Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 2 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air Uni ersity !a"#ell Air For$e %ase, Ala&ama http'(($(a#$gate($p$)pu&s(farr.htm

The Third Temple's Hol O! Holies: Isr"el's N#$le"r We"po%s
Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army Septem&er *+++ The Counterproliferation Papers Series #as esta&lishe, &y the USAF Counterproliferation Center to pro i,e information an, analysis to U.S. national se$urity poli$y)ma-ers an, USAF offi$ers to assist them in $ountering the threat pose, &y a, ersaries e.uippe, #ith #eapons of mass ,estru$tion. Copies of papers in this series are a aila&le from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, /20 Chennault Cir$le, !a"#ell AF% AL /1**2)1223. The fa" num&er is 4//25 +0/)30/67 phone 4//25 +0/) 30/6. Counterproliferation Paper No. 2 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College

Air Uni ersity !a"#ell Air For$e %ase, Ala&ama /1**2)1223 The internet a,,ress for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is' http'(($(a#$gate(a#$)$ps.htm

Page Dis$laimer i The Author ii A$-no#le,gments iii A&stra$t i 8. 8ntro,u$tion * 88. *+26)*+12' With Fren$h Cooperation / 888. *+1/)*+3/' Seeing the Pro9e$t Through to Completion + 8:. *+32)*+++' %ringing the %om& Up the %asement Stairs *0 Appen,i"' ;stimates of the 8sraeli Nu$lear Arsenal 2/ Notes 20

The ie#s e"presse, in this pu&li$ation are those solely of the author an, are not a statement of offi$ial poli$y or position of the U.S. <o ernment, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.

The A#&hor
Colonel Warner D. =>o$-y? Farr, !e,i$al Corps, !aster Flight Surgeon, U.S. Army, gra,uate, from the Air War College at !a"#ell Air For$e %ase, Ala&ama &efore &e$oming the Comman, Surgeon, U.S. Army Spe$ial @perations Comman, at Fort %ragg, North Carolina. Ae also ser es as the Surgeon for the U.S. Army Spe$ial For$es Comman,, U.S. Army Ci il Affairs an, Psy$hologi$al @perations Comman,, an, the U.S. Army Bohn F. Cenne,y Spe$ial Warfare Center an, S$hool. With thirty)three years of military ser i$e, he hol,s an Asso$iate of Arts from the State Uni ersity of Ne# Dor-, %a$helor of S$ien$e from Northeast Louisiana Uni ersity, Do$tor of !e,i$ine from the

Uniforme, Ser i$es Uni ersity of the Aealth S$ien$es, !asters of Pu&li$ Aealth from the Uni ersity of Te"as, an, has $omplete, me,i$al resi,en$ies in aerospa$e me,i$ine, an, anatomi$ an, $lini$al pathology. Ae is the only army offi$er to &e &oar, $ertifie, in these three spe$ialties. Solo .ualifie, in the TA)00A Army heli$opter, he re$ei e, flight training in the T)/3 an, T)/6 air$raft as part of his USAF S$hool of Aerospa$e !e,i$ine resi,en$y. Colonel Farr #as a !aster Sergeant Spe$ial For$es me,i$ prior to re$ei ing a ,ire$t $ommission to se$on, lieutenant. Ae is no# the senior Spe$ial For$es me,i$al offi$er in the U.S. Army #ith prior assignments in the 0th, 3th, an, *Eth Spe$ial For$es <roups 4Air&orne5, *st Spe$ial For$es, in :ietnam, the Unite, States, an, <ermany. Ae has a, ise, the *2th an, 2Eth Spe$ial For$es <roups 4Air&orne5 in the reser es an, national guar,, ser e, as Di ision Surgeon, *Eth !ountain Di ision 4Light 8nfantry5, an, as the Deputy Comman,er of the U.S. Army Aerome,i$al Center, Fort >u$-er, Ala&ama.

8 #oul, li-e to a$-no#le,ge the assistan$e, gui,an$e an, en$ouragement from my Air War College 4AWC5 fa$ulty resear$h a, isor, Dr. An,re# Terrill, instru$tor of the Air War College Ara&)8sraeli Wars $ourse. Than-s are also ,ue to the great ai, of the Air Uni ersity li&rarians. The author is also in,e&te, to Captain B. >. Saun,ers, USN an, Colonel >o&ert Sutton, USAF. Who also offere, helpful suggestions.

This paper is a history of the 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons program ,ra#n from a re ie# of un$lassifie, sour$es. 8srael &egan its sear$h for nu$lear #eapons at the in$eption of the state in *+26. As payment for 8sraeli parti$ipation in the SueF Crisis of *+01, Fran$e pro i,e, nu$lear e"pertise an, $onstru$te, a rea$tor $omple" for 8srael at Dimona $apa&le of large)s$ale plutonium pro,u$tion an, repro$essing. The Unite, States ,is$o ere, the fa$ility &y *+06 an, it #as a su&9e$t of $ontinual ,is$ussions &et#een Ameri$an presi,ents an, 8sraeli prime ministers. 8srael use, ,elay an, ,e$eption to at first -eep the Unite, States at &ay, an, later use, the nu$lear option as a &argaining $hip for a $onsistent Ameri$an $on entional arms supply. After Fren$h ,isengagement in the early *+1Es, 8srael progresse, on its o#n, in$lu,ing through se eral $o ert operations, to pro9e$t $ompletion. %efore the *+13 Si")Day War, they felt their nu$lear fa$ility threatene, an, reporte,ly assem&le, se eral nu$lear ,e i$es. %y the *+3/ Dom Cippur War 8srael ha, a num&er of sophisti$ate, nu$lear &om&s, ,eploye, them, an, $onsi,ere, using them. The Ara&s may ha e limite, their #ar aims &e$ause of their -no#le,ge of the 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons. 8srael has most pro&a&ly $on,u$te, se eral nu$lear &om& tests. They ha e $ontinue, to mo,erniFe an, erti$ally proliferate an, are no# one of the #orl,Gs larger nu$lear po#ers. Using =&om& in the &asement? nu$lear opa$ity, 8srael has &een a&le to use its arsenal as a ,eterrent to the Ara& #orl, #hile not te$hni$ally iolating Ameri$an nonproliferation re.uirements.

The Third Temple's Hol o! Holies: Isr"el's N#$le"r We"po%s
Warner D. Farr

I+ I%&rod#$&io%
This is the end of the Third Temple. − Attri&ute, to !oshe Dayan ,uring the Dom Cippur War* As Hionists in Palestine #at$he, Worl, War 88 from their ,istant si,esho#, #hat lessons #ere learne,I The sol,iers of the ;mpire of Bapan o#e, on their emperorGs sa$re, throne to fight to the ,eath an, not fa$e the ine ita&ility of an Ameri$an i$tory. !any Be#s #on,ere, if the Ara&s #oul, try to push them into the !e,iterranean Sea. After the ,e astating Ameri$an nu$lear atta$- on Bapan, the sol,ier lea,ers of the empire ree aluate, their fight to the ,eath position. Di, the &om& gi e the Bapanese permission to surren,er an, li eI 8t o& iously playe, a military role, a politi$al role, an, a pea$ema-ing role. Ao# $lose #as the min,set of the Samurai $ulture to the 8slami$ $ultureI Di, Da i, %en)<urion ta-e note an, #on,er if the same #oul, #or- for 8sraelI 2 Coul, 8srael fin, the ultimate ,eterrent that #oul, $on in$e her opponents that they $oul, ne er, e er su$$ee,I Was 8sraelGs a&ility to $ause a mo,ern holo$aust the &est #ay to guarantee ne er ha ing another oneI The use of un$on entional #eapons in the !i,,le ;ast is not ne#. The %ritish ha, use, $hemi$al artillery shells against the Tur-s at the se$on, &attle of <aFa in *+*3. They $ontinue, $hemi$al shelling against the Shiites in 8ra. in *+2E an, use, aerial $hemi$als in the *+2Es an, *+/Es in 8ra../ 8sraelGs in ol ement #ith nu$lear te$hnology starts at the foun,ing of the state in *+26. !any talente, Be#ish s$ientists immigrate, to Palestine ,uring the thirties an, forties, in parti$ular, ;rnst Da i, %ergmann. Ae #oul, &e$ome the ,ire$tor of the 8sraeli Atomi$ ;nergy Commission an, the foun,er of 8sraelGs efforts to ,e elop nu$lear #eapons. %ergmann, a $lose frien, an, a, isor of 8sraelGs first Prime !inister, Da i, %en)<urion, $ounsele, that nu$lear energy $oul, $ompensate for 8sraelGs poor natural resour$es an, small pool of military manpo#er. Ae pointe, out that there #as 9ust one nu$lear energy, not t#o, suggesting nu$lear #eapons #ere part of the plan.2 As early as *+26, 8sraeli s$ientists a$ti ely e"plore, the Nege Desert for uranium ,eposits on or,ers from the 8sraeli !inistry of Defense. %y *+0E, they foun, lo#)gra,e ,eposits near %eershe&a an, Si,on an, #or-e, on a lo# po#er metho, of hea y #ater pro,u$tion.0 The ne#ly $reate, WeiFmann 8nstitute of S$ien$e a$ti ely supporte, nu$lear resear$h &y *+2+, #ith Dr. %ergmann hea,ing the $hemistry ,i ision. Promising stu,ents #ent

o erseas to stu,y nu$lear engineering an, physi$s at 8sraeli go ernment e"pense. 8srael se$retly foun,e, its o#n Atomi$ ;nergy Commission in *+02 an, pla$e, it un,er the $ontrol of the Defense !inistry.1 The foun,ations of a nu$lear program #ere &eginning to ,e elop.

II+ ,-./0,-12: Wi&h Fre%$h Cooper"&io%
It has always been our intention to develop a nuclear potential. − ;phraim CatFir3 8n *+2+, Fran$is Perrin, a mem&er of the Fren$h Atomi$ ;nergy Commission, nu$lear physi$ist, an, frien, of Dr. %ergmann isite, the WeiFmann 8nstitute. Ae in ite, 8sraeli s$ientists to the ne# Fren$h nu$lear resear$h fa$ility at Sa$lay. A 9oint resear$h effort #as su&se.uently set up &et#een the t#o nations. Perrin pu&li$ly state, in *+61 that Fren$h s$ientists #or-ing in Ameri$a on the !anhattan Pro9e$t an, in Cana,a ,uring Worl, War 88 #ere tol, they $oul, use their -no#le,ge in Fran$e pro i,e, they -ept it a se$ret.6 Perrin reporte,ly pro i,e, nu$lear ,ata to 8srael on the same &asis.+ @ne 8sraeli s$ientist #or-e, at the U.S. Los Alamos National La&oratory an, may ha e ,ire$tly &rought e"pertise home.*E After the Se$on, Worl, War, Fran$eGs nu$lear resear$h $apa&ility #as .uite limite,. Fran$e ha, &een a lea,ing resear$h $enter in nu$lear physi$s &efore Worl, War 88, &ut ha, fallen far &ehin, the U.S., the U.S.S.>., the Unite, Cing,om, an, e en Cana,a. 8srael an, Fran$e #ere at a similar le el of e"pertise after the #ar, an, 8sraeli s$ientists $oul, ma-e signifi$ant $ontri&utions to the Fren$h effort. Progress in nu$lear s$ien$e an, te$hnology in Fran$e an, 8srael remaine, $losely lin-e, throughout the early fifties. 8sraeli s$ientists pro&a&ly helpe, $onstru$t the <)* plutonium pro,u$tion rea$tor an, UP)* repro$essing plant at !ar$oule.** Fran$e profite, from t#o 8sraeli patents on hea y #ater pro,u$tion an, lo#)gra,e uranium enri$hment.*2 8n the *+0Es an, into the early *+1Es, Fran$e an, 8srael ha, $lose relations in many areas. Fran$e #as 8sraelGs prin$ipal arms supplier, an, as insta&ility sprea, through Fren$h $olonies in North Afri$a, 8srael pro i,e, alua&le intelligen$e o&taine, from $onta$ts #ith sephar,i$ Be#s in those $ountries. The t#o nations $olla&orate,, #ith the Unite, Cing,om, in planning an, staging the SueF Canal)Sinai operation against ;gypt in @$to&er *+01. The SueF Crisis &e$ame the real genesis of 8sraelGs nu$lear #eapons pro,u$tion program. With the CFe$h);gyptian arms agreement in *+00, 8srael &e$ame #orrie,. When a&sor&e,, the So iet)&lo$ e.uipment #oul, triple ;gyptian military strength. After ;gyptGs Presi,ent Nasser $lose, the Straits of Tiran in *+0/, 8sraeli Prime !inister %en)<urion or,ere, the ,e elopment of $hemi$al munitions an, other un$on entional munitions, in$lu,ing nu$lear.*/ Si" #ee-s &efore the SueF Canal operation, 8srael felt the time #as right to approa$h Fran$e for assistan$e in &uil,ing a nu$lear rea$tor. Cana,a ha, set a pre$e,ent a year earlier #hen it ha, agree, to &uil, a 2E)mega#att C8>US rea$tor in 8n,ia. Shimon Peres, the Dire$tor)<eneral of the Defense !inistry an, ai,e to Prime !inister 4an, Defense !inister5 Da i, %en)

<urion, an, %ergmann met #ith mem&ers of the C;A 4Fran$eGs Atomi$ ;nergy Commission5. During Septem&er *+01, they rea$he, an initial un,erstan,ing to pro i,e a resear$h rea$tor. The t#o $ountries $on$lu,e, final agreements at a se$ret meeting outsi,e Paris #here they also finaliFe, ,etails of the SueF Canal operation.*2 For the Unite, Cing,om an, Fran$e, the SueF operation, laun$he, on @$to&er 2+, *+01, #as a total ,isaster. 8sraelGs part #as a military su$$ess, allo#ing it to o$$upy the entire Sinai Peninsula &y 2 No em&er, &ut the Fren$h an, %ritish $anal in asion on 1 No em&er #as a politi$al failure. Their attempt to a, an$e south along the SueF Canal stoppe, ,ue to a $ease)fire un,er fier$e So iet an, U.S. pressure. %oth nations pulle, out, lea ing 8srael to fa$e the pressure from the t#o superpo#ers alone. So iet Premier %ulganin an, Presi,ent Chrush$he issue, an impli$it threat of nu$lear atta$- if 8srael ,i, not #ith,ra# from the Sinai. @n 3 No em&er *+01, a se$ret meeting #as hel, &et#een 8sraeli foreign minister <ol,a !eir, Shimon Peres, an, Fren$h foreign an, ,efense ministers Christian Pineau an, !auri$e %ourges)!anoury. The Fren$h, em&arrasse, &y their failure to support their ally in the operation, foun, the 8sraelis ,eeply $on$erne, a&out a So iet threat. 8n this meeting, they su&stantially mo,ifie, the initial un,erstan,ing &eyon, a resear$h rea$tor. Peres se$ure, an agreement from Fran$e to assist 8srael in ,e eloping a nu$lear ,eterrent. After further months of negotiation, agreement #as rea$he, for an *6) mega#att 4thermal5 resear$h rea$tor of the ;L)/ type, along #ith plutonium separation te$hnology. Fran$e an, 8srael signe, the agreement in @$to&er *+03.*0 Later the rea$tor #as offi$ially upgra,e, to 22 mega#atts, &ut the a$tual spe$ifi$ations issue, to engineers pro i,e, for $ore $ooling ,u$ts suffi$ient for up to three times this po#er le el, along #ith a plutonium plant of similar $apa$ity. Data from insi,er reports re eale, in *+61 #oul, estimate the po#er le el at *20)*0E mega#atts.*1 The rea$tor, not $onne$te, to tur&ines for po#er pro,u$tion, nee,e, this in$rease in siFe only to in$rease its plutonium pro,u$tion. Ao# this upgra,e $ame a&out remains un-no#n, &ut %ourges)!aunoury, repla$ing !ollet as Fren$h prime minister, may ha e $ontri&ute, to it.*3 Shimon Peres, the gui,ing han, in the 8sraeli nu$lear program, ha, a $lose relationship #ith %ourges) !aunoury an, pro&a&ly helpe, him politi$ally. *6 Why #as Fran$e so eager to help 8sraelI De!ollet an, then ,e <aulle ha, a pla$e for 8srael #ithin their strategi$ ision. A nu$lear 8srael $oul, &e a $ounterfor$e against ;gypt in Fran$eGs fight in Algeria. ;gypt #as openly ai,ing the re&el for$es there. Fran$e also #ante, to o&tain the &om& itself. The Unite, States ha, em&argoe, $ertain nu$lear ena&ling $omputer te$hnology from Fran$e. 8srael $oul, get the te$hnology from Ameri$a an, pass it through to Fran$e. The U.S. furnishe, 8srael hea y #ater, un,er the Atoms for Pea$e program, for the small resear$h rea$tor at Sore.. Fran$e $oul, use this hea y #ater. Sin$e Fran$e #as some years a#ay from nu$lear testing an, su$$ess, 8sraeli s$ien$e #as an insuran$e poli$y in $ase of te$hni$al pro&lems in Fran$eGs o#n program.*+ The 8sraeli intelligen$e $ommunityGs -no#le,ge of past Fren$h 4espe$ially :i$hy5 anti) Semiti$ transgressions an, the $ontinue, presen$e of former NaFi $olla&orators in Fren$h intelligen$e pro i,e, the 8sraelis #ith some &la$-mail opportunities.2E The $ooperation

#as so $lose that 8srael #or-e, #ith Fran$e on the prepro,u$tion ,esign of early !irage 9et air$raft, ,esigne, to &e $apa&le of ,eli ering nu$lear &om&s.2* Fren$h e"perts se$retly &uilt the 8sraeli rea$tor un,ergroun, at Dimona, in the Nege ,esert of southern 8srael near %eershe&a. Aun,re,s of Fren$h engineers an, te$hni$ians fille, %eershe&a, the &iggest to#n in the Nege . !any of the same $ontra$tors #ho &uilt !ar$oule #ere in ol e,. S@N 4a Fren$h firm5 &uilt the plutonium separation plants in &oth Fran$e an, 8srael. The groun, #as &ro-en for the ;L)*E2 rea$tor 4as it #as -no#n to Fran$e5 in early *+06. 8srael use, many su&terfuges to $on$eal a$ti ity at Dimona. 8t $alle, the plant a manganese plant, an, rarely, a te"tile plant. The Unite, States &y the en, of *+06 ha, ta-en pi$tures of the pro9e$t from U)2 spy planes, an, i,entifie, the site as a pro&a&le rea$tor $omple". The $on$entration of Fren$hmen #as also impossi&le to hi,e from groun, o&ser ers. 8n *+1E, &efore the rea$tor #as operating, Fran$e, no# un,er the lea,ership of ,e <aulle, re$onsi,ere, an, ,e$i,e, to suspen, the pro9e$t. After se eral months of negotiation, they rea$he, an agreement in No em&er that allo#e, the rea$tor to pro$ee, if 8srael promise, not to ma-e nu$lear #eapons an, to announ$e the pro9e$t to the #orl,. Wor- on the plutonium repro$essing plant halte,. @n 2 De$em&er *+1E, &efore 8srael $oul, ma-e announ$ements, the U.S. State Department issue, a statement that 8srael ha, a se$ret nu$lear installation. %y *1 De$em&er, this &e$ame pu&li$ -no#le,ge #ith its appearan$e in the New York Times. @n 2* De$em&er, %en)<urion announ$e, that 8srael #as &uil,ing a 22)mega#att rea$tor =for pea$eful purposes.?22 @ er the ne"t year, relations &et#een the U.S. an, 8srael &e$ame straine, o er the Dimona rea$tor. The U.S. a$$epte, 8sraelGs assertions at fa$e alue pu&li$ly, &ut e"erte, pressure pri ately. Although 8srael allo#e, a $ursory inspe$tion &y #ell -no#n Ameri$an physi$ists ;ugene Wigner an, 8. 8. >a&i, Prime !inister %en)<urion $onsistently refuse, to allo# regular international inspe$tions. The final resolution &et#een the U.S. an, 8srael #as a $ommitment from 8srael to use the fa$ility for pea$eful purposes, an, to a,mit an U.S. inspe$tion team t#i$e a year. These inspe$tions &egan in *+12 an, $ontinue, until *+1+. 8nspe$tors sa# only the a&o e groun, part of the &uil,ings, not the many le els un,ergroun, an, the isit fre.uen$y #as ne er more than on$e a year. The a&o e groun, areas ha, simulate, $ontrol rooms, an, a$$ess to the un,ergroun, areas #as -ept hi,,en #hile the inspe$tors #ere present. ;le ators lea,ing to the se$ret un,ergroun, plutonium repro$essing plant #ere a$tually &ri$-e, o er.2/ !u$h of the information on these inspe$tions an, the politi$al maneu ering aroun, it has 9ust &een ,e$lassifie,.22
@ne interpretation of %en)<urionGs =pea$eful purposes? ple,ge gi en to Ameri$a is that he interprete, it to mean that nu$lear #eapon ,e elopment #as not e"$lu,e, if use, stri$tly for ,efensi e, an, not offensi e purposes. 8sraelGs se$urity position in the late fifties an, early si"ties #as far more pre$arious than no#. After three #ars, #ith a ro&ust ,omesti$ arms in,ustry an, a relia&le ,efense supply line from the U.S., 8srael felt mu$h more se$ure. During the fifties an, early si"ties a num&er of attempts &y 8srael to o&tain se$urity guarantees from the U.S. to pla$e 8srael un,er the U.S. nu$lear um&rella li-e NAT@ or Bapan, #ere unsu$$essful. 8f the U.S. ha, $on,u$te, a for#ar,)loo-ing poli$y to restrain 8sraelGs proliferation, along #ith a sure ,efense agreement, #e $oul, ha e pre ente, the ,e elopment of 8sraelGs nu$lear arsenal.

@ne $ommon ,is$ussion in the literature $on$erns testing of 8sraeli nu$lear ,e i$es. 8n the early phases, the amount of $olla&oration &et#een the Fren$h an, 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons ,esign programs ma,e testing unne$essary. 8n a,,ition, although their main efforts #ere #ith plutonium, the 8sraelis may ha e amasse, enough uranium for gun)assem&le, type &om&s #hi$h, li-e the Airoshima &om&, re.uire no testing. @ne e"pert postulate,, &ase, on unname, sour$es, that the Fren$h nu$lear test in *+1E ma,e t#o nu$lear po#ers not oneJ su$h #as the ,epth of $olla&oration.20

There #ere se eral 8sraeli o&ser ers at the Fren$h nu$lear tests an, the 8sraelis ha, =unrestri$te, a$$ess to Fren$h nu$lear test e"plosion ,ata.?21 8srael also supplie, essential te$hnology an, har,#are.23 The Fren$h reporte,ly shippe, repro$esse, plutonium &a$- to 8srael as part of their repayment for 8sraeli s$ientifi$ help. Ao#e er, this $onstant, ,e$a,e long, Fren$h $ooperation an, support #as soon to en, an, 8srael #oul, ha e to go it alone.

III+ ,-130,-43: Seei%) &he Pro5e$& &o Comple&io%
To act in such a way that the Jews who died in the gas chambers would be the last Jews to die without defending themselves. − <ol,a !eir26 8srael #oul, soon nee, its o#n, in,epen,ent, $apa&ilities to $omplete its nu$lear program. @nly fi e $ountries ha, fa$ilities for uranium enri$hment' the Unite, States, the So iet Union, the Unite, Cing,om, Fran$e, an, China. The Nu$lear !aterials an, ;.uipment Corporation, or NU!;C, in Apollo, Pennsyl ania #as a small fuel ro, fa&ri$ation plant. 8n *+10, the U.S. go ernment a$$use, Dr. Halman Shapiro, the $orporation presi,ent, of =losing? 2EE poun,s of highly enri$he, uranium. Although in estigate, &y the Atomi$ ;nergy Commission, the Central 8ntelligen$e Agen$y, the Fe,eral %ureau of 8n estigation, an, other go ernment agen$ies an, in.uiring reporters, no ans#ers #ere a aila&le in #hat #as terme, the Apollo Affair.2+ !any remain $on in$e, that the 8sraelis re$ei e, 2EE poun,s of enri$he, uranium sometime &efore *+10./E @ne sour$e lin-s >afi ;itan, an 8sraeli !ossa, agent an, later the han,ler of spy Bonathan Pollar,, #ith NU!;C./* 8n the *++Es #hen the NU!;C plant #as ,isassem&le,, the Nu$lear >egulatory Commission foun, o er *EE -ilograms of plutonium in the stru$tural $omponents of the $ontaminate, plant, $asting ,ou&t on 2EE poun,s going to 8srael./2 The 9oint enture #ith Fran$e ga e 8srael se eral ingre,ients for nu$lear #eapons $onstru$tion' a pro,u$tion rea$tor, a fa$tory to e"tra$t plutonium from the spent fuel, an, the ,esign. 8n *+12, the Dimona rea$tor #ent $riti$al7 the Fren$h resume, #or- on the un,ergroun, plutonium repro$essing plant, an, $omplete, it in *+12 or *+10. The a$.uisition of this rea$tor an, relate, te$hnologies #as $learly inten,e, for military purposes from the outset 4not =,ual)use?5, as the rea$tor has no other fun$tion. The se$urity at Dimona 4offi$ially the Nege Nu$lear >esear$h Center5 #as parti$ularly stringent. For straying into DimonaGs airspa$e, the 8sraelis shot ,o#n one of their o#n !irage fighters ,uring the Si")Day War. The 8sraelis also shot ,o#n a Li&yan airliner #ith *E2 passengers, in *+3/, #hi$h ha, straye, o er the Sinai.// There is little ,ou&t

that some time in the late si"ties 8srael &e$ame the si"th nation to manufa$ture nu$lear #eapons. @ther things they nee,e, #ere e"tra uranium an, e"tra hea y #ater to run the rea$tor at a higher rate. Nor#ay, Fran$e, an, the Unite, States pro i,e, the hea y #ater an, =@peration Plum&at? pro i,e, the uranium. After the *+13 #ar, Fran$e stoppe, supplies of uranium to 8srael. These supplies #ere from former Fren$h $olonies of <a&on, Niger, an, the Central Afri$a >epu&li$./2 8srael ha, small amounts of uranium from Nege phosphate mines an, ha, &ought some from Argentina an, South Afri$a, &ut not in the large .uantities supplie, &y the Fren$h. Through a $ompli$ate, un,er$o er operation, the 8sraelis o&taine, uranium o"i,e, -no#n as yello# $a-e, hel, in a sto$-pile in Ant#erp. Using a West <erman front $ompany an, a high seas transfer from one ship to another in the !e,iterranean, they o&taine, 2EE tons of yello# $a-e. The smugglers la&ele, the 01E seale, oil ,rums =Plum&at,? #hi$h means lea,, hen$e =@peration Plum&at.?/0 The West <erman go ernment may ha e &een in ol e, ,ire$tly &ut remaine, un,er$o er to a oi, antagoniFing the So iets or Ara&s./1 8sraeli intelligen$e information on the NaFi past of some West <erman offi$ials may ha e pro i,e, the moti ation./3 Nor#ay sol, 2E tons of hea y #ater to 8srael in *+0+ for use in an e"perimental po#er rea$tor. Nor#ay insiste, on the right to inspe$t the hea y #ater for /2 years, &ut ,i, so only on$e, in April *+1*, #hile it #as still in storage &arrels at Dimona. 8srael simply promise, that the hea y #ater #as for pea$eful purposes. 8n a,,ition, .uantities mu$h more than #hat #oul, &e re.uire, for the pea$eful purpose rea$tors #ere importe,. Nor#ay either $ollu,e, or at the least #as ery slo# to as- to inspe$t as the 8nternational Atomi$ ;nergy Agen$y 48A;A5 rules re.uire,./6 Nor#ay an, 8srael $on$lu,e, an agreement in *++E for 8srael to sell &a$- *E.0 tons of the hea y #ater to Nor#ay. >e$ent $al$ulations re eal that 8srael has use, t#o tons an, #ill retain eight tons more./+ Author Seymour Aersh, #riting in the Samson Option says Prime !inister Le i ;sh-ol ,elaye, starting #eapons pro,u$tion e en after Dimona #as finishe,.2E The rea$tor operate, an, the plutonium $olle$te,, &ut remaine, unseparate,. The first e"tra$tion of plutonium pro&a&ly o$$urre, in late *+10. %y *+11, enough plutonium #as on han, to ,e elop a #eapon in time for the Si")Day War in *+13. Some type of non)nu$lear test, perhaps a Fero yiel, or implosion test, o$$urre, on No em&er 2, *+11. After this time, $onsi,era&le $olla&oration &et#een 8srael an, South Afri$a ,e elope, an, $ontinue, through the *+3Es an, *+6Es. South Afri$a &e$ame 8sraelGs primary supplier of uranium for Dimona. A Center for Nonproliferation Stu,ies report lists four separate 8srael)South Afri$a =$lan,estine nu$lear ,eals.? Three $on$erne, yello#$a-e an, one #as tritium.2* @ther sour$es of yello#$a-e may ha e in$lu,e, Portugal.22 ;gypt attempte, unsu$$essfully to o&tain nu$lear #eapons from the So iet Union &oth &efore an, after the Si")Day War. Presi,ent Nasser re$ei e, from the So iet Union a .uestiona&le nu$lear guarantee instea, an, ,e$lare, that ;gypt #oul, ,e elop its o#n nu$lear program.2/ Ais rhetori$ of *+10 an, *+11 a&out pre enti e #ar an, 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons $ouple, #ith o erflights of the Dimona re$tor $ontri&ute, to the tensions that le, to #ar. The ;gyptian Air For$e $laims to ha e first o erflo#n Dimona

an, re$ogniFe, the e"isten$e of a nu$lear rea$tor in *+10.22 @f the 0E Ameri$an AAWC antiair$raft missiles in 8sraeli han,s, half ringe, Dimona &y *+10.20 8srael $onsi,ere, the ;gyptian o erflights of !ay *1, *+13 as possi&le pre)stri-e re$onnaissan$e. @ne sour$e lists su$h ;gyptian o erflights, along #ith Unite, Nations pea$e-eeper #ith,ra#al an, ;gyptian troop mo ements into the Sinai, as one of the three =trip#ires? #hi$h #oul, ,ri e 8srael to #ar.21 There #as an ;gyptian military plan to atta$- Dimona at the start of any #ar &ut Nasser etoe, it.23 Ae &elie e, 8srael #oul, ha e the &om& in *+16.26 8srael assem&le, t#o nu$lear &om&s an, ten ,ays later #ent to #ar.2+ NasserGs plan, if he ha, one, may ha e &een to gain an, $onsoli,ate territorial gains &efore 8srael ha, a nu$lear option.0E Ae #as t#o #ee-s too late. The 8sraelis aggressi ely pursue, an air$raft ,eli ery system from the Unite, States. Presi,ent Bohnson #as less emphati$ a&out nonproliferation than Presi,ent Cenne,y)or perhaps ha, more pressing $on$erns, su$h as :ietnam. Ae ha, a long history of &oth Be#ish frien,s an, pressing politi$al $ontri&utors $ouple, #ith some first han, e"perien$e of the Aolo$aust, ha ing toure, $on$entration $amps at the en, of Worl, War 88.0* 8srael presse, him har, for air$raft 4A)2; S-yha#-s initially an, F)2; Phantoms later5 an, o&taine, agreement in *+11 un,er the $on,ition that the air$raft #oul, not &e use, to ,eli er nu$lear #eapons. The State Department attempte, to lin- the air$raft pur$hases to $ontinue, inspe$tion isits. Presi,ent Bohnson o errule, the State Department $on$erning Dimona inspe$tions.02 Although ,enie, at the time, Ameri$a ,eli ere, the F)2;s, on Septem&er 0, *+1+, #ith nu$lear $apa&le har,#are inta$t.0/ The Samson Option states that !oshe Dayan ga e the go)ahea, for starting #eapon pro,u$tion in early *+16, putting the plutonium separation plant into full operation. 8srael &egan pro,u$ing three to fi e &om&s a year. The &oo- ritical !ass asserts that 8srael ha, t#o &om&s in *+13, an, that Prime !inister ;sh-ol or,ere, them arme, in 8sraelGs first nu$lear alert ,uring the Si")Day War.02 A ner Cohen in his re$ent &oo-, Israel and the "omb, agrees that 8srael ha, a ,eli era&le nu$lear $apa&ility in the *+13 #ar. Ae .uotes !unya !ar,or, lea,er of >afael, the Armament De elopment Authority, an, other unname, sour$es, that 8srael =$o&&le, together? t#o ,eli era&le ,e i$es.00 Aa ing the &om& meant arti$ulating, e en if se$retly, a use ,o$trine. 8n a,,ition to the =Samson @ption? of last resort, other triggers for nu$lear use may ha e in$lu,e, su$$essful Ara& penetration of populate, areas, ,estru$tion of the 8sraeli Air For$e, massi e air stri-es or $hemi$al(&iologi$al stri-es on 8sraeli $ities, an, Ara& use of nu$lear #eapons.01 8n *+3*, 8srael &egan pur$hasing -rytrons, ultra high)spee, ele$troni$ s#it$hing tu&es that are =,ual)use,K ha ing &oth in,ustrial an, nu$lear #eapons appli$ations as ,etonators. 8n the *+6Es, the Unite, States $harge, an Ameri$an, >i$har, Smith 4or Smyth5, #ith smuggling 6*E -rytrons to 8srael.03 Ae anishe, &efore trial an, reporte,ly li es outsi,e Tel A i . The 8sraelis apologiFe, for the a$tion saying that the -rytrons #ere for me,i$al resear$h.06 8srael returne, 21+ of the -rytrons &ut the rest, they ,e$lare,, ha, &een ,estroye, in testing $on entional #eapons. Some &elie e they #ent to South Afri$a.0+ Smyth has also &een reporte, to ha e &een in ol e, in a *+32

smuggling operation to o&tain soli, ro$-et fuel &in,er $ompoun,s for the Beri$ho 88 missile an, gui,an$e $omponent har,#are.1E @&ser ers point to the Beri$ho missile itself as proof of a nu$lear $apa&ility as it is not suite, to the ,eli ery of $on entional munitions.1* @n the afternoon of 1 @$to&er *+3/, ;gypt an, Syria atta$-e, 8srael in a $oor,inate, surprise atta$-, &eginning the Dom Cippur War. Caught #ith only regular for$es on ,uty, augmente, &y reser ists #ith a lo# rea,iness le el, 8sraeli front lines $rum&le,. %y early afternoon on 3 @$to&er, no effe$ti e for$es #ere in the southern <olan Aeights an, Syrian for$es ha, rea$he, the e,ge of the plateau, o erloo-ing the Bor,an >i er. This $risis &rought 8srael to its se$on, nu$lear alert. Defense !inister !oshe Dayan, o& iously not at his &est at a press &riefing, #as, a$$or,ing to Time magaFine, rattle, enough to later tell the prime minister that =this is the en, of the thir, temple,? referring to an impen,ing $ollapse of the state of 8srael. =Temple? #as also the $o,e #or, for nu$lear #eapons. Prime !inister <ol,a !eir an, her =-it$hen $a&inet? ma,e the ,e$ision on the night of 6 @$to&er. The 8sraelis assem&le, */ t#enty)-iloton atomi$ &om&s. The num&er an, in fa$t the entire story #as later lea-e, &y the 8sraelis as a great psy$hologi$al #arfare tool. Although most pro&a&ly plutonium ,e i$es, one sour$e reports they #ere enri$he, uranium &om&s. The Beri$ho missiles at Air&at Ha$hariah an, the nu$lear stri-e F)2s at Tel Nof #ere arme, an, prepare, for a$tion against Syrian an, ;gyptian targets. They also targete, Damas$us #ith nu$lear $apa&le long)range artillery although it is not $ertain they ha, nu$lear artillery shells.12 U.S. Se$retary of State Aenry Cissinger #as notifie, of the alert se eral hours later on the morning of + @$to&er. The U.S. ,e$i,e, to open an aerial resupply pipeline to 8srael, an, 8sraeli air$raft &egan pi$-ing up supplies that ,ay. Although sto$-pile ,epletion remaine, a $on$ern, the military situation sta&iliFe, on @$to&er 6th an, +th as 8sraeli reser es poure, into the &attle an, a erte, ,isaster. Well &efore signifi$ant Ameri$an resupply ha, rea$he, 8sraeli for$es, the 8sraelis $ounteratta$-e, an, turne, the ti,e on &oth fronts. @n ** @$to&er, a $ounteratta$- on the <olan &ro-e the &a$- of SyriaGs offensi e, an, on *0 an, *1 @$to&er, 8srael laun$he, a surprise $rossing of the SueF Canal into Afri$a. Soon the 8sraelis en$ir$le, the ;gyptian Thir, Army an, it #as fa$e, #ith annihilation on the east &an- of the SueF Canal, #ith no prote$ti e for$es remaining &et#een the 8sraeli Army an, Cairo. The first U.S. flights arri e, on *2 @$to&er.1/ 8sraeli $omman,os fle# to Fort %enning, <eorgia to train #ith the ne# Ameri$an T@W anti) tan- missiles an, return #ith a C)*/E Aer$ules air$raft full of them in time for the ,e$isi e <olan &attle. Ameri$an $omman,ers in <ermany ,eplete, their sto$-s of missiles, at that time only share, #ith the %ritish an, West <ermans, an, sent them for#ar, to 8srael.12 Thus starte, the su&tle, opa.ue use of the 8sraeli &om& to ensure that the Unite, States -ept its ple,ge to maintain 8sraelGs $on entional #eapons e,ge o er its foes.10 There is

signifi$ant ane$,otal e i,en$e that Aenry Cissinger tol, Presi,ent of ;gypt, An#ar Sa,at, that the reason for the U.S. airlift #as that the 8sraelis #ere $lose to =going nu$lear.?11 A similar So iet pipeline to the Ara&s, e.ually ro&ust, may or may not ha e in$lu,e, a ship #ith nu$lear #eapons on it, ,ete$te, from nu$lear tra$e emissions an, sha,o#e, &y the Ameri$ans from the Dar,anelles. The 8sraelis &elie e that the So iets ,is$o ere, 8sraeli nu$lear preparations from C@S!@S satellite photographs an, ,e$i,e, to e.ualiFe the o,,s.13 The So iet ship arri e, in Ale"an,ria on either *6 or 2/ @$to&er 4sour$es ,isagree5, an, remaine,, #ithout unloa,ing, until No em&er *+3/. The ship may ha e represente, a So iet guarantee to the Ara& $om&atants to neutraliFe the 8sraeli nu$lear option.16 While some others ,ismiss the story $ompletely, the &est)#ritten re ie# arti$le $on$lu,es that the ans#er is =o&s$ure.? So iet premier Leoni, %reFhne threatene,, on 22 @$to&er, to airlift So iet air&orne troops to reinfor$e the ;gyptians $ut off on the eastern si,e of the SueF Canal an, put se en So iet air&orne ,i isions on alert.1+ >e$ent e i,en$e in,i$ates that the So iets sent nu$lear missile su&marines also.3E #viation $eek and Space Technology magaFine $laime, that the t#o So iet SCUD &riga,es ,eploye, in ;gypt ea$h ha, a nu$lear #arhea,. Ameri$an satellite photos seeme, to $onfirm this. The U.S. passe, to 8srael images of tru$-s, of the type use, to transport nu$lear #arhea,s, par-e, near the laun$hers.3* Presi,ent Ni"onGs response #as to &ring the U.S. to #orl,#i,e nu$lear alert the ne"t ,ay, #hereupon 8srael #ent to nu$lear alert a thir, time.32 This su,,en $risis .ui$-ly fa,e, as Prime !inister !eir agree, to a $ease)fire, relie ing the pressure on the ;gyptian Thir, Army. Shimon Peres ha, argue, for a pre)#ar nu$lear ,emonstration to ,eter the Ara&s. Ara& strategies an, #ar aims in *+13 may ha e &een restri$te, &e$ause of a fear of the 8sraeli =&om& in the &asement,? the un,e$lare, nu$lear option. The ;gyptians planne, to $apture an eastern strip ne"t to the SueF Canal an, then hol,. The Syrians ,i, not aggressi ely $ommit more for$es to &attle or attempt to ,ri e through the *+26 Bor,an >i er &or,er to the 8sraeli $enter. %oth $ountries seeme, not to iolate 8srael proper an, a oi,e, triggering one of the unstate, 8sraeli reasons to employ nu$lear #eapons.3/ @thers ,is$ount any Ara& planning &ase, on nu$lear $apa&ilities.32 Peres also $re,its Dimona #ith &ringing An#ar Sa,at to Berusalem to ma-e pea$e.30 This position #as seemingly $onfirme, &y Sa,at in a pri ate $on ersation #ith 8sraeli Defense !inister ;Fer WeiFman.31 At the en, of the Dom Cippur War 4a nation sha-ing e"perien$e5, 8srael has her nu$lear arsenal fully fun$tional an, teste, &y a ,eployment. The arsenal, still opa.ue an, unspo-en, #as no longer a se$ret, espe$ially to the t#o superpo#ers, the Unite, States an, the So iet Union.

I6+ ,-4.0,---: 7ri%)i%) &he 7om* #p &he 7"seme%& S&"irs
Never #gain%

− >eporte,ly #el,e, on the first 8sraeli nu$lear &om&33 Shortly after the *+3/ #ar, 8srael allege,ly fiel,e, $onsi,era&le nu$lear artillery $onsisting of Ameri$an *30 mm an, 2E/ mm self)propelle, artillery pie$es, $apa&le of firing nu$lear shells. 8f true, this sho#s that Dimona ha, rapi,ly sol e, the pro&lems of ,esigning smaller #eapons sin$e the $ru,e *+13 ,e i$es. 8f true, these lo# yiel,, ta$ti$al nu$lear artillery roun,s $oul, rea$h at least 20 miles. The 8sraeli Defense For$e ,i, ha e three &attalions of the *30mm artillery 4/1 tu&es5, reporte,ly #ith *E6 nu$lear shells an, more for the 2E/mm tu&es. Some sour$es ,es$ri&e a program to e"ten, the range to 20 miles. They may ha e offere, the South Afri$ans these lo# yiel,, miniaturiFe,, shells ,es$ri&e, as, =the &est stuff #e got.?36 %y *+31, a$$or,ing to one un$lassifie, sour$e, the Central 8ntelligen$e Agen$y &elie e, that the 8sraelis #ere using plutonium from Dimona an, ha, *E to 2E nu$lear #eapons a aila&le.3+ 8n *+32, t#o 8sraeli s$ientists, 8saiah Ne&enFahl an, !ena$ehm Le in, ,e elope, a $heaper, faster uranium enri$hment pro$ess. 8t use, a laser &eam for isotope separation. 8t $oul, reporte,ly enri$h se en grams of Uranium 2/0 si"ty per$ent in one ,ay.6E Sour$es later reporte, that 8srael #as using &oth $entrifuges an, lasers to enri$h uranium.6* Luestions remaine, regar,ing full)s$ale nu$lear #eapons tests. Primiti e gun assem&le, type ,e i$es nee, no testing. >esear$hers $an test non)nu$lear $omponents of other types separately an, use e"tensi e $omputer simulations. 8srael re$ei e, ,ata from the *+1E Fren$h tests, an, one sour$e $on$lu,es that 8srael a$$esse, information from U.S. tests $on,u$te, in the *+0Es an, early *+1Es. This may ha e in$lu,e, &oth &ooste, an, thermonu$lear #eapons ,ata.62 Un,ergroun, testing in a hollo#e, out $a ern is ,iffi$ult to ,ete$t. A West <ermany Army !agaFine, $ehrtechnik, in Bune *+31, $laime, that Western reports ,o$umente, a *+1/ un,ergroun, test in the Nege . @ther reports sho# a test at Al)Na.a&, Nege in @$to&er *+11.6/ A &right flash in the south 8n,ian @$ean, o&ser e, &y an Ameri$an satellite on 22 Septem&er *+3+, is #i,ely &elie e, to &e a South Afri$a)8srael 9oint nu$lear test. 8t #as, a$$or,ing to some, the thir, test of a neutron &om&. The first t#o #ere hi,,en in $lou,s to fool the satellite an, the thir, #as an a$$i,entJthe #eather $leare,.62 ;"perts ,iffer on these possi&le tests. Se eral #riters report that the s$ientists at Los Alamos National La&oratory &elie e, it to ha e &een a nu$lear e"plosion #hile a presi,ential panel ,e$i,e, other#ise.60 Presi,ent Carter #as 9ust entering the 8ran hostage nightmare an, may ha e easily ,e$i,e, not to alter /E years of loo-ing the other #ay.61 The e"plosion #as almost $ertainly an 8sraeli &om&, teste, at the in itation of the South Afri$ans. 8t #as more a, an$e, than the =gun type? &om&s ,e elope, &y the South Afri$ans.63 @ne report $laims it #as a test of a nu$lear artillery shell.66 A *++3 8sraeli ne#spaper .uote, South Afri$an ,eputy foreign minister, AFiF Paha,, as $onfirming it #as an 8sraeli test #ith South Afri$an logisti$al support.6+

Contro ersy o er possi&le nu$lear testing $ontinues to this ,ay. 8n Bune *++6, a !em&er of the Cnesset a$$use, the go ernment of an un,ergroun, test near ;ilat on !ay 26, *++6. ;gyptian =nu$lear e"perts? ha, ma,e similar $harges. The 8sraeli go ernment hotly ,enie, the $laims.+E Not only #ere the 8sraelis intereste, in Ameri$an nu$lear #eapons ,e elopment ,ata, they #ere intereste, in targeting ,ata from U.S. intelligen$e. 8srael ,is$o ere, that they #ere on the So iet target list. Ameri$an)&orn 8sraeli spy Bonathan Pollar, o&taine, satellite)imaging ,ata of the So iet Union, allo#ing 8srael to target a$$urately So iet $ities. This sho#e, 8sraelGs intention to use its nu$lear arsenal as a ,eterrent politi$al le er, or retaliatory $apa&ility against the So iet Union itself. 8srael also use, Ameri$an satellite imagery to plan the 3 Bune *+6* atta$- on the TammuF)* rea$tor at @sira., 8ra.. This ,aring atta$-, $arrie, out &y eight F)*1s a$$ompanie, &y si" F)*0s pun$he, a hole in the $on$rete rea$tor ,ome &efore the rea$tor &egan operation 4an, 9ust ,ays &efore an 8sraeli ele$tion5. 8t ,eli ere, *0 ,elay)fuse, 2EEE poun, &om&s ,eep into the rea$tor stru$ture 4the *1th &om& hit a near&y hall5. The &lasts shre,,e, the rea$tor an, &le# out the ,ome foun,ations, $ausing it to $ollapse on the ru&&le. This #as the #orl,Gs first atta$- on a nu$lear rea$tor.+* Sin$e *+ Septem&er *+66, 8srael has #or-e, on its o#n satellite re$on) naissan$e system to ,e$rease relian$e on U.S. sour$es. @n that ,ay, they laun$he, the @ffe.)* satellite on the Sha it &ooster, a system $losely relate, to the Beri$ho)88 missile. They laun$he, the satellite to the #est a#ay from the Ara&s an, against the earthGs rotation, re.uiring e en more thrust. The Beri$ho)88 missile is $apa&le of sen,ing a one ton nu$lear payloa, 0,EEE -ilometers. @ffe.)2 #ent up on / April *++E. The laun$h of the @ffe.)/ faile, on its first attempt on *0 Septem&er *++2, &ut #as su$$essful 0 April *++0.+2 !or,e$hai :anunu pro i,e, the &est loo- at the 8sraeli nu$lear arsenal in *+60 $omplete #ith photographs.+/ A te$hni$ian from Dimona #ho lost his 9o&, :anunu se$retly toophotographs, immigrate, to Australia an, pu&lishe, some of his material in the &ondon Sunday Times. Ae #as su&se.uently -i,nappe, &y 8sraeli agents, trie, an, imprisone,. Ais ,ata sho#s a sophisti$ate, nu$lear program, o er 2EE &om&s, #ith &ooste, ,e i$es, neutron &om&s, F)*1 ,eli era&le #arhea,s, an, Beri$ho #arhea,s.+2 The &ooste, #eapons sho#n in the :anunu photographs sho# a sophisti$ation that inferre, the re.uirement for testing.+0 Ae re eale, for the first time the un,ergroun, plutonium separation fa$ility #here 8srael #as pro,u$ing 2E -ilograms annually, se eral times more than pre ious estimates. Photographs sho#e, sophisti$ate, ,esigns #hi$h s$ientifi$ e"perts say ena&le, the 8sraelis to &uil, &om&s #ith as little as 2 -ilograms of plutonium. These fa$ts ha e in$rease, the estimates of total 8sraeli nu$lear sto$-piles 4see Appen,i" A5.+1 8n the #or,s of one Ameri$an, =Mthe 8sraelisN $an ,o anything #e or the So iets $an ,o.?+3 :anunu not only ma,e the te$hni$al ,etails of the 8sraeli program an, sto$-pile pu&li$ &ut in his #a-e, 8sraeli &egan eile, offi$ial a$-no#le,gement of the potent 8sraeli nu$lear ,eterrent. They &egan &ringing the &om& up the &asement stairs if not out of the &asement.

8srael #ent on full)s$ale nu$lear alert again on the first ,ay of Desert Storm, *6 Banuary *++*. Se en SCUD missiles #ere fire, against the $ities of Tel A i an, Aaifa &y 8ra. 4only t#o a$tually hit Tel A i an, one hit Aaifa5. This alert laste, for the ,uration of the #ar, 2/ ,ays. @ er the $ourse of the #ar, 8ra. laun$he, aroun, 2E missiles in *3 separate atta$-s at 8srael. There #as little loss of life' t#o -ille, ,ire$tly, ** in,ire$tly, #ith many stru$tures ,amage, an, life ,isrupte,.+6 Se eral suppose,ly lan,e, near Dimona, one of them a $lose miss.++ Threats of retaliation &y the Shamir go ernment if the use, $hemi$al #arhea,s #ere interprete, to mean that 8srael inten,e, to laun$h a nu$lear stri-e if gas atta$-s o$$urre,. @ne 8sraeli $ommentator re$ommen,e, that 8srael shoul, signal 8ra. that =any 8ra.i a$tion against 8sraeli $i ilian populations, #ith or #ithout gas, may lea e 8ra. #ithout %agh,a,.?*EE Shortly &efore the en, of the #ar the 8sraelis teste, a =nu$lear $apa&le? missile #hi$h prompte, the Unite, States into intensifying its SCUD hunting in #estern 8ra. to pre ent any 8sraeli response.*E* The 8sraeli Air For$e set up ,ummy SCUD sites in the Nege for pilots to pra$ti$e onJthey foun, it no easy tas-.*E2 Ameri$an go ernment $on$essions to 8srael for not atta$-ing 4in a,,ition to 8sraeli Patriot missile &atteries5 #ere'
• • •

Allowing Israel to designate 100 targets inside Iraq for the coalition to destroy, Satellite downlink to increase warning time on the SCUD attacks (present and future), “Technical parity with Saudi jet fighters in perpetuity.”103

All of this ali,ate, the nu$lear arsenal in the min,s of the 8sraelis. 8n parti$ular the $onfirme, $apa&ility of Ara& states #ithout a &or,er #ith 8srael, the so)$alle, =se$on, tier? states, to rea$h out an, tou$h 8srael #ith &allisti$ missiles $onfirme, 8sraelGs nee, for a ro&ust first stri-e $apa&ility. *E2

Current military $onta$ts &et#een 8srael an, 8n,ia, another nu$lear po#er, &ring up .uestions of nu$lear $ooperation.*E0 Pa-istani sour$es ha e alrea,y oi$e, $on$erns o er a possi&le 9oint 8sraeli)8n,ian atta$- on Pa-istanGs nu$lear fa$ilities.*E1 A re$ent Parameters arti$le spe$ulate, on 8sraelGs #illingness to furnish nu$lear $apa&ilities or assistan$e to $ertain states, su$h as Tur-ey. *E3 A retire, 8sraeli Defense For$e Chief of Staff, Lieutenant <eneral Amnon Shaha-, has ,e$lare,, =all metho,s are a$$epta&le in #ithhol,ing nu$lear $apa&ilities from an Ara& state.?*E6 As the 8sraeli &om& $omes out of the &asement, open ,is$ussion, e en in 8srael, is o$$urring on #hy the 8sraelis feel they nee, an arsenal not use, in at least t#o if not three #ars. A ner Cohen states' =8t M8sraelN must &e in a position to threaten another Airoshima to pre ent another holo$aust.?*E+ 8n Buly *++6 Shimon Peres #as .uote, in the Jordan Times as saying, =We ha e &uilt a nu$lear option, not in or,er to ha e a Airoshima, &ut to ha e an @slo,?**E referring to the pea$e pro$ess. @ne list of $urrent reasons for an 8sraeli nu$lear $apa&ility is'
• • • •

To deter a large conventional attack, To deter all levels of unconventional (chemical, biological, nuclear) attacks, To preempt enemy nuclear attacks, To support conventional preemption against enemy nuclear assets,

• • •

To support conventional preemption against enemy non-nuclear (conventional, chemical, biological) assets, For nuclear warfighting, The “Samson Option” (last resort destruction).111

The most alarming of these is the nu$lear #arfighting. The 8sraelis ha e ,e elope,, &y se eral a$$ounts, lo# yiel, neutron &om&s a&le to ,estroy troops #ith minimal ,amage to property.**2 8n *++E, ,uring the Se$on, <ulf War, an 8sraeli reser e ma9or general re$ommen,e, to Ameri$a that it =use non)$ontaminating ta$ti$al nu$lear #eapons? against 8ra..**/ Some ha e spe$ulate, that the 8sraelis #ill up,ate their nu$lear arsenal to =mi$ronu-es? an, =tinynu-es? #hi$h #oul, &e ery useful to atta$- point targets an, other ta$ti$al or &arrier 4mining5 uses.**2 These #oul, &e ery useful for har,ene, ,eeply &urie, $omman, an, $ontrol fa$ilities an, for airfiel, ,estru$tion #ithout e"posing 8sraeli pilots to $om&at.**0 Authors ha e ma,e the point that 8sraeli professional military s$hools ,o not tea$h nu$lear ta$ti$s an, #oul, not use them in the $lose .uarters of 8srael. !any 8sraeli offi$ers ha e atten,e, Ameri$an military s$hools #here they learne, ta$ti$al use in $ro#,e, ;urope.**1 Ao#e er, Jane's Intelligence (eview has re$ently reporte, an 8sraeli re ie# of nu$lear strategy #ith a shift from ta$ti$al nu$lear #arhea,s to long range missiles.**3 8srael al#ays has fa ore, the long rea$h, #hether to Argentina for A,olph ;i$hmann, to 8ra. to stri-e a rea$tor, ;nte&&e for hostages, Tunisia to hit the PL@, or &y targeting the So iet UnionGs $ities. An esteeme, 8sraeli military author has spe$ulate, that 8srael is pursuing an >OD program to pro i,e !8>:s 4multiple in,epen,ent reentry ehi$les5 on their missiles.**6 The go ernment of 8srael re$ently or,ere, three <erman Dolphin Class 6EE su&marine, to &e ,eli ere, in late *+++. 8srael #ill then ha e a se$on, stri-e $apa&ility #ith nu$lear $ruise missiles, an, this $apa&ility $oul, #ell $hange the nu$lear arms ra$e in the !i,,le ;ast.**+ 8sraeli rhetori$ on the ne# su&marines la&els them =national ,eterrent? assets. Pro9e$te, $apa&ilities in$lu,e a su&marine)laun$he, nu$lear missile #ith a /0E)-ilometer range.*2E 8srael has &een #or-ing on sea laun$h $apa&ility for missiles sin$e the *+1Es.*2* The first &asing options for the ne# se$on,)stri-e for$e of nu$lear missile $apa&le su&marines in$lu,e @man, an Ara& nation #ith unoffi$ial 8sraeli relations, lo$ate, strategi$ally near 8ran.*22 A report in,i$ates that the 8srael Defense !inistry has formally gone to the go ernment #ith a re.uest to authoriFe a retaliatory nu$lear stri-e if 8srael #as hit #ith first stri-e nu$lear #eapons. This report $omes in the #a-e of a re$ent 8ran Shiha&)/ missile test an, in,i$ations to 8srael that 8ran is t#o to three years from a nu$lear #arhea,.*2/ 8sraeli statements stress that 8ranGs nu$lear potential #oul, &e pro&lem to all an, #oul, re.uire =Ameri$an lea,ership, #ith serious parti$ipation of the <)3 . . . .?*22 A re$ent stu,y highlighte, 8sraelGs e"treme ulnera&ility to a first stri-e an, an a$$ompanying ulnera&ility e en to a false alarm.*20 SyriaGs entire ,efense against 8srael seems to rest on $hemi$al #eapons an, #arhea,s.*21 @ne s$enario in ol es Syria ma-ing a .ui$- in$ursion into the <olan an, then threatening $hemi$al stri-es, perhaps

#ith a ne#, more lethal 4prote$ti e)mas-)penetra&le5 >ussian ner e gas if 8srael resists.*23 Their use #oul, ,ri e 8srael to nu$lear use. 8sraeli ,e elopment of an anti) missile ,efense, the Arro#, a fully fiel,e, 4/E)0E*265 Beri$ho 88 &allisti$ missile, an, the soon)to) arri e strategi$ su&marine for$e, seems to ha e pro,u$e, a $oming $hange in ,efense for$e stru$ture. The 8sraeli ne#spaper )a'aret*, .uotes the 8sraeli Chief of Staff ,is$ussing the esta&lishment of a =strategi$ $omman, to . . . prepare an a,e.uate response to the long term threats. . . ?*2+ The *++2 a$$or, #ith Bor,an, allo#ing limite, 8sraeli military presen$e in Bor,anian s-ies, $oul, ma-e the flying ,istan$e to se eral potential a, ersaries $onsi,era&ly shorter.*/E 8srael is $on$erne, a&out 8ranGs ,esire to o&tain nu$lear #eapons an, &e$ome a regional lea,er, $ouple, #ith large num&ers of Shiite !oslems in southern Le&anon. The 8sraeli Air For$e $omman,ing general issue, a statement saying 8srael #oul, =$onsi,er an atta$-? if any $ountry gets =$lose to a$hie ing a nu$lear $apa&ility.?*/* The 8sraelis are o& iously $onsi,ering a$tions $apa&le of stopping su$h programs an, are &uying air$raft su$h as the F)*08 #ith suffi$ient operational range. At the first ,eli ery of these 2,EEE -ilometer range fighters, the 8sraeli $omment #as, =the air$raft #oul, help $ounter a gro#ing nu$lear threat.?*/2 They $onsi,er su$h regional nation nu$lear programs to &e a suffi$ient $ause for #ar. Their re$or, of a$$omplishment is $lear' ha ing hit the early 8ra.i nu$lear effort, they feel in,i$ate, &y Desert Storm. They also feel that only the Ameri$an an, 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons -ept 8ra.Gs Sa,,am Aussein from using $hemi$al or &iologi$al #eapons against 8srael.*// 8srael, li-e 8ran, has ,esires of regional po#er. The *+01 allian$e #ith Fran$e an, %ritain might ha e &een a first attempt at regional hegemony. Current ,e&ate in the 8sraeli press $onsi,ers offering Cu#ait, Latar, @man, an, perhaps Syria 4after a pea$e agreement5 an 8sraeli nu$lear um&rella of prote$tion.*/2 A nu$lear 8ran or 8ra. might use its nu$lear #eapons to prote$t some states in the region, threaten others, an, attempt to $ontrol oil pri$es.*/0 Another spe$ulati e area $on$erns 8sraeli nu$lear se$urity an, possi&le misuse. What is the $hain of ,e$ision an, $ontrol of 8sraelGs #eaponsI Ao# sus$epti&le are they to misuse or theftI With no open, fran-, pu&li$ ,e&ate on nu$lear issues, there has a$$or,ingly &een no ,e&ate or information on e"isting safeguar,s. This has le, to a$$usations of =monolithi$ ie#s an, sinister intentions.?*/1E Woul, a right #ing military go ernment ,e$i,e to employ nu$lear #eapons re$-lesslyI Ariel Sharon, an outspo-en proponent of =<reater 8srael? #as .uote, as saying, =Ara&s may ha e the oil, &ut #e ha e the mat$hes.?*/3 Coul, the +ush ,munim, a right #ing religious organiFation, or others, hi9a$- a nu$lear ,e i$e to =li&erate? the Temple !ount for the &uil,ing of the thir, templeI Chan$es are small &ut $oul, in$rease as ra,i$als ,e$ry the pea$e pro$ess.*/6 A *++3 arti$le re ie#ing the 8sraeli Defense For$e repeate,ly stresse, the possi&ilities of, an, the nee, to guar, against, a religious, right #ing military $oup, espe$ially as the proportion of religious in the military in$reases.*/+ 8srael is a nation #ith a state religion, &ut its top lea,ers are not religious Be#s. The intri$a$ies of Be#ish religious politi$s an, ra&&ini$al la# ,o affe$t their politi$s an,

,e$ision pro$esses. 8n Be#ish la#, there are t#o types of #ar, one o&ligatory an, man,atory -milkhemet mit*vah. an, the one authoriFe, &ut optional -milkhemet reshut..*2E The la&eling of Prime !inister %eginGs =Pea$e for <alilee? operation as a milchemet brera 4=#ar of $hoi$e?5 #as one of the fa$tors $ausing it to lose support.*2* 8nterpretation of Be#ish la# $on$erning nu$lear #eapons ,oes not permit their use for mutual assure, ,estru$tion. Ao#e er, it ,oes allo# possession an, threatening their use, e en if a$tual use is not 9ustifia&le un,er the la#. 8nterpretations of the la# allo# ta$ti$al use on the &attlefiel,, &ut only after #arning the enemy an, attempting to ma-e pea$e. Ao# mu$h these intri$a$ies affe$t 8sraeli nu$lear strategy ,e$isions is un-no#n.*22 The se$ret nature of the 8sraeli nu$lear program has hi,,en the in$reasing pro&lems of the aging Dimona rea$tor an, a, erse #or-er health effe$ts. 8nformation is only no# pu&li$ as former #or-ers sue the go ernment. This issue is no# lin-e, to $ontinue, tritium pro,u$tion for the &ooste, anti)tan- an, anti)missile nu$lear #arhea,s that 8sraeli $ontinues to nee,. 8srael is attempting to o&tain a ne#, more effi$ient, tritium pro,u$tion te$hnology ,e elope, in 8n,ia.*2/ @ne other purpose of 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons, not often state,, &ut o& ious, is their =use? on the Unite, States. Ameri$a ,oes not #ant 8sraelGs nu$lear profile raise,.*22 They ha e &een use, in the past to ensure Ameri$a ,oes not ,esert 8srael un,er in$rease, Ara&, or oil em&argo, pressure an, ha e for$e, the Unite, States to support 8sraeli ,iplomati$ally against the So iet Union. 8srael use, their e"isten$e to guarantee a $ontinuing supply of Ameri$an $on entional #eapons, a poli$y li-ely to $ontinue.*20 >egar,less of the true types an, num&ers 4see Appen,i" A5 of 8sraeli nu$lear #eapons, they ha e ,e elope, a sophisti$ate, system, &y myria, metho,s, an, are a nu$lear po#er to &e re$-one, #ith. Their nu$lear am&iguity has ser e, their purposes #ell &ut 8srael is entering a ,ifferent phase of isi&ility e en as their nu$lear $apa&ility is entering a ne# phase. This ne# isi&ility may not &e in Ameri$aGs interest.*21 !any are pre,i$ting the 8sraeli nu$lear arsenal #ill &e$ome less useful =out of the &asement? an, possi&ly spur a regional arms ra$e. 8f so, 8srael has a 0)*E year lea, time at present &efore mutual assure, ,estru$tion, !i,,le ;ast style, #ill set in. Woul, regional mutual se$on, stri-e $apa&ility, easier to a$.uire than superpo#er mutual se$on, stri-e $apa&ility, result in regional sta&ilityI Some thin- so.*23 Current 8sraeli Presi,ent ;Fer WeiFman has state, =the nu$lear issue is gaining momentum Man, theN ne"t #ar #ill not &e $on entional.*26

Appe%di8 A Es&im"&es o! &he Isr"eli N#$le"r Arse%"l


*. Aersh, Seymour !., The Samson @ption. Israel's Nuclear #rsenal and #merican /oreign 0olicy 4Ne# Dor-' >an,om Aouse, *++*5, 22/. 2. Aronson, Slomo an, %rosh, @,e,, The 0olitics and Strategy of Nuclear $eapons in the !iddle ,ast1 the Opacity Theory1 and (eality1 2345623326#n Israeli 0erspective 4Al&any, Ne# Dor-' State Uni ersity of Ne# Dor- Press, *++25, 2E. /. Carsh, ;fraim, "etween $ar and 0eace7 8ilemmas of Israeli Security 4Lon,on, ;nglan,' Fran- Cass, *++15, 62. 2. Cohen, A ner, Israel and the "omb 4Ne# Dor-' Colum&ia Uni ersity Press, *++65, *1. 0. Cor,esman, Anthony, 0erilous 0rospects7 The 0eace 0rocess and the #rab6Israeli !ilitary "alance 4%oul,er, Colora,o' West ie# Press, *++15, **6. 1. Pry, Peter, Israel's Nuclear #rsenal 4%oul,er, Colora,o' West ie#, *+625, 0)1. 3. Luote, in Weissman, Ste e an, Crosney, Aer&ert. The Islamic "omb7 The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the !iddle ,ast. 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' Times %oo-s, *+6*5, *E0. 6. =Former @ffi$ial Says Fran$e Aelpe, %uil, 8sraelGs Dimona Comple".? Nucleonics $eek @$to&er *1, *+61, 1. +. !ilhollin, <ary, =Aea y Water Cheaters.? /oreign 0olicy 4*+63)665' *E*)*E2. *E. Cor,esman, *++*, *23. **. Fe,eration of Ameri$an S$ientists, =8sraelGs Nu$lear Weapons Program.? *E De$em&er *++3, n.p. @n) line. 8nternet, 23 @$to&er *++6. A aila&le from http'(( *2. Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear $eapons in Israel -Ne# Delhi' S. %. Nangia %oo-s, *++15, /. */. Cohen, Israel and the "omb, 26)2+. *2. %ennett, Beremy, The Sue* risis. %%C :i,eo. n.,. :i,eo$assette an, >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi. ,very Spy a 0rince. The omplete )istory of Israel's Intelligence ommunity. 4%oston, !assa$husetts' Aoughton !ifflin Company, *++E5, 1/)1+. *0. Weissman an, Crosney, **2. *1. =>e eale,' The Se$rets of 8sraelGs Nu$lear Arsenal? 4Lon,on5 Sunday Times No. 6,21*, 0 @$to&er *+61, *, 2)0. *3. Cohen, Israel and the "omb, 03)0+. *6. Peres, Shimon, "attling for 0eace. # !emoir 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' >an,om Aouse, *++05, *22. *+. Pry, *E. 2E. Loftus, Bohn an, Aarons, !ar-, The Secret $ar #gainst the Jews. )ow $estern ,spionage "etrayed the Jewish 0eople 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' St. !artinGs <riffin, *++25, 263)/E/.

2*. <reen, Stephen, Taking Sides. #merica's Secret (elations with a !ilitant Israel 4Ne# Dor-' William !orro# an, Company, *+625, *02. 22. Cohen, A ner, =!ost Fa ore, Nation.? The "ulletin of the #tomic Scientists. 0*, no. * 4Banuary) Fe&ruary *++05' 22)0/. 2/. Aersh, The Samson Option, *+1. 22. See Cohen, A ner, =8sraelGs Nu$lear Aistory' The Untol, Cenne,y);sh-ol Dimona Correspon,en$e.? Journal of Israeli )istory, *++0 *1, no. 2, *0+)*+2 an, Cohen, A ner, Comp. =>e$ently De$lassifie, *+1/ Correspon,en$e &et#een Presi,ent Cenne,y an, Prime !inisters %en)<urion an, ;sh-ol.? Journal of Israeli )istory1 *++0 *1, no. 2, *+0)2E3. !u$h of the ,o$umentation has &een poste, to http'PP###.seas.g#u.e,u(nsar$hi e(israel. 20. Weissman an, Crosney, op. $it.,**2)**3 21. Cohen, op. $it., Israel and the "omb, 62)6/. 23. Spe$tor, Leonar, S., The 9ndeclared "omb 4Cam&ri,ge, !assa$husetts' %allinger Pu&lishers, *+665, /63 4n.225. 26. Luote, in Ste ens, ;liFa&eth. =8sraelGs Nu$lear WeaponsJA Case Stu,y.? *2 pages. @n line. 8nternet, 2/ @$to&er *++6. A aila&le from http'((infomanage.$om(nonproliferation(na9ournal(israelinu$s.html. 2+. <reen, Taking Sides, *26)*3+ an, >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi, *++E, *+3)*+6. /E. Weissman an, Crosney, **+)*22. /*. %la$-, 8an an, !orris, %enny, Israel's Secret $ars. # history of Israel's Intelligence Services 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' <ro e Wei,enfel,, *++*5, 2*6)2*+. /2. Aersh, 203. //. <reen, Stephen, &iving by the Sword7 #merica and Israel in the !iddle ,ast1 234:623:; 4Lon,on' Fa&er, *+665, 1/)6E. /2. Cor,esman, *++*, *2E. /0. Weissman an, Crosney, *22)*26 an, >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi, *++E, *+6)*++. /1. Spe$tor, The 9ndeclared "omb, /+04n. 035.+6)*++ /3. >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi, *++E, 06. /6. !ilhollin, *EE)**+. /+. Stanghelle, Aarol,, =8srael to sell &a$- *E.0 tons.? #rbeiderbladet, @slo, Nor#ay, 26 Bune *++E in' Center for Nonproliferation Stu,ies, =Nu$lear De elopments,? 26 Bune *++E, /2)/07 on)line, 8nternet 22 No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'(($ns.miis.e,u. 2E. Aersh, op. $it., */+.

2*. Center for Nonproliferation Stu,ies. =8sraeli Frien,s,? ISIS (eport, !ay *++2, 27 on)line, 8nternet 22 No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'(($ns.miis.e,u. 22. A&e$asis, >a$hel, =Uranium reporte,ly offere, to China, 8srael.? (adio (enascenca, Lis&on, + De$em&er *++2 .uote, in Center for Nonproliferation, =Proliferation 8ssues,? 2/ De$em&er, *++2, 207 on) line, 8nternet 22 No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'(($ns.miis.e,u. 2/. Cohen, Israel and the "omb, op. $it., 2/*)2/2 an, 201)203. 22. Nor,een, Lon @., Ni$olle, Da i,, 0hoeni< over the Nile 4Washington, D.C.' Smithsonian 8nstitute Press, *++15, *+2)*+/. 20. @G%alan$e, ;,gar, The Third #rab6Israeli $ar 4Lon,on' Fa&er an, Fa&er, *+325, 02. 21. %re$her, !i$hael, 8ecision in risis. Israel1 234; and 23;= 4%er-ley, California' Uni ersity of California Press, *+6E5, *E2, 2/E)2/*. 23. Cohen, A ner. =Cairo, Dimona, an, the Bune *+13 War.? !i,,le ;ast Bournal 0E, no. 2 4Spring *++15, *+E)2*E. 26. Cre el,, !artin an. The Sword and the Olive. # ritical )istory of the Israeli 8efense /orce 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' Pu&li$ Affairs, *++65, *32. 2+. %urro#s, William ;. an, Win,rem, >o&ert, ritical !ass. The 8angerous (ace for Superweapons in a /ragmenting $orld 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' Simon an, S$huster, *++25, 262)26/. 0E. Aronson, Shlomo, Israel's Nuclear Options1 # IS $orking 0aper No. ;. Los Angeles, California' Uni ersity of California Center for Arms Control an, 8nternational Se$urity, *+33, /, an, Sorenson, Da i, S., >!iddle ,ast (egional Studies6#Y33,? Air War College' !a"#ell Air For$e %ase, AL, 022. 0*. Aersh, op. $it., *21)*26. 02. Cohen, Israel and the "omb, op. $it., 2*E)2*/. 0/. Spe$tor, Leonar, S., =Foreign)Supplie, Com&at Air$raft' Will They Drop the Thir, Worl, %om&I? Journal of International #ffairs 2E, no. *4*+615' *20 4n. 05 an, <reen, &iving by the Sword, op. $it., *6) *+. 02. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., 26E. 00. Cohen, op. $it., Israel and the "omb, 2/3. 01. 8&i,., 23/)232. 03. !ilhollin, op. $it., *E/)*E2. 06. >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi, /riend in 8eed7 Inside the 9.S.6Israel #lliance 4Ne# Dor- Ne# Dor-' Ayperion, *++25, 2++. 0+. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., 212)210 an, >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi, op. $it., *++E, /E2)/E0. 1E. Spe$tor, The 9ndeclared "omb, op. $it., *3+.

1*. Do#ty, Alan. =8srael an, Nu$lear Weapons.? !idstream 22, no. 3 4No em&er *+315, 6)+. 12. Aersh, op. $it., 2*3, 222)221, an, Weissman an, Crosney, op. $it., *E3. 1/. <reen, op. $it., &iving by the Sword, +E)++. 12. Loftus an, Aarons, op. $it., /*1)/*3. 10 Smith, <erar, C. an, Co&&an, Aelena. =A %lin, ;ye To Nu$lear Proliferation.? /oreign #ffairs 16, no. /4*+6+5, 0/)3E. 11. Aersh, op. $it., 2/E)2/*. 13. @G%alan$e, ;,gar, No ?ictor1 No ?an@uished. The Yom Aippur $ar 4San >afael, California' Presi,o Press, *+365, *30. 16. 8&i,., 2/2)2/0 an, Aronson, S, op. $it., *0)*6. 1+. Spe$tor, The 9ndeclared "omb, op. $it., /+1 4n. 1257 <arthoff, >aymon, L., 8Btente and onfrontation7 #merican6Soviet (elations from Ni<on to (eagan 4Washington, DC' The %roo-ings 8nstitute, *++25, 221, n31 an, %an,mann, Dona an, Cor,o a, Dishai. =The So iet Nu$lear Threat To#ar,s the Close of the Dom Cippur War.? Jerusalem Journal of International (elations *+6E 0, no. *, *E3)+. 3E. Cher-ashin, Ni-olai, =@n !os$o#Gs @r,ers.? (ussian &ife1 /+, no. *E 4@$to&er *++15, */)*0. 3*. %ro#nlo#, Ce$il. =So iets poise three)front glo&al ,ri e. Nu$lear #eapons in ;gypt, artillery &uil,up at <uantanamo, Communist $on$entrations in :ietnam aime, at politi$al gains.? #viation $eek and Space Technology ++, no. *+ 40 No em&er *+3/5, *2)*27 Aolt, >o&ert. =So iet Po#er Play.? #viation $eek and Space Technology ++, no. *+ 40 No em&er *+3/5, 3 an, <ur)Arieh, Danny, =A non)Con entional Loo- at 8srael During G3/ War.? Israel$ire Tues,ay, @$to&er 1, *++6 *3, 2/7 on)line, 8nternet 2E No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'((###.israel#ire.$om(ne#(+6*EE1(+6*EE16.html. 32. Aersh, op. $it., /2*)2/0. 3/. Cre el,, *++6, op. $it., 22E)22*. 32. ; ron, Dair, Israel's Nuclear 8ilemma 48tha$a, Ne# Dor-' Cornell Pu&lishing, *++25, 12)32. 30. Cohen, A ner, =Peres' Pea$ema-er, Nu$lear Pioneer.? The "ulletin of the #tomic Scientists. 02, no. / 4!ay(Bune *++15, *1)*3 an, Aronson, S, op. $it., **)*2. 31. Carsh, op. $it., 61. 33. Luote, in Aersh, op. $it., *6E an, Ste ens, op. $it., *)*2. 36. Aersh, op. $it., 2*1, 231 an, Ca-u, !i$hio. =Contingen$y Plans' Nu$lear Weapons after the Col, War.? In #ltered States7 # (eader in the New $orld Order1 %ennis, Phyllis an, !ousha&e$-, !i$hel, ;,s. 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' *++/5, 11. 3+. Weissman an, Crosney, op. $it., *E+.

6E. <illette, >o&ert, =Uranium ;nri$hment' >umors of 8sraeli Progress #ith Lasers.? Science *6/, no. 2*/E 422 !ar$h *+325, **32)**32. 6*. %arna&y, Fran-, The Invisible "omb7 The Nuclear #rms (ace in the !iddle ,ast 4Lon,on' 8. %. Tauris, *+665, 20. 62. =8srael' The Co ert Conne$tion.? /rontline1 P%S Net#or-, !ay *1, *+6+, .uote, in Spe$tor, Leonar, S., an, !$Donough, !ar- <., #ith !e,eiros, ; an S., Tracking Nuclear 0roliferation. # +uide in !aps and harts1 233C 4Washington, DC' Carnegie ;n,o#ment for 8nternational Pea$e, *++05. 6/. Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear $eapons in the !iddle ,ast7 8imensions and (esponsibilities 4Prin$eton, Ne# Bersey' Cingston Press, *+625, 22)2/. 62. Aersh, op. $it., 2*1. 60. %arna&y, Fran-, =Capping 8sraelGs Nu$lear :ol$ano,? "etween $ar and 0eace. 8ilemmas of Israeli Security1 e,ite, &y ;fraim Carsh 4Lon,on, ;nglan,' Fran- Cass, *++15, +6. 61. Aersh, op. $it., 23*)230. 63. Nashif, op. $it., /2. 66. <affney, !ar-, 8imona7 The Third TempleD The Story "ehind the ?anunu (evelation 4%rattle&oro, :ermont' Amana %oo-s, *+6+5, *EE)*E*. 6+. Pe,atFur, >eGu en, =South Afri$an Statement @n Nu$lear Test Sai, to Ser e 8srael,? )a'aret*, 2+ Buly *++3. @n line' 8nternet, 22 No em&er *++6 an, Celley, >o&ert. =The 8ra.i an, South Afri$an Nu$lear W?QNu$lear A&stra$ts,K * !ar$h *++1, or on)line, 8nternet, 22 No em&er *++6, &oth a aila&le from http'(($ns.miis.e,u. +E. =Was there a Nu$lear Test near ;ilatI? Israel$ire, *1 Bune *++6, or on line 8nternet, 22 No em&er, *++6, a aila&le from http'((###.israel#ire.$om an, =Deputy Defense !inister Denies 8sraeli Nu$lear Testing.? Israeli $ire1 Bune *6, *++6, or on)line. 8nternet, */ @$to&er *++6, a aila&le from http'((###.israel#ire.$om(Ne#(+6E1*6(+6E1*62.html. +*. !$Cinnon, Dan. "ullseye One (eactor. The Story of Israel's "old Surprise #ir #ttack That 8estroyed Ira@i's Nuclear "omb /acility 4Shre#s&ury, ;nglan,' Airlife Pu&lishing Lt,., *+635. +2. =>ussian Foreign 8ntelligen$e Ser i$e, >eport on the Proliferation of Weapons of !ass Destru$tion, !os$o#, *++/.? Journal of 0alestine Studies RR88, no. 2 4Summer *++/5' */0)*2E7 Cre el,, !artin an, Nuclear 0roliferation and the /uture Of onflict 4Ne# Dor-' The Free Press, *++/5, *E07 an, Clar-, Philip. =QThir, su$$essful 8sraeli satellite laun$h.? Jane's Intelligence (eview 3, no. 1 4Bune *++05, 20)21. +/. Sun,ay Times, Lon,on, op. $it., *,2)0. +2. Tos$ano, Louis, Triple ross7 Israel1 the #tomic "omb and the !an $ho Spilled the Secrets 4Ne# Dor-' Carol Pu&lishing <roup, *++E5. +0. <reen, &iving by the Sword, op. $it., */2. +1. Spe$tor, The 9ndeclared "omb, op. $it., *10)*11.

+3. Aersh, op. $it., 2+*. +6. Le ran, Aharon, Israeli Strategy after 8esert Storm7 &essons from the Second +ulf $ar 4Lon,on' Fran- Cass, *++35, *)*E. ++. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., 236. *EE. Cohen, A ner an, !iller, !ar in, Nuclear Shadows in the !iddle ,ast7 0rospects for #rms ontrol in the $ake of the +ulf risis 4Cam&ri,ge, !assa$husetts' !assa$husetts 8nstitute of Te$hnology, *++E5, *E. *E*. Aronson an, %rosh, op. $it., 231. *E2. >a i an, !elman, op. $it., /++. *E/. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., 2+3n an, Cre el,, *++6, op. $it., /2*)/22. *E2. Le ran, op. $it., 6)*E. *E0. Ahmar, !oonis, =Pa-istan an, 8srael' Distant A, ersaries or Neigh&orsI? Journal of South #sian and !iddle ,astern Studies1 *++1, 2E, no.*, 2/)22. *E1. =Nu$lear proliferation ,i,nGt start in *++6 . . .an, not in Pa-istan nor #ith 8slam,? !iddle ,ast (ealities, or on)line, 8nternet, 2* Septem&er *++6, a aila&le from http'((###.mi,,*++6SE1S26.htm. *E3. <arrity, Patri$- B. =The Ne"t Nu$lear Luestions.? 0arameters1 RR:, no. 2 4Winter *++0)+15, +2) ***. *E6. Cohen, ;lieFer. Israel's best defense7 the /irst /ull Story of the Israeli #ir /orce , 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' >an,om Aouse, *++/5, 2+0. *E+. Cohen an, !iller, op. $it., *6. **E. =%efore !eeting #ith Cing, Peres Claims 8sraelGs Nu$lear Arsenal #as &uilt for Pea$e,? Jordan Times, Buly *2, *++6. Luote, in Sorenson, op. $it., 022. ***. %eres, Louis >ene, =8sraelGs %om& in the %asement' A re isiting of TDeli&erate Am&iguityG s. TDis$losureG, "etween $ar and 0eace7 8ilemmas of Israeli Security1 e,ite, &y ;fraim Aarsh 4Lon,on, ;nglan,' Fran- Cass, *++15, **/)*//. **2. Aersh, op. $it., /*+. **/. Amos, De&orah, &ines in the Sand7 8esert Storm and the (emaking of the #rab $orld 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' Simon an, S$huster, *++25, *E0. **2. Do#ler, Thomas W. an, Ao#ar, 88, Boseph A., =Countering the threat of the #ell)arme, tyrant' A mo,est proposal for small nu$lear #eapons,? Strategic (eview, R8R, no. 2 4Fall *++*5, /2)2E. **0. %eres, Louis >ene, =8sraelGs &om& in the &asement' A re isiting of TDeli&erate Am&iguityG s. TDis$losure.G ? 8n Carsh, ;fraim, op. $it., ;,itor, "etween $ar and 0eace7 8ilemmas of Israeli Security 4Lon,on, ;nglan,' Fran- Cass, *++15, **1.

**1. Cor,esman, op. $it., *++1, 210. **3. Aough, Aarol,, =8srael re ie#s its nu$lear ,eterrent,? Jane's Intelligence (eview *E, no.** 4No em&er *++65, **)*/. **6. Cre el,, op. $it., *++/, *E0. **+. %urro#s, an, Win,rem, op. $it., /**)/*2 an, =8srael &egins test of nu$lear missile su&marines,? The Irish Times, Buly 2, *++6, or on)line, 8nternet, 22 De$em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'(( times.$om(irish)times(paper(*++6(E3E2(#or*/.html. *2E. !elman, Dossi, =S#imming #ith the Dolphins,? )a'aret*, Tues,ay, Bune +, *++6, an, =>eport' 8srael to get Su&s #ith Nu$lear Stri-e Capa&ility,? Jerusalem 0ost, 8 Buly /, *++6, / an, Sorenson, op. $it., 02/. *2*. >a i , Dan an, !elman, Dossi, op. $it., *++E, /22)/20, 222)22/. *22. Shaha-, 8srael, Open Secrets7 Israeli Nuclear and /oreign 0olicies 4Lon,on' Pluto Press, *++35, 32) 3/. *2/. Da is, Douglas, =Defense @ffi$ials Sai, Urging Nu$lear Se$on,)Stri-e Capa&ility,? Jerusalem 0ost, 1 August *++6, /7 or on)line, 8nternet, 22 No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'(($ns.miis.e,u. *22. 8n&ar, ;fraim, =8sraelGs se$urity in a ne# international en ironment,? in Carsh, ;fraim, ;,itor, "etween $ar and 0eace7 8ilemmas of Israeli Security 4Lon,on, ;nglan,' Fran- Cass, *++15, 2*. *20. Aough, Aarol,, =Coul, 8sraelGs Nu$lear Assets Sur i e a First Stri-eI? Jane's Intelligence (eview1 Septem&er *++3, 2E3)2*E. *21. Terrill, W. An,re#, =The Chemi$al Warfare Lega$y of the Demen War.? 4*++*5, *E+)**+. omparative Strategy, *E

*23. %oyne, Sean, =A$ross the <reat Di i,e. Will Assa, go for the <olanI? Jane's Intelligence (eview1 *E, no. 2 4April *++65, 2*)22 an, Cor,esman, *++1, op. $it., 202. *26. Cor,esman, op. $it., *++1, 22/. *2+, Aarel, Amos an, %arFilai, Amnon, =!or,e$hai says Arro# alone $annot prote$t against missiles,? )a'aret*, */ Banuary *+++, or on)line, 8nternet, */ Banuary *+++, a aila&le from http'((###/.haaretF.$ */E. Shaha-, op. $it., 36)3+. */*. Chu&in, Shahram, =Does 8ran Want Nu$lear WeaponsI? Survival /3, no. * 4Spring *++05, +*)+/. */2. @GSulli an, Ari$h, =Ne# F)*08 Warplanes ;"pan, 8sraelGs >ea$h,? The Jerusalem 0ost, *+ Banuary *++3, or on)line, 8nternet 22 No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'((###.9post.$ *//. Carsh, op. $it., +. */2. Shaha-, op. $it., 2)0.

*/0. <arrity, op. $it., +2)***. */1. Do#ty, op. $it., 6. */3. <affney, op. $it., *10. */6. 8&i,., /3)/6 an, Frie,man, >o&ert 8. Eealots for Eion7 Inside Israel's $est "ank Settlement !ovement 4Ne# Dor-, Ne# Dor-' >an,om Aouse, *++25, */2)02. */+. %lan$he, ;,, =8s the !yth Fa,ing for the 8sraeli ArmyI J Part *.? Jane's Intelligence (eview1 6, no. *2 4De$em&er *++15, 023)00E an, %lan$he, ;,. =8s the myth fa,ing for the 8sraeli ArmyI J Part 2,? Jane's Intelligence (eview +, no. * 4Banuary *++35, 20)26. *2E. Cohen, Stuart A., The Scroll or the SwordD 8ilemmas of (eligion and !ilitary Service in Israel 4Amster,am, Netherlan,s' Aar#oo, A$a,emi$ Pu&lishers, *++35, **)22. *2*. Cre el,, op. $it., *++6, 2+6. *22. %roy,e, !i$hael B., =Fighting the War an, the Pea$e' %attlefiel, ;thi$s, Pea$e Tal-s, Treaties, an, Pa$ifism in the Be#ish Tra,ition,? or on)line, 8nternet, 2E No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'((###.9la#.$om(Arti$les(#ar/.html. *2/. Aough, Aarol,, op. $it., *++6, **)*2 an, %erger, Bulian, =Court Fury At 8sraeli >ea$tor.? +uardian, */ @$to&er *++3, in Center for Nonproliferation, =Nu$lear A&stra$ts,? */ @$to&er *++3, or on)line, 8nternet, 22 No em&er *++6, a aila&le from http'(($ns.miis.e,u. *22. Cre el,, op. $it., *++6, 202. *20. :alry, Ni$holas, =8sraelGs Silent <am&le #ith the %om&,? New Scientist 4*2 De$em&er *+325, 6E3) E+. *21. Aar,en, !a9or Bames D., Israeli Nuclear $eapons and $ar in the !iddle ,ast, !asterGs Thesis, Na al Postgra,uate S$hool, !onterey, CA, De$em&er *++3. *23. Do#,y, op. $it., 2E. *26. Aronson, <eoffrey, =Ai,,en Agen,a' US)8sraeli >elations an, the Nu$lear Luestion,? !iddle ,ast Journal, 21, no. 2 4Autumn *++25, 1*+)1/E. *2+. Data from Time, *2 April *+31, .uote, in Weissman an, Crosney, op. $it., *E3. *0E. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., 26E an, Cohen, Israel and the "omb, op. $it., 23/)232. *0*. Tahtinen, Dale >., The #rab6Israel !ilitary "alance Today 4Washington, DC' Ameri$an ;nterprise 8nstitute for Pu&li$ Poli$y >esear$h, *+3/5, /2. *02. =Ao# 8srael <ot the %om&.? Time1 *2 April *+31, /+. *0/. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., /E2. *02. Ca-u, op. $it., 11 an, Aersh, op. $it., 2*1.

*00. :alUry, op. $it., 6E3)E+. *01. Data from C8A, .uote, in Weissman an, Crosney, op. $it., *E+. *03. @tten&erg, !i$hael, =;stimating 8sraelGs Nu$lear Capa&ilities,? ommand, /E 4@$to&er *++25, 1)6. *06. Pry, op. $it., 30. *0+. 8&i,., ***. *1E. Data from N%C Nightly Ne#s, .uote, in !ilhollin, op. $it., *E2 an, %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., /E6. *1*. Data from :anunu .uote, in !ilhollin, op. $it., *E2. *12. Aar-a y, >o&ert ;. =After the <ulf War' The Future of the 8sraeli Nu$lear Strategy,? The $ashington Fuarterly 4Summer *++*5, *12. *1/. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., /E6. *12. Al&right, Da i,, %er-hout, Frans an, Wal-er, William, 0lutonium and )ighly ,nriched 9ranium 2334. $orld Inventories1 apabilities1 and 0olicies 4Ne# Dor-' Sto$-holm 8nternational Pea$e >esear$h 8nstitute An, @"for, Uni ersity Press, *++35, 212)21/. *10. Aough, Aarol,, =8sraelGs Nu$lear 8nfrastru$ture,? Jane's Intelligence (eview 1, no. ** 4No em&er *++25, 0E6. *11. 8&i,., 212)21/. *13. Spe$tor, an, !$Donough, #ith !e,eiros, op. $it., */0. *16. %urro#s an, Win,rem, op. $it., 26/)262. *1+. Cor,esman, op. $it., *++1, 2/2. *3E. 8&i,., 2/2. *3*. 8&i,., 2/E, 22/. *32. %ro#er, Cenneth S., =A Propensity for Confli$t' Potential S$enarios an, @ut$omes of War in the !i,,le ;ast,? Jane's Intelligence (eview, Spe$ial >eport no. *2, 4Fe&ruary *++35, *2)*0. *3/. Al&right, %er-hout, an, Wal-er, op. $it., 212)21/.

USAF Co#%&erproli!er"&io% Ce%&er
The USAF Counterproliferation Center #as esta&lishe, in *++6 to pro i,e e,u$ation an, resear$h to the present an, future lea,ers of the USAF, an, there&y help them &etter prepare to $ounter the threat from #eapons of mass ,estru$tion.

%arry >. S$hnei,er, Dire$tor USAF Counterproliferation Center /20 Chennault Cir$le !a"#ell AF% AL /1**2)12234//25 +0/)30/6 4DSN 42+/)30/65 ;mail' %arry.S$hnei,erVma"#ell,

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