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2003 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 110 E/29

of the EU, changes in the nomenclature of products, problems of weighting (simple averages are sensitive
to the nomenclature used, whereas averages weighted by imports are skewed when duties are high because
the level of imports itself depends on the level of duties), levying of specific, mixed, compound and/or
seasonal customs duties, and so on.

Consolidated post-Uruguay Round duties on industrial products stand at 3,9 % for the US and 4,1 % for the
EU (source: WTO  the averages used are simple averages). This is a 40 % drop in customs duties for the
industrialised countries.

(2003/C 110 E/028) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2059/02

by Charles Tannock (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(11 July 2002)

Subject: CAP reform prior to enlargement

The Commission has recently brought forward an interesting and radical series of proposals designed to
address some of the most serious flaws associated with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), including
fraud, overproduction and the consequences for both animal welfare and food safety of overindustrialised
farming. The Commission appears also to have embraced the philosophy of moving away from direct
support payments towards a wider system of subsidy designed to protect rural communities and to win
public support for those communities over the longer term. There remains the issue of disproportionate
net contributions by particular Member States and, in particular, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands,
which are set to increase dramatically if no reforms are agreed before enlargement takes place. The British,
German, Dutch and Swedish governments have all recently called for serious reform, with Chancellor
Schröder reported as showing particular impatience over the issue.

What is the current total cost of the Common Agricultural Policy? If there are no reforms to the Common
Agricultural Policy and ten candidate countries (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) accede in 2004 on the
basis of the Commission’s proposed ten-year sliding scale of payments to candidate countries starting at
25 % of those paid to farmers in existing Member States, what will be the total cost of the CAP for each of
the years from 2004 until the payments to candidate countries reach 100 %, (assuming that Bulgaria and
Romania join sometime between 2008 and 2010), and at the end of that period what will be the
approximate net budgetary contributions of Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Italy and

Does the Commission believe that an unreformed CAP prior to enlargement is economically or politically
realistic, and what consequences does the Commission foresee if no agreement is reached between the
existing Member States before enlargement? In particular, does the Commission believe that taxpayers in
the major contributing states will be prepared to foot the bill for an unreformed CAP after 2006, or at best
that there will be any agreement to agree to anything other than a year-on-year (rather than a five or six
year) financial package if reform is unforthcoming? Is the Commission concerned at the possibility of
growing anti-European feeling in certain Member States if the inequities and wastefulness of the CAP are
not addressed? Finally, aside from restructuring or scaling back the CAP, has the Commission given
thought to the idea of an equalising budgetary rebate mechanism linked to GNP and population which
would ensure that any additional budgetary contributions would be financed on an equitable basis between
all Member States?

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(24 September 2002)

The Berlin European Council (24 and 25 March 1999) decided that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
should be implemented within a financial framework of on average EUR 40,5 billion per year excluding
rural development and veterinary measures in constant 1999 prices. These perspectives foresee a ceiling
for agriculture (markets and rural development) of EUR 41,66 billion in 2006 for the 15 Member States.
C 110 E/30 Official Journal of the European Union EN 8.5.2003

In its recent Communication on the Mid-Term Review, the Commission examined the actual and
prospective development of agricultural expenditure for the period 2000-2006. The results indicate that on
the basis of a continuation of present policies, there will be no overshoot of the annual average of
EUR 40,5 billion. Preliminary estimates on the proposed adjustments to the CAP point at a slight saving.

The Union does not deal with the issue of introducing direct payments in its Common Positions
transmitted to the negotiating countries in June 2002. However, the Commission proposals have been
drafted having in mind the need for budgetary stability and foresaw agricultural expenditure for ten new
Member States (including markets with phasing-in of direct payments and rural development), rising from
EUR 2 048 billion in 2004 to EUR 3 933 billion in 2006. The Commission will be able to produce precise
figures concerning 2007-2013 period when both decision of the Council on the negotiating position and
the Union’s financial perspectives for 2007-2013 will be available.

It is the view of the Commission that there should be no linkage between enlargement negotiations and
the Mid-Term Review of the CAP. Moreover, in the Union’s Common Positions of June 2002, the Council
acknowledged that the decision on direct payments for the new Member States ‘will be taken … without
prejudging the forthcoming internal discussions on Community policies’. The Mid-Term Review is
necessary for internal reasons, as the Honourable Member suggests, to adjust the CAP to the expectations
of citizens and consumers. Such an adjustment would also facilitate the integration of the new Member

The overall position of contributors to the Union’s budget can only be assessed within the framework of
all Union policies. The appropriate time to do so will be during the discussion of the next financial
perspective, when it would also be appropriate to re-examine budgetary rebate mechanisms.

(2003/C 110 E/029) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2077/02

by Philippe Herzog (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(12 July 2002)

Subject: Commission practices in connection with advisers ad personam

A high-level task force was set up in July 2001 to look at the current situation of advisers at the
Commission and their future role. Its report of 14 November 2001 notes several management errors over
the past two years. It also asks questions about the Commission’s practices as regards ad personam
advisers, pointing out that this is an unofficial job designation. It recommends that all the ad personam
advisers (many of whom were heads of unit and/or advisers), as well as many of the present advisers,
should be made into principal administrators or administrators hors classe.

1. On what specific basis does the Commission justify transferring officials from an official post to a
personal post not recognised by the staff regulations?

2. On the basis of the information presented by the task force, it is possible that advisers and advisers
ad personam have been, or still are, subject to professional and psychological harassment. Is the
Commission not pressurising them into taking early retirement?

3. The task force report says that ‘between half and two-thirds of the advisers perform tasks which are
insignificant or ill-defined or needlessly duplicate work already done by the units’. What has the
Commission done to ensure that these advisers and advisers ad personam are given responsibilities,
including management posts, corresponding to their professional skills and experience? Has the
Commission not compounded the problem by creating new adviser posts since the report was finalised?

4. Is the Commission prepared to initiate new analyses and consultation to solve the above
management problems?