainant should be scrutinized with the greatest
reported for work in Dalig,
caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
Balayan, Batangas being a
stand or fall on its own merits and must not be
threshing machine operator. When
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
he went home at 12 o'clock noon, 15
evidence for the defense. On the other hand, the
their barangay captain arrived and
complainant's credibility assumes paramount
informed him that he was being
importance because her testimony, if credible, is
suspected of having committed a 16
sufficient to support the conviction of the accused.
crime. The police invited him to
the police station. And at the
After a thorough review of the records in the case at
police station, the police did not
bar, we see no reason to reverse the trial court's
conduct any investigation. He was
factual finding and conclusion on the credibility of
merely placed or locked up in the 17
Josephine Baon's testimony; we are likewise
jail. He went to the police station,
unpersuaded by accused-appellant's asseverations.
together with their barangay
"Well-settled is the rule that the assessment of the
captain, to explain his side and not
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
to surrender. He denied
matter best undertaken by the trial court, because
vehemently to have committed
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
any crime. (TSN, pp. 2-18, May 19,
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
1994).
attitude under grilling examination. Findings of the
trial court on such matters are binding and
Error Assigned
conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance have been
The defense raises one error; " the court a quo erred overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted."
18

in not acquitting the accused-appellant of the crime

9
charged." Appellant denies the accusation against
Josephine Baon's testimony on how her honor was
him and insists that he was inside his own house at
defiled by appellant that early dawn was clear, direct
the time of the alleged rape. 19
and honest. Josephine never wavered in her
account of the rape in spite of the long browbeating
 20
she received during her cross-examination. Her to have been at complainant's home at the time of
identification of Appellant Castromero as her the crime. It seems to this Court that the defense of
violator cannot be disputed because she personally denial and alibi was routinely raised faute de mieux.
knew appellant who, aside from being a neighbor,
was also a relative of her mother-in-law. Moreover, Was Rape Committed?
she had the opportunity to identify her assailant,
since the crime scene was illuminated by the lights In determining whether the rape was consummated
inside and outside her room which she usually left or merely attempted, we observe that in this case
on, specially in the absence of her husband as was there was no complete or perfect penetration of the
21
the case that night. Besides, it is inconceivable complainant's sex organ. The salient portions of her
that complainant, a decent 26-year old married testimony are as follows:
Filipina with two young children, would suffer the
embarrassment of having to reveal intimate details
Q While he was
of her violation and to undergo all the difficulties
on top of you,
and indignities of a rape prosecution, if her sole
what was he
motivation was not to have the real culprit arrested
doing?
and punished for the outrage committed against her.
Indeed, a rape victim "will not come out in the open
22 A He tried to
if her motive [is] not to obtain justice." In any
insert his penis to
event, it was not shown that complainant had any ill
motive to falsely testify against Accused Castromero. my vagina
The accused himself and his wife Juliana both
admitted during trial that they had no knowledge of Q When he was
any "bad blood" between them and Josephine Baon trying to insert
23
or her family. his private part
to your private
part, what
Hence, Josephine's testimony, which we find
credible and worthy of belief, is sufficient to convict happened?
the accused-appellant of the crime charged. The
reliability and credibility of her testimony are A His penis
bolstered by her narration of the sordid incident touched my
immediately thereafter to her mother-in-law, Felipa vagina.
Baon. Based on the foregoing, we are convinced that
appellant sexually assaulted Complainant Josephine FISCAL CASTILLO:
Baon.
May I request
Appellant Castromero's defense of denial and alibi is Your Honor, that
inherently weak and certainly insufficient to the Tagalog word
outweigh Josephine's positive and categorical "Ang kanyang
assertion of her violation by the pag-aari ay
24
former. Furthermore, "(f)or alibi to serve as basis lumapat sa aking
for acquittal, it must be established with clear and pag-aari)."
convincing evidence. The requisites of time and
place must be strictly met. Appellant must Q What
convincingly demonstrate that it was physically happened next?
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
25
crime at the time of its commission." Appellant's A Because of the
evidence falls far short of this requirement because movement
his house, where he was allegedly sleeping at the sideways his
time the crime committed, was a mere fifty meters penis touched my
26
from the crime scene. Hence, it was not at all private
physically impossible or even difficult for appellant
 27
parts. (Emphasi touch the vagina
s supplied.) for several times.
"Idinuldol ng
On cross-examination, Eden stated further: idinuldol ang
kanyang pag-aari
Q Mrs. witness, sa harap, ni
you testified that Josephine
29
while the Baon". (Empha
accused was on sis supplied.)
top of you, he
tried to insert his To consummate rape, perfect or complete
penis, did the penetration of the complainant's private organ is not
accused insert his essential. Even the slightest penetration by the male
penis on your organ of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the
30
private part? pudendum, is sufficient. In People vs. Dela
31
Pena, this Court held that "the mere touching of
A Yes sir, the the external genitalia by a penis capable of the
opening of my consummating the sexual act constitutes carnal
vagina was knowledge." Josephine's testimony that appellant's
28
touched. (Emp organ touched the opening of her vagina can lead to
hasis supplied.) no other conclusion than that the appellant's
manhood legally invaded, however slightly, the lips
of her private organ. Clearly, rape was consummated
Felipa Baon, on the other hand, declared:
in this case. Because the sexual assault was
perpetrated by force and intimidation, Appellant
Q When Josefina
Castromero is thus guilty of rape pursuant to Article
Baon asked your
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
help and the first
time you see (sic)
In relation to the charge that rape was complexed
her at that
with the crime of serious physical injuries, we stress
morning, what
the settled principle that a person who creates in
was her physical
another's mind an immediate sense of danger that
condition?
causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for
whatever the other person may consequently
A She was lying 32
suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a
in front of the
window of her house to escape from Appellant
window. Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical
injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which
Q And what did required medical attention and surgery for more
she tell you if she than ninety days. This being the case, the court a
told you quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the
anything? complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries.

A Josephine Baon WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court

told me that the is hereby AFFIRMED. However, the indemnity in
accused forcibly favor of Josephine Baon is hereby INCREASED to fifty
enter her room thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with current
and placed 33
jurisprudence.
himself on top of
her and the penis
SO ORDERED.
of the accused
was made to

G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935 incongruent and contradictory that we consider
meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- error of the lower court to have taken it into
appellee, consideration in formulating the findings of its
vs. judgment. Not so with respect to the testimony of
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant. the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the
persons present at said gathering, testified that he
Pedro B. Pobre for appellant. saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went
toward the place where the witness and the other
guests were gathered, telling that he was wounded
RECTO, J.:
and was going to die and naming Juan Quianzon as
the person who wounded him. He also testified that
Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide
Juan Quianzon, upon being asked immediately by
in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and
him about the incident, admitted to him attacked
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to
barrio lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the
fourteen years, seven months and one day
incident, forthwith conducted an investigation,
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan Quianzon
questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it
appeal to this court for the review of the case. was the accused who had wounded him. He likewise
questioned the accused and the latter, in turn,
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of stated that he had wounded the deceased with a
the soul of the deceased person was being held in bamboo spit. Upon being brought before Juan
the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning,
the poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Quianzon confessed to Llaguno that he had applied a
Norte, with the usual attendance of the relatives and firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded
friends. The incident that led to the filling of these him with a bamboo spit. Before the chief of police
charges took place between 3 to 4 o'clock in the could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the
afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons later retracted, denying that he had wounded
present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit Exhibit B
in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's
victuals in his care. It was the second or third time neck appears admitted by Quianzon but not of
that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same having wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit.
purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took
hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place
The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for
where the people were gathered exclaiming that he
the prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo and Llaguno, is
is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he
not questioned by the defense. Neither the accused,
showed to those present a wound in his abdomen
in his testimony, nor his counsel, in the brief filed by
below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this
him in this court, was able to assign any unlawful,
wound on the tenth day after the incident. corrupt or wicked motive that might have actuated
them to testify falsely in this case and knowingly
There is no conflict between the prosecution and the bring about the imprisonment of an innocent
defense as regards the foregoing facts. The question person. Bagabay is not even a relative of the
to be determined is who wounded Aribuabo. The deceased. Dumlao, the barrio lieutenant, is a
prosecution claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to nephew of the accused. Llaguno, chief of police of
prove it, called Simeon Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Paoay, is an officer of the law whose intervention of
Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness this case was purely in compliance with his official
stand. duties. All the appellant has been able to state in his
brief to question the credibility of these witnesses is
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have that they were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the
witnessed the wounding of Andres Aribuabo in the other witness for the prosecution, who testified that
abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the he had not seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor
testimony of this witness so improbable,
to Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime. But the his neck with a firebrand, after which Aribuabo
position of the defense in invoking Simeon Cacpal's appeared wounded in the abdomen, without the
testimony for the purpose of discrediting the other accused and the witnesses for the defense
witnesses for the prosecution is untenable, after explaining how and by whom the aggression had
having vigorously impeached said testimony, been made.
branding it as improbable, incongruent and
contradictory. If Cacpal is a false witness — and the It is contended by the defense that even granting
court believes this claim of the defense as true — , that it was the accused who inflicted the wound
none of his statements may be taken into account or which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be
should exert any influence in the consideration of convicted of homicide but only of serious physical
the other evidence in the case. injuries because said wound was not necessarily
fatal and the deceased would have survived it had
After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the he not twice removed the drainage which Dr.
evidence presented by the prosecution relative to Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the
the appellant's criminal liability for the death of infection. This contention is without merit.
Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's According to the physician who examined whether
statement immediately after receiving the wound, he could survive or not." It was a wound in the
naming the accused as the author of the aggression, abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic
and the admission forthwith made by the accused peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal
that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck matter from the large intestine which has been
and had wounded him, besides, with a bamboo spit. perforated. The possibility, admitted by said
Both statements are competent evidence in the law, physician that the patient might have survived said
admissible as a part of the res gestae (section 279 wound had he not removed the drainage, does not
and 298, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure; mean that the act of the patient was the real cause
U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs. Portento of his death. Even without said act the fatal
and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second, in the consequence could have followed, and the fact that
extrajudicial confession of the accused to the barrio the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does
lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police not alter the juridical consequences of the
Llaguno, in the same afternoon of the crime, that he punishable act of the accused.
was the author of Aribuabo's wound and that he had
inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as One who inflicts an injury on another is
this confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide
corroborated and appears to have been made by the if the injury contributes mediately or
accused freely and voluntarily, it constitutes immediately to the death of such other. The
evidence against him relative to his liability as author fact that the other causes contribute to the
of the crime charged (U.S. vs. so Fo, 23 Phil., 379; death does not relieve the actor of
People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U.S. vs. Jamino, 3 responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)
P.R.A., 52; Francisco's Quizzer on Evidence).
Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in
The defense of the accused consisted simply in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and
denying that he had wounded the deceased and that with the knowledge that he was performing an act
he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-
Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail preservation is the strongest instinct in living beings.
against the adverse testimony of these three It much be assumed, therefore, that he
veracious and disinterested witnesses, all the more unconsciously did so due to his pathological
because neither the accused nor any other witness condition and to his state of nervousness and
for the defense has stated or insinuated that another restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain
person, not the accused, might be the author of the caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of
wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and the drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum.
because it is admitted by the defense that it was the "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a
accused, whom Aribuabo had been pestering with perforation of the stomach, intestine or gall-bladder,
request for food, who attacked the latter, burning etc., it is indicated by violent shivering and pain first
localized at a point in the abdomen, extending later inflicted by said assailant, the crime is homicide and
to the entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, not merely slight physical injuries, simply because
which is aggravated by the slightest movement, the doctor was of the opinion that the wound might
becoming unbearable upon contact with the hand, a have healed in seven days."
rag, or the bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it
gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are
tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter, which are correctly set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows:
very annoying and terribly painful, take from the
beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI While the courts may have vacilated from
Spanish-America Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see time to time it may be taken to be settled
also XXI Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If rule of the common law that on who inflicts
to this is added the fact that the victim in this case an injury on another will be held
was mentally deranged, according to the defense responsible for his death, although it may
itself, it becomes more evident that the accused is appear that the deceased might have
wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his recovered if he had taken proper care of
criminal act to an act of his victim. himself, or submitted to a surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper
The question herein raised by the appellant has treatment aggravated the wound and
already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The contributed to the death, or that death was
Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, immediately caused by a surgical operation
1879, said in the case similar to the present, the rendered necessary by the condition of the
following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the wound. The principle on which this rule is
consequences of his act — and in this case the founded is one of universal application, and
physical condition and temperament of the offended lies at the foundation of the criminal
party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to
whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the be held to contemplate and to be
means employed, but by the result actually responsible for the natural consequences of
produced; and as the wound which the appellant his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound
inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which with a deadly weapon in such a manner as
determined his death, without his being able to to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as
counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in a consequence of this felonious and wicked
question should be qualified as homicide, etc." act, it does not alter its nature or diminish
its criminality to prove that other causes co-
In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the operated in producing the fatal result.
abdominal wound was less serious than that Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the
received by Aribuabo in this case, as it was not wound or its unskillful and improper
penetrating, merely involving the muscular tissue. In treatment, which are of themselves
said case the death of the victim was due to a consequences of the criminal act, which
secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours might naturally follow in any case, must in
after the wound had been inflicted, because of the law be deemed to have been among those
"bodily movements of the patient, who was in a which were in contemplation of the guilty
state of nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting up party, and for which he is to be held
and pacing about the room, as as a consequence of responsible. But, however, this may be, the
which he internal vessels, already congested rule surely seems to have its foundation in a
because of the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage wise and practical policy. A different
thus produced caused his death." The court in doctrine would tend to give immunity to
deciding the question stated that "when a person crime and to take away from human life a
dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the
brought on by moving about against the doctor's conflicting theories of the medical men, and
orders, not because of carelessness or a desire to the uncertainties attendant upon the
increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it
because of his nervous condition due to the wound would be easy in many cases of homicide to
 raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by
which persons guilty of the highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment.

Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's

testimony, there is no evidence of record that the
crime charged was committed by means of the knife,
Exhibit A, and we only have the extrajudicial

admission of the accused that he had committed it
by means of a bamboo spit with which the wound of
the deceased might have been caused because,
according to the physician who testified in this case,
it was produced by a "sharp and penetrating"
instrument.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of
instruction and of intention to commit so grave a
wrong as the committed should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant, without any
aggravating circumstances adverse to him, we

modify the appealed judgment by sentencing him to
an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four
years of prision correccional and a maximum of a
eight years of prision mayor, affirming it in all other
respect, with cost to said appellant.

G.R. No. L-10470 October 1, 1915 present at the time of the occurrence restrained
him.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. After an examination by Dr. Cesar Mercader it was
FILEMON BAYUTAS, defendant-appellant. found that Paras had received a contused wound in
the middle of his forehead extending obliquely from
McVean and Vickers for appellant. the medial line in a downward and outward
Acting Attorney-General Zaragoza for appellee. direction, as well as another wound, also contused,
in the right side of occipital region, also running in an
oblique direction. The wounds required 58 days to
heal, during which period he at first showed
symptoms of brain fever, a consequence of the
habitual drinking of tuba.
TORRES, J.:

Defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged; that while

These proceedings were instituted in the Court of
he happened to be in a billiard hall watching a game
First Instance of Cebu by a complaint filed by the
between Paras and Carvajal, the former, without any
deputy provincial fiscal on October 21, 1914,
cause whatever, thrice challenged defendant to fight
charging Filemon Bayutas with the crime of lesiones
with him, and the third time, even challenged his
graves (serious physical injuries). On November 25
father, who was also in the said billiard hall; that to
following, judgment was rendered whereby
avoid a quarrel defendant moved away; that while
defendant was sentenced to the penalty of one year
passing behind Paras the latter assaulted him,
and one day of prision correccional, to pay an
dealing him a blow with a billiard cue; that against
indemnity of P50 for medicine furnished by the
this attack he defendant himself first with his left
physician, without prejudice to the institution of the
arm and then with a club which he took from the
proper action with respect to the latter's fees, to
hands of Juan Alesna; that in so doing he hit his
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
assailant accidentally with the said club on the
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From this
forehead and the nape of the neck; and that
judgment Bayutas appealed.
Fructuoso Bargamento, one of the witnesses present
during the occurrence, succeeded in preventing
Upon the night of October 8, 1913, after Esteban
Paras from dealing defendant another third blow
Paras and Alfonso Carvajal had finished playing a
with the billiard cue.
game of billiards n a hall of the pueblo of Barili,
Province of Cebu, and just as they were about to
The contradictory testimony of both the injured man
commence a new one, the defendant, Filemon
and the defendant is supported by their respective
Bayutas, suggested laying a wager on Carvajal and
witnesses. If we are to believe the statements of
against Paras. The latter then told Bayutas not to do
defendant and his witnesses, the provocation and
so, as it would not be proper, inasmuch as he, Paras,
the actual assault were commenced by the injured
and defendant were cousins and treated each other
man Esteban Paras, and the wounds which Paras
like brothers. To this Bayutas answered by telling
bore in the forehead and the nape of the neck were
Paras to keep still and to go on playing. Then Paras
inflicted by the defendant, Filemon Bayutas, in
replied saying "All right, as you wish; name the bet;
defending himself against Paras' attack with the
that is my proposition." Just then, with the cue in his
billiard cue after Paras had several times challenged
hand, Esteban Paras put himself in position to make
Bayutas and Bayutas' father to fight.
a stroke with it to start the game. At this moment
the accused Bayutas struck Paras with a piece of
hard wood about two inches in diameter a heavy However, the testimony of the injured man and his
blow on the nape of the neck and when the latter witnesses unquestionably shows that Paras did not
turned around to face his assailant, he received make any prior unlawful assault, but that after a
another blow on the forehead from the effects of slight altercation with Paras the defendant,
which he fainted. When the defendant attempted to undoubtedly angered by Paras' reproach in saying
strike Paras a third blow, one of the witnesses that being relatives and treating each other like
brothers the defendant ought not to bet against him
in the billiard game, placed himself behind and to placed himself behind his assailant; because then we
the left of Paras at the time the latter was partly must believe that no such assault happened and that
stretched out and bent over the table in the act of what the supposed assailant did was to avoid and
making a stroke to start the game, and run from the supposed assaulted party. If it is true
unexpectedly, with a thick, hard club, struck Paras, a that Bayutas restricted himself to warding off with
heavy blow on the nape of the neck; that when the the club the furious assault which Paras made and
latter turned his face to see by whom he had been only accidentally hit the nape of the neck and the
hit the defendant dealt him another blow on the forehead of his assailant with the said club we fail to
forehead which rendered him temporarily understand, nor is there any explanation of how the
unconscious; and that Paras did not receive a third victim received the serious wounds inflicted with
blow from his assailant because one of the eye- force by means of a hard and thick club. The
witnesses, Fructuoso Bargamento, restrained testimony, then, of the witnesses for the
Filemon Bayutas. prosecution, as well as the situation and direction of
Paras' wounds, give the true story of the affair just
It is to be presumed that the injury in the nape of the as the wounded man and his witnesses have
neck was the first one that the victim received, as narrated it and completely refute defendant's
the eye-witnesses testify he had his back turned allegations. Bayutas did assault Paras at the moment
toward his assailant, because if the wound in the the latter was turning his back toward his assailant
forehead had been the first, the victim not having and was leaning over the billiard table in position to
fallen face downwards on the floor (a detail which begin the game, off his guard, and not believing that
no witness maintained) it is not likely that he would he could be attacked from behind, as did
have received the second blow on the nape of the happen.lawphil.net
neck. Furthermore, if it were true that the victim was
attacked in front or that he had advanced toward his From the facts aforestated it results that there has
assailant to defend himself, or if he had retreated for been committed the crime of lesiones
the purpose of avoiding the second blow which his graves, qualified by the circumstance of treachery,
assailant dealt him immediately, or if he had turned provided for and punished by article 416 of the
his back to his assailant in order to escape, the Penal Code in its 4th and penultimate paragraph,
contused wound would not have taken the direction inasmuch as defendant, when he assaulted Paras
observed by the physician who examined him. without prior provocation, employed means,
methods or forms in the assault conducive especially
The testimony of the eyewitnesses who confirmed to the consummation of the crime without those
the charge preferred by the prosecution and the risks to himself which could arise from any defense
statements made by the wounded man appear that the injured man might be able to make
corroborated by the description given by the inasmuch as, after being struck on the back of the
physician of the situation and direction of the two neck, Paras was hardly able to turn his head to see
wounds of Paras. The injury which he exhibited in his assailant, and before he was able to recover from
the occipital region, according to the said physician, either the effects of the pain or the disturbance
extended in an oblique direction toward the right which the blow produced he immediately received
side, which proves that the assailant inflicted the another blow on the forehead. The wounded man
blow from behind and at the left side of the was completely cured without any injurious after
wounded man. If defendant's statement were true, effects with 58 days' treatment.
namely, that, to defend himself from the blows
which Esteban Paras was giving him with a cue he We consider the classification of the crime by the
touched the latter accidentally, without striking him number of days required to cure the wounded man
with the club with which he was provided, on the to be in accordance with the law. It is
nape of the neck and the forehead, we fail to unquestionable that the two wounds of the injured
understand how it was his assailant happened to be man took the said number of days to heal, with
serious wounded in the nape of the neck, for it is not medical attendance. He might have been cured
a natural sequence that in the very moment of the sooner, had he not been addicted to tuba drinking,
assault from which the defendant had been but this circumstance, however, does not mitigate
defending himself, the defendant should have the defendant's responsibility, since he willfully
assaulted and injured the victim with a club, thus
violating a prohibitive law; and if the wounded man,
owing to his physical condition and the state of his
health, was not cured in a less number of days than

that specified, the perpetrator of the crime is
responsible nevertheless for all the consequences of
the personal injuries that resulted. No consideration
can be given to the circumstance that defendant did
not intend to cause such serious harm as he did,
inasmuch as he, the assailant, availed himself of a
club of hard wood, two inches in diameter, for the

purpose of assaulting the wounded man on the nape
of the neck and the forehead, in which parts of the
human body wounds are almost always considered
by physicians as of uncertain prognosis. Therefore it
cannot be believed that defendant did not intend to
cause the greatest possible injury to the victim.

However, in the commission of the crime, one must
take into consideration the concurrence of the
extenuating circumstance No. 7 of article 9 of the
Penal Code, as the reproach which Paras addressed
to defendant must have caused the latter

temporarily to lose his reason and self-control. As
this extenuating circumstance is not offset by any
aggravating one, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium degrees,
prescribed in the penultimate paragraph of the
aforementioned article 416, must be imposed upon
defendant in the minimum degree, as the trial judge
has done in the judgment appealed from, which is in
accordance with the law and the merits of the case.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors

assigned to the judgment appealed from have been

refuted, the said judgment should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed; provided, however, that the defendant
shall be sentenced to pay the offended party P29 as
damages for the wages which the latter lost and
failed to earn, and P80 as the cost of the medicine
and the fees of the physician who attended him,
and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, with the
costs of this instance.

Arellano, C, J., Johnson, Carson, Trent, and Araullo,

JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987 wounds which caused his
instantaneous death and as a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, consequence of which also caused
vs. gunshot wounds to LINA
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant. AMPARADO and ARNOLD
AMPARADO on the different parts
of their bodies thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds which otherwise
would have caused the death of
SARMIENTO, J.:
said Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado, thus performing all the
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional acts of execution which should
Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-
have produced the crimes of
appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex
murders as a consequence, but
crime of murder with double frustrated murder. nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the his will, that is by the timely and
death sentence imposed. With the approval of the able medical assistance rendered
new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death to Lina Amparado and Arnold
and commuting all existing death sentences to life Amparado which prevented their
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to death. 1
inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith,
xxx xxx xxx
he filed a statement informing us that he wished to
continue with the case by way of an appeal.
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately the
The information (amended) in this case reads as
facts as follows:
follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of
xxx xxx xxx accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny,
had illicit relationship. The illicit
The undersigned City Fiscal of the relationship apparently began
City of Tacloban accuses Francisco while the accused was in Manila
Abarca of the crime of Murder reviewing for the 1983 Bar
with Double Frustrated Murder, examinations. His wife was left
committed as follows: behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn,
That on or about the 15th day of Sept. 24, 1984).
July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the On July 15, 1984, the accused was
jurisdiction of this Honorable in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte.
Court, the above-named accused, On the morning of that date he
with deliberate intent to kill and went to the bus station to go to
with evident premeditation, and Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch
with treachery, armed with an his daughter. However, he was not
unlicensed firearm (armalite), M- able to catch the first trip (in the
16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, morning). He went back to the
unlawfully and feloniously attack station in the afternoon to take the
and shot several times KHINGSLEY 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had
PAUL KOH on the different parts of engine trouble and could not leave
his body, thereby inflicting upon (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The
said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot accused, then proceeded to the
residence of his father after which 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who
he went home. He arrived at his received a salary of nearly
residence at the V & G Subdivision P1,000.00 a month was not able to
in Tacloban City at around 6:00 work for 1-1/2 months because of
o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, his wounds. He spent P15,000.00
tsn, Id.). for medical expenses while his wife
spent Pl,000.00 for the same
2
Upon reaching home, the accused purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ).
found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the
intercourse. When the wife and appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof
Koh noticed the accused, the wife reads as follows:
pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was xxx xxx xxx
then peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and WHEREFORE, finding the accused,
ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.). Francisco Abarca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex
The accused went to look for a crime of murder with double
firearm at Tacloban City. He went frustrated murder as charged in
to the house of a PC soldier, C2C the amended information, and
Arturo Talbo, arriving there at pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised
around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's Penal Code which does not
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went consider the effect of mitigating or
back to his house at V & G aggravating circumstances when
Subdivision. He was not able to the law prescribes a single
find his wife and Koh there. He indivisible penalty in relation to
proceeded to the "mahjong Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to
session" as it was the "hangout" of death, to indemnify the heirs of
Kingsley Koh. The accused found Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of
Koh playing mahjong. He fired at P30,000, complainant spouses
Kingsley Koh three times with his Arnold and Lina Amparado in the
rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado (P20,000.00), without subsidiary
who were occupying a room imprisonment in case of
adjacent to the room where Koh insolvency, and to pay the costs.
was playing mahjong were also hit
by the shots fired by the accused It appears from the evidence that
(pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh
Kingsley Koh died instantaneously and defendant's wife had illicit
of cardiorespiratory arrest due to relationship while he was away in
shock and hemorrhage as a result Manila; that the accused had been
of multiple gunshot wounds on the deceived, betrayed, disgraced and
head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28- ruined by his wife's infidelity which
29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also disturbed his reasoning faculties
exh. A): Arnold Amparado was and deprived him of the capacity
hospitalized and operated on in to reflect upon his acts.
the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. Considering all these
17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also circumstances this court believes
exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, the accused Francisco Abarca is
was also treated in the hospital as deserving of executive clemency,
she was hit by bullet fragments (p. not of full pardon but of a
 substantial if not a radical These rules shall be applicable,
reduction or commutation of his under the same circumstances, to
death sentence. parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of
Let a copy of this decision be age, and their seducers, while the
furnished her Excellency, the daughters are living with their
President of the Philippines, thru parents.
the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
Any person who shall promote or
SO ORDERED.
3 facilitate prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have
xxx xxx xxx consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse shall not be entitled
to the benefits of this article.
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors
committed by the court a quo:
We agree with the Solicitor General that the
aforequoted provision applies in the instant case.
I.
There is no question that the accused surprised his
wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS
act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went
CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF
out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following
PENAL CODE; elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual
II. intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills
any of them or both of them in the act or
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY immediately thereafter. These elements are present
4
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had
inflicted under exceptional circumstances, passed between the time the accused-appellant
complexed with double frustrated murder. Article discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with
247 reads in full: the victim and the time the latter was actually shot,
the shooting must be understood to be the
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
inflicted under exceptional accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in
circumstances. — Any legally requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or
married person who, having both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his
surprised his spouse in the act of spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he
committing sexual intercourse with should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
another person, shall kill any of requires that the death caused be the proximate
them or both of them in the act or result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
immediately thereafter, or shall after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of
inflict upon them any serious infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
physical injury, shall suffer the motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not
penalty of destierro. have been influenced by external factors. The killing
must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
If he shall inflict upon them
physical injuries of any other kind, It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247,
5
he shall be exempt from supra, does not define an offense. In People v.
6
punishment. Araque, we said:
xxx xxx xxx incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an
As may readily be seen from its interpretation would be illogical if
provisions and its place in the not absurd, since a mitigating and
Code, the above-quoted article, far much less an exempting
from defining a felony, merely circumstance cannot be an integral
provides or grants a privilege or element of the crime charged. Only
benefit — amounting practically to "acts or omissons . . . constituting
an exemption from an adequate the offense" should be pleaded in
punishment — to a legally married a complaint or information, and a
person or parent who shall circumstance which mitigates
surprise his spouse or daughter in criminal liability or exempts the
the act of committing sexual accused therefrom, not being an
intercourse with another, and shall essential element of the offense
kill any or both of them in the act charged-but a matter of defense
or immediately thereafter, or shall that must be proved to the
inflict upon them any serious satisfaction of the court-need not
physical injury. Thus, in case of be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules
death or serious physical injuries, of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil.,
considering the enormous 368.)
provocation and his righteous
indignation, the accused — who That the article in question defines
would otherwise be criminally no crime is made more manifest
liable for the crime of homicide, when we consider that its
parricide, murder, or serious counterpart in the old Penal Code
physical injury, as the case may be (Article 423) was found under the
— is punished only with destierro. General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of
This penalty is mere banishment Title VIII covering crimes against
and, as held in a case, is intended persons. There can, we think,
more for the protection of the hardly be any dispute that as part
accused than a punishment. of the general provisions, it could
(People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) not have possibly provided for a
And where physical injuries other distinct and separate crime.
than serious are inflicted, the
offender is exempted from xxx xxx xxx
punishment. In effect, therefore,
Article 247, or the exceptional We, therefore, conclude that
circumstances mentioned therein, Article 247 of the Revised Penal
amount to an exempting Code does not define and provide
circumstance, for even where for a specific crime, but grants a
death or serious physical injuries is privilege or benefit to the accused
inflicted, the penalty is so greatly for the killing of another or the
lowered as to result to no infliction of serious physical
punishment at all. A different injuries under the circumstances
interpretation, i.e., that it defines 7
therein mentioned. ...
and penalizes a distinct crime,
would make the exceptional
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the
circumstances which practically
accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his
exempt the accused from criminal 8
protection.
liability integral elements of the
offense, and thereby compel the
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under
prosecuting officer to plead, and,
exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable
act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to
mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
The next question refers to the liability of the MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to
accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered four months and 21 days to six months of arresto
by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were mayor. The period within which he has been in
caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot confinement shall be credited in the service of these
the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify
finding of double frustrated murder against the Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00
accused-appellant, and being the more severe as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of
temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to
48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we costs.
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the
intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a IT IS SO ORDERED.
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the
consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that
9
the act done amounts to a felony.

But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the
accused-appellant was not committing murder when

he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting
death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant
liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered
by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-

appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an
illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it
appears that before firing at the deceased, he
uttered warning words ("an waray labot
kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to
absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his
part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first

part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less
serious physical injuries through simple imprudence
or negligence. (The records show that Arnold
Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half
months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina
Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We
presume that she was placed in confinement for
only ten to fourteen days based on the medical
certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado

spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-
appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and
G.R. No. L-1896 February 16, 1950 accused failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would have produce the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, crime of estafa through falsification of a
vs. security as a consequence by reason of
RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA, defendant-appellant. some causes other than this spontaneous
desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an
Felixberto B. Viray for appellant. employee to whom the said accused
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and presented said ticket in the Philippine
Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee. Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that
the said ticket as presented by the said
accused was falsified and immediately
OZAETA, J.:
thereafter he called for a policeman who
apprehended and arrested the said accused
Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by
right then and there.
counsel, pleaded guilty to the following information
filed against him in the Court of First Instance of
Contrary to law.
Manila:

The undersigned accuses Rafael Balmores y (Sgd.) LORENZO RELOVA

Caya of attempted estafa through Assistant City Fiscal
falsification of a security, committed as
follows:
and was sentenced by Judge Emilio Pena to suffer
not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision
That on or about the 22nd day of
mayor and not more than 12 years and 1 day
September, 1947, in the City of Manila,
of reclusion temporal, and to pay a fine of P100 and
Philippines, the said accused did then and
the costs.
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of
From that sentence he appealed to this court,
estafa through falsification of a security
contending (1) that the facts and (2) that the trial
directly by overt acts, to wit; by then and
court lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of
there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-
guilty because, being illiterate, he was not assisted
wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8
by counsel.
unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket
thereby removing the true and real
unidentified number of same and In support of the first contention, counsel for the
substituting and writing in ink at the bottom appellant argues that there could be so could be no
on the left side of said ticket the figure or genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
number 074000 thus making the said ticket ticket for the June 29, 1947, draw; that this court has
bear the said number 074000, which is a judicial notice that the Philippine Charity
prize-winning number in the Philippine Sweepstakes Office issued only four 1/4 units for
Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29, each ticket for the said draw of June 29, 1947; that
1947, and presenting the said ticket so the information does not show that the true and real
falsified on said date, September 22, 1947, unidentified number of the ticket alleged to have
in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office been torn was not and could not be 074000; that the
for the purpose of exchanging the same for substitution and writing in ink of the said number
the corresponding cash that said number 074000 was not falsification where the true and real
has won, fraudulently pretending in said number of the ticket so torn was 074000.
office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and This contention is based on assumption not borne
that he is entitled to the corresponding out by the record. The ticket alleged to have been
amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket in falsified is before us and it appears to be a 1/8 unit.
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on We cannot take judicial notice of what is not of
said date, June 29, 1947, but the said common knowledge. If relevant, should have been
proved. But if it is true that the Philippine Charity The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or
Sweepstakes Office did not issue 1/8 but only 1/4 falsification of "treasury or bank notes or certificates
units of tickets for the June 29, 1947, draw, that or other obligations and securities" is reclusion
would only strengthen the theory of the prosecution temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to
that the 1/8 unit of a ticket which appellant exceed P10,000, if the document which has been
presented to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or
Office was spurious. The assumption that the true security of the United States or of the Philippine
and real unidentified number of the ticket alleged to Islands. This being a complex crime of attempted
have been torn was the winning number 074000, is estafa through falsification of an obligation or
likewise not supported by the record. The security of the Philippines, the penalty should be
information to which appellant pleaded guilty imposed in its maximum period in accordance with
alleged that the appellant removed the true and real article 48. Taking into consideration the mitigating
unidentified number of the ticket circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the
and substituted and wrote in ink at the bottom on Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot
the left side of said ticket the figure or number be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period,
074000. It is obvious that there would have been no which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. It results,
need of removal and substitution if the original therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial
number on the ticket was the same as that which court is correct.
appellant wrote in ink in lieu thereof.
The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing
The second contention appears to be based on a sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone
correct premises but wrong conclusion. The fact that and would not constitute a crime were it not for the
appellant was illiterate did not deprive the trial court attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-
of jurisdiction assisted by counsel. The decision winning number. So in the ultimate analysis
expressly states that appellant waived the right to be appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit
assisted by counsel, and we know of no law against estafa (punishable with eleven days of arresto
such waiver. menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer
for the serious crime of falsification of a government
It may be that appellant was either reckless or obligation. We realize that the penalty is too severe,
foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as considering all the circumstances of the case, but we
that which he admitted to have perpetrated would have no discretion to impose a lower penalty than
succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the authorized by law. The exercise of clemency and not
falsification did not make the crime impossible in this court.
within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in
relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. We are constrained to affirm the sentence appealed
Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly from, with costs against the appellant.
was not punishable but is now under article 59 of
the Revised Penal Code, are the following: (1) When Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
one tries to kill another by putting in his soup a Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
substance which he believes to be arsenic when in
fact it is common salt; and (2) when one tries to
murder a corpse. (Guevara, Commentaries on the
Revised Penal Code, 4th ed., page 15; decision,

Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1879; 12 Jur.
Crim., 343.) Judging from the appearance of the
falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to
say that it would have been impossible for the
appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru
falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was
presented for the payment had not exercised due
care.

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992 Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if
(sic) you were not injured". 2
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was
guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from
this Court a modification of the judgment by holding
him liable only for an impossible crime, citingArticle
CAMPOS, JR., J.: 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL
review of the decision of the Court of RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Responsibility shall be incurred:
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder. xxx xxx xxx

From the records, we gathered the following facts. 2. By any person performing an act
which would be an offense against
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, persons or property, were it not for
Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig the inherent impossibility of its
went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, accomplishment or on account of
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to the employment of inadequate or
go with them to the house of Bernardina ineffectual means.
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's
Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he absence from her room on the night he and
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land his companions riddled it with bullets made
dispute between them and that Mandaya should the crime inherently impossible.
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would
also be killed. On the other hand, Respondent People of the
Philippines argues that the crime was not
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition,
Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his respondent pointed out that:
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, . . . The crime of murder was not
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It consummated, not because of the
turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in inherent impossibility of its
another City and her home was then occupied by her accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room Penal Code), but due to a cause or
when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by accident other than petitioner's
the gun fire. and his accused's own
spontaneous desistance (Art.
Petitioner and his companions were positively 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not
identified by witnesses. One witness testified that sleep at her house at that time.
before the five men left the premises, they shouted: Had it not been for this fact, the
"We will kill you (the witness) and especially crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the the law; (2) there is intention to
Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in perform the physical act; (3) there
the Old Penal Code where: is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the
. . . it was necessary that the consequence resulting from the
execution of the act has been intended act does not amount to a
commenced, that the person crime. 14
conceiving the idea should have
set about doing the deed, The impossibility of killing a person already
employing appropriate means in dead 15 falls in this category.
order that his intent might become
a reality, and finally, that the result On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
or end contemplated shall have extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
been physically possible. So long as beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
these conditions were not present, intended crime. 16 One example is the man who
the law and the courts did not hold puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
him criminally liable. 5 intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the
pocket empty. 17
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely
unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner
the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his shoots the place where he thought his victim would
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
out with means which prove inadequate, would accomplish his end.
constitute a felony against person or against
property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish One American case had facts almost exactly the
such criminal tendencies. 9 same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the
accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the
Under this article, the act performed by the offender spot where he thought the police officer would be. It
cannot produce an offense against person or turned out, however, that the latter was in a
property because: (1) the commission of the offense different place. The accused failed to hit him and to
is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused
the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) of an attempt to kill. It held that:
ineffectual. 10
The fact that the officer was not at
That the offense cannot be produced because the the spot where the attacking party
commission of the offense is inherently impossible imagined where he was, and
of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be where the bullet pierced the roof,
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the renders it no less an attempt to
offender must be by its nature one impossible of kill. It is well settled principle of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either criminal law in this country that
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in where the criminal result of an
order to qualify the act an impossible crime. attempt is not accomplished
simply because of an obstruction in
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, the way of the thing to be
even if completed, would not amount to a operated upon, and these facts are
crime. 13 Thus: unknown to the aggressor at the
time, the criminal attempt is
Legal impossibility would apply to committed.
those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the
to perform an act in violation of accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
victim because the latter did not pass by the place In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill,
where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable fired at the window of victim's room thinking that
for attempted murder. The court explained that: the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the
victim was in another part of the house. The court
It was no fault of Strokes that the convicted the accused of attempted murder.
crime was not committed. . . . It
only became impossible by reason The aforecited cases are the same cases which have
of the extraneous circumstance been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court
that Lane did not go that way; and sustain the judgment of attempted murder against
further, that he was arrested and Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these
prevented from committing the decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
murder. This rule of the law has difference between the Philippine and the American
application only where it is laws regarding the concept and appreciation of
inherently impossible to commit impossible crimes.
the crime. It has no application to a
case where it becomes impossible In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article
for the crime to be committed, 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
either by outside interference or made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States,
because of miscalculation as to a the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent
supposed opportunity to commit regarding this matter. What it provided for were
the crime which fails to attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code.
materialize; in short it has no Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
application to the case when the committing the offense is merely a defense to an
impossibility grows out of attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and
extraneous acts not within the the cases generally divide the impossibility defense
control of the party. into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held that:
defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there
was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the . . . factual impossibility of the
court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit: commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have
It being an accepted truth that been committed had the
defendant deserves punishment by circumstances been as the
reason of his criminal intent, no defendant believed them to be, it
one can seriously doubt that the is no defense that in reality the
protection of the public requires crime was impossible of
the punishment to be commission.
administered, equally whether in
the unseen depths of the pocket, Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense
etc., what was supposed to exist which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an
was really present or not. The attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was
community suffers from the mere indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and
alarm of crime. Again: Where the out of prison. The law governing the matter made
thing intended (attempted) as a the act criminal if done without knowledge and
crime and what is done is a sort to consent of the warden. In this case, the offender
create alarm, in other words, intended to send a letter without the latter's
excite apprehension that the evil; knowledge and consent and the act was performed.
intention will be carried out, the However, unknown to him, the transmittal was
incipient act which the law of achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent.
attempt takes cognizance of is in The lower court held the accused liable for attempt
reason committed. but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
"elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge crime.
of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model
Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is To uphold the contention of respondent that the
consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In offense was Attempted Murder because the absence
disposing of this contention, the Court held that the of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
federal statutes did not contain such provision, and independent of the actor's will, will render useless
thus, following the principle of legality, no person the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
could be criminally liable for an act which was not criminally liable for an act "which would be an
made criminal by law. Further, it said: offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ."
Congress has not yet enacted a law In that case all circumstances which prevented the
that provides that intent plus act consummation of the offense will be treated as an
plus conduct constitutes the accident independent of the actor's will which is an
offense of attempt irrespective of element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
legal impossibility until such time
as such legislative changes in the WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is
law take place, this court will not hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court
fashion a new non-statutory law of of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted
criminal attempt. Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined
To restate, in the United States, where the offense and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of
sought to be committed is factually impossible or the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the
to commit the substantive crime where the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together
elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, with the accessory penalties provided by the law,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an and to pay the costs.
impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a
crime. On the other hand, where the offense is SO ORDERED.
legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an
attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason
for this is that in American law, there is no such thing

as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes
impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that
is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction,

impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore,
the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility
and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos

distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a
physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under

Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009 In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo,
also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner, Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649
vs. postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby
Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
D E C I S I O N petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam.
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
PERALTA, J.:
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of
petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed
and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal
1
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee
G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003,
of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in
affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of
2 the middle of July from one of their customers,
Qualified Theft, and its Resolution dated March 5,
Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if
2004 denying petitioner's motion for
she could issue checks payable to the account of
reconsideration.
Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable
to CASH. Said customer had apparently been
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely,
instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check
Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around
Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court
that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of
an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who
Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows: was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the
call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check
That on or about and sometime in the month of July deposited in his account had been dishonored.
1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a
named accused, conspiring together and mutually
former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking
helping one another, being then all employees of
the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein
phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced
represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as
check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and
such had free access inside the aforesaid
relay the message through Valencia, because the
establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain
reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-
and without the knowledge and consent of the
employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came
in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No.
from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask
0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of
Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia
₱10,000.00, representing payment made by
also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and
customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc.
divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca,
aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.
upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
3 reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Joseph Dyhengco.

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino
the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events
and was able to confirm that the latter indeed
that transpired to be as follows. handed petitioner a BDO check for ₱10,000.00
sometime in June 1997 as payment for her
 4
purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino further Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out
testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked
called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO money previously given to her by Dyhengco.
5
check bounced. Verification from company records Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to
showed that petitioner never remitted the subject the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and
check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the
cash in August 1997 as replacement for the whole time.
6
dishonored check.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent
admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of
bank account, but explained that the check came their hands. This showed that petitioner and
into his possession when some unknown woman Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a
arrived at his house around the first week of July criminal case for qualified theft against the two and
1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline
his cash in exchange for the check without even Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman
or her address. When he was informed by the bank The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken
that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as the subject check and presented the following
he didn’t know where to find the woman who scenario.
rediscounted the check.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked claimed that she had stopped collecting payments
out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her
pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were resignation from the company. She further testified
marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to
NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, her mother’s house, where she was staying at that
who was tasked to pretend that she was going along time, and asked that she accompany her
with Valencia's plan. (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner
was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride
at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then with the former and her husband in their jeep going
holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She
check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to
proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the
replaced with cash, but the plan did not push house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
through. However, they agreed to meet again on Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI
August 21, 2007. agents arrested them.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the
petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and 1997. It was never part of her job to collect
Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; payments from customers. According to her, on the
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up
because she decided to go shopping. It was only on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could
petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby
who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so,
Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from despite her admission during cross-examination that
the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she
pretending that she was getting cash from Baby had never been to said house. They then met at the
house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised
petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby in the petition are as follows:
Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place,
Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for 1. Whether or not petitioner can be
her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came convicted of a crime not charged in the
out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money information;
and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI
agents arrested them. 2. Whether or not a worthless check can be
the object of theft; and
The trial of the three accused went its usual course
and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its 3. Whether or not the prosecution has
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
8
doubt.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, The petition deserves considerable thought.
Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
The prosecution tried to establish the following
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is
pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5)
crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in
YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown
TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega
7
Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment
SO ORDERED. to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for
herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her
2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was
portion of which reads, thus: done with intent to gain – this is presumed from the
act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the that the check was deposited to the bank account of
trial court is MODIFIED, in that: petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without
the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma she had received the check payment from her
Jacinto stands; employer's customer by not remitting the check to
the company; (5) it was accomplished without the
(b) the sentence against accused Anita use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto of force upon things – the check was voluntarily
mayor medium. handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was
known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it
was done with grave abuse of confidence –
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is
petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection
acquitted.
of payments from customers.
SO ORDERED.
However, as may be gleaned from the
aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the
Code, the personal property subject of the theft
foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner
must have some value, as the intention of the
Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per
accused is to gain from the thing stolen.This is
Resolution dated March 5, 2004. further bolstered by Article 309, where the law
provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
Hence, the present Petition for Review accused is dependent on the value of the thing
on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was inherently impossible, or the means employed was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended
the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code
10
was further explained by the Court in Intod in this
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. wise:

9
Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and Under this article, the act performed by the offender
applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused, cannot produce an offense against persons or
intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s property because: (1) the commission of the offense
bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2)
was not home at the time, no harm came to him. the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of ineffectual.
attempted murder. But upon review by this Court,
he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible That the offense cannot be produced because the
crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, commission of the offense is inherently impossible
Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said offender must be by its nature one impossible of
provisions read as follows: accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify
responsibility shall be incurred: the act as an impossible crime.

x x x x Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts,

even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
2. By any person performing an act which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not x x x x
for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls
of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis in this category.
supplied)
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
commit the crime because the means employed or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
11
the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intended crime. x x x
intending to commit an offense has already
performed the acts for the execution of the same In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an
but nevertheless the crime was not produced by offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with
nature one of impossible accomplishment or the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets
because the means employed by such person are nothing since the pocket is empty.
essentially inadequate to produce the result desired
by him, the court, having in mind the social danger Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above
and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this
shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto case, petitioner performed all the acts to
mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a
crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
that the act performed would be an offense against taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of
the fact that the check bounced, she would have one’s personal property, is the element which
received the face value thereof, which was not produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x
13
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the x
extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, From the above discussion, there can be no question
that prevented the crime from being produced. The that as of the time that petitioner took possession
thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
absolutely worthless, because the check was performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received theft, had it not been impossible of
the cash to replace the value of said dishonored accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of
check.1avvphi1 petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check was no longer
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped necessary for the consummation of the crime of
receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which she qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
thought was the cash replacement for the Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check
dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held was hatched only after the check had been
12
in Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of
is only one operative act of execution by the actor receiving the cash replacement should not be
involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of considered as a continuation of the theft. At most,
another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus: the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
under Article 308, there is one apparent answer
provided in the language of the law — that theft is Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to
already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its
property of another without the latter’s consent." issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme.
Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included
x x x x or covered by the allegations in the Information, the
Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of
would be all but certain unanimity in the position the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme
that theft is produced when there is deprivation of could have been another possible source of criminal
personal property due to its taking by one with liability.
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
offender, once having committed all the acts of is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated
dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T.
from the owner alone has already ensued from such Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
acts of execution. x x x defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and
59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
x x x x Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or
apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the SO ORDERED.
moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same. x x x