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BABAR, IEWCE N TER «ME Naw Gpattivorccore ~ Wag BEA bo MAGIC AREAS in CIVIL LAW 2018 Bar Examination Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO Proprietor & Bar Review Director PRELIMINARY CHAPTER and HUMAN RELATIONS The policy of the Constitution 1s to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, (See Arucle Ul Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution) and marriage as the foundation of the family (See Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and pratects it from dissolution at the whim ofthe parties. In this regard, psychologycal incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental « not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incogmitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, ‘among others, include their mutual obligations to live together. observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. nother words, it must be a malady that 1s so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond ane is about to assume (Republic v. Romero, citing Navales v. Navales, 578 Phal. 826, 840 (2008); Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, ct al, GR, No, 222541, February 15,2017, Perlas-Bernabe, }) Constitutional provisions on family and marriage. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accardingly, 1 shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development (Sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution): 2, The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and life of the unborn fram conception (Sec. 12, Art. Il, Constitution). 3, Marriage as an inviolable social institution, isthe foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State (Sec. 2, Art XV, Constitution) Abuse of right. ‘A bank may be considered grossly negligent in not giving prior notice to chent about sts course of action to suspend, terminate, or revoke the credit line, thus violating Art. 19 of the Civil Code ‘in order for Art, 19 to he actionable, the following elements must be present: "(1) the existence ofa legal right or uty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” Prior notice 1s ‘required before termination of the credit line. This is the legal duty of the bank and since it falled to do so, it 1s liable for damages. Malice or bad faith is atthe core of Art. 19. Maliee or had faith “implies 2 conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity." (EUSEBIO GONZALES v. PCIB, ct al, G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011, Velasco, J; Ardiente v. Pastorfide, GR No. 161921, july 17,2013) The core of Articles 19, NCC Is bad faith. “Article 19 ofthe Civil Cade "prescribes @‘prumdrdial imitation on all ight’ by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof.” (Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc, 349 Phil 769 {1998]) Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following clements are present: (1) there is 3 legal right or duty; (2) whichis exercised in bad faith; (3) forthe sole intent of prejudicing oF injuring another. (Dart Philippines, inc. v Calogcog, 613 Phil, 224 {2009)) “Thé Gaur, expounding an the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held: v» Male or bad faith 's at the core of Article 19 ofthe Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of, mind which ts manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain $fyqqn taking an uneonscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed, Thus, he who alleen bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or - siiple tagligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a reach of known duty due to some motives or intorestor il wll that partakes of the nature of 1 Maile connotes il will or spite and speaks notin response to duty. It implies an intention to do ultener‘and difatifable harm. Malice is bad fath or bad motive (Diaz v, Encanto, etal, GR. No. 171303, January20,2016) Liability for breach of promise to marriage: basis. 7 ‘Any person who willfully causes oss or injury to another na manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. (Art. 21, NCC) ‘Apperson cannot escape liabihity by promising to marry her, only to thereafter renege on his promise after cohabiting with her for 21 days. There are other reprehensible acts which he did, like practically detaining the woman after the alleged rape, leaving her without any justiable reason, withdrawing the application for marriage license, acts which can make him liable for damages. (Bunag, It. v5.CA, etal, GR, No. 101749, fly 10, 1992; Baksh vs.CA, etal, GR. No. 97336, Feb. 19, 1993) ‘ABRC2O18 Magic Ares in Cl Law/EVSA/erys 1 rivacy. ieee two (2) adjacent ots, one ofthe owners set-up and installed on its building two (2) video survaiianee camera facing the property of the other there 1s a violation of its right to privacy because there was interference in the re ace 250) ofthe Cl Code, protects an ineiats right to privacy a provides 2 legal remedy agatat 's that may be committed against him by other individuals. aii provision recognizes that a man's house i is cate, where his right to privacy cannot be dented or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.” The phrase “prying into the privacy of another's residence” however does not mean that only the residence ts entitled to privacy. Our Code specifically mentions: prying into the privacy of another's residence.” This does not ‘ean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in, ‘Thus, an individual's right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Crvil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another's residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as Drivate. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. ‘ariting the application of Article 26(1} ofthe Civil Code only to residences isnot correct (Sps. Hing vs. Choachuy, Se, et al, GR. No. 179736, June 26, 2013, Del Cosi}. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Marriage without alicense is void. \fa marriage was ceiebrated without a icense, its void. < ‘The certification ofthe Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non issuance af said license. (Cariio v. Cariio, 403 Phil. 861, 869, 12001}) | ‘The mere fact that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to Cure the absence ofa valid marriage license. Article 4 ofthe Family Cade is clear when it says, "The absence of any ofthe essential or formal requisites shall render the marmage void ab initio except as stated in Article 35(2)" Article 35(3) ofthe Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license i void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, ofthe same Code. Again this marriage cannot be characterised os among the exeimptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marrage license vend ab initio. As the marriage {ecense,a formal requisite s clearly absent, the marriage of the partis 1s void ab initia. (SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS. GR. No, 183896, january 30, 2013, Velasco, rj Caro v,Cartho, 403 Phi 862,869, (20011) Proceedings after declaration of nullity af marriage. ‘The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Youd Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support. and property relations ater the trial court renders a decision granting the: petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition. ludge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing ruies ussued by this Court toa tine when a decision granting the petition s already at hand and before a final decree is issued. The tral court shall proceed withthe lguidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of thelr presumptive Jegitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition, (ERIC U. YU v. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, GR Ne 189207, June 15, 2011, Velasco, rs }.) Divorce hetween Filipino citizens void; second marriage void. When the frst marniage between both Filipinos was solemnized inthe Philipines, the law in force adopted the nationality ele tothe effect that Philippine las relating to family rights and duties. of tothe status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine eos governed this case. So they remained married until his death which terminated their marnage. From the time af the celebration of his frst marriage until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognised in the Phiippines..The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Famuly Cade, ‘even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad, Hence, the second macriage i void for being bigamous. And under Article 148 of the Civil Code (now Art. 148, FC) ‘he property relation between them Is governed by the rules on co-ownership. But in order to establish co-ownership the second wife should prove that she actually contributed in the acquisition ofthe property. Even under the Famuly Code, whore co ownership between them is presumed, there must still be proof af actual contribution fr the presumption to apply. in ths case she failed to prove her actual contribution in the dequisition ofthe subject properties. It the parties have no legal impediment to marry, itis not necessary that there be actual or material contribution because in such a case, there isa presumption that the contribution is equal, In fact, the contribution may anly be spiritual, (Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, 6.8. No. 171914, uly 23, 2014) Foreign divarce. A foreign divorce can be recognized in the Philippines provided the divorce decree is proven asa fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The fact that a party was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is sufficient. Given the validity and efficacy of divorce decree, the same shall be given a res judicata effect m this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between the spouses is considered severed: they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, they are no longer hushand and wife to each other. Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, the husband could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. ‘ABRC2018. Magic Areas im Civil Law Law/EVSA/crys 2 (MARIA REUECCA MAKAPUGAY BAVOT v, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. GR. No_ 185688, November 7 2008, VELASCO, IR, L, Media v, Kotke, et al, GR.No, 21872. July 22, 2016), Recognition can tw in a separate action. It ean likewise he recognized if nvoked by 1 party asa defe ¥ Romito, 224 Phil AS? [19H5}, Santos v. Peaple February 28, 201K) nse (Van Don Fiect f foreign divorce initiated by Filipina spouse. Both Dacasim » Docs 628 Phi. 494 [2010] and Van Dorn already recognized a fore gu divorce decree tl Initiated and obtained! by the Filipina spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of chuld custody’ and property relation, respectively T he fact that a vally obtained toneign divoree initiated by the Eilpino spouse can be recagmized and piven te effects in the Phuhippunes s implied! fhom the rulings vn Fugit Maria, e€ af. and Mina ¥ Im Fup, the Filipino witv, with the help of her frst husbandt, whe a f Judgment from Japou's family couet, which doy lared the martnage between her anil her second! Nusband, whe 12 fapanese nhattonal, vaid on the ground of bigamy. In resclving the tssue of whether a husband or wife ofa prior marriage can fle 2 petition to recognize a foreign judgment nnlfvang the subcequent marriage hetween his oF her spouse and a foreygn citizen on the ground of bigamy, t was tule upkt has the personality to fle a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Code nedginent rullitying the marriage between Marinay ant Mackara on the ground af bygamy because the judgement Concerns his civil status ae married to Marinay For the same ceason he has the personality £0 fle a petition under Rule 108 te cancel the entty oF marriage between Marinay and Maekara yn the ¢lvil registry on the basis of the dextee of the Japanese Fanny Catt “There ts na doubt that the prvor spouse has a personal yn maternal nterest in muanattny the integety af the mar age he contracted and the property relations arising thom it There t alsa ne lout that he 1s nvterested ih the canwellation wt a entry at 2 bigamous marriage 1 the civil registry, whieh compromise the public recor of his marriage the interest derives from the substantive rght of the ‘spouse not only to preserve (oe dissolve, ca limites instances) his most inbmnate human relatton, but alse ta protect his neoperty tnterests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage these Droperty unterests in marriage unclude the rght ta be supported “Wa keepang wath the nancial camaeaty ot the family” and preserving the property req ofthe marrage Pruperty rights are already substantive rights profected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right na marriage extends further to relational rights revoized under Titi iT ("Raghts and Obligations Inetween Hushanel and Wife") of the Fanuly Code. xxx (Rep. v. Manalo, GR No, 221028, April 24, 2018, o obtain a Invocation of nationality principle: not absolute, ‘Convenpontiy invoking the nationality prineaple fs erroneous: Suck primeypie, ound under Article 18 of the Civil Code. is not an absolute and unbending rule tn fact the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 wa testament that the State may pravide for an exception theruto, Morvover, Mind adhere tothe natuonalty anes mus be disallowed wt Avould cause uiyust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of undividuals whow rathts are equally protected by Taw. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divarre ax written by the Legislature only if they are constituttonal {See Barvetto Gonzales v. Gonealos, $8 Pll. 67, 72 (1983). as cited un Tenchawet v.Escato, etal, supra). prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do mare harm than good. f We diatlow a Hlipino cae who initared and obtained foreign dtvorce from Une caverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26and sill require him oe her to Trot aval of the existing “mechanisms” under the Family Cod, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the antime shall be considered ax ilict tn the eyes ofthe Philippane law Worse, any chit born out af such “extra prsaeal aftr has to sutTe the atigna of being branded as legitimate, Surely these are just but afew of the adverse Tensequences, not only to the parent but also to the chit. f We are to hold @ extrctive interpretation af the subyoct raven The tony Is thatthe prep of tnviolallty of marrage water Section 2, Arucle XY of the Constitution i revit ta be blted i favor of marriage and against unions nat fornwalteed by marriage, but without denying State Protection and esstence to ives arrangements orto amines frre actor to mages customs (Rep. ¥. Mana) Duty casupport: effect ife party Isa foreigner who divorced the Filipino; nationality principle Trea as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Fannly Code on support. the same only apres to Alipine ctians. By analogy, the same principle apples to freutners such that they are governed by ther sores ae wath respect to fanly rights and duttos which provides that aw relating to amily rights and duties oF tothe Ttreus condition and lege) capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philipps even though ling abroad (Ast 1S, NCC}, rn obligation to give support toa chika matter that flls nde tly aghts and duties. Sue the regpandent sa cuinon of Roland or the Netherlands, the lower court was correct that he ts subject he the laws of his ewuntry, not ro Phitippine law, aa ta whether he 18 obliged to give support to his child. ax well ws the vonsequences of his fairy to do so "hn Vive. Cloribel, GR. Na. l-25441, October 26, 1968, 28 SCRA 616, it was sand that being still aens. they are not tn poattion te invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. for that Coxe cleaves to the principle thar faruly sees snd une ae pera ee en ‘aw, Le. the laves of the nation to which they belong even when saying wt * ‘country (Civil Cad, Article 15; Norma A Del Socarro w Ernest tohan Brvakinan Van Walsen, C-R. Na, 19707, December 10, 2014 Pera!) Why te foreign law which does not oblige te father to support his child cannot by made to apply in the ‘Notenthatanding that the rational law of respondent states ttt parents have no obhgation to support their ‘children or that such obligation is Rot punishable by law, said Law woukd till not find applicabshty tn Baek of America NT ‘ahd SA «American Reaity Corparadon 478 Phil 1279 [1900] it wax sard that when the foreign lave. rudgment oF contract 8 ‘AIRC Mage Areek in Cv Law LAWN a ee ee ee SAY A, contrary to 3 sound an eased public polcy ofthe frum, the sid foreign law, deme or order say applied. are, : Prohbve las concerning persons, the ats o property ai those whch have for tet objet public ode, pubic ple and gondcstomsshltot be endered nec by fw or hens promulgated, ory decrmnehoe Or contentions greed upon nator county Moreover foreign should nt be pid when ts application woud work undeniable must tothe lazens or resent ofthe orm. To gue uss she most portant waco of law; enc, law or gent or contrat that ‘Sabwiowsy ues negates the hndametalpinapes Conti Las Aivng the Torepnng even the ams ofthe Netheands nth enforce a pores oblgtign to suport his Chl nor pena the nomcomplance there, such obligation sll uly enforces nthe Pippnes Beeuse ould be great music othe eld be dened of fnancal support shen tates ented there (Nora A Del Socorro Eines jnan Srinkonan Van Wisen oR wo 195707, Decener 12014) Purpose of Art. 26(2), F.C. The intention of the l im law is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, ater obtaining 12a divorce, sno longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of {he Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, ‘the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alten spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating bim or her to remarry. The capacity of the Filipino Spouse to remarry, however. depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do So, Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the jusicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, ‘whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose of as a related issue in another proceeding. would be of no ‘Stanificance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recagnize divorce as a mode of severing the marital hond:; (Art. 17 NCC) Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments Promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the Sirect exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the tharriage between the Filipino Being 284 MS oF her ahen spouse. (Gilbert B. Corpus v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas, et al, GIR No. 186871, August 11, Article 26(2) a corrective measure, “The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws oF his or her country, The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which 's already effective in the country where it was rendered, The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code ts based Gn the Court's decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo, 228 Phil. 357 {1985}, which declared that the Filipino spouse “should not be scrimunated against in her oven country he ends of use ao be served: (Minoru Fusve Mavioy otal, Git Ne 196049, June 26, 2013) a : ‘ i. e Marriage valid even ifthe purpose isto secure citizenship. ‘The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is forthe couple to establish a conjugal and family le. The possibilty that the parties in a marciage might have no real intention to establish a hfe together is however, insufficient to nullity a marriage frely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides thatthe nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus jonly be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void i iis {entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such asthe acquisition of fereigh eitizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law ate present, and Iti aot vod or votdabe ‘under the grounds provided by law, it shall be,declared valid (Article 4, Family Code: Republic v. Albios, GR. No. 198780, October 16,2013). ‘Abandonment by spoute of er family dors not make out ase ofpeychologes incapacy, rchologeal incapacity, asa found to lfya marage or Aricle Sof the oy Cod, shoud retro no a send sgedacsenellteals dese quand oatsuctent tp bu pete on toned aes Copeeaterehe Srctie Fl oor let, espana ids tno femal smpcues a gatos anaes ft nen help an spot Te wad ny at he met of ease one he mncang of peyehaloga incapocty’ to the man seus coset af personality dsrdsscery demansssue of arene imscnnieeytar takai to ive meaning and sigfcence to the marrage (RapobiewDe'Graca, 726 PAL, SCD, S09 en ‘The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 [1995], taught us that psychological incapacity under ruce 30th fay Cat mst be chracereed by (a) gravy, (0) real asecedens ane) ear. Tne seincly Shute rave or serous seh atthe party walle meapaiie of carting out he onary dates Feqed a ri PE mrued inthe biry ofthe pee amedaing the atrig,aieugh the ore anesaton may ron st murae aut mat eines ave earn eae wah hag eee Fae a ee conten te burden of proves paycologea lnipachy ion Oe pelonr pura pure Court of Appeatc 298 Pi 4,676 (1997 or the Mote ave (Dl Rosario w De Rosa sl Gk No. Se Fone 12 Bar9,PelaeBormab, [Rep Romero le a, GR. No. 209100, February 24,2016, Pero: ional Allegation ofiereconcilablediferences and conflicting personalities no psychological incapacity. Trreconelble differences and conflicting personas of «spouse donot make up 2 good css for psyeholgial incapacity. "Psychological incapacity” as a ground to mulify marriage under Artcle 36 ofthe Family Coe, should refer to tn less than a mental-not merely physical-incapacity that causes a party to be truly wncognitive ‘ABRC2018. Magic Areas in Civil Law Law/EVSA/CFVS ‘covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed Aracle 68 ofthe Coe, amc ater. clude the mutual} olgaton Iie tps: observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and suppart. (Republic v. De Gracia, .R. No, 171557, February 12,2014) ‘As declared by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals. GR No. 112019, anuary 4, 1995. 240 SCRA 20, paychologica! incapacity must be charateried by (2) gravity. (burda! antecedence and (¢) maura in sum, a person’s psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential obligations, 19 marriaxe must he rooted on a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at the time of marrage although the manifestations thereof may only be evident after marriage. Using the abovementioned standards in the present case, the Court found that the totality of evidence presented 1s insufficient to establish Josephine and Dantha's psychological incapacity (Republic v, Danilo Pangasinan, GR. No. 214077, August 10, 2016, Velasco,]) Deycholopieal incapacity: ness must be 2 downright incapacity or inability to perform duties to the marriage In Repubhic v. CA, 338 Phil. 664 [1997], the Court laid down defimtive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 36 ofthe Family Code, Among others, st clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the incapacity or mability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage suck that “mld characteniological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be Shown as downright incapacity or mabuhty, nota refusal, neglect or ificulty, much less tl will. In other words, there is 2 hhatal or supervening disabling factor im the person, an adverse integral element in the personality strbeture that efcarly mapas te pram from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential tO “That he married Ohwia not out of love, But out of reverence for the latter's parents, does not mean that Reghis 1s psychologically neapacitated in the context of Article 36 ofthe Family Code. la Republi Albios,GR. No. 198780, October 16,2013, 707 SCRA 584, the Court held tha: Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of if that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their night to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to tnartal privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they sce fit (0 Ive together or live apart, to have children or no children, to lave one another or nok and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, ‘Companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, Gre equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marrtage contract, is not the only valid Cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage (Rep. v. Romero Il, etal, GR. No, 209180, February 24, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe.}) Bringing children to mahjong sessions exposed them to culture of gambling; eroded moral fiber. oansther’s act of bringing her children with her to hér-mahyong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental dues but also manifested et tendency to expose them toa culture of gambling, Her wilfully exposing Ret aarerea iatee butture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of Subordinating their needs for parenting tothe graiication of her own personal and escapist desires. See ae vied her watton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard vielated her dury as» parent to safeguard and protect her chldren affecting the development oftheir mora, mental and physical Shvacter and well-being, (Art. 209, FC; Kalaw v. Fernandez, GR. No. 166357, January 14, 2015). Root cause may be hereditary. BBE my ee yrdicalantecedencé ofthe Foot cause of psychological incapacity oF paranotd personaly ean be herediecy the father had pathogenic made thus, there was psychi contamination called double insanity (Del Fuente v. Del Fuente, March 8.2017). complaot fodectaration of mult ofmarriage onthe ground of psychological Incapacity, the plain allege the immaturity, deceitfulness. i derepealncapacty should refer to no less hana mental not phys neapacty that auee 2 Py he seul eeppve tthe base arial covenants that must concomany be assumed and discharged by fe Pats the Cr ar aso exresed by Article 68 of he Foy Code include ter mutual obligations 2 Ws ge ee observe a ee ey ad to ender lp and KE> "a (Pues auddiga 24) JO WEY MoU} AuEdwIO SNA, pue AUBB Ise 3e4 PUL [S007] EE Md OVS OPEDIAW ‘A unre '52 ¥uDs 212 2661 HBNV ‘£056 ON YD S\waddy yo 13n0:4°9U (ang sok EWE) woquiOg JO AEG (eany) edioutad sy j0 syeG9q wo pu 20) Ue aya Aq PaUB’s pur parn2ax2 sem p99p 943 ssVUN‘Yed}2UN24 a4p PUIG 6) UDIIYINS 20U St AasadoUd D4 Saethiow 0) pazuoyre seas wa8e ay) wy We} 919UL 94D ‘spow saxo ul -Ted‘IuLIG ak JO awEL a4 LA pajess puE peuds “pews 9q 07 todand ave; sit uedn ysnur poop 943 uaBe Ue Aq parnoaxa poop v Aq tedIouLad 24 pug OF 49P0 Uy edvuud ain you pue wade 942 Avo spurg (edioutad S14 Jo e4aq uo pur 20) poe 24 ew Bureaus moysim aweU avo siy UI Pauls oven uae pazuONE Ue Aq PaxnDax9 aHeIOK, ‘yed}outsd wo Buypurg rou 19e ‘asi MuaINO ed}>UTId Jo J}e4IG UI PuE 10} 19" ysMUL Way ‘{['220pUaW'StOZ 61 49900 "esOFIz'ON Y'D "WED "dO nog 9 MowsBeueH dion “A aytds-estmen eunuaro1y “9002! 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Koo szrguiosSusied 0H 9 OM) Potent Ny AINSUANLUVd Ho euoRIPpY {ON 6z8t 1) woneuTUID SH uF BuEUILUIND $soursng jo dn Suipuim ows ap yun pours i Ayeuosind (89 sp snus Ueistnied ait wore ft od “oon ‘azat uy) ssoursna a jo ‘dn Buupurm a4p wo.) poysinBusip aq dn se wo BuiAste9 ayaet poreooe p21 Heer? soued fue da posnes sonied on 0 von aw ED oy 8 dusuRsed eyo ONO NL sofeuep 40) Aye ews yaa eo 3 eap Inqdys.HUaER aya Jo UOTIMYosstp sah yuaAaid na, cauePUSL OM Yu Ou ye) Pood W133 sana YSN 9} Im. disused ayy 0 UonNes|p e seonp TH Ye ew ssounaed o42 Jo'au0 Aue “A049 yas me} a4 Kq papIAOAA Worossyp 405 a5ne> eo HmUaSqE own 0% 0 eh i ‘when act of an agent binding upon the principal even if he acted beyond the scope of his authority. Under Articles 1898 and 1910, NCC, an agent's ac, even if done beyond tne scope of his author) principal if he ratifies them, whether expressly or tacitly. It must be stressed though that only the principal. an ‘agent, can ratify the unauthorized acts, which the principal must have knowledge of Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person of an act perform without authority. The substance of the doctrine is confirmation after conduct, amounting, ity, may bind the 1ed on his behalf by another to a substitute for a prior {uthority, Ordinanly, the prinepal must have full knowledge at the time of ratification of al the material facts and Circumstances relating to the unauthorized act ofthe person who assumed toact as agent. Thus, if material Facts wore thereof in suppressed or unknown, there can be no valid ratification and this regardless of the purpose oF 1a concealing such facts and regardless of the parties between whom the question of ratification. rey arise. Nevertheless, ths principle does not apply ifthe principals ignorance of the materval fets and crcumsianee i ‘elf or that the principal chooses to actin ignorance ofthe facts. However, in the absence of circumstances PULTE Feasonably prudent man on Inguly, ratification cannot be Implied 2s against the principal who Is ignorant oe tact (Coun Bankers nance Corp. Ker sb Spar GR Mo ToGdH4, June 18, 2012, Leonardo-de astro, Effect ifagent violates the authority and acted for himself. ven iit was assumed that the agents obtaining the 1oans in his own namie, and executing the mortgage contrac, also inhi Son note had sreceded hs arent authority under the SPA te prinspa stil ale to FEBTC by wre of ie express ratifcaton ofthe agent's act Under Article 1898 of the Curl Code, the acts of an agent done beyond te 0Pe rhs authority do no bind the rinipa unless he latter expressly or impliedly ratifies the same, (See: A. 1889, NEO) Tre pcy.taniatien& the adoption or confirmation By oe person ofan act performed an his behalf by another without authority: The substance of ratifeation is the confirmation after the act, amounting to 3 subsutune [5 Fee Munowty: (Mans Memorial Park Cemetery v Linsangan GR. No. 151319, November 22,2008, 449 SCRA 377, 898) Hers Raa isn nufeston by Marcos as bomne out by his execution ofthe letter of acknowledgement on September 12, 1996 (Prieto v. CA, GR, No. 158597, June 18, 2012, Bersamin, ‘Additional on AGENCY 1, Asa rule, an agency s revocable at will except if ts coupled with an interest. the agency is coupled With 40 te acalsfahe etencat of agent goes beyond what she will recive by way of commissions but extends tothe very sere ter of the agensy rset This s shown by the fact that she I also able for Bal f the rentals and that She is solidarily lable for the price ofthe goods sold on credit, 2. There are restrictions imposed by law of a capitalist partaer and an industrial partner. saeisehat partner cannot engage for himselfin any busines which dretiy competes withthe business in which the actnorsip ts engaged. However, an industrial partet is expected to give his fll ime and attention 10 He rae parship such that hes prohibited from engaging st any business ever if the same isnot the same as cht in Grhich the partnership ts engaged in (Arts. 1789 & 1808, NCC). Effect ifthere are two (2) agents. When tro persons contract with regard to the same thing, one of them with the agent and the other with the principal/snd the two contract are incompatible wth each other, that of prior dave shal be preferred, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1544. (Art 1926, NCC) oe esa NCC contemplates ofa double sale situation. Under said law, whoever registers the document ist in good faith he being a buyer In good faith and fr value, hasa prefered right DEPOSIT ‘Nature of liability of banks; one imbued with public interest. oy orcag banking is impressed with pubbe interest and great reliance is made on the bank’s sworn rofession of ingence and metieuousness In giving Wreproachable serie. Like a common carrier whose Busnes PrpmedL wih public interest, a bank should exercise extraordinary diligence to negate its lability to the depositors. i jration/Metropalitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tan, GR. No, 167346, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 123, 129- een is sorely remiss in the diligence required in treating with its client, Gonzales. It may not iphte without respecting and honoring the eights of ts clients Ar. 19, NCC applies (Arlegu v. CA, es BCIB etal. GR. No. 180257, February 23, 2011). oa Deposttin hotels Tapon a7Gival of guest at 2 hotel, the est gave notice tothe doorman and parking attendant ofthe hotel when he entrusted the ignition of his car tothe latter, and there slo ofthe car, the hotelkeeper is lable because there was a ye rnc of deposit with tye hotlkeeper. The contract of deposit was perfected from the owner’s delivery, when he handed coat he keys't his vehicle with the parking attendant with the obligatici of safely keeping and returning it Hence, i is fable for damages for the loss of the car. (Durban Apartments Corp. v. Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp,.GR. No. 179419, January 12,2011, (Abad, )). Nature of rent of safety deposit box. it is a special Kind of deposit since the primary function is still the safekeeping of funds, documents, and other ‘objects, The renting out of the safety deposit boxes is not independent from, but related to ar in conjunction with, the function of safekeeping, (CA Agro-Industrial Dev. Corp. vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 90027, March 3, 1993; Sia vs. CA, et al. G.R, ‘No. 102970, May 13, 1993, 222 SCRA 24) Liability of hotet keeper. ABRC2O18 Magic Areas in Cull Law Law/EVSAVCYS 3 Vader he aw he ht eer ano! ee msl rom esponsty by posting notes to the ec not table othe ais brought bythe gest Any spulaton between the het eepée and te gust Seep Tesonuty othe forme asst fth im Arcs 198 to 2001s spresed or dimimshed shal Be vld fre 2063 ~ Pa , Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely. The hotel busines ete comin irs uses cd nh pure Eaten tthe pub, hote-Azepes ae bound {a provice not ony lng for ht! pcs and seat te thr pesons and belongings The twn day constates the Essence fe bane Te lw taf doce nt allow such Gyo the publi fo be negated ate by any contrary “tpl nse underang tha onary appear n prepared forms imposed by hae espe on ess for the sgt (FHT Rely Corp eta reals oR he 126780, febany 17,2063) GUARANTY/MORTGAGE Distinction between the liability of the guarantor from that ofa surety. ‘surety 1s responsible for the debt's payment at once ifthe principal debtor makes default, whereas a guarantor Pays only ifthe prineipal debtor is unable to pay. ‘A surety an insurer of the debt, whereas a an undertaking that the debt shall he patd, a guaranty, Promises to pay the principal's debt if the prine Proceeding against the prineipal, may proceed af huself to perform f the principal does not, witho ‘contract that the princtpal will pay, but simply th guarantor 1s an insurer ofthe solvency of the debtor. A suretyship is ‘an undertaking that the debtor shall pay. Stated differently, a surety ipal will not pay, while a guarantor agrees that the creditor, after gainst the guarantor af the principal is unable to pay. A surety binds ut regard to his ability to do so. A guarantor, an the other hand, does not at he is abe to do so. in other words, a surety undertakes directly for the payment and s so responsible t once if the principal debtor makes default while a guarantor contracts to pay if by the use of due diigenee, the debt cannot be made out of the principal debtor. (Palmares v. CA. 351 Phi 664 [T998i, perso Jnvestment Dev. Corp, ofthe Phils tal. v. Asta Paces Corp, et al, GR No 187403, Febrvary 12,2014). Liability of guarantor. ‘The guarantor “binds himself to the creditor to full the obligation of the principal debtor in ease the latter should fait to do 50." The libty of the guarantor is secondary to that af the principal debtor because he ren ee mpaled to pay th creditor unless the later has exhausted all the property of the debtor. and has resorted to al the leat ‘Rimeticn against che debtor: In contrast the surety is sldarly bound tothe oblgation‘of the principal debtor, targea Associated Bank, GR No, 146511, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 244, 274-275; allied Banking Corp v; Varmee GA 163116, June 29, 2015, Bersamin,}) Pactum commissorium. Under the law, the creditor cannot appropriate the tings given by way of pledge or mortgage. or dispose of them, Any stipulation to the contrary is vod. (Art 2088, NCC: Ph. Phosphate Fertilizer Corp.v. Kamslig Resources Ine ee 465608 December 13, 2007), Ths stipulation ss contrary to.the nature ofa true pacto de retro sale since te sachean gvwnership ofthe property sas immediately transferred othe wendee arto upon execution of he sale subject en {he tepurchase ofa vendor a retro within the stipulated period, Undoubteiy, the aforementioned stipulation se ences commssoram because enables the mortgagee to aca ownership ofthe more properties without need ay foreclosure proceedigs which isa nullity Being contrary to the provisions of Articke 2088 ofthe Civil Code (Lamayag al. v. Heirs of Jacinto Nemeno, etal, GR. No. 162112,fuly 32007}. Se iat a mortgage may be validly perty. IF the instrument 1s not ‘hu v.CA, September 26, 1989) Mortgagor may sell the property mortgaged without the consent of the mortgagee. ‘The mortgagor may’ sell the Uhing mortgaged, hut, when a mortgagor sells the mortgaged property to a third person, the ereditor may demand from such third person the payment af the principal obligation. The reesen for this {hat the mortgage credit isa real right, which follows the property wherever it goes, even iits ownershipehanges, Arte 2129 of the Cul Code gives the mortgagee, the option of collecting from the third person in possession of the mortgaged! property in the.concept of owner (Teco v. Metrabank, GR. No. 162333, December 23, 2008, 57S SCRA Ha) the mortgagor-owner's sale of the property does not affect the right ofthe registered mortgagee to foreclose on the same even Fats ownership had been transferred to another person. The latter is bound by the registered mortgage on the ate he acquired, “he contract cannat absolutely forbid the mortgagor. s owner ofthe morgaged property, while her Ioan remained unpaid. Such stipulation contravenes public policy, being an undue imped fon the transmission of property. (Cinco v.CA, GR. No. 151903, October 9, 2009, 604 SC! ¥.S55, eal, GR No. 181672, September 20, 2010) from selling the same liment or interference RA 108; Sps. Antonio & Leticia Vega Concept of blanket mortgage clause" or a “dragnet clause". lanket mortgage clause,” also known as a “dragnet clause” 1s one which 1s specifically phrased to subsume all debts of pastor future origins, Mortgages of this character enable the parties to provide continuous dealings the nature oF extent of which may not be known or anticipated atthe time, and they avoid the expense and inconvenience of executing a ew security on each new transaction. A “dragnet clause” operates as a convenience and accommodation to the borrowers 38 1 makes available additional funds without their having to exccute additional security documents, thereby saving time, ABRCZOLB Magic Areas in Gil Law Law/EVSAVerys 34 ™ travel loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, recording fees t cetera ned. thas been settled in along line of decisions that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts (Mopica vs. CA, G-R. No. 94247, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 517) and the amounts named as consideration sad contracts do not int the amount for stich the morgage may stan security if rom the feur corer ofthe sre ee secure are a er indebtedness can be gathered. (China Bankang Corp. vs. {L198 {1996}, Prudential Bank vs Don A Alvi, eta GR No. 150197, July 28, 2008) ng Corp. vs. CA, 333 Phil. 158 {1996} SPA Inserted in real estate mortgage. tsa requirement for the validity of an extrajudicial foreclosure by the mortgagees that 2 SPA he inserted in the REM. That the mortgagor agreed to an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage 1” the event of failure to pay 1s not sufficient authority for the mortgagor to foreclose the mortgage extrajudicially. ‘Their agreement isa mere expression oftheir amenabilty to extrajudicial foreclosure as the means of forecios ng the mortgage, and does not consutute the special power or authority to sell the marigage property to enable the ‘mortgages to recover the unpaid obligations. What is necessary 1s the special power or authority to sell = whether inserted in the REM itscl, or annexed thereto ~ that authorizes the mortgagees to sell in the public auction their ‘mortgaged property (Sps. Baysav. Sps.Plantilla,et al, GR. No, 159271, July 13, 2012, Bersarmn, I) Additional on MORTGAGE /PLEDGE 1. lfthere isa loan secured by a chatte! mortgage, the prohibition against the sale of the chattel is valtd, Because ts a secunty for the loan obligation. It is intended to answer for the principal obligation when it becomes due and demandabie. The invocation of Art. 2130, NCC 1s misplaced where 2 stipulation forbidding the owner from alienating the immovable mortgage is vod 2. fim acontract of loan secured by a chattel mortgage. there ts no payment and the object is sald. the stipulation to recover the balance is valid. Such stiputation probibiting the unpaid balance is valid only if it ts @ contract of pledge. Under the law, uf the thing pledge is sold and there 1s a deficiency. the pledgee cannot recover the eficiency even if there tsa stipulation inthe contract. Such stipulation 1s woid (AP. 2115, NCC). 3. A stipulation in a chattel mortgage contract that if the object 1s sold fer more, the mortgagor can recover the excess 1s valid. IF itis 2 pledge, the pledges cannot recover the excess except If there is a stipulation to the contrary, MUTUUM ~ INTERESTS Interest rate is now 6% perannurn, ‘There has been a change in the rules on interest from 12% per, annum to 6% per annum in view af the amendinent to Circular No. 905 Series of 1982 by Cir. No. 799. The landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines. Inc. CA, GR. ‘No. 97412, july 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78 is no longer controlling in view of the recent ruling in Dario Nacar v, Gallery Frames ‘and/or Felipe Bondey, Jr, Nature ofa credit line. q 'R. No, 189871, August 13,2013, Peralta "A credit line is really a loan agreement between the parties. In Rasorio Textile Mills Corporation v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Co, G.R. No. 137232, June 29; 2005, 462 SCRA 88, it was satd that a credit line 1s “that amount of money for merchandise which a banker,a merchant. or supplier agrees to supply to a person on credit and generally agreed ton advance.” It isa fixed limit of credit granted by a bank, retailer, or creditcard issuer to a customer, to the full extent of ‘which the latter may avail himself of his dealings with the former but which he must not exceed ands usually intended to Cover 2 series of transactions in which case, when the customer's line of credit is nearly exhausted, he is expected to reduce his indebtedness by payments before making any further drawings. (Sps. Dela Cruz v. Planters Products, Inc, GR. No. 158649, February 18, 2013, Bersamin, J; Sps. Chua, etal v.UCPB, etal, GR. No. 215949, August 16, 2017, Bersarmin [ Edron Const. Corp. v. The Provincial Gov't. of Surigao det Sur, G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, |) Compounding of interest must be in writing. “The compounding of interest should be in writing Provision, payment of monetary interest shal be due only th (1) thet@'was an express stipulation forthe payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for such payment was reduced in ‘writing, Tus the collection of titerest without any stipulation thereof in writing is prohibited by law. he first requirement--that there be an express stipulation for the payment of interest=-is not sufficiently complied wf irposes of imposing compounded interest on the loan. The requirement does not only entail reducing tm writingthe tet! rate to be earned but also the manner of earning the same, sto be compounded. Failure to ‘specify the manser pffearning interest, however, shall not automaticaly render the stipulation imposing the interest rate oid since ts addy apparent from the contract itself thatthe parties herein agrved forthe loan to bear interest. Instead, In default of any Stipulation on the manner of earning interest, simple interest shall accrue. (SPOUSES TAGUMPAY N. ‘ALBOS and AIDA C ALBOS v, SPOUSES NESTOR M, EMBISAN, etal, G.R. No, 210831, November 26,2014, THIRD DIVISION, Velasco, JR, |; TING TING PUA v. SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG etal, GR. No, 198660, October 23, 2013, Velasco, fr J) Stipulated interest of 3% or more Is excessive; void. ‘Acontract of loan secured by mortgage Was entered into with a stipulated interest of 3% per month is not vali It is void because itis excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, hence, illegal, and void for being contrary to ‘morals. In Agnerv. BPI, Inc, t was ruled that settled 1s the principle that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, niquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant, Wile Central Bank Circular No, 905-82 which took effect on january 1, 1983, (as amended by Cir. No. 799) effectively, removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the satd circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets Since the stipulation on the interest rate i void for being contrary to morals, f not against ‘ABRC2018 Magic Areas in Civil Law Law/EVSAerys 35. Beeeeseees SSS sha law, tw a there was no express contract on sad nterest rate; thus the interest rate may be reduced as Meaty demand. (Woriag Martner, GR. No, 201892, fly 22, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe. I} ttfectifthere is tack ofa written stipulation to pay interest onthe loaned amount airy oer ret ctae rue thatfthere eno express stipelatin on interest, nonterest shall be duc (De La Pazy. Lf] Dev. Co. GR Nor 144360. Sepember 8, 2014, De Cato) Under Artie 1956 ofthe Cv Code, no interest shal be dos tse i has bsenexpreslysupueted i wring lurspruzence on the matter also holds that for interest tobe due retest condtvons ast cones: a) express stipulation for the payment of terest and (b) the agreement to pay tnterest s reduced mn writing if the parties did not put down in writing their agreement, no interest 1s duc. The collection. without stipulation in writing it prohibited bylaw (Siga anv Vlanucra 596 Phil 760,769 [2009] Sun Life of Canada (Phils), Inc. v. Sandra Tan fetal, GR. No. 183272, October 15, 2014, Del Casilo, Federal Bilder, Inc. Foudnation Specialsts, Inc, GR. No 194507, September 8, 2014), (QUASI-DELICT and DAMAGES School is obliged to provide safe place for students. wher ‘an academic stitution accepts students for enraliment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with, For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip hun with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education of a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the,schoo!’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learniitg, must alsa m 2 the implicit oF “builtan” obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists m attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the «nteieacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are fying or grenades exploding an the air ar where there looms around the schoo! premises-a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to mal mn peace and order within the ‘campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereat. Tnstitutsons of learming have the "built-in" obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are fi constant threats to hfe and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained (PSBA, et ‘1. CA, etal, 282 Phil. 759, 764-765 {1992}; St. Luke's College of Medicine-Willain Quasha Memoraial Foundation, etal. v. Sps. Perez, otal, GR. No. 222740, September 28, 2017, Perez I. Employer is liable for the loss of cargo due to acts ofits employees. if there 1s 9 contract for the delivery of cargo, but there was failure to deliver because the employees were Instrumental in the hijacking oF robbery of the shipment the employer is liable for the acts of the employees. The employer should be made answerable for damages. Whenever-an employee's negligence causes damage ar injury to nother, there instantly arises 2 presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to excreise dlligentissimi patris Jamilies wv the selection (culpa im elgiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of ts employees. (Tan v. Jam Transit, Inc, GR No. 183198, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 659, 675, citing Delsan Transport Lines, In. v._ C&A Construction, Ine. 4459 Phil. 156 (2003), To avoid habihty for a quastdelict committed by its employee, an employer must avercome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the Selection and supervision of his employee. In this regard, Loadmasters failed. (Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Giodel Brokerage Corp, etal, GR. No, 179446, January 10, 2011), Effect ifthere are several causes for the resulting damages of goods that are supposed to be delivered by a party. ‘The extent of the respective liabilities of several parties ifthe cause af loss is due to their negligence is that, hey are sohdarily table. - Each wrongdoer is liable forthe total damage suffered. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, 3 party 1s not relieved from habilty, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It ss no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage ‘would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Doctrine of res tpsa loguitur once again applied. “Phe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies inthis case and explained this doctrine as follows: While negligence 1s not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and whale the mere happening of an. ‘ABRC2O1B Magy Areas in Ci Law Law/EVSAVerys accident oF Injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was duc to negligence on defendant's part, under the doctrine of res ipso laquitur, which means, literally, the thing fr Wansaction speaks for sel, oF i one yurtsdicuon, that the thing or mstrumentality speaks for itself, the faets or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. ‘Where 1 is shown that the thing or ynstrumentahty which caused the inury complained of was. under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such 2s in the ordinary course of things would not happen ifthase who had its control or management, used proper care, there 1s sufficient evidence, or, aS sometimes state, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose fram or was caused by the defendant's. want of care The res ipso loguitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the aceldent or has the best ‘opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintif has no such knowledge, and therefore 1s compelled to allege negligence im general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to 36 establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits cue ‘ octrine permits 1s grounded upon the fact that the chiel evidence ofthe tue cause, whether culpable or nace, practealy acess othe defendant bu Inacesible othe inured persan (Malayan insurance Company... Alero, 0 Pil 1813, 824-825 {2012}; Cortel etal. v. Cele Gepayo-Lim, G.R. No, 218014, December 7, 2016, Carp I. Elements of the doctrine nave ements of essa loqutur are (1) the acedent of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except forthe defendant's neghgence: (2) the acient must have Bete ‘caused by alt agency OF instrumentality within he exclusive management of conta f the person charge wh he egigence complained af; and the aeident must nat have heen dic to any voluntary action or contribution onthe part the person sured (Tossl2Y Manila Electric Company, GR. No, 182705, 18 july 2034, 730 SCRA 126). the samc arte Na the exclusive control af he bus, including ts Spee, The tos an the motorcycle were running 19 J same wae direction sna such, the clision would not bare happened without neghasnce on the Park CoG teas established tht the clon between the bur and tne motoreyee cased Lin's death Aside fom are aiegatons 3" petoners fed to prove there was nothing (o show that Lim had contributory nelgence to the 2ceen “The rule is when an employee causes damage duc to his own negligence while performing I aves there anses a presumption that hiserployer i noglgnt presumption cane rebutted ony y proof Of ODS TUS Te employer of the digenes ofa gnnd hero fry m the selection and supermsion of enDOVEDE [ta segs greed with thera court andthe Court af Appts vat Yliow Ss ine aie to prove that toners Se agence of weed inter os Eris in he secon and spervsn ats employees, ortel s ceriates of shenagoe® 2 | ith Yellow Bus Lincddnotenen present ar evidence nthe tal cour are not enough to prove oMerws= Employers liable fornegligent act of employee acting within scope of assigned 256% See ae ee ayer rnc New Cova Code, employers are liable fr the davnages caused 1} TEE IO Te nptian in en cer cee sm gins spo fs DU SO cls ml Fea omer te capes was emues in te stecton and/or superasion Of he Tee TT rasumpion by Tay fate apauetercoramite by ts emplayee i incumbent upon ENE MBPT DST acy un the presenting adequate and convincing proof that it exercise aa id the care and diligence of ; craton end sapersion oft employees (Lampesa v. De Ver, etal Supra nOKe AA "20-21, citing Sykt v. Begasa, 460 Phil. 381, 386 {2003}; R. Transport Corp. v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161, Fet heir employees acting ‘pruary 18, 2015, Peralta, |} EMect autisbasedomtart 180 of the New Civil Code, as such, the lability for which employer is being made respons jbetween employer and the deceased, but from a damage caused by th a aera salary Habit forthe lablty ofthe employer for the negligent Sour Taare J nabjctanly to the defense of due dilgenge in the selection and suPevisi0n 9 ‘Frucking Corporation v. People of the Philippines, 386 Phil. 41,57 {20001 vast under Article 2176, 0 relation to Article 2 a Fi ol rm a pre-exsing contactal relation fyarses nt omc empioyec. the employer canno oa Wf its subordinate 1s direct and the employee: (Rafael Reyes Liability of registered owner of vehicle ty ofregitered owner of ve sic or bath he ower of record and hs actu perso A sity a a evr amonangs Transporation Comyn v Csr AMSA £110 real Lae gor af Appa ane red IE Cast, Ng No.8 et comerernl ve 1962; Redado v. Bautista, CA GR. No. 19295-R, Sept. 19, 4059-4061; Castanares v. Pages, CA-GR. No. 21809-R, March 8, AoA eeeeNeths CALC. No. 20483-R, April 29, 1965) “The principe of holding he registered owner liable for ysscle has already been transferred to another is designed to lous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, inorder to Corp. ¥. Yu, GR, No, 174161, February 18, 2015, damages notwithstanding that ownership ofthe offending ve protect the public and:not as 2 shield on the part of unserupil pe telf from lablity arising fromts own negligent act.” (R. Transport Perala,)). = Liability ofrgistered owner of vehicle although not the actual operator: reasons “PAfa motor vehicle was sold but the seller remained the registered owner of the bus at the time of the incident, it could non eee abt forthe personal injuries and property damage suffered by the anather. This because of he registeredsowner rule, whereby the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in a ‘vehicular accident could be held bt ort emeaences (Erzo tx ete, 102 Pi 10, 108-109 (1973) Fie came glaraunn is required not to make said regstration the operative act by which ownership in vides bcuatered at in Land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of wae eion doesnot hear any essental relation to the contact of sale between the paris (Chinchilla Tee ae Cenaguer, 39 Phil. 688), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any epic hghray (section 5 [al Act No. 3992, as amended.) The tain aim of motor vehicle registration 1s aavcnuy the owner so that ifany acident happens, or that any damage or tury is caused by the Tense, the public highways, responsibilty therefor can be fixed on 2 definite individual, the epstered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highway’ caused accidents Tetsleres to pedestrians or other vehicles without postive identification of the owner or drivers, or Shai very seant means of \entifcation, It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient oF projudiial to the public, tht the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, m the interest ofthe serermination of persons responsible for dainages or injuries caused on public highways (Metro Manila ‘Transit Corp. v-Cuevas, GR. No. 167797, June 15,2015, Bersamin, f- Remedy of registered owner. ‘Although the registered-owner rule might seem to be unjust towards MMTC, the law did not leave it without at ree en ec Pear Tonpor Sera Eapinasi4 MMC could recover rm Minas Tans he ‘ABRC2018 Magic Areas in Civil Law Law/EVSAVenys 37 actual employer of the negligent driver. under the principle of unjust enrichment, by means of a cross-claim reimbursement ofall the amounts that st could be required to pay as damages arising from the driver's negligence. A cross aim a claim by one party against a co-party arising, Out of the transaction or occurrence that 1s the subject matter either ‘ofthe original action oF of a counterclaim therein, and may include a claum that the party against whom itis asserted 1s oF may be lable to the crass-claimant for oll ar port of @ claim asserted inthe action against the eross.clarmant. (Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Cuevas, GR. No. 167797, June 18, 2015, Bersamin, I) Liability of hotelkeeper for the death of a guest. ‘The hotelkeeper is able for damages in case of death of a guest msde his room occasioned by trespassers. The hhotel business ts smbued with public interest, Catering to the public, htelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging, {or their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of ther guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the ‘business (VHT Realty Corp. v. CA, GR. No. 126780, February 17, 2008, 451 SCRA 638). Applying by analogy Article 2000, Arle 2001, and Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as ta the personal effects af their guests), it was held that there 1s much greater reason to apply the same if not greater legree of care and responsibilty when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved. Otherwise, the hatelkeepers would simply stand ily by as strangers have unrestected access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being held hable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests, That would be absurd, something that no good law would ever cavision. (Makati Shang-rt a Hotel & Resor, inc. v. Harper, ota, GR. No. 189998, August 29, 2012, Bersamin |). Res ipsa loquitur. Literally, res ipsa foguitur ma nquiry, taken with the cans “the thing speaks for it eI Was the ts thatthe fact ofthe occurrence of an surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference oF raise a presumption of negligence, or make ‘out a plaintf?’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, {Ramos v. CA, GR, No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 584), Stated differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, 1s under the exclusive control of the defendant and the mjury 1s such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, i alfords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the ‘jury arose tram the defendant's want of eare, and the burd, ‘of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed ddue care and diligence. (Africa v. Caltex (Phils) Inc, 123 Phil. 280) ‘The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res psologuitur ae: {1) the occurrence ofan injury (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant, (3) the occurrence was such that Inthe ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper cares and w ye absence of explanation by the defendant. OF the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental 1s the “control and ‘management ofthe thing which cause the injury.” ‘The clement of ‘control and management ofthe thing which caused the injury” are wanting inthe case. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loyuitur will not jie. (Professional Services, In. v. Agana, GR. No. 126297; Agana v. Juan Fuentes, GR. No. 126467: Aumpil v. Agana, GR, No. 127590, January 31, 2007). Effect If a driver was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, at the time of a vehicular accident. He Is presumed negligent. (Secuon 35, RA. No. 4136). Under the New Civil Code, unless there 18 proof to the contrary, 15 presuined that 3 person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was, Violating any traffic regulation, (Art, 2185, NCC}, The driver's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption {hat he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as te speed, 9 motorist is Coxpected to excreise aritinary cape and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions fencountered (Cannos [t.¥, People, GR, No, 147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 348, 361, citing Foster v. ConAgra Poultry Co, 670 Sa.2¢ 471) which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle toa full Stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. (Nunn v. Financial Indem. Co, 644 So.2d 630; Filipinas Syntheuc Fiber Corp. ¥, Wilfredo delos Santos, etal, .R No. 152033, March 36, 2011). ‘Additional on QUASL-DELICT Lab of employer eee rcicle belonging toa employer hts and hla pederan wiles bing dren by the employee, thc emlagrlsnbie unr rie F180, NCC Torbuig te simple oruner Art 103, RPC An eployeheeae civilly for the negligent act or criminal act of his employee. The employee ts hable criminally for imprudence resulting to homicide ore may be sued based on quast-delict. Distinctions on thelr Habitlties. “The employer's hability \(pursued under the Cwvil Cade is dircet and primary without need of recourse against the cemplayee, He may however, nterpose the defense of the diligence of a good father of a family. Ifthe injured party decides to the enforce the civil abilty tt the criminal ease, prior canviction ofthe accused 1s necessary. In such a case, the employer shall only he subsidiary habe under the RPC but he ts not allowed to interpose the diligence of a good father of a farmily asa defe DAMAGES Compensatory damages fo loss of capacity to earn: when recoverable peMtindey Artie az06 ofthe civ Code the hers a he victim are ented to indemmty fr loss of earning capac Compensatan of ths nature awarded mt or loss of earns i fo loss af eapacty to earn. The sndemmteation for lows of cart eapuenypartakos i the ature of atoat damages which must be duly proven by competent prot and the Sewtabuaimahe evdcnee therea’ Thus va rule documentary evidence should be presented (substantiate dhe lim for ABRC2018 Magi Areas Cowl Law LaW/EVSAVCOVS 38 rity may be awarded despite ‘minimum wage of work no. raamages for 1055 of Caring capacity. By way of exception, damages tor oss of earaing, Pa. fe absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self employed and earning less than the tinder current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is emplayed asa daily wage worker earning fess than the mnUME swage undercurrent labor lars. (Jose v. Angeles, No. 187899, October 23,2013, 7DB SCRA Qe; Peuple v Vallar, GA: No 202708, April 13, 2015, Del Castillo.) Death due to erime; amount of damages. ‘When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be award: (1) evil indemn death ofthe victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages: damages. (People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012, 680 SCRA 386,437) Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of evi indemnity and moral damages awarded to the hews of victim of Paricide at P75,000.00 each (People v. Tibon 636 Phil S21, 838 (2010), The temperate damages awarded PY the RTC inthe amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest jurisprudence, te fiting ta additionally award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the qualifng circumstance of relationship. (People v. Guting, G.r No. 205412, September 9, 2015, Leonardo-De Castro I} ty ex delicto for the ‘and ( 5) temperate Breach of contract, when moral damages recoverable. in an action for breach of eonttnce, moral damages may be recovered only when a) death ofa passenger results or b) the carrier was guilty of fraud and bed faith even f death does not result; and that netther of these circumssancr® Were present inthe ease at bar. The CA correctly held that, since no mora! damages was awarded then, there 1s no basis to grant exemplary damages and attorney's fees to petitioners To stress, this case 1s one for breach of contract of eariage (culpa constence of the contract between the parties, and the failure ofthe common car for her destination, An action for breach of contract differs fram quast-dlicts (also referred as culpa agullana or culpa fxtra contractual) asthe latter emanate from the neghgenceof the tortfeasor (Caalas v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phi), 146, 150-181 [2000}) including such instance where a person is injured ina vehicular accident by a party other than the carrier where he isa passenger “ihe pence that n an action for breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may-be awarded only incase (4) an acci¢ent results in the death ofa passenger, or (2) the carrier Is guilty of fraud or bad faith, is pursuant to Article 176%, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, and Article 2220 thereof (Darines, ct al. v. Quinones ct al. GR, No. 206468, ‘August 2, 2017, Del Castillo, f) » contractual) where wtis necessary to show the rier to transport its passenger safely to his Compensatory damages for loss of capacity to earn: when recoverable, “Article. 2206 of the Cavil Code. the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity. Compensation of this nature fs awarded not for lass of earnings, but for lass of capacity to earn. The indemnification for ioss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proc! and the best obtanane evidence thereof Thus, asa rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacty. By way of exception, damages for loss af earcing capacity may be awarded despite the alsence of documentary evidence when (1)the deceased 1s self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage naler current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence ts available; oF (2) the deceased is employed asa daily wage worker earning less than the minienam tage under current labor laws. (Jose v Angeles, G.R-No, 187899, Octaber 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 506: People v. Villar GR. No 202708, April 13,2015, Del Castillo, 1). Moral damages and civil indematy need not be pleaded in a homicide case. rt gamages and chal indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human Iie absolutely brings moral and spiral losses as well as @ definite loss, Moral damages and civil indemnity aauire nether pleading Aor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions moral suflerungson the part Trae cums heies (People v.Ogianas, GR No, 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319, 339-340; People v, Buduhan, GR No. 176196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367-368; People v. Berondo, ‘No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 Scha $47, 54-555) As the Court said m People v.Panado- (People v. Panado, GR, No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-691) : "cx yiolent‘death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the ‘retin’ farly tis inherently human to sufer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved Ene becomies the victim ofa violent or brutal kiling. Such violent death or brutal ling not only steals from bis famly ofthe deceased his precious hie, deprives them forever of his love affection and suppor, but ofp leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. ‘The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime (Ladines v. People, etal, GR. No. 167333, January 11, 2016, Bersamin, J}. ‘Award of damages. : ‘Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right 1s technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a Joss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. In the present case, Gonzales had the right to be informed of the ‘accrued interest and most especially, for the suspension of his COHLA, For failure to do so, the bank is. liable to pay ‘nominal damages, Moreover, the failure to give prior notice when required constitutes a breach of contract and isa clear violation of ‘Art. 21 of the Code which entitles the client to an award for moral damages. Even in the absence of malice or bad faith, a depositor still has the right fo recover reasonable moral damages, if the depositor suffered mental anguish, serious ast embarrassment and humiliation. (EUSEBIO GONZALES v. PCIB, etal, G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011, Velasco, 39 award of temperate damages seis angen: poof on te amma of xl danoges sec 2 party sete to eceed dona atic pany " at Guce-Africa, G.R. No. 165679, (Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. Castillo, supra, citing Duenas ¥. ‘provides that: "Temperate or moderates damages, sd when the court finds that some certainty.” The amount temperate damages. October 5, 2009, 603 SCRA 11, 22). Article 2224 of the New Civil Code Which are miore than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recaverc ppecumiary loss has becn suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature af the case, be proved with c thereof is usually left to the sound discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be “more than nominal but less than compensatory.” Considering the concomitant tances prevailing in this case, temperate damages in the amount of P350,000.00 is deemed equitable. (International minal Services, Inc. . Chua, G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014, Peralta |) Container Tei LAND REGISTRATION Land registration court has no jurisdiction over land already decreed under the name of another. ‘An application for registration aver a portion ofa big lot covered by a TCT may not be granted. A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed im the name of another in an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another decree covering the same land 1, therefore, null and void. (Top Management Programs Corporation v. Fajardo, GR, No. 150462, June 15,2011, 652 SCRA 18, 37, and Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, ine, GR. Nos. 141019, 164281, and 185781, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 13, 44) ‘The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public should be able to rely on a registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because st was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of Jand titles and to protect their indefeasibulity once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title Is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting n the portals of the cout, oF sitting on the "mirador su casa’ to avoid the possibility of fosing his land. (Ingusan v, Heirs of Reyes, 558 Phil. $0, 61 [2007]; Francisco v. Rojas, etal. GR. No. 167120, April 23, 2014, Peralta, I) A Certificate of Title cannot be subject to collateral attack. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the issue of the validity of tile can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. (Ingusan Miguel v. Hetrs of Aureliano 1, Reyes, $58 Phil. 6 (2007), citing Caraan v. Court of Appeals, 551 Phil. 172 (2005); and Spouses Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 476 Phil. 414 (2004))-A certificate of title cannot. be attacked collaterally. This rule is provided under Section 48 of PD 1529 which states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack, It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with Jaw. (Wee v Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, une 4, 2014, Mendoza, I) PD 1529 merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alicnable and disposable atthe time the application for registration of tile is fled, The required possession is not to be reckoned (rom the time of the declaration of the property as alienable and disposable. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor ‘s entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his ttle thereto as soon as tis declared alienable and disposable. (REPUBLIC (OF THE PHILIPPINES v. IGLESIA Ni CRISTO,et al, GR. No, 180067, June 30, 2009, VELASCO, IR.) Good Luck toAll 2018 Bar Examinees We Are Praying for Your Success God Bless From: ABRC Family -ABRC2O16 Magic Areas in iil Law Law/EVSNerys 40