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2. 10.

98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 304/143

(98/C 304/213) WRITTEN QUESTION E-0660/98
by Leonie van Bladel (UPE) to the Council
(16 March 1998)

Subject: The Netherlands obstructing the international hunt for a drug baron

1. Is the Presidency aware of the dismissal by the Netherlands Minister of Justice (who represents D’66) of the
Hague public prosecutor, Mr Arthur Docters van Leeuwen?

2. Is the Council aware of confidential and personal military intelligence report 913 of 21 January 1982 in
which the Netherlands’ former Minister of Defence and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr H.A.F.M.O. van
Mierlo (D’66) intended to provide training for the intelligence service of the then dictator of Surinam, Desi
Bouterse?

3. Does the Council realise that a dictator’s military intelligence service is used solely for the purpose of
repressing the population?

4. Is the Council aware that the Netherlands Ministry of Justice has requested international assistance in
tracing Surinam’s ex-dictator Bouterse who is suspected of large-scale international dealing in cocaine?

5. Is the Council aware that ministers Van Mierlo and Sorgdrager made it impossible to arrest Bouterse in
Brazil last year?

6. Is the Council aware of the circumstances whereby Mr Charles van der Voort, the public prosecutor
responsible for tracing Bouterse, was removed from active service?

7. Does the Council realise that the Hague public prosecutor, Mr Arthur Docters van Leeuwen, is in fact the
only person willing to continue with tracing and prosecuting Bouterse?

8. Does the Council not feel that the dismissal of Mr Docters van Leeuwen is simply the latest in a series of
steps aimed at frustrating the prosecution of Desi Bouterse?

9. Can the Council make an urgent appeal to the Netherlands to allow Mr Docters van Leeuwen to resume his
work and to continue in his efforts to arrest and prosecute Bouterse?

Answer
(25 May 1998)

The questions posed by the Honourable Member of the European Parliament relate solely to matters that are
internal affairs of the Netherlands.

(98/C 304/214) WRITTEN QUESTION P-0662/98
by Nikitas Kaklamanis (UPE) to the Commission
(2 March 1998)

Subject: Installation of hazardous nuclear reactor at Akkuyu

In April 1998, Turkey is due to select the type of nuclear reactor to be installed in the region of Akkuyu, which is
particularly prone to the risk of earthquake and is also home to the rare, protected species of seal known as
Monachus Monachus.

Turkey reportedly intends to select the Canadian reactor ‘Candu’ which is capable (through a particular method)
of increasing the quantity of plutonium produced, creating a basis for the production of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, it is not a matter of chance that this type of reactor has been installed in sensitive areas of countries
such as South Korea, India, Pakistan and China. The quality and safety standards of these reactors have been
severely criticized in certain quarters in the USA and Canada, while Canada gave a commitment at the Kyoto
environment summit (last December) to close down seven nuclear plants of this type.

What action will the Commission take to prevent the installation of this type of reactor only a few miles outside
the EU’s boundaries?
C 304/144 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 2. 10. 98

Answer given by Mr Van den Broek on behalf of the Commission
(23 March 1998)

The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission’s answer to his Question E-3787/97 (1).

The Turkish authorities require tenderers to have a proven track record in the design, construction and
performance of at least two nuclear power stations, at least one of which must be suitable as a reference for the
Akkuyu project. Applicants must also demonstrate their ability to manage international projects. Tenders should
be submitted only by companies or organisations with sufficient financial resources to meet the commitments
arising from projects of this scale.

The Turkish authorities have also called upon several consultants specialising in the technical evaluation of
tenders, contract negotiation and legal and economic issues. These companies include the Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute and the Spanish company Empresarios Agrupados Internacional.

The Commission must point out that Community directives are not applicable to a plant situated outside the
territory of the European Union such as that referred to by the Honourable Member.

(1) OJ C 223, 17.7.1998, p. 22.

(98/C 304/215) WRITTEN QUESTION P-0683/98
by Umberto Bossi (NI) to the Commission
(2 March 1998)

Subject: The Banca d’Italia’s gold and the Italian public sector borrowing requirement

The circumstances surrounding the sale of gold belonging to the Banca d’Italia to the Ufficio Italiano Cambi
(UIC, the Italian Foreign Exchange Office) is only the latest in a long series of scandals which have shown Italy
in the undignified role of desperately attempting to meet the Maastricht criteria.

A document recently approved in Brussels by the Commission, to the effect that the Council will look into this
case and that Eurostat is in the process of investigating the matter to ascertain the nature of the transaction in
question, notes that in 1974, to protect the lira against attacks by speculators, the Banca d’Italia obtained a
US $ 2 billion loan from the Bundesbank. The UIC purchased 543 tonnes of gold from the Banca d’Italia to
underwrite the loan. The loan was paid off in September 1978, but the gold remained on the UIC’s balance sheet.
It was revalued over the years, but the corresponding capital gains were never taxed because, under Italian tax
law, capital gains are not subject to tax until they are realized. In July 1997 the UIC -which, by the way, was in the
process of being wound up- sold the gold back to the Banca d’Italia. That operation generated a capital gain of c.
Lit 7600 billion, and hence the requirement to pay Lit 4000 billion in tax, part of which (Lit 3 400 billion) was
paid in November 1997. Consequently the sum of Lit 3400 billion was credited to the public exchequer and duly
entered against the public sector deficit, which proved to have been kept down to 2.7% of GDP by the end of
1997, in other words well below the crucial 3% ceiling set by the Maastricht criteria.

Does the Commission intend to finally ascertain the nature of this transaction?

Does the Commission intend to establish whether it is permissible to encourage tax revenues of this kind to be
offset against the public sector deficit?

If not, does the Commission not consider that this incident shows yet again that Italy has not changed its ways
and is prepared to stoop to dubious accounting practices in order to enter Europe?

Answer given by Mr de Silguy on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 1998)

In the framework of the monitoring procedures established by the EC Treaty, such as the multilateral surveillance
(Article 103) and the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104c) the Commission has always thoroughly assessed
the scope and nature of macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment of individual Member States, making a clear