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3. 4.

98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 102/129

With regard to emergency aid to victims of disasters within the Community, the Commission would remind the
Honourable Member that the 1997 budget provided no appropriations for the relevant budget item (B4-3400)
which would allow immediate action to be take to help the families in distress. The Commission would also point
out that this Community measure was never designed to compensate the victims of damage caused by disasters
but rather to demonstrate Community solidarity with the population affected.

The Portuguese authorities have not notified the Commission of the situation to which the Honourable Member

(1) OJ L 193, 31.7.1993.

(98/C 102/194) WRITTEN QUESTION P-2820/97

by Nuala Ahern (V) to the Commission
(1 September 1997)

Subject: Proposed completion of the Rovno Unit 4 and Khmelnitsky Unit 2 (k2/r4) nuclear reactors under the
Memorandum of Understanding between G7 and Ukraine

Concerning the proposed completion of the k2/r4 nuclear reactors in Ukraine, do the safety proposals at each of
the costing, least-costing, evaluation and construction phases of the project incorporate a completely new
instrumentation and control system, a full probabilistic safety assessment, and the separation of all power and
control cabling as dictated by the lessons of the Browns Ferry cable-tray fire of 1975, all of which are being
undertaken on the similar reactors in Temelin, and if not why not?

Further, will all the requirements to meet the implications of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters be
included, and if not, why not?

How is it proposed to deal with pressure vessel embrittlement, and safety against air-crashes?

Can the Commission clarify how the Risk Audit safety assessment (Report No 52) could possibly be used as a
basis for any final decision on this matter, since there seems to have been no complete analysis of existing work
on these reactors, and certain problems are left for future resolution, or for implementation after start-up? How
therefore could the PHARE/TACIS Nuclear Safety Expert Group possibly have given safety approval for the
project last year, and why did it take more than 6 months for the Risk Audit report to be made publicly available?

Answer given by Mr Van den Broek on behalf of the Commission

(1 October 1997)

In the Commission’s view, the final safety level to be achieved at the Rovno 4 (R4) and Khmelnitsky 2 (K2)
reactors is of critical importance. With the assistance of the Tacis programme, a modernisation programme has
been prepared for both reactors. Riskaudit, an organisation composed of independent technical safety
organisations from France and Germany, has evaluated this modernisation programme on the basis of guidelines
produced by the International atomic energy agency (IAEA) and on the basis of approved practices in similar
reactors operating in the Community and has assessed that the proposed modernisation programme represents
the state of the art and is fully consistent in itself.

In this context, it is clear that the status of the present construction is important. As the plant construction has
been interrupted for some years, a careful assessment of the actual plant status has been initiated. If this
qualitative inspection identifies weak points, corrective measures will be taken. The inspection reports and the
corrective measures will also be independently evaluated by Riskaudit.
C 102/130 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 3. 4. 98

The implementation of the resulting modernisation programme, which includes the recommendations made by
Riskaudit, completed by additional specific measures by the Ukrainian organisations, and of the specific
recommendations resulting from the qualitative inspection, will guarantee a safety level comparable to that
achieved in western plants of the same vintage design, upgraded on the basis of subsequent improvements in
safety standards. The safety level will therefore be equivalent to that of many reactors operating now in western

With regard to the specific questions raised for the R4K2 reactors results of probabilistic safety assessments
(PSA) on similar reactors have been used. A full scope PSA is foreseen on the basis of the modernised

The instrumentation and control (I&C) as foreseen in the original project has a certain number of shortcomings
which have been identified through assessment and operating experience. They are subject to specific corrective
measures. At Temelin, the choice has been made to fully replace the I&C. The separation between cabling for
I&C and cabling for power supply is not a safety related requirement. However, the separation of the redundant
trains of safety systems needs to be achieved either by geographical or physical separation. Both principles will
be used concurrently at R4K2 to achieve independence of trains.

In answer to the general question, it is obvious that the lessons from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
accidents have been taken into account.

With regard to the pressure vessel embrittlement, the exposure of the VVER-1000 reactor pressure vessel wall to
neutron flow is in the same range as in the western pressurized water reactor vessels of the same vintage.
Additional measures will be implemented through the modernisation programme so as to reduce the fluence
(irradiation) and the number of thermal shocks. A surveillance programme will be developed in order to
determine the residual lifetime of the vessel.

The modernisation programme includes the assessment of the probability of an aircraft impact on the reactor
building. If the value obtained from the assessment exceeds the internationally accepted value, administrative
measures with respect to air corridors will be enforced.

(98/C 102/195) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2824/97

by Ria Oomen-Ruijten (PPE) to the Commission
(1 September 1997)

Subject: Textile recycling

Recently the Council adopted a resolution on a Community strategy for waste management. This resolution
suggests that used textiles are not waste.

Does the Commission share the Council’s view that used textiles, collected old clothes and used clothing and
products obtained from them (eg cleaning cloths and recovered fibres) do not constitute waste and the textile
recycling industry depots are therefore not waste dumps?

Answer given by Mrs Bjerregaard on behalf of the Commission

(13 October 1997)

With regard to the Council Resolution of 24 February 1997 (1) on a Community strategy for waste management,
the Commission is not aware of any reference to the legal status of used textiles.

Description of items as waste has to be made in the light of the definition of waste as laid down in Article 1a) of
Directive 75/442/EEC on waste (2). On the basis of this provision waste is any substance or object in the
categories set out in Annex I which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard. As Annex I contains a
catch all-entry (Q16 ‘any materials, substances or products which are not contained in the above categories’)
every substance or object might be waste.