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THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS

LIBRARY

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY

Call Number __5131,43 --------


Accession Number 8320

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
T A CT ICS

A HANDBOOK BASED ON LESSONS OF THE

WORLD WAR

Compiled by

ROHRBECK

Ma.jor°

y4.
.

(N\ s A.

fi'/
{im i
. ., -

E..M.&Son.

With Numerous Tables in the Text

Berlin, 1919 v Ernst Siegfried Mittler Son Blookshop

TB" V
AkMnwl
p
4 t~r A5 S4
All rights under the Law of June 19,1901

reserved, as well as the right of trrns.

1 tion
FOREWORD

The far-reaching changes, which Tactics experienced in the W~orld ar, and

the numerous, for the most part secret, Regulations, which became necessary in

the matter of Tactics, lead to, belief that it is proper to compose a Guide

for the ierge domain of present day Tactics. It is hoped that this will

prove to be a useful guide and counsellor to readers, teachers, and students.

The Compiler

Berlin, November 1919


III

TABLE OF CONTENTS page

Foreword Ix
I3:
I. WAR 1
II. Leadership and Its means 1
A. Leadership 1
Task - Situation - Decision - Methods of Attack - Defense
Delaying Action - Pursuit - Breaking of
the Battle 8
Retreat
B. War Organization and Organization of Troops 11
C. Messages, Reports, Written Coimnunications 12
D. Influence of the Terrain 14
E. Estimate of Situation and Decision 15
F. Orders 17
G. Transmission of Orders and Messages, Means of Conunication 20
H. The Staff of the Commander
26
I. The Place of the Commander 26

III. TACTICS OF THE SINGLE ARMS 29


A. Infantry and its Auxiliary Arms 29
1. General Rules 29
a) Task of Infantry
b) kinds of Infantry Arms
a) Capacity of Tfntry
d Utilization of the Terrain
2. The Company 36 36
Schools of the company - Formation, ovements - Field Training
General Rules - The Squad - the light M.G.Group
Platoon - Company in mobile war - Company in
Position iarfare Infantry Pioneer Service
3, Machine Gun Company
Schools of the Company - In the Field - Replenishment
of ammunition -, men, materiel
4, The Battalion 64
5. Infantry Regiment 65
6. Infantry Minewerfer Company 66
7. Infantry Gun Company 72
8. Organization of Infantry
on the Battlefield 76
9. The Regiment in Mobile Warfare 81
10 . Cyclist Troops 90

B. ARTILLERY 96
1. General Rules 96
2. Light Artillery 99
a) The Piece and Caisson 99
b) Battery 99
a) Light Artillert Battalion 105

3. Heavy Artillery 105


a&. Heavy Horse A.rtillery 105
b. Heavy Horse Battery 109
a) Heavy Artillery Battalion 109
4. Minerwerfers 111
5. Combat Action of artillery 116

C. CAVALRY 134 134


1. General Rules 134
2. The Troop 135 135
3. The Regiment 137
4. Machine Gun Battalion 138
5. The Cavalry Division 141
6. Cavalry I" Action 141
7. Cavalry Reconnaissance Patrols 149
D. ADDITIONAL MACHINE GUN ORGANIZATION 153
1. M.G.Sharpshooter battalion 153
2. Mountain M.G.Battalion 153

E. PIONEERS 154

F. -AERIAL FIGHTING FORCES AND DEFENSE 158


G
G? COMMI UUNICATION TROOPS 169

H. TRAIN ORGANIZATIONS 176

IV. TACTICS OF THE ARMS COMBINED 177

A. POSITION WARFARE 182 182


a) The Position and its Selection 182
b) Leadership in Position Warfare 184
c) Occupation of the Position 191
d )Nattle
Tasks of the Artillery 211
e) Means of Communication and Maps 218
f) Communications to the Rear 222
g) Relief 224
h) Mine Wrafare 226
i) Fighting rirnored Cars and Planes 226
k) Attack with limited b ective 234
1) Defense in Position 'carfare 244
m) Offensive in Position Warfare 275

B. Mobile Warfare 330

a) Reconnaissance 330
b) The March 339
c) Village Shelter and Bivouac 349
d) Outposts 354
e) Rencontee Engagements 359
f) Puraiit 373
g) Defense 377 xatBr(4
h) Breaking off the Battle and Retreat 387
i) Battle for Field Fortifications and Fortresses 393

C. SPECIAL BATT CONDITIONS #k( 399


a The Terrain & its Importance for Battle 399
b) The Battle at Dark and in Fog 427
c) Fronier Guard 430
d) Minor warfare 432
e) Co-operation of Army and Navy 439,

V. SUPPLY OF TROOPS IN THEF FIELD 450

450
A. TRAINS AND ^ MU1NITION COLUMNS

B. AiMUNITION SUPPLY 452

457
6, SUBSISTENCE

D. SANITARY SERVICE 460


Organization - 460; Sanitary Service - 4621
Car of the Wounded - 464
I. W A R

1. The obiect of'war is the accomplishment of' the ends of Politics or

policies by means of force of arms. Annihilation of the hostile fighting

forces is.the task of the army.

2. I a b i 1 e w a r f a r e with offensive battles on large sales

is the kind of war bringing about the decision. R e n c o n t r e engage-

ments, in which transition to battle on both sides commences directly from

column of march, change with attacks against a deploypd nemeny, who will

be Pound intrenched in most cases; or chance with defense from prior de-

ployment, pursuit, and retreat vam engagements. Defense with intention

to subsequent attacks may be proper if the opponent has the advantage of

9
deployment, when the main point is to deceive the enemy and to induce or rce hir

him to hold to a definite directions The terrain also may force us to

preliminary or partial defense.

The higher leader will decide on d e f e n s e p u r e a n d s i m p ee

only rarely and when materially inferior in force, and in cases where the

terrain offers him a chance to overcome this disadvantage.

3. If neither of the opponents has sufficient forees to overcome the

enemy s resistance, and if neither one has the proper means at hand to force

a decision, the the mobile warfare comes to a standstill and thus results

the p o s i t i o n war.

II. P
U;?AEPM aNT
N ITMANS

A. IADBRSHIP

4-r tonsidering the many phases of' war no definite rules can be laid

down for leadership. Only maxims and general noints of view can form some basi

basis. "Cbonduot of War is an Art, and in addition, of course, a Science t

Task and situation form the basis for leadership.


5. The t a s k means the objective to be gained. The leader is

bound to it. In view of the rapid change of situation, in the absence of

receipt of orders the leader will not infrequently act without having a

definite task and will have to set himself his own task, in order to take

full advantage of conditions. But this must, never lead to comirng to de-

cisions without due regard to the entire situation, must never lead to the

disregard of definite orders received, must never allow any "I know better"

to take the place of obedience. Only in cases where events overtake

orders, will it become the duty of the subordinate to disregard orders or

to change them; but such action must be immediately reported to the superior.

6. In spite of excellent reconnaissance arnd information service the

s i t u a t i o n will but seldom he so clear as to assure complete knowl-

ledge of conditions with the enemy. Thus, the leader in most cases has

to act, in uncertainty. The only certain thing is what he himself

possesses in the atter of willpower and forcefulness. This shows that

leadership is more a matter of n''haracter than of knowledge.

7, The decision is based on task and situation. "ecision pre-

supposes rapid, definite, correct estimation of all conditions beyond and

behind the front line and its effect on the sequence. if the leader

has arrived at his decision, then he should tenaciously //%l{p adhere to

it, notwithstanding interfering obstacles and changes in the situation as

long is there is no compelling reason for a change in his decision.

C~orrect execution of the decision is the proof of the strength of character

on the part of the leader. It is most. important that the leader, insofar

as he is not bound down by his task, is entirely clear in his own mind

whether he rants to f'ight or to avoid a fight..

8. Only an engagement, which breaks the onemy's will, can bring about

the decision. For that, reason it is the duty of every leader to solve his

taks - in so far as the situation permits - by battle, notwithstanding


the sacrifices which each contact demands. Any leader, willing to

assume responsibility, will never hesitate to insert his troops regardless

of everything else at any point where the outcome of the battle is in

doubt.
For the battle proper, we can never he too strong at the decisive point.

For that reason all available troops must be brought ti and every subordinate

must endeevor to participate in the battle. In this connection, the

direction in which such participation promises the best success, must be

carefully considered. Any c'/ march coluxmn which has no chance to meet

the enemy, will in most cases support its neighbor engaged in battle more

effectively by continuing its march in order to threaten the flank or rear

of the enemy than by direct support.

A leader will engage in a battle that promises no victory only where

the situation absolutely renuires it.

9. Prior to entering a battle the leader must be clear in his own

mind whether he wants to attack or defend himself, or if a delaying action

might pro.ise success.

10. The o f rf e n s i v e lays down tie law to the opponent; it

has on its side all the moral superiority, and it only can actually over-

come the enemy.

Had the leader decided on attack, then from that moment on all measures

taken have to bear the hall-mark of absolute decisions The leader must be

imbured with indominable will to be victorious and must find means and ways

to have his will permeate down to the lowest subordinate. The object to

be gained must. be to beat. the enemy, but to annihilate hirm. The attacks

can be successful only when we succed in breaking the fighting powrer o^ +the

ene y/ This will be seldom the case along the entire fighting line.

For that reason it is 6. very material task of the leader to lay= down the

the direction favorable for the attack and from the very start arrange a

distribution or troops which will result in the largest possible display


of _force at the decisive point.

11. In the matter of directionb. of attack, we distinguish between

a) frontal attack; b) f lank attack; c) Diercing; d) envelopment;

e) marching around.

(a) F r o n t a l a t t a c k. This is the simplest, rut also

the most difficult form, because it leads directly against the hostile front.

1
In this case the enemy generally has the advantage of fa'vorah le fire-effect;

while the attacker has the difficulty in deploying / % rifle or

artillery fire su le riority. As compared with other forms of attack, the

frontal attack has the least effect, in so far as in most cases it leads

only to a frontal exhaustion of the forces and, in the most favorable cave,

throws the enemy directly back on his line of communications. urinf


Tin. the

battles of the giant armies in the World1s Var

the frontal attack became the rule in most units

and therefore lead to no decision, In the case

of smaller units, the frontal attack may be prop--

er when the opponent is weak, when there is no

time to he lost, or When the cuestion is to con-

tain an enemy who would otherwise evade battle.

In the case of larger comnmands frontal attack will frequently happen

in combination with envelopment, as the latter can, as a rule, become

effective only is the enemy is actually held down in his front by an

attack.

(b) F 1 a n k a t t a c k . This form of attack it,materially

more favorahle; in case of success it may have extraordinary consequenr es;

it may roll up completely the enemy's flank and deprive him of his natural

line of retreat. In a less favorable case. - ____________

the enemy will at least be compelled to make a. =F, '° r

difficult, deployment towards the flank. But e

a flank attack pure and simple can succeed

only in case of complete surprise, in case the


enemy is careless, in case he is deceived in his front, or in cases where

the approach can be kept, hidden. This will seldom be the case consider-

ing present day .±Sxla± air reconnaissance. (Interference of the

15th Armr Corps, coming up by rail, against the plank of the Belgian Army

during its second sortie from Antwerp, Sentember 8-9,1914.)

(c) P i e r c i n g . In cases wherc the enemy its denloed in


in fNll force
a thin line, piercing appears correct/at some point alone his front lihe,

and that was the case also heretofore, whenthe


I ~"" ~~i~iLiFi-I
artillery range was not what it is now. At the

present day the piercing attempt will meet the

concentric fire effect of the enemy. To overcome

or to nullify this, the piercing attempt must be

made very broad and care must be taken on the wings to prevent interferecce,

by hostile neighboring forces, by means of inserting strong artillery forces.

In the case of the piercing party, provided the attempt is made with sufficient

depth formation, all dander of being flanked is overcome and the entire

hostile front; weill break don. Thus, duPring, the rtorld ~ar piercing -

resulting from position warfare - reeatedly succeeded in cases where there

was sufficient depth formtion. (Crorlice--Tarnor; the piercinr battles in

France during March and May 1918.)

In a rencontre engagement a sudden attack against the hostile center

may be successful, especially if the enemy attempts a far reaching

envelopment.

(d). E n v e 1 o p m e n t. Simultaneous attack against front nd

flank is as a general rule the most effective method. We may succeed. in

overlapping the enemy and get into his flank and

rear. At the point where the frontal attack

has located the hostile wing, lies the objective

of the envelopment. That point must be kept

firmly in view, so as not to lose connection with


6

the frontal attack. If the opponent should bend back his wing and pro­

long it, he must be attacked there also frohtally, but overlappingly as lnuch

as possible. In that case t,he attacker can at least hring fire superi­

ority with concentric erfect opposite the piercing point. lbe larger
range
the tra~ectory and fire. effect of modern arms is now, the mOTe decisive

will such an attack be. In an. operat.ive rep;ard also are the adva.nt.~lges

of the envelopment important. '£he envelopment not only presses the

opponent back but materially Ulreatens his lines of co~nunications.to the

rear and may increase the victory to ~omplete annihilation.

Simultaneous envelopment o~ both hostile wings may be practicahle onlv

if we have a material superiority in numbers or if conditions are specially

favore.h Ie, but in any case rr.a~T lead to the enemy being completA31y surrounrled.

(Sedan; Tanneberg 1914~ winter ba.tt.le in Masuria..)

As a. general rule any envelopment can become effect.ive onl~! if' the

front is attacked simultaneously and when the opponent is thereby prevented

from evading the attack by retreat.

Considering present day numerical strength and extensions +,ho en'V'e lopment

has to be started operatively, meanin.g that the units designat.ed for the

envelopment receive from the ver~r sf,art t.h~dr march direct,ion ursainst the

hostile flank.; In that case the operative advantages will becone much

lar~er and we will succedd much sooner Ip/~~prty~ in depriving the opponent

of his communications (K8niggrHtz; Approach to the battle of Lodz.)

It will be difficult ... on the ba"ttlefield. proper ... to arrange for e,n

envelopment by withdrawing the units desir;nated therefore from behind our

front line, and that could probably be accomplished only under the cover

of darkness.

(2) Marching a r 0 u n d •

In this case we ahandon t.he immedia.te atta.ck and

attempt to drive the enemy from a certain posi­

tion by marching around him. As a. general rule

this form of attJack will be ut,ilized in f'ightJin~

for defiles, or in attacking stream-lines.


r
In case of smaller units we would prefer to march around strong hostile

position and maneuver the opponent out of his position, instead of attack-

ing him. This is especially the case if we encounter rear guard positions

in a pursuit.

12. The above division of attach formations,or methods of attack,

is of but comparative value. The attacker will hardly have his choice

in all cases. In a mobile rar the situation and the direction of the

approaching columns will generally have their effect on the selection of

attack direction. The science of the leader will hae to arrange that

the direction of approach hits the I/$f4j ' most effective point. A de-

cisive victor , the annihilation of the enemy, is possible only if'the

hostile flank and even the rear is attacked and the enemy thus denrived of

his line of retreat. onsidcering present da giant. armies such a victory

may have an enormeous effect; the hostile masses, deprived of subsistence

and ammunition, IV falls easy prey to panic and complete dissoultion..

(Tannenberg; winter battles in Masuria.)

13. It is justifyahle to assume the d e f e n s i v e when the

main point is to save our forcesT which are intended to be inserted for

the attack at some other point, or when the strength of the eneriy or the

unfavorable terrain promises little result in an attack.

The defender is generally in the dark concerning the intentions of

the enemy as well as in the matter of best measures to be taken to Jx-ii


defeat those intentions. Htowever, the long-range firearms, extensive

reconnaissance and communication means, and also the matter of' strengthening

the terrain with all means of technique at hand, give a strength to the

defense which may offset even. great numerical superiority.

The task of the leader is to e~lect the position, to have in readiness

all the means for strengthening that position and the distribution of the

troops. This task must be accomplished. with due regard to the uncertainty of

the situation, which is inherent to the defense.


The defense can merely defeat an attack, it can never gain a decisive

victory. If the intention is to gain a victory, then we must change

from the defensive to the offensive.

14. a d e 1 a y i n g action is resorted to when the question is

to gain time o Tt is the duty of the leader to take such measures which

will prevent a serious battle and thus to delay the recision. This

object will best be attained by inserting strong artillery at long range,

and by conducting the infantry engagement also at long range and in broad

extension.

15. Every leader must endeavor to accomplish his task with the

least possible force. But he must not commit the error of inserting in-

sufficient numbers to accomplish the task, A miscarried attempt not only

leads to useless losses but weakens the morale of the troops, while strength-

ening the morale of the enemy and it may thus gain a far reaching importance

outside of the looal failure. Thus it will be seen that it is a very

material task of the leader to correctly estimate the numbers required for

any project and to form his troops corresponding to the object to be gained.

16. Ilie e x t e n s i o n of the troops denloyed "or battle depends

on whatever connection with troops on the right or left can be had, on the

object of battle, and on the terrain.

If the extension is too large, then there is danger of being 9 ,%$

$/ % y/;~ii!l pierced; is the extension too small then there is danger

of being enveloped or circumvented. On the other hand, large extension

may bring about or itself large or material success. Art of leadership

must arrange the correct medium.

The above points of view hold good for f o r m a t i o n of the troops

in regard to breadth and death prior to entering battle and for the formation
of reserves, but the object of the battle holds first. place. Breadth

extension holds the enermy in suspense as to from what point, to expect the

attack, it facilitates utilization of the terrain and also the insertion


increases
of strong f,% fire power. It also heightens the capacity for marching

of the troops. Formation more to the depth, unmits keeping back forces

for the final decision as ell as their utilization towards the front as well

as for any enveloping movement and also for protection of our flanks.

Thus, eadth formation will be correct when we desire to engage in

a delaying action, where the terrain supports the method of battle or in cases

where we have to count on but weak hostile resistance.

Depth formation will be resorted to in cases where we seek the de-

cision, were we have to reckon with strong hostile opposition, especially,

on the flanks, or in cases where echeloning our forces is made necessary

by our intention to undertake special measures against the hostile flank,

Depth formation is necessary in most all defensive operations, in order to

nullify local hostile successes by counter-attacks.

17, The principal effect on the course of any operation lies in the

hands of the leader in having forces not yet drawn on - the r e s e- r v e

It would be faulty to utilize forces at the moment of the decision for

security or for flank protection, which forces could bring about the

victory by direct participation in the battle.

The reserve is far rather a means in the hands of the leader to transfer

the center of the operation to the desired point, to hrin support to that

point or part of the line where the leader thinks proper to offset the

fluctuation of the battle and where he intends to finally bring about

the decision,

The importance of the reserve to the leader requires that he keeps to

himself its direct support so as not to let the reserve get out of his control.
The position of the reserve dpends on the situation and on the terrain.

In the matter of position as well as in t e matter of subsequent transfer

towards the flank, protection against hostile fire and aireal reconnaissance

plays a material part.

18. ere breaking the enem t s resitance is but a half-victry.

Victory is comiete only by pursuit, the object, of' which is the annihila-

tion of the enemy. Without effective pursuit the enemy may soon renew

resistance, which has to overcome again by a renewed battle.

If the leader perceives that the battle will have successful termination,

he must take timely measures for pursuit, which must be stanrted immediately

after the tactical victory with the object in view to prevent the "enemy

from gaining a rehewed foothold or, should this not be possible, to allow

him no time whatever to strengthen or fortify the terrain. But as even

victorious troops become exhausted, it requires the full activities of

the leader to carry on an effective pursuit.

19, r e a k i n g o f f a battle - in the belief that we are

inferior in numbers, or to avoid an unfavorable battle situation, or after

completion of our task - will, considering present day fire effect, be possible

without large losses only if the infantry has not been engaged at short

range. Cutting loose from the enemy Till in most case be accomplished,

only under cover or protection of a reserve that has so far been held back

or under the cover of darkness.

H e t r e a t * If troops are forced to fall back the main question

is to gain distance between them and the enemy. It is the duty of the

highest leader, after opening the route of retreat, to lead the retreating

fight by insertion of retreating swarms, by arranging for receiving positions and

by designating rearguards; it i the duty o" subordinate commanders to main-

tain the morale of their troops.


13. WAR '
ORGANIZATION AI DISThIBUTTTO OF TROOPS

20. onditions of command and supply regulates the war organization

charged with mobilization of the field. army or separate units, at the opening

of the campaign.

21. According to the war organization during the World War the field

army consisted of armies organized into army groups; the armies consisted

of army corps, independent infantry and cavalry divisions, and the special
such
army troops, pi/i*/X as heavy and heaviest artillery, battle planes, and

troops of the line of communications. An army corps consisted of several

infantry divisions and the corps troops such as corps telephone detachments

and corps bridge trains.

,omposition of infantry and cavalry divisions differs. Concerning the

composition of an infantry division the war organization of an infantry

division in the last year o± the World War will show an example - see

anpendix I.

Concerning the composition of a cavalry division see paragraph 336.

Several cavalry divisions may be organized. into a cavalry corps under

one ranking (higher) cavalry commander.

General Headquarters has at its disposition several army reserves, con-

sisting of infantry and cavalry divisions as well as special troops, which are

attached according to need to the different army groups and armies, such as

army artillery, especially also pioneer and minewerfer troops, aerial

combat forces, etc.

For designation of these troops see appendix II.

22. Fhe dist ribu tion of troops shows the

temporary composition of troops for special operations and tactical Purposes

)advance guard, rear guard, flank gurad, etc.) In this connection the

composition of the war organization must be adhered to as much as possible,


C. * SSAGES AND REPORTS. WRITTEN COMUTThTNICATION.

23. Messages and reports received concerning conditions with the

enemy form one of the most important bases for estimating the war situation

and for the leader's orders. But the most detailed message and the best

of reports fail in their purport if they cannot be made use of in good time

by the proper leader. In addition to rapid finding out the situation with the

enemy, the most rapid and most certain transmission of messages and reports

it of special importance.

24. Results of the spy service and information gleaned from news-

papers often give the &igher commander his first and correct point of' view.
Knowledge of the enemy is best xHxr*Kkx± acquired through reconnaissance,

through seeking out and permanent observation of the opponent. When

numerous reports from different points are received, correct estimate can be

drawn by considering them together. Frequently messages or reports which

are considered by subordinate corxnanders as unimportant, when taken in con-

nection with other reports may give complete insight into conditions.

25. It is the duty of every commander to keep up nernanent reconnais-

sance within his district with all means at his disposal and to inform his

superior, the subordinate troops, as well as neighboring troops, as far as

necessary as soon as possihle concerning conditions in his district. In

this respect nothing must be taken for granted.

26. 'esides direct observation of' the eneirgcr from the terrain and from
listening-in
the air and besides cutting-in on hostile long distance ,'% telephone lines'

statemenst s of inhabitants, requisitioning o5'* newspapers, letters and telegrams

and other writings at different points may yield important information, as can als

also the capture of carrier pigeons and war dogs carrying messages.

27. An additional basis for estimating the situation with the enemy

may be eecured from statements of prisoners and wounded and sick left behind,
as well as from papers and documents taken from the dead and from prisoners,
The following
found in villages, positions and baggage wagons. -! is of secial im-

portance to the highest leader in examining prisoners and in scrutinizing

documents:- Learning the organizations to which they belong, their neighbor-

ing organizations, what their unit belongs to, names of the higher commanders,

the place of the last camp or bivouac, marches, ;-ourneys by rail, and con-

dition and morale of' the hostile troops.

28. To each higher headquarters an officer is attached charged with

regulation of the message and reconnaissance service. Tt is that officer' s

duty to see that each commander immediately learns 'what is important for

him to rwi~o

29. The number of messages does not matter, the main thing is that

messages or reports clarify the situation and enable the leader to arrive

at a correct decision. Tseless messages overload the message service and

overload all headquarters through which they pass. Important messages

should be repeated with the next message sent. Exact designation of

numbers, time and place is of great importance. It is often of great value

to learn, that the enemy was not round at some certain point, or that no change

occurred in M the situation for a certain period.

Important statements concerning terrain conditions, such as conditidn

of roads, bridges, streams, discrpencies of mas compares with actual ground,etc

should without fail be attached to reports concerning the enemy, In terrain,

of which but poor maps are available, timely terrain reconnaissances are of

special importance.

In composing messages a difference must be made between what the one

sending the message has seen himself and what some one else has found out or state

and what is merely supposition. The source of the information must. be stated,

suppositions must be supported by something else, or reasons therefore given.


30, During an engagement continual commrunication between leader and troop;

troops and with neighboring troops mustbe maintained, In urgent cases reports

must be ent direct to higher headquarters in addition to the immediate cor-

mander. Troops in direct danger from the enemy must be immediately informed

of their danger without regard to messages that must be sent otherwheres.

Id different headquarters are notified, the fact thereof must be contained

in each message so sent.

Neighhoring detachments must keep themselves and each other continually

informed of what is learned of the enemy, and of changes occurring in the

situation, in most cases by communicating directly with higher headquarters;

the higher headquarters had best utilize special information officers.

31. The r e p o r t frequently consists oP a resume of many short

messsages and is consequently more in detail. Its contents must. be stated

at head under "subect.'

32. The s k e t c h serves to illuminate the text of the reort and

can supplement a more detailed description. It must, in s simple, direct

and concise manner, shrr everything material. Signs on the map that c p/$$/

are not material may be omitted. It is always advisable to

adhere to the proper scale. Distances, which are important, for instance

the width of' a stream at a certain point, should, be noted in numerals.

Additions of phases of the terrain on the sketch can take the place of separate

descriptions. Panoramic views also are of assistance.

33. Concerning war diaries and forms for written communications

see field service regulations

D. INFUIENCE OF t TE TE}IR IN

34. The terrain has a material influence on the activity of troops in

the field. The leader will attempt to attain tactical success by apt

utilization o the terrain connected with proper estimation of the terrain.


15.

In carrying on a tactical action the subordinate commander is confined to a

certain terrain and has to adapt that to his tactical fore ation. Thus,

employemant of troops and utilization of terrain go hand in hand.

The million armies of the present day require for concentration and for

march the most far reaching utilization of rail and road net; for shelter,

reconnaissance and security conformation of the terrain are of material

importance; the importance of the terrain as far as concerns the battle is

ofear . It is the duty of all branches of' theservice to thoroughly reconnoiter

the terrain prior to any engagement.

E. ESTTMkA.T OF MiEh FITIJATION AND TLh CEThION

35. Messages and reports on which the leader bases his decision, will

in most cases be found to be insufficient, contradictory and one-sided. They

are often exaggerated ,,hen they come from the battle ground direct. 'wherefore,

correct estimation of same is of especial importance and requires extensive

tactical knowledge. It frequently is the the case that we read out of'

messages Aust that what we desire.

36. The situation must, be arrived at at the time at which the decision

has to be made. Therefore all movements still nossible of execution after

receipt of the last message must be considered.

The leader will get a quicker insight into the situa+ i on by marking on

his map the situation of both opponents. In addition to his own troops he has

to pay due attention to neighboring troops, insofar as their attitude may g

have an influence on the execution of the task. At highor headquarters a

special officer had best be charged with continually keepin the map correctly

noted, that is, showing the location of all troops.

37. The estimate of the situation with the enemy must be as clear as
possible concerning the enenemy's intentions, based on reports and messages

no matter how scarce these latter are. To wait for further messages will
16

seldom bring better conception of the situation, but may ~eoPQrdize the

execution of a. decision. too la.te arritJed at and t.hus rob t)16 leadf3r of his

freedom of action.

It shou1d be considered:

(a) where and how stron~.~. is the enemy?


­ Concernin~ the strength

we wi 11 have in most CRses only general supposi tJ.ons, for instance

length or specif\l forma-t"ion of the march coihumns, number of

artillery vehicles, degree of.' t.raffic on a road.

(b) What did the enemy do so far, vrhat can and will he do prol:::ably?

In t~is we must always presuppose that he will act correctly and

to the point, just so as we would act in a similar situation.

'Knovrledge of the hostile commander and his pe.ri',iculiarities

and the particuliarities of his troops should be (wnsidered.

(0) How can the dif'rerent 1'ossihilit,ies of' tJhe enemy's conduct.

inf'luence our O\\rn intcnt,ions? FoT' instance, where will a

rencant.ro take place if bot.h sides cont.inue their march, might

VlS still reach some hill Or other prior t. 0 the enemy or can we

cross a defile ahead 0:" him?

38. Correct e s t i mat e o f' t. h e t e r. r a i n will f're que ntl:

be of decisive importance to find out the enemy&s intentions as well as in

forming our mvn decision and its execution.

39. In considering our mvn situation we must ftl rst of Hll a.scerb~.in

where the different unit~s of our and of the neighborinp; troops are. Further

it must be considered what forces are at, our disposal :ftor carryinr; out our

task, what forces ~an still be brou~ht up, and whether their arrival should

The possibi lity o? support. by neifShbor d etachment",s should be considered,

to arra.nge for their part,icipati.on.

What. our troops have so far attained and t.heir condit.ion are not. wit.hout,

their in.fluence, but willrrequently have to take a back-seat vThen more im­

portant raasons are ~onsidered.


40, Based on these minute considerations, in which correct calculation

of time and space play an. important role, all eventualities that may arise

in the solution of the task set within the limits of' the existing situation,

must be thoroughlyr considered and compared. with each other. It is more

necessary to find in good time a solution that cannbe carried out, than to

arrive at a better one too lEte.

A de finite dec is ion which lays down the law to the

enemy as much as possible and foces our will onto him, has to be the result of

all estimates.

F. ORDERS

41. The means the leader has to transpose his will into action, i.e.

to lead his troops, ire the orders.

Prior to issuing orders to the troops, higher headquarters causes the

orders to be written out and then transmitted to the troops by wire, by wire-

less or in writing. -imple arrangements, directions or minor tasks, may be

issued verbally and by phone, being subsequently followed in writing.

Subordinate cominmndess will resort to written orders only when verbal

orders or transmission by phone is impracticable.

42. Any order must contain that, but only that, which the subordinate

must know in order to act indeoendently. It must be short, concise and

clear, and must conform to the receipients knowledge and under certain con-

ditions to his peculiarities. It will be we&1 to place ourselves into the

position of our subordinate, to ascertain how we would act in accordance with

those orders, and what misunderstandings may obtain,

Meaningless expressions such as "if poss ible", under certain conditions",

"place your hand on some point" and similar ones must be avoided. Every sub-

ordinate can demand not to be left in doubt concerning; his task.


Written orders, concerning or regulating the activities of different unity fo

for a common purpose, should be composed in numbered paragraphs. The most

i mportant thing should receive first place and everything pertaining to one

thing should be in one numbered paragraph.

; 43. Orders should ospcially ovoid details, if changes in the situation

are probable before the orders can he executed. Tr larger operative units,

especially in cases whore orders have to nrovide for a number of days, this

should be especially observed. After probable change in the situation the

next important thing is our own intention; the obect sought to he attained

is to be specially emphasized. Concerning the exeution of the task points of

view should be laid down, the manner of execution should be left to the sub-

ordinate. In this manner an. order changes into a "directive ((directions)

Thus,' i Y
4 general orders are not 'to be issued beyond conditions that

can be ascertained, especially not giving instructions up to the very contact

with the enemy and beyond, we maybe forced on the other hand in snecial cases

to issue t
orders"up to the very contact with the enemy and beyond , such as in

cases of any attack in a position war, especially so in a piercing attack

in a position war. In such cases the basis gained by manifold reconnaissances,

especially gained by the pictures furnished by aerial reconnaissance, ustifies

such procedure.

Suppositions and expectations never have a place in any order, if for no

other reason than for keening them secret, and reasons for the, measures taken

and snecial directiosns for suppositious cases certainly have no place whatever

in orders. But the subordinate must know the purport of the orders so as to

be able to act in accordance therewith in case he has learned different than the

orders presgcribe.

44. 0 p e r a t i o n o r d e r s regulate the activity in the field

of the troops and take measures for supply and traffic, insofar as concerns the

troops. They are designated by all headquarters according to their position,

such as army orders, corps orders, XXXX division orders,etc and by troopl
units also, such as advance guard orders, etc.

45. The following sequence in operation orders is advisable:

Information concerning the enemy and neigh'ioring troops, as far as it

is inportant, for the receipient.

Decision of the leader.

Distribution of troops.

Special reconnaissance measures.

Tasks for the different units

Orders for supply and traffic, as far as concerlrns the troops

Statement to where messages are to be sent and what, measures have been

taken for transmittal(relay)

Place of the cormrander.

Notation on bottom of order how and to whom issued.

Tn the distribution of troops the troops are Pown in sequence accord-

ing to branch of service: Infantry, artillery, minewerfers, cavalry, pioneers,

sanitary companies. If the sequence of march is laid down in the written

order, then the troops are mnarched in that sequence; the respective headings

in the distribution of troops (main body, advance guard, rear guard,etc)

receive then the addition: "in order of march."

46. It is seldom advisable to transmit the entire orders,issued by higher

authority,with additions. Every head.quarater'- had best issue its own orders.

47. It is frequently to the point to issue short special orders, to

be followed by the general order, for instance, measures for reconnaissance

or special reconnaissance, time and place os starting the next day.

13ut frequently it will of advantage to subordinate headquarters to learn

only the decision of the higher commander. the former will then fidoubtedsly ar

make arrangements and consider them in good time. This me+hod of issuing

orders, which is made possible only by telephone, calls the subordinate commander

materially earlier to the work and thus is a material factor in hastening

*9r-iff, matters.
20

48. R at t 1 e o r d e r s must he devoid. of any scheme and are

issued mostly in he shape of special orders. Co-operation of all units

must he guaranteed by the method of issuing orders.

49. Special order regulate the activity of communication troops

and attached aerial battle units, supply, traffic, sanitary measures, movements

of columns, baggage and field mail, as well as other special tasks. They

are transmitted to the headquarters concerned. Notations contained about

these in operation orders should. briefly state what the fighting troops have

to know. During a pause in operations or action it is proper to issue all

orders concerning traffic in the shape of special orders. This is always

advisable in case of corps and higher headquarters.

50. Daily Orders 0corps, division da'r orders) concern the service f' tho

interior, personal matters, etc.

For examples of orders see appendix III

G. TR NSTATS ION OF ORDERS AND REPORTS

51. Prerequisite for successful leadership is a well constructed, rapidly

working message service for the transmission of orders reports and messages,

while in camp, on the march and in battle. Par reachinig utilization of

all techniwal mans at hand is required therefor. Security rests on co-

operatiion.

Transmission by means of individuals, or carrier pigeons and.dogs is

necessary in the absence of technical means, or where these latter have not yet

been constructed or where they are unreliable. In addition, in specially

important oases, in which secrecy is paramount, transmission by officers in

autos or planes may bocce have to he resorted to.

"From Arny Headquarters down, in position war, higher headquarters has

to establish and maintain comrmunication with subordinate headquarters.

"Should higher headquarters not be in position to establish permanent com

municatin with its subordinatle headquarters and troop units, ten it wrill
establish one or more relay s :ationsas much to the front as practicable and

directs its subordinate headquarters to connect with those, relm s'tations.

"The probable locaion of those rel y stations must be mnde known to the

different subordinate headquarters as soon as possible so that the latter can

tke proper steps to comply.

"Wihen there are no special conditions requiring deviation from 'the rule, then

in the matter of connection with neighboring troops, each he=.dqu^.rters is re-

sponsible for extension and.maintenance of the communication to the r i g h t

This does not preclude that by orders or through mutual agreement other measures ^Y

are taken. It also does not mean that connection towards the left should. not

be sought. We must never wait for our neighbor to be the first'to establish

communication. It should alwravs be considered that he m . not be in a

sitution to start coI,. unic?tion.

52. Connection with our neighbor, considering the continual changes/ occur-

ing in msobile operations are genernlly best est lished !>7t applying to the

headquarters of wirhich both parties -re subordintese. Besides this we must

at. sll times seek 'o stablish cormunication with our neighbor bzr sending out

com:rmunicastion (connecting) officers with specinl comrnunication means and

connecting patrols.

The connections necessary for co-operption of rtilleryr nd_ inf'- ntry Rre

as a generl rule established by the former in, g.mobile ar. In a position

war higher headquarters will ha~ve to employ in 'ddit ion ltechnic-l


specid

me'ns 'heref or.

53. Inform tion officers ttached to troops (one with each inf'retry

regiment, each artillery detachment (battalion) or group) supervise the entire

message service of their units. They will m_intain close connection (touch)

between themselves and. with the division information officerj, hich latter

supervises the entire technic~l essa~e servrice. In mobile war, where eiieryr

one acts only ccording to his o n requirements, lbor, men "nd implements will

be saved thereby nd interruptions confined to a minimum. In q position w-r

it is absolutely necessary) from the very st.rtto hove all mne ns of ommuni-
cation and their control in charge. of one man.

All informaition officers must be continua'llykept informed. concerning -the

situ'-tion, in order to'arrange for proper communication in adv.nce.

54. Location of fighting units, and of all headquarters, long distance t

telephon.e stations and message centers or relay stations and all roads leading

to the ill the bbove. must be specislly marked day end night,Aso that they can

be found without difficulty. For headquarters of divisions and up special

guidons and f lrogs are presecribed.

OF
5ANS C01iFMNTICAnTI0N

55. The telephone is the most imortant2i means of coImunicatioi which alone

permits personal conversation. But in it also lies danger 'timt superiors

may'interfere without cause. ^nd unnecessarily inquire about Is.


'thyin. The

subordinate nay easily be dep rved 'tv'_roby o_ 'hs i ndonsndenco.

All hadqu a r.teFrs murs:t


ss nt A_.
!. ,a°1.ll C,-re that
JLlIoi;e the
Jelij lVit .n

overburthened by unnecessary talking. Strict control of the telephone line is..

absolutely necessary. In close proximity of the enemy (up .to about 3000

meters) the danger of listening-in requires special technical mens, such as

use of assumed names and codes, and most of all strict limitation. of talking.

In 'ill cases strict division and exact designation of th'e different lines

is abs olutely necessary, such as "general, Infantry, rtillery, Mi newerfer

lines."' Cutting-in on stra nge lines is absolutely forbidden.

,During heavy fire 4:31 telephone lines pl out Therefore they must be

supplemented by other means of communication.

56. .. In telegrahing we use the following systems:

(a) The common telegrph key, in case the telephone is insufficient,

from division heedquarters down, transmits the Morse signs, which are received

at the other end of. the line: by sound.' To. look for errors iaxtr nsmission is

imposibbl* ' The different signs can be heard en-route by unauthorized persons.

Its '-dvantages are: sma'l cost of) installment;.simple construction; easy


transmission; rapid construction; small working personnel; large capacity,

(b) The Hughes apparatus furnishes messages in print at sending and

receiving stations, and consequent transmission without errors. Large

capacity. Possibility of telegraphic talking. Security against listening-in

of unauthorized persons. Because of its size and susceptibility in general

used only by corps headquarters and up.

(a) The Siemens Rapid Telegraph. Used at army grout headquarters,

General Headquarters and main headquarters on the line of communications at

home. Great capacity and secrecy. Minor dependence on condition of the line.

Large costs to establish and maintain; special mechanicians required therefor,

minor mobility; it requires seven men of a complement at each station,

57, The flash light is independent of the passability of the terrain

and cannot be endangered by hostile fire as much as telephone lines, especially

when relay stations can be used; but its utilization is influenced by the co-

formation of the terrain and growth (woods, etc®), Fog, rain and snow interfere

with its utilization, (Note 1,), The powder and dust clouds raised by heavy

firing decrease materially its capacity.

Communication by means of the flash light, using the Morse Code, works

slow. We must strive to increase its capacity by means of prearranged

words and abbreviations, especially in the transmittal of decisive tactical

events. The flash light is especially suited to supplement the telephone

in the zone of effective hostile fire, or to entirely take the place of the

telephone,

58. Wireless communication is independent of the above mentioned

influences, and has little to fear from artillery fire. They serve, according

to the range of the stations (Note 2,) for the purpose of wireless connection

up to the longest range. Electricity in the air and special measures taken

by the enemy can interrupt traffic, The number of wireless stations in a

certain district is unlimited, Establishing ten stations in the battle

sector of one division is about the limit,


23.

NOTE I 0t Tel. Note. Heliograph is not the correct definition, Flash light,
probably, is better.
Large flash light, range in day time about 6 kilometers, medium
flash light about 3 kilometers, small heliograph about 800 meters;
aerial about 5 kilometers. At night the range is double that of
daytime.

Note 2:me Army wireless de:achment: 2 heavy wireless stations: 300 kilometers;
Group wireless: 1 light wireless station: 100 kilometers; Division
wireless detachment: 1 division wireless station, 100 kilometers,
2 wireless platoons each with 2 portable wireless apparatuses: 4
to 6 kilometers; 2 wireless platoons each with 5 to 8 portable
wireless apparatuses: 2 to 3 kilometers with ground antennae; in
employing high antennae (10 to 15 meter masts) the range is 35
and 25 kilometers, respectively. Cavalry Division: cavalry
wireless detachment with 1 heavy wireless station (300 kilometers)
and 2 light stations (100 kilometers). Each light artillery
regiment and each heavy artillery.battalion have one artillery
receiving wireless squad (3 mte) and one or more antennae officers,
An especial form of wireless/ connection is offered by "ground" telegraphy,

which serves for -the purpose of transmitting short messages throrh the ground

at limited distances (up to 2 kilometers). The- danger of listening-in is

great, terefor ,code is necessary. Telephone and ground telegraph interfere

writh each other. Specially unfavorable geologic-:1 conditions may preclude

utilization of ground telegraphy, while favoral conditions m.ny greatly increase

facilities of. communication.

60. ounted messengersm cyclists, auto drivers and runners -take over

the service of transmitting messages in c' se technic ' means are absent or

give out.

The contents of specially imnortant messages,, unless secrecy is absolutley

required, must be divulged to the messengers, Specially reliable end intrepid

men should be selected to serve as runners in the zone of effective :fire.

It is the duty of every officer to show the road to messengers. Higher

officers are authorized *to scan ll messages carried. They must note that

fact, however, on the message belnk. The sendermust take special care

to instruct the messenger in the route 'to be taken and its condition. The

names of villages and other points and. places must be written'


down as they are

pronounced.

As soon as contact with the enemy or insurgents is imminent, mounted

messengersletc should:not"be sent out by themselves. When' mounted messengers

etc meet officers they do not slacken speed.

Re1ay stations increase the rapidity of tr~nsmission. Their arr ngement

requires speciel care. In special cases it may be advantageous to establish

advanced communicntion stations, which re connected to -the rear by means of

technical arrangements or which have mounted messengers and .autos-at their

disposal. They have to be strong enough to m intain their positions in the

face os smaller hostile dtetachments. In the position war also it will be

found, dvis able to estiablish advanced 'lessage collecting points.


61. P 'ssenger utomobiles fac ilitate personal nd direct communic-tion

with the commander and ser-'e for transmitting important messaegesm s well as

maps and printed matter. They are dependent more or less on good ro^ds.

62. Aeroplanes serve - not counting reconnaissance and artillery fire

activity, - for the rapid transmission of messages at long distances, especially

when there is no other possibility, for instance, in the case of a fortress.

in position warfare, when in heavy fire all other means of conmuniction give

out, communication with the most -dvarnce infantry can be mint'eined by using

aeroplanes.

63. General lights (flcres, rockets, message bombs) and sound s44 s

(signal trumrpets, sirens, wrhistles) are for the purpose of supplementing other

means of communication. All of them are more or less dependent on the freather'.

Ifessage bombs are used principally after destruction or. giving out of other

means of communication. The message hand grenade is fired from--grenade guns

in rear to the most advanced firing line ip the station of battalion headqua.rters,

artillery observers, etc. Its range is 500 to'600 meters. The light

message mine is thrown by -the light message mine thrower, Range 1300 meters.

Roth methods require receiving stations and finding the range (triail shots).

64. Carrier pigeons are employed for connection between-the most adv.ncedlii

lineto the rearm when all other means give out. Darkness and fog preclude theij

employment. On account of pigeons losing their way all messages must be

written in-code or prearranged words.

Message carrying dogs ?re attached to infantry message detachments' or

companies; presupposing correct employment arnd continual traaining they may prove

an excellent means of communic ation in the most advanced fighting zo'e. They

save the emnployemnt of men, but in case of o',er exertion become easily afraid

of fire.
H. TE STAFF OF THE LE k DER

6%. It is the duty of every staff to relieve the leader of all work

which the latter must not perform himself. Every leader, especially the

higher ones, must restrain himself to a certain extent and not take over work

which is the duty of members of his staff to perform. It is necessary for him

considering the heavy responsibility which every leader has, to save his moral

and physical force as much as possible for the decd sine hour.

66. In every staff there must be some one who is thoroughly familiar

with all events, so that in sudden case of disability on the part of any

menber, or of the leader himself, there will be no interruption.

67/ Prerequisite for the smooth working of a staff is that every member

be assigned to a definite task. measures must be taken for relief and also

arrangements must be made by which different members may work on the same

subject.

The following division might be well for subordinate headquarters in

the matter of field service: AS) Tactical matters; b) supplies and traffic;

c) information and communications; D) matters of shelter and subsistence.

J. PLACE OF T E LEADER.

66. The great stretch of terrain -occupied by troops on the march and

in battle seldom permits the higher commander to personally interfere.


connection
Necessity of permanent, secure and rapid communication with the superior

officers, with neighboring troops, with subordinate commands, with reserves demands

demands, just the same as work of the numerous offices in the matter of

battle leadership, communication and supply, that the commander be as long as

practicable at some one definite point. The possibility of permanent lo-

cation even during the rapidly advancing mobile war is furnished by the rapid
trabsportatiof
means of j%(jd(, which permit the higher leader to overtake his troops

that have marched even for several days in szmrmxikem a few hours. with
careful preparation the duration of the time,in which there might not be any

cukx connection on aecoutt of change of camps, may be cut to minutes or

fraction of an hour.

Even in actual battle the commander of larger trtop units will but seldom

be able to personally overlook the battlefield of his troops. He selects his

location farther to the rear. The selection of that location depends materi-

ally on good roads aInd road connections for passenger autos. Careful em-

ployment of all means of communication will facilitate the higher commander to

get a clear picture of all portions of his troops at the front. He can come

to his decisions in tranquility without being influenced by the noise and other

impressions of the battle. In a position war the location of the higher

headquarters must be far enough in rear to be out of range of long range fire

and to be able to avoid transfer to some other point by reason of some minor

changes along the front.

Points offering to the ccananders possibility of a good view of the

battle terrain and sufficient secutity for m intaining communication to the

front and rear, must be well fortified. In other cases observation points

(artificial) will suffice, from which the leader or his staff officers observe

the battle, while the supervision proper of the fighting is directed from

location of headquarters.

69. During an advance and as soon as :kUEmk contact with the enemy is

imminent, the higher leader will proceed to the front. It must be his en-

deavor to gain an insight into the -terrain in to which his battle orders will

bring his troops. Such an insight he cannot gain from the map nor by means

of messages. Seeing with your own eyes is the very best in all situations.

Thus he will be in the situation to take his first measures correctly,

to gain advantages over the enemy byr timely tmxft decision, to save his troops

from making detours. and to prevent unsuited decisions on the part of subordinate

leaders.

For the purpose of carrying on the battle the higher commander snarcsh

headquarters far enough to the rear so that all lines of communication to the flay
flank and rear are out of range of effective hostile fire. For the selection

of the fortified location of headquarters the following are material: Easy

access, Easy to locate, and protection against aerial observation. A view of

'the battlefield is desirable. He has his stlff officers to learn what is

going on at distant points of the battlefield.

If the location has once been selected. it should be kept as long as

prccticable. In that case orders and reports will reach him most rapidly

and xns -- cs xuu x with certainty.

70. It is necessary that the officers commanding in the front line

have a good view of the battalefield and of the enemy as well as good connection

with the next immediate commander, Thhy change the location of their head-

quarters according to the progress of the battle so that they will have their

troops in hand at all times.

In position warfare they select their location so that they can directly

handle their troops. A view of the battlefield is of course desirable.

Even in the heaviest hostile fire percmanent observation of $he surrounding

country is necessary as well as connection with the most advance lines, the

reserves and the neighbor troops.

71. In the pursuit the location of all commanders is as far forward

as practicable so that they can take proper measures to hold what has been

won and so that they can, by personal interference, get the very best out of

all the pursuing troops.

72. During a reatreat, the highest comrmnder, after he has convinced

himself that his orders for the reatreat or correctly understood, proceeds to

the point where the next resistance is to be made in order to take further

measures. l1 subordinate comnanders remain with their units to keep up

the morale.
73. In changing his location every eommnander must make arrangements

for rapid and secure transmission of orders and messages to the new location.

A change on the battlefield must be made only fter connections necessary for

battle leadership have been established. It is absolutely necessary for the

purpose of permanent connection that the location of the higher headquarters

be in echelon.

III. TAeFICS OF THE DIFFERENT _AMS

.. I ATRY AND ITS AUXILIARY'TARMS

1 .GEHER ^L RULES

a. Task of the Infantry

74. Tasks of the infantry are: Annihilation of and driving off the

enemy in attack, holding the position in defense. In these 'tasks all other

arms support the infantry. Only exceptionally will infantry be able to

carry on battle with its own means; it will fight almost without exception

in close connection and with the help of artillery. The fihal decision of

the battle lies with the infantry; it carries the main burthens of the battle,

it brings the greatest sacr=fices, but it also gathers the first fruits of

victory.

b. KIND OF INFANTRY .ARMS. THEIR EFFECT AND USE

. Infantry arms are: Rifle, model 98, or carbine, machine guns

(model 08; 08/15 and 08/18), automatic pistols, pistol model 08, light pistol o8

with removable stock and magazine, tank guns, sabers, baiyOnets, light minewerfer,

hand granades, rifle granades, Y %%X grenade throwers with granades, flame-

throwers and hand gas granades or bombs.

All arms can be used against open targets; light minewerfers, hand granades,

rifle granades, granade throwers, flame throwers and hand gas bombs can also

be used against covered targets.

Light pistols (Signal pistols) and gas masks are important auxiliaries.
Effect and Use of the §eparate Arms

76. R i f 1 e . The fie os the separate rifles is combinied into mass-fite_

in b ttle and effectively employed against large, (tall), broad and deep targets

'units in close order) up to the longest ranges the sight permits (2000 meters).

At mid-range (1200 to 800 meters) and short range (below 800 meters) the effect

on large targets may be increased to snnihilation.

Employed against small targets (skirmishers lying down) proper effect is

possible only at short range. Thorough training in firing must enable the in-

fantry man to bring that effect to lasting success.

Premature opening of fire shows absence of confidence; faulty effect increases

the morale of the enemy. Though the enormour fire rapidity and the assurance

of being able to hit the target may give opportunity to sharpshooters of attaining

suceess even against treat superiority, the full advantages of the rifle c~nbe

utilized only be insertion of machine guns or by bringing up fresh skirmish lines,

which holds good for attack as well as defense.

Fire effect depends on: numbers of rifles and cartridges, duration of fire,

fire rapidity, range and its estimate, nature of terrain near the target and

degreecof possibility of observing hits, the extent of the sheaf, fire control,

effect of hostile fire, accomplishment of individuals firing, degree of exhaustion,

morale influences and the influences of the day.

Flank fire is especially effective at all ranges and against all targets.

Correct estimate of the distance is the basis for successful fire control.

Permanent observation of effect by means of field glasses is necessary. Proper

fire control is more effective than the results ac lieved by troops without it.

Decisive effect cannot be attained against artillery and. against machine

guns with protective shields within m±eshort range, even if S.m.K. ammunition

is used.

As general rule imaxi±h


t at ranges up to 1000 meters firing is had with

sights set at one range, beyond that range, when the range is unknown, with sights

set at two ranges,100 meters difference.

As a general rule the aim should be below the target, but under certain
conditions this rule may be disregarded and at short range the choice may be

left to the men firing.

It is important to distribute the fire along the entire front of the

target. In most cases each portion of the firing line fires on the target

straight in its front. tcrxxku Still, we must not be afraid of enploying

cross-fire.

R-pidity of fire depends on the situation, the object of battle, ammunition

available and composition of the target. Long range, unfavorable light

and poor visibility of the target will decrease fire rapidity. It must be
greater
increased, when the point is to secure 4{ effect as rapidly as possible.

It is well to employ xxqsk*d greatest fir rapidity and to insert as many rifles

as possible at decisive phn.ses of the battle (perparation / for or defense of

a charge), also at moments of sudden and direct contact as well as in the

pursuit.

Ye must demand of the rifleman a large degree of p reparedness, independent

action, confidence in his weapon and the strictest discipline, even under the

demoralizing effect of strong hostile fire effect.

71. On account of great rapidity of fire, machine guns are enabled to

attain the strongest possible fire power in the narrowiest space. One machine

gun is about equal to one hundred rifles and can fire ten rounds per second.

As compared with the infantry rifle the heavy machine gun has great advant-

ages. By means of an aiming tube it can locate targets otherwise difficult

to see, can find the range and observe hits. By means of the heavy carriage

(sled) w±± x±c a with its automatic arrangement for raisong and lowering the

barrel, the latter can be held in permanent position rind the sheaf will remain

narrow.

The moral effect and excitement of battle, which so unfavorably interfere

with the sheaf of the infantry riflemen, have no influence whatever on the

machine gun.

The range and effect of the machine gun is about the same as that of

the rifle Model 98. Special ammunition, such ais bullets capable of piercing

armor, bullets well constructed in the matter of ballistics, frequently in


connection with a composition to give light orf ire producing composition, are

employed for special pirposes. The compactness of the sheaf produced by the

machine gun allows observaetion even under the most unfavorable conditions and

facilitates finding the range.

In firing against aeroplanes the cirdular front sight enables the range

to be kept approximately.

The effect, up to 1200 meters, on skirmishers lying down and on machine

gund without shields is very material on account of the possibility to keep

the decd space to a very narrow limit by means of trial shots. Large targets

can suffer great losses at 1580 meters range, even if we cannot observe the

hits.
Oblique -fire
Cross-fire is specially effective.

Biring over our own troops can be resorted to onlgt from an overtopping

position and against such a position if our own troops are sufficiently far

from the enemy and when the field of fire is open.

Fire on targets offering themselves favorably is rapidly and from a number

of machine guns. Machine guns cannot carry on a long continued fire fight

because of the large consumption of ammunition and dependency on cooling the

barrel.
heavy
The following targets are gener lly fired on bymachne guns: Hostile

reinforcements, counter-attacks, retreat, protecting batteries, battle planes

and tanks (in ease of armored targets ,with sufficient expenditure of ammunition).

For the purpose of changing position the heavy machine gun can be taken

apart. Shields offer effective protection, but are also a great load. It

must always be considered that effect is more important than cover.

77a. Heavy machine guns do without the sled to increase mobility. Thus

1Ctheireffect becomes similar to that of the infantry rifle and corresponds

in its dispersion of shots with the fire of a battlion armed with rifle 98.

The same holds good with the heavy machine gun with auxiliary trail.

In general light machine guns are employed at short range. Through

them the infantry company receives material increase in fire power without
making the firing line denser 'nd for that reason a relatively larger number of

skirmish groups can be utilized as a shook reserve or can be kept at the dispositic

of the cowiander.

In position warfare the insertion of light machine guns saves men without

decreasing the fire power.

It is the task set heavy machine guns to fire on battle planes and low

flying observation planes; Troop concentrations, routes of approach , d% #qi/

road crossings, bridges and defiles can be fired on by indirect fire up to

2500 meters with special a aunition.

78. The Granade Thrower is an ajlK weapon employed at close range. Each

infantry has two granade throwers, carried with their anwunition in the comb.t

wagon; more are supplied the company in position warfare. Range 60 to 300

meters; they are employed in high-angle fire against living targets under cover

that cannot be reached by hand grenades, and against open targets at low

trajectory. On account of their very sensitive cap (igniter) they are well,

suited for bi ng (Germ: Sperr) fire. They take the place of artillery fire

in the fight against machine guns and minewerfers. An advantage is that they

are hard to perceive when fired.

chieve"ents: very little lateral dispersion in a depth dispersion up to

50 meters, but much influenced by the direction of the wind. Heavy splinter

effect up to 200 meters; rapidity of fire: 6 to 8 rounds per minute. Head-

cover are not pierced. Completent: 1 comm der, 2 men. Each infantry

platoon must have a complement for two throwers and tne relief complement.
attack
ende throwers are suitable for preparation of the point
In the jo$v(J'** gri

of attack and for keeping bbth sides of that point under fire; fore firing on

machine gun and rifle grenade nests and for supporting the working up of the

infantry to the attacking point. In defense, the greande throwers are used

for firing on machine gun and rifle grenade nests and for employment of

interruption annihilation and blockaae fire. Consolidation of four to six

throwers into one group is adiinantageous.

specially favorable targets for grea de throwers in postion warfare are;

Spp and mine heads, portion of trenches to be taken lengthwise under fire,
supporting poinst, advanced posts, entries to mines; useful tasks and promising

tasks are firing on workings going on during the night, blocking trenches, firing

on relieving infantry.

79. R i f l e G r e n a d ea ae fired from a cup-like affir attached

to the infantry rifle. Their effect is about the same as that of the icix

grenade thrower; advantages: ea-ier to handle especially on the move. There-

fore rifle grenades had best be employed in the course of an attack/. Complement

one commander, 4 to 8 men.

80. The P i s t o 1 o8 is employed general in self-defense. The

light pistol 08 with stock and drum magazine is an excellent weapon to defeat

a charge.

The automatic pistol is the most effective short-range weapon with great

accur/acy. It can fire 32 rounds in 3.5 seconds at close range.

n k rdifle(13 mm) is employed on account of its great armor-


The t a

piercing quality, for firing against tanks at short range; up to 500 meters

the bullet will pierce a two centimeters thick plate.

m n e w e r e r have a. stronger effect than the


81. The light

Its projectiles
grenade throwers and have a range of from 300 to 1200 meters.
average
of medium thickness. They help out the fire of the field grenades
piercecover

living
in high-angle fire at short range and are general>-7 employed against

living
targets. Thrown with low trajectory they are very effective against

targets; they have good effect on tanks up to 600 meters. Their employment

a certain advance preparation of the position, which must be hidden


presupposes

The fire accuracy and the small dispersion of the light


from the enemy.

minewerfers facility in the attacks continuation of their fire into the most

line, even up to the moment of the charge, in which the fact


advanced hostile

that they are close to the infantry facilitates cooperation between them and the

infantry. In defense, they relieve the artillery from $) close-range tasks;

in the matter of defeating a charge the light minewerfers. with their great

rapidity of fire (20 rounds per minute) greatly assist the artillery in its
bloackade fire.
In mobile war the light minewerfer with their low trajectory trail are an ex-

cellent guard gun, which with their mobility, close connection wit- the infantry

and very accurate ftlr fire can take the place of artillery or assist it materiall

at short and mid-ranges, especially in the fight against hostile nests and tanks.

In mountain warfare and in terrain where roads .are fevw, they will have W to

take the place of artillery. at times.

The actual and moral effect of all these fire-arms is materially increased

when they can direct their fire from the flank against the target.

82. Hand grenades are effective short range fighting means in attacks as

well as in defense. Besides their bursting effect their morale effect one the

enemy is very material. Roth kinds, the handles grenade with lit'_ile bursting

effect but subsequent stronger detonation, and the lighter one, effective at longer

range and splintering better - shaped like an egg4-supplement each other in the

attack as well as in defense. The largest moral effect is accomplished by

hand greade throwers when the attack is short, rapid and sudden.

Arrnes blanche are those arms with which the very last resistance of the
defending
enemy is overcome or which can be employed in the melee in/the hostile attack

84. Infantry guns - for the time being the field gun 96, 7.7 or 7.82 cm

infantry gun - are employed in close and personal connection with the infantry

(see paragraph 191 to 109).

Small flame throwers - see paragraph 377 - have good, effect against tanks.
biting
Hand gas bombs, not poisonous, have a strorg/effect and serve for the purpose

of smoking out covered trenches, falnking works, trenches.

c. CAPACITY OF INFANTRY

85. Infantry fights in J every kind of terrain than can be traversed


material
and can overcome/obstacles in heavy marching order. Their "dvance must never

be interfered with with by their vehicles.

Removing heavy marching equipment increases the capacity. All independent

coxan.nders (those from regimental commanders up) are justified to order that.
Plate 1

a) Machine gun squad in close order

Q
0 20 *Machine guncommander
c Laying gunner
S3 4 C gunners of the compler
" gunners for replenish:
b) Machine Iun squad in skirmish line.

Ji fl 55 2 S 4
However, they must fully understand the disadvantages resulting from leaving

the knapsacks behind.

d. UTILIZI'~G THE, TERRAIN

86. Apt Utilization of the terrain becomes necessary in order to leave

the enemy in the dark as long as possible as to our intentions and in order to

bring our troops up to the enemy in condition to fight. To this pertains

training in map-reading, good judgment of' the terrain and timely reconnaissance.

The latter must be executed carefully but should not interfere with the fighting

by exaggerated thoroughness.

If we y ld cannot avoid open terrain, then we must select I

open formations, larger intervals, and,in case of closed detachments, dividing

them into smaller units with large interi' ls Selection of the time of day

and light is of importance.

In difficult terrain also order and keeping together the different units

must not be lost. Every opportunity must be utilized which the terrain

offers for bringing the units into order.

2. T C0 .NY

. nation strength: 250; fighting strength: 150 to 180 men; one

led horse; 8 draft horses; 4 two-horse wagons; 1 cycle.

Combat train: Mchine gun wagon with 6 machine guns 08/15 with 3000 round

of miunition for each gun; one reserve of infantry ammunition and close combat

means; one large field kitchen.

fgf'% 7f/ Field Train: 1 company baggage wagon; 1 provision wagon.

a. SCHOOL OF THE COMP&NY

88. Formation of company in twMo ranks. Division into three platoons,

each platoon compoed of four squad ;~ in each platoon 2 machine gun groups

Here follows plate l on page 28 of text.


+U + 1-1 f
0 .r3J+
i-I N !!
P~(D 00
00+{
a '4J
tiU
~1 40 *-
0S02
O a
4) C 4DI
02
k4 d k , 0
4- t)r
*004H! O+ aOd 1
0r0 0
00 0 20 m i d
X0
0 a
.c
4q O r.Ct 100 ~0ad
00-iP4C
?AG 31 )F T3XT

Plate 4 Plate 5 Plate 6


Company in March Company ;in
company in Column
Column of twos
of Squads column

640000e

7.

0000

C5ooao* 2.
t=2J

+000
I 00

00

4.j
Q04
+r
Weio

00

Eo00 K
101
s

CII
Platoons are numbered from the right of the company,E = squads within

the platoons. It is permissible to designate the units according to the name

of the leader.

Special conditions (for instance, bearer service in position warfare) or specd

special offensive tasks (see field service reguiations 323) may compel division of

the company into .four or more platoons.

Division of the company into platoons and squads, and under permanent leaders,

should be adhered to per anently if practicable and employed also for interior

service.

89. Formations of the company are: the line (plate 2), compa'nyBepltmn

(plate 3), column of squads, (plate 4), march column (plate 5), colu n of f4lwt

(plate 8) nd

(here follow plates above mentioned - pp 30 31 of text

The line is the principal formation of the company. In that formation

the company should not be drilled. The rest of the formations are for the

purpose of assembly and 7%X movements. Next to the column of march the

single file formation should be considered on the mrhh.

The company assumes that formation in the field which facilitates its

advance best and which is best suited to protect it from hsostile fire and

sight. .iardand fast rules are forbidden.

Each company must be able to atke up, in addition to the formations laid

down, any formation ordered better suited to the terrain and available space.

The formation of the platoons need not be the same. The main point is,

that the company is in readiness at every moment for its task.

90. Movements: Parade march, march in cadence and march without step;

length of pace 80cm; 114 steps per minute.

Double time : march-march! (without keeping step as quick as possible,

but keeping places in formation.)

Changes in formation are executed by breaking off, ploynent, deployement

of squads, turns, assuming single file formation.


b, FIELD TAINING

91. 0 p e h o r d e r is the batttle formation of infantry. The

open formation of the skirmishline (usually 6 paces) allows the skirmishers

greatest mobility of the body in the use of his rifle and apt utilization of the

terrain. The endeavor should be to offset the disadvantage caused by the

skirmishers being less in the hands of the leader than they would in close

order, by training the individual skirmishers to independent action, by

keeping open order formation within. certain limitations, by frequent' assembly

should the terrain and hostile fire permit the latter.

THE I f'AN TPl SQUAD

92. The squad is the lowest unit. of open order. he squad leaders

are charged with carrying through the infantry fight and are the most import-

ant, loer commanders in modern battle. As long as the battle situation

permits the platoon commander to lead the platoon, the squad leader execut.es

to a finish the orders of the platoon leader. e takes care that connection

with the platoon commander is kept as long as possible. The squad leader

must be competent to act independely within the limits of the task set to

the platoon.

In attack he leads his squad by correct utilization of the terrain and

works his way with it un to the enemy. He has to decide whether that shall

be done by simultaneous rushes forward, by crawling, by creeping from cover to

cover or in any other manner. He must always strive to brin hts squad

forward and to keep it well in hand. ?se cooperates with the neighbor squads

ijuxfi under fire and while in motion, seizes points in the terrain wThich can sea

serve as supporting points for his own further advance and which may facilitate
fire
the advance of neighbor squads. i uual/support musth be striven for.
the fire of
To block/neighboring; squads must be avoided. Once within the hostile nosi-

tion, the squad leader remains there, no mattiter what may happen.

In defense it is the squad leader's duty to bring his skirmishers timely

into the firing line, even under the heaviest fire. There he remains to the

last man, paying no attention to what happens on his right or left. He must
understand that his tenacious stand may decide occupation or recapture of

the entire position.

93. To tform as skirmishers" can take place from the halt, from any

formation, from the march, and fro the halt, standing, kneeling, or lying,

and along the base line with Rreatest order and silence.

94. Movements consist of advance and retreat or running, short flank

movements tunder cover and outside the hostile fire zone) and in changing

the march direction. Tf it is te entention to assume the fire fight from

the march or from the halt, then on the command "as skirmishers" the skirmishers

take up nests around their squad leader and get ready to fire. After fire

has been opened the advance is made by rushes, mostly with fire support.

The length of the rush depends on the terrain and on the will power of the

men. Long rushes are desirable. In most cases terrain and hostile

fire effect will compel short rushes.

95. Taking the enemy s position, the" c Ti a r g e , must, be made by

squads simultaneously, with loaded rifle, bayonet fixed, and intense decision.

Shortly before entering the hostile position every shouts ""hurrah." In


a certain portion of
exceptional cases, for instance in a sudden rush into/the nosition, the

charge must be mado without shouting, so as not t4o atract the attention of

portions of the enemy in the vicinity.

96. K i n d s o f f I r e . As a general rule only one skirmish

line fires. The fire is by individuals. ?sreouently only a strip of the

terrain can be designated as the target.. Ranidity of fire lies in the

choice of the skirmisher, who must be trained to fire conscientously and who must

must never abuse that privilege. If the leader thinks decrease or increase

of Fire necessary, he can order that. Volley firing may lead the indi-

vidual skirmisher to fire without aim and must therefore be used only exce:,-

tiona.l.lj, for nastance in firing with a number of rifles an a certain point

to find the proper range.

97. F i r e c o n t r o 1 . Exact estimate o' the range is the


basis for successful fire control. us of range finder, scaling the

range on the map, and inquiry of troops already firing can help, but cannot

entirely replace estimate of the range. The platoon commander designates

target, setting of sirhts, and opening fire as long as this is possible in

battle. Frequently the squad leader will have to act independently in

that matter, when kxr x uxx orders do not reach because of the noise

along the front, in spite of being transmitted f'rom mouth to mouth.

By :ield-glasses
usingf permanent observation of fire effect is poss&-l.e.
bring
The endeavor should be to sXz$A$ the densest portion of the sheaf directly

on the target, i.e. equal portions thereof in front and behind the target.

F i r e d 1 s c ip 1 i n e supplemets fire control, it is cor-

posed of conscientuous carrying out of orders received during the fire fight

and painstaking observation of regulations governing the handling of'arms

and. conduct under fire.

98. The infant ry squad in position warfare.

Trench warfare requires other arms, fo mations, and tasks for the squad than

warfare in the open. Tn addition to the rifle, hand grenades, gas and

smoke bombs, granade throwers and rifle grenades, flame throwers, light

machine guns, and the combination of all these arms with heavy machine guns,

minewerfers and infantry field pieces come into consideration.

Battle formations of the squad in position warfare differ according to

task, terrain, hostile fire effect and kind of obstacles.

Each man must be drilled in the use of all of them. '-e must kow that in

the attack the decision is gained not only by the effect of arrms but also

by intrepid x ca fighting regardless of consequences. The tasks

mentioned in par.225 of A.V.F. concerning the infantry squad presuppose a

defihite training of shock squadsor groups for attack and defense. The

more difficult the task, the more neceesary is cooperation between the above

mentioned auxiliary arms for hand to hand fir hting.


99. Depending on the size and kind of task set, pioneers, machine guns,

grenade and flame throwers may be attached to shock groups. /l/


% upnort

by minewerfers and artillery should always be considered, as well as employ-

ment of means of ammunication (message dogs, carrier pigeons, long distance

telpephones, telephones) and light signal throwers.

squad leader
100. Personality of the 4WM)' is very decisive for success. e

must be able to act independently within the limits oP his task/ THe dis-

tributes the task among the men according to their capabilities and conducts

the fight. His assistant must be informed in the matter of all prepara-

tions and must be familiar w'ith all, the details of carrying on the fight.

101 . Tt is absolutely necessary that all commanders and subordinate

leaders have correct knowledge, gained from maps and aerial photographs,

of the initial position, the road to betaken, and the noint of attacks.

Prerequisite for success is practicing an attack, everyv one participating,

in all Ik *x kxxxn i kxfaxx the details o" the hostile ros tion.

102 We prefer to employ:

Pioneers for demolition;

iachine guns to fight suddenly appearing hostile machine guns, trench

mortars, to hold down the trench defenders at the point of contact and ad-

;joining portions of the trench, to open pursuing fire, to drive off hostile

counter attacks;

Bomb throwers, in general like machine guns, and. in addition for fire in

rolling up the enemy, to keep down rifle grenade nests and hostile positions

in readiness in trenches farther to the rear, to block trench crossings;

Flame-throwers, for fighting against block-houses and covered trenches,

to block tunnels and covered rest-stations, to defeat counter-attacks, and also f

for fighting tanks.

103. To fight a4-Atr machine gun nests and block-houses reauires great

caution and ability. Only seldom cah we succeed in working our way up

to their very walls. In most cases sharpshooters, machine guns, and grenade
throwers will have to hold down the fire of hostile mach te guns from

well covered positions and in case of block-houses fire at the loop-holes.

It is of great importance to at once perceive trouble with loading on the

part of hostile machine guns and such events must, be immediately taken ad-

vantage of for further advancing. Use of smoke bombs and hand gas bombs

etc. are very advantageous. During this time the other portions of the squads

work their way against the hostile flank and rear within throwing range to set

him hors de combatb,y means of hand grenades.

The LIGHT MACHhIF GT1 D ; :

104. being a very mobile principal fire power, the light machine gun

Unj*es- form the skeleton of the infantry attack and are generally employed

at short range. They can carry on the fire fight even without skirmish

lines and all they require "is some advanced skirmishers for protection.

We should endeavor to attach two light machine gun rt to each platoon

for mutual support in fire.

105. Instructions for the squad leader hold good for the leader of the

light machine gun sewp_ HIe has to insert his arms as effectively as
possible in conformity w ith the situation. He must endeavor to gain

momentary effects /%/$/Ai%, must take advantage of temporary

appearing targets, must fire on the momentarily dangerous target, and must

coperate with other machine gun m and with heavy machine guns.

106. In the attack the leading machine run.(( (attacking noints)


uip
works as close to the enemy as practicahle by using the cover of the terrain

and open fire at short range, if.possible under 500 meters, and direct their

sudden fire unexpectedly on the enemy's .first line to protect the approach-

ing skirmishers. They support the /J( fire prepapatory for the charge,

enter the hostile position immediately behind the first troops entering, and

attempt to gather the fruits of success..

107. In defense they are specially adapted to defeat attacks; they keep
keep on firing the last cartridge an' thus give an oportunity to their own

troops for ax counter-attack.

Iii position warfare their insertion saves men without lessening the

fire ower.

108. The machine gun ° adopts the ame formation in deploying as

skirmishers and other formations o -fthe infantrir squad; there should be but

little difference between the two; the "rincipal thing is to avoid crowding

around the gun. Tf the light machine gun is not used in battle, the corn-

clement serves the same as an infantry squad.

If the machine gun giupenters battle by itself, mebers of the com-

plement furnish flank protection against surprises and keen their platoon

commander in sight.

109. As a rule fire is opened, to proof the correctness of the sight,

by firing at one nd the same point, and thereafter, when necessaryr, dispersing

fire.

Kind of fires Fire for short mements is the rule and are best for that

arm. If target and light are favorable, duration fire may be correct,.

During movements in the vicinity of the enemy, when on guard and in all

cases where the gunner is to fire by himself, a drum (cartidge box 16) is

attached, to be ready to fire at all times mza without having to wait for

ammunition to be brought up.

Fire while in notion may be advantageous at o lose range, for instance

during the charge or attacking trenches.

THE PTA TOON

110. The main fire power of the platoon lies in the light nachine guns,

the platoon's shock power in its skirmish squadaas.

The platoon remains as long as possible the unit for leadership and fire

control in action. Frequently leadership will be made more difficult by

hostile fire effect, when the fire position can not be seen, and when the

platoon is far xtended to riht and left. But even in all those cases
it. must be the endeavor of the platoon commander to retain his influence by

all means.

The platoon &or mmander, accomanied by his battle runners, is not hound

down to any definite place; he goes in front for necessary reconnaissance

and leadership. The bugler of the platoon is a permanent means of connec-

tion with the company commanders.'

11. Vltlhods of advance up to opening fire. The mthod of the ad-

vance is
regulated by the battle task, effect of fire, terrain and light.
unit
Generally an advanced/Exdr kx**,u± is in front with sufficient interval.

This generally will be a machine un squad (attack point), which under protec-

tion of one or two pairs of reconnoiterers works its way as close to the enemy

as practicable, which means even in open terrain to within short range, where

it will open fire in the hope of gaining some success. Then it may be p

Possible, after inserting a few skirmish squads and more machine gun squads,

to leave to the machine gun squads the introductory fire and to keep up the

fire, and on the other to keep the largest portion of the skirmish squads as

long as possible in close order to insert them later at the decisive ooint.

112. Tf large, open saces have to be crossed at. lon r nge from the
into
enemy, the hostile fire may force the deployment of /y/Y/ smallest units

which the must gain ground with large intervals between each other either

in shape of very much extended skirmish lines following each other wave-like
squads in column of file, or in squads in anyr ormationr.
or in $/f$/ %i/L/y{i 4~XXd (see plate 7 to par.122). Advantages:

of the latter two methods: The enemy will have difficultv in seeing the ne.r ro t.

target at long range and his machine guns and artiolery rill have greater diffic

difficulty in making hits; Each squad leader keeps his men in hand in the

advance up to the point where fire is opened and squads will not become

dispersed when forming skirmish line; intervals will be created allowing

machine guns in rear to fire through them.

However such formation must. not interfere with the platoon commander

retaining control. Attack direction and connections must be definitely

laid down by the platoon commander and strictly adhered to be the different

units. Every unit must adhere to its line of advance so as not to give
the hostile machine Pins a chance to fire on more than one unit simultaneous lv.

113. Tf we can count on early contact with the enemy, the platoon ill

have to take up formations which will guarantee invisibility as much as

possible and fire effect. For this narrow formations are specially suited

, in the first instances column of files, in which formation the terrain can

he better uyilized than in skirmish lines. Many skirmish lines behind each

other are to be avoided. They augment losses, and order is disrupted pre-

maturely.

114. Advance subsequent to Opening of Fire. Formation, manner and

rapidity of the moiements in which the platoon after fire has been spened

works its way up to the enemy depend. on the terrain, on the hostile and on

our own fire;effect, 4 ~ Where rushes by the entire npltoon are impossible,

squads and even individuals will have to work their wcv forward by themselves,

Where ditches, knolls etc facilitat approach, theyr should be utilized in

column of files.

The guide for action must be to overcome the hostile fire by mutual

support and to open a road into the hostile position for our own shook power.

Whether the entry into the hostile position, is made with dense or light

skirmish lines and with larger extension X or more in shape of a wedge sent

against the point of impact, dnends on the battle situation, especially on

the results of our own fire.

115. The c h a r g e is executed according to pararraph 95 sunra,

It will generally be prepared by artillery,, minewrerfers and grenade throwers,

The charging units must reach the hostile line directly behind the last hits

of the projectiles fired br the above. As soon as the shout of "hurrytt is

taken up, all buglers and truminetors continue sounding the "charge." The

platoon commander is in front of his men, his example has tremendous effect

oh his men, and a charge once started must lead into the very midst of the

enemy. Any hesitation means annihilation.


Co-operation of light machine guns from flank or overtopping Positions

is especially ef ective in the charge.

If the charge succeeds only at separate points, those points must, be

immediately changed into fire support positions by light machine guns, from

which the hostile machine gun fire is kept at bar and from which the enemy

can be rolled up in flank.

116 If the intention is to pierce a deep hostile position, the leading

elements making the charge must keep to the advance without regard to mnaking

prisoners or capturing munitions,etc, hostile counter-attacks must be crushed

in their inception, the retreating enemy must be kept moving by machine gun

fire, He prevents his lines in rear from firing and causes them to v abble,

When the object of the charge has been reached order must at once be re-

estahlished, arrangements made for holding the captured position by security

detachments sent ahead at sufficient distances, sufficient occupation of the

position and cutting out reserves.

117. Forming skirmish line and assembly. The skirmish line must

be formed out of any formation in close order and towards any side, Prior

to deploying into a mrch direction different from the one we took, the new

front is assumed. In denlovment from line the base unit must be designated.

Deployment is made on the leading unit while in formation of column of squads,

column of twos and column of files. The squads of the leading half-platoon

deploy 'd% to the right, those of the rear harf-platoon to the left,

Touch muist never be lost, The squad leaders are responsible therefor.

The platoon commander issues the orders to open fire, adding target and

sight elevations.

If adhering to the open order in the course of the engagement is no longer

in conformity with obect to be gained and with the situation, then, commencing

with the squad, it is every leader's duty to immediately assemble his unit

and report it to the next, higher co mmander for disposition.

Ur anizations created in the course of an engagement continue as such

until an opportunity offers to resume proper organization


118. The Platoon in Position Warfare. For command, relief, etc of the

platoon, duties of the commnder, see pars 300 to 304 F.S.P.

Any hostile attack must find the platoon in readiness for action.. Alarm-

ing the platoon, rushing out of cover, occupation of firing positions, rapid

readiness for counter-attack are part of training. Increased readiness is

required during the night and during foggy weather, All portions of the trench

defenders must have plenty of hand grenades in readiness.

Timely rushing out of shelter and occupation of the firing position are

possible onlyif observation post are placed at the entrances to trenches and

if increased care is taken to have the trench defenders in readiness 6n the steps

leading from the shelter to the trenches to rush out, in proper unit fornmations,

under di ection of squad and platoon leaders. The platoon commander must per-

sonally convince himself, especially under heavy fire, that his sentries are

on the alert.

Counter attack. If the enemy has entered the position of the pl'-toon,

then it becomes the task of the platoon commander to attack the enemy with what

is left of his platoon, independently and without waiting for orders, and to

drive him off. This is not accomplished by - dvancing in the trenches, but

best outside of them, on both sides, shock unit in the lead, followed by a

reserve supported by light machine guns and plentifully supplied with hand

grenadfes.

If the enemy has entered a neighbor sector, or if the platoon is posted

in the rear in a position of readiness, then the platoon must, leaving sufficient

guards behind, advance independently and without waiting for orders to the

counter attack.

THE COM A:11Y IN MOBILE WARFAtRE

119. D'uring the march, as a. part of a larger unit,the company commnnder

must get a clear picture of the terrain from the map from time to tine and keep

that in mind when near contact with the enemy is expected, so that he can

insert his company correctly when he leaves the march column. He designates
how far the machine gin wagom shall advance to give room to the machine guns.

For subsequent leadership of his company he selects his position there where he

has a good view, but must never lose connection nor 1 ndership. He cares for

recoa:'issance, security and terrain reconnoissance.

120. The company commander regulates the employment and cooperation

of the platoons, that of his grenade throwers and all other attached infantry

auxiliary arms. He issues corresponding orders for the different tasks and

directs what portions of the company are to occupy the first line, and what are

to be kept back in support. In this first deployment clear and tranquil

issue of orders is of special value.

121. The conduct of the front line follows 'the directions given to the

squads and platoon.

If the company commander finds that he has to employ more than one platoon,

then he parts the platoons in advance correspondingly, so that in the deploy-

mentthe platoons will find themselves just in rear of their deployment spaces.

As a general rule the command to deploy is given by the platoon commander.

If several platoon are to deploy, then the company commander may give the com-

mand therefor himself. When several platoons deploy simultaneously, then

a base platoon must be designated. ^.s general rule the base platoon guides

itself on its center, while the neighbor platoons transfer their guide to the

corresponding flank.

122. In most cases it will be found useful to limit the first insertion

of forces. ° his is necessary in the initial stages of a battle, when the

situation is still in the dark and. when the decision of the higher commander

is not yet known.


and mixing up of
In order to prevent confusion/among/the platoons, it may be advisable

to cut out weaker portions of the several platoons and insert them alongside

of each other (whatever that maay msean, trsl.) This procedure is proven cor-

rect by the fact that in this manner several light machine guns can be inserted

without having to fall back on the skirmish squads.


}

41,it
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49

For an example of the formaton of a company %q in attack, see

plate 7 (page 41 of text,)


company
123. As a part of other detachments, the/commander takes measures for

proper connection with the next higher commander and the neighbor units. it

is of utmost importance that the message service with the next higher commnder

is absolutely maintained. One of the buglers accompanies the company commander

the others are distributed to the platoons and keep the company commander in

sight.

124. As a general rule the platoon commander give the commands for

opening fire. The asany commander may reserve to himself that right, if

it is demanded by the battle object (fire surprise, defense.)

If the company commander is in the leading line, he regulates the ditribu-

tion of fire nd in the attack the working up of the platoons to the enemy.

Company commanders, platoon commanders, and machine gun detachment com.-

manders must keep an eye on timeley replenishment of amunition, especially

for the light machine guns. The station or location of the machine gun

wagon must be knan. The noncommissioned officer with that wagon must. take

care that when going for ammunition there are plenty of empty drums, etc, to

be filled.

That portion of the company kept in rear forms the support. It serves

for reinforcing the front line, for its prolongation, for protection of the

flanks, for carrying out the charge and the counter-attack. Its location is

shown by these requirements.

The distance from support to front line is regulated by battle situation qnd

terrain. Timely reinforcement if thefiring line are the maid points to be


as close to
kept in view. For that reason the support must be - 1. ° the firing

line as cover and possibility of flank movement permit.

M anner and formation of the forward movement correspond to the terrain

and to hostile fire effect. The main point is for the support to save its

energies as much as possible to the time of coming into the front line.
It depends on that whether the support can remain in close order or must be de-

ployed. In any case, the conmlander must keep the support in hand.

It may become meceesary to detach some portions of the support, such as

machine dun squads, for special tasks, such as flank protection, or to pose,
ing
them ftiempra r°1Jy on scale Tminat/position to support the firing line.

Advance into the front line is regulated by the support commander according

to orders from the company commander. Where units become mxed up, new t

ones must be formed quickly. Careful training must assure that in such cases

discipline and correct fire control are reestablished at once.

Insertion of support and prolonging the firing line may also be resorted

to with the intention of carrying a line forward that has temporarily been

stopped, or to bring ammunition to the front.

Every unit without flank protection by other units c' res for the pro-

tection of its flanks. This holds good for portions in front as well as in

rear.

126. If the front lines advances to the charge, the supports must

press forward at once.

The same points hold good for charge by a company as for charge by a

platoon (see par.115.) The basic thought must always be: Pushing forward

up to the designated point, be that in regardlessbreaking of resistance or

in pursuit. That portion of the comnand, cut out after the accomplishment

of the object, to hold itself in readiness for any contingency, must always

be ready to defeat counter-attacks or dangers in the flank.

127. As a general rule, prior to occupying a defensive position, its

skeleton is definitely marked by platoon and squad headers. Thereupon

observers must be left in the position in order to assure timely occupation

by all portions of the company that are under corer and in most cases already

deployed. It is also neceesary that the position has the look of a dead

position to the view of aerial reconnoiterers.


THE COMP=PNY IN POSITION WARF.ARE

L28. The duties of the company corander are about the same as those

of the platoon comuander within his platoon (see par.ll8.)

129. For an attack on a large scale measures are taken down to the last

det ils. Formation and execution are, for the company, the same as those
laid down for mobile warfare. Orders must be timely issued for reconnaissance a:

after the battle is finished.

Minor tasks, which are not to carry the units too far into the hostile

position, may be given to single comp'nies.

130. The division of the company for such tasks is regula ted according to

the nature of the task, which results from the strength, base plan, and other

peculiarities of the sector to be taken. In this work it is oroper to place

the platoons alongside each other, to avoid from the very start mixing the units

with all their resulting consequences.

Thus, for each separa-.e task a special platoon should be designated as a

rule. The number of platoons, to be formed and their strength apportioned

according to the task set, must be regulated in each case by the company com-

mander. : portion, even if consisting only of a few squads with a supply of

hand to hand fighting means, -ust be retained in the hands of the company

comet-nder in all cases as a support.

131. The dompany has in its shock units composed of the most suitable men

excellent fighting men. They are inserted at points where the strongest

hostile resistance is to be expected. The company finds valuable support

in grenade throwers, minewerfers and machine guns even in oases where artillery

preparation is not intended.

132. Whether the attack is carried forward in trenches or ditches, across

the open, units independently behind each other, in smaller units, in dense

or light lines, is regulated, Tesidea the condition of the terrain, by the nature

of obstacles near the enemy or near our own starting point. Thus, advance

from sapp heads requires a different formation of the charging detachments,


bhan would an advance from trenches or ditches parallel to the hostile position.

By the fact that the leading charging line is followed by other lines,

which according to need can be employed as cleaners-up, as carriers of hand to

hand fighting means and message means, building materia.ls,etc, the charge will

assame the format on of waves, following each other at short~in tervals. In

most cases it will be well to have all waves start simultaneously and. unexpect-

edly, so that the hostile defensive fire cannot part the leading line from the

supports. Formation of the waves in reg-rd to depth takes then place only

within the network of the hostile trenches.

Distribution, positions in readiness and advance require careful advance

preparation and drill, all men participating must also be physically trained in

running.

Connection between neighboring attacking units must not be t'king strictly

on the flank. Connection lies in the attacking objective which must be clearly

designated and known to every man. Every one must push forward toward that

objective regardless of everything. The '~d A(]6 /ai/d

X %/yj/ The cleaning-up of ustrange trenches must be left to units following

up in rear. Only reconnoiterers go beyond the attack objective.

133. For special,purposes pioneers may be attached, with charges to

open obstacles th t have not been destructed by the preparatory fire, with

flame tubes to smoke out covered trenches and the like, with small flame throwers

for attacking block-houses, machine gun nests, with light bridge ma.terial,etc.

They also take part in the advance exercises.

134. Prerequisite for Success of the attack is accurate knoledge

and careful reconnaissance of the portions of the hostile position that are

to be attacked with the help of of position charts and photos secured. by aero-

planes. B&sed on the reconnaissance roads and targets are designated for

the different portions of the company by sketches and orders. The men must

be drilled in attack by arraning the hostile positiom (tracing the trenches

by means of a plow.) Everything the infantry observation organs have

ascertained must be utilized in this, especially the location of machine runs,


trench mortars, position o4 the conmmnders,etc. Panoramic sketches Pre of
great importance.

135. For defense, the portions designated for the counter-attack must be

correctly posted, that means so that they can start at any time without loss

of time against the probable points that will be attacked and pireed. If the

enemy has entered the position, the company commander must endeavor to recapture

the position, independently and without waiting for orders, by a rapid counter-

attack, if possible from both flanks in order to take prisoners. He must

use the same procedure if the neighbor sector has been entered.

136. Message Service. Co-operation between all fighting forces in

attack and defense can be assured only if all subordinate commanders, especi-

ally company commanders. keep the imprt nt duty in mind to keep the battalion

commander and higher headquarters permanently informed of events. All events

in their corn as well in neighbor sections must be reported; if the messages


duplicate
are important, Oi XZ messages are to be xmdx sent by different transportation

means (dogs to the battlion; carrier pigeonis to division headquarters); even

reports that in a certain sector no changes have occurred may be of great im-

portance to higher headquarters. Higher headquarters can send help timely

only, if the subordinate commanders, trained in sending messages, utilize the

means of transmitting messages and reports correctly. Even under heavy fire

the message service must be continued.

3. THE MACHINE GUN COMPANY OF 9 PIECES WITH THE BATTALION.

137. Numbers: approximately 130 men, 5 saddle horses, 18 light draft-

horses, 9 two-horse vehicles, 2 cycles.

Combat $X Train: 6 machine gun wagons, four of them with 2 machine guns

08 each, 1 wagon with 1 machine gun, 6000 rounds for each gun, 1 small field
kitchen.

Field Train: 1 machine gun baggage wagon, 1 provision & forage wagon.
Position VAtMaterial and on Machine Gun w~agon

Platoon & Secttn


GIun Comdr
* Gunner
*j.Heavy'machine gun
water chest 4-xx-,

1~ cartridge ches t

3 3X ~

147x 2 o
Plt 9 9

The Line

Copn Cmad

SupyOfie

Liuenn

istSrgat .

Acg$s Srg1
a) Drill

138. General Rules: The task of the machine gun company consists in direct

support of the fire fight of the infantry.

here follows plate 8

The machine gun company is a permanent part of the battalion to which

assigned. Its company commander is responsible for training of the company

and for the condition of the equipment.

Machine gun gunners, trained in infantry drill, and the drivers, are armed

ith the pistol Model 08, some of them with the earbibe. All gunners must be
2
trained in serving the light machine gun against ground and air targets, some

of them in estimating distances also. Officers and gun commanders must be


with
familiar with indirect fire and fire from cover and %y( the use of the usual

auxiliary means.

The following form the complement of each light machine gun: 1 gun captain,

5 gunners and two auxiliary gunners. Gunner No.2 sights the gun. The

auxiliary gunners serve also as battle runners and to bring up aimunition.

Position at machine gun wagon see Plate 8.

139. Formation and Movements of the Horse-dr rwn VMchine Gun Company.

The horse-drawn machine gun company must be trmined in formations and movements

so far that it will be able to follow up the inf ntry even in the most difficult

terrain, ill moements are made at the walk. Taking up the trot is per-

mitted exceptionally only. It is forbidden if the battle object can be rached

without it.

here follows Plte 9 - page 4a of text

The complement marches. Cn the right of each driver sits the gun captain

to handle the brake. On the march the gun captains may be allowed to march

temporarily. Atording to orders from the. xxzkii company commander, if the

battle situation demands rapid interference, portions of. the complement may

ride on the mchine gun wagon, for instance gunners Ios 1 to 3 distributed on
Plate 10 Pae1
Plate 11

M~arch Colunn Single file

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the six wagons. The remaining gunners follow in close order.

For formations see P1 tes 9, 10, 11.

The line is the usual assembly formation. In this formation the company

is not to be drilled. The column of files is the prinsipal assembly and march

formation.

It may lso be to the point to have the platoons march in line behind each

other or in column of files.

here follow P1,t s 10 & 11 - p-ge 47 of te t

The column of march serves as march and assembly formation, the platoon

conmmanders (mounted) are with the gunners or with the'vehicles of their platoons.

ts rule the quartermaster rides in rear of the company.

Movements: without keeping step, in cadence, h-lf turns, full turns,

to the rear march, facings.

Changes of formation: breaking-off, concentration, march column, order

of march.

b) FIELD TRAINING OF THE ACHINE GU? CONS NY

140. In the light machine guns the Infantry possesses a very mobile

arms, with accurate fire at short range. The heavy machine guns are more

hindered in their movements on account of heavier weight and clumsiness in its

movements, but are specially suited for firing at long ranges. Therefore

both kinds of machine guns must co-operate. bee pat.?7.

141. It is the task of the light machine gun to support the infantry

from the lower half of mid ranges, to carry forward the attack of the machine

gun squads and to drive off battle planes, These tasks they will be bale to

easily solve when occupying oertopping or flank positions, and will also be

frequently able to fire through gaps in the front line. If they have to be

inserted in the front line, then they conform to the movements of that line.

Utilizing carriages or sandbags in place of sleds the machine gun becomes more

mobile and offers a smaller target, but because of the great dispersion firing

at ranges of more than 500 meters as well as firing over our own troops is
practicable only under favorable conditions.

142. Onl:y seldom will the machine gun company find employment as a, unit

in battle under direct command of its commander. In most cases it will be

divided by platoons to support infantry companies of the battalion to which

it belongs. Therefore its training must conform closely to that of the rest

of the infantry.

LEADERSHIP

143. The commander of the machine gun company remains with the battalion

commander as long as his company is not in action. He must receive definite

orders for going into action with his company; he makes the proper reconnaissance

therefor himself and issues his orders accordingly. He supervises

going into position and fire of the platoons in action and cares for telephone

connection and supplies of every kind. He must make known his location.

In mobile warfare the company commander, in the advance, must consider

if he can count on certain replenishment of amunition from the vehicles to

the firing line. If that is not the case, he must bring forward as much am-

munition as possible. with the machine guns. The nearest infantry company is

bound to supply replenishment in men when necessary.

Capability of coming to a rapid decision, thorough knowledge of the fire

technique of the machine gun fire fight, combined with personal energy are

the attributes of a good machine gun commander.

144. If lightmmachine guns have to take position in the foremost line

on account of absence of overtopping or flank positions, then they are subordinate

to the company they join. Care must be taking for necessary support when the

guns come to the front. The machine gun company co ander regulates the sub-

sequent bringing up of ammrunition,et.

145 beading the fire fight is the province of the m chine gun platoon

or Xta X or half-platoon commanders. Their influence must not be lost

even if the the different guns are far apart. They are responsible for,proper

fire co-operation as well as for replenishment within their platoons and half-
platoons of nmmunition,etc. they select their loautions accordingly in b°'ttle.
The gun captain must be trained tp ersona decision and action. Me

has the fire control of the machine gun in his hands; he must, be thoroughly

acquainted how to handle his ari. Me is required to maintain strict fire

discipline and care for proper replenishmen t of ammuniton and other hieeded

supplies.

FIRING POSITION

146. The machine gun company, to husband its forces, allows the machine

guns and ammunition to remain on the wagons as 'one es cossihle, and travels

on the roads,

To facilitate surprising fire, it is necessary to avoid any movement,that, c

could be observed by the enemy, when going into position. All reparations

including loading must be made as much as rossi le under cover. On the macrh

the guans are generally not loaded and carried dismounted. If the machine

guns have to traverse a space in view of the enery in a hurry or have to make

a change if position, the machine guns must be taken apart,

147. The firing position must avoid as far as possible to be seen by

the enemy and from the air; this is best done by selecting shade and suitable

back-ground for the position, throwing up masks, or carefully hugging folds

of the terrain. In an open position the machine gun shields easily betray

the location.

Specially advantageous are positions from which can. be fired for a longer
on slds ~-0
time without endangering our own troops. The light machine gun 'can fire

over their own troops from positions that overtop them only slightly. Mouses

and tees occasionally offer good positions, If the position is located

too high, flat tralectory cannot be sufficiently ta.ken advantage of.

148. The position best suited for fire effect must be selected flor

each machine gun. We should always endeavor to employ several machine guns fi

from the flank, separated, but co-operatninly. The interval between the xi

light machine guns is rdeacendent, on the terrain, ",ut should never he nxnx*raw

less than twrentgy paces.


FIRE ACTION

14 9. Before a target is fired. on we must consider whether the expenditure

of ammunition warrants it. The number of rounds carried along is lirmited.

In addition, the time to open fire must be correctly ascertained. Effect

must be attained as soon after opening fire as possible, as machine uns are

not capahie of carrying on a long, uninterrupted fire action.

150. The ranid sequence of shots with a comparatively narrow dispersion

and the possibility of covering certain defeiniteeWy designated spaces with

effective fire, promise quick result. This result mar heennihilating in

a very short time at short and mid ranges, rwhen fire


esoeciallv is opened in-

expectedly.

151. Kinds of Fire:- Not, counting single shots, we differ between

volley fire and continuous fire.

By volley fire is meant a sequence of approximately 50 rounds. It serves

the purpose of finding the range and aim.

Continuous fire serves for effective Eire, It is fired either at one

certain point, or at a designated space, sweeping fire, depth ire. The latter

serves to cover the allotted space more in de.th.

Fire for effect must follow the volley fire as quickly as nossible, as the

enemy's attention will have been attracted by the volley and naturally will to

his best to Dut them out of combat.

152. Fire Effect.- The ffire effect depends on correct range, observa-

tion, size and density of the target, X$ % I$'kO re .ge, fire duration, and hostile

counter effect. We must endeavor to attain good effect by fire rapidity and

plenty of ammunition in the shortest oossible time, Sudden opening of

fire and flank fire increase the effect.

153. Most of the tasks set light machine guns will be solved by them

by direct fire. The desire to keep the position of machine runs in fire

hidden from the enemy as long as possible, this evading hostile fire effect,

demands d i r e c t fire, as is also the case When different. battle tasks


are give n, for instance, firing concentrated. fire to defeat, a charge in front,

of the main position to be defended in position warfare, and to fire on the

Tamdden fire support of the attacking infantry in the depth of the attacking

space in mobile warfare.

Firing on aeroplanes wl by using the circular front sight demands good

training. Indirect fire and fire on aeroplanes must never lead to squander-

ing ammunition.

154. F i r e C o n t r o 1 . Choice of target and distribution of

fire depend on the situation.

The order to oen fire must be bried, giving direction, target, limits

of target and elevation o4 sight.

If the battle situation permits fire is opened by trial shots (range-

finding j. Targets, which must be fired on inueediately, are fired on con-

tinuously without first finding the range.

The main point is to aim at the bottom of the target. eviation from this

rule pays only in fire on high targets and at short range.

Puring battle the fire of the light machine guns must. frequently he con-

fined to short moments, taken quickly advantate of, (Sud'denl1_r appearing

machine guns, fire support of infantry rushes, firing on hostil.e rushes,)

In such cases regular commands cannotbe given therefor. Success can be attaii

attained only by the commanders giving correct directions, clearly knowing the

battle task, cold-bloodedness and independence in employing the arm.

the hits
155. It is necessary to nermanently observe/through field glasses the

k$xM *k. PBy the hits and by the conduct of the enemy wh easily find out,

if the bullets strike the target, or what, changes must he made to increase the

fire effect (lessening the sweeping). Such observation is the main duty of

the gun and half-platoon cormianders.

Conduct of the Vehicles and punlies

156. A location under cover should he assigned all vehicles when going

into action.
If their advance to within the hostile fire xone could not be avoided,

they are sent hack as soon as possible to cover. Kfny position or location

hugging the ground and which offers a chance to change -osition rapidly

is permissi.ble. In. the absence of good cover the column of file is advisable

outside the zone of effective hostile fire. Position underneath sihgle

trees guarantees security from planes.

All noncommissioned officers and men not required to serve with the guns,

the armorer (NCO) and one of his assistants take their position with the

wagons.

157. The commande of the vehicles rist. keen in touch wit9h the machine

guns either personally or by battle runners and must follow up the machine

guns without further orders. Every change in his location he reports to the

front,

It is the duty of the commander of the vehicles to keep the strictest

discipline and order. Every disorder in rear of the firing line, especially

blockade of defiles, can have gar reaching consequences. 1'e must avoid

to locate his vehicles on roads,

The commander of the vehicles must take proper care for bringing up

suppies of all kinds, especially ammunition and water. %e arranges to have

cartridge boxes lefta in the vehicles transported to the front, bring back

empty ones and gather them up in the subsequent advance. "e arranges to

have all drums and belts filled.

158. Ammunition roplensihm ent is aiccompanied by replenishment in per-

sonnel and mnterbel. Readiness to fire and mobility of the guns and, vehicles

must be maintained in all events and using all available means t.herefor at hand.

MAAThT I!Th COI. PANY T LEWARFARE


MOnT;

a) Attack

159. The piercing effect and the moral power of the machine gun fire

must be fully taken advantage of in the infantry attack. 'ut that, effect

can be attained only if the gunners and especially the, subordinate fommaenders

of the machine gun company are thoroughly trained in thorough copperttion


with the infantry and their own machine gun squads, trained to great independe-

ence and imbued with the uncontrollable desire to push forvrlrd. without wait-

ing for orders.

Prerequisites for success is detailed instructions to be given by the

subordinate commanders to the men in regard to nemy, terrain, battle tasks

and points of view for the advance by sections.

160. If the nine machine runs of the machine gun company are formed

into three platoons of two guns each which are to accompany and carry forward

the attack, and one platoon of' three guns to serve as reserve of the battalion

and as materiel reserve, then the follow ing employment may serve as point of

view for organization and tasks of the machine gun pla.toons:-

Two machine gun platoons, distributed according to the terrain along the

extension of attack sector of the battalion, are inserted as far as possible

at the opening of the battle at long range to protect the deployment of the

battalion, to protect the fire of the machine gun squads (attacking points)

and the skirmishers hastening to the front with them, One gun of each of these

platoons may be kept in readiness to immediately fire on lc-flyring battle

planes and suddenly appearing tanks, Closely hugging the folds of the terrain,

suddenly app'peaning, antly evading hostile artillery fire, these machine gun

platoons follow up by echelon the firing line, Often they will fire through

gaps in the line to enable the skirmish and machine guns squads to get

forward and break down the hostile resistance, and will by cross fire among

themselves and with machine guns in and cc-


neighbor sectors by cross fire
Intermediate
zawrakin combined fire attempt, to break the hostile resistence. ,/Connection

with the leading infantry, thorough observation of the battlefield on the nart

of the machine gun platoon commander is required therefor,

Corresponding to the features o the terrain the third machine g!un

platoon follows at some interval the other platoons working their way forward

by echelon. The endeavor must be tb have one platoon always in readiness

to fire while one or two platoons advance. This formation in depth is

for the purpose of permanentlty supporting the attack and to form at, the same

time a supnorting point against hostile counter-attacks, especially to be able


to bring a strong fire effect to bear on an open flank against hostile en-

velopment movements.

This advance of the three machine run platoons to accompany the infantry

attack is regulated by the m chihe gun company coimaner according to in-

structions received by him from the battalion commander, with whoa he mast

remain in permanent communication. But neither the company commander nor

his subordinates must wait for orders, must must independently seek connection

toward the front.

161. During the progress of the attack the light machine guns must

interfere especially there where in the rapic advance of +.hbe infantry the

heavier auxiliary fighting means, such as artillery and inewerfers, can not

yet participate. In that,firing on hostile machine gun nests is less their

task, than that of the light minewerfers, the grenade throwers, and the

accompanying artillery. li ht machine guns must endeavor to attain by their

fire the best effect at the point where the hostile infantry is during the

decsive battle, tha; mesan sthe light m chine guns rimtu especiallyz fire on those

points in the final fire preparation which are to be stormed. As a general

rule the machine guns platoons are in the start inserted on the flank of the

infantry lines, °eshould avoid to insert them into the lIeading fighting

line as long as practicable. But, such insertion may become necessary

to strengthen the morale of this infanTt~ry or when firing through the gaps in

the infantry line or firing from overtopning nositions is impracticable but whero

when strong fire support becomes paramount..

162. 7then the charging troops have entered the hostile position, light

machine guns must be quickly on hand to annihilated the fleeing enemy with

their fire and to he able to maintain the captured position against hostile

counter attacks.

163. Machine gun platoons still kept echeloned in rear also participate

in the pursuit When they can no longer effectively fire from overtopping

positions, by advanicing rapidly and firing on all targets offering them-

selves and within range*


b) IN DEFENSE

164. In the defense the light mahine guns bear the main burden of the
infa ntry
tenacious ±pmHickkH resista nce. Their fire accuracy enables then to take up thi

the fire action at long: range.o

"ecause of .he narrow space required by the light machine guns, cover

is easily arranged for them. TrOwever, they will be savPed from premature

destruction only if they can remain hidden from the enemy as long as possible

Therefore they must, be well concealed.

165. We must strive for flanking fire principally in the defense.

A machine gun firing towards the flank remains easier concealed than firing

toward the front.

iring from covered positions at long range may be advantageous. (see

par, 153.)

166. The more numerous the firing directions of th searate machine

gun and the more several guns can concentrate their fire on every point, of

field of attack, the better is the machine gun position, If it is the

intention to carry on a protracted resistance, echeloning the guns to the rear

is absolutely necessary,

Selection of the firing position demands great, care . It is to he made

by specially fitted officers according to instructions from the commander of'


Locations for
the troops. /hanges of position must be prepared in advance.

RE U NhI'iH NT OF AITh4TTHITON, PERSONNEL AND MTERIEL.

167. In most case it will be nossile -to carry only the fallowing on the

vehi-des, lasting for one day:-

with eah infantry company, in the light riachine gun wagon, for each

light machine gun - 3000 rounds, d 18,000 rounds, in belts and drums;

with each machine gun company, distributed on the six machine gun wagons,

6000 rounds for each gun, total 54,000 rounds, one-third of that in boxes.

(FOOT NOTE: t is desirable that the battaliof should have at, its risnosal R xg
an additional light machine gun walgon, under disposition of Pn.TnT
carrying two reserve machine guns for each compacny and 18,000
rounds as a reserve.)
It will be suffficient in attack if each Mght machine gun going ihto

action has 1000 rounds, and several drums,and each heavy machine gun 3000

rounds. The rest of the ammunition follomrs as a. moile reserve br orders

of the company corrnmander,in some instance by one, in others by another battalion

coMmander. Everything which the combat troops cannot carry ±iza±f themselves

and requires as replenishment is brought up according to the orders of the

regimental commander on machine run hand carts, by carriers, pack animals, and

wagons xxxocikkx
E xEx combined as combat echelon from the personnel and equipme)

of the light pioneer column (see par.373). This combat echelon will require

and energetic and cautious commnder. The colonel in command of the machine

gun regiment supervises the bringing back of empty materiel, and cares for

timely filling of drums and belts and bringing up ammunition and replenishment

materiel.

4. THTE BATTA ION

168. The battalion is composed of:- Pattalion headquarters, 3 infantry

companies, 1 machine gun company and 1 platoon of infantry message company,

Strength: in peace about 700 men, in war approximately 1000 men; strength

of battalion headquarters; approximately 50 persons, 8 led horses, 6 light.

draft horses, 3 two-horse vehicles, 1 cycle.

Strength of the battalion message platoon:- approximately 65 persons,

4 message dogs, 1 led horse, 6 light draft horses, 3 two-horse imnlement

wagons.

ITION OF BATTALION Vi!}{; LEaS


COMMP0c

COMBAT TRAIN: s1 saddle horse for battalion commander


3 light--machine gun wagons )
6 machine gun wagons of the :T.G. Co) with the companies
3 implement wagons of the Bn Mess.Pln )
4 large field kitchens ) marching genera.lly
I sanitary wagon ) in rear of Bn
1 intrenching tool wagon )

FIELD TRAIN: 1 q.baggage wagon


4 Co. baggage wagons
3 Provision wagons of the inf'.cos.
1 provision .'r forage wagon of the M.GComapnay

Fom NotBe: In addition the following are urgently needed for the field:-
I light. machine gun wagon for battalion hcadquarters as irmtlement, ammunition
and zamgx hand to handf'ighting means reaserve; 1 smith's wagon f'or each
machine gu ncompany and the field train of the battalion; one provision wagon
for battalion headquarters to serve at the same time as canteen wagon;
one provision wagon for the battal.ion message platoon, and one for age wagon
for the machine _an comany.

169. The battalion commander leads his battalion through orders. He


directs the psoition of' the companies, including that of the machine gun

company, and that of the attached hand to hand combat arms according to situa-

tion and terrain, and orders the directions of march) intervals and distances
designates
between companies and/the base company.

For purpose o? assembly in a narrow space formation by companies in column

of march alongside each other is suitable; where there is lack of space for

depth, the companies will be in column of' companies, alongside each ether.

eight must. never be lost of cover, especially against plane observation.

5. T1E REGIMENT

170. The regiment is scecially well suited for the execution of

definite battle tasks on account of its unity in training, the esprit of the

officers' corps and by the addition of different hand to hand fighting arms.

171. An infantry regiment is composed of:- regimental headquarters,

3 battalions; headquarters of One infantry message cornaany; the three nlatoons

of which will usually be with the battalions; one infantry minewerf er company of'

four to six light minewerfers and one infantry field battery of six infantry

guns.

Some infantry regiments also have attached to then .jger battalions with

one cyclist company each (with four light machine guns ;. In war the j g er

battalions are as a rule attached to the army cavalry as support and to re-

inforce the 'ire ower. In similar mr ,nner the cyclist, compannies, forrmed

into larger cyclist units (battalions) regiments) ill be u.ilined ny the

army cavalry or for sne-ial tasks (see par.237 to 244.)

Several infantry regiments, usually 2 to 3, compose the infantry of the

division, and are under the command of one infantry officer.


172. Strength of a regiment:

Foot N~ote. In th~e field should be added: for regimental headqa rters
for the mnavhine gun colonel and his chief armorer- one machine gun armnorer
wagon and at large one1 office
east field wa °on; for headquarte rs of the infantry message
kitche (to serve at thG sae time frcompany-
foreimental
headquarters), and one bagage and provrision wa ;on.

fi egimental headquarters: approximately 60 persons, 8 saddle horses,


2 draft horses, 1 headquarters haggage wagon;

b) Headquarters of the infantry Message (;omfpany: an-proximately 20 persons;

1. saddle horse, 4 light draft hors'es, 2 im~pllement wagons.

173. During practice marches and during marches where contact with the
as a unit.
enemy is not to he expected, the Infantry message companry marches l.-elese

a 4er and is quartered the same. If a battle is expected, ±x fx i


each battlion message platoon usually marches with its battalion.

The technical capacity of the infantry message company and the di fferent

battalion message platoons is different according to their equipment. The

nucleus for regimental headquarters and for each of the battalion platoons will

have to have one station squad, each of them with one equipment for field
chest
message lines and one hinged xtit Germ: TKlap~enschrank) ; in addition each

battalion platoon will require 5 telephone squads and 5 heliograph squads.

The machine gun company and the minewerfer company each receives one equipment

for field message lines; each infantry company and cyclist company one equipmsent

for army field line. Regimental headquarters has 4 medium heliographs (range
up to 8 kin); each battalion 6 medium and 2 sm:all1 heliographs (range up to

800 i).

8. THE IAN TRY 1MRER COMPANY WI TI! 4 LIGHT MTNERRS

174. Composition:

Strength : approximately 100 men.


5 saddle horses, 32 draft horses, 11 two horse wagons)
10 one horse wagons) 2ctle
Combat Company: 4 light minewerfers with 10 one-horse iinewerfer carts, eaci
each with 44 rounds; throwers suspended.
combat Train: 8 two-horse implement wagons carrying 80 rounds each
1 trio-horse observation wagon
1 two-horse small field kitchen
Field Train: 1 baggage wagon
1 chief armorer and shop wagon
1 Provision and forage wagon.
C"omplement of1 one thrower : 1 cornmander and 6 men.
The infantry ninewerfer company is under directj orders of the regi-
m
mental commxander, for the purpose of rations it is attached to some one battalioi

In position warfare each battalion hes 4 light minewerfers which are speecially

attached to it.

In mobile war, the infantry minewerfen company is kent as one unit on

the march. :'hen entering battle it will mostly be to the oint± to attach to

each infantry battalion oft the First line two throwers dusoended from mine-

erfer carts with 2 implement wagons each.

175. Uenera1 matters concerning the light minewerfers see nar.81

The light minewwerfers xa ik augment and take the places in many it

stances of the light artillery, dsegul ations for artillery therefore govern

them in many noints The battle tasks are to he distributed to both arms

according to their nature, wherein it should be considered if bursting mine

fire promises greater success by moral and bursting effect or by gas bomb fire.

176. Kinds of Fire: Interference fire in short fire surprises; ustilizin!

moments of favorable opportunities; interference with traffic and with the

enerrxv' s activities.

Annihilating Fire: sudden, considering space and time, if possible

within view; in attack and defense against those points where living enemy

is seen or assumed to be.

hlokade 'ire: to be used automatically, but flexible, in order to than e

target or make the fire denser; against routes of anroach or concentration

points of hostile charging troops in the defense; to block the enemy in attack.

177. The battalion commanders are responsibl for placing the light
designate
minewerfers into action. Ther /C/A 7$ positions and targets and regulate fire

activity and bringing up ammunition,

At times the corinnders of the rinewerfer companies and at all times the

platoon commanders are responsible for the election of observation stations

and firing positions. Prerequisite for correct selection of the positions

is thorough reconnaissance of hostile and our positions as well as of routes of


approach. In oosition warfare it will be necessary to have exact charts on P. I

1r o'btfp
cmaterial
le importance
s t o for
s the effect is good observation; it is generellv
conducted from the ground. Tn consideration of secure connection the ground

observation station should not bee too far from t+he firing stnation. To crowd

several observation stations toge+her is nrohibited. Communication between

observation end firing position is had by means of telephone, signals, calls,


and runners; in larger tasks communication with artillery cormanders or their

observation stations must also he arranged.

178. The throwers are generally constructed by squads, having care

in regard to target and terrain, so that Mid ranges can be uti.lized. Fire

from flank is special.ly eff~ective . Long ranges are to be resorted +-o in

exceptional cases.

'osition far to the front is excellent for short ranges and diminishes

dispersion; it facilitates effect 4aeper in the Midst of the enemy and, offers

the advantage of a broad Ri xxm~cxxx target space, so that several targets

can be fired on without changing position; but. has th~e disadvantage that the

position is hard to conceal, that, replenishment of arrwmnition is more dif-


ficult. In no case should minewerfer be in the most advanced firing line nor
inmediately behind it. Loose, echeloned position, avoiding all specially

expos~d high points, makes it harder for the enemy to locate it and diminishes

losses.
on
Ye should always avo id taking position in our trenches,or/routes of

approach with regrd to traffic.o M:aterial for the location is protection


against discovery by planes, and that hold good during construr^:tion of the

position. Tnder certain conditions it meAT be advaisable // to lead thie

routes of approach (their final stretch) as covered saps into the position of

the i newe rfer .

179. Tn case of reverses the firing positions of the minewerfer offer


good assembly points against a. hostile ?die ring. 'thoey must be constructed

for self-defense and, if effect with mines is no longer -oossihle, must be


defended to the last with hand to hand combat arms,,

180. if there is no time, nor material and laborers at our disposal

for bullet,-nroof construction, then we must be satisfied with protection apninst

observation from pianos or must fire from the open. In that case main

protection from hostile artilleryr fire must. be sought by changes be position.

181. Replenishment of ammunition is the most difficult questilon for


the acivtyof^.ewrars ss far as possible mines are broug~ht up by rail,

by wagons, or pack animals.

Change of position op the throwvers can alswygs be done in $3very short

time; The possibility of effctive fire depends on whether i*e succeed in

bringing the necessary ammunition timely to th-ie new position.

As we have learned, much of the implemts are destroyed in action..

Replenishment must be brought up in good time.

182. The higher fire control (regulating co-operation with other arms,

distribution of' tarmets, attaching snecial means of' obso-rVtion and tr nsm~ittal

of messages, fire orders) is, in larger units, the business o ,he highr troop

commarnder, or of the artillery commander, who issues the order to fire. That

commander must also isisue orders concerning m .nor operations and the dayl-y

firing activity.

Cioncerning direct Fire control, the commander of' the ninewerfers is reamn

responsiblef'or that in accordance with his instructions from higher commanders.

In this he must act. independently and with foresight. in tasks of the

immediate commander are o


timely and exact gW~y$ y / reconnaissance of' targets;
%/'
regulation of fire distribution and fire orders b-ased on orders re d.
Timely regulation of the fire;
correct utilization of' ammunition,

For the reconnaissance of targets photos taken from aeroplanes are of'

utmost importance . The tactical? situation~ decides whether it is best in each


dio use
case/survpris e fire, increase of'P
fire, or decrease r}:" fire or to use gas bombs

or to keep a nurmber of throwers in readiness under cover.


Correct timely regulation of fire demands,after consultation with the

other arms, utilization of the effect at the best tactical moment. It 5is

very wrong to squander ammunition for minevwerfers because o f the di fficulty

of replenishment, but using ammunition too sparse is ,Juts as bad as the former

for any snecial task. As a, general rule, fire must, be opened by minevrrerfers on]

only is sufficient ammunition is assured,. henevr possible hits must be

observed. Value is to be laid on special trial shots prior to opening


fire for effect. This can be omitted. when the range i //XY/1/3' and when

the influences of light ,etc are .,,ell known.

183. In position war, the l .?ht minewerf erg,, because of their mobility

and rapidity of ire, evr. movement and assembly in the hostile position.,

works and reliefs wnhen seen must be fired on with interruption fire or with

gas bombs. Light rminewerfers find special employment in preparation and

support of our own as well as in the defeat of hostile operations.

184.* In gas bomb engagements,, the employment of Gr fr reuz (literall1y

green-cross, cera r not only need to be considered


e~~,n as far as con

cerns light minewerfers. Gas mines, like gas projectiles of~ the artillery,

musi:. be used for attack and defense., ecause of the greater accuracy at

short range of the minewerfers the densest volume of gas can be reached in the

shortest time and by using little ammunition. Good success promises the

method of concentrating the effect of several mirnewerfers on to one point, the

minewerfers firing for about one minute. Still greater success can be attained

by a sud den gas attack fired as attRunt tfire, in whaich the Fl kre z.-gas anun it: c

of the medium minewerfers is mixed with light bursting bombs.

Weather and terrain influences have to decide whether gas bombs are to

be utilized.

185. By using the low trajectory mount, the light 4 W minewerfers can

throw a very effective flat traliectory nro-iectile, without being 1hereby -ore-
vented. from their usual employ ment. The possibility of making hits is more

favorable, the sheaf is smaller than in the high angle firing. The range

is from 150 to 1100 meters.


The light minewerfer iwith Plat trajlectibry mount is specially useful

to accomanyv the infantry fiel fun. 1t is far superior to the field. piece

96 by reason of greater mobility and consequent ea~sier connect ion with the

i nfant ry.

186. In attack, the light minew .erfere with flat trajectorv mount must

support, the infantry by direct or indirect fire in fightirng hostile resisting

nests, machine gun positions on the flank, tanks, and also in dlefeaiin ttacks.

In the defense tanks, advancing infantry and machine guns are especially

favorable targets for the flat trajectory fire of the light minewerfers.

In a planned attack there is generally sufficient time -'Or reconnaissance,


taking a position, etc. During the progress of~ the attack however the mnain
point is that the minewerfers, with sufficient ariun tion, remain in close

comp~any with the advancing infantry and procure quick ef fect,

187. The thoowers have to he veryt mobile to accom'pany the inhfqntryv.

on the road, in the march colum, and even, on the battle field the throwers are

suspended to the minewerfer carts, while the implemcent wagons follow immediatelf

behind in section. As long as terrain and hostile fire effect permit, the

cat with their suspendee throwers are drawn by horses; it' that is no longer

possible, the the carts are drawn by men and the ammunition carried by men.
The section follows in sectors according to situation, roads, and terrain

conditions . The section commanders are responsible that connection with

the throwers is not lost.

If,, on entry into battle, the minewerl'er company is two


split up to the
wagons
battalions in the leading line, it will be well to have only two implement.,

of each mxrxxxotcx minewerfor's section follow up, while the company

commander retains two wagons as 13Y an ammunition reserve. It may also be ne

necessary to held back the entire section at the dis~osi.trion of the company
commander, when there is no expectation of a large expenditure of ammun#ion.
188. There is no time in the offensive figzht for time-consuming reconnais-

spnces and advance preparations. The minewerfer commander must have the abi-

lity to keep himself continually informed with what is going on by personal ob-

servation and close touch with the different units. Experiences gained in war

teach that only those minewerfer commanders who are unusually adept and capable

to come to an independent decision brought their throwers timely to the support

of the infntry and inserted them correctly. Their first and principal duty is

just like that of the ma chine gun commanders, to be imbued with the spirit to

presss forward, without waiting for orders.

189. It is necessary to quickly perceive /useful positions, without

paying too much attention to cover, with observation station generally immeditely

near the thrower, not to wait for orders to fire, but independently fire on tar-

gets appearing the most urgent to be fired on in a tactical reletion, are necessary

to most rapidly conform to the wishes of the infantry in the matter of fire

support.

190. In firing the main point is to gain an effect in the shortest time.

For that purpose fire is opened without wheels, to utilize favorable moments in th(

the engagement. We distinguish between direct and indirect laying, the latter

from a covered position and at night and during fog.

7. THE INFANTRY GUN BATTERY OF 6 INFA.NTRY GUNS

191. strength: approximately 190 men, 24 saddle horses, 90 draft horses,

8 pack animals, 20 four-horse wagons, 5 two-horse wagons, 1 machine gun )8.

TION:
FORMA'

Combat Battery:- 6 guns, cal.7.lcm, 7.62cm or field gun 96


6 ammunition wagons
6 pack animals, according to need for telephone, intrench-
I oh tools, observation equipment, subsistence.
Combat Train: - 6 ammunitio wagons
1 four-horse implement wagon
1 four-horse large field kitchen
Field Train: - supply wagons
3 subsistence & forage wagons.
192. Different from the artillery firing at long range, the infantry

gun battery firesas accompanying battery in close local and personal connection

with the infantry. It procures thereby extraordinaryily moral and material

effect.

Infantry gun batteries are indispensable in the attack changing from posi-

tion warfare and in mobile warfare.

They are of minor value for rigid defense; they find well-paying targets

in a mobile and offensively carried on defeat of an attack.

193. TASKS. The infantry gun batteries are especially mobile

Foot 'ote.- I t is the duty of the rtillery comminader after consultation with
the inf ntry ommnrider to drill the infantry r .n personnet As general rule,
na
that duty is given to the comm nder otf the ±:x*°± yxHo ih artillery
re-4iment, ' who
also supervises, through his ;_rmorer, the mteriel of the i ifntry
gun battery.

The infantry gun batteries are for the purpose of firing AT SHORT RAIWGE on the

the opponent whit whom the infantry is engaged in short range battle. For tie

reason that they are close to the infantry, they will be able to rapidly open fire

at the right time onto the correct target, than is the case with artillery

posted farther in rear. The short distance between the guns and target also

permits to fire on them, which target cannot be seen from far in the rear.

And finally, considering the minor dispersion at short range, the guns can, in the

innediate vicinity of the aitfantry fire between the squads. Decisive for

success is not the number of rounds fire, but the accuracy of the single round

and in the attack firing through the infantry without delay.

Most important and most frequently is the fight against mchine guns and

tanks. Further targets of the infantry gun batteries are hostile skirmishers
fighting
in open and in reinforced positions, against hand to hand/guns, against minewerfer

and reserves close to the leading lines. Targets perceptible farther in rear,

for instance hostile artillery, are not considered by infantry guns except in

rare instances.

Employ$ent of infantry guns is had as a general rule by platoons or piece.

Single pieces or platoons are attached to battalions or are used for definite

tasks laid down by the regimental conander.


194. MOBILITY. POSITIONS. The infantry guns must be employed mobile.

There is no question of permanent strong shelter for them. "apidity of movement

in any kind of terrain, even drawing them by men, rapid reconnaissance, rapid and

unobserved taking up positions, covered or open, are demanded of them. In many

b.ttle situations going into action in the open, regardless of consequences, is

possible without doubt, not dangerous, and necessary in order to procure rapid

effect, Whereever and whenever possible, cover against plane observation at

least is advisable.

Positions iiinedately behind cover, where the gun pointer, standing on

the end of trail, can sight directly on the target or any auxiliary target

farther in front, are especially advantageous. This kind of position guaran-

tees also rapid bringing forward of the guns for direct fire in open firing

position against tanks and other moveable targets. Rapid construction of

cover against planes, balloons, and ground observation ! 4/ is important

195. OPENING OF FIRE. MANNER OF FRING. Infantry guns are easily

perceived by the enemy. Theref ore in addition to going into position without

attracting attention, surprising and rapid opening of fire and rapid comnencemnt

if fire for effect is necessary. Interruption fire, unaimed blockade fire, and

night firing on the part of infantry guns is the exception.

196. AMUNITION. The following ammunition is used advantageously:

a very effective high explosive shell, fired either with time or percussion fuze;

use of the percussion fuse is correct when, ii firing on open targets, it is

the intention to achiev the same effect as a high explosive shell has in she

rebound, or when targets offering resistance are to be pierced, for instance,

tanks, walls of houses, etc. Piring against targets offering great resist-

ance ma armor-piercing shells are valuable. Rebounds occur only seldom.

At close range the x rmnM high explosive shhrapnell or the case-shot are

to be preferred.

In all other cases the time-fuze should be employed. In exceptional

cases we have the Blsukre"Z~(literally Blue-wFcross,trsl) high explosive shell

and smoke shells.


Special measures have to be taken for a sufficient ammunition supply.

197. CONNECTIO WITH THE I NFANTRY. Close co-operation with the infantry A

is the basis for the activity of the infantry ,gun batteries. or that reason

they are not under the command of the artillery commander but under that of the
regimental
infantry/cmner.

The infantry regimental commander sets the task. Execution of the task

in detail is the province of the artiller~st. Orders for inserting his guns

will generally received by the battery commander in person, so as to arrange

the manner of going into action. If the battery is distributed (among batta~lioi

he takes his place as a rule with the regimental commander, without however be-

ing strictly bound to that. He far rather takes his place with that battery

where it appears to him to be most necessary. It is seldom necessary that

an artillery communication officer should be permanently with the regimental

comm'nder or headquarters.
with
The same holds good for connection ba xikffci platoons and pieces

attached to a battalion, few messengers will suffice for connection.

~More important than connection with headquarters is co-operation with the

troops. That must be arranged by mutual exercises and consultations. The

latter are necessary for definite active operations; in aather cases, only

independent, timely and rapid action in the sense of the battle object lead

to the objective.

198. PIERCING. MOBIL' AR. The battery a.s a.general rule does not

participate in advance preparatory fire; it is rather-kept, horses hitched up,

near the leading infantry line in order to, as soon as practicable, follow up the

advancing infantry, or placing single pieces in a waiting position far to the

front, so as to be able to hold down with direct fire any resistance contingent

upon the appearance of the infantry. These pieces also must have their animals

close at hand. Cover against planes is important. aostile fire is to

be evaded.
As a general rule the advance is made by echelon from position to position,

so that the advancing infantry has always fire protection of single pieces.

Frequently reconnaissance units are with the leading portions of the infantry.

Pioneers or infantry should be attached to the sdvancing guns as needed, who are
to help in crossing difficult terrain.

Expenditure of ammunition must be confined within the limits of possible

replenishment. The infantry comnander must be accurately informed concern-

ing expenditure and what is on hand.

If the attack comes to a stand-still, the infantry gun patteries take

over the.fire protection only long eneough until sufficient artillery can be

brought up from the rear to take over that task. If the stand-still is pro-

longed, the infantry gun batteries ire drawn back farther to the rear for

futher mobile employment, or are entirely removed from the front.

199. POSITION WARFARE. In attack against the infantry gun battery is

employed in local attacks; in defense, it is inserted mobile.

8, FOR MPITIOW OF THE I FANTRY ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

(Holds good for the battalion and up.)

200. Possibility of contact with the enemy requires a deployment suitable

to the terrain, which means, ngir front extension and depth

formation, which increases readiness for battle. The situation governs the

time for deployment; that time must be chosen so tht the battalion never gets

into hostile fire in close order, avoids unnecessary deto,.rs and also avoids

premature leaving the route of march.

By means of special orders the battalion commander designates the march

direction, base company, the subsequent extension and depth formation, and

possible divsion of the machine gun company. The battalion is deployed in the

simplest way by the leading elements of the companies executing a turn. 'etach-

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PA 4 rTX

14
201. EXTENSION AND FORMATION depend on the relation to neighbor troops

(if alone, if in connection, if protected by troops on both flanks or protected

on one flank only), the battle objective (if rencontre engagement, planned

attack, defense, or delaying ction) and the terrain. When flnks are bare,
depth
i.e. unprotected, it is advisable to prepare simultaneous/formation and miranx
towards the flank (echelon) which occasionally covers the flank in the shape of

steps, or to prepare an envelopment in echeloning to the front. In addition,

the leader must care for formation of the forces for the introductory battle, for

the course of the batt'le and for reserve.

(here folly s ap late - pse 65 of text) which. should be

consulted to understand the following:

to (a) troops fighting alone must preserve depth formation for protec+ipn

against envelopment on account of the not yet cleared up situation (Situation

of the advance guard battalion).

to (b) strong front deployment, to achieve in early fire success; little

depth formation, as only a skirmish reserve is required.

to (c) sufficiently strong fire front, strong echeloning towards the

flank to the rear behind the open(unprotected)flank: Possibility of forming a

defensive flank; or echeloning towards the front to form an offensive flank.

In selecting the formation for battle the insertion of sufficient forces

is of importance from the very start (at Gr.C-rschen in 1813 success which would

have been easy could not be attained because of the insertion of troops drop by

drop.) We would caution against any extensive extension; the consequence would

be that units would become mixed too soon. We should endeavor as much as

possible to insert the forces in echelo3, that means, the units alongside of

each other, for instance ir c©ise of an advance, guard regiment in the derloyent

in front.of a defile:-

here follows q. pint - see page 66 of text


As the regiment is in danger of being enveloped, ?road denloyment of

all battalions alongside each other is advisable immediately; the battalions

then assume adepth formation with due care for, subsequent more lateral ex-

tension and arrange for plenty machine guns along the front line. Far more

unfavorable would be the deployment of the 1st Battalion, crossing the de-

file in the lead, to more than 1500 meters and then inserting the 2d Battalion

along the entire line.

In the battle of Spichern in 1870 the insertion by echelons of a bat-

talion after the other caused an extension of 5 kilometers of the leading

brigade. Thus neither the regiments nor the brigade were capahle of carry

ing on the battle..

The distances in denth of the formation should be measured so that hostile

fire cannoy:simultaneous ly -effectively fire on more than one unit.

202 o materially larger forces requires much time and.

may require specia. Protetion. The leader must nroperly figure out the

fed
-aac c Paying due attention to the march deths.

March columns march around longrange;fire, taking advantage over kind of

of cover and avoiding cross roads. Crowding troops together, even under

good cover, may bring about serious losses. Where troops on a, halt can not

find cover, cover must be thrown up in the simplest form. In no case

must the preparation of cover be allowed to interfere with the sirit to

push forward in the attack and in no instance should the use of cover lead

to neglecting permanent observation of the battlefield.

.203. The movements of the battalion must be regulated by.

giving a' proper march direction to the base company. Terrain and battle

conditions may cause company cormnanders to temporarily change the intervals

and distances. The manner of doing this is left to the discretion of the

6ompany commanders . With transition into battle the imortance of the

base. company becomes less'; and less in the face of the demands of the battle.

It is the task-of the battalion commander to assure proper cooperation

between all parts of his battalion and to maintain connection with


sectora. Battle orders must assign to each company, the machine run

company, and attached accompanying arms a definite hattfletask and must state

as far as' possible the result of reconnaissances of the enemy, place and

task of adjoining troops, our own artillery, location.of hattalion headquarters,

troop dressing stations, and combat train. Where conditions permit, orders

are issued simultaneously to the companies nrior to entering the battle.

Verbal orders are the rule.

204. As a general rile. DEPWV 'NT of the infna.rtrr succeed development,.

which means formation for battle 69 in the shape ofskirmish lines. Only

smaller units. are able to form line of skirmishers directly from the column

of march. Deployment is necessary to avoid large losses when the.infantry

can no longer keep under cover. It offers the infantry the possibility

to get to the front even under heavy fire. roperly led infantry, imbued

with the spirit to get forward, will get forward even under the greatest

difficulties.

Temporary deployment of'riuixrf xdeveloped infantry may become necessary

at long range as units in close order must never"be shown in the range off

hostile artillery fire. In that case the the auxiliary fighting means

brought along on vehicles must, be carried unless the vehicles can, by making

detours, get around the space- swenpt by hostile artillery fire.

205. LEADERSHIP AND CONNECTION. Nhring any engagement the battalion

commander must never lose oversiight of -the situation of the front line and'

connection with it. For that purpose he arranges runner-relays, telephone

and heliograph connection.

The, battalion' commander must arrange with all-means at, his command to

:x±~ki establish zxP zMrtxzxcs x lk rapid and permanent communi-

eettion with the regimental commander and with the artillery.


'w: !j:s a' . '." ; «a: 'in^ T. F'" xd' .. .: 'i" .r iv aj;k'«se,'i ' : "j" ',y' , .'?'r.. s-x 'n+.,.:

'XI

PAal 69 OF TZXT

Plate 12

Attack . Machine Gun Nest


_
II

Q.. '

06

00
A

_
R"R"R
RRR (tii 1 ?

14,
1
RRrR"
" """ /

Advanced
"' ,"" :L' . 1 "" skirmish

; '1st Co squads of ' the


2d Co
Ba ttal ion.

f E a
BattaliorV
Comdr.

00

it. Mimewerfers

NOTE : Attack and silence No l


first then No II*

1 cannon battery
206. Tnstructiions given f'or the suprsport of the comanies hold good

for the distance and the movements of the reserve comanies (see t. er. 125,1x26.)

('reat. :must be taken in each instance for reconnaissance and security

in front and on the endangered f'leanks.

207. An important duty of the battlion commnder is hr nging up

ammunition and subsistence. As a general rule the vehicles of the combat

train keep on the move in rear of the battalion, Subsecuent hringing them

up, issue of ammunition, of hand-to-hand fi htir means, intrenching -toocls,


vehicles
location of the vehicles, whether// // are to be assembled for the entire

re iment and brought. up as a unit, should be stated in tli sp.necial orders,

The noncommissioned officer in charge of the combat train leads the

hand-to-hand fighting meais wagons, intrenching tool wagon, ammunition wagons-

if any- and the sanitary wagon as combat.. vehicles. When entering battle

the sanitaryr wagon is for the purpose of establishing the dressing station,

which is usually used by the entire reg;iment.

208. The battalion cormander must. issue his orders to the auxiliary

arms, if any are attached, in good tine (light, minewerfers and infantry guns)

so as to give their commanders time for reconnaissance of nositLions and for

bringing their commands un.

209. One of the most important tasks set the 1;tta.l1ion with attached

auxiliary means is attacking hostile machine gun nests in teF attack, A

good example for proper formation is seen in Plate 12 (page 69 of text),

here insert n ate 12

Hefore the skirmish squads advance to the attack on such nests, the infantry

guns and light mineerfers accompanying the leading infantry line must throw

an annihilating fore on time, using direct fire and observing hits. n

addition, a heavy nreparatory fire must be directed on the by machine guns .

Under the fire protection of the acoomPanying guns, of light mirewerfers

and heavy machine gun pstoons, the machine gun squads and shoc k troops de-
signatged for the attack, wcrk their way up endeavoring to rep,:ch the flanks of

the machine gun nests until the shock troops can complete the annihilation

of' them by means of hand grenades and bayonet. A sig;nal for the charge can bE

be prearranged. The ki ;rMnnezzxx


x trenches adjoining the machine

g'un nests and the machine gun nests must he kept under fire from other guns and

machine gun platoons.

9, TFE IiGIMENT TN MO'?T 1A2 W.FARF

2l1). The regimental commander issues definite battle tasks to the

battalions. He assigns them battle sectors in such manner that. deth for-

mation is practicahle. As a general rule. the roimental commander will re-

tain one battalion at his disposal. The maxim must be to leave to each
sent into action
battalion/its machine gun company.

The regimental takes nronoer care that the battalions co-operate in the

sense o'the hattle objective and do not lose connection with adjoining units.

He also must gain an insight into the activities and. conditions with those

adjoining units, if ever possible by personal observation. As far as required

he keeps his battalions informed thereof. (f special importance is timely

knowledge of possible hesitation on the part of his battalions, energetic

interference to prevent that. haPpenin ;, or to overcome it, if started, and to

take advantage of immediate security and gathering ,he fruits of success about

to he attained.

Correct working together with the artillervr is absolutely necessary.

For that purpose the regimental cost 'ander omploys his artillery communication

officer.

Means for transmitting messages and orders must be arresnged in time and

correctly. ormmunicat ion with the battalions, with the infantry commander,

and ,with the artillery must be regulated and observation oust ho secure,

csorrect leading of the combat train in advance and in battle, as well as

establishment of troon) dressing stations will be rerula.ted bw the re iment.l

commande r 11 .hJr:
TTY; INFANXTRY ATMOKT

211. For details of advance in attack sector see infan ,ry souadsmnlatoon
company, machine gun company and minewerf er coomnanv, -o rs . 92®®95,

The infantry attack consists in carrying forward. the fire up to- chargLing

disance. In the charge with cold, steel the resistance of the enemy is
broken. The hostile fire compels insertion of thin battle 'lines, but the
desired eff'ect of arms on our part deriands insertion of a strong fire powrer.
W~e should spec- ally strive to attain the latter by insertinn sufficient

machine gun squads and heavy machine gun platoons accomtpanyingr the attacck,

On the other hand we should be economical in inserting skirmish squads to

avoid unnecessary loss in dense skirmish lines, but munst keep sufficient re-

serves under command of the subordinate leaders to replenish losses and to

have sufficient shock troops fc ,~.~j y{re

1.e
'4."Jn/.
holdV t ine JG 1,"L i 4 i I1 down
~iy6lo, to th)e lowest

unit- the Ikirriish squad. Tie soldier m-ust fight immeditely uinder his

platoon com ander, under his company commander.

212. To avoid the different units from getting in front of each other

or that the attack becomecs disrupted, the commanders must give definite
defining
directions, clearly designating the attack sectors of larger units according

to starting points and objective points. These "battle strips" should. fi rst

be designated on the map and thereafter according to the actual terrain. Smal.

Smaller detachments receive objectives which they hav=e to take direction on

by proper utilization of the terrain. Exact, timely regulation of" the

attacking line and attack objectives are absolutely necessary, as errors can

be rectified only with difficulty after the infantry has started, Correct

insertion of the infantry at the correct place is an art and forms the basis

for conduct of the battle.

213. The machine gun squads ( attacci ng nooint.s) protected by a fe-vi

scouts are followed, wvith large intervals, acc.ording to the extension of

the designated space 'or deployment and the terrain, the leading plattons of
of the comanies in single le and f'rude1. 1 ' (irre.gular) formation see

olate 7, par.. 2 followed in turn by the accompanying heavy mac hine gun

platoons, then follow in single file and. irregular forrmtion the company sup-

ports, then come the echeloned mnachine run platoons, light minewerfer , ac

companyin', guns, reserve of the battalions with hgand-toahan . 'ighting ?means,

ammunition reserves and liit.+er hearers.

Even in th is formnation very heavy infaen,ryr fire and artiller fire can

greatlyv interfere with an uninterrupted f9orward movement. Tn such cases

nrobebly single men and squads may he a'le to work their way t."rough that,

fire if the correctly take advantage o, the terrain and mayr he able to observe

the exact situation, the direction of the fire and intervals between single amt
shot.

Effet of the hostile infantry and especially machine gun fire will decrease

as soon as the advancing skirmishers are lying prone, that, means as soon as

no actual target is offered, and esneci.aly s soo. as the skirmishers rind the
Machine guns open fire on their part.. Points in the terrain, that can serve

as supporting points in the further course of1 the attak, must. he quickly taken

possession of and secured by posting mchine guns. Prom these the advance

of units can be facilitated by lively fire activity.

214. If it is impossible, '' any means to gain a noirit ;There the fire

fight can he started, then the ef'fect of our artillery has to he awaited, or'

darkness .

The more time it takes (or the infantry to get un to the enemy, the longer

it is subjected to his fire. T'here fore, every moment when the hostile fire
slackens, esp~cially every pause in. his mnachine gun fire, must, be taken ad-~

vantage of to get fors ard. (Aur machine guns must hold. down the hostile

fire by firing at short range and employing flank fire. The subordinate leads
9
leaders of all grades, imbued with the snirit of Pushinfg orward, carry their mie

men forw~ard by their example. Their conduct is of the utmost importance t~o

the men.
Losses suTBred by the leading lines must. always be made eooc1 by the

follrow ing-up lines. The replenishment necessary for increasing the Fire

effect will usually be impracticable at Doints where unusual heavy losses

have occurred, but rather at oints where the men have suffered less from

the fire.

215. Usually the enemy, under cover, offers an unfavorable target to

attacking infant.ry. Onl-r trang$quil, 'well-aimed ire on the strip of ground

held by the enemy can hold him down and prevent him from throwing massed fire

on large targets, whi ch the attacker offers in the advance. Such fire will

be specially necessary if the hostile fire increases in volue aginst our

detachments working their way fonrard. It will principal by the duty of

the light machine gun platoons to carry on that fire to protect the advancing

detachments

Bomb thorwers and light minewerfers increase and augment the effect of

rifle fire, by throwing their projectiles o~n the enemy behind cover and in

machine gun nests.

216. As long as the skirmish line has not reached the kffki position

from which it is to take up the charge, supports remain, when the terrain

offers no cover, outside effective fire zone. skirmish wallows, hastily

thrwn up by the skirmishers in the leading line, will be held by them and

improved. If the terrain offers cover, supports will hold themselves in

readiness close to the firing line.

If no support is necessary to fll gaps in the firing line, the supports

must be on hand at, the proper time the charge is taken up, as will also the

reserves which will be brought up to the skirmish lines. It is the dutzsr of

commanders of supports and reserves to keep their men well in hand.

217. If the skirmish line has reached the position from which the

charge is to be taken up, the infantry must bring all its auxiliary fighting

means to their greatest effect. The light minewerfers, formed into squads, sup

support the artillery fire directed on the point where the entry is made in
the hostile position. The bomb and grenade throwers are brouht to the immedias

immediate rear of the position from which the charge is m;ade. To increase

the fire to its tull.est effect the light minewerfers are brought into the
heaatr'
most advanced firing line and the leading '%;d. machine guns hes~t at points

from where they can continue their fire even during the charge.

Everybody must be imbued with the thought : "On to the enemy."

A protracted struggle on both sides to gain the fire superiority at

charging distance is but seldom resorted to considering the annihilating

fire effect.

218. Tn order to grasp the correct moment for the commencement of the

charge, observation of the effect of our artillery and minewer fers, especi-

ally against machine guns and more so against machine guns firing from the

flank, is absolutely required. nowledge of the battle attributes or

k t± fighting morale of the enemy is also well. Sut the principal point

is the morale and value of the attacking infantry.

If the leading line decides to take up the charge, it. reports that. fact

to the rear. if it, believes itself strong enough threrefore, it should not

wait for the arrival of the reserves, . ut it is the duty of the latter,

as soon as they perceive that the leading line prepares for the charge, to

hasten forward regardless of losses.


} r the entire force
It will be possible only in exceptional cases to carry on a charge/in broad
theat
extension. The endeavor to do that might lead to/those portions of the

command, seeing an opportunity promising success, would delay the charge while

other portions are still far in rear.

219. When it is practicable to issue orders f-or formation of a charge,

the following may serve as guiding points: Hand grenade throwers, with about

the same number of skirmishers covered the gaps in their line froma behind,

start as the first wave, The successive waves follow ixiR at intervals of

about 50 paces. Single macnhiye guns accompany them or follow immediately in

rear of the last wave, to sxport holding captured positions.


For the reinf orcemnen, of the waveslih minewerfers are very suitable.

220. Any portion of +thetroops tha+, has once started the charge rust

keep~ to it, regardless of what happens on its righlt or left. V hever possible

Machine guns must rain a hail of fire, from ficnking and overtopping positions,

onto the point where the hostile position if to be pierced, kx g~x ?hexx

y rox and ,renade throwers and light minewerfers must keep firing on the

hostile machine guns, so as to protect the attacking troops from reverses,

Tf the enemy starts a counter attack during out~ attack, the charging

troops must not allow themselves to be misled to resume firing, but they must.

throw themselves intrepidly onto the enemy withhand grenades and cold steel,
f ire of the
If the charging troops should. return the/new app~earing, hostile infantir
the charge will., come to naught genrally. If a counter attacok happens

immediately after the position has been entered, then we raust hold tenacious-

ly to what has been gained andi the enemy mst be covered with annihilating

fire. The heavy and light machine gun~s that have enetered with the charging

infantry m'ust take u?3 an effective fire without any delay whtever.

221, If in an attack with a limited objective the position o-f' the enemy

has been taken and. the charge carried throug~h to the objective, the troops

that enetered first will rapidly intrench. All subordinate coriiander must

at that moment bring their full energy into play and must lead their men

correctly. More than ever do troops, after a successful, charge, require

the effective leadership of cautious comr anders, who know how to fully utilize

the most favorable moment for fsr-reeaching consequences.

'hether it is better after a successful charge to merely hold what has

been gained, or to nieree the positions or +toroll up the enemy, depends on


the situation. In an attack seeking the decision it less a matter of secur-

ing what has been gained -than gathering the fruits o f the success by con-

tinuing the attack and pursuit of' the enemy to annihilation.

222. If the enemy has been thrown back during an attack having a limited
objiective, it is faulty to crowd more rifles into the c ±ptured nosition than
what can be uti lized. Portions o thie charrging troops in rear must be
stopped in good time, in order to be employed somewhere else. eir leaders

must frequently act independently in this case.

By correct insertion of the rapidly following-up greneade throwers, heavy

and light minewrerfors and infantry punsmust. take care to throw an annihilating

fire onto the retreating enemy up to the limit of their range and on the other

hand hold what has been gained. Communication must.be established as


r
quickly aE possible with the hihoe/ commanders, so that the success can be

properly tilized.

223. If a charge fails, returning to the point from rhere the charge

started means annihilation, Every man., every squad, must ta.ke position

where he or it is and intren&-i and recume the fire. Our art illery, renade

throwers end min ewerf'ers, who fired during the charge on th)e Clank and rer

of the point attacked to shut theun in. must without loss of +ire emrepare anew

the charge and make its repetiton possible. Put any unit defeated in the

charge by hostile infantry will hardly be able to resume the charge ; it, must

be reinforced by fresh troops.

TTIWFANTRY!N
1DEPESE

224. 1 i~th correot use of its firearms, infantry is very strong in.

front and need.s but minor f orces there. The infantrvys wreskness lies on

the flanks as far as those are not prorected by the terrain or other troops.

The defender has more advantage than the attacker 9 though he has but a very

few hours prior to the opening of the fight. ~e knows the terrain and can

prepsre it for bettering his fire effect. Te can also intrench himself,

22$. The selection of a position must, be made so that the attacker has

to traverse a difficult field of attack, that the tne %nder has better observa-

tion facilities than the att acker, and that the field of fire is open at

short range. The defender can do without a long range field of fire,

esecially hen the attacker can be fired on from the flank, A posit=on.

advantageous in all respects is hard to find; proper distribution of' forces

must offset disadvantages.


Terrain
226. The infantry intrenches as a general rule. /reinforcements con-

structed by fully utilizing all the peculiarities of the terrain must be

hidden from the enemy's sight and from the air also. As soon as time and
,shelter for
ne cessary laborers are avai ls3~le./supoorts and reserves must. be constructed,

227. Every position is divrided into E~(~ and these assigned to

the troops for occupation. The foregorund must also be correspondingly

divided. Comnmunic~ati on with neighbor detac hments and higher headquarters


and especially with the artillery must be arranged for with all available

means. As telephone lines soon give. out under heavy fire, arrangements

must be made for transmitting messages by lights (at night), visual signals

and runner relays.

228. .ADVANJCED PODITTOIS can serve to gain time or can force the

&pponent to deploy in a Xl false direction. Mowevrer, they easily inter-

fere with the -fire f'rom the main position, may lead to partial defeat and, when

vacated by the defender, provide cover for the attacker, Their effect

can be materially increased by false positions occupied by only weak forces,

W=hen it appears necessary to defend advanced positions to the utmost, then

in their construction care e taken that they can he supported from the
but

main position byr flanking machine gun and artillery fire, As a general

rule utmost defense of these advanced position is to be avoided.

229. In the defense infantry must assum~e great det orain Only

in cases where the main point is to gain time or to deceive the enemy, Which

means that no battle for the decision is sought, such depth formation is not

necessary.

The sectors are dtvided into -positions.


for first line, their s' mports
for
and %xsector reserves. To the latter we should always attach machine guns.
230. 8peccia l attention m st be given to the selection of machine gun

nos .tions . The main point is to intrench then so that, they can sweep the

mot important lines from the flank and to be able to reinforce rapidly the
locations
infantry fire on threatened points. Overtopping __ behindtthe -

position are especially advantageous. The machine guns must. take up nests

at apparently innocent points, so as to be hidden from the view of the enemy.

231. TUnless inortant reasons sneak against it, thJ e defender ovens his

fire at long range, as soon as vell nay


ring targets aJpnear, Brod stretches,

devoid of cover will always be swept by moncertrated fire.

The defender can d1o no more than to increase the attackers difficulties

in getting forwrard. The attacker will always work up, under protection of

darimess and by mean: of his artillery and minewerfers nror that reason the

defender will always have to expect a charge at, night an( during fog. Firmly

placing the rifles in position and machine guns for sweeping the foreground. From
signals
the flanks, as well as agreeing on /$'%p/ (Light signals at night) with the

artillery, mine erfers and gren ade throwiers, i-f nractibable also artificial

illumnination, help out in defeating a night attack.

232. 'over, completed and augmientred in the 'ourse of +i9re, permit the

troops to evade the attacker's fire at times at certain points by moving to the

flank. gut the defender must do everything in his Dower to timely per-

ceive the approaching attack and must at tine have so much fire Power in the

front line as will defeat the attack, 'or that purpose the defender must

concentrate his entire fightirg power at short moments and di slay his entire

fire power. Artillery, grenade throwers and minewrerfers Perform their

utmost in supporting the infantryr fire.

233. Tf the enemy has entered the first, line he must be driven out

by an im mediate counter attack. For that the defender uses all forces in the

imrnediate vicinity. As long as the enemy finds himself in the excitement

and confusionof the entry, as long as he is noot in the hands of his commanders,
not yet
and has/taken a firm foothold, evry counter attack will succeed, even that
executed by smaller but, well led detachments . The main thinp; is to

utilize the moment. Orders from the rear in most cases come toolate
In nearly ell cases onl' 4 the subordinate leaders can perceive the opnortunit

and utilize it. They are required to do so independently. Therefore the


shock troops at their disposition should. be kept ,lose at hand.

If we do not succeed in driving, the enemy off', then only a new action,
a newly prepared counterattack has any hope of success - and that takes time.

234. In every pause in the battle the garrison has toe attempt, to repair

the damages caused by hostile fire. Its defense action is carried with

the spade as well ast with the rifle.

235. The defender will he able to proceed to a. counter attack from the

front only when he has defeated the charge and fully utilized the firearm, or

when the enemey, defeated in .front, shall be pushed hack, A premature

counterattack may lead to loss of 'Position. The counterattack by the


reserve, generally effective, against the hostile flank must, be started only

when the enemy has fully. started on his frontal attack.

10. CYCLISTS

236. The cyclist organizations, still in their infancy at the opening

of the World 'r, has done ex~cellentlv durin that war, esnerci~a 1W after

the:y were properly equipped, based on the experiences o f +he -first years of

the war, and the formation of battalions, regiments and even one brigade,

more corres nding to their emplovment,.

The cyclist troops performed especially good service in 1916 in the

strategic pursuit in Ri.imania, in 1917 in screening the retreat of the Siegfried

position, and in the autumn in the pursuit in Italy, in 1918 in the rapid

capture of Estland.

Formed into larmer cyclist units, they are well suited as a mobile

reserve in the hands of the leader for ranid %/X~


employment at weak points of

of the attack or defense, for increasing the size of t1he niercin;, for
rapid preparation of overtaking pursuit in conljunction with the army cava lry,

and for strategic reconnaissance also in~ conjunctioni with the army cavnlrv,

: E CYCLIS T CObi1PANY

2<7. Strength: alpproximately 120 persons, 4 light draft horses. for

*xq ho one four-hourse heavy field kitchen, 1.19 cycles (7 reserve), I

passsenger auto, 2 auto-trucks (3-ton), one of them for baggage and supplies,

one as workshop on wheels, for arriorerc implements, and 4 light machine guns

air-cooled (08/18).

Equipment: - with express folding wheels, carbines or. the front Pork,

~e r eq i ne nt.

~ivided into three platoons of 4 squiad, each and one light machine gun

squad. One machine~ gun reserve.e

Fore ation: Line, double rank, Piles at, 3 paces interval, light machine

rgun on l ft flank, o the platoons. Platoon comande r 5 paces in front of


center of platoon, squad leaders on the flanks of both platoon squads.

Column of Twos: Squad leader at head and roar of each platoon, distance

from wheel to wheel 3 paces, distance between platoons 10 paces, 'Marching

depth of the company 350 meters w4ith auto-trucks. Principal formation for

march and movements.

Columnn of Platoons:- Platoons with 10 paces distance, platoon commander,

two paces in front of' centers squad leaders of the flanks of platoons® This

is the assembly formation.

Column of' files: 700 to 800 meters long, march -'ormation on bad roads,

and for purpose of passing other columns.

Columns of Fours: exceptionally; each 2(d and 4th file takes place to the

left of 1st and 3d file.

-:hen wheels are f~~x stacked, the carbines, on a march in the field.,

are leaned against the wheels.

Position writh folded wheels on back are with one Pace interval and

one pace distance.


Larches: As a rule a point i- 4 r* about 200 meters in front (one

leader, 4 cyclists) to show the road and open it.

On the march the platoon has a length of from 120 to 230 meters; in long

marches it is advisable to change the leading platoons

In marching at night when it is very dark it is advisable to spilit the

company up, 1 lantern in fVront, throwing its light toward the front, in rear

a refl lantern.

Capiacity: Daily 60 kilometers in 5 hours in full equipmnent; for short

distances 20 kilometers Doe- hour. 120 kilometers per day are the excention..

Usually the cyclist company is bound to firm, good roads, but country

roads with deep ruts can frequently be used also. The folding wheels enable
the cyclists
to also easily overcome had terrain between the roads t ill1 seldom be I
9
necessary to carry the wheels wrhile fighting.

Foot Note: Kd tages of the folding whe41: The compa ny doe~s not have
to leave a guard wi th the iwheels,
need not trouble about sending hack for .hem,
and th us enters the battle matrially stronger and is agairn immediate ly
mobile.

Attaching four light nachine guns has materially increased the fire

power in battle. For the purpose o?' carrying these On the bicycles the

light machine gun wiith air-cooling has been selected.

The workshop auto trick, which followrs the comrpern without distance,

ma~kes nossiblte immediate exchange of~ damaged wheels and does not interfere

with the march. While at rest the cyclist troonis need rest and tim~e after

a long marxh to thoroughly repair the wheels if the troops are to be kept.

in good shape. This only a small part of' the componi? will be available

for the service of security.

238. The CYCIJTST BATTALION is composed c,enerallv of several (506)

companies and one machine gun compoanvy with 1< machine guns O8 on ant otrucks,

while the complement is equipped with wheels The RP 'ITT or FLEET is

composed of several such battalions (2-®3,

IHFJADQJART I NST
a TrfPje OF A CYC LIS T BATTALION

1 battalion comiander, 1 adjutant, 1 supply officer, 1 information


officer, 2 surgeons, I pavmrnster. 45 men o0 them i NCO, 10 privat+es o! Pioneers

as demolition command, i gt Y~e or, I1N730 and 12 menr as cha'.ffeurs, 11I saddle,

13 draft horses , 21 cycles, I auto-cycle, 1 four horse sanitary- wagon, one

four-horse intrenching tool. wagon, I two-horse field kitchen, 1 tw o-horse

provision weagon, 2 samill. totrucks, Tour seated, I autotrucic (-+on) for


baggage and office supplies, 1 aut otruck (s-ton) as workshop, also for carrying

equipments for message service, 'as implements, hand-to-hand _fighting arms,

2 autotrucks (5-ton) for supplies and as ambulances.

Strength of a cyclist .machiqne gun company of 12 guns 08:


4 officers, 17 NCO, 103 men, of these 84 rifles, 17 chaffeurs; 1 small

autotruck (four-seated) ; 3 autotricks (3-ton) each with 4 machine guns and their
O ammunition,
3 autotrucks (3 -tor.) one for ammunition and men's baggage, one for

office and gas implements, means of communi ation, supplies and one as work-

shop with armorers -tools m~d sup'plies; o motorcycle, 1 four-horse large field

kitchen, 2 two-horse provision wagons.

239. The assembly of' the 5 to seven units of a cyclist battalion for

the march is made as much as possible along the route o'_ march. Through
correct and far-seeing distribution of tasks and utilization of' all means

of message service (PK4!* 3xx motor cycles and cycles) the battalion commander

must assure his influence on the activity o -I hlis companies. On the other

hand, the company commanders care with all. means at hand for connection wi t

the battalion commander and with neighbor troops, but must, where necessary,
make use of the mobility of their comipny independently fo assure success.

Formations for position, march and battle deployment are to be selected

by the individual. companies as well as concernin~g or<'ers for the treucks ac,-

companying themn. But on the other hand, the bettalion commander issues the

orders for horses, vehicles and baggage autos; he also has to direct the use

of sanitary establ ishmnent s, hand-to-hand r'ighting means, mes sage service ,etc.

240. During a march we must endeavor to separate the companies by re- .

gulating the time of their starting. This procedure saves men and implements aB

and facialitates traffic to other troops. If this is not practicable,


the march formation requires special regulation: e connaissance, leading of

columns and keeping contact with other companies must be distributed betw.een

the company commanders . Distances between companies and rests are to be

ordered. according to the roads and traffic conditions (distances at. least 100

meters usually, rests after 10 to 25 kilometers have been coiered), The work-

shop autos bring along men with damaged wheels and the rate o marchof o'the

companies has to be regulated. Only in this manner can we avoid men fall~ing,

outs which is a frequent occurrence among cyclfists.

The marching length of a bat.talion inclusive of headquarters troop,

machine guns on autotrucks and autotruck section of the battalion ~unounts


to 2 to 2~ kilometers. till we have to count on the workshop auto to halt

shortly after a start; these will then follow with what is called '"work-

distance", a distance of about 15 minutes, a time inYhich thl-ie cyclist himself

can repair the damage to his wheel; the auto following up will take along

the men who fell out or will help them by exchanging cycles.

Days marches of 60 to 80 kilometers in general are about the same X

on cyclist troops as a days march of 20 kilometers to the foot soldier.

241. FIELD TRLINING iTR 3PF03ILL TASKS

Prior to denloyment and during the course of' an engagemeant the wheel

should be fully utilized, to take advantage k of its great mobility,

The company commander designates the time when the folded wheels are to he

carried on the backs. Light machine guns must be put in readiness. The

company with its three platoons assumes a readiness for battle, Tt must be

avoided that individual cyclists or squads leaire their wheels. The auto comma

commanders must, care for communicattion with the troops and for :security of the

vehicles. The machine gfun company, on ordaers f'rom the battalion commander

gets the machine guns ready and assumes readiness for action.

242. cyclist battalions cannot do without the support of heavy machine

guns. iheslatter form a eserve for the battalion cor mander, assure good

fire support at long and mid ranges, facilitate the execution of even a long
fire action, assure- inmediate fire support in case the attached artillery has

not yet come up.

A machine gun armored platoon may take the place of the machine gun com-

pany. Strength: 2 officers, 10 NCO, 27 men, i passenger auto, 2 armored machine

gun wagons, 2 autotrucks, 1 work :op--autotruck. 20oeration o4 such an

armored platoon with cyclists was performed excellent service in the sudden

advance April 13,1918 north of the Lys against the forest of ienne.

243. The armored autotruck has most of its armor in resr and is capable

of running just as far to the rear as to the front. In a reconnaissance in

force, for instance, against a vil'la e or some other supporting point held

by the eerny,the armored auttruck travels rear end ahead into the field of action

thus, the motor is best protected and it~s -ront the strongest. The cyclists

ride into cover under protection of the armored autotruck. Thus mere in-

fartrv resistance is quickly overcome. ihen retreat, is ordered the armored

autotruck can take un the march without any delay whatever.

The basic requirement "or cyclists in action rmust be to be in readiness,

after having solved their task, irmmediately for other, tasks, with all their

means of locomotion. We can utilize the rapidity o the cyclist troops

to the f~zllest extent only if' the commanders work raidly and are well sup-

ported by all subordinate *conmnders,

t
When different organization are toget;er the leaedershin mus he in the

hands of the ranking cyclist commiander, provided cyclists form the principal

portion of the fighting trocons. Liberal equipment of all diffeent means of

transmitting messages is necessary for such conands.

244. :7uitable special tasks for cyclist troops are:

1. Appearnce far in front or on the flanks o" other troops


2. Uaptur e of important, points in the terrain , such as railroad stations,
streches of railroads, streets, villages, streams, bridges, defiles in front of
other troops.
3. Security and holding o' such points by keeping ;the cyclists together
and using the road net.
4. Destruction of buildings
5. Surpris
attacks, using sneed and denloment
3. Screening, deceiving the opponent by taking up extended line formation
and rapid change of positions.
7. Engagements in conjunction with cavalry
8. Oveetaking pursuit and envelopment by rapid utilization of detours.
9. Stopping hostile pursuit or envelopment by rapid Chang&ng and taking
positions to c use the enemy to leave the proper route.
10. Artillery protection for advanced artillery
11. Very mobile reserve for higher commanders on the march and in camp
12. Connection with far off troops,
13. Flank cover by t-king down and rapidly reconstructiong of lines of
security for foot troops (FSR 176 to 178)
14. Protecting stations in rear for reconnoitering cdnlry, message
collecting stations, message relays for extensive stretches of roads
15. Outposts, frontier protection especially at points weher the question is
less of a close net than a question of observation of extensive terrain with
few troops.
16. Teehnjal labor, using the quickest means of connection with their
pioneers.

B, Artillery

245. The artillery strike the enemy down with its fire and opens a rod

for the infantry. It enables tenacious stand in defense and successful defeat

of the attacker. It forms the firm skeleton of the battle. Main requirement

for artillery is excellent firing, timely, from the right point, against the

correct target.

1. EFFECT, KINDS and EMPLOYME NT

246. Artillery combines great effect of the single round with higfh fire

r pidity at long ranges, Sudden appearance and consolidation of fire. especi

from different directions, increases of itself still mnterially the strong fire

effect. Observation is the basis for effect principally.

In additin is required: permanent and assured connection With the infantry

as fir as the fighting line (artillery communication officers and artillery

observers) and correct consolidation according to the battle object, so that

each task can be solved as rapidly and effectively ns possible.

The different kinds of targets require light and heavy guns with different

effect. Correct estimation of their capacity is prerequisite for successful

leadership of the artillery fire. War organization has to to reckon with

this.

a) The light gun and the light howitzer should be used against the most
common targets in the field battle and in position wrfare. The light how-

itzer is superior in effect to the light gun in the case of artillery targets

villages, troops in forests and under cover. Mountain guns are of the same

c-liber as those of the light artillery, the only difference is that they are

constructed for greater mobility.

b) The heavy howitzer outranks the light in the matter of piercing power,

bursting and splintering effect. In ddition to being effective against live

targets, it is specially effective against artillery, strongly constructed

positions, trench warfare means of every kind, wire enta..nglements, weaker con-

crete and stone structures.

c) The heavy guns are suitable, on account of their range, their depth

and spinter effects, for firing on live targets, on raods and villages, and for

the destruction of targets offering great resistance, as well as firing on

captive balloons and aeroplanes, even at great altitude.

d) The Mortars serve for destruction of fortifications and obstacles of

all descriptions; they co-operate specially effectively in fihtirg artillery.

.11 of the Thove mentioned kinds are used also in gas warfare,

e) In addition, the heaviest kinds of guns are designated for destruction

of targets offering the greatest resittnce and targets at the longest range.

Of special 'inds of guns we have: 'srop° ne defense guns asnd trench guns.

Infantry guns and minewerfers supplement the effect of the artillery and.

relieve the latter from short range battle tasks.

247. Cannons ,rod light howitzers carry -reir'7das and shrapnell with time
cP; - -.:I,;

and percussion fuse; in part also case shot; the heavy howitzers carry r Aes

with time and percussion fuse, the mortars only -'s with percussion fuse.

Shells with delaying fuses can also be fired.

Shells are used against live and dead. targets, X{B 3 ik xotx
flrxjt shells
with time fuse
/against live targets under cover, shra:-nel with percussion fuse to find the

range; iagpllkrx shrapnel with time fuse against open live

targets.

Burning effect can be had with both kinds and with fire-setting shells.

Effect uncertain.
Firing gas shells is resorted to either to har/ass the enemy by using relative

relatively small amount of ammunition against hostile batteries, working troops,

etc,, as effective fire by firing a considerable amount of ammunition to prepare

our own undertakings, or to lame the hostile artillery. To fire a few gas

shells while firing common shells is also advisable.

248. The effect of artillery fire is increased with fire rapidity and the

size of c'liber, The moral effect on our own troops and those of the enemy' is

great. It increases our confidence in victory and lessens the power of re-

sistance of the enemy.

The artillery fight demands a great degree of fire discipline, the upholding

of which is a prerequisite for uninterrupted and smooth firing even under the

heaviest loss.

249. Considering the decisive influence of good observation of fire

effect special value has to be attached in the selection of observation positions.

Full fire effect can be attained only when assured and far readhing observation

is possible. The selection of firing positions must be preceded by considera-

tion of utilization of all possibilities of observation.

The artillery must under all possible conditions be given sufficient time

-to select and prepare observation positions and communications. The ground

observation will be augmented and, if that is impracticable, supplanted by aerial

observation, especially by artillery flyers. These are a matersil and indis-

pensable means for artillery battle leadership, In addition artillery measuring

±xzwlz squads (light and sound squads) are usefully employed.

250. The power of the artillery fire will increase and decrease -according

to the changes in the battle situation. Fire rapidity is dependent on the one

hand on the battle situation and on the other hand on observation, maintenance

of equipment and replenishbnment of ammunition. Annihilation of the enemy is best

accomplished by exact and uninterrupted fire.


;F401
11-

'T 77T
,,, ~ i'"""lin~; ~ PA G $4 OF TIXT~i(8
:

Plate13.Plate 14

Piecehitchd upLightfieldhowizer (alibe 10.


,,,,,, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ cm)

The caisson may be placed left o


i,~ lgun
also.
IC~ I ~
~:a:.i
1.'I 15. :
81~.Plate ;;:
1~:piece ~ (Caliber 7.5 cm) il:
gun uni on obs rvtio
wago wagon.fiil~i~
°Domu n t e dl!:iiiil i . I ...'lilll 'i,.- ~illi~i~i~i;
,~l:l,~l,:li~ili ;'r. 1"1'
dismounts "811I :l c) o":

roar:i

8!B
1
:
i
r;

2 ce_.

O O O iP~ ~; aB
3 4 ?S 2
C) Z J OCR
2. LIGHT ARTILLERY
a. THE GUN A.ND TH-E TA IKITTION WAGON (caisson)

251. Complement: 1 gun commander and 5


complement of caisson 4
gunners,
driver
men (horse battery 3); complement of observation wagon 5 gunners and 1 t 't'rV

Fear purpose of firing guns and caissons are detached from their limbers, connected

with the latter for moving.

here f ollows plate 13,9 1, 16 p ge 4 of te.Rt ..

b. THE BAPTTERY

STRENGTH, ORGANIZATION, FORMATION

252. The battery has four runs, 1 observation wagon, 4 ammunition wrons.

and 6 two-horse vehicles; in addition 2 mchine guns o8/i5/


Strength: approxima~tely 110 persons, 26 saddle and 58 draft horses.

40 :Battery
3 messengers (one with scissors telescope)
2 telephonists
2 laying wo
in action, in addition, the commander of the battery
Wagon.

Organization Of The Battery

combat Battery: 1. gun) 1.pto


2 s gun)

4. gun) 2[.toon
battery wagon (f~oonote : c-rries scissors lblscp
telephLone =, a_.tiu+J .If ':1ct. F n is7imminent h1e
aet' den b the !ien of the =- ttery squ~ad.
1. ammunition wagon)1tw
2,.unition wagon) stwagon section)
3. ammunition wagon) Q) echelon (section)
4. ammunition wagon) 2d wagon section)

Combat train: 1st Supply wagon (or supply lafette and sanitary cart)
Officers and supply horses
1 small field kitchen
Field Train: 2d Supply wagon
Baggage wagon
Brovision wagon
Forage wagon
Smith's cart

Formations :

a) Single column (see plate 16


Object: March column, aassembly on road and main formation on tie

battlef: eld.

b) double column - see plate 18

Object: Ohortening the march depth. Simultaneous insertion of the guns and sectic
.P O t06 TEX

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100

section when unlimbering towards the flank.

c) ptterC in open order - see plate 17.

Objects: Movements on battlefield, Position in readiness.

1. The battery wagon may also follow behind the flank gun or according to

need can be brought to the head of the march column

2. The section can follow behind everynother gun or can follow in open

order or ammunition wagons can be brought beside the guns. The section

must keep 8 paces from the battery wagon

3. The gun commanders may also ride in front of their piecesm the platoon

commanders in front of the piece on the right, alongside the gun

commander - according to orders from the battery coinmnder.

d) Battery in close order - plate 19.

Object: Assembly alongside the road, Position in readiness.

here follow plates 16, 17, 1, 19 - see pp 86/87 O text

battery and section commanders are not bound down to their places. In

movements during a.ction, especially in close terrain, the platoon commnncders

will frequently have to ride forward to reconnoiter roads.

MOVB E TS . CI
CH GES OF FORT TI ON

253, On average gound time per minute: at a walk 125 paces, on the trot

275 paces, galop 500 paces.

Gallop is seldom in war. In long movements and in difficult terrain

shortening of cadence must be directed. Easy trot is the rule.

March to the front and rear, half turns

Forming double column from single file - by bringing up the section

Battery in open order from column of files - by front turn and visa versa

battery in close order from column of files - by ployment and vice versa -
by breaking off.
101

254. Unlimbering and limbering u- the pieces~etc. can be executed to

the front, rear, and flank, and by pieces also on orders of the battery

commander.

In all firing positions it will be well, in case terrain and consideration

of fire control permit, the increase the intervals to lessen losses. Then

going into position we usually prefer unlimbering towards the flank. In mobile

war we unlimber towards the rear - seldom towards the front - to better utilize

the cover of the terrain.

Orders are issued for the location of the btttery wagon. After unlimber-
The caissons immediately drive up to the battery and unlimber.
ing the limbers go under cover. The caissonsX%,$'jj are emptied.

The ammunition wagon limbers a'~e led back by the section commn ander. The position

of =1l limbers is desinted by the comminder or, if he is not an officer, .by

the 1st Sergeant. the limbers, conforming to the terrain and front of the

battery, are placed in position 800 to 1000 meters to the flank and rear of

the firing position so that they are not in the sweeping fire, that they covered

against sight from planes, and that crossings will be avoided when driving to

the front. Every one dismounts. Combinedposition of gun and caisson limbers

is not always necessary. The commanders are responsible for connection with

battery and neighbor troops as well s for flank protection.

Limering-up. The b'Sttery comms'nder causes the limbers to br brought up

in good time by visual signals, messengers or telephone sending orders at the

same time in what manner limbering up shall proceed.

255. Going into and leaving the fire position. The battery commander,

reconnoitering the firing position, is accompanied by the battery squad.

For the occupation of a battery usually are required:

a) in the observation position: the battery commander, i observation

officer, 1 scissors telescope RCO, 1 ichtkreis TCO (1 nssistant observer, 1

clerk to note down observations) 1 telephone squad

b) in the firing position: 1 battery officer, 1 officer as antennae officer,

2 platoon commanders, 1 Richtkreis NCO, 1 diver as ammunition NCO,. 1 'assittant

armorer or battery smith, 1 complement for each piece, 1 telephone RICO with tele-

phone squad,,l sanitary NWO or private.


The observation officer causes the observation station to be prepares; he

designated to the telephone squad -,.hat communications (telephone and signnl con-

nections) are to be constructed, on what roads to construct them, and how they

are to be constructed. During the engagement he keeps an eye on the telephone

squads activities and supports the battery commander in reconnaissance, observa-


tion and fire control.

The batter"y commander may take position either in the observation station

or in the firing position. In the former case, he has the fire control, while

one battery officer in the psoition waches over the execution; in the latter

case, the observation station is in charge of an officer or officer's assistant.

For activities and duties of platoon and gun commanders, see regulations for

the Field artillery, part II, pfrs 55 and 56.

To advance, as a rule the grun limber drive in first, in the retreat the

caisson limbers. The ammunition wagons (rear parts) are to be drawn back in

good time into cover behind the line of guns; as a rule they are limbered up

towards the rear.

256. ethods of Laying: In an open firing position for direct laying

the target must be designated short, clear and definite. Indefinite designation

of targets are to be avoided by applying an indirect laying methad (selection

of a general laying point, laying according to base piece or richtkreis. The

latter me hod holds good also for laying in covered position.

In using the spirit level the a~ceeigire laying towards a flank must

be designated according to a fixed point (usually as much as possible in rear,

and easily to locate), in most cases for each single piece.

In indirect laying, the elevation laying will be taken with 'the spirit level,

flank laying by means of the Richtkreis, according to the base piece or to one

laying point.

Fire Order and Fire Rapidity

257. -Firing by platoon or piece is used to find the range and for effect

firing with single observation against targets of limited importance, or when 'the

kind of target necessitates that each single piece find the range.
103

Fire by piece is suitable for gaining rapid effect and for rapid utilization t

of f'cvorable battle situations. It facilitates estimate of fire distribution

and point of bursting.

Fire by platoon is suited for surprise fire and to attain most rapid effect

against momentary tsrgets.

The Salvo or rapid salvo serve with combined fire of all pieces to find the

range in bad weather; with single salvos for the purpose of discerning the target

so a~s to avoid mistaking the hits caused by other batteries, to prove the correct-

ness of the elevation and fire distribution in combination with larger units as

well as for fire for effect.

Flank fire favors the observation of the single rounds fired. Its em-

ployment, ig recommended to prove the correctness of the fire distribution nd

to prove the basis for fire for effect. It is suitable against targets which

are to be kept under fire without too great n expenditure of ammunition for .

protracted period.

le distinguish between: continuous loading and loading by battery (all runs

a.t the same time); fire by piece and rapid fire.

Fire by piece permits the battery comrwrnder to designate when the pieces

are to be fired; he can thereby regulate the fire rapidity to the observation

conditions.

Rapid fire makes possible for a short time the complete display of the fire-

power of the battery. It serves for utilization of favorable moments in pre-

carious battle situations, especially to throw blockade fire, and can also be

employed at certain times when the losses are heavy and when pieces are set out

of action.

Fire rapidity when finding the r-inge is regulated by the necessity of observin

the hits, to make proper corrections. The battle situation regul tes 'the

fire rapidity in firing for effec't. Increase in volume of fire can be attained

by designating a larger number or by having the sequence of fire by piece,

salvos and rapid salvos increased, or by short fire pauses in flank fire or

by rapid fire.
194

Fire by hr'1f platoons in rapid succession is better than rapid fire,

becatuse fire control is kept better in the hn.nds of the commander.

258. Fire Distribution. Like in firing to ascertain the range for ob-

servation, the shots must' be laid toward the flank in fire for effect as to be

best for producing effect. In firing for effect it will generally suffice

if the shots aere equally distributed on the target. However, in firing on

targets of confined limits and which re capable of strong Ba'4/ resistance,

good effect can be expected only when the shots strike the designated point.
lateral
If ascertainment of the correct fX~'$r direction encounters difficulties,

then we can overcome the difficulty by firing on elevation bursting points (?)

( 'orman - Richtungs sprengpu~bnkte )

In indirect firing the target is not laid down by higher command; but

the battery has to receive instructions therefor. If a battery is ordered to

take a certain laying method, which cannot be followed by some of the pieces,

then the pieces or the plat oons select the method most suited to them.

The gun captain or one of the gunners of each piece, during firing to find

the range. proceed to the clinometer noncomnmissioned officer to receive from

him written statements of the figured out clinometer numbers (?) and in laying

according to the base gun, to receive written statements of the f xx mtx


clinometer numbers figured out by K2 under the supervision of the gun or

pla~toon comander.

The battery commander must regulate the fire distribution as much as

possible prior to opening fire. Fora lateral change of the fire in rapid

fire, especially in blockade fire or firing at night, the KLurbelschlag is a

simple and secure procedure.

In order to be able to give to the battery at all times is definite lateral

direction, the base direction must be laid down.


105

c. LIG T ARTILLERY BATTALION

259. Strength of battalion headquarters: Approxrnately 45 persons, 16

saddle horses, 10 draft horses, 1 $ X bicycle, 5 two-horse vehicles ( 1 F.T.

receiving station wagon, 1 battery wagon, 1 forage and provision wagon, 2

baggage wagons).

The battalion has 3 batteries and one light ammunition column. The

battle tasks brought it about that in the war organization the battalions can

be composed of a combination of field gun batteries and light field howitzer

batteries.

As a general rule each light artillery regiment has two battalions.

Strength of regimental headquarters: Approximately 70 persons, 16 saddle

hoses, 10 draft horses, 1 four-horse wagon for material for telephone lines,

1 F,.T.receiving station wagon, 2 baggage wagons, 1 bicycle.

btrength of the light ain unition column (for 3 batteries): approximately

120 persons, 16 saddle horses, 98 draft horses, 9 four-horse ammunition wagons,

27 two-horse amunition transport wagons.

Strength of a mountain artillery battery:

a) battery headquarters: approximately 45 persons, 5 two-horse vehicles

(1 tool wagon, 1 small field kitchen, 1 sanitary wagon, 1 baggage wagon, 1 pro-

vision and forage wagon).

b) 2 Platoons, each: approxirately 125 persons, 18 saddle horses, 14

draft horses, 6 bicycles, 2 guns, 5 two-horse vehicles t1 tool wagon, 1 supply

wagon, 2 forage wagons, 1 provision wagon.)

c) the section: approximately 380 persons, 67 saddle horses, 122 draft

horses, 47 vehicles (24 ammunition wagons, 1 tool wagon, 1 supply wagon, 1 pro-

vision wagon, 2 forage wagons, 1 small field kitchen.)

For aeroplane guns see pars. 390 to 403.

3. AVY AR TILLERY

a) TTE HEAVY HORSE BATTERY

(heavy field howitzer 13; long, heavy field howitzer 13; long heavy field howitz
13/02; lcri gun;14; 10c m gun 17/04 and 17,

here follows plate 20 - pagn 91 o text


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106

260: Strength: approximately 180 persons, 21 saddle horses, 96 draft

horses, 13 six-horse vohicles t4 guns, 8 ammunition wagons, 1 supply wagon),


field forge,
3 four-horse vehic les itattery wagon, s :th'. s:: wagOn forage wagon), 3 two-horse

vehicles (1 field kitchen, 1 baggage wagon, 1 provision wagon), 2 bicycles.

FORMJTION OF TEA' BATTERY

Combat battery - 1 natterv wagon As a rile the battery has 4 guns. it


with 1 tele- 4 guns is divided into two platoons of 2 guns each
phone squad 1 to 4 ammunition and into vehicle sections of 2 ammunition
wagons wagons each
Section: 5 to 8 amrnunition
wagons Each gun has 1 gun commander, 5 gunners;
each ammunition wagon 1 driver and 7
uombat Train: Saddle and led gunners as conrlement
horses
buppy wagon rr batter. squad see par.252
L eld kitchen
complement of battery see- par..252; in
FIELD Train: bagage wagon addition addit.inalo. fficers:, COs, as
Ale 1d .forge observers andadditional :men.for replenish-
Forage wagon ment of ammunition.
provision wagon

Gunners 6 to 8 of the ammunition wagons of the combat battery are.employed

with the pieces to assist, the others a.re usually sent back to the limbers

A battery coluim belongs to each Iheavy horse battery, Strength: approx.

75 persons, 12 saddle orses, 64 draft horses, 14 four-horse vehicles, 2 two-horse

vehicles, 1 bicycle.

26. Activities and duties of' the gun commanders platoon commanders,

telephone squad, laying NCO, assistant observers, obeserver, antennae officer

and battery officers are laid down in. DR for Heavy HA, pars 172--178.

it is the battery cormmander's duty to see that his battery is at all times

ready for action and that the fire power of the battery is maintained as long

as possible. He is responsible for the selection of and preparation of the

observation positions and firing positions, for their communications and for

the correct working of the entire battery.. He instructs the observation and

antennae officers, the assistant ohservers, and laying NCO, as to targets,

battle sector, main direction and base direction. He conducts the fire of

the battery of delegates te fire control to the observer or atennae officer.


artillery A

He must take up communication with the next higher comnider


om and if

ever possib1e also with the next higher infantry comaner. . iring action he ta
Battey inCloseOrde

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emT fJD
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d rlrrillll

is t Sergean

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Guide
(NCO) ~;
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Cartridge LL_~i:
107

takes his post where is presence is most necessary. Personal observation is


in
the rule; $ firing with assistance of other means of observation (planes,

balloons, measuring squads) his presence in the firing position will assure the

best transmission of orders. Under certain conditions it may be correct for

him to taxi conduct the fire from the antennae or the plane table. He super-

vises correct entries in the target book and on the blockade and annihilation

fire tables. e supervises expenditure of ammunition and regulates replenish-

ment.

262. Formations:

a) Battery in close order for purpose of assembly;

b) Uolumn of files serves for assembly on the road, as march column,, and

for movements on the battlefield.. sequence with 5 paces distance: Battery wagon,

guns, ammunition wagons. To shorten the depth, ammunition wagons may march along-
side the guns (douhle column)
here follow plates 21 and 22 page 93 ootext.

tsovements: The battery executes movements to the front, to rear, half-

flank, and flank movements as well as turns of the battery in close order and

turns to the rear in the single file formation. rmhanges in m*±x formation

movements are executed by breaking off or development (plovraent)

263. Pieces are unlimbered usually toward the flank, and by piece and

ammunition wagons of the combat battery in succession after the double column of

pieces has first been formed. The section remains in the start in rear and

goes into position only as soon as the ammunition wagon limbers of the combat

battery drive off. intervals between pieces not more than 24 paces.

To limber up, the limbers of the guns drive up to them in the march direction j

they are to take, getting as close to them as practicale. Then follow the

limbers of the ammunition wagons.

264. Entering and Leraving a Fire Position.

As soon as the battery commander leaves the battery to reconnoiter, the

battery officer assumes command. Battery wagons and battery drive up to the

points designated by the battery commander. When the battery commander has

desided on observation station and battery


position, he issues orders to the
108

laying NCO to arrange the battery, le calls up the observation officer and

the observation wazon and gives them proper instructions for the arrangement

of the observation station and its connections with the firing position.

The telephone squad, under the direction of the observation officer, starts

construction of the observation position and laying of telephoneX wires. The

observation wagon remains either in cover near the observation station or is

sent back to the limbers.

The battery comander orders the start for the battery into its position.

To designate the limit of the advance at some ridge and to designate the march

direction, the battery commander posts mounted messenoger or trumpeters. it

is well, esecially in vovered terrain, to designate the flanks of the position.

We should avoid as much as possible to shorten the interval between the pieces.

Without paving regard to intervals being equal the most favorable spot should be

selected for each piece; paving to regard to reconnaisance from Mlanies is of

special importance.

The battery officer, having received instructions from the battery commander

after the latter has ridden ahead and re connitered the position and observation

station position, conducts the battery into its position.. The battery officer

must in good time ride up to the battery commander to receive those instructions.

When there are special difficulties encountered in the terrain, or when the

battery proceeds to a position prepared in advance, platoon commanders and gun

captains can be called forward.

As a rule the limbers of the combat battery and of the section brought back

from the firing position should take position from 800 to 1000 meters in rear

to be out of range of the hostile fire directed on the battery. If suitable

cover is closer, it can be made use of. If no cover is available, position

of single rile is to be recommended behind one of the flanks of the battery,

Under proper cover, any kind of' formation is permissible, provided it assures

possibility to drive ranidly and without crossing the road other limbers take

up to the pieces. Proper care must be taken against plane observation.

The field train joins the limbers. Drivers dismount. The section commander

or the 1st 'ergant takes charge of control and security and arranges for

connection with the battery.


109

When necessary to open fire immediately, we must not wait until all the

pieces are ready to fire.

If the firing position is to be vacated, the battery commander announces the

new position and, gives the direction to take.

265. Kinds Of Fire, a) Fire By Piece. The gun designated to fire, fires

only at the comand of the battery commander; it is used for finding the range.

b) Salvo. The pieces are fired in sequence on the command of the platoon

cormanders. "ire rapidity is to be gregulated so that each shot can be observed.

c) Rapid Fire. Each piece keeps on firing, at the command of the gun

captain, until it has expended a designated number of rounds.

d) Volley. The picea are fired combined at the command o? the battery

commander.
Salvo.
e) Rapid 9 X%~. The The platoon commanders direct the nieces to fire in
as
sequence %( rapidly as possible.

In regulating the fire rapidity, possibility of replenishment of ammunition

is to be considered.

b. T E 3OKE .)RTAR BATFRY.

266. strength same as heavy horse battery. The battery has three guns.

ORGANIZAT ION:

Combat Battery - 1 battery wagon


with 1 telephone 3 cun carriages -

squad 3 trails M
3 s whvetha. maytaan) wagons
3 ammunition wagons
I supply wagon
Combat Train and Field Train: same as that of heavy horse battery
One battery column attached to each horse battery.

c. THE AVY ARTITLLRY BATTALION

261-. The heavy artillery battalion consists as a rule of 2 heavy field

howitzer batteries (15cm) and one l0om battery, all having four pieces.

Strength of battalion headquarters: approximately 50 persons, 15 saddle

horses, 14 heavy draft horses, 1 four-horse observation wagon, 1 four-horse tele-

phone construction wagon, a two-horse F.T


andaon, 1 baggage raon, 1 prylion wagon
and 2 cyclles.
PAGE 06f TEXT

Heavy Artillery Battalion in Single Column

Plate 23.

1 Observation wagon and telephone wagon of the battalion


L
Observation Observation wagon of 1st Battery
Section of of of f

ft If I tt

Purpose & Employment as in.the


1. Combat Battery battery.

The double column serves to


shorten the march column.
2. Combat Battery
In maneuvers the observation
wagons and sections remain with
3. Combat Battery the batteries, the observation:
and telephone construction wagons
of the battalion march ahead of
Section of 1st Bat-
the leading battery.
tery.
e e

II f

Combat Train of the battalion and the 3 batteries.

Field Train of the battalion and the 3 batteries.

Formations:

a) Broad Column: Observation wagon, telephone constr.


wagon and batteries with 15 paces interval alongside
each other. Observation wagon on the right wing.

b) Depth column: Observation wagon and batteries with


25 paces distance.
110

HEAVY ARTILUIRI BATTALION IN SINGLE COLUN-.(P ate 28, p.96 of text)

Obserration Section -
ibattery wagon/ and telephone condtruction wagon

I battery wagon of the lst battery

Battery wagon of the 2d battery

Sbattery wagon of' the 34 battery

1st combat battery - task and employment same


as that of the battery

i 2d obatbattery To shorten the march depth


the column of twos is formed

3d Combat battery On practice marches the battery


wagons and sections remain with
the batteries, the battery wagon
Section of' 1t battery and telephone construction wagon
of the battalion march with
the leading battery.
Section of 2d battery

I Section of 3d battery

ioambat train of the battalion and of the 3 batteries

Field Train of the battalion and of the 3 batteries.

FORATIONS:

a) broad column: atta**on wagon, telephone construction wagon and batteries

with 15 paces interval alongside each other; battery wagon on the right
Battalion
b) Depth colun: )1% aY wagon and batteries with 25 paces distance behind

each other.

Both formations employed for assembly.


Battalion
c) Single file: Xf C 'I wagon and batteries behind each other with 15

paces distance. Employment same as in battery

do t)ouble column: see above aid battery.

Drill movements 1hy battalion are not had. The battalion commander leads his

battalion by orders only. Battalion wagon, telephone construction wagon of the

battalion and the battery wagons of the batteries are consolidated under the

ranking battery officer.

269. Entering and leaving a position. The battalion commander sends for th

the battery commanders and directs the battalion and telephone construction wagons

to follow up as close as practicable. He instructs the battery commanders in


111

battle situation and task det the battalion and designates to each one his

observation station. He designates the general location of the firing posi-

tions, issues orders for their occupancy and for security of the batteries and

issues orders when to open fire. When necessary he also designates the location

of the sections. "e issues the necessary orders to the observation officer

of the battalion for the arrangement of the battalion observation station and

necessary communications therefrom.

In case of need fire may be opened even if not all of the batteries are in

position.

In leaving the firing position the battalion commander designates direction

of macrch and whether the change of position shall be executed in unison of by

echelons.

269. The heavy artillery battalion is a unit of the artillery of the

infantry division and is under the orders of the artillery commander of the

division.

In addition to heavy horse artillery we have autotruxk heavy batteries, con-

solidated into battalions, with ane ammunition autotruck section.

270. The heavy artillery regiment, under orders of umxpxxhexrrK*.rxx

army or corps headquarters consists usually of three battalions, of which two

are mortar battalions of two batteries of 3 runs each and one battalion of 15cm

autotruck batteries (2 batteries of 2 guns each).

4 The MI RE 1)2(4K""

~V1. .In attack and defense the heavy and light minewerfers supplement the

artillery effect at short range and take its place whore the artillery can not

fire on account of the short distance between target and own infantry. PrerequiE

Prerequisites for success are possibility of good observation, assured communi-

cation between observation position and fire position, and organization into

squads for combined effect. Mobility and heavy shock fire are of great, value.
112

THE HORSE MIN EIrRFER 3ATTERY WITR TWO !4 DITL


nMIT EYFERFER

272. To the organization of an infantry division belong one ninewerfer

battalion with several horse-drawn minewerfer batteries of 2 medium minewerfers.

The normal equipment in the f 0~ position warfare are four heave and 8 medium

minewerfere.

For special tasks of mountain warfare we have mountain minewerfer companies

of 4 medium and 8 light minewerfers, with mountain vehicles and peck animals.

Army headquarters has at its disposal minewerfer battalions. They are

employed according to requirements at important points. The battalion consiets

of four companies with 3 heavy and 5 medium minwerfers each, the train personnel

and the autotruck section.

273. Strength of the horse-drawn minewerfer battery of 2 minewerfers:-


approaimatoly 100 persons; of these 19 drivers; 6 saddle horses, 30 draft horses;
11 two-horse and 8 one-horse vehicles; 2 bicycles. Complement of each medium
minowerfer: 1 officer, 4 ICO, 25 men. The remainder is with the section to bring
up ammunition and to take places of casualties.
l3attery:
Combat j/%{1: 2 medium minewerfers, i observation wagon, 8 thrower carts
(with five mines each, 4 supply wagons with 10 mines each, the latter as section.

Combat Train: 1 two-horse small field kitchen.

Field Train: 1, armorer's and shop wagon; 1 baggage wagon; 1 provision and
forage wagon.

Strength of battalion headquarters: approximately 50 persons, nine saddle


horses, 8 draft horses, 4 vehicles (1 battalion wagon, 2 tool and implement
wagons, 1 baggage wagon); 4 bicycles.

274. he division commander issues order for going into action through

the artillery commander, several batteries under one commander, the throwers not

evenly distributed, by organized into squads at short ranges at points where an

annihilating effect is desirable.

Position far in front facilitates co-operation with infantry, utilizes fully

the short range, decreases dispersion, facilitates effect tarther in the midst of t]

the enemy, and offers the advantage of a broad target. Otherwise, the enemy will

be given a greater chance to defeat the minewerfers because of the possibility of

seeing the high angle mines and replenishment, of ammunition is harder for the

battery. Uareful utilization of the terrain, loose echelong position in the

terrain, firing from many throwers, simultaneous screening of their fire by our
113

artillery, and finally hange of position after completion of task, offset this

disadvantage.

275. Higher fire control is the duty of the artillery commander; sub-

ordinate fire control is left to the commanders of the minewerfers in compliance

with orders issued. them. The uatter should. act independently and with fore-

sight. His main tasks are: timely and correct reconnaissance of the target,

regulation of fire distribution and fire discipline, regulation of the fire in

regard to time, correct expensiture of ammunition.

In position war, photos taken from planes are very important for target re-

connaissance, especially serial photos without gaps ,omissions of certain stretcher

and are frequently the only means to find out how and where the heavy and medium

minewerfers are to go into action, what changes occur in the hostile position,

and if the intended effect has been reached.

In which manner fkxbxxffpXkstunK surprises, increasing or decreasing the fire,

or concentrated fire may become necessary for proper regulation of the fire,

when gas shall be used, or if a portion of minewerfere are to be kept in ambush,

has to be arranged. in aocordance with the tactical situation. In all oases

every method of throwing and. every kind of ammuntition must be used for that task

which is best suited for it.

Prerequisite for correct utilization of the effect is regulating the fire


co-operation
at the correct time in ZMx x*±m ax xsrgrfa ait with the other arms, so that

success is attained at the best tactical moment.

considering the difficulties in bringing up ammunition, waste of ammunition

is especially wrong. As a general rule, fire must not be opened until we have

plenty of' ammunition on hand.

careful imbedding is necessary for good effect. Only fire the effect of

which can be observed should be the rule whenever possible. We mayr do without

trial shots to find the rsange prior to firing for effect if the range has been

well measured and the influences of weather are known.

2T6, The ewerfera acompl sh ther tasks in tranquil, observed detruc-

tive firing, which s ould increase in volumetpsP 4tA1't&11!i ik&eirnportant targets

for preparation of the asault and defense of an assault,


114

276. The minewerfers accomplish their task in tranquiil, observed destruc-

tive firing, which should increase in volumne to annihilating fire against im-

portant targets for preparing the assault of defeating and assault, as permitted

by observation, fire control and equipment. Destructive fire is used at, favor-

able opportunittres to interrupt traffic and the enema s activity. Gas armuni-

tion is employed by medium minewerefers, such as a afmsxilaK, mustard gas, a

etherite, and sneezing gas. The gas permeates low points and trenches and often I

has a better effect than a bursting mine. Firing gas ammunition is for the pur-

pose of annihilating living targets and destroying the fighting power of the

enemy.

Medium and heavy minethrowers are little suited for blocking fire on account

of their negligent fire rapidity. In place of blocking fire they throw a con-

centrated, sudden annihilation fire on the Attack preparations of the enemy, and

later on his reserves.

277 In position war preparation for battle takes first place on quiet
of
fronts (construction/and measuring distances from fire positions, positions for

changes, observation positions, cover for men, mine depots). For the rest

every opportunity for ermploying minewerfers for the battle must be fully uti-

lized, ' mainly for destructive tasks, preparation and support of our own, and

defeat of hostile operations.

Even during construction of positions protection against sight from aero-

planes is mate ial. The strength of the constru'tion is dependent on terrain,

tactical situation, labor at disposal and means. Frequently we will be satis-

fied with protection from view of Aeroplanes or fire from the open. Protection

from artillery fire is then bo be sought by change of position.

In reverses the fire positions of the minewerfers offer rallying points

against hostile piercing.

278. In mobile war the horse-drawn minewerfer battery will make use of

its horses as 741w long as possible on the battlefield. If that is no loner

possible, then minewerfers and ammunition carts are drawn by men, and additional

ammunition is carried forward. The battery goes into position where resisting
115

nests or flank constructions, which the accompanying guns and light minewerfers

were unable to destroy, dea in the infantry in its attack or where the enemy

takes a new foothold for continuing resistance. This task reauires following

the infantry at distances which allow freedom of movement on the battlefield

and rapid ly proiuving effect. A diistance ofr from one to two kilometers from

the leading infantry line will generally be correct.

279. The commander of the mineverfers must, by rapid reconnaissance and

personal observation and. close connection with the infantry commanders and the

artillery commander in front, keep himself permanently informed hoer the battery

is best be brought up; positions suitable for the miriewerfers he has to quickly

perceive and understand how to occupy them. /. consideration of coor

take a back-seat. The observation stations are in most cases directly along-

side of the throwers.

In the progressive attack, reconnaissance squads go ahead with the t fxrN rx

leading lines of the infantry to support the minewerfer commander. They must

never lose connection with the battery. We cannot always wait for orders to

go into position. The minewerfer commander must know of himself that a few

well-thrown rounds, fired suddenly, often have a timely success which, had the

oppenentbeen given time, would have been attained only after a long fire pre-

paration.

The thrower is placed into position without special arrangements for a

foundation. As everything depends on producing an effect rapidly, the men

must be trained to get ready for fire as quick as possible.

Of very great importance for the possibility of producing effect by the

medium minewerfers is their ample and timely supply of ammunition. Specially

suitabl e officers and noncommissioned officers must be selected as leaders of

the ammunition squads.

In defense it may be possible to open fire only when the assault preparations

are perceived, and to place the minewerfers so far in rear that they will out-

side the zone of hostile artillery fire thrown on the leading infantry line.
116

5. ARTILLERY BATTLE LEADERSHIP

280. In regard to the employment in action of artillery the seane general

rules governy(j//dj in mobile war and in position war, but in mobile war more

thorough preparations and longer time is necessary.

a. FORMATION4 FOR ACTION


1
281. he artillery pertaining to divisions according to War Organization

tables can be increased according to need. The medium and heavy minewerfers

are an inflexible portion of the division artillery. Inserting light mine-

werfers and grenade throwers of the infantry may be regulated with consultation

of the artillery commander.

In action the entire artillery working in the battle sector of an independent

mixed unit is under the orders of the artillery commander, except the special

pieces 6f heaviest caliber, which as a general rule are directly under the

orders of corps or army headquarters.

The interior formation of artillery must correspond to the battle tasks.

This, for the combination into units for the purpose of orders not the _"..

location of the firing positions but the cooperation in the same aiming space

is the deciding factor.

Under directions of the artillery commander groups (regimental groups) are

formed. These groups are divided into smaller groups. 1


Mixing of leavv and

light artillery within the groups and smaller groups is permissible and to be

governed by local conditions. For 'the gas action batteries of the light and

heavy artillery are to be designated in each case.

b. LEADERSHIP

282. The army comm ender exerts his influence on the artillery battle

conduct .by means of battle orders to the corps, by means of regulating the

co-operation of neighboring corps, and by designating the strength and armmunition.


117

The corps commander regulates the battle tasks and co-operation of the

divisions also in an artilleristic relation and also regulates the ammunition sup-

ply. In case of need he reinforces any division by assigning corps artillery

on hand, in exceptional cases he calls also on that of other divisions.

Artillery advisors are generally found at army and corps headquarters.

The division commander directs what portion of the artillery is to be

put into action and what portion he wants to hold at his disposition, gives

instructions as to their positions, tasks and time of opening fire. He per-

manently supervises the activity of the artillery and gives it its battle tasks.

He regulates the iooperation of the artillery with the other arms, especially

with the infantry, the minewerfers and the aerial forces.

Troop leader and artillery commander must continually exchange views and

opinions. The troop leader informs the artillery comnander continually con-

cerning his intentions and tasks. On the other hand, he received from the

artillery commander reports of all happenings and results of artillery recon-

naissance and activity.

283. The artillery is in command of the entire artillery with the

Division. Ps a general rule, his place is with the troop leader. In smaller

units his place is taken by the ranking artillery officer.

The artillery commander will insert his numerous and manifold means of

reconnaisseance in good time. He forms an independent estimate of the situa-

tion with the enemy from messages he receives, of the terrain, and of the best

utilization of his. arm. He comes to the decision of how to divide his fire

power, reports to the troop dJfslS leader his estimate of the situalon, and

makes recommendations for inserti g his artillery. He receives from the


informs
troop leader his battle task. Thereupon he ijI'% his artillery commanders

of the situation, regulates special reconnaissances, and designates to them,

as much as possible in conformity with the terrain, sectors for observation

and primary action, and under certain conditions assigns them also definite

targets. When necessary he divides the terrain for the observation positions,

and issues orders for taking positions, communication Iith his location, and

time to open fire. e may also issue instructions conr'erning finding the
118

by sighting shots. On orders from the troop leader, or independently report-

ing to him, he designates portions of artillery to join infantry units for solving!

certain and definite battle tasks.

He orders the assignment of special ground and aerial observers to the

groups for carrying on the fire.

Based on his knowledge of the situation with the enemy and his own troops
informs
he takes measures for the correct execution of the fire fight. He xtyt
the troop leader
xdsl rsjPtrm m concerning the activity of the artillery and that he

has learned and receives from '%lM him all the .important nesws concerning the

artillery. He establishes communication with the infantry commander and takes

core for permanent touch between artillery and infantry commanders.

He must be at all times informed. as to the Lighting power of all batteries

and makes arrangements to equalize that. He makes timely recommendations

for replenishment of men, horses, materiel and ammunition. At the proper

time he consolidates the mass of his fire power in order to gain victory at the

decisive point by enormous effect.

284. he artillery commanders are the leaders are the commanders of

artillery units. They are with their units and prior to entering action are

called to the '// leading element of the artillery or to the artillery commander.

They conduct the special reconnaissances and regulate according to the results

the arrangement s of observation, going into position, fire activity, and re-

plenishment of ammunition within their command.

The establish connection through the artillery communication officer with

the infantry battalions which are fighting in the same sector. They mist con-

tinually report to the rtillery comm'nder concerning the battle activity and

the fighting power of. their batteries.

The battalion commanders //$ carry the main burden of fire control, by
assigning target sectors
- targets, y'/% '4$s and observation sectors to the bat-

teries and regulate their fire activity and expenditure of "ammunition.

They must interfere with the fire of the batteries only inhgeneral way
119

and when they clearly see that the target is not correctly fired on or that the

guiding points for fire for effect are not correctly ascertained.

Fire control of the batteries is the business of the battery commanders.

The battery commander has to decide on what fire rapidity he had best employ con-

sidering the battle situation, the kind of target, what effect is being had, and

considering the state of his ainunition.

It is the duty of every artillery cornwander to keep in constant communica-

tion with his next higher superior. Different connnections for tr nsmission

od orders and messages must be arranged from the start (see pars 55--64.)

Communication between artillery planes and artillery is had. by means of wireless

supplemented by light signals and by planes throwing down written messages.

Concerning artillery patrols for reconnaissance in mobile war see par.lllb.

co Inserting Artillery into Action.

285. The mass of the artillery must be early in readiness for employment

on the battlefield. Single units will be inserted immediately if the situation

dmands it, if reconnaissance is to be augmented or if a careless enemy is to

be surprised with fire. If the troop leader has arrived at his decision, the

entire artillery is inserted at effective range.

It requires careful consideration if an artillery reserve is to be held

back. This is justified in general only so long as the battle situation is

not yet clear. Independent therof keeping a few batteries in ambush in ordei

to utilize favorable moments by surprise, may frequently be'of advantage.

286. mployment of artillery by battalions is the general rule. Position

by groups in any kind. of terrain should be the endeavor. Certain conditions

may also require the appearance of single batteries, platoons, and guns. The

requirement to hove sufficient artillery at hand for all battle tasks should be

met if ever possible withut disruption of units.

Batteries in open position are generally exposed to rapid destruction.

Therefore, the artillery fires as a general rule from cover. Occasionally

batteries or single guns may fire from open positions to take adv':,ntage of
120

rapidly changing favorable battle situations, or when in exceptional cases it is

very important to dominate the field of fire up to the shortest ranges.

Long range batteries should iii the very start be inserted far to the front to

fully take advantage of their peculiarities.

Horse batteries or horse howitzer batteries are well suited for the rapid

support of any threatened point because of their mobility, provided they are not

employed with the cavalry divisions, and are also wel suited to take adbantage of

favorable battle situations and to fire on the enemy from. the flank.

287. It is absolutely necessary that every artillery position ismpro-

tected from the view of aeroplanes. Where there is no cover, it must be pro-

vided. Villages, forests, orchards, inclines covered with brush and defiles

offer the best protection in that regard. Small woods standing by themselves,

farm buildings or other specially prominent points should be avoided, because they

will usually draw the hostile fire.

When a position is taken up, earthworks should at once be thrown up for

protection against hostile fire. To lessen the labor every natural cover should

be used. If the position is to be held a long time, obstructions must be

constructed around the position.

288. The artillery is protected by advanced infantry, special protection

will be required only at exposed flanks. The artillery must guard itself

against surprises. The machine guns attached to the artillery offer effective

protection.towards all sides and against low flying planes. For self-defense,

when fire from the guns is no longer possible, serve mnchine runs, hand firearms,

hand grenades and cold steel.


under
289. When %y{ very superior fire the artillery comnanders are authorized to

cease fire temporarily and to allow the men to seek cover. However, they

must be fully cognizant of the great responsibility resting on them thereby.

In a hostile attack the position must be held to the very last man. A.battery
that has fired all its ammunition must not leave the firing position without

direct orders.
121

290. Firing over our own troops is the rule. 1hen both oppositing infantr,

lines are at close distance from each other danger may threaten our infantry be-

cause of the natural dispersion and splintering effect (150 meters for light,

200 meters for heavy artillery, and 400 meters for rortars). Our infantry

in such a case will have to count, on losses sustained by the fire of our own

artillerv.

291. To deceive the enemy as to the strength of our artillery and in case

of special undertakings (flanking at short range, fighting tanks) it will fre-

quently be well to divide the batteries into independently appearing platoons

and even single guns. It is therefore necessary that all nonconmissioned

officers and as many men as practicable are trained in the fire control of

platoons and single pieces.

292. uhange of position is executed by orders of the troops leader or

with his approval. however, for the purpose of fully utilizing advantages

gained independent /% action on the art of the artillery commander and his

subordinates may become necessary. That action must at once be reported.

Minor changes in position are not i$ y{ considered in this regard.

As a general rule positions are changed by echelon. Generally the battery

goes into a new position as a unit. Tt is necessary to limber up unperceived

by the enemy.

3 EuONNA hSA!1CE

293. Timely and thorough reconnaissance is prereqy4site for success. It

requires time and includes conditions with the enemy, his position, strength, and

escpecially location of his different headquarters and observation positions, and

also includes our own observation positions, firing positions, routes of anproach

and departure and cormunications to the rear.

Flyers, balloon observers, artillery reconnoiterers, artillery measuring

squads and direction listeners are employed for reconnoitering the enemy. The

flyers and balloon observers receive their orders from the troop leader or
122

or the artillery commander; the artillery reconnoiterers and artillery measuring

squads receive their orders from the latter. It is necessary to start them

out early. They are to ascertain what must be known for proper artillery fire

on the enemy.

The view of conditions with the enemy is had mFon an aeroplane or balloon.

Photographs taken from them give the best target reconnaissance. Artillery re-

connoiterers will generally supplement the results of aerial reconnaissance.

Observation of shots from the air changes hidden targets into open targets.

However, planes and balloons are ependent on the weather and their number is

limited. And besides the number of planes to be employed for observation

of the hits is &imited by the difficulies in transmitting their observations.

Therefore only a limited portion of the batteries may have the service of planes

in the matter of observing hits. In unfavorable weather the artillery will

have to relay for reconnaissance exclusively on ground observation and artillery

measuring squads. Therefore arrangement of a good observation not is always

a prerequisite for the artillery in action.

It will frequently be advisable to send the artillery reconnoiterers ahead

with the cavalry. The report that, hostile artillery is n o t in a certain

sector is of importance. Anything learned which has not been directed in the

instructions when starting out must also be reported.

Reconnaissance must he continued throughout the action with all means at,

hand.

294. Going into each and every position must be preceded by a general

reconnaissance by the artillery commander and a special reconnaissance by the

subordinate artillery commnanders. The general reconnaissance of the artillery

commander will usually be confined to a view of the terrain in which the artillery

is to deploy. The special reconnaissance of the other artillery commanders

has to embrace: the enemy, terrain, observation positions, fire positions, routes

of approach.

We must avoid in all reconnaissance to attract the attention of hostile

planes, balloon observers and reconnoiterers to the observation stations to be


123

taken up and to the firing ositions Care must be paid to riding forward under

cover, timely dismounting and leaving accompanying men behind.

295. The following come into consideration for observation positions:

Extensive view of the terrain, cover against view of any kind, distances within

the battalion not too extended, but avoiding crowding at exposed points. The

pbsition must always afford a ,good view of our leading infantry lines and the

terrain behind them. ?or that reason it may be necessary to construct several

observation positions for one battery, one of them prohaby being with the most
observation
advanced infantr' line. The combined/positions must assure a far reaching view

of the designated sector to far in rear of the hostile front line.

Observation positions in the leading line itself or in its close proximity

cannot be maintained during action. Therefore ground reconnaissance must in

the main base itself on observation positions located farther in rear. Observa-

tion positions advanced towards the flanks often assure a surprisingly excellent

and far view. Connection with them has to be specially assured.

296. Wireless connection with planes, $tith round stations and signal

arrangements are established at ?opints in cover from hostile fire and from which

secure co' munivation with the respective artillery commanders and batteries is to

be established.

291. The terrain selected for the deployment o-" arrtillerv has to be se-

cured by the infantry. The positions are to be selected so that all tasks

confronting the artillery in action can be solved from one position. Therefore

the artillery usually goes so close to the enemy as is permissible in proper con-

sideration of effect and cover. beleotion of the proper front is important.

In thw matter of fire position it is desirable that it offers a good field

of fire to the front and flanks and that it is not too far from the observation
Loose
position. J$ld( and soar ground is bad 3 for the position itself but very

desirable for its immediate surroundings to lessen the W'twtile fire effect.
dpwn
Of advantage is sloping of disadvantage is sloping-up ground in rear of' the positi

position. A position in forests increases the enemy's difficulties in locating


124

our artillery. Creation of dust-clouds must be avoided, smoke and muzzle

fiza: flashes must be hedden from hostile sight. asks, and rtidicial maska

are of value. Exetnsiwe and irregulat 1ki taxkaaxx intervals between nieces

are desirable. In absence of room and cover positions can be placed behind

each other with plenty of distance.

Position of the batteries depends on intentions of the leader, battle

situation, terrain, observation conditions and kinds of guns. The most effect-

ive ranges are to be utilized. By unequal distribution of the batteries in

the terrain and death formation the hostile fire is dispersed. Position in

connecting lines is just as much to be avoided as crowding batteries into con-

fined battery nests. To increase the hostile reconnaissance, the pieces of

a battery should not be placed in one line, but irregularly echeloned and with

unequal intervals. Cowiding in a limited space must be avoided.

Routes of approach and dearturo must be reconnoitered with repjgard to

firmness, slopes, capacity off bridges,etc. If repairs are necessary we must

timely requisition for help. Required: Indicators (wooden signs or sentries),

illumination at night, masks at stretches that can be seen.

APPROACH '10.AND TAKING UP THE B)SITION

298. In connection with reconnaissance and selection of the position care

must be had that the artillery gets to the position rapidly and securely. The

commanders remain at the point from where orders are issued or at the observation

stations and keep an eye on the enemy.* it is left, to the battery commanders

to bring their batteries into position. The commanders bringing up the artiller

receive necessary instructions beforehand. Taking up the position must be

kept secret from the enemy as far as possible, as a battery going into position
an alert
can easily be annihilated by a/hostile battery . Having guns take the position

before observation and communication arrangements are finished is not correct if

thereby the enemy's attention is attracted. prematurely.

ufficers hringua the batteries must specially care for security and cover

by near reconnaissance and must select roads that can be used. The reconnoitere

sent out by them must accompany the artillery by rahes and must timely report
125

so that a sudden attack may find the batteries ready for battle on the one hand,

and on the other, that unnecessary delay may be avoided by the artillery suddenly

encountering the hostile artillery at close range. The reconnoiterers also

maintain connection with the battery commanders who have ridden on ahead. The

officers bringing un the batteries themselves must ride only so far for'ard

as to be able to keep their eyes on the latter and lead them personally. It

is usually necessary to slacken speed on the last stretch to secure sorrect and

orderly entrance into the position.

To protect the positions from the view of planes roads and field roads are

to be used as long as possible and single column adhered to. Star shaped

nets of ruts in the terrain, ending in the position betray the battery positions

to the planes. If ruts are caused, they must be quickly obliterated or to

prolong them to deceive the planes.

1(TDS OF FIRE

299. According to the battle objective, in attack and defense the follow-

ing kinds of fire are emnloyed:


Destructive
a) 1 1%X~%~{g fire: tranquil, carefully controlled fire, as a rulewith
so
observation of the hits, carried on with. much ammunition that the destruction

of the target fired on (machine guns, minewerfers, artillery, supporting points,

important field fortifications) is assured. It ma'r be employed by all pieces.

Additional effect on live targets desirable

b) Interfering fire: Employed at irregular timesto interfere with deploymen

and going into position on the part of the enemy, with hostile traffic, comminica-

tions, supply, for firing of detraining stations, shelters, dlying fields, etc.

It can be of longer duration or in shape of sudden and unexpected fire. As a

general rule it will be impossible to fire trial shots to aseertain the range,

as the effect must be sudden to be effective. Flanking effect is specially

good.

The interfering fire si used by all kinds of guns except the heaviest

high angle fire guns, but is specially suited for heavry caliber flat trajectory

guns .
126

Annihilating Fire: Fire combined in regard to extent and time, mostcy

shock-like, and in shape of shortter or longer and repeated. sudden fire. Ob-

servation of the general effect desirahle. Annihilating fire is fired by all

kinds of guns, except the heaviest calibers, against targets which are to be set

rapidly and decisively out of action. It is suitable to produce the strongest

moral in addition to material effect. It is the most important kind of fire in

attack, especially for the immediate preparation of the charge or its defeat.

The annihilating fire, as means of artilleristic defeat of a charge, will in most

cases join the more permanent, slowly increasing destructive fire and interfering

fire.

d) Blocking Fire (Barrage): This method is to be employed automatically

on demand of the infantry or indetendently, and in position war as rapid fire

practiced in drill. It is used as soon as the hostile charge or counter charge

is perceived and must be confined in regard to space and time onto the infantry

attack. Observation generally impossible. The barrage must be carefully

adjusted therefore and proven if it lies without gaps in front of the sector.

Early change to controlled fir must he the endeavor. In common position warfare

barrage is prohibited. Barrages happening too frequent or kept up too long

prematurely uses up available ammunition and betrays the location of our own

batteries without being certain of keeping an energetic opponent from the attack.

e) Gas Fire:Used for bringing about annihilation of or damage to living

targets and interference with the enexrv's combat activity. In consideration.

of our own troops far off targets, i.e. principally hostile artillery, are best

suited fxxxtas targets. ut favorable targets will usually also be found

under proper supervision in the infantry battle sector.

Gas ammunition is to be used in attack as well as in defense. According

to the manner of utilization either paralysis, disorders and material lose

will be caused in the enemy s lines or entire positions ma4 be made untenable.

Success depends on hostile gas protection, the attained gas density, which means

correct selection of the different gasses and the state of weather.


127

TARGET" AND T)I( Tv ENGAGE THEM

300. The battle objective regulates the selection o' targets. infantry

must receive the most far-reaching support. This can be achieved only if

co-operation between infantry and artillery is permanently assured by the re-

spective comianders keeping in personal touch or keep up communication by


and knowledge of the situation
liaison officers. By this means and by personal observation/the artillery

commander will get a correct picture for proper leading the action. Dduring

the course of the action he must at all times be clear in his own mind how much

of his artillery he should insert against the annihilating effect of the hostile

artillery and how much against the hostile infantry.


r of the target
In distribution tagts it must be considered if all portions/thereof are

to be taken under fire and with the sarm degree or if portions thereof shall

not be fired on in the start.

301. We should primarily strive to damage living targets, then the de-

struction of important meteriel and important works. ere barrage and destruc-

tion of' hostile works which can easily be reconstructed. (trenches for instance)

are a secondary consideration.

In detail, the artillery performs the following battle tasks:

a) fighting artillery and minewerfers


b) fighting infantry
3) fighting planes and balloons
d) Firing on cormmunications to the rear, shelter, parks; interrupting
traffio;and battle action
8) firing on special targets.

302. The best success is pronised in firing on hostile artillery if we

succeed in throwing an observed fire on it when it goes into position. In

this case guns of' all calibers have good effect against hoses, men and materiel.

Artillery in the open can also be fired on by all caliber guns with hope of succes

while in firing on intrenched artillery the heavy caliber guns ought to be

employed.

We will but seldom succeed in complete and permanent silencing the hostile

artillery. Therefore we must distinguish according to the battle situation

whether the question is to lame the hostile artillery for a shorter time and to

at
128

its
prevent their fire at least, or if destruction of materiel, %W%/ arm znition

and intrenchments are to he destroyed. In the first gas ammunition is best.

Firing with high explosive ammunition promises success only if we can observe
lessening
the hits are if we succeed in l% %%%yfg the dispersion limits. If, on the

other hand, destruction of the materiel is intended, then the hostile artillery

is taken under a carefully controlled destructive fire. If we cannot observe

results, we must at least sufficient bases for firing , or the artillery measure-

ing squads will have to be called on for co-operation. Firing on the hostile ha

battery positions in the same manner as on firing position,(laminf their fire

or destroying them) proises success. Throwing a smoke screen or a fog, screen

prevents observation.

303. The hostile infantry will suffer annihilating losses if it gets

into artillery fire in close formation. Even extended skirmish lines and

skirmish waves are excellent targets, for firing on which the light artillery

is ecially suited. (Entrenched infantry will be damaged less the better its

trenches. In that case destruction of trenches, shelter, machine guns and

minewrerfers, and commando. positions, etc is the principal question, where the

heaviest caliber guns are to be employed the stronger the cover is.

304. Firing on planes and balloons is necessary to cut out hostile aerial

observation. Principally we employ special aerial defense guns (flak) for that

purpose. Other kinds of' guns employed as a makeshift against planes will

have but little success. un the other hand, long range flat trajectory .fire

against balloons is very effective and ought to he principally employed in action.

305. Firing on communications to the rear is had with interference fire.

If the question is of important points (defiles, bridges) then destructive fire

is also employed. At close range the field gun is principally used, at longer
flat
ranges and to flank and sweep (in dente) we employ heavr ,Y trajectory fire.

Firing on special targets, such as headquarters, cavalry, spires, bridges,

railroads, etc., is had With due consideration of the capacity of the different

guns in conjunction with the general situation.


129

FIRE CONTROL

number of
306. Suporioriny in/guns is best utilized by artillery in concentration

of fire. Even when no numerical superiority exists we must attempt to gain,

by concentrated fire, superior effect against portions of the enemy.

We should always endeavor with all means at hand to silence hostile artillery

by concentrated fire of different calibe guns and different. kinds of guns, if

that artillery blocks the advance of our infantry or threatens tobreak its de-

fensive power. Only silenced Rotillery, whose materiel has been destroyed,
for
is cut out of the battle. But X this we require exact observation of hits.

If we cannot gain any idea whatever concerning the enemy's artillery, then the

attert to fire on it leads only to wasting amunition.

During the fire on artillery we must make every preparation to be able to

switch our fire on hostile infantry. The fire of the heavy artillery should

be directed principally against those targets that are the most dangerous for our

infantry.

307. The larger the units, the greater the difficulty, but also the

importance, of fire control, in the hands of one commander. it is necessary


is
for success that the enormous fire power of the artillery/utilized according

to the battle objective and the situation. ('oncerning the question what targets

are _for the time being the most important, and consequently should have the pre-
in general
ference of fire, is decided E caxxmx xxz by the troop leader, in detail by

the highest and subordinate artillery commanders.

It is the duty of all commanders to use their influence permanently in correct

expenditure of ammiunition corresponding to the momentary situation. Wrong

expenditure of ammunition, too much or too little; the commander is responsible

for just as much as for wrong insertion of men.

As far as possible each kind of' gun should be employed in that task for

which it is best suited. The main question is to correctly regulate according

to tactical points, the following: fire distribution, opening of fire, concentra-

tion of fire, incease of decrease of fire according to caliber, fire rapidity,


130

number of batteries firing, and expenditire of' ammunition according to fire

technique.

Of special importance is regulating the fire in accordance with time; for

instance, command positions and battery positions must be destroyed at a mement

which is most undesirable to the enemy.

The fire will have its best effect when we succeed in suddenly firing,

from locations which the enemey has not. yet perceived and taken under fire,

on certain targets and throwing an effective fire without having to find the

range by trial shots. For this purpose keeping a few batteries in readines s

in carefully hidden locations is frequently eery suwoessful in firing on moment-

ary targets.

In special cases the fire of several batteries can be combined under o n e

observation position (base or guide battery).

308. Designating the target is had according to points in the terrain,

graduated lines from them or the map, letters, numbers, or snecial names, lIots=

squares on the map, coordinates.

All artillery commanders are permitted to independently change targets if

danger threatensn but only in case the battle objective is not endangered.

309. In using aerial observation, the battery commander controls the fire

of his battery in the same manner as when he has an advanced observer. In case

he hinself is not at the wireless station he makes use the antennae officer to tr

transmit observations .z

310. Sweeping fire and sudden fire with splintering effect are generally

useless if the effect cannot be observed.

Observation is generally impossible at night., therefore firing at night,

which can be done only with barrage and annihilating fire, destructive Fire and

gas fire, must. be closely confined or must have a good basis for #'iring.

ARTTLLFRY LIAISON OFFICERS

311. The artillery liaison officer (one at each infantry regimental

headquarters with a few mounted messengers or runners or telephoneoperators)


131

serves the purpose to increase close co-operatili between artillery and infantry

in action and to augment it. !!is tasks are:

a) to keep headquarters to whteh attached permanently informed concerning

insertion and activity of artillery and to also keep the artillery informed of

the activity of the infantry;

b) to relieve the infantry headquarters staff of' work during any action,

by transmitting the wishes and demands of the infantry for artillery suport, to

the proper artillery headquarters;

c) to keep in touch with the artillery and infantry observers of the sector

and transmitting information the artillery has gai.nod to the infantry;

d) to transmit the demands or desires of' the artillery to the infan ry.

312. Then the infantry regiment goes into action, the artillery liaison

officer first proceeds to the artillery commander, informs himself concerning

the insertion of artillery and. then establishes communication between, his infantry

re iment and the artillery commander attached to it.

?curing the course of the action it may become necessary to attach artillery

liaison officers also to battalions .ft:tiix .c s these are furnishe

by the artillery fighting with the infantry battalion in the same sector. The

infantry regimental commander calls on the artillery commander for them.

Where infantry and artillery units are from the start charged with execution

of a common task (advance guard,etc)the artillery must send to the infantry -

when not already suppplied with one - an artillery liaison officer without being

specially called on to do so.

Duties of the artillery liaison officer in position warfare, see par.440.

REPLENISHflANT OF A IIthNITION AND MATERIEL

313. Each battery in action must take proper steps to be permanently ready

for /%f% action and remains mobile.

Replenishment of ammunition is of utmost importance and is worked out by

the first general staff officer of headquarters. It is the duty of every ar-

tillery commander to take correct steps for replenishment of ammunition and for

proper location of ammunition and supervision. Only when the strictest dis-
132

cipline and order is maintained and when we insert, regardless of everything,

every man and animal without fear of losses, can replenishment of amunition

he properly executed under specially energetic officers. In bringing up

ammunition, none must be lost.

314. For additional replenishment of ammunition the troops engaged in

action have light ammunition columns of light and u~osit battery columns of

heavy artillery. The light ammunition columns are filled 'from the artillery
army
ammunition columns of the corps, the battery columns from the/ammrunition columns

of the rmw heavy artillery. Autotruck columns are also used ior bringing up

ammunition.

In actions of longer duration the caissons of the combat batteries and the

sections are made availbale for bringing up ammunition.

The heaviest and some of the heavy batteries are supplied with autotrucks

to carry along and replenish ammunition.

315. In mobile warfare the renlemishment o+ ammunition is difficult because

of the continually ;hanging routes for bringing up supplies and distances and.

requires earful qnd farseeing measures.

The troop leader regulates the location of the light ammunition columns and

battery columns in the march column. then the ammunition column reach the

battlefield, locating the troops to which they pertain and timely reconnaissance

of roads is very important. On the battlefield the columns take covered position

behind the limbers of the batteries, carefully utilizing the terrain.

The commander of the light ammunition column or the ranking commander of' aiix

xntitm ix the battery column of a heavy artiller - battalion immediately establishs

connection with the section leaders of the firing line and the artillery battalion

commander. le reconnoiters the best roads to the positions of the batteries

and sections, keeps himself informed of the state of ammunition along the firing

line and establish connection with the approaching ammunition columns

The ammunition wagons of the light ammunition column and battery column,

without betraying their march into the firing position, drive if possible to those

positions and unload. in addition the amount of ammunition of the limbers of


133

the batteries is replenished from the ammunition columns. In actions lasting

several days and when great amounts of ammunition are required the ammunition

carried by the columns can be stored at suitable points near the batteries so

as to have as many vehicles as possible for going back for more ammunition.

The division commander informs the artillery commander of time and place

of probable arrival of the artillery ammunition columns. Where haste is re-

quired, the artillery ammunition columns or parts therod may be brought up to

the firing line and. filled .wagons may temporarily be left with troops. But

usually the light ammunition columns or battery columns procure the ammunition

according to need from the location or depot of the artillery ammunition columns

or from the depots erected by the latter. Such depot wFill generally be several

kilometers in rear of the fire positions of the hatteries.

316. 'hanging position should be executed with full caissons of the

fighting battery. Ammunition left back in the position, is gathered up by

the light ammunition columns or battery columns.

are
317. The combat trainsof the batteries 'X conducted by the ranking noncom-

missioned officers. In the advance , they march, combined by battalions, at

the rear of the battalion, conducted by the ranking train commander. If the

battalion approaches the firing position, the combat train is brought to the

rear of the batteries and remains under cover until the limbers have taken up

their positions.

318. The most careful handling and preservation of the materiel is ab-

solutely necessary. Caring for that is one of the most important tasks of

artillery combat discipline. Taking unserviceable equipment and empty wagons

etc to the rear is very necessary for a properly regulated replenishment.