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APPLICATION FOR DISCRETIONARY APPEAL

I JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Court of Appeals, rather than the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this

application, because the subject is dispossessory, and the Supreme Court does not

have exclusive jurisdiction over dispossessory actions filed into Magistrate Courts.

This application is filed within seven (7) days of the Court’s ruling.

II. STANDARD FOR GRANTING DISCRETIONARY APPEAL

An application for leave to appeal a final judgment in cases subject to

discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 shall be granted when (1) Reversible

error appears to exist; (2) The establishment of a precedent is desirable...”

Applicant, Mr. Jones1 contends that this brief shows that both (1) and (2) exist.

There is a question that has yet to be addressed by the Appellate Courts, and

seriously needs to be addressed. Applicant Prays that this Honorable Court will

Grant his application, and will addressed the yet to be addressed questions presented

herein.

Pursuant to Rule 31(c), Applicant has attached a stamp filed copy of the trial

court’s order Appendix 1. The Docket Reports are at Appendix 2. A copy of the

petition or motion that led directly to the order or judgment being appealed and a

1
Mr. Jones is an elderly, 71 year old, disabled man, retired from a Military Career
as a First Sergeant and who served inViet Nam. He is 100% disabled.

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copy of any responses to the petition or motion, Appendix 3. The Complaint filed

in Magistrate Court are at Appendix 4. Parts of the Answer2 are at Appendix 5.

Relevant parts of the Transcript from the final hearing in Superior Court are attached

in Appendix 6. Judge Coursey’s Order dated Nov. 20, 2018, recorded Dec. 04, 2018

is at Appendix 7.

III. BRIEF BACKGROUND

CitiMortgage, Inc. in September 2017 foreclosed upon Mr. Jones.3 Mainstreet

Renewal, LLC (“MSR”) purchased the property at auction. The official records

indicated years of on-going court cases concerning the property.

Mr. Jones in 2017, following the sale under power, filed a wrongful

foreclosure action, in DeKalb County Superior Court.4 MSR was named a defendant.

Rather than participate in the Superior Court action, MSR defaulted.

In an attempt to moot the Superior Court action, MSR in 2018, filed a

2
The important parts of the answer, prior to the ruling, which was only seven days,
will be included in App. 5.
3
CitiMortgage, Inc. foreclosed and executed sale under power in August 2010; four
years later rescinded the sale and put the title back into Mr. Jones’s name. The
problem was that he had bankrupted under Chapter 7, discharged in 2006. The loan
was not reaffirmed, so Mr. Jones remained, and paid rent to CitiMortgage. The put
a loan back into his name when they rescinded the sale in 2014.
4
Mr. Jones is only giving background and information, this appeal has nothing to
do with the Superior Court action, other than the fact stated here; that Mainstreet
Renewal filed for dispossessory in Magistrate Court, because of their default in the
other case and therefore, wanted to moot the Superior Court action.

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dispossessory action into Magistrate Court of DeKalb County. MSR had never

demanded possession of the property. Magistrate Court did not grant MSR rent.

MSR did not appeal.

In response to the dispossessory, Mr. Jones filed Defenses, Answers and

Counterclaim. Magistrate Court lacked jurisdiction over the whole counterclaim.

Mr. Jones further was not properly served with process, which he brought up in his

responsive pleading. Mr. Jones also filed Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively,

Motion to Stay or Continue pending ruling on Superior Court action5. Mr. Jones

went on to attempt to Remove to Superior Court to consolidate the two actions

[App.2, p.3]. The Magistrate Court clerk had told Mr. Jones that the Magistrate

Judge was not going to allow Removal. She was right.

Mr. Jones filed Notice of Appeal from the Magistrate Judge’s Order

Granting a Writ of Possession to MSR. The Magistrate Court had deemed MSR was

not entitled to rent. At that time, MSR had not sought back-rent.

Judge LeShaw, acting Magistrate Judge, had told Mr. Jones that if Mr. Jones

could get a TRO hearing set within seven days, he would not issue the Writ of

Possession. Mr. Jones found out later that the Judge had already issued the Writ the

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There had been three foreclosures and sale under power of the same loan and same
property. Further rescission of the first sale under power, was four years after the
foreclosure. No Court order allowed it, CitiMortgage just decided they wanted to
rescind the sale. So, they put Mr. Jones’s name back on a loan that had been
discharged in bankruptcy back in 2006.
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same day as the hearing. Nevertheless, Mr. Jones did get a TRO Hearing scheduled

within 7 days [App.2,p.4; App.6.p.12@16-19]. Mr. Jones attempted to file the

information into the Magistrate Court, but it kept being rejected by the e-file system.

The last day that Mr. Jones was allowed to file Notice of Appeal, he did so. Mr.

Jones had not wanted to Notice Appeal, but was out of time. That same day, the

docket report reflects the TRO hearing had been scheduled was finally accepted for

filing.

IV. THE MAGISTRATE TO SUPERIOR COURT APPEAL

Along with Notice of Appeal, Mr. Jones filed Motion to Stay Writ

[App.2,p.4]. Mr. Jones had attempted to get everything stayed until a ruling on the

Superior Court action. The trial Court has assured Mr. Jones that she would also be

ruling on the superior court actiom

MSR, filed motion for rent, which Mr. Jones responded to. Then on 10/24/18,

MSR filed Motion for Rent or Supersedeas Bond. Mr. Jones on 11/01/18 objected

to [App.2,p.7].

Mr. Jones’s family lives in Chicago. He received an emergency call on a

Sunday night, and was informed that his uncle on his mother’s side was in ICU

dying. Mr. Jones is 71 years old, his mother is 92 and she is in good health for her

age. Mr. Jones was told his mother needed him there with her. Mr. Jones quickly

wrote an emergency motion for leave or to stay or to continue on the grounds of

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family health related emergency, e-filed the document and hopped a plane to

Chicago [App.2,p7]. The uncle died and Mr. Jones’s mother took it very hard.

While Mr. Jones was in Chicago, the Court held a hearing on the rent issue,

and since Mr. Jones was not at the hearing, the Court granted, not only the rent, but

granted back rent as well. MSR being in collusion with CitiMortgage, and

CitiMortgage having lost an Adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court, retaliated

against Mr. Jones for obtaining a settlement. Mr. Jones dare not say more than that

about the adversary settlement.

The Court ordered, that in order for Mr. Jones to remain at the property, he

must pay $18,615 into the registry by 5:00 p.m. on December 20th and pay into the

registry $1,201 no later than the 3rd of each month beginning January 1st, until

conclusion of the appeal [App.6,p.4@15-20].

That order was given on 12/4/2018, and withheld from being filed until

12/20/2018 [App.6p,4@21-23]. Mr. Jones had believed that he was granted stay or

continuance until the first of the year. When Mr. Jones received something from the

e-file system, he thought it would be an order granting his emergency leave. Mr.

Jones was more than shocked to see that the order was one granting rent and back

rent. Mr. Jones consulted with attorneys, and lay people, and no one has ever heard

of a court denying emergency leave for a death of a family member. Mr. Jones

hurried back to Atlanta [App.3,pp.16-18].

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To this day, there has been no ruling on the Emergency Motion For Leave

The trial court knew nothing about the case, had not read the file. In fact the

trail court stated “THE COURT: And I just want to be clear that this --we all have

the same information -- just give me one second -- is that this is an appeal from a

magistrate hearing on a dispossessory that was filed. And at the time, it was that --

alleged that you are remaining in the house after foreclosure had taken place and that

rent had accrued up to $1,245 per month, and the other costs were $63 in court costs.

That was filed on May 16th, 2016. [App.6,p.4@9].

That the dispossessory action had been filed May 26, 2016? Mr. Jones 3rd

foreclosure on the same loan and same property had not been until Sept 2017.

Nothing took place on May 6, 2016.

Mr. Jones filed a motion for clarification, and a motion for reconsideration to

the Dec. 20th order [App.6,p.5@3-4]. At the final hearing of the appeal, the judge

stated “…what we will do is because there’s a motion, just so it’s procedurally, I’ll

listen to the motion for reconsideration…”[App.6,p.5@6-8].

Mr. Jones brought up that he thought he was on emergency leave.

The court: “What does emergency leave mean?”6

Mr. Jones: “I had a death in the family”

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The judge had no idea what had been filed into the case. The judge was not familiar
with the case at all, but wanted to just read the docket report on her screen throughout
the whole case.

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The Court: “Did you file a notice with the Court?”

Mr. Jones: “Yes ma’am”. [App.6,p.5@23-23-25, p.6@1-2].

The Court stated that “It does not look like it was granted” [App.6,p.6@9-10].

The court went on to ask opposing counsel, who said “…the judges said he hadn’t

granted the motion and the defendant wasn’t here so he moved forward”

[App.6.p.6@16-17]. The problem with that is that Judge Coursey has since retired.

The Court stated “Well if it wasn’t granted, it was denied” [App.6,p.7@17-

18]. Mr. Jones fails to understand how, if the other side’s motions aren’t granted or

denied, they are never mentioned again, and Mr. Jones’s motions if not granted are

denied.

The court further stated: “Their position is the judge did not grant it, and as

an officer of the court, Ms. Cruikshank has stated that that's what the judge indicated

during that time. I do not see -- and I'm telling you, just for the record, I'm looking

at the court's docket. I do not see that the motion was granted or -- your motion to

stay or continue, the hearing went forward, and that Judge Coursey granted the

plaintiff's motion for rent”. [App.6,p.7@5-12]. Mr. Jones also doesn’t understand

why an officer of the Court is allowed to testify for their client and their client was

never present at any hearings, opposing counsel and their client was not present at

the Magistrate Court hearing. Different counsel represented MSR at the Magistrate

Court hearing.

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When Mr. Jones said that the court never granted or denied the emergency

leave, the court stated: “Well, if it wasn't granted, it was denied, which is -- and they

went forward with the hearing”. [App.6,p.7@17-19].

Another remarkable thing the court said “I remember saying that, and I

remember seeing you as well as your witnesses who are here shaking their heads”.

[App.6,p.8@5-6]. The witnesses had been talking about something between

themselves, and not paying attention to the court, without calling the witnesses to

speak under oath, it was not fair to Mr. Jones that the Court make such assumptions.

Then going back to the motion, the Court stated: “Ms. Cruikshank has stated

that the judge did not grant it and that she had a witness here, they took evidence,

and that they ordered it, and she's requested that your motion to reconsider be denied.

You get the final word”. [App.6,p.9@3-6]. Mr. Jones was under the impression

that an attorney was not allowed to testify for, or be a witness for their client. MSR

appeared at none of the hearings, only their counsel attended. Further Cruikshank

was not the same attorney as the one that was at the Magistrate Court’s trial or at the

hearing that Judge Mark Anthony Scott ruled the Emergency Injunction Petiton was

moot, that the appeal stopped the Writ.

When the court addressed the Petition for Temporary Restraining Order

(“TRO”) that Mr. Jones had filed, and asked opposing counsel about the TRO,

opposing counsel thought that was the reason for the hearing. The same thing that

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Mr. Jones thought, that it was a motions hearing. Opposing counsel stated: “I wasn’t

even aware we were here on the appeal. I thought we were here because we have a

writ that we’ve been trying to get, and I actually have one. And because he filed a

motion that’s why we’re here, because we want to get that writ of possession, since

no funds…as well as a judgment for that amount” [App.6,p.11@1-7].

Discussion went on, and finally came back to the rent issue. Mr. Jones stated

that the Magistrate Judge had not granted them rent or money. The Court stated:

“You’re right. You’re absolutely correct. And after you filed the appeal, a motion

was filed and a hearing was heard, and Judge Coursey – because you appealed, it

starts all over again. And so in the new case, there was a motion had and that’s --

after hearing the facts and evidence and applying applicable law, that’s what Judge

Coursey ruled on.” [App.6,p.16@5-11].

Then in the middle of the trial, and Mr. Jones testifying, the court stopped the

trial to handle a name change case [App.6,p/16@22]. That was very confusing,

“handled other matters” was granting a petition for a name change.

The Court held that “or the appeal is moot at this point, based off of the order

that Judge Coursey signed on November 20th that was filed into the court docket on

December 4th, 2018. And at that time, Judge Coursey made it very clear that if the

money payments were not made, that a writ of possession shall be issued instanter”.

[App.6,p,17@1-7]. What happened to appealing the ruling from magistrate court?

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Mr. Jones thought that he was appealing from the Magistrate Court’s order.

Then the court and opposing counsel had a conversation:

The Court: “And then also, Ms. Cruikshank, if you will e-mail to Ms. Daldry and

submit the writ -- or do you have that present here today?” [App.6,p.17, @21-23].

MS. CRUIKSHANK: “I do”. [Id.@24].

THE COURT: “All right. Then we'll have it. For the [Id.@25]

purposes of form, if you'll show it to Mr. Jones. [App.6,p.18@1]

MS. CRUIKSHANK: I have an extra one I can give them.

THE COURT: All right. They'll give you an extra one. And make sure -- it has this

18 case number, correct? [App.6,p.18@2-5]

MS. CRUIKSHANK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I don't know -- it needs to be changed, because it says "having

come before ex parte," and it wasn't ex parte, because (unintelligible --crosstalk) --

MS. CRUIKSHANK: I'll e-mail with it. [App.6,p.18@6-11].

THE COURT: -- proper notice that was filed and a hearing was had. And I do see

that Ms. Smith issued a Rule NISI on this matter on October 25th, 2018. I don't feel

comfortable signing something with ex parte, and I don't feel comfortable signing

something that has multiple cross-outs and additions.

MS. CRUIKSHANK: It's fine. I'll e-mail it. I'll get her e-mail address. If Mr. Jones

will give me his e-mail address, I will also e-mail him a copy.

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THE COURT: He can give it to you. It doesn't have to be on the record. Mr. Jones,

what this means is that you're going to have to move. You have to -- you will not be

able to stay there. And I understand there's another matter that's [Id.@12-25]. going

on that is separate and apart. Do you understand? [App.6,p.19@1].

The transcript has a problem that Mr. Jones just found, and he was not asked

to read it over and let anyone know if there was anything wrong, but he will be

seeking to have it corrected.

THE COURT: Well, the order that is here -- and I've ordered for Ms. Cruikshank to

amend the order, because there's some information that says it's ex parte and it's not,

because you're here -- it says the set-out date may be scheduled within --

MR. JONES: I'll fix it, Your Honor. We asked that it be issued instanter, but the

marshals have an issue if it's not done within 30 days. So we try to put that in there

to get them to move within that 30 days so we don't have to file more motions to

extend the rents. That's the only reason that's in there. But I will fix that.

The bold “Mr. Jones” was actually opposing counsel testifying.

It is very puzzling that the proposed order brought by opposing counsel was

for ex parte. It is equally puzzling that there was no paperwork transferring the case

to Judge Jackson, as well as the fact that the Judge knew nothing about the case, she

went strictly by the docket report, viewing it on the computer screen the whole

hearing.

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The trial court assured Mr. Jones that the same judge will be ruling on the

Superior Court wrongful foreclosure, which will violate Mr. Jones’s right to due

process of law. The judge just ruled against Mr. Jones, and ruled without proof of

what the trial court did or did not intend:

THE COURT: I don't. We're going to get that scheduled -- that's what I said, sooner

than later. It's going to be in the -- I know the trial will be in the first six months, but

with a trial, that's not a one-hour hearing. And I know there are other defendants.

And let me just say this: Lawyers say five minutes, and it really means like 15 or 20.

And so this is something that time [App.6,p.21@19-25]

is going to have to be blocked off to ensure that we have an adequate -- because we'll

have to pick the jury and then present all the evidence. So we're looking at a couple

of days.

But I will have that information to you sooner than later. And when I say to you, it'll

be to you as well as all the other defendants, including Main Street. And I understand

that you filed something on the default for Main Street, and we'll take all of that up

prior to a trial, if a trial is to be had. But there's motions that need to be filed. There

will be a date certain.

So the next correspondence that you get from this Court outside of that relates to the

17CV case. We'll be telling you when motions are filed and when they're due. A

consolidated pretrial is when everybody puts all their issues in one document for me

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to read instead of me going through yours and everyone else's. And that's what

governs the trial, as well as when the trial date will be. So you will get that sooner

than later, and it will govern out everything until that case is closed out -- God

forsaking if there's, you know -- not including an appeal. But if there's something

like that. Do you understand? [App.6,p.22@1-22].

Then turning back to the case at trial:

MR. JONES: Will I get something in writing telling me --

THE COURT: No.

MR. JONES: They'll just show up?

THE COURT: Yes. So that's where we are. We'll get that -- Mr. Jones, if you want

to provide Ms. Cruikshank with an e-mail address, she will copy you in the

correspondence so that you can see the order.

MS. CRUIKSHANK: And Your Honor, the last contact I had was with Judge

Coursey's office, so I just need to get your staff attorney's e-mail, or if she has a card

– [App.6,p.25@7-14].

Mr. Jones never received anything from opposing counsel as the judge had

suggested would happen. Mr. Jones heard nothing more until he was emailed by the

e-file system letting him know the final order had been given.

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V. ERRORS

1) Was it error for the Magistrate Court to deny the filed Removal to Superior

Court?

2) Was it not error for the Magistrate Court judge to ignore that they lacked all

jurisdiction over the counterclaim ?

3) Was it error for the Magistrate Court to tell Mr. Jones that if he would get a

hearing set for TRO/injunction hearing scheduled within seven days, he would hold

on the Writ of possession, and when it was done, still gave opposing party the writ

of possession? [App.6]

4) Was it error when it was shown that the emergency motion for leave, to never

be ruled on, the trial court deemed what Judge Coursey had intended on the words

of opposing counsel, it was not written in an order and Judge Coursey retired January

01, 2019, prior to the trial [App.3,pp.16-18]?

5) Both Courts’ failure to rule on Mr. Jones’s Motions violated due process of

law. Neither Court ruled on any of Mr. Jones’s Motions.

6) Judge Coursey’s Order referenced in the trial, did not mention Mr. Jones or

his emergency leave, or that Mr. Jones was not at the hearing, was it not error for the

trial court to make determination about that which Judge Coursey did not address in

the order [App.7]?

7) Was it error for the trial court to stop in the middle of a trial to hear a name

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change case, when the trial went from 11:45 am until 12:40 pm? [App.6,cover and

p.26@22-23].

VI. ARGUMENT

1 Deny Removal When Court Lacks Jurisdiction

According to Uniform Magistrate Court Rule 36:

In all cases where it is determined by the court that the court in which
a case is pending lacks jurisdiction, or venue, or both, the court shall
by written order transfer the case in accordance with Article VI,
Section 1, Paragraph 8, of the 1983 Constitution of the State of
Georgia, or where this rule is not applicable, dismiss said case
without prejudice.
GA R UNIF MAG CT Rule 36.

Even if the Court has jurisdiction over the Complaint, Uniform Magistrate

Court Rule 36.1 shows:

36.1 Lack of Jurisdiction Over Counterclaim.


Where the defendant asserts a legally sufficient counterclaim in good
faith which is beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate court but the
entire case is within the jurisdiction of another Georgia court, the
court shall transfer the case to a court with jurisdiction over the
counterclaim. Where the parties agree on a transferee court with
jurisdiction over the counterclaim, the court shall transfer the case to
that court. Otherwise, the court shall select a proper court to which
to transfer the case.
GA R UNIF MAG CT Rule 36.

Mr. Jones had shown that he had an on-going Superior Court action (No. 17-

cv-10316), and wanted to have the case transferred so that all of the matters could

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be determined together [App.2,p.3].

2 Magistrate Court Never Ruled on Removal/Transfer

Mr. Jones contends that had the Magistrate Court transferred the case to

Superior Court, the end result would have been different. Neither the Magistrate

Court, nor the Superior Court on Appeal, ever ruled on the Notice of

Removal/Motion to Transfer to Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction [App.2,p.3].

The Magistrate Court never ruled on any of Mr. Jones’s Motions. One such

motion was Notice of Removal or Motion to Transfer. There was also Motion to

Dismiss or in the Alternative to Stay pending ruling by Superior Court in the first

filed case No. 17cv10316. The Magistrate Dispossessory action was filed in bad

faith because MSR had defaulted in Superior Court action, and intended to moot the

Superior Court action by obtaining a Writ of Possession.

The trial court claimed that the case starts as new. If that is true, one would

conclude that either a new complaint would have to be filed, or the unruled upon

Motions filed into the Magistrate Court would still remain pending.

This is one issue that Mr. Jones, no matter how much he has searched, has

found nowhere that this court or the Supreme Court has ruled on such issues. Since

the Magistrate Courts do not follow the Civil Practice Act, questions of proper

procedure remain unaddressed for many litigants and attorneys alike.

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For example,

“The entry of a judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties is not a final judgment under Code Ann. s 6-701 (a)
1 and lacks res judicata effect unless the trial court makes an express
direction for the entry of the final judgment and a determination that
no just reason for delaying the finality of the judgment exists. Code
Ann. s 81A-154 (b); Walker v. Robinson, 232 Ga. 361, 207 S.E.2d
6 (1974); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil, p. 90, s 2661 (1973). If the trial court does certify that the
judgment is final and ripe for review under Code Ann. s 81A-154
(b), the time for appeal begins to run. No certification was made in
this case.
Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243, 248 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1978).

Does that hold true for Magistrate Court rulings, and appeals from Magistrate

Court rulings?

3 Magistrate Told Litigant if He Could Get a Hearing Scheduled

Was it error for the Magistrate Court to tell Mr. Jones that if he would get a

hearing set for TRO/injunction hearing scheduled within seven days, he would hold

on the Writ of possession, and when it was done, still gave opposing party the writ

of possession? [App.6] Mr. Jones has found nothing in case law or secondary

sources that addresses this issue. He does not abandon the error. Mr. Jones believes

that this may happen to other litigants, who did not appeal, or did not address it

because there were no authorities to be found on the issue.

Mr. Jones addressed it to the trial court, and opposing counsel did not deny

that it happened. Mr. Jones, as well as numerous other litigants deserves a ruling by
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this court on the issue. The trial court did not rule on the issue.

4 Emergency Leave, Motion to Stay or Continuance Never Ruled Upon

Mr. Jones has shown that Judge Coursey, prior to his retirement, January 01,

2019, never ruled on the Emergency Motion to Stay or Continue [App.3,pp.16-18]

was never ruled upon [App.6.p.7]. The trial court deemed that if it was not granted

it was denied [App.6p.7@17]. Mr. Jones had also filed Motion to Dismiss, Motion

to Stay Writ, which Magistrate Court never ruled upon.

Under that premise, then every Motion not ruled upon, would automatically

be denied. If that were true, this Court would never dismiss an appeal for the ruling

not being the final ruling due to remaining pending motions, which Mr. Jones has

found. He has not found that un-ruled upon Motions are automatically denied. Even

searching for that in the Magistrate Court case law, he has not found that when the

court fails to rule on a motion, it is automatically denied.

5 Refusing to Rule On Mr. Jones’s Motions Violated Due Process

The trial court also did not rule on all the motions. The un-ruled upon Motions

stated above were also not ruled upon by the trial court. Mr. Jones had also filed

Motion for Clarification which the trial court had not ruled upon. So there were four

pending Motions never ruled upon, which was not fair to Mr. Jones. Only opposing

party’s motions were ever ruled upon. That is direct violation of due process of law,

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even for a magistrate court.

“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity


to be heard.’ Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779,
783, 58 L.Ed. 1363. This right to be heard has little reality or worth
unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657,

94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).

Refusing to rule on Mr. Jones’s Motions was a violation of due process of

law.

6 Trial Court Ruled What a Retired Judge Intended and Allowed Opposing
Counsel to Testify to What the Judge Intended

Mr. Jones contends that the trial court did not have the power to rule what was

not stated in a retired Judge’s Order. On top of that, the trial court should not have

requested, and opposing counsel should have never agreed to state what the retired

judge intended.

“No attorney shall be competent or compellable to testify in any


court in this State, for or against his client, to any matter or thing,
knowledge of which he may have acquired from his client, by virtue
of his relations as attorney, or by reason of the anticipated
employment of him as attorney, but shall be both competent and
compellable to testify, for or against his client, as to any matter or
thing, knowledge of which he may have acquired in any other
manner.”
Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 177 S.E. 582, 583 (1934).

One would think it especially so, when the attorney testifies to what a judge,
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who had since retired, intended. The retired Judge’s order, never mentioned Mr.

Jones, or that Mr. Jones was not at the hearing. Never mentioned the Emergency

Motion for Leave/to Stay or Continue [App.7].

7 Stop in the Middle of a Trial of One Hour, to Hear a Name Change Case

Mr. Jones contends that it was an error for the trial Court to stop in the middle

of his one hour long trial, to hear a name change case. The transcript App. 6, page

16, @ 22 shows “handled other matters”. The Court interrupted Mr. Jones’s trial to

hear a name change issue. Mr. Jones’s trial lasted all of one hour, including the time

it took for the name change case. That was very confusing to Mr. Jones, who was

already confused enough.

This is another situation where there is no known case law on the subject.

Perhaps an abuse of discretion? It seems highly unusual for a trial that lasts only

one hour, including the hearing of the other case, for the court to stop in the middle

of the one trial, to hear another case. Or perhaps the showing of bias for Mr. Jones’s

case?

Mr. Jones has several issues that he can find no appellate court rulings on. He

finds it highly suspect that the Judge, in the middle of any trial would stop, to hear

another case.

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