Prepared by


Steps t o Satuhcl .

. . . .

At Cape Canaveral, on October 27, 1961, at about ten o’clock in the morning, a white, three-stage rocket, one hundred and sixty-two feet tall, lifted slowly from its pad on a roaring column of fire. T h e vehicle rose with ceremonial dignity, four hundred and sixty tons of propellants and piping, framework, instruments and engines, the whole encased in a smooth aluminum skin and set free to lift itself into the air. You could not tell exactly when the slow rise quickened. Suddenly, the vehicle was rushing upward. Its speed increased and doubled, and increased again, until the vehicle shrank to a brilliant orange dot in the southeast sky. But the sound of engines remained, a profound disturbance behind the clouds. This was the first flight test of the SATURN launch vehicle -- an eight-engine booster capped with two inert stages and payload. T h e launch-. ing will be followed by flights of nine other research and development vehicles, some with a single live stage, some with two, and a few vehicles with test versions of man-carrying spacecraft riding forward of the second stage.


By the end of these tests, after the measurements have been made and improvements completed, we will have developed a new space vehicle t o meet the objectives and programs of the national space effort. In perfecting such a vehicle, we move one step closer to realizing certain of the national space objectives -- to carry instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space; to expand human knowledge of space; and to preserve the role of the United States as a leader in peaceful space exploration. T h e Government, in accepting its obligation to develop and extend the nation’s capabilities in space, has begun a series of advanced scientific programs. These include manned exploration of space, lunar circumnavigation and landing, development of orbital communication networks, investigation of the space environment between the earth and the sun and, of course, development of vehicles and spacecraft to carry out these programs. Viewed in this context, the first S A T U R N flight takes on a particular importance. W e know rather precisely when the vehicle will become operational. From this knowledge, we can construct a reasonably accurate timetable of vehicle-oriented activities in space for the next several years. W e may plan special missions in far more detail. And, during vehicle development flights, we can provide a continuous flow of technical information to the spacecraft designers.

North American Aviation DOWNEY, CALIFORNIA

S l A G t S-IY, S-IY ti

Douglas Aircraft


T h e launch of the first SATURN was a public demonstration of that detailed and sustained effort, on a national scale, begun little more than three years before, in August 1958. Between design and launch, the skills and talents of thousands of people were com.bined into a single program, as fibers are combined to form a cord. People in management, people in science, people in Government and industry -- all joining in a coordinated effort to develop a new vehicle. W e can see that effort quite clearly from the viewpoint of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, manager of the S A T U R N program. In mid-1960, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration gave the Marshall Center responsibility for developing and launching NASA space vehicles. SATURN was the largest and most demanding of these.



K E D S T O N E MISSILE, d e v e l o p e d for t h e Army b y t h e p r e s e n t MSPC team, is noui d e p l o y e d b y NATO

J U P I T E R MISSILE, d e t w l o p e d b y p r e s e n t M S F C t e n m , e x t e n d e d t e c h n o l o g y o/ RliDSTONE program. JUI’I?’ER is presenfly d e p l o y e d b y N A T O

Responsibility for major R&D programs has long been accepted by members of Marshall. The Center is formed about a scientific and management group that includes pioneers in rocketry and space research. Supporting this group are engineers and technicians whose experience goes back through JUPITER and REDSTONE to early United States' rocket programs. T h e Center has also attracted many additional highly trained people. Collectively, these individuals form an integrated organization of widely diversified skills.

J U N O I!, a N A S A space probe vehicle, used J U P I T E R first stage and solid propellant upper stages. established /irst U S satellite around the s u n









MER :URY S P A C E C R A F T , under deve Iopment by the Manned Spacecraft Cenr!er, is first in‘ U s e r i e s o f manned v e h i c l e s

Members of the Marshall Center have participated in some of the nation’s most important space projects, ‘MERCURY-REDSTONE being possibly the best known of these. Marshall also directs a number of major development programs. One of these will provide the first high-energy rocket engine to use liquid-hydrogen technology. In other programs, boosters, upper stages, and engines are being developed for SATURN and an advanced S A T U R N launch vehicle. National recognition has frequently been given Marshall’s technical achievements. By contrast, Marshall’s program management -- the work of organizing and directing these achievements -- is little known. Essentially, management consolidates into a single program the individual stage and engine development efforts, the overall funding and mission requirements, and the support equipment and facilities development.

T h e magnitude of this effort, in which a variety of interrelated

R&D programs advance along a common front, has created a most complex job for management. Marshall makes decisions which affect the
vehicle program from three to five years ahead. These necessary long lead-time decisions are supported by Marshall’s coniprehensive technical background. In the past, development of missile systems by members of the present Marshall group was concentrated at Huntsville, with industrial support. T h e present SATIJRN program is on an altogether larger scale, requiring greatly expanded industrial assistance. T h e development effort has become national in scope, its success depending on tightly knit industry-Govcrnmcnt teamwork. In Marshall technical working groups, representatives from industry and Government attack technical problems in a spirit of close cooperation, working out solutions by a common effort. T h e vehicle development program is composed of several clcarly defined parts -- the in-house research and development work carried on in Marshall’s laboratories, shops, and test areas; the research and development performed b y industry under the Center’s direction; and special study and test programs performed at private and Government facilities. As a final part, there is Marshall’s work of overall program management, during which in-house and out-of-house activities are integrated along planned schedules into a unified project.


MSC SPACECRAFT North American Aviation

S-IV STAGE Aircraft



Chrysler Corporatioi


H-1 E N G I N E

Rocket dyne/ North American Aviation

Management of earlier research and development programs was, comparatively, less complicated. Present management, in contrast, is severely taxed by rapidly advancing technology and ever-expanding fields of investigation. In this atmosphere of change, management must remain flexible and informed by first-hand experience with the new tools of science. This is particularly true of research and development, where programs are based on principles recently discovered and technology still being defined. Specific problems and questions change. T h e final responsibility of management remains constant. I n an R&D program, the objectives are clear, but, at any given time, the details may be obscure. Yet, on these details, management decisions must be made. Thus, management of a space vehicle development program means more than contract control and the monitoring of schedules and fund requirements. N o r is it a matter of doing the LLTork in-house, building a vehicle from off-the-shclf componcnts. More realistically, wc can describe vehiclc management as a constant balancing of the efforts of ind 11stria 1 con t r ;I c t o r s, tech n i ca I ad v isc r s, con t r i b 11ti n g agen c i es a n d av a i 1able resources along a schedule leading to launch.

T o see more clearly how this balance is maintained, let us examine the SATURN research and development program. T h e problems met and decisions made in carrying the system from design to launch are typical of large vehicles. In the following section, we will view the diverse panorama of the SATURN effort, and you will see how Marshall formed and directed the program.


Three main elements run like nerves through the SATURN program: the launch vehicle, the ground support equipment, and the test and launch facilities. Each element demands a sustained research and development effort. N e w technical fields are explored. New techniques are devised. W o r k progresses in many places at the same time. In Florida, machinists form parts for a liquid hydrogen rocket engine. In a Tennessee wind tunnel, air roars past a scale model of the SATURN vehicle. In California, the dome of a fuel tank rotates in a welding fixture, while, in Alabama, a full-size inert SATURN vibrates under applied forces in its test stand.


These many events, so diverse and seemingly unrelated, advance the vehicle program along carefully wrought schedules. Results of research and development flow into the project. N e w technical applications are combined with proven techniques for each step in development. By management direction, the three elements -- vehicle, ground support equipment, and facilities -- support and define each other, as work moves forward along a broad front. During research and development, much new information is secured. One can never be sure exactly what form this information will take or how its use will affect program schedules. N e w problems constantly arise, their solution requiring that old concepts be discarded and new methods devised.

1 ) I V li I< S I : E V E N ' I ' S A 1) V A N C E '1'1 I I: V 1 111C I, E PI< O(;I< A A! 3 I3 E LO IC': V P h i c la ra s p onse 1o / l i g h t c o n d i t i o n s is s i m u l n t c d in rlynnmir t p s t toirvr. F A C I N G P A G E . AI3OVE: Prod u c t i o n o/ 11-1 e n g i n e s /or hoostcr; /jt?/,()\\'; Welding / u p 1 tank doma / o r S A T U R N


sacond stnge


A V A I L A B L E ENGINE DESIGNS W E R E A D A P T E D F O R T H E B O O S T E R -- A B O V E : T H O R / J U P I T E R ENGINE. Designs o/ this engine were used to accelerate development O / S A T U R N booster H-1 engine, shown BELOW

To each problem, management responds with clear decisions: W e will do this. W e will forego that. W e will go this way. Each decision drives the program forward. Each decision leads to a more exact definition of vehicle performance.
T h e S-I booster stage, the keystone of the SATURN vehicle, takes its present design from decisions made early in development. A booster producing about 1,500,000 pounds of thrust was needed to orbit the heavy payloads planned. But time was short. T h e need to support the national space mission was immediate. Design studies showed that a booster could be built around a single, high-thrust engine. While technically practical, however, that engine could not be developed and tested in time to meet flight schedules. And, almost certainly, development of an entirely new engine would be complicated by unpredictable technical problems, a condition common t o any unproven design. As development of a single-engine stage was not the answer, management took another approach. The needed thrust was secured by grouping eight engines of the THOR/JUPITER type. The engine design, thoroughly tested and of proven reliability, was quickly up-rated in thrust and adapted to SATURN. (After simplification, the engine, identified as H-1, has become more reliable than the parent engine.)


T A N K C L U S T E R I N G BEGINS -- D e s i g n s of RED.TTONE t a n k s (Foreground) a n d JU~'1'l'E'K t a n k s (Background) were a d a p t e d /or the c l u s t e r e d booster

To speed booster development still more, it was decided to use propellant tanks and components designed for the REDSTONE and JLJPITER programs. Most o € the hardware could be built with existing tools, using established fabrication and inspection procedures. Weight, size, and reliability of the components were suitable for the new application. And experienced personnel were ready to begin work.
In pressing vigorously toward launch, responsibility for each phase of booster development is assigned to the technical divisions o € the Center. Preliminary designs are completed. Test schedules are worked out and a wide range of investigations begins to Secure design information nccded later in the program.

A V A I L A B L E T O O L I N G WAS A D A P T E D F O R B O O S T E R FABRICATION -- A B O V E : LOX tank d o m e is s p u n formed i n J U P I T E R - d e v e l o p e d fixture. BELOW: 105-inch tank s e g m e n t i s j o i n e d in horizontal w e l d fixture



INS'I'ALLATION O F H - 1 ENGINE on thrust structure

-- D e s i g n

a n a l y s i s a s s u r e s p r e c i s e mounting of e n g i n e s

T h e work is accelerated by parallel design of the booster stage a n d H-1 engine. There is a free interchange of information between the Center's design group and the engine contractor. Through this mutual activity, the engine design is matched precisely with the design of the booster tail section. Propellant line routing is adjusted. T h e attachment of engine controls and the location of flame shields and insulation is worked out. During this development phase, the design groups combine their technical skills to define details of the final structure.

By using available engine and equipment designs, we speed development of a booster for the present vehicle. Looking to the future, however, we foresaw a clear need to develop a vehicle of increased performance. Thus, as fabrication of the first clustered booster proceeded, Marshall began a series of design studies to improve vehicle capability. T h e guidance equipment was analyzed to make sure that, through natural growth, it would be satisfactory for missions of the future. Simultaneously, studies began to determine the possible effect of manned guidance on the vehicle system.

MANUFACTURING METHODS D E V E L O P E D A T MARSHALL PROVIDE T H E T E C H N I C A L BASIS F O R MANAGING INDUSTRIAL ROOSTER PRODUCTION Forward spider beam, central LOX tank, and tail section have been joined to form the basic structure of the booster


B O O S T E R ASSEMBLY -- FACING P A G E , ABOVE: Eight outer fuel and LOX t a n k s are c l u s t e r e d about the central tank; BELOW: After tank c l u s t e r i n g is c o m p l e t e , e n g i n e s w i l l be i n s t a l l e d on thrust structure. ABOVE: Instrument c o n t a i n e r s are i n s t a l l e d ; BELOW: C o m p l e t e d b o o s t e r is m o v e d t o checkout. then t o s t a t i c firing t e s t s


All of this activity was paralleled by a program to develop the very large I;-1 engine, intended for use in a future high-performance stage. Design of this stage, however, began only after engine R&D was substantially complete, in order to secure maximum design experience. This experience, in turn, served to shorten final stage development time. T h e engine and stage development programs share the common factor of reliability. As part of the reliability effort, emphasized from design through launch, the booster has an “engine-out” capability: that is, if one engine fails, the mission can be completed with the remaining seven engines. While technically demanding, this feature is a kind of flight insurance, bought because of the importance. of the data to be secured from instrumented payloads and, also, to give an extra margin of safety in the coming manned space flights.

S P E C l A L DESIGNS S O L V E T A l L A R E A P R O B L E M S -- BELOW: T a i l shroud (shown inv e r t e d during j a b r i c a t i o n ) p r o t e c t s e n g i n e s / r o m a e r o d y n a m i c p r e s s u r e s . FACING P A G E : Engine c o n n e c t i o n s are s h i e l d e d by s p e c i a l i n s u l a t i o n s

- .



To develop a reliable space vehicle booster, the Marshall Center and its contractors have solved many design problems. To use the maximum amount of propellants, a special propellant utilization system has been devised. To compensate for shrinkage of the tanks when filled with liquid oxygen, special sliding joints have been designed for the booster structure.
Eight engines, with exhaust gases of 5,000°F, are clustered at the base of the booster: to protect sensitive connections above the engines, special insulation materials have been developed. To relieve in-flight aerodynamic pressures on the engines, a newly-designed tail shroud encloses the rear of the booster. T h e shroud also includes air scoops to flush the tail area free of explosive gas concentrations.


Every research and development program meets its share of unknowns, and SATURN is no exception to this rule. T h e very number of problems encountered, as we extend technological and scientific frontiers, requires the assistance of many participating organizations. Often the equipment needed to study unusual technical problems is available at only a few facilities. Or, perhaps, only a few individuals possess the specialized skills and techniques required for certain investigations. Thus, in advancing development as efficiently and rapidly as possible, Marshall enlists the aid of many private and Government facilities. T h e work performed by these facilities supplements research and development work carried on by hlarshall’s operating divisions.

V E H I C L E D E V E L O P J l E N T P R O C E E D S ACROSS A BROAD F R O N T A T A V A R I E T Y O F S P E C I A L I Z E D F A C I L I T I E S -- FAC1,VG P A G E : F a c i l i t y /or d e v e l o p m e n t o/ l i q u i d hydrogen t e c h n o l o g y . AnOl’E: F - 1 e n g i n e turbopump t e s t s t a n d




F A C I L I T I E S R E F L E C T 7 E C I I N O L O G I C A L GROU’Tll t a n k s at S-IV Stage t e s t area


L i q u i d hydrogen s t o r a g e

These divisions have numerous responsibilities. They design, build, and test the booster. They originate design criteria for the entire vehicle and develop the guidance and control system. They also perform applied research in a multitude of fields, developing materials suitable for space, o r new fabrication methods, or advanced propulsion systems. The out-of-house investigations, performed on specific assignment, clarify sclcctcd dctails of the larger R&D eflort performed by the Marshall divisions. In turn, the work of each division is phased, step by step, into the overall vehicle program.

B U L K O F F - I E N G I N E LOOMS O V E R H - 1 -- O n e F - 1 engine p r o d u c e s 1,500,000 pounds of thrust, the s a m e amount as eight of the H - 1 e n g i n e s , in foreground


Into the vehicle program comes a tidal surge of information: wind tunnel investigations to determine aerodynamic responses. Studies of flame pattern and heating in the booster tail section. New methods of suppressing propellant slosh. Recovery of flight stages. Performance of lowtemperature propellants. Each research activity is reviewed and directed by Marshall, for loss of tempo in a single study may be the cause o f a slip in overall program schedules.

C t f E C K O U T EQUIPMENT P R O R E S V E I f l C L E S Y S T E M S -N e w c h e c k o u t t e c h n i q u e s must b e d e v e l o p e d to m e e t d e m a n d s of n e w v e h i c l e s y s t e m s

V A R I E D INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES S U P P O R T SATURN R C D -- A B O V E : T e s t mea for c r y o g e n i c c o m p o n e n t s of l i q u i d hydrogen engines. BELOW: P r e s s u r e t e s t of s e a l e d components




From the results o f in-house and out-of-house research efforts, spring the first Marshall designs o f vehicle systems and hardware. T o prove these designs, thousands of' development tests are performed. There is a bewildering variety o f these tests, in all degrees of complexity; yet each plays a planned role in the project.

Typical of Marshall’s approach to development testing are the test programs for the H-1 engine and the booster stage. O n receipt of engines from the contractor, Marshall begins a further series of static tests. T h e engines are fired, first singly, then grouped on the booster. As a result, a great amount of performance data are collected for each engine within a short time. Working groups (representing Marshall and the contractors) study the test data and initiate design revision, if need be, before additional tests are conducted.

V E H I C L E D E V E L O P M E N T IS A D V A N C E D BY TIIOUSANDS O F T E S T S - - F A C I N G P A G E : Static t e s t o/ H - 1 e n g i n e ut contractor’s / n c i l i t y . RELOW’: C o l d / l o w t e s t i n g a t industrial l i q u i d hydrogen f a c i l i t y


The same general method is used in formalizing booster design. Marshall instruments and static fires a special test booster. Necessary design changes and modifications are incorporated on the first flight booster, which is then qualified for flight by its own short series of static tests. While the flight booster I S being fired, the special test booster is modified to include further design improvements. T h e test sequence is now repeated. T h e modified test booster is again static fired, and results of these tests are used to improve the design of the second flight booster. In this way, the latest findings of research and development are quickly applied to flight hardwarc. The total numbcr of static firings is minimized a n d devclopment time is correspondingly shortened. For the greatest economy, many separate tests are made during each booster firing. Name shield materials are evaluated at the same time that techniques of engine ignition and shut-down are explored. Performance of the propellant utilization system and control of engine movements are stud i ed si m u I t a n eo ii s1y .

S T A T I C T E S T I N G BEGINS -- A SATURN booster i s p o s i tioned in Marshall’s static test stand for live firing tests


A s \\.e Ii;ivc seen, the myriad details o f appIied research and dev e l o 17m e n t t cs t i 11 a r e m o n it o red by hf a r sh a I 1' s tcc-li n i ca I d i v is i o n s. h 1a n ag e g ment, howcver. clearly distinguishes M n r e e n responsibilities o f the di-

visions in their spccific areas, and the interdivisional work accomplished by the technical working groups.

These groups directly link the Marshall Cei Ler with its contractors.
Fcr examp!e, at the beginning of the program to develop the SATURN

second stage, the S-IV Stage, Marshall formed working groups and invited the contractor’s participation. These groups reviewed the s-IV design, defining the proposed mating method, assuring that second stage systems were compatible with those of the booster, and determining interface and interstage requirements.

M O C K U P O F S-l\J S T A G E -- T h e S A T U K N s e c o n d sfage u s e s s i x liquid hydrogen e n g i n e s p r o d u c i n g 90,000 pounds O/ tlwust


The booster and S-IV Stage are joined by an interstage segment. I n this area, the working groups resolve technical problems concerning hoth the S-1 a n d S-IV design groups, Major rlcments invcstiptccj include ae rod y namic 1oads, e I ec t rical connections, ph y s ica I mating , d i s po s i t io 11 of hydrogen gases prior to separation, and placement of ullage rockcts (Lvhich give the stage sufficient forward motion, after separation, to settle the propellant). As urork progresses on the stage, parallel studies d d e f i n e the designs o f r eq u i red ground SLIp po r t c1 u i p m e 11t a 11 I a LI n c 11 ' facilities.

T h e fuel for the S-IV Stage is liquid hydrogen. (Earlier decisions have established that all SATURN upper stages will be powered with liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen engines.) Liquid hydrogen propulsion is a relatively new field, thus far applied only to the ATLAS-CENTAUR vehicle, and, in many areas, the technology is still being defined.

C E N T A U R V E H I C L E -- L i q u i d hydrogen t e c h n o l o g y e v o l v e d during C E N T A O R program s p e e d s d e v e l o p m e n t o/ SATURN propulsion s y s t e m s


I N T E G R A T E D T E S T PROGRAAIS D E F l N E PERFOK,\IANCE O F Ll Q U l l ) HYDROGEN - A B O V E : New i n s u l a t i o n s are f r s t d in s c a l r S-IV f n n k filled will) liquid hydrogen. [?ELOW: C o n s t r u c t i o n of r l o u ~ ~ l e - u ~ n l lliquid Iiydrogr?n s t o r a g e t a n k crl


T o speed development of liquid-hydrogen propulsion, management assures a maximum exchange of technical information between the CENTAUR and the S-IV programs. Such information includes results of cryogenic materials testing, special welding techniques, and design approaches to propellant utilization. Similar close-knit cooperation will exist between the S-IV and the still more advanced S-I1 Stage, which is planned for an advanced launch vehicle.

To accelerate the S-IV program, Marshall recommended to NASA Headquarters that the stage be powered with the same engines used in the CENTAUR vehicle. This dual application eliminated the need for another engine development program. Thus, in the same way that the decision to use available engine designs speeded booster development, use of the CENTAUR engines measurably reduces the time required to develop the S-IV Stage. Later, it was decided to use six engines in the S-IV, rather than the four engines first considered. Without affecting the basic stage concept, the increased number of engines provides additional payload capability and better in-flight control.


Basic Marshall policy is to speed vehicle development by parallel development of the stages. In keeping with this policy, engines for the several SATURN stages are also developed simultaneously by contractors who have demonstrated outstanding ability in the propulsion field. Through this approach, development of the booster and its H-1 engines proceeds at the same time. While the S-IV is under development, its RLlOA-3 engines a x undergoing design 2nd test. -4s design planning continues for the S-11 Stage, its 1-2 engines are being developed. And, conciirrently with these programs, the F-1 engine enters development testing, \vliile preliminary design begins of an advanced booster stage which will use these engines.


S-IV S T A G E T A N K A G E I S POSITIONED FOR P R O P E L L A N T LOADING T E S T S d e v e l o p m e n t t e s t i n g p a r a l l e l s e n g i n e and b o o s t e r d e v e l o p m e n t






8 -


Characteristic of the approach used in coordinating these parallel programs are the methods devised to integrate engines with the S-IV Stage. Initially, inert engines are installed in a full-scale stage mockup to verify proper fit and arrangement. Then prototype engines (the first fully functional engines) are forwarded to the stage contractor; these engines are instaiied to check control systems, mounting structures, the propellant flow system, and for static firing tests. Finally, fully-developed engines are assembled into the new stage for flight testing. Similar methods are employed to integrate the S-IV Stage with the S-I booster. A mockup of the S-IV is used to check functional and mechanical mating with the interstage segment. In turn, the segment is fitted precisely to the s - I Stage. After development and tests of the s-IV are completed, the stage will be checked out, using equipment which electronically simulates the booster stage and vehicle instrumentation. (After movement of stages and payload to Cape Canaveral, the vehicle will be erected on the launch pedestal and given a final exhaustive checkout before being committed to launch.)

T I I O l < I % O N T A I - ,+lA?'ING 0 1 : ' l ' / l / ~ A 7 ' U K N L A U N C l l V E H I C L E - - T h e f i r s t S A T U R N i s a t h r e e - s f a g e v e h i c l e . 162 l e e t t a l l . Initial flight t e s f s w i l l u s e a l i v e booster, Plus tu'o inert upper s t a g e s ana' payload body

E A R L Y M O C K U P OF S-IV A F T SECTION Engine-stage inlerconnections c a n b e s t u d i e d in d e t a i l b y use of lull-scale mockups


PREPARATION FOR LAUNCll OF FIRST FLIGHT VElllCLE -A B O V E : R o o s t e r is moved t o MSFC dock. RIGHT: P a l a e m o n begins 2OOO-mik trib to C a n e Canaueral.

A S S E M B L Y O F SATURN BEGINS -- LEFT: Booster stage is lifted to position on launch pedestal. BELOW: Inert S-IV Stage i s hoisted into service structure.

I ‘ I N A L ASS1:’MIILY IS COMl’Lli7’Iil) - - AI?OVI:‘: Inert S-V Sfage is m a t e d with S - I V . IIE120M‘: l n r r t p a ylo a d b o d y is positioned on S-V. F A C I N G P A G E : F i r s t S A T U R N launch vehicle stands u n s u p p o r te d on Launch pedestal

I K A C K l N G FAL’ILII 11-7 7UI’I’OR I’ R C I ~F L I G I I T Y -- \’eh i c k trajectory is p L o t t ~ d across projecttoti oj downrange ureu

Inimediately after completion of the first mating checks, an additional element is iiitroduced into the SATURN program. L J p to this time, effort has been concentrated on stage development. W i t h the availability o f mockups and inert stages, however, we begin a later development phase, focused 011 the veliicle, itsell. For months previous, theoretical studies have been conducted o f the vehicle’s expected flight responses. N o w it is time to prove out results of these studies. An inert vehicle is assembled in Marshall’s dynamic test tower. In this device, built to simulate actual flight conditions, problems affecting thc \vholc vehicle are investigated. Determinations are made of bending inoclc\ and frequencies, as well as torsional and longitudinal vibrations. I hcse results are used to verify vehicle design a n d to determine i f responses are within acceptable limits. In this way, a thoroughly integrated, extensively tested vchicle evolves, with a decreased number o f flight tests needed before operational status is reached.
r .

T h e ten-vehicle research and development flight program is the reai proof-test of the entire SATURN system. To hasten the vehicle toward operational readiness, the Center plans a cumulative series of stage flight tests. During the first launches, the flight performance of the booster and the vehicle configuration will be clearly established. T h e control system will be proven out and the operation of launch facilities and tracking networks verified.

C A R E F U L L Y ORGANIZED R A D A R NETWORK S U P P O R T S SATURN PROGRAM -- V e h i c l e !light i s t r a c k e d by interlocking radar i n s t a l l a t i o n s

By the time that booster flight tests are completed, the liquidhydrogen engines will be available for the s-IV Stage. T h e engines will have been flight tested on the CENTAUR vehicle, and the great majority of improvements made. Flight testing of the S-IV Stage will now begin. During these tests, we will secure information concerning S-!V flight operation, control, and in-flight separation. Additional checks will be made of the tracking networks and launch facilities. At the same time, the booster receives further flight trials, steadily increasing its reliability.
In this way, one stage at a time is cleanly tested. Each advance in development is based on proven hardware. While holding the normal risks of an R&D flight program to minimum, we reap all the advantages of quick development.

SEPARATION O F S-IV S T A G E FROM S O O S T E R -- F l i g h t t e s t i n g of s-IV b e g i n s a f t e r booster in-flight performance i s c l e a r l y d e f i n c d


PROCESSING T E L E M E T E R E D FLIGHT D A T A -- T e l e m e t r y r e c o r d s of SATURN flight are a n a l y z e d to determine additional v e h i c l e d e s i g n i m p r o v e m e n t s

T h e process of research and development continues after launch at an even more accelerated pace. During flight, more than 500 channels of telemetry poured a torrent of signals from the vehicle to the recording instruments of the launch complex. Having been processed to an easily usable form, the information is subjected to a searching analysis and evaluation at Marshall. Results are used by the appropriate technical divisions and responsible contractors to improve the performance and reliability of later vehicles. Representative of other actions taken by management in planning and directing the SATURN program are the decisions leading to support of the APOLLO mission.


The original launch schedules called for fliSht tests of another upper stage, called the S-V, rather than the APOLLO spacecraft. T h e S-V
Stage? a slightly modified CENTAUR vehicle, was to be €light tested immeclintely after tests of the live S-IV were completed. With the shift in emphasis toward APOLLO orbital missions for the first SATllRN configuration, Marshall reevaluated the C-1 vehicle progwn. The SATURN vehicle had been conieivccl as a carrier of both hcavy payloads and men; the vehicle had been designed to accommodate possiblc manned missions. Consequently, the design could be adjusted very rapidly to support the specific requirements of the APOLLO mission.

As a result of the reevaluation, Marshall recommended to NASA Headquarters that program effort be redirected toward support of the APOLLO project. A two-stage SATURN could provide the required performance. For this reason, the NASA decided to postpone development of the S-V Stage. Present SATURN flight test schedules permit APOLLO development tests to be substituted for the originally planned s-V Stage flights. Advantages to the national space effort are immediate. SATURN-APOLLO interface problems and reentry heat shielding requirements can be studied in flight even before launch vehicle development is completed. Information secured during these tests will markedly shorten spacecraft development time, for much of the design information can be secured only during actual flight and reentry.


T F P A R A T I O N 0 1 ’ A P O L L O PPACECRAFT -- ‘<r.sciwduhd /lights permit early development t e s t s of spacecrnlt


TO support APOLLO most effectively, Marshall is adding several design improvements to the booster. Tanks are being lengthened to accommodate a greater volume of propellants. Fins will be added to provide increased vehicle stability. For an extra measure of control, the booster engine swivel angle has been increased, and a more sensitive guidance control system is being readied for thc manned mission.

F U L L - S C A L E MOCKUPS OF B L O C K I 1 V E H I C L E S T R U C T U R E S - - A B O V E : Instrument unit will h o u s e g u i d a n c e and instrumentation equipment. BELOW: lnterstage connection and retrorockets

As this work progresses, scale models of the improved vehicle undergo air flow and aerodynamic heating tests. Modified launch faciiity designs allow for the booster’s tail fins and increased propellant requirements. While these activities proceed along a coordinated schedule, an instrument unit is being developed for later Block I1 vehicles. Nerve center of the entire vehicle, the instrument unit contains all guidance and instrumentation required during flight. T h e unit, located just behind the payload, will significantly improve the vehicle in-flight performance and provide a test bed for guidance and other instrumentation being developed for an advanced vehicle.

W I N D T U N N E L MODEL O F B L O C K I 1 V E H I C L E Many s t u d i e s are performed t o de/ine v e h i c l e per/ormance


L A U N C H P E D E S T A L F O R B L O C K I1 VEHICLES equipment reflect evolving vehicle design

- - D e s i g n s of

ground support a n d launch


The SATURN program demands maximum flexibility and decisiveness by management. Rapid response to new needs is esse.ntial. T h e immediate adjustment of the S A T U R N program to the APOLLO mission is representative of Marshall’s swift technical reaction in an already complex program. T h e capacity for immediate management response is now, as in the past, based on the capabilities of Marshall’s operating divisions and technical working groups. In the preceding paragraphs, we have dwelt on some of the problems and decisions directly affecting the vehicle. As we have stated, however, the vehicle is but one of the three elements comprising the SATURN system.

Taken by itself, the vehicle is a romantic object -- splendid, eye-catching, of immense potential. Taken by itself, however, the vehicle will not fly. SATURN is totally dependent upon its unromantic ground support equipment -- the electrical power sources, the hydraulic pressure units, the checkout equipment that probes the vehicle’s well-being after assembly and during the countdown. Development of ground support equip. ment is intimately associated with development of the vehicle. Schedules established for the design, fabrication, and test of this equipment parallel, in detail, vehicle development schedules. At the same time, test and launch facilities are developed to support the evolving program.

V E H I C L E , S U P P O R T EQUIPMENT, A N D FACILITIES A R E D E V E L O P E D ALONG INTEGRATED SCHEDULES -FACING P A G E : LOX fill mast is tested at Marshall. BELOW: Instrumentation developed for booster checkout


L A U N C l l FACILITIES A R F I I E S I G N E I ) T O AIEE?' TPEC1I:IC VBIIICIdP NEEDY -AI3OVE: Aerial uierr, of S A T U R N L a u n c h C o m p l e x 34, C a p e Cannrrcral. I3FLOM': IliRh-pressure pneurnatzc l i n e i n s t a l l a t i o n b r n c a t h u m b i l i c a l torrwr of the launch complex

f A C I L I T l F S A 1 L A U N L l i L U l l P L F Y 34 -- 4 O O V E . Service structure ann' LOY storage funk at LC-34. UELOll: F l a m e deflector nioues on r a d s to position heneoth launch pedestal. seen in background




S A T U R N LAU,VCII P E D E S 7 ' 4 L -- F o u r o / t I v Pighi arms support the iichicle prior to li/to//; rpmnining nrrns rcstrnin iiehiclc n/ter ignition until n l f e n g i n e x r p n c b l u l l s t a b l e burning, then drlrrm hock to r ~ f ~ nthe v e h i c f e s e


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Launch facilities are particularly sensitive to vehicle design. Decause o f the long lead times involved, these facilities must be specified early i n the program. They must be big enough and flesible enough to handle possible vehicle design changes after the facility has been completed. Each structure at the launch site has been devised to satisfy a particular vehicle need. Systems f o r loadins propellants, placement of flame def l e c t o r s be n eat li t li e l au n ch ped e s t a l, b lock li o u s e i n s t r 11 i i i e n tat i o n, size a n d design details o f the service structure -- the physical characteristics of all these are defined by specific requirements of the launch veliiclc and its stages.


While construction o f the first SATLJRN launch complex \vas under\vay, hiarsliall began studies o f a second launch complex to support operational firing rates. Designs o f the complex, including liquid-hydrogen facilities, are based on the configuration o f the operational launch vehicle. While this work progresses, planning begins for a launch cornplex which will support advanced vehicles.

In the preceding pages, we have examined some of the major decisions giving impetus and direction to the SATURN program. Marshall has constantly balanced and coordinated program elements -- vehicle, ground support equipment, facilities, and manned spacecraft effects -along rigorously compressed development schedules. Each element requires an intensive research and development effort, with a constant, sensitive interplay maintained between the separate programs. In coordinating and directing this activity, Marshall blends old knowledge and new, in-house and out-of-house activities, within the boundaries of time and funds, toward a clearly defined goal. Management decisions are based on Marshall’s technical capabilities, gained by long experience in active project participation. T h e Center’s interweaving of design, test, and related research and development work results in a flexible, rapid development of a launch vehicle to satisfy assigned missions.

So far, our emphasis has been on the initial SATURN launch vehicle, the C-1. From the present SATURN, however, other vehicles naturally evolve. In the following pages, we will examine some of the ways in which program continuity is maintained. W e will see how management prepares, in advance, for development of later members of the heavy launch vehicle family.


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g h e g c r h Side

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T h e coming launch vehicles will evolve directly from the present S A T U R N program. These vehicles will be physically larger, their performance enormously greater. Their missions will transcend the limits o € the first launch vehicle program. Yet, for all their increased size and capability, these vehicles are directly related to SATURN. They will be developed by a logical extension of techniques and principles secured during the SATURN program. In managing advanced vehicle R & D programs, Marshall draws upon the mature products of past plans. Two roads are to be followed concurrently -- production of the present SATURN, and development of the advanced S A T U R N configuration, called the C-5. Planning for this dual effort has long been underway.


To phase smoothly from the last research and development vehicle to the first operational vehicle, Marshall had laid the necessary program framework even before the first SATURN flight. For our production needs, we turn to industry. The production contractor is selected in the same way that contractors are selected to support the development program. Invitations for bid are extended to industry. Resulting proposals are subjected to intensive analysis, based on predetermined evaluation criteria. After this detailed and objective study, a new member is selected for the SATURN System team.


T o carry out the booster production program, t\vo prime contractors havc b e e n chosen. One \vi11 build and test thc operational first stage o f the C-1 vehicle. T h e other contractor will develop and manufacture, in production quantities, the F-I-powered booster for the advanced C-5

A booster production site \\.as selected after detailed operational and I og ist ica I p I an 11i ng . Such pI an 11i ng incI u ded av a i I ab i I it y o E f aci I i t ies and labor, location of the required test site, appropriate transport methods for moving the completed stages to the test and launch sites. T h e Govcrnmc 11 t - ow 11cd M i c h o i i d PI a 11t , ne a r New 0 r I c ;11s, s ;I t i s f I c d a 11 r eq ii i r e m e 11 S ~ t and \\;is sclected for the production program. As prepar;ltions begall to activate that plant, plans were also initiated to dcvelop a new booster static test facility a few miles from the plant.

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I N D U S T R Y WlLL P R O D U C E A N D TEST V E l i l C L E B O O S T E R S -- Al3OVE: Proposed layout of booster production areas, .Ilichoud Plant. LIELOI!’: A r t i s t ’ s concepi o / Jfisszssippi T e s t F a c i l i t y where ~11zchoud-produced o o s t e r s 1 1 , 1 1 1 be t e s t fired b



~hesc nmJrrrtinn n!2fis fcrrr: - - * c n C 2 !aigci paiteiii. Eevelopment r r - - -------of the F-1 has been so scheduled that a thoroughly tested engine, of known performance, will be ready for integration into the C-5 booster stage. Development of that booster is paralleled by development of the advanced S-I1 upper stage. While this work progresses, the liquid-hydrogen J-2 engine, now under development, will undergo live firing tests. As a result, the schedules of these programs, as delicately interwoven as the components of a guidance system, mesh smoothly, engine to stage, along strict development schedules.
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During the same period of time, research and development of the advanced S-IVR Stage begins. To this program are brought the latest findings of liquid-hydrogen technology. In this way. Marshall’s development planning bears fruit -- each stage using liquid-hydrogen propulsion benefits from the experience of its predecessors. I3ehind this complex of engine and stage developn1ent programs stands the unifying framework of MarshaII’s flight test philosophy. Each program is so timed in relation to the others that, 011 successful flight testing of the advanced booster, the S-I1 begins live flights. Following s-11 flights, C-5 vehicle tests will continue, using a live S-IVB Stage.

With this general structure of the C-5 SATURN program in mind, let us see how some of the intermediate steps are carried out. As work proceeds on stages and engines, Marshall’s operating divisions and technical working groups continue design development of the new vehicle configuration. This work evolves directly from the technology of the present SATURN project. There is n o definite cut-off point, no clearly defined technical area at which one program stops and the next program begins. The two efforts merge inseparably, a continuity of research and development, based on and extending present knowledge.

A D V A N C E D S-IVB STAGE IN F L I G H T - - A n S-IV Stage, modified lo use one J - 2 engine and re-identified as S - f V f i , will become third stage of the S A T U R N C-5 vehicle


ARTIST'S C O N C E P T OF T H E SATURN C-S LAUNCH V E H I C L E -- T h e v e h i c l e , measuring ? S O f e e t i n height, will lift o v e r 100 t o n s of p a y l o a d t o low earth orbit or e s c a p e e a r t h ' s g r a v i t y w i t h 40-50 t o n s


-- The s i z e and weight o/ advanced launch vehicles place increased demands on designers of s u p p o r t and launch equipment

Studies of advanced vehicle design extend those studies which began with the C-1 vehicle. Research continues with metals and insulations presently used, defining how these can be improved to meet conditions of increased heat and vibration. Design of advanced ground support equipment begins, stepping off from the experience gained during the first launch vehicle program. In the same way, new designs of handling and launch support equipment extend proven design concepts to meet the increased needs of coming vehicles.


Tooling is adapted to meet the larger size and weight of the new stages. Fabrication methods proven during the C-1 program are used to develop improved methods of handling the thicker metals of the advanced stages. Altered methods of assembly are devised -- assembly in the vertical position, for instance, to prevent the stages from deforming through their own \\eight. Checkout procedures are revised to suit new needs. Automated checkout, at the factory, the test site, and the launch area, is elaborated, step by step, from the findings of the present program.




S A T U R N B L O C K I f O U S E INSTRUNELVTATIOiV -- K n o w l e d g e g a i n e d during p r e s e n t program a l l o w s d e f i n i t i o n of launch c o m p l e x instrumentation / o r a d v a n c e d v e h i c l e s

To assure that development progresses quickly and precisely, facility design, construction, and instrumentation are correlated with the vehicle and ground support equipment programs. As firm requirements are set for static and dynamic test stands, studies -- drawing on experience gained with the initial SATURN vehicle -- determine how the advanced stages will be handled, transported, and assembled at the launch site. In this area, too, progress is based on the technical knowledge secured during the present program. Because of their bulk, the new vehicles present numerous problems: additional safety procedures must be developed, telemetry stations must be expanded, improved ways must be found to protect and service the vehicle after assembly.
As in the C-1 program, these representative problems are solved under time pressure. Launch facilities and procedures are developed along schedules precisely matched with the development schedules of vehicle and ground support equipment. In this way, maximum compatibility and parallel development are assured as the program progresses.


T h e sum of all this activity -- the experiments and tests and plans driving forward in every section of the country -- is only a part o f the program. There is more. T h e tempo of the program must be maintained. Today is not soon enough to lay out plans for the still more advanced vehicles of tomorrow.

So, as metal is shaped to form the advanced C-5 launch vehicle, planning begins for the vehicles which will follow. T h e first ideas of a nuclear-powered upper stage are laid out. Using an engine developed jointly by the NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission, this stage will propel massive payloads deep into space. T h e engine, burning for extended periods of time, will accelerate the stage to the immense speeds needed to cross between the planets.

N E W MODES OF PROPULSION A R E U N D E R D E V E L O P M E N T -- BELOW: N u c l e a r - p o w e r e d upper s t a g e . FACING P A G E : Model 01 p r o p o s e d SATURN nuclear v e h i c l e



SOLID P R O P E L L A N T I3OOSTEK.T M A Y I3E C O M H I N E I ) lVlTll L I Q U I D P K O P E L I ~ A N ' I ' U P P E R S T A G E S -- Combination v e h i c l c s of t h i s t y p c c o u l d l i l t up t o 70 t o n s of p a y l o a d on e s c a p e m i s s i o n s

The application of nuclear energy to space tlight is but one of the new methods of propulsion under investigation. Solid propellants have been proposed for use in boosters to lift vehicles on escape missions, and studies are being conducted to define the siLe and capability O E these vehicles and the requirements o f their systems. At the same time, research at the Lewis Research Center is defining the techniques of plasma propulsion. In this form of propulsion, ionized gases, accelerated by electricalmagnetic forces, are ejected from an engine. T h e resulting thrust, while low, can be continued , f o r long periods. Thus, these ensines would be useful for driving instrumented payloads o n explorations deep in space.


Research and development probes continuously in other directions. At the facilities of Marshall and its allied contractors, new insulations are developed to reduce fuel evaporation in space and to protect circuitry from the environment encountered outside the atmosphere. Instrumentation is devised to meet the new conditions of space. N e w methods of tracking are worked out. New materials are developed to withstand months of exposure to space. Techniques of engine start and shutdown outside the atmosphere are studied. Methods of orbital rendezvous and refueiing are investigated.

We must develop new techniques to meet problems never before stated. W e require new materials. W e require a great extension of our experience. Each o f these requirements must be secured along severely circumscribed schedules for application to the coming vehicle programs. W e make our plans now so that we can maintain a smooth continuity of development, building always from the known to the unkown. As w e manage programs to satisfy present missions, we also define and prepare for the missions to come.

ORRITAL R E F U E L I N G - - E n t i r r l y n c u opernfionnl techniques m u s t bQ iieurloped d u r i n g the n e x t p h a s e o/ s p a r p r x p l o r n t i o n s

C O N C E P T O F F U T U R E H E A V Y LAUNCH V E H I C L E V e h i c l e s of t h i s t y p e , l a u n c h e d /I--- ---*L - - - I J
d ~ n I r n c h a r o r r o l f o n mnnn







As the Marshall Center manages its assigned vehicle programs, so the NASA manages a number of larger programs, in which the vehicle is but one of several important elements. In turn, each of the NASA programs contributes to the completion of national missions. In the final analysis, the Government stands as the central organizing point for this complex of missions and projects. In discharging its obligation to direct and control the national space effort, the Government provides guidance for plans, funds, missions, vehicles, and expanding technical capabilities.
T h e Government’s role in furthering the national space effort has been illustrated by Marshall’s management of the SATURN research and development program. In these pages, we have seen much of the effort which culminated in the launch of the first high-performance vehicle. We have seen, as well, some of the planning leading to later members of the heavy launch vehicle family, those vehicles which will support expansion of the national space effort toward the moon and beyond.




This expansion has been planned as an orderly progression into the regions beyond our planct. Each tcst contributes its share to the general progress. 1’:ach stage increases vehicle capability. Each vehicle furthers per. formancc of a mission, and each mission advances, one step further, the national space effort.

Our sp;icc effort has steadily evolved towards ends \vhich can, at prcscnt, be barely defined. This is to be expected. The f u l l impact o f exploration lxyond natural boundaries cannot be determined all at once. We met the same problem in the American expansion \vest. Then, the cxplorcrs cnmc first to test out the ne\\‘ territory, to make direct contact n i t h the country \ \ f a t , the land behind the river.
At this point in time, we are approaching our present equivalent of thc land hehind the river. Except that our exploration is to be in areas stranger than 11n mapped te r r a i n an d ii n reco r d ed mou n ta i n s . We a re m ovin8 out to explore the spaces beyond the air, d i e r e maps are differential equations and the apparent route not thc shortest. O u r transportation 110 longer has a familiar shape. \We cross tlic bounclry of air i n a many-ccllcd Inc ta I t 11bc, heavy with ins t r ii m e n ts and the pro pel I i ng ma ter ial s.

Yet some things have not changed. Although the areas we seek to explore have been penetrated only by the human imagination, although our vehicles and maps are o € kinds never before visualized, what we seek to d o now approximates what was done when the American expansion \vest began. For as we then sought to map the un€amiliar contours of our continent, so now \ve seek to map the outer boiindries of the sky. Once exploration reached toward the Pacific mountains. It reaches now toward the surface of the moon and to the possible mountains and plains of the outer worlds.

Illustrative material cited below has been reproduced through courtesy

of CHRYSLER MISSILE DIVISION (pages 25, bottom 37, 80, top 81); DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (pages: bottom 21, 32, 34, 43, 44, 46, 49, top 51, 88, 101); GENERAL DYNAMICS ASTRONAUTICS
(pages 36, 39, 45); MCDONNELL AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (page
11); PRATT & W H I T N E Y CORPORATION (page 37) ; ROCKETDYNE DIVISION OF N O R T H AMERICAN A V I A T I O N (pages: top 21, bottom 22, 33, 35, 38, 82); and US ARMY (pages 4, 8, 9).


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