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C 89 E/108 Official Journal of the European Communities EN 20.3.

2001

as a precondition for full liberalisation, it is necessary to maintain and raise standards of public service and
to take into account the implications in terms of jobs in the industry.

Safeguards against undue amalgamation with detrimental effects are provided by Treaty Articles 81 and 82
and further Community legislation deriving therefrom. In addition, Article 153(2) guarantees that
consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other
Community policies and activities.

It should be emphasised that Treaty Article 127(2) ensures that liberalisation will take into consideration
the objective of a high level of employment, and that the realisation of the untapped economic potential of
a fully integrated and operational internal market in these areas would have a significant impact on job
creation.

The key aim of liberalisation, which considers the specific characteristics of each of the sectors concerned,
including relevant geographical factors, is to ensure the effective functioning of the internal market so as to
ensure consumer wellbeing, and generate sustainable economic growth through which a higher level of
employment can then be supported. The call to speed up the liberalisation of public services reflects the
fact that progress made in the opening up of some public utilities to competition has already produced
significant economic and social dividends, in terms of lower prices, innovative services and, in certain
cases, new jobs.

(2001/C 89 E/117) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1898/00


by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission

(16 June 2000)

Subject: Subsidies and their allocation in the crane manufacturing industry

In Austria there are many very successful undertakings operating at international level, the crane
manufacturing industry being an example. Some criticism has been voiced concerning EU-wide requests
for tenders and the EU subsidisation policy.

If a firm is unsuccessful in an EU-wide request for tenders abroad, it is not told why its bid was rejected or
how close it came to the prices quoted by the successful bidder.

Despite the current overcapacity in the crane manufacturing industry, the Commission grants subsidies in
this sector. One result of this is that, with the Commission’s support, certain crane manufacturers engage
in massive price dumping.

The Commission is therefore requested to answer the following questions:

1. Why are firms which bid unsuccessfully not informed of the reasons for their rejection?

2. Are there any plans for measures that are transparent and close to the citizen to be taken in this
sector in the near future?

3. Does the Commission monitor the offers made by the enterprises which it subsidises with the
taxpayer’s money?

4. If so, does this also affect crane manufacturing?

5. If not, does it not see a need for reform here?


20.3.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 89 E/109

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(28 July 2000)

Under Article 8 of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of
procedures for the award of public works contracts (1), the contracting authority must, within 15 days of
the date on which the request is received, inform any eliminated candidate or tenderer who so requests of
the reasons for rejection of his application or his tender, and, in the case of a tender, the name of the
successful tenderer.

Moreover, according to a recent judgement by the Court of Justice (2), it must be possible to make an
application to have a decision awarding a contract set aside, which implies in practice an obligation on the
part of the contracting authorities to inform all tenderers of this decision.

The Commission does not monitor bids submitted by companies receiving Community subsidies. Instead,
under Article 30 of Directive 93/37/EEC, the contracting Authority, having the power to reject tenders,
must request, in writing, details of the constituent elements of the tender if, for a given contract, tenders
appear to be abnormally low in relation to the works.

It should also be noted that the fact of having received a subsidy that enables a firm to submit substantially
lower bids than the other tenderers is not in itself contrary to Community law on public procurement or
the principle of equal treatment (3).

(1) OJ L 199, 9.8.1993.


(2) Judgment of 28 October 1999 in Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria and others.
(3) See the conclusions of Advocate-General Léger in Case C-94/99, ‘ARGE Gewässerschutz’, presented on 15 June
2000.

(2001/C 89 E/118) WRITTEN QUESTION P-1908/00


by Neena Gill (PSE) to the Commission

(6 June 2000)

Subject: Joint Research Centre

The author understands that the current Director-General of the Joint Research Centre is retiring
in October. What arrangements have been made for the recruitment to this post?

How many people employed at the Joint Research Centre are employed on three-year temporary contracts,
and how many on five-year temporary contracts? What proportion of these temporary contracts are
renewed?

Could the Commission give an outline of its future strategy for the JRC? What measures have been
implemented to ensure that the Joint Research Centre is managed more effectively?

Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(25 July 2000)

The current Director-General of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) is due to retire on 31 October 2000.
The Commission will take the necessary steps to fill the post as soon as possible.

The JRC applies the research staff policy adopted in 1996 for the whole of the Commission’s research
budget. It employs 832 temporary staff including 155 on three-year temporary contracts (not renewable),
183 on initial five-year contracts, 143 on second five-year contracts and 451 on open-ended contracts.