CHI MING TSOI vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Petitioner: CHI MING TSOI

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
Ponente: TORRES, JR., J.

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao got married in 1988. They lived together in the house of
Chi Ming Tsoi’s mother. After 10 months of living together, Gina Lao-Tsoi filed a case for
the annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. During the trial, it
was established that Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi had no sexual intercourse despite
living together as husband and wife for ten months nor did they see each other’s private
parts. When submitted for examinations, Gina was declared a virgin while Chi Ming was
declared potent and capable of erection despite the fact that the latter’s penis measured
only 2 inches, and 3 inches in its full length.

Gina claimed that their marriage be annulled because Chi Ming was psychologically
incapacitated for his failure to consummate their marriage by refusing to have sexual
congress with her. On rebuttal, Chi Ming claimed that there is no psychological incapacity
for their differences can still be reconciled and cured through medical technology and
science.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. When appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether refusal to have sexual intercourse with your spouse constitutes
psychological incapacity which is a ground for annulment of marriage.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that marriage contracted by any party who
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage shall be void. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.

In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Thus, the marriage between Chi Ming and Gina was declared void by the Supreme
Court.
Case: PEOPLE Vs GONZALES ET. AL.
G.R. No.: 80762
Date: March 19, 1990
Ponente: J. Sarmiento

Facts:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay
captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their
landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities.
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not
guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on
October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. He stated that he clearly
saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim
Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform as the place was then awash in
moonlight. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant) Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the
accused denied participation in the crime.
In the decision dated October 31, 1984 on the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo found all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The case then was brought
to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or Not the evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime of murder
beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:
No, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged. Huntoria
testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking
and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the
malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the
stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that
he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and
what particular weapon was used by each of them. Thus this principal witness did not say,
because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria
does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, under appropriate circumstances, like in the
instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be
considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of
alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused.
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
Case: THE UNITED STATES Vs AH CHONG
G.R. No.: L-5272
Date: March 19, 1910
Ponente: J. Carson

Facts:
The defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were
employed in the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after the
defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door, and
called out twice. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife, struck
and fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate.

Issue:
Whether or Not Ah Chong should be acquitted because of mistake of fact

Ruling:
Under such circumstances, yes, Ah Chong should be acquitted. It is noted that there’s
no criminal liability on his part, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not
due to his negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts
is sufficient to negate a particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient
of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions governing negligence, and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1
of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even
though the act be different from that which he intended to commit. The circumstances
proved that in Ah Chong’s mind, he was being attacked, regardless of the
circumstances outside him. Would the facts been as he though them to be, there would
have been no crime. Mistake of fact indicates good faith. Good faith negates intent.
Without intent, there is no crime.