People vs.
Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] affected the jurisdiction of the trial court, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy
En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur
Facts: On 22 November 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the alleged crime,
Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita
Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with
robbery, alleging "That on or about 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in
the afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of
Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of
violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have
carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the
roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place while she was alone on her way to
barrio San Raymundo." After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for
rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the complaint, with an additional
averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the
case contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd
designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd
designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted
the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint
filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with
'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the
fiscal appealed.
Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government constitutes double jeopardy.
Held: An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant
would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that "When a defendant shall have been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information." In order that the protection against double jeopardy
may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the
original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. The complaint filed with the municipal court in the present case was valid; the
trial court was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows
that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The particular aspect of double
jeopardy, i.e. dismissal or termination of the original case without the express consent of
the defendant, has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from the Supreme
Court. In People vs. Salico (1949), the Court held that "When the case is dismissed with
the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby
prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him." The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs.
Marapao (85 Phil 832, 30 March 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil 299, 5 March
1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil 53, 28 March 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion
(94 Phil 258, 26 January 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (GR L-15516, 17 December
1966). On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double
jeopardy was first enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a
case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is
estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his
plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the
doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought
by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and
bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a
new prosecution for the same offense. The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs.
Amada Reyes, et al., (96 Phil 927, 30 April 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al., (98 Phil 646,
23 March 1956); People vs. Casiano (GR L-15309, 16 February 1961), and People vs.
Archilla (GR L-15632, 28 February 1961). The case of Bangalao, Ferrer, and Labatete,
did not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases
even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in Acierto).
In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles, like in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by
the defendants, were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on the right
of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute.
Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a dismissal not
amounting to an acquittal. Here, the controverted dismissal was predicated on the
erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity
trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in
the present case did not terminate the action on the merits. The application of the sister
doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal
must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and
second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an
acquittal. Indubitably, the present case falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. The
case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 176389 14 December 2010
FACTS:
On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were
brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI
announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of
its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer,
Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an asset to
the NBI by leading the agency to criminals. Some of the said criminals had been so
high-profile, that Alfaro had become the “darling” of the NBI because of her contribution
to its success. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct and
spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should be
given a great weight in the decision of the case.
In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was
asked to see Carmela at their residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a
male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs
and plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the
accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken
place, he was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09
March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992. As documentary evidence, he
presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from
both the Philippines and the US, Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents in
the US during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated
by the Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough
recount of his activities in the US
ISSUE:
Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more
credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.
RULING:
For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:
The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.
She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for
mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And although her testimony included
details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She
took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example,
just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence
that:
He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi
presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will
not hold altogether. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.
Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] First Division,
Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less
serious physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court said the defendant could not
be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial.
The certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the
exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had
succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result
of the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did not
agree. Through their counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the
provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision notified to them
on 23 January 1980. This motion was sent by registered mail on 2 February 1980. It was
denied on 28 February 1980, in an order that was communicated to the private
prosecutor on 18 March 1980. On 20 March 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the
trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor.After
considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge Romeo N. Firme
(Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union)
dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1980, for tardiness. Both the fiscal and the private
prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but these were denied on 12 May
1980. The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the
Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United States, where the U.S.
Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared
by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the
purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double
jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction. It need only be
stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then can the offended
party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition
operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information."
There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused
in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The
petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting
the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and
therefore null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been
committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It
did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no
longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be.
Infine, thus, however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and although a
miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted because
of the timely plea of double jeopardy.
People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985]
Facts: On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed
before the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information
against Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the crime of theft,
committed as "That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true
names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the following
property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at —
P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not
guilty." Proceedings were had on 7 July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L. Bocar
(Branch XVI) conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant
as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation, " the Judge issued the order
dismissing the case, holding that the case is more civil than criminal. On 12 July 1967,
the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. On
18 July 1967, the private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"; and
on 8 August 1967, the City Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion
for reconsideration. On 9 August 1967, the Court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration. A copy of said order was received by the City Fiscal's Office on 11
August 1967. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the
CFI order of 7 July 1967.
Issue: Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis
for a claim of double jeopardy.
Held: The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the
the Judge. Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the
case before the Court. The Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was
arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme
Court cannot permit. Thus, the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee is that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee
as "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. — When a defendant shall have
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information." Thus, apparently, to raise the
defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right
of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and
the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused
to a second jeopardy.
People vs. Relova [GR L-45129, 6 March 1987]
Facts: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued
by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. The
police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed,
without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed
inside the walls of the building" owned by Opulencia. These electric devices and
contraptions wereallegedly "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of
electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold
storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a
written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to
lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter." On 24 November 1975, an
Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance 1, Series of 1974,
Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine
"ranging from P5.00 to P50.00 or imprisonment, which shall not exceed 30 days, or both,
at the discretion of the court." Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the information filed. On 2
February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the
crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to
be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an
order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which
prescribes 2 months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the
information was filed by the fiscal more than 9 months after discovery of the offense
charged in February 1975. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II, another
information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article
308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case
266) before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be
arraigned thereon, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he
had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that
the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order
dated 16 August 1976, Judge Benjamin Relova granted the accused's Motion to Quash
and ordered the case dismissed. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied
by the Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976. On 1 December 1976, the petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court by the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City on behalf of the People.
Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443, Opulencia could — if he failed to
plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in case 16054, in which
he has already been acquitted.
Held: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first
or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. The Bill of Rights
deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." The second sentence of said clause provides that "if
an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence,
one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or
does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging
said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. Thus, where the
offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast,
where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized
by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to
have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the
same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. It is
perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be
understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need
not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same
offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily
included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment
of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements. Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and
are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity,
should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as
there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor
can find. It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such
offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense.
Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the
grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense.
Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639
Facts:
Question: Are we a government of laws or a government of men? Would we disregard
law just to give way for the most popular leader? Let's see what the Supreme Court will
have to say. Lest we forget this long standing jurisprudence.
Again this is a landmark case. In this classic case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban, the
Supreme Court upheld the right of Filipino citizens to Freedom of Domicile.
Here's the facts:
Justo Lukban was then the Mayor of the City of Manila. Problem with this dude is he
ordered the deportation of 170 agogo dancers and prostitutes to Davao. Which was then
not a city yet I guess. This case is dated 1919 so take note, the President wasn't even
born yet. Said women were inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
(So there was a brothel house in that area during those days)
The mayor's reason for doing this was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila.
(This guy was probably the biggest hypocrite there ever was during those early days)
He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an
haciendero named Feliciano Ynigo. He had the prostitutes confined in houses meaning
the one in Gardenia Street before boarding them, at the dead of night, in two boats
bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being
transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no
idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
(Poor guy. Imagine all the commotion starting to happen in your place and you're still
fuckin' totally clueless)
So the families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against 3 people. Lukban.
Anton Hohmann, who was the Chief of Police who rounded and took custody of the the
dancers and prostitutes, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao.
(Of course there's a considered conspiracy between these three)
They prayed for a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS to be issued against the respondents to
compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their
knowledge and will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported
without their consent. Infact there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation
of the 170 prostitutes.
(So in effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Obviously the guy doesn't
know anything about the law and fundamental human rights)
Liberty of abode was raised here versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in
deporting the women without their knowledge and consent in his capacity as Mayor.
You know what the mayor did? He got technical. The guy moved for the dismissal of the
case stating that those women were already out of his jurisdiction and that, it should be
filed in the city of Davao instead.
(Let me get my hands on him)
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners with the instructions to the respondents
giving them 3 options (1) Produce the bodies of the persons according to the command
of the writ. (2) Show by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
(170 women subject of the writ of habeas corpus) could not safely be brought before the
court, or (3) Present affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present.
(So the mayor resorted to technicalities in his defense and he was slapped by the court
through technicalities as well giving him a dose of his own medicine)
The three respondents hence appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men? Was the act of the
mayor in deporting these women valid?
RULING:
The Supreme Court said "We are clearly a government of laws". Lukban committed
grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to
change his residence.
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite
uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate
themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse,without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this,
Lukban etal must be severely punished.
Court reasoned further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines
could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of
the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly
fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official,
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality, then the more the writ of habeas corpus
should be enforced.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If
the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the
same means to return them from Davao to Manila.

The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had
the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence.
Moncupa vs. Enrile , No. L-63345, January 30, 1986
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings – Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not render the
petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic)
Facts: Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members
of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from
detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s custody.
Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and
academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an
involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view
of the detained person’s release with restrictions.
Held: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the
Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of
such restraints as may be illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary
release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render
the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person
continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo,
Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano
lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo
City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999,
petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband
alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify
the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86
years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against
his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of
a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.
MELISSA ROXAS v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (2010)
J. Perez
PONENTE: Perez, J.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
1. Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data
2. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
summarily heard the Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the
Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States,
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in
the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions
were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and
dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she
is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and was
brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking
off and landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her
communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured
her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her
name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim
card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas
continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension,
she threw the phone and the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of
military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
SC issued the writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence
and appropriate action.
CA granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo
absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were
responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the SC.
ISSUES/HELD: 1) WON the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in
an amparo petition – NO

DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally

inaccurate – The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in
impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.

The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy – As held in the case of Rubrico v.

Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by
the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or
threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law.

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual

liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than
in a summary amparo proceeding.

However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the
petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—
but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

2) WON circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of
amparo – NO

EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere

circumstantial evidence – In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly
proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

3) WON substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right

to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the
privilege of the writ may be extended – YES

EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS

Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy

in life, liberty or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before
the privilege of the writ may be extended – An indispensable requirement before the
privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.

In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of
such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence
of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched,
and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.